BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-V2-2018
for
KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor
v1.3.4
from
KoCo Connector GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-V2-2018 (*)
KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor
v1.3.4
from KoCo Connector GmbH
PP Conformance: Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile)
Schutzprofil 1: Anforderungen an den
Netzkonnektor (NK-PP), Version 3.2.2, 11.04.2016,
BSI-CC-PP-0047-2015
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_TDS.3,
ADV_IMP.1, ALC_TAT.1, AVA_VAN.5, ALC_FLR.2
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and
ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 13 February 2018
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-V2-2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-V2-2018 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................7
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................7
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................7
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................8
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................9
5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................9
6. Publication...................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................14
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................14
6. Documentation............................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................14
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................20
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................21
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................21
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................27
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................29
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-V2-2018 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-V2-2018
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the component AVA_VAN.5 that
are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the SOGIS MRA. For
mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-V2-2018 Certification Report
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor, v1.3.4 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017. Specific
results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor, v1.3.4 was conducted by
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 10.11.2017. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: KoCo Connector GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 13 February
2018 is valid until 12 February 2023. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-V2-2018
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor, v1.3.4 has been included in the BSI list of
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
KoCo Connector GmbH
Dessauer Str. 28/29
10963 Berlin
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-V2-2018 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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1. Executive Summary
The target of evaluation (TOE) is KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor, Version 1.3.4. The TOE
is the network connector (German: “Netzkonnektor”) and a small part of the application
connector (German “Anwendungskonnektor”) of the so-called “KoCoBox MED+” connector
(German: “Konnektor”). The TOE is part of a secure platform called KoCoBox MED+ which
is used as an “e-Health Konnektor” in the context of the German health care telematics
infrastructure.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile) Schutzprofil 1:
Anforderungen an den Netzkonnektor (NK-PP), Version 3.2.2, 11.04.2016, BSI-CC-PP-
0047-2015 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 3
augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_TDS.3, ADV_IMP.1, ALC_TAT.1, AVA_VAN.5,
ALC_FLR.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.VPN VPN Client
SF.DynamicPacketFilter Firewall with stateful packet inspection
SF.NetworkServices DHCP, DNS and NTP networking services
SF.SelfProtection Self-tests, attack counter mechanisms, deletion of confidential data and
non-emanation of data
SF.Audit Secure audit
SF.Administration Secure administration channels and update mechanism
SF.CryptographicServices Cryptographic services required by other functionality
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target, chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapters 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-V2-2018 Certification Report
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor, v1.3.4
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 FW Firmware Image 1.3.4 Either:
Initially included in the e-Health Konnektor
product KoCoBox MED+
or as a software update package via KSR
process.
2 DOC KoCoBox MED+ Allgemeine
Gebrauchsanleitung
Purpose: Guide for the end user
1.3.4 Delivered with the delivery package of the
product KoCoBox MED+.
3 DOC Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox
MED+ für die Komponente
Netzkonnektor
Purpose: Guide for the Administrator
1.3.4 Delivered to the authorized service
technician, who installs the TOE at the end
user site. The service technician performs
administration tasks.
4 DOC Guidance addendum documentation
(„Ergänzungen zum
Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox
MED+ für die Komponente
Netzkonnektor“)
1.0.3 See 3.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
TOE Delivery Process
The TOE is delivered to the end user as part of the product KoCoBox MED+. An
authorized service technician will deliver the product to the end user. The service
technician installs the product KoCoBox MED+ within the premises of the end user. Prior
to installation, the service technician must be identified via a photo ID by the end user. The
service technician is trained, instructs the end user and provides security advice.
TOE Identification
The TOE can be identified within the KoCoBox MED+ follows:
● Display
• OK to enter the Menu
• Select 4 for Version
Identification: Firmwareversion 1.3.4, Hardwareversion 2.0.0
● Web Administration Interface:
• Check the entry Firmware on the status page of the Web Administration Interface
Identification: Produktversion: 1.3.4:2.0.0
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-V2-2018
The hardware is not part of the TOE and therefore not relevant for the TOE identification.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Security Audit,
● Cryptographic Support,
● User Data Protection,
● Identification and Authentication,
● Security Management,
● Protection of the TSF,
● Trusted Path/Channels.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.NK.phys_Schutz: The TOE must be physically protected against unauthorized
access,
● OE.NK.Admin_EVG: The TOE must be configured by a trustworthy and well trained
administrator, who operates the TOE according to the guidance.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
A high level description of the IT product and its major components can be found in the
Security Target [6], chapter 1.4.7.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Developer's Test
TOE test configurations:
The Security Target [6] has not identified different TOE variants or configurations. Only the
released TOE is referenced. Nevertheless, the developer uses two firmware variants for
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-V2-2018 Certification Report
blackbox and for whitebox testing. For test configuration, the developer used two
preparative and four test configurations. Environment simulation is also used.
TOE test environment configurations:
The assumptions and objectives for the operational environment stated in [6] are not
applicable for testing. Nevertheless, the developer uses five test environment
configurations which cover a large amount of the real environment.
Testing approach:
● Coverage and depth tests are done together.
● The test specifications give mappings to the tested TSFI(s), SFR(s), subsystem(s), and
module(s).
● Different testing approaches are used:
• Code analysis,
• Blackbox tests:
• Manual,
• Automatic.
• Whitebox tests:
• Manual,
• Automatic.
● The test descriptions comprise (inter alia):
• Pre conditions: preparative steps,
• Test steps: Core test steps,
• Post conditions: clearance steps to tidy up before the next test.
● Testing results: The developer’s testing efforts have been proven sufficient to
demonstrate that the TSFIs and subsystems perform as expected.
All test cases in each test scenario were run successfully on the TOE and they all passed
according to their expected result.
Evaluator Tests
TOE test configurations:
The evaluation body used the same test configurations and test environment as the
developer during functional testing.
Test subset chosen:
The evaluation body chose to repeat and inspect a broad set of developer tests. Effectively
more than 50% of the tests were covered.
Interface selection criteria:
The evaluation body chose to broadly cover the existing interfaces without specific
restrictions.
Interfaces tested:
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Services at the LAN and the WAN ports were considered during testing.
Developer tests performed:
The evaluation body chose to perform a random sampling with the intent to broadly cover
the existing interfaces and the implemented security functionality.
Verdict for the sub-activity:
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
Penetration Testing
The configuration defined in the ST was tested. Furthermore, different TOE variants were
used during penetration testing to verify different mechanisms.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually
successful.
● Penetration testing approach:
The evaluation body conducted penetration testing based on functional areas of concern
derived from SFRs and architectural mechanisms. The areas were prioritized with
regard to various factors, e.g. attack surface, estimated flaw likelihood, developer testing
coverage and detectability of flaws during developer testing.
Medium and high areas were guaranteed to be penetration tested, with a stronger
emphasis on high priorities. Low priorities were also considered during penetration, but
could be less emphasized, if developer tests were found to be sufficient.
The penetration testing activities were performed as tests and as analytical tasks.
Whenever an analysis was estimated to yield better results, the evaluators chose the
analytical approach. Analytical activities were especially applied in the areas Update,
Random Number Generation and Hardening Mechanisms. Combined approaches were
also applied.
● TOE test configurations:
The TOE was delivered by the developer in two different configurations: A release TOE
and a special ATE variant. The ATE variant is an enhanced variant of the software
running on the same hardware and using the same smart cards (gSMC-K). The ATE
configuration is used to enable tests that are not possible due to security mechanisms
applied in the release TOE. The differences between release TOE and the ATE variant
are clearly defined. Therefore, two goals can be achieved:
(1) Perform detailed testing using the target hardware and smart card,
(2) ensure that the test results of the ATE variant are also valid for the TOE.
During the evaluation process, the TOE was updated several times. Penetration tests
were performed with versions 1.3.0 and 1.3.4. The developer provided a change
analysis which documents, the differences between the versions. The evaluation body
did not identify changes that would render the 1.3.0 test results invalid for 1.3.4. The
most important tests were conducted with the final version 1.3.4.
● Attack scenarios having been tested:
The evaluation body considered security analysis and penetration testing in the following
areas:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-V2-2018 Certification Report
• VPN Connections,
• Administration Connections,
• Random Number Generation,
• Update,
• Hardening Mechanisms,
• Filtering and Routing,
• Self-Protection,
• Network Services,
• Audit.
● Tested security functionality:
The evaluator ensured that all areas listed above are tested. Actually, the evaluation
body used a more detailed list during the analysis and testing. The penetration testing
was then conducted based on priorities as described above. Therefore, a complete
coverage of security functional testing based on technical areas of concern is performed.
● Verdict for the sub-activity:
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment provided that all measures required by
the developer are applied.
Summary of Test Results and Effectiveness Analysis
The TOE testing did not reveal vulnerabilities exploitable by an attacker with high attack
potential.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The evaluation results are only valid for the single configuration defined in the Security
Target [6].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-V2-2018
● All components of the EAL 3 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ADV_FSP.4, ADV_TDS.3, ADV_IMP.1, ALC_TAT.1, AVA_VAN.5,
ALC_FLR.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on
● Support of new TLS cipher suites with elliptic curve ECDHE key exchange and GCM
mode of operation,
● Update of software components, and
● Detail implementation changes according to changes of the gematik specification.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile) Schutzprofil 1:
Anforderungen an den Netzkonnektor (NK-PP), Version 3.2.2,
11.04.2016, BSI-CC-PP-0047-2015 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_TDS.3, ADV_IMP.1,
ALC_TAT.1, AVA_VAN.5, ALC_FLR.2
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Comment
1 Authenticity RSA signature
verification with
encoding RSASSA-
PSS and RSASSA-
PKCS1-1.5 using
SHA-256
[PKCS#1] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
2048 FPT_TDC.1/NK.Zert,
FCS_COP.1/TLS,
FCS_COP.1/Sign
2 Authentication RSA signature
creation with support
of gSMC-K and
verification with
encoding RSASSA-
PKCS1-1.5 using
SHA-256
(sha256withRSAEncr
yption)
[PKCS#1] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
2048 FCS_COP.1/NK.Auth,
FCS_COP.1/TLS
3 Key
Agreement
Diffie-Hellman
(IKEv2) with key
derivation function
[HaC] (DH)
[RFC2526] (dh-group),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
2048 (dh-
group 14) with
DH exponent
FCS_CKM.2/NK.IKE
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Comment
PRF-HMAC-{SHA-1,
SHA-256}
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC5996] (IKEv2)
length ≥ 384
bits
4 Diffie-Hellman with
TLS key derivation
function
[HaC] (DH)
[RFC2526] (dh-group),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC1321] (MD5),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC4346] (TLSv1.1)
[RFC5246] (TLSv1.2)
2048 (dh-
group 14) with
DH exponent
length ≥ 384
bits
FCS_COP.1/TLS
5 EC Diffie-Hellman
with TLS key
derivation function
[SEC1] (ECDH),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC1321] (MD5),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC4346] (TLSv1.1)
[RFC5246] (TLSv1.2)
Key sizes
corresponding
to the used
elliptic curves
P-{256,384}
[FIPS186-4]
and
brainpoolP{25
6,384}r1
[RFC7027]
FCS_COP.1/TLS
6 Confidentiality AES in CBC [FIPS197] (AES),
[RFC3602] (AES-
CBC)
256 FCS_COP.1/NK.ESP,
FCS_COP.1/NK.IPsec
,
FCS_CKM.2/NK.IKE
7 AES in CBC [FIPS197] (AES),
[RFC3602] (AES-
CBC)
128, 256 FCS_COP.1/TLS
8 Integrity HMAC with SHA-{1,
256} (IKE, IPsec)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC2404],
[RFC4868],
[RFC5996] (IKEv2)
160, 256 FCS_COP.1/NK.HMA
C
9 HMAC with SHA-1
(TLS)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC2404],
[RFC4868],
[RFC5996] (IKEv2)
160 FCS_COP.1/TLS
10 Trusted
Channel
IKEv2, IPsec [RFC5996] (IKEv2)
[RFC4301] (IPsec),
[RFC4303] (ESP)
FTP_ITC.1/NK.VPN_
TI
11 IKEv2, IPsec [RFC5996] (IKEv2)
[RFC4301] (IPsec),
[RFC4303] (ESP)
FTP_ITC.1/NK.VPN_
SIS
12 TLS v1.1 and v1.2 [RFC4346] (TLSv1.1),
[RFC5246] (TLSv1.2)
FTP_TRP.1/NK.Admin
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
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The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
According to [gemSpec_Kon], [gemSpec_Krypt] and [TR03116-1] the algorithms are
suitable for the corresponding purpose.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comment
1 Authenticity RSA signature
verification with
encoding RSASSA-
PSS using SHA-256
[PKCS#1] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
4096 yes FCS_COP.1/
Sign for
x.509
certificate
verification
2 RSA signature
verification with
encoding RSASSA-
PSS using SHA-512
[PKCS#1] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
2048 yes FCS_COP.1/
Sign for
firmware
update
signatures
verification
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality (Firmware update)
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
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11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DH Diffie-Hellman
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
eGK Elektronische Gesundheitskarte
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
gSMC-K Secure module for the connector
HBA Heilberufsausweis
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE Internet Key Exchange Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
IPSec Internet Protocol Security
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
KSR Konfigurations- und Software-Repository
LAN Local Area Network
MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm 5
NK Network connector
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SFP Security Function Policy
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SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIS Secure Internet Service
SMC-B Secure Module Card – Type B: Praxisausweis / Institutionsausweis
ST Security Target
TI Telematikinfrastruktur
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VPN Virtual Private Network
WAN Wide Area Network
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
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Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-V2-2018, Version 1.8.5, 18 October 2017,
KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor Common Criteria Certification Security Target,
KoCo Connektor GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 10 November 2017, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile) Schutzprofil 1: Anforderungen an
den Netzkonnektor (NK-PP), Version 3.2.2, 11.04.2016, BSI-CC-PP-0047-2015
[9] Configuration list for the TOE (confidential documents):
• KoCo-Box_Med+_NK_Konfiguration Items N-Design (ALC_CMS.3 +
ADV_IMP.1)_v1.3.4.xlsx, n-design GmbH, Version 1.3.4
• Konfiguration_items_osc_(ALC_CMS.3+ADV_IMP.1)_v1.3.4.xlsx, os-cillation
GmbH, Version 1.3.4
[10] Guidance documentation for the TOE:
• KoCoBox MED+ Allgemeine Gebrauchsanleitung, KoCo Connektor GmbH,
Version 1.3.4, 25 October 2017
• Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox MED+ für die Komponente Netzkonnektor,
KoCo Connektor GmbH, Version 1.3.4, 8 November 2017
• Ergänzungen zum Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox MED+ für die
Komponente Netzkonnektor, KoCo Connektor GmbH, Version 1.0.3, 13
October 2017
[11] Implementation standards:
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
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[Brainpool] ECC Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation. Version 1.0,
October 19, 2005.
[HaC] A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot und O. Vanstone. Handbook of Applied
Cryptography. CRCPress, 1996.
[FIPS180-4] FIPS PUB 180-4 Secure Hash Signature Standard (SHS), NIST,
March 2012
[FIPS186-4] FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS
PUBLICATION 186-4: Digital Signature Standard (DSS); National Institute of
Standards and Technology, July 2013
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197:
ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), NIST, November 2001
[PKCS#1] B. Kaliski: PKCS #1: RSA Encryption, Version 2.1, RFC 3447, Version
2.2, October 2012
[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm ", April 1992.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, „HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
for Message Authentication", February 1997
[RFC2404] The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH, Network Working
Group, November 1998
[RFC3268] Chown, P., Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Cipher suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS), June 2002
[RFC3526] More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for
Internet Key Exchange (IKE), May 2003
[RFC3602] S .Frankel, R. Glenn, S. Kelly: The AES-CBC Cipher Algorithm and
Its Use with IPsec. September 2003
[RFC4301] Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol (IPsec), S. Kent, K.
Seo, December 2005
[RFC4303] IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), RFC 4303 (ESP), S. Kent,
December 2005
[RFC4346] The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1, T. Dierks,
E. Rescorla, April 2006
[RFC4868] Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with
IPsec, S. Kelly, S. Frankel, May 2007
[RFC5246] The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, RFC 5246,
Network Working Group
[RFC5996] The Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2), D. Harkins,
D. Carrel, September 2010
[RFC7027] Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Curves for Transport
Layer Security (TLS), RFC 7027, J. Merkle, M. Lochter,
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7027.txt, October 2013
[SEC1] SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Certicom Research. Version 2.0,
21.05.2009, http://www.secg.org/download/aid-780/sec1-v2.pdf
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[SP800-38A] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation – Methods
and Techniques, December 2001
[SP800-38B] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The
CMAC Mode for Authentication, May 2005
[SP800-38D] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, November 2007
[SP800-90A] Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit Generators, NIST Special Publication 800-90A,
Revision 1, June 2015
[12] Application standards:
[gemSpec_Kon] Einführung der Gesundheitskarte: Konnektorspezifikation,
gematik Gesellschaft für Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte mbH,
Version 4.6.0, 26.08.2014
[gemSpec_Krypt] Einführung der Gesundheitskarte - Verwendung
kryptographischer Algorithmen in der Telematikinfrastruktur, gematik
Gesellschaft für Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte mbH, Version
2.3.0, 17.06.2014
[TR03116-1] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116-1, Kryptographische Vorgaben
für die eCard-Projekte für der Bundesregierung, Teil 1: Telematikinfrastruktur,
Technische Arbeitsgruppe TR-03116, 30.01.2014 (Version 3.18)
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.4
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 11
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 12 to 16
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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Note: End of report
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