TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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Version
2021-3
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Certification Report
Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Business Unit Security & Connectivity
Troplowitzstrasse 20, 22529 Hamburg
Germany
Evaluation facility: Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-66030-CR5
Report version: 1
Project number: 66030
Author(s): Jordi Mujal
Date: 07 July 2021
Number of pages: 14
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 8
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
2.3.1 Assumptions 8
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 8
2.4 Architectural Information 8
2.5 Documentation 9
2.6 IT Product Testing 9
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 9
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 10
2.6.3 Test configuration 10
2.6.4 Test results 11
2.7 Re-Used Evaluation Results 11
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 12
2.9 Results of the Evaluation 12
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 12
3 Security Target 13
4 Definitions 13
5 Bibliography 14
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the CC. Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual recognition
of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components up to and
including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be found at: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOG-IS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 effective since April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-
basic) is provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed
initially by Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. Italy joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations,
approved certification schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition
applies can be found at: https://www.sogis.eu/.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Crypto
Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB. The developer of the Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB is NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany and they also act as the sponsor of
the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers
when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) consists of the Crypto Library V3.1.x and the NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P6021y VB Secure Smart Card Controller. For ease of reading the TOE is often called
“Crypto Library on SmartMX2”.
The Crypto Library on SmartMX2 is a cryptographic library, which provides a set of cryptographic
functions that can be used by the Smartcard Embedded Software. The cryptographic library consists
of several binary packages that are intended to be linked to the Smartcard Embedded Software. The
Smartcard Embedded Software developer links the binary packages that he needs to his Smartcard
Embedded Software and the whole is subsequently implemented in arbitrary memory. The NXP
SmartMX2 smart card processor provides the computing platform and cryptographic support by means
of co-processors for the Crypto Library on SmartMX2.
The TOE provides AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA key generation, RSA public key
computation, ECDSA, ECC key generation, ECDH, ECC point addition, and SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-
256, SHA-384, SHA-512 algorithms.
In addition, the Crypto Library implements a software (pseudo) random number generator, which is
initialised (seeded) by the hardware random number generator of the SmartMX2.
Finally, the TOE provides a secure copy routine, a secure compare routine, a secure modular multiply
routine, a secure modular add and subtract routine, and includes internal security measures for
residual information protection. For more details refer to the [ST], chapter 1.3.2.
The TOE has been originally evaluated by Brightsight located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified on 28 July 2016, and re-certified on 17 November 2017, 29 May 2019 and 5 December
2019.This re-evaluation also took place by Brightsight and was completed on July 07 2021 with the
approval of the ETR. The re-certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
This fifth issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”. The major
change is the recertification of the underlying HW. In addition, some IT and Datacenter sites have
been removed from [ETRfC] as they are either already considered in the scope of the hardware
platform certification or no longer in use.
Note that in the second certification of this TOE, the ST was updated to remove all claims regarding
the security of ECC parameter verification. If the security of a composite or end product relies on this
functionality, appropriate evaluation of the security properties of this functionality is required.
Note that in the third certification of this TOE, the scope of the underlying platform certification was
updated: MIFARE is now out of all scopes, production sites were added and an additional variant was
included.
Note that in the fourth certification of this TOE, there were changes on the underlying platform
certification guidance and production sites and an additional variant, and subsequent recertification.
The security evaluation re-used the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up to
date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB, the
Note that in the [ST] the “Crypto Library V3.1.x” represents the Crypto Library V3.1.1 and Crypto
Library V3.1.2. Both these minor versions are covered by this certificate.
In case of a composite evaluation the used minor version of the CL should be explicitly checked
and mentioned.
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security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB
are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR], [GAR 2019] and [GAR 2021]
1
for
this product provide sufficient evidence that the TOE meets the EAL6 augmented (EAL6+) assurance
requirements for the evaluated security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with
ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw remediation) and ASE_TSS.2 (TOE summary specification with architectural
design summary).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 and [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report and Gap Analysis Report contain information proprietary to the
developer and/or the evaluator, and are not releasable for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Type Name Release Date Form of
delivery
V3.1.
1
V3.1.
2
V3.1.1 V3.1.2
Library
File
phSmx2ClDes.lib 1.4 1.5 2015-03-26 2015-09-14 Electronic file
phSmx2ClAes.lib 1.5 1.6 2015-03-26 2015-09-14 Electronic file
phSmx2ClRsa.lib 1.9 1.10 2015-04-28 2015-09-14 Electronic file
phSmx2ClRsaKg.lib 2.6 2.7 2015-04-28 2015-09-14 Electronic file
phSmx2ClEccGfp.lib 2.6 2.7 2015-04-28 2015-09-14 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSha.lib 1.6 1.7 2015-03-26 2015-09-14 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSha512.lib 1.7 1.8 2015-03-26 2015-09-14 Electronic file
phSmx2ClRng.lib 2.7 2.8 2015-04-28 2015-09-14 Electronic file
phSmx2ClUtils.lib 2.1 2.2 2015-06-09 2015-09-14 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSymCfg.lib 1.7 1.8 2015-03-26 2015-09-14 Electronic file
Header
file
phSmx2ClDes.h 1.4 2015-03-26 Electronic file
phSmx2ClAes.h 1.5 2015-03-26 Electronic file
phSmx2ClRsa.h 1.9 2015-04-28 Electronic file
phSmx2ClRsaKg.h 2.6 2015-04-28 Electronic file
phSmx2ClEccGfp.h 2.6 2015-04-28 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSha.h 1.6 2015-03-26 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSha512.h 1.7 2015-03-26 Electronic file
phSmx2ClRng.h 2.7 2015-04-28 Electronic file
phSmx2ClUtils.h 2.0 2015-04-28 Electronic file
phSmx2ClUtils_ImportExportFcts.h 2.0 2015-04-28 Electronic file
phSmx2ClUtils_RngAccess.h 2.0 2015-04-28 Electronic file
phSmx2ClTypes.h 1.1 2013-11-15 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSymCfg.h 1.7 2015-03-26 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSymCfg_Aes.h 1.7 2015-03-26 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSymCfg_Des.h 1.7 2015-03-26 Electronic file
Source
code
phSmx2ClUtils_ImportExportFcts.a51 2.0 2015-04-28 Electronic file
phSmx2ClUtils_RngAccess.a51 2.0 2015-04-28 Electronic file
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Crypto Library
V3.1.x on P6021y VB. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
The hardware part of the TOE is delivered by NXP as described in the hardware guidance.
The Crypto Library is delivered in Phase 1 of the TOE lifecycle (for a detailed and precise description
of the TOE lifecycle refer to the [ST], chapter 1.2.2.) as a software package (a set of binary files) to the
developers of the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software may comprise
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in this case an operating system and/or other smart card software (applications). The Software
developers can incorporate the Crypto Library into their product.
As explained in the user guidance, as part of the delivery procedure, the customer shall verify the
correctness of the delivered files by calculating the SHA-256 hash value of the delivered files and
comparing them to reference values provided in the user guidance.
For the identification of the Hardware please refer to the hardware certification.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE provides the cryptographic algorithms AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA key
generation, RSA public key computation, ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) signature generation and
verification, ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) key generation, ECDH (ECC Diffie-Hellmann key-exchange, full
point addition (ECC over GF(p)), standard security level SHA 1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-
512 algorithms in addition to the functionality described in the Hardware Security Target [ST-HW] for
the hardware platform. The cryptographic algorithms (except SHA) are resistant against Side Channel
Attacks, including Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Differential Power Analysis (DPA), Differential Fault
Analysis (DFA) and timing attacks. SHA is only resistant against Side Channel Attacks and timing
attacks. Details on the resistance claims are provided in the Security Target [ST], relevant details are
provided in the user guidance documents.
The TOE implements a software (pseudo) random number generator, which is initialised (seeded) by
the hardware random number generator of the SmartMX2.
The TOE also a secure copy routine, a secure compare routine, secure modular multiply routine, a
secure modular add and subtract routine and includes internal security measures for residual
information protection.
Note that the TOE does not restrict access to the functions provided by the hardware: these functions
are still directly accessible to the Smartcard embedded Software.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Detailed information on these
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment can be found in chapter 4 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
This chapter provides a high-level description of the IT product and its major components based on
the evaluation evidence described in the Common Criteria assurance family entitled “TOE design
(ADV_TDS)”. The intent of this chapter is to characterise the degree of architectural separation of the
major components and to show dependencies between the TOE and products using the TOE in a
composition (e.g. dependencies between HW and SW).
The TOE contains a Crypto Library, which provides a set of cryptographic functionalities that can be
used by the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Crypto Library consists of several binary packages
that are intended to be linked to the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded
Software developer links the binary packages that he needs to his Smartcard Embedded Software and
the whole is subsequently implemented in arbitrary memory. Please note that the crypto functions are
supplied as a library rather than as a monolithic program, and hence a user of the library may include
only those functions that are actually required. However, some dependencies exist; details are
described in the User Guidance.
The TOE is implemented as a set of subsystems. The division into subsystems is chosen according to
the cryptographic algorithms provided. The whole TOE provides AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA,
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RSA key generation, RSA public key computation, ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) signature generation
and verification, ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) signature generation and verification, ECDSA (ECC over
GF(p)) key generation, ECDH (ECC Diffie-Hellmann) key-exchange, full point addition (ECC over
GF(p), SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 algorithms in addition to the functionality
described in the Hardware Security Target [ST-HW] for the hardware platform. In addition, the TOE
implements a software (pseudo) random number generator, which is initialised (seeded) by the
hardware random number generator of the SmartMX2.
Finally, the TOE provides a secure copy routine, a secure compare routine, a secure modular multiply
routine, a secure modular add and subtract routine, and includes internal security measures for
residual information protection.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Name Release Date Form of
delivery
V3.1.1 V3.1.2 V3.1.1 V3.1.2
User Guidance Manual 1.5
1.31 1.5 2018-02-28
2015-11-192016-03- 2018-02-28 Electronic document
User Guidance: DES 1.0 2015-11-23 Electronic document
User Guidance: AES 1.0 2015-11-23 Electronic document
User Guidance: RSA 1.0 2015-11-23 Electronic document
User Guidance: RSA Key
Generation
1.0 2015-11-23 Electronic document
User Guidance: ECC over GF(p) 1.0 2015-11-23 Electronic document
User Guidance: SHA 1.0 2015-11-23 Electronic document
User Guidance: SHA512 1.0 2015-11-23 Electronic document
User Guidance: RNG 1.0 2015-11-23 Electronic document
User Guidance: Utils 1.0 2015-11-23 Electronic document
User Guidance: SymCfg 1.1 2016-03-16 Electronic document
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
For the Crypto Library, the developer has performed extensive testing on FSP, subsystem and module
level. All parameter choices have been addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified have
been tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions have been covered
probabilistically. The testing was largely automated using a test-OS that allows access to the
functionalities. Test scripts were extensively used to verify that the functions return the expected
values.
The hardware test results are extendable to composite evaluations on this hardware TOE, as the
hardware is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided a testing environment. The
evaluators have reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
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2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The evaluator independent penetration tests were conducted according to the following testing
approach:
1. Inventory of required resistance
This step uses the JIL attack list [JIL-AM] as a reference for completeness and studies the ST
claims to decide which attacks in the JIL attack list apply for the NXP Crypto Library. In addition,
both external ([BSI-RSA], [BSI-ECC]) and internal attack lists are used to augment the JIL attack
list.
2. Validation of security functionalities
This step identifies the implemented security functionalities and performs tests to verify
implementation and to validate proper functioning. (ATE)
3. Vulnerability analysis
This step first gives an overview against which attacks the implemented security functionalities are
meant to provide protection. Secondly in this step the design of the implemented security
functionalities is studied. Thirdly, an analysis is performed to determine whether the design
contains vulnerabilities against the respective attacks of step 1. (AVA)
4. Analysis of input from other evaluation activities
This step first analyses the input from other CC-evaluation classes expressed as possible
vulnerabilities. Secondly, the evaluators made an analysis of the TOE in its intended environment
to check whether the developer vulnerability analysis provides sufficient assurance or whether
penetration testing is needed to provide sufficient assurance. (AVA)
5. Design assurance evaluation
This step analyses the results from an attack perspective as defined in step 1. Based on this
design analysis the evaluators determine whether the design provides sufficient assurance or
whether penetration testing is needed to provide sufficient assurance. (AVA)
6. Penetration testing
This step performs the penetration tests identified in step 4 and step 5. (AVA)
7. Conclusions on resistance
This step performs a [JIL-AM] compliant rating on the results of the penetration tests in relation
with the assurance already gained by the design analysis. Based on the ratings the evaluators
draw conclusions on the resistance of NXP Crypto Library against attackers possessing a high
attack potential.
During this re-certification the vulnerability analysis was refreshed. As a result some representative
tests were performed to provide ongoing assurance of penetration testing performed in earlier
evaluation of the TOE.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators during this recertification was 5 weeks. During that
test campaign, 20% of the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks and 80% on side-channel
testing.
2.6.3 Test configuration
Since the TOE is not an end-user product it is not possible to perform testing without first embedding it
in a testable configuration. To this end, the developer has created a proprietary test operating system.
The main purpose of the test OS is to provide access to the crypto library’s functionality. The test OS,
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and its documentation, was provided to the evaluators, and was used in all the testing. See the [ETR],
[GAR 2019] and [GAR 2021] for details.
The following items were used to provide support during the tests:
 A set of card samples (the TOE) containing the following:
o Hardware sample: P6022P VB and P6021P VB in contact mode.
o Crypto library loaded into the hardware sample.
o CryptOS loaded into the hardware sample.
 A toolset provided by the developer in order to facilitate recreation of the Cryptographic library,
and loading the library and the CryptOS into samples.
 CryptOS documentation.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], [GAR 2019] and [GAR 2021], with references to the documents
containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e. from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities. These activities revealed that for some cryptographic
functionality the security level could be reduced. As the remaining security level still exceeds 80 bits,
this is considered sufficient. So no exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent
penetration tests.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Re-Used Evaluation Results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
re-used, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
Note that this fifth certificate is a re-certification with major change. Since the previous certification of
this TOE, recertification of the underlying HW and the removal of some IT and Datacenter sites as
they are either already considered in the scope of the hardware platform certification or no longer in
use.
Note that in the second certification of this TOE, the ST was updated to remove all claims regarding
the security of ECC parameter verification. If the security of a composite or end product relies on this
functionality, appropriate evaluation of the security properties of this functionality is required.
Note that in the third certification of this TOE, the scope of the underlying platform certification was
updated: MIFARE is now out of all scopes, production sites were added and an additional variant was
included.
Note that in the fourth certification of this TOE, the scope of the underlying platform certification has
been updated: production sites are added and an additional variant is included.
The security evaluation re-used the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up to
date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.
There has been extensive re-use of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the software component
of the TOE. Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform were re-used
by composition.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
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2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB.
The TOE consists of a hardware part and a software part. This certification covers the configurations
of the TOE identified as follows:
 The authenticity of the hardware part of the TOE is checked following the guidance and
certification report of the hardware.
 The reference of the software part of the TOE is checked by calculating the SHA-256 hash
value of the delivered files and comparing them to reference values provided in the user
guidance.
2.9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], [GAR 2019] and [GAR 2021],
which references other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to [CCDB-
2007-09-01] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document provides details
of the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite
evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Crypto Library V3.1.x on
P6021y VB, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL
6 augmented with ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1. This implies that the product satisfies the security
requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [BSI-PP-0084].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the implemented cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of
this evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms,
protocols and implementations: MIFARE (out of scope).
To fend off attackers with high attack potential appropriate cryptographic algorithms with adequate key
lengths must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and
standards).
The user of the Crypto Library must implement the advice of the hardware user guidance.
Page: 13/14 of report number: NSCIB-CC-66030-CR5, dated 07 July 2021
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
3 Security Target
The Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB Security Target, Rev. 1.9, 22 March 2018 [ST] is included
here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
IC Integrated Circuit
MAC Message Authentication Code
NSCIB Netherlands scheme for certification in the area of IT security
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
TOE Target of Evaluation
Page: 14/14 of report number: NSCIB-CC-66030-CR5, dated 07 July 2021
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[BSI-ECC] Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of
Elliptic Curve Implementations Version 2.0 (DRAFT2).
[BSI-PP-0084] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, Version
1.0, registered under the reference BSI-PP-0084-2014.
[BSI-RSA] Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of RSA, DSA and Diffie-
Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of
RSA, DSA and Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Implementations Version 1.0.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II
and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB EAL6+, 18-
RPT-198, Version 4.0, 17 August 2018.
[ETRfC] ETR for Composite Evaluation Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB EAL6+,
18-RPT-197, version 9.0, 06 July 2021.
[GAR 2021] Gap analysis report for CL V3.1.x on P6021y VB P6022y VB re-certification
2021, v6.0, 06 July 2021
[GAR 2019] 19-RPT-687, v2.0 Gap analysis report for CL V3.1.x on P6021y VB P6022y
VB re-certification 2019, v2.0, 20 September 2019.
[HW-CERT] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1072-V4-2021 for NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P6021y VB including IC Dedicated Software, BSI, V1.0, 24 June
2021.
[ST-HW] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6021y VB Security Target, Version 1.11,
23 August 2019
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January
2020 (sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[ST] Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB Security Target, Rev. 1.9, 22 March
2018
(This is the end of this report.)