Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0373-2007
for
PhenoStor® Card Reader GRE100010
from
Bayer Innovation GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V3.32
Common Criteria Arrangement
BSI-DSZ-CC-0373-2007
PhenoStor® Card Reader GRE100010
from
Bayer Innovation GmbH
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version
2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 09. März 2007
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0373-2007 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
1
Under the BSIG Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0373-2007
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0373-2007 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
2
• BSIG
3
• BSI Certification Ordinance
4
• BSI Schedule of Costs
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
5
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.3
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0373-2007
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective in March 1998. This agreement has been signed by
the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
recognizes certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and
the United Kingdom within the terms of this Agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition
of Protection Profiles based on the CC. As of February 2007 the arrangement
has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.
The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http:\\www.commoncriteriaportal.org
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0373-2007 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product PhenoStor® Card Reader GRE100010 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product PhenoStor® Card Reader GRE100010 was
conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
Bayer Innovation GmbH
Merowingerplatz 1
40225 Düsseldorf
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 09. März 2007.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0373-2007
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-22.
The product PhenoStor® Card Reader GRE100010 has been included in the
BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
7
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Bayer Innovation GmbH
Merowingerplatz 1
40225 Düsseldorf
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0373-2007 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0373-2007
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 9
3 Security Policy 11
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 11
5 Architectural Information 12
6 Documentation 13
7 IT Product Testing 14
8 Evaluated Configuration 15
9 Results of the Evaluation 16
10 Comments/Recommendations 18
11 Annexes 18
12 Security Target 18
13 Definitions 18
14 Bibliography 21
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0373-2007 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the PhenoStor® Card Reader GRE100010.
The TOE is a card reader device for holographic memory cards providing the
functionality of reading data from a holographic storage card and securely
transmitting the data to the interface unit connected to the card reader.
The TOE basically consists of an optical module for reading out data from a
holographic memory card, a standard microcontroller with dedicated software
for the main control of the card reader as well as the STMicroelectronics
ST19WP18-D security controller with its dedicated software and embedded
software running on ST19WP18-D.
The TOE physically reads sensitive data that is symmetrically encrypted and
MACprotected or symmetrically encrypted and digitally signed from a
PhenoStor® holographic card and sends the data to the Interface Unit (IU),
which is out of the evaluation scope. The IU decides which data is needed for
the application. If this data is cryptographically protected, it is sent to the TOE
where it is decrypted and its signature (or MAC) is verified. Then the data is
sent to the IU through a secure communication channel.
All the cryptographic keys on the TOE can be updated by the administrator
(through the Administrator Unit (AU)) at any time in the end user phase. The
security of the card reader is based upon the STMicroelectronics ST19WP18-D
which is a smartcard integrated circuit with its dedicated software certified in
compliance with Common Criteria 2.2, EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2,
AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 and in accordance with Smartcard IC Platform
Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001 [9] and Protection Profile Smartcard
Integrated Circuit PP/9806 [10]. The cryptographic functionality of the certified
cryptographic library (3DES, RSA, SHA-1) of ST19WP18-D is used for
protecting the communication within the TOE, and for the secure
communication channel between the TOE and IU and between the TOE and the
administrator’s device, respectively.
Additionally, the data on the holographic memory card can be analogue
scrambled but the analogue scrambling is neither part of the security
functionality nor analysed during the evaluation.
The IT product PhenoStor® Card Reader GRE100010 was evaluated by T-
Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 21. Dezember 2006.
The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is
Bayer Innovation GmbH
Merowingerplatz 1
40225 Düsseldorf
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0373-2007
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL 3 (Evaluation Assurance Level 3 - methodically tested and checked).
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ETC.2 Export of user data with security attributes
FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT Security Management
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0373-2007 Certification Report
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
FTP Trusted path / channel
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Table 1: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST [7] chapter 5.1.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FDP User data protection
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes
FTP Trusted path/channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Table 3: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST [7] chapter 5.3.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0373-2007
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.1 Trusted channel with confidentiality, integrity and authenticity
SF.2 TOE state integrity protection during and after interruption of
the normal procedure
SF.3 Decryption and verification of encrypted A.ProtectedData
SF.4 Protection against unauthorized personalization
SF.5 Access denial
SF.6 Protection against unauthorized change of keys
SF.7 Protection against
A.ProtectedData
unauthorized access to decrypted
SF.8 Generation of random numbers
SF.9 Key derivation functions (KDFs)
SF.10 Security domain
Table 4: Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 6.1.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘medium’ (SOF-medium) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [7], chapter 6.1.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The assets to be protected by the TOE consist of user data and symmetric
keys. They are denoted by:
A.ProtectedData: the user data;
A.SymkeyData: the symmetric key used for decrypting and MAC checking the
data from a PhenoStor® card;
A.PubkeySignature: the public key for checking the signature of the data from a
PhenoStor® card;
A.SymkeyIU: the symmetric key used for securing communication between the
security controller and the IU;
A.SymkeyRNG: used in the creation of the initial state of the deterministic
random number generator;
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0373-2007 Certification Report
A.SymkeyAdmin: the symmetric key used by the administrator for updating
A.SymkeyData, A.SymkeyIU, A.SymkeyAdmin, A.PubkeySignature
All the assets have to be protected against manipulation and disclosure within
the TOE, i.e. the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the data has to be
ensured by the TOE.
The TOE has to resist against the following threats:
T1: An attacker could try to manipulate A.ProtectedData on its way from the
holographic memory card through the TOE to the IU or from the IU to the place
in TOE where its processing starts, in order to provide the TOE with
manipulated decrypted A.ProtectedData.
T2: An attacker could try to reveal or manipulate A.ProtectedData,
A.SymkeyData, A.SymkeyIU, A.SymkeyRNG, A.SymkeyAdmin or to manipulate
A.PubkeySignature by manipulating the program execution or the program code
in the TOE (e.g. buffer overflow or glitches).
T3: An attacker could try to get information about A.ProtectedData,
A.SymkeyData, A.SymkeyIU, A.SymkeyRNG, A.SymkeyAdmin through
sidechannel attacks (active and passive) on the TOE.
T4: An attacker could try to manipulate A.ProtectedData, A.SymkeyData,
A.SymkeyIU, A.SymkeyRNG, A.SymkeyAdmin, A.PubkeySignature through
active physical attacks on the TOE.
T5: After its processing within the TOE, A.ProtectedData is about to be
transmitted to the IU. An attacker could try to reveal or manipulate
A.ProtectedData during this transmission as well as to generate manipulated
A.ProtectedData and provide the IU with it on behalf of the TOE.
T6: An attacker could try to exchange the IU against some other device (with
some key known to him) in order to obtain A.ProtectedData.
T7: An attacker could try to reveal or manipulate A.SymkeyData, A.SymkeyIU,
A.SymkeyRNG, A.SymkeyAdmin or manipulate A.PubkeySignature on their
way from the administrator to the place of their final storage within the TOE.
T8: An attacker could try to exchange the administrator’s device against some
other device (with some key known to him) in order to manipulate (e.g.
exchange) A.SymkeyData, A.SymkeyIU, A.SymkeyRNG, A.SymkeyAdmin,
A.PubkeySignature in the TOE.
T9: An attacker could try to reveal or manipulate A.ProtectedData,
A.SymkeyData, A.SymkeyIU, A.SymkeyRNG, A.SymkeyAdmin or to manipulate
A.PubkeySignature by using the TOE personalization interface to manipulate
program code or data.
The following OSPs are defined for the TOE:
P1: Procedures for the development, design, implementation and testing as
required in the ST19WP18-D Security Target [15], which states an
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0373-2007
augmentation and refers to the Protection Profiles BSI-PP-0002-2001 [9] and
PP/9806 [10], shall be applied.
P2: Procedures for the manufacturing, delivery and storage as required in the
ST19WP18-D Security Target [15], which refers to the Protection Profiles BSI-
PP- 0002-2001 [9] and PP/9806 [10], shall be applied.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The TOE will be operated in only one configuration that will be set up by the
manufacturer before delivery. All necessary administrative actions that have to
be taken before the usage of the TOE are described in the „Administrator-
Sicherheitshandbuch“ [11].
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following assumptions are defined for the TOE environment:
Identifier Definition
AE1 Data stored on a PhenoStor® card is protected
AE2 All used keys are cryptographically strong
AE3 All keys used in the
manipulation and disclosure
environment are protected against
AE4 All random numbers in the environment used for cryptographic
purposes are cryptographically good.
AE5 A.ProtectedData is protected against disclosure and manipulation
AE6 The IU verifies that the TOE knows A.SymkeyIU before accepting
data received from the TOE
AE7 The administrator’s device verifies that the TOE knows the current
A.SymkeyAdmin before sending data to the TOE
Table 5: Assumptions for the TOE environment
Note: Only the titles of the assumptions are provided. For more details please
refer to chapter 4 of this report or the Security Target [7], chapter 3.2.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0373-2007 Certification Report
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called
Phenostor® Card Reader GRE100010.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery
1 HW
/SW
PhenoStor® Card Reader
GRE100010
Version
1.1
See below personally or by delivery
company
2 DOC Benutzer-
Sicherheitshandbuch,
(AGD_USR.1), PhenoStor®
[12]
Version
1.1
21.09.2006 encrypted and signed
via email or postal on
storage media
3 DOC Administrator-
Sicherheitshandbuch mit
Installation, Generierung
und Anlauf (ADO_IGS.1 und
AGD_ADM.1), PhenoStor®
[11]
Version
1.3
27.10.2006 encrypted and signed
via email or postal on
storage media
4 Keys Relevant (customer specific)
keys (at least the
A.SymkeyAdmin for
personalisation)
- - encrypted and signed
via email or postal on
storage media
Table 6: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE Phenostor® Card Reader GRE100010 consists of hard- and software.
The hardware consists of
- the PhenoStor® boards version 1.1 labelled as phenostor-mbX-v1.1-Y,
where X denotes the individual number of a PhenoStor® board and Y is
the date of its receipt. Each board mainly consists of the Atmel
ATmega128 controller, optical module, Ethernet interface, serial port
interface, keyboard, display and non-intelligent hardware components
incl. the plastic case and
- the PhenoStor® ST19WP18-D TSSOP28 controllers version 1.0 labelled
as phenostor-tssopX-v1.0-Y, where denotes the individual number of the
received reel and Y is the date of its receipt.
The software consists of
- com.zip #7 is the COM module running on the standard controller
(25.08.2006, p. 5 of [14]);
- esc.zip #16 is the ESC module running on the standard controller
(21.08.2006, p. 5 of [14]);
- bootloader.zip #4 contains the bootloader software (18.10.2006, p. 17 of
[14]);
- secmodule.zip #4 contains the SEC module (SEC_ROM /
SEC_EEPROM) (18.10.2006, p. 18 of [14]).
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A card reader is delivered from the developer escrypt GmbH to the distributer
Bayer Innovation GmbH or to the integrator of the project for delivery to the end
user, or it is delivered directly to the end user. The delivery can be done by
delivery companies or personally. The integrator and the end user, respectively,
shall verify the integrity of the security relevant part of the card reader after
delivery. For this purpose they shall check whether the card reader has
knowledge of the secret keys transferred in parallel over a secure channel to
the end user as described below (e.g., by checking whether the card reader is
able to decrypt a message encrypted with the appropriate secret key).
The relevant keys, the administrator security guide and the user security guide
are sent to the end user by trusted delivery. One possibility is the usage of PGP
or a similar software between escrypt GmbH and the end user such that all data
is transmitted encrypted and digitally signed, another way is the delivery in an
encrypted and digitally signed manner on a storage medium (e.g. a CD) by
delivery companies, a third way is personal delivery. When using software for
encrypting and signing the data such as PGP, it has to be made sure that the
keys are authentic. Hence, the fingerprint must be verified by phone or the keys
must be exchanged personally.
An alternative way of delivery is to trust Bayer Innovation GmbH or the project
integrator and to deliver the keys and the security guides on a storage medium
to Bayer Innovation GmbH or the project integrator in a secure manner as
described above. Bayer Innovation GmbH then stores the keys and the security
guides in a secure environment providing confidentiality and integrity. For
instance, the keys can be stored on a CD that is locked away in a safe, or the
keys are stored on a secure PC with encrypted hard disk and user
authentication that is not connected to a computer network.
It is ensured that the delivery of the keys plus security guidelines on the one
hand and the card reader on the other hand is performed separately. In case of
improper delivery, appropriate corrective actions are performed, even
considering sending a new card reader, if necessary.
The card readers and the delivered storage media carry the complete name of
the TOE including the version number such that the end user knows that he
received the correct items. The assembling step within escrypt GmbH is
supervised by the development officer, the completeness of the TOE and the
correctness of the procedures is always verified and all necessary details of
each delivery activity are carefully documented.
After receipt of the TOE the administrator has to load the keys into the TOE.
This procedure is described in the „Administrator-Sicherheitshandbuch“ [11].
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3 Security Policy
The TOE is a holographic memory card reader and is designed for handling any
kind of confidential and manipulation sensitive information, which is stored on a
mobile storage medium and has to be processed digitally. The security policy of
the TOE is to protect sensitive data from disclosure and manipulation while
transferring it from a PhenoStor® holographic card through the TOE to the IU.
Data stored on the card is encrypted and signed (or MACprotected) and,
therefore, cannot be read or undetectably modified without knowing the
corresponding keys. The corresponding keys are stored safely in the security
controller of the TOE, which is able to decrypt data and to verify signatures (and
MACs), but which transfers decrypted data solely via trusted channels.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
The following assumtions regarding the usage of the TOE have to be fulfilled:
AE1: The user marks as protected, digitally signs (or MAC-protects) and
encrypts all the data that is to be stored on a PhenoStor® card and that he
wants to be protected (i.e. the A.ProtectedData).
AE3: All the keys A.SymkeyData, A.SymkeyIU, A.SymkeyRNG,
A.SymkeyAdmin, PrivkeySignature in the environment (administrator, interface
unit, card writer) are protected against manipulation and disclosure. The key
A.PubkeySignature is protected against manipulation. The IU knows
A.SymkeyIU, the security controller knows A.SymkeyData, A.SymkeyIU,
A.SymkeyRNG, A.SymkeyAdmin, A.PubkeySignature, the administrator knows
all the keys (including PrivkeySignature).
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumtions about the TOE environment have to be fulfilled:
AE2: All the keys A.SymkeyData, A.SymkeyIU, A.SymkeyRNG,
A.SymkeyAdmin, A.PubkeySignature, PrivkeySignature are generated
according to the administration manual, that is, they are cryptographically good
and strong.
AE4: All random numbers in the environment (IU, AU, card writer) used for
cryptographic purposes are cryptographically good.
AE5: A.ProtectedData is protected against disclosure and manipulation within
the card writer, the IU and all other devices entitled to have access to any
information about A.ProtectedData.
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AE6: The IU verifies that the TOE knows A.SymkeyIU before accepting data
received from the TOE.
AE7: The administrator’s device verifies that the TOE knows the current
A.SymkeyAdmin before sending data to the TOE.
4.3 Clarification of scope
The administrator’s unit, the interface unit, the memory card and card writer are
not part of the TOE but are needed in the IT environment for the functioning the
card reader. They are provided by Bayer Innovation GmbH.
The data on the holographic memory card can be analogue scrambled but the
analogue scrambling is neither part of the security functionality nor analysed
during the evaluation.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is divided into the following four subsystems:
- SRS (security relevant subsystem):
hardware: ST19WP18-D security controller
software: SEC module
- AVR:
hardware: AVR ATmega128 standard controller
software: COM and ESC module
- Optical module:
hardware: card reader (card slot, a light source, a camera, a control chip,
photo sensors, and a phase mask enabling analogue scrambling of
thelight beam.)
software: OPT module
- Non-intelligent HW components:
hardware only (data transmission lines, power supply wires, capacitors,
standard Ethernet controller with a connector, display, keyboard, etc.)
Figure 1 below depicts a top level block diagramm of the TOE architecture:
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Figure 1: Architecture of the TOE
6 Documentation
The documentations [11] and [12] are provided with the product by the
developer to the customer for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the
Security Target.
Developers of the Interface Unit, the Administrator Unit and the Card Writer
should follow the guidelines in the Guidance for implementing the Interface Unit,
Administrator Unit and Card Writer [13].
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Test Effort
Test cases were included for the personalization of the TOE as well as the
usage phase of the TOE. Some tests at the usage phase make use of an
emulator of the ST19WP18-D which is a reasonable approach as these tests
deal with internal processes of the TOE that cannot be adequately tested at an
external interface. Further, tests are included to show that the TOE remains in a
secure state if tampered with the voltage supply of the ST19WP18-D or bus
lines between the AVR and the ST19WP18-D.
According to the test approach there are different test configurations used.
During personalization, the ST19WP18-D was fitted in the personalization
device. Except for the emulator tests, testing of the usage phase operates the
TOE in a grey-box approach, i.e., one logs and analyses the communication on
the external interface but with the knowledge of the internal processes. At
emulator tests the internal processing of the ST19WP18-D was observed at
critical parts of the implementation that need to be secured to guarantee a
secured state of the TOE, even if interrupted.
7.2 Evaluator Idenpendant Testing
Independent testing (comprising the subset of penetration test) was done at
escrypt GmbH and at T-Systems GEI GmbH. At escrypt GmbH, all emulator
test cases were carried out. Other test cases were carried out both at escrypt
GmbH and at T-Systems GEI GmbH.
For evaluator testing, the developer handed over a TOE sample and the GUI
aided test tool including all sources to the evaluators. The evaluators were able
to develop their own test cases as part of this developer test tool, i.e., the test
tool was reprogrammed for independent testing. The evaluators produced a log
file as result of the test cases executed.
Test cases were included for the personalization of the TOE as well as the
usage phase of the TOE. Some tests at the usage phase make use of an
emulator of the ST19WP18-D which is a reasonable approach as these tests
deal with internal processes of the TOE that cannot be adequately tested at an
external interface.
According to the test approach there are different test configurations used.
During personalization, the ST19WP18-D was fitted in the personalization
device. Except for the emulator tests, testing of the usage phase operates the
TOE in a grey-box approach, i.e., one logs and analyses the communication on
the external interface and knows the specification on the internal processing. At
emulator tests the internal processing of the ST19WP18-D was observed at
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critical parts of the implementation that need to be secured to guarantee a
secured state of the TOE, even if interrupted.
The evaluators devised and conducted additional tests during the execution of
the handshake protocols which manipulate only special data items. These tests
were conducted to increase the confidence of the TOE security functions.
Other main directions for evaluator testing are (i) to verify procedures during
programming and personalization, (ii) to check the resistance of the TOE
against buffer overflow attacks, (iii) to verify the absence of any additional
commands (as far as it can be done with reasonable effort at the external
interface of the TOE), (iv) to verify the correctness of the implementation of the
pseudo random number generator and the DFA countermeasures, (v) to verify
the correct implementation of cryptographic key derivation functions and the
handshake protocol, and (vi) to verify the resistance against tampering attacks
with the voltage supply of the ST19WP18-D. During evaluator testing all
security functions were covered.
For the repetition of developer tests, the evaluators selected a subset of test
cases found in the developer test plan and procedures. The choice was
motivated by the aim that as much security functions are included as possible.
Except for SF.8 (Generation of random numbers) all security functions are
covered by this subset.
The SF.8 (Generation of random numbers) was tested by using an independent
reference implemetation. The correct operation (as specified) of the
deterministic random number generator (and thus also SF.8) has been
demonstrated.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration of TOE consists of i) PhenoStor® Card Reader
GRE100010 including the application software and ii) the pertaining guidance
documentation ’Administrator- Sicherheitshandbuch mit Installation,
Generierung und Anlauf (ADO_IGS.1 und AGD_ADM.1), PhenoStor®’ [11] and
‘Benutzer-Sicherheitshandbuch, (AGD_USR.1), PhenoStor®’ [12]. The software
runs on the security controller ST19WP18-D from STMicroelectronics.
The environment for testing the TOE was provided by escrypt GmbH in
Bochum. The TOE is labelled as stated above. The test were carried out at
escrypt GmbH and at the T-Systems GEI GmbH.
For the tests, the software part of the TOE has been loaded into the security
controller by using the Bootloader. This test configuration has been tested as
been described in the previous section 7.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
As the evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation, the
ETR [8] includes also the evaluation results of the composite evaluation activi-
ties in accordance with CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition:
Annex A Composite smart card evaluation [4, AIS 36]. The ETR [8] builds up on
the ETR-lite for Composition document of the evaluation of the underlying the
STMicroelectronics security controller ST19WP18-D (Certification Report
2005/41 [16] and Maintenance Report M-2006/05 [17] ).
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL3.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL 3 and
the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are summarised in the
following table:
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Authorisation controls ACM_CAP.3 PASS
TOE CM coverage ACM_SCP.1 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Delivery procedures ADO_DEL.1 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Informal functional specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Examination of guidance AVA_MSU.1 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Developer vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.1 PASS
Table 7: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL3
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
SF1, data and subject authentication during initialisation and usage of a
trusted channel,
SF3, decryption and verification of encrypted A.ProtectedData and
SF8, generation of random numbers
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Phenostor® Card
Reader GRE100010 with its components as listed in chapter 2, table 6 of this
report.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
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10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documents [11] and [12] contain necessary information about
the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Annexes
none
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitized version of the
complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
3DES Triple-DES - Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
AU Adimistrator Unit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
IU Interface Unit
MAC Message Authentication Code
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman – a public key encryption algorithm
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SHA-1 Secure Hash Algorithm 1
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
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TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
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TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0373-2007, Version 1.8, 30.10.2006 , Security
Target PhenoStor® Card Reader GRE100010, Bayer Innovation GmbH
(confidential document)
[7] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0373-2007, Version 1.1, 08.03.2007 , Security
Target Lite PhenoStor® Card Reader GRE100010, Bayer Innovation
GmbH (sanitized public document)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.2, 18.12.2006, Evaluation
Technical Report BSI-CC-DSZ-0373, T-Systems GEI GmbH (confidential
document)
[9] Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI
registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs,
Hitachi Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[10] Protection Profile Smartcard Integrated Circuit, Version 2.0, 09.1998,
registered at the French Certification Body under the number PP/9806
[11] Administrator-Sicherheitshandbuch mit Installation, Generierung und
Anlauf (ADO_IGS.1 und AGD_ADM.1), PhenoStor® Card Reader
GRE100010, Version 1.3, 27.10.02006, Bayer Innovation GmbH
[12] Benutzer-Sicherheitshandbuch, (AGD_USR.1), PhenoStor® Card
Reader GRE100010, Version 1.1, 21.09.2006, Bayer Innovation GmbH
[13] Guidance for implementing the Interface Unit, Administrator Unit and
Card Writer, PhenoStor® Card Reader GRE100010, Version 1.2,
27.10.2006, Bayer Innovation GmbH
[14] Configuration List, PhenoStor® Card Reader GRE100010, Version 0.6,
07.12.2006, Bayer Innovation GmbH
[15] ST19WP18-D Security Target SMD_ST19WP18D_ST_06_001_V01.00,
February 2006
[16] Certification Report 2005/41 - ST19WP18E microcontroller, 18 novembre
2005, SGDN/DCSSI
[17] Maintenance Report M-2006/05 - Secure microcontroller ST19WP18-D
Reference certificate: 2005/41, DCSSII
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0373-2007 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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