BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-V2-2014
for
Crypto Library V2.7/2.9 on SmartMX
P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/ V0B(s)
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.76
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-V2-2014
Smart Cards and similar devices: IC, Cryptolib
Crypto Library V2.7/2.9 on SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/ V0B(s)
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version
1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
TThe IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 16 July 2014
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department SOGIS Recognition
Agreement
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-V2-2014
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-V2-2014 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-V2-2014
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................16
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................16
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................17
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................17
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................17
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................22
11 Security Target............................................................................................................22
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................22
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................25
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................27
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................28
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................37
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-V2-2014 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-V2-2014
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.3 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the
EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Crypto Library V2.7/2.9 on SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/ V0B(s) has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011-MA-02. Specific results from the evaluation process
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011-MA-02 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Crypto Library V2.7/2.9 on SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145
V0v/ V0B(s) was conducted by Brightsight BV. The evaluation was completed on 2 July
2014. Brightsight BV is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body
of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH.
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product Crypto Library V2.7/2.9 on SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/ V0B(s) has
been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Stresemannallee 101
22529 Hamburg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-V2-2014 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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1 Executive Summary
The evaluated TOE is “Crypto Library V2.7/V2.9 on SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/
V0B(s)”. This TOE is a composite TOE, consisting of:
• The hardware “NXP SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/ V0B(s) Secure Smart Card
Controller”, which is used as evaluated platform, and all its Major Configurations
• The “Crypto Library V2.7/V2.9 on SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/ V0B(s) ”,
which is built upon this platform.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 4.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SS.RNG Hardware Random Number Generator
SS.HW_AES Hardware AES Co-processor
SS.HW_DES Hardware Triple-DES Co-processor
SF.OPC Control of Operating Conditions
SF.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation
SF.LOG Logical Protection
SF.COMP Protection of Mode Control
SF.MEM_ACC Memory Access Control
SF.SFR_ACC Special Function Register Access Control
F.AES AES encryption and decryption
F.DES DES encryption and decryption
F.RSA_encrypt RSA encryption
F.RSA_sign RSA signature generation and verification
F.RSA_public computation of an RSA public key
F.ECC_GF_p_ECDSA ECC Signature Generation and Verification
F.ECC_GF_p_DH_KeyExch Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
F.RSA_KeyGen generate RSA key pairs
F.ECC_GF_p_KeyGen ECC Key Generation
F.SHA compute Secure Hash Algorithms
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-V2-2014 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
F.RNG_Access software RNG
F.Object_Reuse clearing memory areas
F.LOG Extended Logical Protection
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 5.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 2.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapters 2.2, 2.3 and, 2.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Crypto Library V2.7/2.9 on SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/ V0B(s)
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
Components TOE variation P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0A with MIFARE MSO
1 HW NXP Secure Smart Card
Controllers
P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0A
V0A wafer, module, inlay, package
(dice have nameplate T051A)
2 SW Test-Rom Software for
MIFARE MSO
97 Test-ROM on the chip acc. to:
tmfos_97_collected.ms3
3 SW Boot-ROM Software for
MIFARE MSO
97 Test-ROM on the chip acc. to:
tmfos_97_collected.ms3
4 SW MIFARE Operating System
MSO
97 Test-ROM on the chip acc. to:
tmfos_97_collected.ms3
5 DOC Data Sheet
P5Cx128/P5Cx145 family,
Secure dual interface and
contact PKI smart card
controller
Electronic document
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
6 DOC Instruction Set,
SmartMX-Family, Secure
and PKI Smart Card
Controller
1.1 Electronic document
7 DOC Guidance, Delivery and
Operation Manual NXP
Secure Smartcard
Controllers
P5Cx128/P5Cx145V0v, NXP
Semiconductors, Business
Unit Identification
Electronic document
8 SW Crypto Library 2.7 Electronic File
9 SW Crypto Library 2.9 Electronic File
10 DOC Guidance documents [12] Electronic document
Components TOE variation P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0A with MIFARE FleX™
11 HW NXP Secure Smart Card
Controllers
P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0A
V0A wafer, module, inlay, package
(dice have nameplate T051A)
12 SW Test-ROM Software for
MIFARE FleX™
102 Test-ROM on the chip acc. to:
tmfos_102_collected.hex
13 SW Boot-ROM Software for
MIFARE FleX™
102 Test-ROM on the chip acc. to:
tmfos_102_collected.hex
14 SW MIFARE FleX™ Operating
System
102 Test-ROM on the chip acc. to:
tmfos_102_collected.hex
15 DOC Data Sheet
P5Cx128/P5Cx145 family,
Secure dual interface and
contact PKI smart card
controller
Electronic document
16 DOC Instruction Set,
SmartMX-Family, Secure
and PKI Smart Card
Controller
1.1 Electronic document
17 DOC Guidance, Delivery and
Operation Manual NXP
Secure Smartcard
Controllers
P5Cx128/P5Cx145V0v, NXP
Semiconductors, Business
Unit Identification
Electronic document
18 SW Crypto Library 2.7 Electronic File
19 SW Crypto Library 2.9 Electronic File
20 DOC Guidance documents [12] Electronic document
Components TOE variation P5Cx128/ P5Cx145 V0B with MIFARE FleX™
21 HW NXP Secure Smart Card
Controllers
P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0B
V0B wafer, module, inlay, package
(dice have nameplate T051B)
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
22 SW Test-ROM Software for
MIFARE FleX™
102 Test-ROM on the chip acc. to:
tmfos_102_collected.hex
23 SW Boot-ROM Software for
MIFARE FleX™
102 Test-ROM on the chip acc. to:
tmfos_102_collected.hex
24 SW MIFARE FleX™ Operating
System
102 Test-ROM on the chip acc. to:
tmfos_102_collected.hex
25 DOC Data Sheet
P5Cx128/P5Cx145 family,
Secure dual interface and
contact PKI smart card
controller
Electronic document
26 DOC Instruction Set,
SmartMX-Family, Secure
and PKI Smart Card
Controller
1.1 Electronic document
27 DOC Guidance, Delivery and
Operation Manual NXP
Secure Smartcard
Controllers
P5Cx128/P5Cx145V0v, NXP
Semiconductors, Business
Unit Identification
Electronic document
28 SW Crypto Library 2.7 Electronic File
29 SW Crypto Library 2.9 Electronic File
30 DOC Guidance documents [12] Electronic document
Components TOE variation P5Cx128/ P5Cx145 V0B with MIFARE FleX™
31 HW NXP Secure Smart Card
Controllers
P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0B(s)
V0B(s) wafer, module, inlay, package
(dice have nameplate s051B)
32 SW Test-ROM Software for
MIFARE FleX™
102 Test-ROM on the chip acc. to:
tmfos_102_collected.hex
33 SW Boot-ROM Software for
MIFARE FleX™
102 Test-ROM on the chip acc. to:
tmfos_102_collected.hex
34 SW MIFARE FleX™ Operating
System
102 Test-ROM on the chip acc. to:
tmfos_102_collected.hex
35 DOC Data Sheet
P5Cx128/P5Cx145 family,
Secure dual interface and
contact PKI smart card
controller
Electronic document
36 DOC Instruction Set,
SmartMX-Family, Secure
and PKI Smart Card
Controller
1.1 Electronic document
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
37 DOC Guidance, Delivery and
Operation Manual NXP
Secure Smartcard
Controllers
P5Cx128/P5Cx145V0v, NXP
Semiconductors, Business
Unit Identification
Electronic document
38 SW Crypto Library 2.7 Electronic File
39 SW Crypto Library 2.9 Electronic File
40 DOC Guidance documents [12] Electronic document
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The security policy of the TOE is
to provide basic Security Functions to be used by the smart card operating system and the
smart card application thus providing an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the
TOE will implement algorithms to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption
and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a random number
generator.
The TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to provide
protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of cryptographic
keys during cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), against physical probing,
against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality.
Hence the TOE shall
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the
TOE and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security
Features provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
• Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization
• Usage of Hardware Platform
• Treatment of User Data
• Check of initialisation data by the Smartcard Embedded Software
• Usage of Key-dependent Functions
• Operational Environment for RSA Key Generation function
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 2.2.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-V2-2014 Certification Report
5 Architectural Information
The evaluated TOE is “Crypto Library V2.7/V2.9 on SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/
V0B(s)”. This TOE is a composite TOE, consisting of:
• The hardware “NXP SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/ V0B(s) Secure Smart Card
Controller”, which is used as evaluated platform, and all its Major Configurations
• P5CD145V0A
• P5CC145V0A
• P5CN145V0A
• P5CD128V0A
• P5CC128V0A
• P5CD145V0B
• P5CC145V0B
• P5CN145V0B
• P5CD128V0B
• P5CC128V0B
• P5CD145V0B(s)
• P5CC145V0B(s)
• P5CN145V0B(s)
• P5CD128V0B(s)
• P5CC128V0B(s)
• The “Crypto Library V2.7/V2.9 on SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/ V0B(s) ”,
which is built upon this platform.
The TOE provides AES, DES, Triple-DES (TDES), RSA, RSA key generation, RSA public
key computation, ECC over GF(p), ECC over GF(p) key generation, ECC Diffie-Hellman
key-exchange, SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 algorithms.
In addition, the Crypto Library implements a software (pseudo) random number generator,
which is initialised (seeded) by the hardware random number generator of the SmartMX.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
For the Crypto Library, the developer has defined an extensive test set. The test set covers
all TOE interfaces, and all modes of operation of the implemented algorithms, as well as all
available parameters. Since the TOE is not an end-user product it is not possible to
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perform testing without first embedding it in a testable configuration. To this end, the
developer has created a proprietary test operating system. The main purpose of the test
OS is to provide access to the crypto library’s functionality. The test OS, and its
documentation was provided to the evaluators, and was used in all the testing.
The penetration tests are devised after performing the Evaluator Vulnerability Analysis.
This analysis has followed the following steps: The reference for attack techniques against
which smart card-based devices controllers such as the Crypto Library on SmartMX must
be protected against is the document "Attack methods for smart cards". Additional
guidance for testing was provided by the certification body in the form of a number of
questions regarding the TOE. The vulnerability of the Crypto Library for these attacks has
been analysed in a white box investigation conforming to AVA_VAN.5.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated TOE is “Crypto Library V2.7/V2.9 on SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/
V0B(s)”. There are no additional version or other identification and configuration
characteristics.
The environment of the TOE is characterised by the general environment descriptions in
the Eurosmart Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile:
• OE.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
• OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
• OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing
Additional refinements in the Hardware Security Target are also valid. The TOE assumes
that the Smartcard Embedded Software abides by the provisions detailed in section 4.3
“Security Objectives for the Operational Environment”, and the following additional security
objective for the Smart Card Embedded Software:
• OE.Check-Init Check of initialization data by the Smart Card Embedded Software.
The TOE imposes one additional requirement on the environment:
• OE.RSA-Key-Gen In case that resistance of the fast, but insecure mode of the RSA
Key Generation against side channel attacks is needed, the operational
environment shall ensure that side-channel attacks cannot be performed.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
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(iii) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations
have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(see [4]4], AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 37).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a
re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011-MA-02, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on vulnerability
analysis, penetration testing and changes to the Security Target.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June
2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
1 Cryptographic
Primitive
DES FIPS 46-3 (DES) 56 no
2 DES in ECB, CBC,
CBC-MAC mode
FIPS 46-3 (DES),
SP 800-38A (ECB),
SP 800-38A (CBC),
ISO 9797-1, Alg. 1
(CBC-MAC)
56 no
3 TDES FIPS 46-3 (DES) 112 no
4 TDES FIPS 46-3 (DES) 168 yes
5 TDES in ECB mode FIPS 46-3 (DES),,
SP 800-38A (ECB)
112, 168 no
6 TDES in CBC,
CBC-MAC mode
FIPS 46-3 (DES),
SP 800-38A (CBC),
ISO 9797-1, Alg. 1
(CBC-MAC)
112 no
7 TDES in CBC,
CBC-MAC mode
FIPS 46-3 (DES),
SP 800-38A (CBC),
ISO 9797-1, Alg. 1
(CBC-MAC)
168 yes
8 AES FIPS 197 (AES) 128, 192, 256 yes
9 AES in ECB mode FIPS197 (AES),
SP 800-38A (ECB
128, 192, 256 no
10 AES in CBC,
CBC-MAC mode
FIPS197 (AES),
SP 800-38A (CBC),
ISO 9797-1, Alg. 1
(CBC-MAC)
128, 192, 256 yes
11 SHA-1 FIPS 180-2 (SHA) None no
12 SHA-{224,256} FIPS 180-2 (SHA) None yes
13 RSA signature
generation and
verification
(RSASSA-PSS)
PKCS#1 v2.1 (RSA) modulus length =
256-1975
no
14 RSA signature
generation and
verification
(RSASSA-PSS)
PKCS#1 v2.1 (RSA) modulus length =
1976-5024
yes
15 RSA signature
generation and
verification without
EMSA-PSS
(RSASP1, RSAVP1)
PKCS#1 v2.1 (RSA) modulus length =
256-1975
no
16 RSA signature
generation and
PKCS#1 v2.1 (RSA) modulus length =
1976-5024
yes
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
verification without
EMSA-PSS
(RSASP1, RSAVP1)
17 RSA public key
computation
(RSAEP, RSAVP1)
PKCS#1 v2.1 (RSA) modulus length =
256-1975
no
18 RSA public key
computation
(RSAEP, RSAVP1)
PKCS#1 v2.1 (RSA) modulus length =
1976-2048 (Straight
Forward) or
1976-4096 (CRT)
yes
19
ECDSA signature
generation and
verification
[ISO 14888-3]
(ECDSA)
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curves secp{192}r1
(SEC2) and
brainpoolP{192}r1
(RFC 5639)
No
20
ECDSA signature
generation and
verification
[ISO 14888-3]
(ECDSA)
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curves
secp{224,256,384,
521}r1 (SEC2) and
brainpoolP{224,256,
320,384,512}r1
(RFC 5639)
Yes
21
ECDH [ISO 11770-3] Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curves secp{192}r1
(SEC2) and
brainpoolP{192}r1
(RFC 5639)
No
22
ECDH [ISO 11770-3] Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curves
secp{224,256,384,
521}r1 (SEC2) and
brainpoolP{224,256,
320,384,512}r1
(RFC 5639)
Yes
23 RSA encryption and
decryption without
EME-OAEP
(RSAEP, RSADP)
PKCS#1 v2.1 (RSA) modulus length =
256-1975
no
24 RSA encryption and
decryption without
EME-OAEP
(RSAEP, RSADP)
PKCS#1 v2.1 (RSA) modulus length =
1976-5024
yes
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
25 Confidentiality RSA encryption and
decryption
(RSAES-OAEP)
PKCS#1 v2.1 (RSA) modulus length =
256-1975
no
26 RSA encryption and
decryption
(RSAES-OAEP)
PKCS#1 v2.1 (RSA) modulus length =
1976-5024
yes
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional
configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Support
Software or Embedded Software.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
guidelines for the developer of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Embedded
Software on how to securely use the microcontroller chip and which measures have to be
implemented in the software in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security
Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the software.
Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the
evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10].
The Security Target, the user guidance and the ETR for Composition have changed
between the issuance of the original certificate and this revision of the certificate. The
TOE’s software and hardware components have not changed. Earlier users of this TOE,
e.g. developers of a software platform or application on top, are advised to examine the
renewed Security Target and guidance, and assess the impact on their composite
solutions. Users of the old certificate revision should examine the impact on their
composition of these additional restrictions by a re-assessment or re-certification making
use of the new ETR for Composition Document.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
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the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
DES Data Encryption Standard
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECB Electronic Codebook Mode
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MAC Message Authentication Code
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
ST Security Target
TDES Triple-DES
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-V2-2014, Version 1.7, 26 June 2014, Crypto
Library V2.7/2.9 on SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/ V0B(s), NXP
Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification (confidential document)
[7] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
[8] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-V2-2014, Version 1.7, 26 June 2014, Crypto
Library V2.7/2.9 on SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/ V0B(s), NXP
Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification (sanitised public document)
[9] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.0, 26 June 2014, Evaluation Technical
Report Crypto Library V2.7/2.9 on SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/ V0B(s)
EAL5+, Brightsight, (confidential document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36, Version 1.0, 26 June 2014, ETR
for composition Crypto Library V2.7/V2.9 on SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145 according
to AIS36, Brightsight (confidential document)
[11] Configuration list:
• List of Configuration Items for Crypto Library v2.7 on P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/
V0B(s), June 23, 2014
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1)
and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 1, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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• List of Configuration Items for Crypto Library v2.9 on P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/
V0B(s), June 23, 2014
[12] Guidance documentation for the TOE:
• Secured Crypto Library on the P5Cx128/P5Cx145 family, Revision 1.8, June 6,
2014
• AES Library User Guidance Manual “Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX”, Rev.
1.2 – 19 August 2010
• Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX. DES Library, Revision 3.2, May 8, 2013
• ECC over GF(p) User Guidance Manual “Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX”,
Rev. 1.4 – 30 March 2010
• Random Number Generator User Guidance Manual “Secured Crypto Library on the
SmartMX”, Rev. 5.0 – 24 August 2007
• RSA Library User Guidance Manual “Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX”, Rev.
4.5, 15 April 2010
• RSA Key Generation User Guidance Manual “Secured Crypto Library on the
SmartMX”, Rev. 4.3 – 30 March 2010
• SHA Library User Guidance Manual “Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX”, Rev.
4.1 – 12 June 2008
• Utility Library User Guidance Manual “Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX”,
Rev. 1.0 – 24 August 2007
[13] Certification report. NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD128V0v/ V0B(s),
P5CC128V0v/ V0B(s), P5CD145V0v/ V0B(s), P5CC145V0v/ V0B(s),
P5CN145V0v/V0B(s), BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013, Revision 1.0, June 12, 2013
[14] ETR for composition according to AIS36. NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers
P5CD128V0A/B, P5CD128V0B(s), P5CC128V0A/B, P5CC128V0B(s),
P5CD145V0A/B, P5CD145V0B(s), P5CC145V0A/B, P5CC145V0B(s),
P5CN145V0A/B, P5CN145V0B(s). Revision 1.0, April 22, 2013
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-V2-2014
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Crypto Library V2.7/2.9 on SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/ V0B(s)
(Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using
the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by
advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for
the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 16 July 2014, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2) are fulfilled for the development and production
sites of the TOE listed below:
• BU ID Hamburg
• Requirements, Functional Specification, High-Level Design, Analysis,
Low-Level Design , Coding, Design Review, Testing, Code Review, Delivery,
Maintenance, User Guidance, Documentation, Tools, Configuration
management
• NXP Gratkorn
• Providing documentation to customer
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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