Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0304-2006
for
IBM z/OS
Version 1, Release 7
from
IBM Corporation
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0304-2006 ZS-01-01-F-329 V3.21
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0304-2006
IBM z/OS
Version 1, Release 7
from
IBM Corporation
Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw
remediation”, Version 1.1, February 2002 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for
compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Issue 1.b, 08.10.1999
and
Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP), Issue 1.d, 08.10.1999
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw remediation)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the
evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, March 2nd
, 2006
The Vice President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Hange L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptographic algorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0304-2006 ZS-01-01-F-329 V3.21
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0304-2006
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
BSI-DSZ-CC-0304-2006 Certification Report
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0304-2006
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
• Part 1, Version 0.6
• Part 2, Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• CEM supplementation on “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1,
February 2002
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22 September 2000 in the Bundes-
anzeiger p. 19445
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0304-2006 Certification Report
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0304-2006
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM z/OS Version 1, Release 7 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005.
For this evaluation specific results from the evaluation process based on BSI-
DSZ-CC-0247-2005 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product IBM z/OS Version 1, Release 7 was conducted by
atsec information security GmbH. The atsec information security GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor and vendor is:
IBM Corporation
2455 South Road
Poughkeepsie NY 12601 - USA
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on March 2nd
, 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0304-2006 Certification Report
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-32.
The product IBM z/OS Version 1, Release 7 has been included in the BSI list of
the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
http://www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
IBM Corporation
2455 South Road
Poughkeepsie NY 12601 - USA
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0304-2006
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0304-2006 Certification Report
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 12
3 Security Policy 13
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 14
5 Architectural Information 15
6 Documentation 19
7 IT Product Testing 20
8 Evaluated Configuration 22
9 Results of the Evaluation 24
10 Comments/Recommendations 27
11 Annexes 28
12 Security Target 29
13 Definitions 30
14 Bibliography 32
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0304-2006
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is IBM z/OS Version 1, Release 7.
z/OS is a general-purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking operating system for
enterprise computing systems running on IBM zSeries or z9 mainframe
computers. Multiple users can use z/OS simultaneously to perform a variety of
functions that require controlled, shared access to the information stored on the
system.
The TOE includes software components only and provides LSPP and CAPP
compliant security functionality plus product specific extensions. Among these
functions are:
• Identification and Authentication
• Discretionary and Mandatory Access Control
• Secure Communication
• Audit
• Object re-use functionality
• Security Management
• TSF Protection
The TOE is one instance of z/OS running on an abstract machine as the sole
operating system and exercising full control over this abstract machine. This
abstract machine can be provided by
• an IBM zSeries or z9 Processor (z800, z890, z900, or z990, or z9 109)
• a logical partition of an IBM zSeries or z9 Processor (certified version of IBM
PR/SM) or
• (certified version of) IBM z/VM either running on a zSeries or z9 Processor
or on a logical partition of PR/SM
Multiple instances of the TOE may be connected in a basic sysplex or in a
parallel sysplex with the instances sharing their RACF database.
The individual TOEs can be run alone or within a network as a set of co-
operating hosts, operating under and implementing the same set of security
policies.
For more details concerning the software version defining the TOE, the abstract
machine the TOE runs on and the user guidance documentation delivered with
the TOE please refer to the remainder of this report.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0304-2006 Certification Report
The IT product IBM z/OS Version 1, Release 7 (for details on the evaluated
configuration please refer to chapter 2) was evaluated by atsec information
security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 23.02.2006. The atsec
information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The developer and sponsor is
IBM Corporation
2455 South Road
Poughkeepsie NY 12601 - USA
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C of this report,
or [1], part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL4+
(Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented).
The assurance level is augmented by: ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation.
For the evaluation of the CC component ALC_FLR.1 the mutually recognised
CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1, February
2002 ([5]) was used.
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following table:
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) used in the Security Target
are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following table:
Security Functional Requirement Identifier
SFRs from CC Part 2, contained in LSPP/CAPP
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FAU_SEL.1 Selective audit
FAU_STG.1 Guarantees of audit data availability
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0304-2006
Security Functional Requirement Identifier
FDP_ACC.1 Discretionary access control policy
FDP_ACF.1 Discretionary access control functions
FDP_ETC.1 Export of unlabeled user data
FDP_ETC.2 Export of labeled user data
FDP_IFC.1 Mandatory access control policy
FDP_IFF.2 Mandatory access control functions
FDP_ITC.1 Import of unlabeled user data
FDP_ITC.2 Import of labeled user data
FDP_RIP.2 Object residual information protection
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_SOS.1 Strength of authentication data
FIA_UAU.1 Authentication
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UID.1 Identification
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1 Management
FMT_REV.1 Revocation of attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security management roles
FPT_RVM.1 Reference mediation
FPT_SEP.1 Domain separation
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
SFRs not in CC Part 2 (Part 2 extended), contained in LSPP/CAPP
„Note1“
as defined in LSPP/CAPP
Subject Residual Information Protection
SFRs from CC Part 2, not contained in LSPP/CAPP
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Distribution
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation
FDP_UTC.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0304-2006 Certification Report
Security Functional Requirement Identifier
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FMT_SMF.19
Specification of Management Functions
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Table 1: Security Functional Requirements met by the TOE
Note that only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements (SFR) are
provided and some of the SFRs have been iterated in the Security Target. For
more details on the contents and the iterations please refer to [9], chapter 5.1.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security-attribute-based access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine testing
Table 2: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.3.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
Identification and
authentication
The TOE provides identification and authentication of users by
the means of an alphanumeric user ID and a system-
encrypted password.
Discretionary access
control:
The TOE supports access controls that are capable of
enforcing access limitations on individual users and data
objects.
Discretionary access control (DAC) allows individual users to
specify how such resources as direct access storage devices
(DASDs), tape data sets, and tape volumes that under their
control are to be shared. DAC is provided by two
mechanisms. The z/OS standard DAC mechanism is used for
most protected objects, except for UNIX file system objects,
which are protected by the z/OS UNIX DAC mechanism.
Mandatory access control In addition to DAC, the TOE provides mandatory access
control (MAC) in LSPP mode, which imposes access
restrictions to information based on security classification.
9
Added because of AIS32, Final Interpretation 065
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0304-2006
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
Users and resources can have a security label specified in
their profile. Security labels contain a hierarchical
classification (security level), which specify the sensitivity (for
example: public, internal use, or secret), and zero or more
non-hierarchical security categories (for example: PROJECTA
or PROJECTB).
The access control enforced by the TOE ensures that users
can only read labelled information if their security labels
dominate the information’s label, and that they can only write
to labelled information containers if the container’s label
dominates the subject’s, thus implementing the Bell-LaPadula
model of information flow control.
Audit The TOE provides an auditing capability that allows
generating audit records for security-critical events.
RACF (Resource Access Control Facility) as part of the TOE
provides a number of logging and reporting functions that
allow resource owners and auditors to identify users who
attempt to access the resource.
Audit records are collected by the System Management
Facilities (SMF) into an audit trail, which is protected from
unauthorized modification or deletion by the DAC and (in
LSPP mode) MAC mechanisms.
Object re-use The TOE ensures the re-usability of protected objects and
storage before making it accessible to further use.
Security management The TOE provides a set of commands and options to
adequately manage the TOE’s security functions. Several
roles are recognized that are able to perform the different
management tasks related to the TOE’s security.
Secure communication z/OS provides means of secure communication between
systems sharing the same security policy. In LSPP mode,
communication within TOE parts coupled into a sysplex can
be multilevel, whereas other communication channels are
assigned a single security label. In CAPP mode, no labels are
assigned and evaluated for any communication channel.
The confidentiality and integrity of network connections are
assured by Secure Sockets Layer / Transport Layer Security
(SSLv3/TLSv1) or IPSec-encrypted communication (with the
Internet Key Exchange / IKE) for TCP/IP connections.
TSF protection TSF protection is based on several protection mechanisms
that are provided by the underlying abstract machine the TOE
is executed upon.
Table 3: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [9], chapter 6.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0304-2006 Certification Report
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of function is rated ‘SOF-medium’ for the authentication
function using passwords (refer to [9], chapter 6.2).
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptographic
algorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3,
Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
In compliance with LSPP and CAPP all security objectives are derived from
OSPs. Therefore no threats have been defined in [9].
The TOE has to comply to the following Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs). Note that only a summary of the policies is provided here. For the
detailed and precise definition refer to [9], chapter 3.4:
Name of OSP Summary
P.AUTHORIZED_USERS Only users who have been authorised to access information
within the system may access the system.
P.NEED_TO_KNOW The system must limit the access to, modification of, and
destruction of the information in protected resources to those
authorized users who have a “need to know” for that
information.
P.ACCOUNTABILITY The users of the system shall be held accountable for their
actions within the system.
P.CLASSIFICATION The system must limit the access to information based on
sensitivity and formal clearance of users (LSPP mode only).
Table 4: Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The configuration requirements for the TOE are defined in chapter 2.3 and
subsequent chapters of the Security Target [9] and are summarised here
(please refer to the Security Target for the precise and more detailed
description):
• Installation and configuration of the TOE components as detailed in chapter
2 and 6 of this report is required.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0304-2006
• Software outside the TOE components boundary may be added if this
software cannot run
• in supervisor mode
• APF-authorised or
• with keys 0 through 7
Please note that this explicitly excludes a replacement of any element in the
ServerPac.
The following elements or element components are not to be used:
• All Bulk Data Transfer (BDT) elements: BDT, BDT File-to-File, and BDT
Systems Network Architecture (SNA) NJE
• Connection Manager component from the UNIX System Services Element
• The Common Information Model element
• The Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) component of the Integrated
Security Services element
• DCE Base Services
• The DFS™ Server Message Block (SMB) and DFS DCE-DFS components
of the Distributed File Serviceelement
• The Enterprise Identity Mapping component of the Integrated Security
Services element
• The Firewall Technologies Base component of the Integrated Security
Services element
• Infoprint®
Server
• The Integrated Cryptographic Service Facility (ICSF) component of the
Cryptographic Services element
• JES3
• The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server component of the
Integrated Security Services element
• Managed System Infrastructure for Operations (msys for Operations)
• The Multiple Virtual Storage / Advanced Program-to-Program
Communication (MVS/APPC) component of the BCP
• The Network Authentication Service component of the Integrated Security
Services element
• Network File System (NFS Server and NFS Client)
• Process Manager component from the UNIX System Services Element
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As these components / component elements are part of the base system, either
they must be not configured for use or they must be deactivated, as described
in Chapter 7 of the Common Criteria user guidance document [11].
The use of TCP/IP communication for JES2 NJE has not been part of the
evaluation and cannot be used in the evaluated configuration.
The PassTicket authentication mechanism has not been part of the evaluation
and cannot be used in the evaluated configuration.
The RACF Remote Sharing Facility has not been part of the evaluation and
cannot be used in the evaluated configuration.
The Data Facility Storage Management Subsystem (DFSMS) Object Access
Method for content management type applications cannot be used.
Note: The evaluated software configuration is not invalidated by installing and
operating other appropriately certified components that possibly run authorized.
However, the following restrictions apply:
• The security policies implemented by those components must not
undermine those described in the Security Target [9].
• The evaluation of those components must show that the component does
not undermine the security policies described in the Security Target [9].
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following assumptions about the technical environment in which the TOE is
intended to be used are defined in the ST [7], chapter 2.3.2 and are
summarized here:
The TOE can be run either directly, or within a logical partition provided by a
certified version of PR/SM, on the z/Architecture as implemented e.g. by the
following hardware platforms:
• IBM zSeries model z800
• IBM zSeries model z890
• IBM zSeries model z900
• IBM zSeries model z990
• IBM z9 model 109
In addition, the TOE may run on a virtual machine provided by a certified
version of z/VM.
For details on peripherals which can be used with the TOE, while still preserving
the security functionality please refer to [7], chapter 2.3.2.
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The following constraints concerning the operating environment are made in the
Security Target. They are based on the assumptions defined in [7], chapter 3.2.
(Please refer to the Security Target for the precise and more detailed definition):
Name of Assumption Summary
Physical Assumptions
A.LOCATE The processing resources of the TOE will be located within
controlled access facilities that will prevent unauthorized
physical access.
A.PROTECT The TOE hardware and software critical to security policy
enforcement will be protected from unauthorized physical
modification.
Personnel Assumptions
A.MANAGE There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to
manage the TOE and the security of the information it
contains.
A.NO_EVIL_ADM The system administrative personnel are not careless, willfully
negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide by the
instructions provided by the administrator documentation.
A.COOP Authorized users possess the necessary authorization to
access at least some of the information managed by the TOE
and are expected to act in a cooperative manner in a benign
environment.
Procedural Assumptions
A.CLEARANCE
(LSPP mode only)
Procedures exist for granting users authorization for access to
specific security levels.
A.SENSITIVITY
(LSPP mode only)
Procedures exist for establishing the security level of all
information imported into the system, for establishing the
security level for all peripheral devices (such as printers, tape
drives, and disk drives) attached to the TOE, and marking a
sensitivity label on all output generated.
Connectivity Assumptions
A.PEER Any other systems with which the TOE communicates are
assumed to be under the same management control and
operate under the same security policy constraints. The TOE
may be deployed in networked or distributed environments
only if the entire network operates under the same constraints
and resides within a single management domain. There are
no security requirements that address the need to trust
external systems or the communications links to such
systems.
A.CONNECT All connections to peripheral devices and other systems
reside within the controlled access facilities unless they are
protected by the TLSv1, SSLv3, or IPSec protocol. The TOE
only addresses security concerns related to the manipulation
of the TOE through its authorized access points. Internal
communication paths to access points such as terminals or
job entry stations are assumed to be adequately protected.
Table 5: Assumption for TOE operational environment
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1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IBM z/OS Version 1, Release 7
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
z/OS Version 1 Release 7 Common Criteria Evaluated Base Package (consisting of):
1 SW z/OS Version 1 Release 7
English Base
z/OS V1R7,
program number 5694-A01
V1.7.0
Tape
2 SW Overlay Generation
Language Version 1
OGL V1R1,
program number 5688-191
Tape
3 SW IBM Print Services Facility™
Version 4 Release 1 for
z/OS
PSF V4R1, 5655-M32 Tape
Required Patches
4 SW PTFs UA22055, UA22598,
and UA90249
UA22055, UA22598, and
UA90249
Download
Required Documentation
5 DOC z/OS Planning for Multilevel
Security and the Common
Criteria
GA22-7509-05 CD-ROM or printed
shipped together with
the tapes
Table 6: Deliverables of the TOE
Please note that only the most important CC guidance documentation is listed
above. More information on Guidance documents (which are also shipped
together with the TOE) and which have to be followed can be found in chapter 6
of this report.
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3 Security Policy
The TOE implements several policies which are specified in the Security Target
by the TOE security functional requirements. Those policies are:
• An Identification & Authentication Policy that is defined by the SFRs
FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_USB.1, FIA_SOS.1,
FMT_MTD.1, FMT_REV.1, FMT_MTD.1
• Access Control Policies.
A Mandatory Access Control Policy defined by the SFRs FDP_IFC.1,
FDP_IFF.2, FDP_ETC.1, Note 1, FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FIA_ATD.1,
FIA_USB.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_REV.1, FPT_TDC.1 and
a Discretionary Access Control Policy that is defined by the SFRs
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_ACF.1, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1,
FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_REV.1.
• An Audit Policy defined by the SFRs FAU_GEN.1.2, FAU_GEN.2,
FAU_SEL.1, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_SAR.3, FAU_STG.1,
FAU_STG.3,FAU_STG.4, FIA_USB.1, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_MTD.1,
FPT_STM.1
• A Trusted Channel Policy defined by the SFRs FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1,
FMT_MTD.1, FTP_ITC.1
In addition to the Security Target the Security Policy of the TOE has been
described in a separate Informal TOE security policy model as required by the
CC assurance component ADV_SPM.1.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
Based on the personnel and procedural assumptions the following usage
conditions exist. Refer to [7], chapter 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 for more details:
• The TOE is managed by competent individuals (A.MANAGE)
• Administrative personnel are not careless, wilfully negligent, or hostile
(A.NO_EVIL_ADMIN)
• Users of the TOE are co-operative (A.COOP)
LSPP mode only:
• Procedures for granting users authorization for access to specific security
levels exist (A.CLEARANCE)
• Procedures for establishing the security level exist (A.SENSITIVITY)
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by
the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [7], chapter 3.2.1
and 3.2.4):
• The TOE is located in an access controlled facility (A.LOCATE)
• The TOE (Hardware used by the TOE and the TOE software itself) is
protected against physical modification (A.PROTECT)
• Any other system with which the TOE communicates is assumed to be
under the same management control and operate under the same security
policy constraints (A.PEER)
• All connections (to peripheral devices and other systems) not using TLSv1,
SSLv3 or IPSec reside within the controlled access facilities (A.CONNECT)
Please consider also the requirements for the evaluated configuration specified
in chapter 2 and 8 of this report.
4.3 Clarification of scope
No threats to be averted by the TOE environment have been defined in the
Security Target [7].
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5 Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the z/OS operating system with the software
components as described in chapter 2 and 8 of this report. z/OS is a general-
purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking operating system for enterprise computing
systems. Multiple users can use z/OS simultaneously to perform a variety of
functions that require controlled, shared access to the information stored on the
system.
The TOE is seen as one instance of z/OS running on an abstract machine as
the sole operating system and exercising full control over this abstract machine.
This abstract machine can be provided by one of the following:
• an IBM zSeries or z9 processor (z800, z890, z900, z990, or z9 109)
• a logical partition of an IBM zSeries or z9 processor (certified version of
PR/SM)
• certified version of z/VM on a zSeries or z9 processor or on a logical
partition of PR/SM
The abstract machine itself is not part of the TOE, rather, it belongs to the TOE
environment. Nevertheless is the correctness of separation and memory
protection mechanisms implemented in the abstract machine analysed as part
of the evaluation since those functions are crucial for the security of the TOE.
Multiple instances of the TOE may be connected in a basic sysplex or in a
parallel sysplex with the instances sharing their RACF database.
The individual TOEs can be run alone or within a network as a set of co-
operating hosts, operating under and implementing the same set of security
policies.
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) network services,
connections, and communication that occur outside of a sysplex are restricted
to one security label; that is, each system regards its peers as single-label
hosts. Other network communication is disallowed, with the exception of the Job
Entry System 2 (JES2) Network Job Entry (NJE) protocol.
Most of the TOE security functions (TSF) are provided by the z/OS operating
system Base Control Program (BCP) and the Resource Access Control Facility
(RACF), a z/OS component that is used by different services as the central
instance for identification and authentication and for access control decisions.
z/OS comes with management functions that allow configuring of the TOE
security functions to tailor them to the customer’s needs.
Some elements have been included in the TOE that do not provide security
functions. These elements run in authorized mode, so they could compromise
the TOE if they do not behave properly. Because these elements are essential
for the operation of many customer environments, the inclusion of these
elements subjects them to the process of scrutiny during the evaluation and
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ensures that they may be used by customers without affecting the TOE’s
security status.
In its evaluated configuration, the TOE allows two modes of operation: LSPP-
compliant and CAPP-compliant. In both modes, the same software elements
are used. The two modes have different RACF settings with respect to the use
of security labels. All other configuration parameters are identical in the two
modes.
Intended Method of Use:
z/OS provides a general computing environment that allows users to gain
controlled access to its resources in different ways:
• online interaction with users through Time Sharing Option Extensions
(TSO/E) or z/OS UNIX System Services
• batch processing (JES2)
• services provided by started procedures or tasks
• daemons and servers of the z/OS UNIX System Services that provide
similar functions as started procedures or tasks based on UNIX interfaces
These services can be accessed by users local to, or with otherwise protected
access to, the computer systems.
All users of the TOE are assigned a unique user identifier (user ID). This user
ID, which is used as the basis for access control decisions and for
accountability, associates the user with a set of security attributes. The TOE
authenticates the claimed identity of a user before allowing this user to perform
any further security-relevant actions actions; an exception are anonymous users
of the HTTP Server which are assigned to an installation-defined user ID.
All TOE resources are under the control of the TOE. The TOE mediates the
access of subjects to TOE-protected objects. Subjects in the TOE are called
tasks. Tasks are the active entities that can act on the user’s behalf. Data is
stored in named objects. The TOE can associate a set of security attributes with
each named resource, which include the description of the access rights to that
object and (in LSPP mode) a security label.
Objects are owned by users, who are assumed to be capable of assigning
discretionary access rights to their objects in accordance with the organizational
security policies. Ownership of named objects can be transferred under the
control of the access control policy. In LSPP mode, security labels are assigned
by the TOE, either automatically upon creation of the object or by the trusted
system administrator. The security attributes of users, data objects, and objects
through which the information is passed are used to determine if information
may flow through the system as requested by a user.
Apart from normal users, z/OS recognizes administrative users with special
authorizations. These users are trusted to perform system administration and
maintenance tasks, which includes configuration of the security policy enforced
by the z/OS system and attributes related to it. Authorizations can be delegated
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to other administrative users by updating their security attributes. The TOE also
recognizes the role of an auditor, who uses the auditing system provided by
z/OS to monitor the system usage according to the organizational security
policies.
The TOE is intended to operate in a networked environment with other
instantiations of the TOE as well as other well-behaved client systems operating
within the same management domain. All of those systems need to be
configured in accordance with a defined common security policy.
The primary security features of the product are:
• Identification and Authentication
• Discretionary Access Control
• in LSPP mode: Mandatory Access Control and support for security labels
• Auditing
• Object Re-use
• Security Management
• Secure Communication
• TSF protection
These primary security features are supported by domain separation and
reference mediation, which ensure that the features are always invoked and
cannot be bypassed.
A detailed description of the security functions can be found in the Security
Target [7], chapter 6.2 to 6.8.
The subsystems considered in the high-level design of the TOE are the
following:
• z/Architecture
• Base Control Program (BCP)
• System Management Facilities (SMF)
• Security Server (RACF)
• Systems Operations
• Communications Server (IP)
• DFSMS – System Managed Storage
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• JES2
• TSO/E
• z/OS UNIX System Services
• Print Services Facility – Print Labeling Function
• HTTP Server
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6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer:
• Memo to Customers of z/OS V1.7 Common Criteria Evaluated Base
• ServerPac: IYO (Installing Your Order), a custom-built installation manual
shipped in printed form
• z/OS V1R7.0 Planning for Multilevel Security and the Common Criteria (IBM
Document number GA22-7509-05), shipped in printed form
• ServerPac Using the Installation Dialog (Dialog Level 18) (IBM Document
number SA22-7815-10), provided on the set of documentation CD-ROMs
• z/OS V1R7.0 Information Roadmap (IBM Document number SA22-7500-
08), which contains references to other relevant documents provided on a
set of documentation CD-ROMs
• Additional documents shipped on CD-ROM:
• z/OS V1R7 Program Directory
• z/OS V1.7 Collection
• PSF 4.1 CDROM Kit BOOK
• PSF 4.1 CDROM Kit PDF
• PSF V4R1 User's Guide
• Overlay Generation Language/370: User's Guide and Reference
• OGL/370 V1R1.0: Getting Started
• OGL/370 V1R1.0: LPS
• OGL: Command Summary and Quick Reference
To get to the evaluated configuration of z/OS a user should start with the
guidance documents "Memo to Customers of z/OS V1.7 Common Criteria
Evaluated Base" and "z/OS Planning for Multilevel Security and the Common
Criteria (IBM Document number GA22-7509-05)".
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7 IT Product Testing
Test configuration
The Security Target requires the software packages comprising the TOE to be
run on an abstract machine implementing the z/Architecture machine interface
as defined in the "z/Architecture Principles of Operation". The hardware
platforms implementing this abstract machine are:
• IBM zSeries model z800
• IBM zSeries model z890
• IBM zSeries model z900
• IBM zSeries model z990
• IBM z9 model 109
The TOE may be running on those machines either directly or within a logical
partition provided by a certified version of PR/SM. In addition, the TOE may run
on a virtual machine provided by a certified version of z/VM.
IBM has tested the platforms (hardware and combinations of hardware with
PR/SM and/or z/VM) for z/OS individually for their compliance to the
z/Architecture using the Systems Assurance Kernel (SAK) suite of tests. These
tests ensure that every platform provides the abstract machine interface that
z/OS requires.
Due to the massive amount of tests, testing was performed throughout the
development of the TOE. To ensure proper testing of all security relevant
behaviour of the TOE, the evaluators verified that all tests that might have been
affected by any security-relevant change introduced late in the development
cycle had been run on the evaluated configuration.
Depth/Coverage of Testing
The developer has done substantial functional testing of all externally visible
interfaces (TSFI). Internal interfaces of the High-level design have been
covered by direct and indirect testing. The evaluators repeated a subset of the
developer tests and conducted additional independent tests and penetration
tests.
Summary of Developer Testing Effort
Test configuration:
The sponsor/developer has performed the tests on the platforms defined above.
The software was installed and configured as required in the guidance
documents (refer to chapter 6).
Testing approach:
The sponsor/developer conducts extensive testing for every release of z/OS.
Functional Verification Testing (FVT) and System Verification Testing (SVT) are
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performed by independent test teams with testers being independent from
developers. A special collection of tests was compiled to explicitly deal with the
security functionality as claimed in the Security Target.
Testing results:
All actual test results were consistent with the expected test results.
Summary of Evaluator Testing Effort
Test configuration:
The evaluator used the same abstract machines as the developer. The
configuration of the TOE was conformant to the Security Target requirements
and have been set up according to the guidance documents.
Testing approach:
The evaluation facility decided to re-run a subset of the developer tests focusing
on functionality newly introduced since the previous evaluation. In addition
evaluator tests were defined and executed by the evaluation facility.
Testing results:
All actual test results were consistent with the expected test results.
Evaluator penetration testing:
The evaluators have devised a set of penetration tests based on
• common sources for vulnerabilities of operating systems,
• findings of their evaluation work.
The penetration testing can be classified into the following categories:
• Resource exhaustion tests
• Paramenter validation tests
• Tests to bypass mandatory access control
• Stress testing
The penetration testing showed no vulnerabilities which are exploitable with the
attack potential assumed for EAL4 in the intended operating environment.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The Target of Evaluation is IBM z/OS Version 1, Release 7. The TOE is
software only. The following product components represent the TOE:
Software Components:
IBM z/OS Version 1, Release 7 Common Criteria Evaluated Base Package
consists of the following tape sets:
• z/OS Version 1 Release 7 (z/OS V1R7, program number 5694-A01 V1.7.0)
• Overlay Generation Language Version 1 (OGL V1R1, program number
5688-191)
• IBM Print Services Facility™ Version 4 Release 1 for z/OS (PSF V4R1,
5655-M32)
• PTFs UA22055, UA22598, and UA90249 (available via download)
The same software elements are used in the LSPP and CAPP mode of
operation. The mode of operation is defined by the configuration of the labeling-
related options in RACF.
Guidance Documents:
• Memo to Customers of z/OS V1.7 Common Criteria Evaluated Base
• ServerPac: IYO (Installing Your Order), a custom-built installation manual
shipped in printed form
• z/OS V1R7.0 Planning for Multilevel Security and the Common Criteria (IBM
Document number GA22-7509-05), shipped in printed form
• ServerPac Using the Installation Dialog (Dialog Level 18) (IBM Document
number SA22-7815-10), provided on the set of documentation CD-ROMs
• z/OS V1R7.0 Information Roadmap (IBM Document number SA22-7500-
08), which contains references to other relevant documents provided on a
set of documentation CD-ROMs
• Additional documents shipped on CD-ROM:
• z/OS V1R7 Program Directory
• z/OS V1.7 Collection
• PSF 4.1 CDROM Kit BOOK
• PSF 4.1 CDROM Kit PDF
• PSF V4R1 User's Guide
• Overlay Generation Language/370: User's Guide and Reference
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• OGL/370 V1R1.0: Getting Started
• OGL/370 V1R1.0: LPS
• OGL: Command Summary and Quick Reference
The software elements are shipped on installation tapes. All guidance
documents are either printed or on CD-ROMs packaged and shipped with the
installation tapes.
The configuration requirements for the TOE are defined in chapter 2.3 of the
Security Target [7]. A summary can also be found in chapter 1.5 of this report.
Constraints on the abstract machine the TOE can be run on are given in the
Security Target [7], chapter 2.3.2. Chapter 1.6 of this report provides a
summary of the operating platform.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [10] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. It was supplemented by the methodology for “ALC_FLR – Flaw
remediation”, Version 1.1, February 2002.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented by ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation and the class ASE for the
Security Target evaluation) are summarised in the following table:
Assurance Classes and Components Verdict
Security Target CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
TOE CM coverage ACM_SCP.1 PASS
Delivery and Operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.1 PASS
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Assurance Classes and Components Verdict
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Examination of guidance AVA_MSU.1 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Independent vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.2 PASS
Table 7: Security Assurance Requirement verdicts
This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005. For this evaluation
specific results from the evaluation process based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005
were re-used. In comparance to the former certificate the Level of Assurance
has been increased and new functionality was subject to analysis (refer to [9]
for details).
The evaluation has shown that:
• the TOE is conform to the PPs
• Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP), Version 1.d, National
Security Agency, 1999-10-08, [7] and
• Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Version 1.b, National
Security Agency, 1999-10-08, [8]
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by ALC_FLR.1
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
SF IA.2 (Identification/Authentication with passwords)
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptographic
algorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3,
Clause 2). This holds true for to the cryptographic algorithms (used in the
Security Function CS „Communication Security“), the process of generating
keys for those cryptographic algorithms (including the random number
generator), or the cryptographic hash functions implemented in the TOE.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the IBM z/OS Version 1,
Release 7 as outlined in chapter 2 of this report.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
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10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documents as listed in chapter 6 of this report contain
necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein
have to be considered.
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11 Annexes
None.
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12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [9] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
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13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
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Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme AIS33, Version 2 –
“Methodologie zur Fehlerbehebung – Flaw Remediation”, 26.07.2002
[6] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[7] Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP), Version 1.d, National
Security Agency, 1999-10-08
[8] Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Version 1.b, National
Security Agency, 1999-10-08
[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0304-2006, Version 2.14, February 16, 2006,
Security Target for IBM z/OS Version 1 Release 7, IBM Corporation
[10] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2.00, 22.02.2006, Evaluation
Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0304 (confidential document)
User Guidance Documentation
[11] z/OS Planning for Multilevel Security and the Common Criteria, IBM
Document Number GA22-7509-05, IBM Corporation .
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance
requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL,
Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part
of the conformance result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
"The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 2.1."
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM: Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery and
operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV: Development Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle support Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 8: Assurance family breakdown and map
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
"The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility."
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component“
is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the
obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with
explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 9: Evaluation assurance level summary
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
"Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
"Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
"Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.“
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
"Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
"Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
"Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.“
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
"Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
"Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.“
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
"Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4)
attack potential.“
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