BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V3-2018
for
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF with IC Dedicated
Software
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.01 CC-Zert-327 V5.22
BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V3-2018 (*)
Smartcard Controller
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF
with IC Dedicated Software
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 17 December 2018
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Thomas Gast L.S.
Head of Branch
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V3-2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V3-2018 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................8
6. Publication.....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................15
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................16
6. Documentation............................................................................................................17
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................20
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................20
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................22
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................23
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................23
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................24
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................27
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................28
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V3-2018
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
• Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
• BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
• BSI Schedule of Costs3
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
• DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
• BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
• BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V3-2018 Certification Report
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V3-2018
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF with IC
Dedicated Software has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-
certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V2-2016. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V2-2016 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF with IC Dedicated Software was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 26 November 2018. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH.
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 17
December 2018 is valid until 16 December 2023. Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V3-2018 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF with IC
Dedicated Software has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Troplowitzstrasse 20
22529 Hamburg
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V3-2018
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V3-2018 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the IC hardware platform NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF with IC Dedicated Software.
The TOE also includes documentation describing the Instruction Set and the usage. Within
this document the TOE will be abbreviated by P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/VF or short
P60D024/016/012y.
The IC hardware platform NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/VF is a microcontroller incorporating a central processing
unit, memories accessible via a Memory Management Unit, cryptographic coprocessors,
other security components and two communication interfaces. The central processing unit
supports a 32-/24-/16-/8-bit instruction set optimized for smart card applications, which is a
super set of the 80C51 family instruction set. On-chip memories are ROM, RAM and
EEPROM. The non-volatile EEPROM can be used as data or program memory.
The IC Dedicated Software comprises IC Dedicated Test Software for test purposes and
IC Dedicated Support Software. The IC Dedicated Support Software consists of Boot-ROM
Software controlling the boot process of the hardware platform and Firmware Operating
System which can be called by the Security IC Embedded Software.
Except for the y=P configuration the P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/VF includes Emulation
Software MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and/or MIFARE DESFire EV1. The Mifare Software
does not implement any Security Functional Requirements. The evaluation scope of
MIFARE emulations is limited to being non-interfering with the TSF.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-
CC-PP-0035-2007 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Security Services
SS.RNG Random Number Generator
SS.HW_DES Triple-DES Coprocessor
SS.HW_AES AES Coprocessor
SS.RECONFIG Post Delivery Configuration
Security Features
SF.OPC Control of Operating Conditions
SF.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V3-2018
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.LOG Logical Protection
SF.COMP Protection of Mode Control
SF.MEM_ACC Memory Access Control
SF.SFR_ACC Special Function Register Access Control
SF.FFW Firmware Firewall
SF.FIRMWARE Firmware Support
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.2 to 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF with IC
Dedicated Software
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery
TOE components for P60D024/016/012P configurations
IC
Hardware
NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller
P60D024/016/012PVB(Y)
VB(Y) 20 September
2011
Wafer, module, inlay,
package (dice have
nameplate 9047A)
NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller
P60D024/016/012PVB(Z)
VB(Z) 12 September
2012
NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller
P60D024/016/012PVB(A)
VB(A)
NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller
P60D024/016/012PVF
VF 27 November
2013
Wafer, module, inlay,
package (dice have
nameplate 9047B)
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V3-2018 Certification Report
Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery
Security
IC
Dedicated
Test
Software
Test ROM Software 08.07 21 September
2011
Test-ROM on the chip acc. to
9047A_BG002_TESTROM_v
1_btos_08v07_fos_5v0.hex
Security
IC
Dedicated
Support
Software
Boot-ROM Software 08.07 21 September
2011
Boot-ROM on the chip acc. to
9047A_BG002_TESTROM_v
1_btos_08v07_fos_5v0.hex
Security
IC
Dedicated
Support
Software
Firmware Operating System
(FOS)
5.0/5.03 21 September
2011
Firmware Operating System
on the chip acc. to
9047A_BG002_TESTROM_v
1_btos_08v07_fos_5v0.hex
TOE components for P60D024/016/012M configurations
IC
Hardware
NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller
P60D024/016/012MVB(Y)
VB(Y) 20 September
2011
Wafer, module, inlay,
package (dice have
nameplate 9047A)
NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller
P60D024/016/012MVB(Z)
VB(Z) 12 September
2012
NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller
P60D024/016/012MVB(A)
VB(A)
NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller
P60D024/016/012MVF
VF 27 November
2013
Wafer, module, inlay,
package (dice have
nameplate 9047B)
IC
Dedicated
Test
Software
Test-ROM Software 08.0A 17 April 2012 Test-ROM on the chip acc. to
9047A_BM097_TESTROM_v
1_btos_08v0A_fos_6v10.hex
IC
Dedicated
Support
Software
Boot-ROM Software 08.0A 17 April 2012 Boot-ROM on the chip acc. to
9047A_BM097_TESTROM_v
1_btos_08v0A_fos_6v10.hex
Firmware Operating System
FOS
06.12 /
06.13
17 April 2012 Firmware Operating System
on the chip acc. to
9047A_BM097_TESTROM_v
1_btos_08v0A_fos_6v10.hex
TOE Components for P60D024/016/012D
IC
Hardware
NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller
P60D024/016/012DVF
VF 27 November
2013
Wafer, module, inlay,
package (dice have
nameplate 9047B)
IC
Dedicated
Test
Software
Test-ROM Software 08.0C 22 April 2013 Test-ROM on the chip acc. to
9047A_BJ094_TESTROM_v
1_btos_08v0C_fos_8v00.hex
IC
Dedicated
Boot-ROM Software 08.0C 22 April 2013 Boot-ROM on the chip acc. to
9047A_BJ094_TESTROM_v
1_btos_08v0C_fos_8v00.hex
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V3-2018
Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery
Support
Software
Firmware Operating System
FOS
08.00 22 April 2013 Firmware Operating System
on the chip acc. to
9047A_BJ094_TESTROM_v
1_btos_08v0C_fos_8v00.hex
Developer documents valid for all major configurations
Document Product data sheet SmartMX2
family P60D012/016/024
VB/VF Secure high-
performance smart card
controller, NXP
Semiconductors
5.2 27 June 2014 Electronic Document
Document Instruction Set for the
SmartMX2 family, Secure
smart card controller, NXP
Semiconductors
3.1 02 February
2012
Electronic Document
Document Information on Guidance and
Operation, NXP Secure Smart
Card Controller
P60D024/016/012 VB/VF, NXP
Semiconductors
2.4 24 October
2018
Electronic Document
Document Wafer and delivery
specification SmartMX2 family
P60D012/016/024 VB/VF, NXP
Semiconductors
3.2 21 May 2014 Electronic Document
Document Product data sheet addendum:
SmartMX2 family Post Delivery
Configuration (PDC), NXP
Semiconductors
3.2 04 February
2013
Electronic Document
Document Product data sheet addendum:
SmartMX2 family Chip Health
Mode (CHM), NXP
Semiconductors
3.1 01 October
2014
Electronic Document
Document Product Errata Sheet
SmartMX2 family
P60D012/016/024 VB/VF
Secure high-performance
smart card controller, NXP
Semiconductors
1.2 24 October
2018
Electronic Document
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The requirements for the delivery of TOE are described in chapter 31 of the [13]. For each
delivery form of the hardware platform NXP offers two ways of delivery of the TOE:
1. The customer collects the product himself at the NXP site, or
2. the product is sent to the customer by NXP with special protective measures.
The TOE documentation is delivered in electronic form by the document control centre of
NXP.
The commercial type name is the identification used to order the TOE in the respective
major configuration and with the evaluated package type. In consequence this means that
a full commercial product name that fits in the variable forms described in [6] and [9]
determines that the hardware platform is an evaluated product. In addition the hardware
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V3-2018 Certification Report
version can be identified by the coded nameplate "9047A" or “9047B” on the surface of the
hardware platform as described in Chapters 4.2 and 3.9 of [16]. The nameplate “9047A” is
the same for all “VB” configurations and “9047B” for the configuration “VF”. In addition
each major configuration has a different device coding described in [13] chapter 31.2.
Identification is also possible using the Chip Health Mode. The identification string
provided by the command 00h of the Chip Health Mode comprises also the device coding
and the firmware version.
Please note that the Mifare Software does not implement any Security Functional
Requirements. The evaluation scope of MIFARE emulations is limited to being non-
interfering with the TSF.
3. Security Policy
The security policy is defined by the selected set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement the symmetric
cryptographic block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by
encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a True
Random Number Generator (TRNG).
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), against physical
probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of
functionality. Hence the TOE shall
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the
TOE and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the
TOE.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled and measures to be taken by the TOE
environment, the user or the risk manager. The following topics are of relevance:
The objective OE.Plat-Appl states that the IC Embedded Software Developer must provide
protection against disclosure of confidential data. Further, random numbers must be tested
appropriately.
The objective OE.Resp-Appl states that the IC Embedded Software Developer shall treat
user data (especially keys) appropriately.
OE.Process-Sec-IC states that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by
the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-consumer to maintain confidentiality and
integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy,
modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V3-2018
The objective OE.Check-Init states that the TOE provides specific functionality that allows
the unique identification of the TOE in form of FabKey-Data.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.2 and 4.3.
5. Architectural Information
The product is a single chip micro-controller unit designed by NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH and built in 90 nm CMOS technology. A block diagram is given in the
Security Target [6] and [9] chapter 1.4.1.
The TOE consists of the following hardware:
• CPU / co-processors:
◦ a CPU implementation supporting a 32-/24-/16-/8 bit instruction set which is a
superset of the 80C51 family instruction set and distinguishes four CPU modes,
◦ a Triple-DES co-processor, supporting single DES and Triple-DES operations (in
2-key or 3-key operation, with two/three 56 bit keys (112-/168 bit)), where only
Triple-DES operations are evaluated and considered as security functionality,
◦ an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) co-processor with key lengths of 128,
192 and 256 bits,
◦ an arithmetic co-processor, called Fame2 co-processor, whose availability is
subject to specific choice of Customer Reconfiguration Options. It supplies basic
arithmetic functions to support implementation of asymmetric cryptographic
algorithms by the Security IC Embedded Software; the Security IC Embedded
Software is not part of the TOE,
◦ a CRC co-processor, providing the CRC generation polynomials CRC-16 and
CRC-32 for hardware cyclic redundancy check calculations,
• Memory / Memory Controller:
◦ Read-Only Memory (ROM): the TOE incorporates 352 kBytes of ROM, where 1
kByte = 1024 Bytes. The ROM is partitioned by a Memory Management Unit
(MMU) into 264 kBytes Application-ROM for the Security IC Embedded
Software. 88 kBytes are reserved for the Test-ROM, Boot-ROM, and Firmware
including emulations,
◦ Random Access Memory (RAM): 8.125 kBytes of RAM, which is parted into
RAM available to the Firmware Operating System only (512 Bytes). The
remainder, which is available to the Security IC Embedded Software, is split into
2.625 kBytes for the Fame2 co-processor, called FXRAM and 5.0 kBytes
general purpose RAM, called CXRAM,
◦ Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM): An overall
maximum of 24 kBytes of EEPROM, where 768 Bytes are always reserved for
IC Dedicated Support Software, 512 Bytes for the manufacturer area and whose
actual size is subject to specific choice of Major Configuration and Customer
Reconfiguration Options,
◦ Memory Controller: A Memory Management Unit (MMU) controls access to all of
the three above mentioned memory types,
• Internal Peripherals:
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◦ a True Random Number generator,
◦ reset generator,
◦ watch-dog timer, configurable by the Security IC Embedded Software to protect
program execution,
◦ 16 bit timers (T0 and T1),
• Physical protection:
◦ secure shielding,
◦ security sensors with reset generator,
• Electrical interfaces:
◦ ISO/IEC 14443 A contactless interface with pads LA and LB, whose availability
is subject to a minor configuration option,
◦ ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface with serial communication pad I/O,
◦ single external power supply of 1.8 V, 3 V or 5 V nominal by the lines VDD and
VSS, or supply by inductive coupling via the ISO/IEC 14443 A contactless
interface,
◦ clock input CLK with a clock filter and clock generator,
◦ reset input RST_N.
The TOE consists of the following firmware:
• Security IC Dedicated Test Software, which is stored to the Test-ROM and used by
the manufacturer of the Security IC during production test; it includes the test
operating system, test routines for the various blocks of the circuitry, control flags
for the status of the EEPROM’s manufacturer area and shutdown functions,
• Security IC Dedicated Support Software, according to:
◦ Boot-ROM Software, executed during start-up,
◦ the Firmware Operating System (FOS) provides an interface for the Security IC
Embedded Software. This interface is called FVEC. There are several FVECs
defined, namely FVEC0.x, FVEC1.x, FVEC3.x and FVEC7.x. The letter „x is a
‟
placeholder for the sub functions of the FVECs. „x can be a number between 1
‟
and 255. Please note not all sub numbers are valid.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The tests performed can be divided into the following categories:
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7.1. Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
Testing has been performed by the developer according to a documented testing
approach, covering well defined TOE configurations and various categories of tests,
thereby covering the whole TOE security functionality.
The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE in general and its TSFs behave
as expected and specified.
TOE test configuration and developer’s testing approach:
• The tests are performed with the TOE in different test environments and
configurations depending on the test categories.
• All TSF and related security mechanisms, subsystems and modules are tested in
order to assure complete coverage of all SFR.
Test categories:
◦ Simulation tests are performed to verify functionality, which is not visible at the
accessible interfaces of the TOE. These simulation tests are a subset of those,
which were performed during development of the device to ensure a proper
design of its modules.
During run-time of a simulation an automated regression test continuously
compares pre-defined internal signals (probe list) like data and address buses,
control signals, register contents and microcode information against a “golden
reference”. Test results are automatically listed in log files and a summary, i.e.
discrepancies occurred (yes/no), is output to the user interface.
Manual simulation tests are performed in case an automated result comparison
based on executable code is not possible.
◦ Characterization tests verify the electrical properties of the device, which are
specified with regard to limiting values, thresholds and timings of several
electrical parameters like voltages, currents, frequencies, capacitors,
resistances and latches. For this purpose a number of devices for test are taken
from production.
◦ Verification tests are performed on single samples of the device to verify specific
security functionality, which is not testable for each device during production test
or within the scope of characterization testing. Such tests include standard tests
of the Random Number Generator, AES coprocessor and Triple-DES
coprocessor.
◦ Test of configurations: Configuration data are stored to EEPROM based on the
customer’s choices in the Order Entry Form at later stages of the production
test. For this purpose production test implements special test steps relying on an
according test strategy to verify the required configuration. Special parts of
verification tests explicitly test the configuration options of the device.
7.2. Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
As a result, the evaluator’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE in general and its
TSFs behave as expected and specified.
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The independent testing was partly performed in the developer’s testing environment and
partly at TÜViT GmbH, information security department, in Essen. The same platforms and
tools as for the developer tests were used (see ATE_FUN one section above).
Testing approach:
• The evaluator's objective regarding this aspect was to test the functionality of the
TOE, and to verify the developer's test results by repeating developer's tests and
additionally add independent tests.
• In the course of the evaluation of the TOE the following classes of tests were
carried out:
◦ Module tests,
◦ Simulation tests,
◦ Emulation tests,
◦ Tests in user mode,
◦ Tests in test mode,
◦ Hardware tests.
With this kind of tests the entire security functionality of the TOE was tested.
7.3. Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
The penetration testing was partially performed using the developer’s testing environment,
partially using the test environment of the evaluation body.
All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were
tested. The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and
the actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential high was
actually successful.
Penetration testing approach:
• Systematic search for potential vulnerabilities and known attacks in public domain
sources, use of a list of vulnerabilities, and from a methodical analysis of the
evaluation documents.
• Analysis why these vulnerabilities are unexploitable in the intended environment of
the TOE.
• If the rationale is suspect in the opinion of the evaluator penetration tests are
devised.
• Even if the rational is convincing in the opinion of the evaluator penetration tests are
devised for some vulnerabilities, especially to support the argument of non-
practicability of exploiting time in case of SPA, DPA and FI attacks.
• The tests are performed with the chip P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF. For the
tests different chip types are prepared with different patch. With the loaded patch
code the defined tests could be performed. The entire functionality is the same for
all chips.
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8. Evaluated Configuration
The complete TOE reference is given by NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF with IC Dedicated Software (see [6] and [9], chapter
1.2) where y is a placeholder for:
• y = P: Plain configuration without Mifare software.
• y = M: The availability of MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0.
• y = D: The availability of MIFARE DESFire EV1.
These TOE configurations and their components are defined in [6] and [9], chapter 1.4
The TOE can be configured into (see [6] and [9]):
• Major configurations for example P60D016PVB(Y), P60D012PVB(Z), P60D024PVB(A)
or P60D012DVF (chapters 1.2 and 1.4.1),
• Minor configurations (chapter 1.4.2.2),
• Post-delivery configurations (chapter 1.4.2.3) and
• Evaluated package types (chapter 1.4.2.4).
The memory sizes available for the IC Embedded Software depend on the major
configuration of the TOE as described in [6] and [9] chapter 1.4.2.1.
The P60D024/016/012y hardware platform was tested including all minor configuration
options that can be selected based on Table 8 in chapter 1.4.2.2 of [6] and [9]. The major
configuration does not have dependencies to security features. All minor configuration
options that are part of the evaluation were tested. The minor configuration options behave
as specified and described in [13] and [15]. Therefore the results described in this
document are applicable for all minor configurations described in [6] and [9].
The major configurations M and D provide MIFARE functionality. However, MIFARE
emulation is explicitly excluded from the logical scope of the TOE for the current
evaluation. The evaluation scope of both emulations is limited to being non-interfering with
the TSF.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(iii) Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation
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(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
• All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
• The components ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V2-2016, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on life cycle and
Penetration Testing.
The evaluation has confirmed:
• PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [8]
• for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
• for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.1
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
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Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
Cryptographic
Primitives
Two-key TDES [FIPS-46-3] (DES) |K| = 112 no
Three-key TDES [FIPS-46-3] (DES) |K| = 168 yes
AES [FIPS-197] (AES) |K| = 128, 192,
256
yes
Physical RNG PTG.2 [AIS31] N/A N/A Supports
cryptographic
implementations
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the IC Dedicated Support Software and/or Embedded Software using the TOE.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely
use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the
security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of
the composite product or system it must be examined if the required measures have been
correctly and effectively implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the
evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the evaluation results as
outlined in the document "ETR for composite evaluation" [10].
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
In addition, the following aspect needs to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
• A new guidance document [19] was introduced to address specific behaviour of the
memory management unit (MMU). This also causes an update of the access control
policy defined in the security target [6] and [9].
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11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
DES Data Encryption Standard
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FVEC Firmware Verctor Call
IT Information Technology
IC Integrated Circuit
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PDC Post Delivery Configuration
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
ROM Read Only Memory
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
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TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
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[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V3, NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF, Version 4.4, 29 October 2018, NXP
Semiconductors (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, for the P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/VF, Version 4, 26
November 2018, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-
0035-2007
[9] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V3, NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF, Version 4.4, 29 October 2018, NXP
Semiconductors (sanitised public document)
[10] Evaluation Technical for Composite Evaluation (ETR COMP) for the
P60D024/016/012y VB(Y/Z/A)/VF, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Version 4, 26
November 2018 (confidential document)
[11] NXP Secure Smart Controller P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/ yVF Configuration List,
NXP Semiconductors, Version 2.50, 20 November 2015 (confidential document)
7
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report)
für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 19, Version 9, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation
Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 23, Version 4, Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 47, Version 1.1, Regelungen zu Site Certification
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[12] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF Evaluation
Reference List, NXP Semiconductors, Version 3.26, 14 November 2018
(confidential document)
[13] Product Data Sheet SmartMX2 family P60D012/016/024 VB/VF Secure high-
performance smart card controller, Version 5.2, 27 June 2014 (confidential
document)
[14] Instruction set for the SmartMX2 family Secure smart card controller Product data
sheet, NXP Semiconductors, Version 3.1, 02 February 2012 (confidential
document)
[15] Information on Guidance and Operation, NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D012/016/024 VB/VF, NXP Semiconductors, Version 2.4, 24 October 2018
(confidential document)
[16] Product data sheet addendum: Wafer and delivery specification SmartMX2 family
P60D012/016/024 VB/VF, NXP Semiconductors, Version 3.2, 21 May 2014
(confidential document)
[17] SmartMX2 family Post Delivery Configuration (PDC) Secure high-performance
smart card controller Product data sheet addendum, NXP Semiconductors, Version
3.2, 04 February 2013 (confidential document)
[18] Product data sheet addendum: SmartMX2 family Chip Health Mode (CHM), NXP
Semiconductors, NXP Semiconductors, Version 3.1, 01 October 2014 (confidential
document)
[19] Product Errata Sheet SmartMX2 family P60D012/016/024 VB/VF Secure high-
performance smart card controller, NXP Semiconductors, Version 1.2, 24 October
2018 (confidential document)
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-V3-2018
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF with
IC Dedicated Software (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM),
Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations , by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 17 December 2018, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.3)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Name of site / Company name Address Function
Development Sites
NXP Hamburg
Business Unit Identification
Troplowitzstraße 29
22569 Hamburg, Germany
Development, Delivery and
customer support
NXP Eindhoven
Building 46, High Tech Campus
5656AE, Eindhoven,
The Netherlands
Development center
NXP Nijmegen
NXP Semiconductors Netherlands B.V.
Gerstweg 2
6534AE Nijmegen,
The Netherlands
Development and
Manufacturing, Regional
Quality Center - Europe
NXP Gratkorn
Business Unit Identification
Mikron-Weg 1
8108 Gratkorn,
Austria
Document control
NXP High Tech Campus Building
60 Secure Room
Building 60, High Tech Campus
Secure Room 131
5656AE, Eindhoven,
The Netherlands
IT Engineering and
Generic Support
Development Center NXP
Bangalore
NXP Semiconductors India Private Limited
Manyata Technology Park
Nagawara Village,
TOE database
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Name of site / Company name Address Function
Kasaba Hobli,
Bangalore 560045 India
DC COLT– Obenhauptstrasse –
22335 Hamburg - Germany
Obenhauptstrasse,
22335 Hamburg - Germany
TOE Database
DC Akquinet – Ulzburger Strasse
201 – 22850 Norderstedt -
Germany
Ulzburger Strasse 201,
22850 Norderstedt - Germany
TOE Database
Production Sites
TSMC Tainan and Hsinchu
Fab 14A:
1-1, Nan-Ke North Rd., Tainan Science Park,
Tainan 741-44, Taiwan, R.O.C.,
Fab 2 and 5:
121, Park Ave. 3, Hsinchu Science Park,
Hsinchu 300-77, Taiwan, R.O.C.,
Fab 8:
25, Li-Hsin Rd., Hsinchu Science Park,
Hsinchu, 300-78, Taiwan, R.O.C.
Mask data preparation,
Mask and wafer production
Chipbond, Hsin-Chu Chity, Taiwan
No. 3, Li-Hsin Rd. V
Science Based Industrial Park
Hsin-Chu City Taiwan,
R.O.C.
Bumping
Test Center Europe - Hamburg
(TCE-H)
Troplowitzstraße 29
22569 Hamburg,
Germany
Test Center, configuration
of the Fabkey, and delivery
NXP ATBK
303 Moo 3
Chaengwattana Rd.
Laksi, Bangkok 10210,
Thailand
Test centre, wafer
treatment, module
assembly and delivery
NXP ATKH
#10, Jing 5th Road, N.E.P.Z,
Kaohsiung 81170 Taiwan, R.O.C
Test centre, wafer
treatment, module
assembly and delivery
HID Global Teoranta
Paic Tionscail na Tulaigh
Balle na hAbhann
Co. Galway, Ireland
Inlay assembly
Linxens (Thailand) Co Ltd.
Street: 142 Moo, Hi- Tech Industrial Estate
Tambon Ban Laean, Amphor Bang-Pa-In
13160 Ayutthaya,
Thailand
Inlay assembly
Table 4: Relevant development/production sites for the respective TOE configurations
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
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and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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