ChipDoc v3 on JCOP 4 P71 in
ICAO EAC with PACE
configuration
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Rev. 1.0 — 12 February 2020
Final
Evaluation documentation
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Keywords Common Criteria, Security Target Lite, ChipDoc v3, JCOP 4 P71, ICAO
EAC, PACE
Abstract Security Target Lite of ChipDoc v3 application on JCOP 4 P71 in ICAO
EAC with PACE configuration, which is developed and provided by NXP
Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification according to the Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 at
Evaluation Assurance Level 5 augmented.
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Contact information
For more information, please visit: http://www.nxp.com
For sales office addresses, please send an email to: salesaddresses@nxp.com
Revision history
Rev Date Description
1.0 2020-02-12 Initial Version of this Security Target Lite
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1. ST Introduction (ASE_INT)
1.1 ST Reference and TOE Reference
Table 1. ST Reference and TOE Reference
Title ChipDoc v3 on JCOP 4 P71 in ICAO EAC with PACE configuration
Security Target Lite
Version Revision 1.0
Date 2020-02-12
Product Type Java Card Applet
TOE Name ChipDoc v3 on JCOP 4 P71 in ICAO EAC with PACE configuration
Version 3.0.0.52
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version
3.1, Revision 5, April 2017 (Part 1 [1], Part 2 [2] and Part 3 [3])
1.2 TOE Overview
Fig 1. Components of the TOE
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The TOE consists of an applet which is executed by a software stack that is stored on a
Micro Controller. For a complete picture of the TOE see Figure 1, and for details with
regards to the different components see section 1.3.1.
The protection profiles [5] and [6] define the security objectives and requirements for the
contactless chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the
requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO). This ST extends this PP to contact, contactless and dual interface smartcard
modules. It addresses the advanced security methods Basic Access Control (BAC),
Standard Inspection Procedure (PACE), Extended Access Control (EAC) and Chip
Authentication similar to the Active Authentication in the Technical reports of ‘ICAO Doc
9303’ [11] and [12] for SAC (also known as PACE mechanism defined in [6]).
ChipDoc v3 passport application is configurable in BAC or EAC with PACE chip
authentication modes, with or without Active Authentication [11]. Also, it supports contact
and contactless communication.
This ST applies to the EAC with PACE configuration with or without Active
Authentication.
Note that there is no non-TOE hardware/software/firmware that is required by the TOE.
1.2.1 TOE Usage and Security Features for Operational Use
The ChipDoc v3 application offers variety of applications like electronic identification
(eID), electronic driver’s license (eDL) or electronic passport (ePP), subject of the current
TOE.
A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel.
The traveler presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The
MRTD in context of this TOE contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and
portrait of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine
reading using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements
on the MRTD’s chip (such as CAN for PACE authentication) according to LDS for
contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveler is based on (i) the
possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given
on the biographical data page and (ii) optional biometrics using the reference data stored
in the MRTD. The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of
genuine MRTD’s. The receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or
Organization.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain
the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport
book and the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the Document Number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on
paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and
organizational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures)
[11]. These security measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport
book.
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The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created
by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security
features of the MRTD’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods (Passive Authentication) and the
optional advanced security methods (BAC and/or SAC to the logical MRTD, Active
Authentication of the MRTD’s chip, EAC to the logical MRTD and the Data Encryption of
additional sensitive biometrics) as optional security measure in the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [11].
The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed
completely and independently on the TOE by the TOE environment.
This TOE addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by write only- once
access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the EAC Mechanism.
This TOE addresses the AA as an optional security mechanism.
1.3 TOE Description
1.3.1 General
The TOE is an MRTD IC where application software is loaded to FLASH, and the TOE
can be assembled in a variety of form factors. The main form factor is the electronic
passport, a paper book passport embedding a contactless module.
The followings are an informal and non-exhaustive list of example graphic
representations of possible end products embedding the TOE:
• Contactless interface cards and modules
• Dual interface cards and modules
• Contact only cards and modules
The scope of this TOE is covered in section 1.3.1 above.
The TOE is linked to a MRTD reader via its HW and physical interfaces.
• The contactless type interface of the TOE smartcard is ISO/IEC 14443 compliant.
• The optional contact type interface of the TOE smartcard is ISO/IEC 7816 compliant.
• The optional interfaces of the TOE SOIC-8 are ISO 9141 compliant.
• The optional interfaces of the TOE QNF-44 are JEDEC compliant.
There are no other external interfaces of the TOE except the ones described above.
The antenna and the packaging, including their external interfaces, are out of the
scope of this TOE.
The TOE may be applied to a contact reader or to a contactless reader, depending on
the external interface type(s) available in its form factor. The readers are connected to a
computer and allow application programs (APs) to use the TOE.
The TOE can embed other secure functionalities, but they are not in the scope of this
TOE and subject to an evaluation in other TOEs.
1.3.2 MRTD’s Chip
For this TOE the MRTD is viewed as unit of
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1. The physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It
presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the
MRTD holder
a. the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
b. the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and
c. the printed portrait.
2. The logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [11] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents
contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD
holder
a. the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
b. the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
c. the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or
both,
d. the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
e. the Document security object.
This TOE addresses the protection of the logical MRTD:
• in integrity by write-only-once access control and by physical means, and
• in confidentiality by the SAC and Extended Access Control Mechanism.
This TOE addresses the Chip Authentication described in [12] as an alternative to the
Active Authentication stated in [11].
1.3.3 Basic Access Control
The confidentiality by Basic Access Control (BAC) is a mandatory security feature that is
implemented by the TOE. For BAC, the inspection system
(i) reads optically the MRTD,
(ii) authenticates itself as an inspection system by means of Document Basic Access
Keys.
After successful authentication of the inspection system the MRTD’s chip provides read
access to the logical MRTD by means of private communication (secure messaging) with
this inspection system [11], normative appendix 5.
In compliance with the ICAO Extended protection profile [5], this ST requires the TOE to
implement the Chip Authentication defined in [12]. The Chip Authentication prevents data
traces described in [11], informative appendix 7, A7.3.3. The Chip Authentication is
provided by the following steps:
(i) the inspection system communicates by means of secure messaging established
by Basic Access Control,
(ii) the inspection system reads and verifies by means of the Passive Authentication
the authenticity of the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Public Key using the
Document Security Object,
(iii) the inspection system generates an ephemeral key pair,
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(iv) the TOE and the inspection system agree on two session keys for secure
messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to the Diffie-Hellman Primitive and
(v)the inspection system verifies by means of received message authentication
codes whether the MRTD’s chip was able or not to run this protocol properly (i.e.
the TOE proves to be in possession of the Chip Authentication Private Key
corresponding to the Chip Authentication Public Key used for derivation of the
session keys).
The Chip Authentication requires collaboration of the TOE and the TOE environment.
1.3.4 PACE
The confidentiality by Password Authenticated Access Control (PACE) is a mandatory
security feature of the TOE. The travel document shall strictly conform to the “Common
Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection
Procedure with PACE (PACE PP)” [6]. Note that [6] considers high attack potential.
For the PACE protocol according to [14], the following steps shall be performed:
(i) The travel document’s chip encrypts a nonce with the shared password, derived
from the MRZ resp. CAN data and transmits the encrypted nonce together with
the domain parameters to the terminal
(ii) The terminal recovers the nonce using the shared password, by (physically)
reading the MRZ resp. CAN data.
(iii) The travel document’s chip and terminal computer perform a Diffie-Hellman key
agreement together with the ephemeral domain parameters to create a shared
secret. Both parties derive the session keys KMAC and KENC from the shared
secret.
(iv) Each party generates an authentication token, sends it to the other party and
verifies the received token.
1.3.5 Extended Access Control
In compliance with the ICAO Extended protection profile [5], this ST requires the TOE to
implement the Extended Access Control as defined in [12]. The Extended Access Control
consists of two parts:
(i) the Chip Authentication Protocol and
(ii) the Terminal Authentication Protocol.
The Chip Authentication Protocol:
(i) authenticates the MRTD’s chip to the inspection system and
(ii) establishes secure messaging which is used by Terminal Authentication to protect
the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data during
their transmission from the TOE to the inspection system.
Therefore Terminal Authentication can only be performed if Chip Authentication has been
successfully executed. The Terminal Authentication Protocol consists of
(i) the authentication of the inspection system as entity authorized by the receiving
State or Organization through the issuing State, and
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(ii) an access control by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive biometric reference
data only to successfully authenticated authorized inspection systems.
The issuing State or Organization authorizes the receiving State by means of certification
the authentication public keys of Document Verifiers who create Inspection System
Certificate.
1.3.6 Active Authentication
This TOE offers an optional mechanism called Active Authentication and specified in [12]
section 1.2. This security feature is a digital security feature that prevents cloning by
introducing a chip-individual key pair:
(i) The public key is stored in data group DG15 and thus protected by Passive
Authentication.
(ii) The corresponding private key is stored in secure memory and may only be used
internally by the MRTD chip and cannot be read out.
Thus, the chip can prove knowledge of this private key in a challenge-response protocol,
which is called Active Authentication. In this protocol the MRTD chip digitally signs a
challenge randomly chosen by the inspection system. The inspection system recognizes
that the MRTD chip is genuine if and only if the returned signature is correct. Active
Authentication is a straightforward protocol and prevents cloning very effectively but
introduces a privacy threat: Challenge Semantics (see Appendix F for a discussion on
Challenge Semantics).
1.3.7 TOE Components and Composite Certification
The certification of this TOE is a composite certification. This means that for the
certification of this TOE other certifications of components which are part of this TOE are
re-used. In the following sections more detailed descriptions of the components of Figure
1 are provided. In the description it is also made clear whether a component is covered
by a previous certification or whether it is covered in the certification of this TOE.
Micro Controller
The Micro Controller is a secure smart card controller from NXP’s SmartMX3 family. The
Micro Controller contains a co-processor for symmetric cryptographic operations,
supporting DES and AES, as well as an accelerator for asymmetric cryptographic
algorithms. The Micro Controller further contains a physical random number generator.
The supported memory technologies are volatile (Random Access Memory (RAM)) and
non-volatile (Read Only Memory (ROM) and FLASH) memory.
Access to all memory types is controlled by a Memory Management Unit (MMU) which
allows to separate and restrict access to parts of the memory.
The Micro Controller has been certified in a previous certification and the results are re-
used for this certification. The exact reference to the previous certification is given in the
following table:
Table 2. Reference to Certified Micro Controller with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto
Library
Name NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated
Software and Crypto Library
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Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1040
Reference [26]
Security IC Dedicated IC Software
Micro Controller Firmware
The Micro Controller Firmware is used for testing of the Micro Controller at production,
for booting of the Micro Controller after power-up or after reset, for configuration of
communication devices and for writing data to volatile and non-volatile memory.
The Micro Controller Firmware has been certified together with the Micro Controller (refer
to Table 2) and the same references [26] as given for the Micro Controller also apply for
the Micro Controller Firmware.
Crypto Library
The Crypto Library provides implementations for symmetric and asymmetric
cryptographic operations, hashing, the generation of hybrid deterministic and hybrid
physical random numbers and further tools like secure copy and compare. The
symmetric cryptographic operations comprise the algorithms 3DES, AES and
KoreanSEED, where these algorithms use the symmetric co-processor of the Micro
Controller. The supported asymmetric cryptographic operations are ECC and RSA.
These algorithms use the Public Key Crypto Coprocessor (PKCC) of the Micro Controller
for the cryptographic operations.
The Crypto Library has been certified together with the Micro Controller (refer to Table 2)
and the same references [26] as given for the Micro Controller also apply.
Security IC Embedded Software
JCOP 4 P71
The Operating System consists of JCVM, JCRE, JCAPI and GP framework. It is
implemented according to the Java Card Specification and GlobalPlatform and has been
certified in the course of a previous certification, where the results are re-used for this
certification. The exact reference to the certification is given in the following table:
Table 3. Reference to certified Platform
Name JCOP 4 P71
Configurations relevant for this TOE JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.00.4
JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.01.4
Certification ID NSCIB-CC-180212
Reference [27]
ChipDoc v3 application:
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS)
[11] and providing the EAC and SAC mechanisms according to the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [11]
and BSI TR-03110 [15], respectively.
The TOE comprises at least:
• the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (N7121 IC)
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• the IC Embedded Software (JCOP 4 P71 Operating System)
• the MRTD application (ChipDoc v3 applet in ICAO configuration)
• the associated guidance documentation
1.3.8 TOE Lifecycle
The TOE lifecycle is shown in Fig 2 TOE Life Cycle. Described in terms of the four life
cycle phases (subdivided to 7 steps) mentioned in PP0055 [3], but with a refinement in
pre-personalisation, to support platform patching by the MRTD manufacturer who
operates from a CC certified site.
The IC Developer, IC Manufacturer as well as the MRTD Embedded Software Developer
of this TOE is NXP Semiconductors. In particular the software development for this
composite TOE took place at “NXP Gratkorn, Mikron-Weg 1, A-8101 Gratkorn, Austria”.
All other sites contributing to the Lifecycle of this TOE can be read from the certification
report of the underlying IC1.
Phase 1 “Development”
(Step 1 – IC Design)
The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the
guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
(Step 2 – Embedded Software Design)
The embedded software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated
circuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software
and develops the operating system, the MRTD application and the guidance
documentation associated with these TOE components.
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
(Step 3 – IC Manufacturing)
In the first instance the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the MRTD’s chip
Dedicated Software and the parts of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the non-
volatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer programs IC
Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as MRTD material during the IC
manufacturing and the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer. The IC is securely
delivered from the IC manufacturer to the MRTD manufacturer.
(Step 4 – IC Initialisation)
The Embedded Software which constitutes the Operating System and the Card Content
Manager is enabled with the requisite keys loaded and transport mechanisms enabled,
which supports the secure transport of the IC from NXP manufacturing facility to the
MRTD Manufacturer facility.
1. 1
BSI-DSZ-CC-1040
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Fig 2. TOE Life Cycle
(Step 5 - PrePersonalisation)
During the step Pre-Perso, the MRTD manufacturer
(i) creates the MRTD application and
(ii) equips MRTD’s chips with pre-personalization Data.
IC Pre-Personalization
To create the application, it is necessary to instantiate the applet and create an MRTD
file system. In addition to the certified MRTD file system, one or more additional file
systems may be present on the TOE. This allows the TOE user to switch between more
than one (potentially certified) file systems or configurations of the application. Since the
ChipDoc v3 application offers electronic identity, driving license or SSCD functionalities
in addition to MRTD, the associated file systems may coexist on the TOE.
Any platform patching required is completed at this point. For e-passport products, Card
Content Management is finalized in this phase, thus post issuance applet loading is
disabled and the platform closed to further amendments.
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The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the
MRTD manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. NXP or the MRTD Manufacturer also
provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
(Packaging)
The MRTD manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contactless interface in
the passport book.
IC Packaging
MRTD Manufacturing
This step corresponds to the integration of the hardware and firmware components into
the final product body. The TOE is protected during transfer between various parties. IC
Packaging and MRTD Manufacturing are not part of the scope of this TOE.
Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”
(Step 6 - Personalization)
The personalization of the MRTD includes:
• the survey of the MRTD holder’s biographical data,
• the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data,
• the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical MRTD,
• the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical MRTD and
• configuration of the TSF if necessary.
The step 6 is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to
the creation of the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1), the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the
biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both, the
other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and the Document security object.
The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [11] finalizes the
personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD
(together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the
MRTD holder for operational use.
Personalization – 3rd Party Personalization facility
The TOE is protected during transfer between various parties by the confidential
information which resides in the card during mask production.
In case the personalization is done by 3rd party personalization facility, the
Personalization phase is not part of the scope of this TOE.
Phase 4 “Operational Use”
Where upon the card is delivered to the MRTD holder and until MRTD is expired or
destroyed.
(Step 7)
The TOE is used as MRTD chip by the traveler and the inspection systems in the
“Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of
the issuing State or Organization and can be used according to the security policy of the
issuing State but they can never be modified.
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The Operational Use phase is not part of the scope of this TOE.
1.3.9 TOE Identification
TOE Delivery
The delivery comprises the following items:
Table 4. Delivery Items
Type Name Version Form of delivery
JCOP 4 P71
Platform
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121
with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto
Library
ROM Code (Platform ID)
FLASH content (FLASH ID)
Patch Code (Patch ID)
R1.00.4
R1.01.4
Micro Controller
including on-chip
software: Firmware,
Crypto Library and
JCOP 4 Operating
System
ChipDoc v3
application
FLASH content 3.0.0.52 Application software
loaded onto the IC
Document ChipDoc 3.0 User Guide Manual [28] 2.5 Electronic Document
Document ChipDoc 3.0 ICAO Personalization Guide [29] 2.5 Electronic Document
Identification of the TOE
The TOE can be identified by
• identifying the JCOP 4 P71 platform: The IDENTIFY command shall be sent to
the TOE to verify the correct values of Platform ID, the FLASH ID and the Patch
ID as stated in section "2.2 Platform identification" of the Personalization
Guidance for this TOE [29].
• identifying the ICAO application: The ChipDoc v3 application and the specific
TOE configuration (ICAO EAC) can be verified according the respective
instructions in section “2. Identification” of the Personalization Guidance for this
TOE [29].
1.3.10 Evaluated Package Types
A number of package types are supported for this TOE. All package types, which are
covered by the certification of the used platform (see [27]), are also allowed to be used in
combination with each product of this TOE.
The package types do not influence the security functionality of the TOE. They only
define which pads are connected in the package and for what purpose and in which
environment the chip can be used. Note that the security of the TOE is not dependent on
which pad is connected or not - the connections just define how the product can be used.
If the TOE is delivered as wafer the customer can choose the connection on his own.
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2. Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
The ST claims compliance with the following references:
• Common Criteria Version 3.1 Part 1 [1]
• Common Criteria Version 3.1 Part 2 [2] extended
• Common Criteria Version 3.1 Part 3 [3] conformant
Extensions are based on the Protection Profiles (PP [5] and PP [6]) presented in the next
section:
• FAU_SAS.1 ‘Audit data storage’
• FCS_RND.1 ‘Generation of random numbers’
• FIA_API.1 ‘Authentication Proof of Identity’
• FMT_LIM.1 ‘Limited capabilities’
• FMT_LIM.2 ‘Limited availability’
• FPT_EMSEC.1 ‘TOE emanation’
2.2 Package Claim
This Security Target claims conformance to the assurance package EAL5 augmented.
The augmentations to EAL5 are:
• ALC_DVS.2, and
• AVA_VAN.5
2.3 PP Claim
This ST claims strict conformance to the following Protection Profiles:
Protection Profile [5]
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
“ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP)
Version 1.3.2
Date 05th December 2012
Prepared by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
Identification PP0056V2
Approved by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
Registration BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012
Assurance Level Common Criteria 3.1 EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2,
ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Protection Profile [6]
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using
Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP)
Version 1.01
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Date 22nd July 2014
Prepared by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
Identification PP0068V2
Approved by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
Registration BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01
Assurance Level Common Criteria 3.1 EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2,
ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The ICAO SAC and EAC PPs define the security objectives and requirements for the
contactless chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the
requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO). It addresses the advanced security methods SAC and Extended Access Control
and Chip Authentication similar to the Active Authentication in the Technical reports of
‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [11] along with its supplements [13] and [14].
This MRTD’s IC does not limit the TOE interfaces to contactless: both contact and
contactless interfaces are part of this TOE and the PP content has been enhanced for
this purpose.
Additions to the claims from the PPs [5] [6] have been added to the related sections of
this Security Target and are listed including rationales in section 8.4 of this Security
Target.
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3. Security Problem Definition
3.1 Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the travel document’s
chip, user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal, and travel document
tracing data.
Logical travel document sensitive User Data
Sensitive biometric reference data (Integrity and Confidentiality):
• EF.DG3: Biometric Finger(s)
• EF.DG4: Biometric Eye(s) Iris
Logical MRTD data
The ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [11] requires that Basic Inspection Systems must have access to
the following logical data which integrity should always be preserved (integrity,
Confidentiality and Authenticity when PACE is used):
• EF.COM: Common Data Elements, lists the existing EF with the user data
• EF.SOD: Document Security Object according to LDS [11] used by the inspection
system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD
• EF.DG1: document’s data (Type, Issuing State or Organization, Number, Expiry
Date, Optional Data), holder’s data (Name, Nationality, Date of Birth, Sex) and Check
Digits
• EF.DG2: Encoded Face (Global Interchange Feature)
• EF.DG5: Biometric Face
• EF.DG7: Displayed Signature or Usual Mark
• EF.DG8: Displayed Portrait
• EF.DG9: Data Feature(s)
• EF.DG10: Structure Feature(s)
• EF.DG11: Additional Personal Detail(s)
• EF.DG12: Additional Document Detail(s)
• EF.DG13: optional Detail(s)
• EF.DG14: Security Info (Chip Authentication Public Key Info)
• EF.DG15: Active Authentication Public Key Info
• EF.DG16: Person(s) to Notify
Due to interoperability reasons with ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [11], the TOE specifies the BAC
mechanisms with resistance against enhanced basic attack potential granting access to:
• Logical MRTD standard User Data (i.e. Personal Data) of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1,
EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) (DG6 is absent),
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• Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14,
• Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15,
• Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD,
• Common data in EF.COM.
The TOE prevents read access to sensitive User Data
• Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4).
Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for
the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
This authenticity relies on the confidentiality and integrity of data such as the Active
Authentication Public Key, PACE key, EF.CARDACCESS info or the Chip Authentication
Private Key.
Additional assets from the PACE PP
The primary assets
• User data stored on the TOE,
• User data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected, and
• Travel document tracing data,
And the secondary assets
• Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorized subjects,
• Genuineness of the TOE,
• TOE internal secret cryptographic keys,
• TOE internal non-secret cryptographic material, and
• Travel document communication establishment authorization data.
3.2 Subjects
This Security Target considers the following subjects:
S.Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD
Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user
of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between
the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
S.Personalizer Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the
MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities: (i) establishing the identity
of the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference
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data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the
encoded iris image(s), (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the
holder as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the
initial TSF data and (v) signing the Document Security Object defined in [11].
S.Country Country Verifying Certification Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the
issuing State or Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric
reference data stored in the MRTD. The CVCA represents the country specific root of the
PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI.
The updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in the form of Country
Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
S.DV Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving State with
respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the
Extended Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the
Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by
the issuing States or Organizations in the form of the Document Verifier Certificates.
S.Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through its physical
interfaces.
S.IS-PACE Inspection system
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining
an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the
traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for
the communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic
Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD
under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the
passport book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a
Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication
Mechanism. The IS-PACE implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and
authenticates itself to the travel document using a shared password (PACE password)
and supports Passive Authentication. The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in
addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal Authentication
Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document
Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security
attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.
S.Holder MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized
the MRTD.
S.Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the
MRTD holder.
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3.3 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will
be used or is intended to be used.
A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) for global interoperability (i) includes the Country
Signing CA Public Key and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE and/or BAC (with
optional Active Authentication). BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both
PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE and the IS, PACE must be used. The EIS
reads the logical travel document under PACE or BAC and performs the Chip
Authentication v.1 to verify the logical travel document and establishes secure
messaging. EIS supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 in order to ensure
access control and is authorized by the issuing State or Organisation through the
Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
A.Passive_Auth PKI for Passive Authentication
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for
passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical travel
document. The issuing State or Organisation runs a Certification Authority (CA) which
securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the
Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country
Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The
Document Signer
(i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair,
(ii) hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification,
(iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and
(iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document
Security Objects of the travel documents. The CA creates the Document Signer
Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the
receiving States and Organisations. It is assumed that the Personalisation Agent
ensures that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of
genuine user data.
A.Auth_PKI PKI for Inspection Systems
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for
card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying
Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold
authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control
rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or
Organisations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document
Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving
States or Organisations. The issuing States or Organisations distribute the public keys of
their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their travel document’s chip.
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3.4 Threat agent
S.ATTACKER
A threat agent trying
(i) to manipulate the logical travel document without authorization,
(ii) to read sensitive biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG3,
EF.DG4),
(iii) to forge a genuine travel document, or
(iv) to trace a travel document.
A threat agent trying to undermine the security policy defined by the
current Security Target, especially to change the properties of the
assets having to be maintained.
This threat agent has high attack potential.
Application note: An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT
environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged travel document.
Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the
attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
3.5 Threats
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified
below.
T.Read_Sensitive_Data Read the sensitive biometric reference data
An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the
communication interface of the travel document’s chip.
The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [6]) in respect
of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on the
travel document’s chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive
biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other data), the
opportunity (i.e. knowing the PACE Password) and therefore the possible attack
methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored only on the travel
document’s chip as private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and the
portrait are visually readable on the physical part of the travel document as well.
T.Counterfeit Counterfeit MRTD’s chip
An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a
genuine travel document’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit travel document. This
violates the authenticity of the travel document’s chip used for authentication of a
traveller by possession of a travel document.
The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from
a genuine travel document’s chip and copy them to another appropriate chip to imitate
this genuine travel document’s chip.
T.Skimming Skimming travel document / Capturing card-Terminal communication
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An attacker imitates an inspection system in order to get access to the user data stored
on or transferred between the TOE and the inspecting authority connected via the
contactless/contact interface of the TOE.
T.Eavesdropping Eavesdropping on the communication between the TOE and the
PACE terminal
An attacker is listening to the communication between the travel document and the
PACE authenticated BIS-PACE in order to gain the user data transferred between the
TOE and the terminal connected.
T.Tracing Counterfeit MRTD’s chip
An attacker tries to gather TOE tracing data (i.e. to trace the movement of the travel
document) unambiguously identifying it remotely by establishing or listening to a
communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE.
T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
An attacker fraudulently alters the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the travel
document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal connected in order to
outsmart the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE by means of changed travel document
holder’s related reference data (like biographic or biometric data). The attacker does it in
such a way that the terminal connected perceives these modified data as authentic one.
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational
phase in order
(i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the TOE,
(ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE or
(iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of
the TOE.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialisation and personalisation
in the operational phase after delivery to the travel document holder.
T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE during its usage in order to
disclose confidential User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the travel document or/and
exchanged between the TOE and the terminal connected. The information leakage may
be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering
An attacker may perform physical probing of the travel document in order
(i) to disclose the TSF-data, or
(ii) to disclose/reconstruct the TOE’s Embedded Software.
An attacker may physically modify the travel document in order to alter
(i) its security functionality (hardware and software part, as well),
(ii) the User Data or the TSF-data stored on the travel document.
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T.Malfunction Counterfeit MRTD’s chip
An attacker may cause a malfunction the travel document’s hardware and Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to
(i) deactivate or modify security features or functionality of the TOE’ hardware or to
(ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the TOE’s Embedded
Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating the travel document outside
the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the travel document’s
Embedded Software or misusing administrative functions. To exploit these
vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.
3.6 Organisational Security Policies
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as
security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its
operations.
P.Sensitive_Data Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are
sensitive private personal data of the travel document holder. The sensitive biometric
reference data can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for this
access at the time the travel document is presented to the inspection system (Extended
Inspection Systems). The issuing State or Organisation authorizes the Document
Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems within
the limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The travel document’s chip shall
protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during
transmission to the Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication Version 1.
P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The
travel document Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalisation Data which contains at least
the Personalisation Agent Key.
P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organisation guarantees the correctness of the biographical data,
the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data
of the logical travel document with respect to the travel document holder. The
personalisation of the travel document for the holder is performed by an agent authorized
by the issuing State or Organisation only.
This PP includes all OSPs from the PACE PP, chap 3.3, namely P.Pre-Operational,
P.Card_PKI, P.Trustworthy_PKI, P.Manufact and P.Terminal. Due to identical definitions
and names they are also not repeated here.
P.Pre-operational Pre-operational handling of the travel document
1) The travel document Issuer issues the travel document and approves it using the
terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
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2) The travel document Issuer guarantees correctness of the user data (amongst
other of those, concerning the travel document holder) and of the TSF-data
permanently stored in the TOE.
3) The travel document Issuer uses only such TOE’s technical components (IC)
which enable traceability of the travel documents in their manufacturing and
issuing life cycle phases, i.e. before they are in the operational phase.
4) If the travel document Issuer authorises a Personalisation Agent to personalise the
travel document for travel document holders, the travel document Issuer has to
ensure that the Personalisation Agent acts in accordance with the travel document
Issuer’s policy.
P.Card_PKI PKI for Passive Authentication
1) The travel document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the
passive authentication, i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for the
travel document. For this aim, he runs a Country Signing Certification Authority
(CSCA). The travel document Issuer shall publish the CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) .
2) The CSCA shall securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The CSCA
shall keep the CSCA Private Key secret and issue a self-signed CSCA Certificate
(CCSCA) having to be made available to the travel document Issuer by strictly
secure means, see [11], 5.5.1. The CSCA shall create the Document Signer
Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys (CDS) and make them available
to the travel document Issuer, see [11], 5.5.1.
3) A Document Signer shall (i) generate the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hand over
the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iii) keep the
Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) securely use the Document Signer
Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of travel documents.
P.Trustworth_PKI Trustworthiness of the PKI
The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful
organisations (DS) and DSs shall ensure that they sign exclusively correct Document
Security Objects to be stored on the travel document.
P.Terminal Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization
only
The Basic Inspection Systems with PACE (IS-PACE) shall operate their terminals as
follows:
1) The related terminals (basic inspection system, cf. above) shall be used by
terminal operators and by travel document holders.
2) They shall implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol, of the Passive
Authentication and use them in this order. The PACE terminal shall use randomly
and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating
ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann).
3) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
4) They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive
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Authentication (determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the travel
document).
5) The related terminals and their environment shall ensure confidentiality and
integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE
passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure
operation of the TOE according to the current PP.
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4. Security Objectives
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for
the TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated
into security objectives for the development and production environment and security
objectives for the operational environment.
Extensions to the security objectives from the PPs [5] [6] are underlined and listed in
section 8.4.
4.1 SOs for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of
identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be
met by the TOE.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data
(EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection
Systems. The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection
System Certificate used for the successful authentication and shall be a non-strict subset
of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to
the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organisation. The TOE
must ensure the confidentiality of the logical travel document data during their
transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive
biometric reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity
The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization
by means of the Chip Authentication as defined in [12]. The authenticity proof provided
by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
Application note: The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the MRTD’s chip to have (i) a
unique identity as given by the MRTD’s Document Number, (ii) a secret to prove its
identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall
protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference data
to verify the authentication attempt of MRTD’s chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip
Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the
MRTD’s chip. This certificate is provided by (i) the Chip Authentication Public Key
(EF.DG14) in the LDS [11] and (ii) the hash value of the Chip Authentication Public Key
in the Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer.
OT.AA_Proof Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity by Active Authentication
The TOE may support the Extended Inspection Systems to verify the identity and
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization
by means of the Active Authentication as defined in [11].
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OT.Data_Int Integrity of data
The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by
protecting these data against unauthorised modification (physical manipulation and
unauthorised modifying).The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-
data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and
represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication.
OT.Data_Aut Authenticity of data
The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by
enabling verification of their authenticity at the terminal-side.The TOE must ensure
authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE
and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after
the PACE Authentication. It shall happen by enabling such a verification at the terminal-
side (at receiving by the terminal) and by an active verification by the TOE itself (at
receiving by the TOE)
OT.Data_Conf Confidentiality of data
The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data by granting read
access only to the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE connected. The TOE must ensure
confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the
TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE)
after the PACE Authentication.
OT.Tracing Tracing travel document
The TOE must prevent gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying
the travel document remotely through establishing or listening to a communication via the
contactless/contact interface of the TOE without knowledge of the correct values of
shared passwords (PACE passwords) in advance.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE, which may not be used in TOE
operational phase, can be abused in order
(i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the TOE,
(ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE,
(iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of
the TOE.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored
and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip
• by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
• by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
• by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
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OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the
TSF Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against
attacks with high attack potential by means of
• measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips
surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage
and current) or
• measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure
analysis)
• manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
• controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
• with a prior
• reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside
the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been
proven or tested.
This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp.
electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
Application note: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct
interaction with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation
(refer to the objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper) provided that detailed knowledge about the
TOE´s internals.
OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the
Document Security Object according to LDS [11] and the TSF data can be written by
authorized Personalisation Agents only. The logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after
personalisation of the document.
Application note: The OT.AC_Pers implies that:
1) the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for MRTD holder (at least
EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) cannot be changed by write access after personalization,
2) the Personalization Agents may (i) add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not written
yet, and (ii) update and sign the Document Security Object accordingly. The support
for adding data in the “Operational Use” phase is optional.
OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in its
non-volatile memory. The Initialisation Data must provide a unique identification of the IC
during the manufacturing and the card issuing life cycle phases of the travel document.
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The storage of the Pre-Personalisation data includes writing of the Personalisation Agent
Key(s).
4.2 Objective on the Environment
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE. Auth_Key_Travel_DocumentTravel document authentication keys
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to
(i) generate the travel document’s Chip Authentication Key Pair,
(ii) sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public
Key data in EF.DG14 and
(iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or Organisations to verify the
authenticity of the travel document’s chip used for genuine travel document by
certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document
Security Object.
OE. Active_Auth_Key_Travel_Document Travel document active authentication keys
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to
(i) generate the travel document’s Active Authentication Key Pair,
(ii) sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active Authentication
Public Key data in EF.DG15
(iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or Organisations to verify the
authenticity of the travel document’s chip used for genuine travel document by
certification of the Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document
Security Object.
OE.Authoris_Sens_Data Authorisation for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference
Data
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of travel document
holders to authorized receiving States or Organisations. The Country Verifying
Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organisation generates card verifiable
Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.
OE.Exam_travel_document Examination of the physical part of the travel document
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation must examine the travel
document presented by the traveller to verify its authenticity by means of the physical
security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical part of the travel
document. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the
Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing
State or Organisation, and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE [4] and/or the Basic
Access Control [11]. Extended Inspection Systems perform additionally to these points
the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented
travel document’s chip.
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OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document Protection of data from the logical travel document
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the data read from the logical travel document. The inspection system will
prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is
successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1.
OE.Ext_Insp_system Authorization of extended inspection system
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organisations authorizes Extended
Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive
biometric reference data of the logical travel document. The Extended Inspection System
authenticates themselves to the travel document’s chip for access to the sensitive
biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection
System Certificate.
OE.Legislative_Compliance Issuing of the travel document
The travel document Issuer must issue the travel document and approve it using the
terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign Authentication of travel document by Signature
The travel document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure as
follows: the CSCA acting on behalf and according to the policy of the travel document
Issuer must
(i) generate a cryptographically secure CSCA Key Pair
(ii) ensure the secrecy of the CSCA Private Key and sign Document Signer
Certificates in a secure operational environment, and
(iii) publish the Certificate of the CSCA Public Key (CCSCA). Hereby authenticity
and integrity of these certificates are being maintained.
A Document Signer acting in accordance with the CSCA policy must
(i) generate a cryptographically secure Document Signing Key Pair,
(ii) ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Key,
(iii) hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification,
(iv) sign Document Security Objects of genuine travel documents in a secure
operational environment only. The digital signature in the Document Security
Object relates to all hash values for each data group in use according to [11].
The Personalisation Agent has to ensure that the Document Security Object contains
only the hash values of genuine user data according to [11]. The CSCA must issue its
certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS) and DSs must sign exclusively
correct Document Security Objects to be stored on travel document.
OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD
The travel document Issuer must ensure that the Personalisation Agents acting on his
behalf
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(i) establish the correct identity of the travel document holder and create the
biographical data for the travel document,
(ii) enrol the biometric reference data of the travel document holder,
(iii) write a subset of these data on the physical Passport (optical personalisation)
and store them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel
document holder,
(iv) write the document details data,
(v) write the initial TSF data,
(vi) sign the Document Security Object (in the role of a DS).
OE.Terminal Terminal Operating
The terminal operators must operate their terminals as follows:
1) The related terminals (basic inspection systems, cf. above) are used by terminal
operators and by travel document holders as defined in [11].
2) The related terminals implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [3], of the
Passive Authentication [3] (by verification of the signature of the Document Security
Object) and use them in this order. The PACE terminal uses randomly and (almost)
uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral
keys for Diffie-Hellmann).
3) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
4) The related terminals securely store the Country Signing Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to
perform Passive Authentication of the travel document (determination of the
authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document, [11]).
5) The related terminals and their environment must ensure confidentiality and integrity
of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of the PACE passwords,
integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the
TOE according to the current PP.
OE.Travel_Document_Holder Travel document holder obligations
The travel document holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of the
PACE password to an authorized person or device who definitely act according to
respective regulations and are trustworthy.
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4.3 Security objectives rationale
All the security objectives described in the ST are traced back to items described in the
TOE security environment and any items in the TOE security environment are covered
by those security objectives appropriately.
4.3.1 Security Objectives Coverage
The following able indicates that all security objectives of the TOE are traced back to
threats and/or organizational security policies and that all security objectives of the
environment are traced back to threats, organizational security policies and/or
assumptions.
Threats
Assumptions
Policies
/
Security
objectives
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Chip_Aut_Proof
OT.AA_Proof
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Aut
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Tracing
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document
OE.Active_Auth_Key_Travel_Document
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
OE.Exam_Travel_Document
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
OE.OE.Personalisation
OE-Passive_Auth_Sign
OE.Terminal
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
OE.Legislative_Compliance
T.Read_Sensitive_Dat
a
X X X
T.Counterfeit X X X X X
T.Skimming X X X X
T.Eavesdropping X
T.Tracing X X
T.Abuse-func X
T.Information_Leakag
e
X
T.Phys-Tamper X
T.Malfunction X
T.Forgery X X X X X X X X X
P.Sensitive_data X X X
P.Personalization X X X
P.Manufact X
P.Pre-Operational X X X X
P.Terminal X X
P.Card_PKI X
P.Thrustworthy_PKI X
A.Insp_Sys X X
A.Auth_PKI X X
A.Passive_Auth X X
Table 5. Security Environment to Security Objectives Mapping
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4.3.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency
The threat T.Skimming addresses accessing the User Data (stored on the TOE or
transferred between the TOE and the terminal) using the TOE’s contactless/contact
interface. This threat is countered by the security objectives OT.Data_Inty, OT.Data_Aut
and OT.Data_Conf through the PACE authentication. The objective
OE.Travel_Document_Holder ensures that a PACE session can only be established
either by the travel document holder itself or by an authorised person or device, and,
hence, cannot be captured by an attacker.
The threat T.Eavesdropping addresses listening to the communication between the
TOE and a rightful terminal in order to gain the User Data transferred there. This threat is
countered by the security objective OT.Data_Conf through a trusted channel based on
the PACE authentication.
The threat T.Tracing addresses gathering TOE tracing data identifying it remotely by
establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the
TOE, whereby the attacker does not a priori know the correct values of the PACE
password. This threat is directly countered by security objectives OT.Tracing (no
gathering TOE tracing data) and OE.Travel_Document_Holder (the attacker does not a
priori know the correct values of the shared passwords).
The threat T.Forgery addresses the fraudulent, complete or partial alteration of the User
Data or/and TSF-data stored on the TOE or/and exchanged between the TOE and the
terminal. The security objective OT.AC_Pers requires the TOE to limit the write access
for the travel document to the trustworthy Personalisation Agent (cf.
OE.Personalisation). The TOE will protect the integrity and authenticity of the stored
and exchanged User Data or/and TSF-data as aimed by the security objectives
OT.Data_Int and OT.Data_Aut, respectively. The objectives OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
and OT.Prot_Abuse-Func contribute to protecting integrity of the User Data or/and TSF-
data stored on the TOE. A terminal operator operating his terminals according to
OE.Terminal and performing the Passive Authentication using the Document Security
Object as aimed by OE.Passive_Auth_Sign will be able to effectively verify integrity and
authenticity of the data received from the TOE. Additionally, the examination of the
presented MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_Travel_Document
“Examination of the physical part of the travel document” shall ensure its authenticity by
means of the physical security measures and detect any manipulation of the physical
part of the travel document.
The examination of the travel document addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys
“Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for
the TOE environment OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of
the travel document” which requires the inspection system to examine physically the
travel document, the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control,
and the Extended Inspection Systems to implement and to perform the Chip
Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented travel
document’s chip. The security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document “Protection of data from the logical travel
document” require the Inspection System to protect the logical travel document data
during the transmission and the internal handling.
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The threat T.Abuse-Func addresses attacks of misusing TOE’s functionality to
manipulate or to disclosure the stored User- or TSF-data as well as to disable or to
bypass the soft- coded security functionality. The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-
Func ensures that the usage of functions having not to be used in the operational phase
is effectively prevented.
The threats T.Information_Leakage, T.Phys-Tamper and T.Malfunction are typical for
integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The
protection of the TOE against these threats is obviously addressed by the directly related
security objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper and
OT.Prot_Malfunction, respectively.
The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the travel document’s chip” requires a unique
identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-
personalisation Data as being fulfilled by OT.Identification.
The OSP P.Pre-Operational is enforced by the following security objectives:
OT.Identification is affine to the OSP’s property ‘traceability before the operational
phase’; OT.AC_Pers and OE.Personalisation together enforce the OSP’s properties
‘correctness of the User- and the TSF-data stored’ and ‘authorisation of Personalisation
Agents’; OE.Legislative_Compliance is affine to the OSP’s property ‘compliance with
laws and regulations’.
The OSP P.Terminal is obviously enforced by the objective OE.Terminal, whereby the
one-to-one mapping between the related properties is applicable. Additionally, this OSP
is countered by the security objective OE.Exam_Travel_Document, that enforces the
terminals to perform the terminal part of the PACE protocol.
The OSP P.Card_PKI is enforced by establishing the issuing PKI branch as aimed by
the objectives OE.Passive_Auth_Sign (for the Document Security Object).
The OSP P.Trustworthy_PKI is enforced by OE.Passive_Auth_Sign (for CSCA,
issuing PKI branch).
The Assumption A.Passive_Auth “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly addressed
by OE.Passive_Auth_Sign requiring the travel document issuer to establish a PKI for
Passive Authentication, generating Document Signing private keys only for rightful
organisations and requiring the Document Signer to sign exclusively correct Document
Security Objects to be stored on travel document.
The assumption A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for use of
sensitive biometric reference data” requires the CVCA to limit the read access to
sensitive biometrics by issuing Document Verifier certificates for authorized receiving
States or Organisations only. The Document Verifier of the receiving State is required by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems” to authorize
Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the
receiving issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key
infrastructure.
The OSP P.Personalisation “Personalisation of the travel document by issuing State or
Organisation only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical travel document by the
Personalisation Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment
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OE.Personalisation “Personalisation of logical travel document”, and (ii) the
access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective
OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical travel document”. Note the
manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalisation Agent Key(s) according to
OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective
OT.AC_Pers limits the management of TSF data and the management of TSF to the
Personalisation Agent.
The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data” is fulfilled and
the threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” is
countered by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive
biometric reference data” requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing
the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems.
Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures the data’s
confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the
issuing State or Organisation as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for
use of sensitive biometric reference data”. The Document Verifier of the receiving State
has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection
System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems”.
The OSP P.Terminal “Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals” is countered by the
security objective OE.Exam_Travel_Document additionally to the security objectives
from PACE PP [6]. OE.Exam_Travel_Document enforces the terminals to perform the
terminal part of the PACE protocol.
The threat T.Counterfeit “Counterfeit of travel document chip data” addresses the attack
of unauthorized copy or reproduction of the genuine travel document's chip. This attack is
thwarted by chip an identification and authenticity proof required by
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of travel document’s chip authentication” using an
authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organisation. The Public
Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and signed by means of
Documents Security Objects as demanded by OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document “Travel
document Authentication Key”. According to OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination
of the physical part of the travel document” the General Inspection system has to perform
the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the authenticity of the travel
document’s chip.
In addition, the threat T.Counterfeit “Counterfeit of travel document chip data” is
countered by chip identification and authenticity proof required by
OT.Active_Auth_Proof “Proof of travel document’s chip authentication” using an
authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organisation. The Public
Active Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG15 and signed by means of
Documents Security Objects as demanded by OE.Active_Auth_Key_Travel_Document
“Travel document Authentication Key”.
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5. Extended Components Definition
This ST contains the following extended components defined as extensions to CC part 2
in the claimed Protection Profile [5]:
• SFR FAU_SAS ‘Audit data storage’
• SFR FCS_RND ‘Generation of random numbers’
• SFR FIA_API ‘Authentication Proof of Identity’
• SFR FMT_LIM ‘Limited capabilities and availability’
• SFR FPT_EMSEC.1 ‘TOE emanation’
5.1 Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE, a sensitive family (FAU_SAS)
of the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than
FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE
itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behavior
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component leveling:
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the
capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the
audit records.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage 1
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5.2 Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE, a sensitive family
(FCS_RND) of the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family
describes the functional requirements for random number generation used for
cryptographic purposes. The component FCS_RND is not limited to generation of
cryptographic keys unlike the component FCS_CKM.1. The similar component
FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behavior
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are
intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:
FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a
defined quality metric.
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random
numbers that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers 1
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5.3 Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API)
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family
(FIA_API) of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family
describes the functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the
authentication verification by an external entity where the other families of the class FIA
address the verification of the identity of an external entity.
Application note: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication
verification of users’ identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality
of the user to prove their identity. The following paragraph defines the family FIA_API in
the style of the Common Criteria part 2 (cf. [2], chapter “Extended Components definition
(ASE_ECD)”) from a TOE point of view.
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behavior
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be
verified by an external entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component leveling:
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity.
Management: FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management
functions in FMT: Management of authentication information used to
prove the claimed identity.
Audit: FIA_API.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism]
to prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role].
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity 1
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5.4 Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the
TOE.
The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class
addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical
mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the
specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the
functions and by limiting their availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behavior
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a
combined manner. Note, that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the
Limited capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a
specific manner.
Component leveling:
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its
genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions
(refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for
instance, by removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of
the TOE’s lifecycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family
(FMT_LIM) of the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family
describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new
functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the
management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in
the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of
preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by
limiting their availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as
follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
1
2
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FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability
(FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as
follows.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities
(FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
Application note: The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that
there are two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which
together shall provide protection in order to enforce the policy. This also allows that:
(i) the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but
its capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced
or conversely
(ii) the TSF is designed with test and support functionality that is removed from, or
disabled in, the product prior to the Operational Use Phase.
The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.
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5.5 TOE emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)
The sensitive family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the
TSF) is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The
TOE shall prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is
based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such
attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA),
differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional
requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed
by any other component of CC part 2 [2].
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)” is specified as follows.
FPT_EMSEC TOE Emanation
Family behavior
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component leveling:
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires not to emit interface emanation enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in
excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to
[assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of
types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to
use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to
gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and
[assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation 1
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6. Security Requirements
This chapter gives the security functional requirements and the security assurance
requirements for the TOE.
Some security functional requirements represent extensions to [1].
Operations for assignment, selection and refinement have been made and are
designated by an underline (e.g. none), in addition, where operations that were
uncompleted in the PP [5] are also identified by italic underlined type.
The TOE security assurance requirements statement given in section 6.2 is drawn from
the security assurance components from Common Criteria part 3 [2].
The definition of the subjects “Manufacturer”, “Personalization Agent”, “Extended
Inspection System”, “Country Verifying Certification Authority”, “Document Verifier” and
“Terminal” used in the following chapter is given in section 3.2. Note that all these
subjects are acting for homonymous external entities. All used objects are defined either
in section 9 or in the following table. The operations “write”, “modify”, “read” and “disable
read access” are used in accordance with the general linguistic usage. The operations
“store”, “create”, “transmit”, “receive”, “establish communication channel”, “authenticate”
and “re-authenticate” are originally taken from [1]. The operation “load” is synonymous to
“import” used in [1].
Definition of security attributes:
Security
attribute
Values Meaning
Terminal
authentication
status
none (any
Terminal)
default role (i.e. without authorization after start-up)
CVCA roles defined in the certificate used for authentication
(cf. [12], A.5.1); Terminal is authenticated as Country
Verifying Certification Authority after successful CA and
TA
DV (domestic) roles defined in the certificate used for authentication
(cf. [12], A.5.1); Terminal is authenticated as domestic
Document Verifier after successful CA and TA
DV (foreign) roles defined in the certificate used for authentication
(cf. [12], A.5.1); Terminal is authenticated as foreign
Document Verifier after successful CA and TA
IS roles defined in the certificate used for authentication
(cf. [12], A.5.1); Terminal is authenticated as Extended
Inspection System after successful CA and TA
Terminal
Authorization
none
DG4 (Iris) Read access to DG4: (cf. [12], A.5.1)
DG3
(Fingerprint)
Read access to DG3: (cf. [12], A.5.1)
DG3 (Iris) /
DG4
(Fingerprint)
Read access to DG3 and DG4: (cf. [12], A.5.1)
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The following table provides an overview of the keys and certificates used:
Name Certificate Data
CVCA Private
Key (SKCVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) holds a private
key (SKCVCA) used for signing the Document Verifier Certificates.
CVCA Public
Key (PKCVCA)
The TOE stores the Country Verifying Certification Authority Public
Key (PKCVCA) as part of the TSF data to verify the Document
Verifier Certificates. The PKCVCA has the security attribute Current
Date as the most recent valid effective date of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority Certificate or of a domestic Document Verifier
Certificate.
Country
Verifying
Certification
Authority
Certificate
(CCVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate may be a
self-signed certificate or a link certificate (cf. [12] and Glossary). It
contains (i) the Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
(PKCVCA) as authentication reference data, (ii) the coded access
control rights of the Country Verifying Certification Authority, (iii) the
Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as
security attributes.
Document
Verifier
Certificate
(CDV)
The Document Verifier Certificate CDV is issued by the Country
Verifying Certification Authority. It contains (i) the Document Verifier
Public Key (PKDV) as authentication reference data (ii) identification
as domestic or foreign Document Verifier, the coded access control
rights of the Document Verifier, the Certificate Effective Date and
the Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Inspection
System
Certificate
(CIS)
The Inspection System Certificate (CIS) is issued by the Document
Verifier. It contains (i) as authentication reference data the
Inspection System Public Key (PKIS), (ii) the coded access control
rights of the Extended Inspection System, the Certificate Effective
Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Active
Authentication
Key Pair
The Active Authentication asymmetric Key Pair (KPrAA, KPuAA) is
used for the Active Authentication Protocol: allowing the chip to be
authenticated as genuine by the inspection system.
Active
Authentication
Private Key
(KPrAA)
The Active Authentication Private Key (KPrAA) is used by the TOE to
be authenticated as a genuine MRTD’s chip by the inspection
system. It is part of the TSF data.
Active
Authentication
Public Key
(KPuAA)
The Active Authentication Public Key (KPuAA) is stored in the
EF.DG15 Active Authentication Public Key of the TOE’s logical
MRTD and used by the inspection system for Active Authentication
of the MRTD’s chip. It is part of the user data provided by the TOE
for the IT environment.
PACE Session
Keys
(PACE-KMAC,
PACE-KENC)
Secure messaging AES keys for message authentication (CMAC-
mode) and for message encryption (CBC-mode) or 3DES Keys for
message authentication and message encryption (both CBC)
agreed between the TOE and a terminal as result of the PACE
Protocol.
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Name Certificate Data
PACE
authentication
ephemeral key
pair (ephem-
SKPICC-
PACE, ephem-
PKPICC-
PACE)
The ephemeral PACE Authentication Key Pair (ephem-SKPICC-
PACE, ephem-PKPICC-PACE) is used for Key Agreement Protocol:
Diffie-Hellman (DH) according to PKCS#3 or Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH; ECKA key agreement algorithm) according to TR-
03110.
Ephem-
PKPICC-PAC
PKCS#3 or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH; ECKA key
agreement algorithm) according to TR-03111.
Chip
Authentication
Public Key Pair
The Chip Authentication Public Key Pair (SKICC, PKICC) are used
for Key Agreement Protocol: Diffie-Hellman (DH) according to RFC
2631 or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman according to ISO 15946.
Chip
Authentication
Private Key
(SKICC)
The Chip Authentication Private Key (SKICC) is used by the TOE to
authenticate itself as authentic MRTD’s chip. It is part of the TSF
data.
Chip
Authentication
Public Key
(PKICC)
The Chip Authentication Public Key (PKICC) is stored in the
EF.DG14 Chip Authentication Public Key of the TOE’s logical MRTD
and used by the inspection system for Chip Authentication of the
MRTD’s chip. It is part of the user data provided by the TOE for the
IT environment.
Country
Signing
Certification
Authority Key
Pair
Country Signing Certification Authority of the issuing State or
Organization signs the Document Signer Public Key Certificate with
the Country Signing Certification Authority Private Key and the
signature will be verified by receiving State or Organization (e.g. a
Basic Inspection System) with the Country Signing Certification
Authority Public Key.
Document
Signer Key
Pairs
Document Signer of the issuing State or Organization signs the
Document Security Object of the logical MRTD with the Document
Signer Private Key and the signature will be verified by a Basic
Inspection Systems of the receiving State or Organization with the
Document Signer Public Key.
Document
Basic Access
Keys
The Document Basic Access Key is created by the Personalization
Agent, loaded to the TOE, and used for mutual authentication and
key agreement for secure messaging between the Basic Inspection
System and the MRTD’s chip.
BAC Session
Keys
Secure messaging TDES key and Retail-MAC key agreed between
the TOE and a BIS in result of the Basic Access Control
Authentication Protocol.
Chip Session
Key
Secure messaging TDES key and Retail-MAC key agreed between
the TOE and a GIS in result of the Chip Authentication Protocol.
Application note: The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a Document
Verifier as “domestic” in the Document Verifier Certificate if it belongs to the same State
as the Country Verifying Certification Authority. The Country Verifying Certification
Authority identifies a Document Verifier as “foreign” in the Document Verifier Certificate if
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it does not belong to the same State as the Country Verifying Certification Authority.
From MRTD’s point of view the domestic Document Verifier belongs to the issuing State
or Organization.
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6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
Extensions to the Security Functional Requirements from the PPs [5] [6] are defined in
the subsequent section.
6.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)
Audit Storage (FAU_SAS.1)
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to
store the IC Identification Data in the audit records.
Application note: The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the
TOE in the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer in
the Manufacturer role write the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data as TSF
Data of the TOE. The audit records are write-only-once data of the MRTD’s chip (see
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS).
6.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)
Function Algorithm Key Size(s)
Chip
Authentication
Hashing SHA-1 -
Authentication
DH 1024, 1536, 2048, 4096 bits
ECDH
(NIST) 192, 224, 256, 320, 384,
521 bits
(Brainpool) 192, 224, 256, 320,
384, 512 bits
PACE Authentication
DH-GM 1024, 1536, 2048, 4096 bits
ECDH-GM
(NIST) 192, 224, 256, 320, 384,
521 bits
(Brainpool) 192, 224, 256, 320,
384, 512 bits
Terminal
Authentication
Signature
verification
RSA
Pad: PKCS#1 (v1.5 [7] or
PSS [22])
Hash: SHA-1, SHA-256
1024, 1280, 1536, 2048, 4096
bits
ECDSA
Hash: SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256
192, 224, 256, 384, 521 bits
Active
Authentication
Signature
generation
RSA
ISO9796-2 scheme 1
1024, 1280, 1536, 2048, 4096
bits
ECDSA
Hash: SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256
192, 224, 256, 384, 521 bits
Secure
Messaging
ENC/DEC
TDES CBC [21] 112 bits
AES 128, 192, 256 bits
MAC
Retail MAC 112 bits
CMAC 8 -
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Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)
→ Chip Authenticate keys generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/
CA
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm based on the key
Diffie-Hellman key derivation Protocol compliant to PKCS#3 [18], or
ECDH compliant to ISO 15946 [19] and specified cryptographic key
sizes DH 1024-1536-2048-4096 bits or ECDH NIST curves 192-224-
256-320-384-521 bits or ECDH Brainpool curves 192-224-256-320-
384-512 bits respectively that meet the following: [12] Annex A.1.
Application note: The TOE generates a shared secret value with the terminal during the
Chip Authentication Protocol, see [12], sec. 3.1 and Annex A.1. This protocol may be
based on the Diffie-Hellman-Protocol compliant to PKCS#3 (i.e. modulo arithmetic based
cryptographic algorithm, cf. [18]) or on the ECDH compliant to ISO 15946 (i.e. an elliptic
curve cryptography algorithm) (cf. [12] Annex A.1, [19] and [16] for details). The shared
secret value is used to derive the TDES key for encryption and the Retail-MAC Chip
Session Keys according to the Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm [11],
normative appendix 5, A5.1, for the TSF required by FCS_COP.1/ENC and
FCS_COP.1/MAC.
→ PACE keys generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/
DH_PACE
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm based on the key
Diffie-Hellman key derivation Protocol compliant to PKCS#3 [18], or
ECDH compliant to ISO 15946 [19] and specified cryptographic key
sizes DH 1024-1536-2048-4096 bits or ECDH Generic Mapping
NIST curves 192-224-256-320-384-521 bits or ECDH Generic
Mapping Brainpool curves 192-224-256-320-384-512 bits
respectively that meet the following: [12] Annex A.1.
→ Cryptographic Key Pair generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/
KP
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA and ECC key
pair generation and specified cryptographic key sizes RSA 1024-
1280-1536-2048-4096 bits or EC 192-224-256-384-521 bits
respectively that meet the following: IEEE 1363 [22].
Application note: The component FMT_MTD.1/PK applies to both the Active
Authentication Private Key and the Chip Authentication Private Key. This component
defines an operation “create” that means here that these keys are generated by the TOE
itself. This resulted in this instantiation of the component FCS_CKM.1 as SFR for the
generation of these two key.
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Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method zeroization that
meets the following: none.
Application note: The TOE destroys the BAC Session Keys after detection of an error in
a received command by verification of the MAC, and after successful run of the Chip
Authentication Protocol. The TOE destroys the Chip Session Keys after detection of an
error in a received command by verification of the MAC. The TOE clears the memory
area of any session keys before starting the communication with the terminal in a new
power-on-session.
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
→ Hashing
FCS_COP.1.1/
SHA
The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1, SHA-224 or SHA-256 and
cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following: FIPS 180-2 [20].
Application note: The Chip Authentication Protocol uses SHA-1 (cf. [11], normative
appendix 5, A5.1). The TOE implements additional hash function SHA-256 and SHA-
224 for the Terminal Authentication Protocol (cf. [11], Annex A.2.2). SHA-224 is
supported by the TOE for ECDSA Signature operations only.
→ SM Encrypt/Decrypt Chip Authentication
FCS_COP.1/
CA_ENC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and decryption
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm TDES in CBC
mode and cryptographic key sizes 112 bits that meet the following:
FIPS 46-3 [21] and ‘TR-03110’, [12].
Application note: The TOE implements the cryptographic primitives (e.g. TDES) for
secure messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are agreed
between the TOE and the terminal as part of the Chip Authentication Protocol
according to the FCS_CKM.1. Furthermore the SFR is used for authentication
attempts of a terminal as Personalization Agent by means of the symmetric
authentication mechanism.
→ SM – MAC Chip Authentication
FCS_COP.1/
CA_MAC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication
code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail
MAC (DES) and CMAC (AES) and cryptographic key sizes 112 for
retail MAC and 128, 192 and 256 bit for CMAC that meet the
following: [14], FIPS PUB 46-3 Data Encryption Standard (DES) [21]
and [23].
Application note: The TOE implements the cryptographic primitive for secure
messaging with encryption and message authentication code over the transmitted
data. The key is agreed between the TSF by Chip Authentication Protocol according to
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the FCS_CKM.1/CA. Furthermore the SFR is used for authentication attempts of a
terminal as Personalisation Agent by means of the authentication mechanism.
→ Signature verification
FCS_COP.1.1/
SIG_VER
The TSF shall perform digital signature verification in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA or ECDSA and
cryptographic key sizes RSA 1024-1280-1536-2048-4096 bits or
ECDSA 192-224-256-384-521 bits respectively that meet the
following: PKCS#1 v1.5 [7] or PKCS#1 PSS [22] and FIPS 180-2
[20].
Application note: The signature verification is used to verify the card verifiable
certificates and the authentication attempt of the terminal creating a digital signature
for the TOE challenge.
→ Signature generation
FCS_COP.1.1/
SIG_GEN
The TSF shall perform digital signature generation in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA or ECDSA and cryptographic
key sizes RSA 1024-1536-2048-4096 bits in case of RSA and 192,
224, 256, 384 and 521 bits in case of ECFDS that meet the following:
ISO/IEC 9796-2 [17] and ANSI x9.62 [30] respectively.
Application note: For signature generation in the Active Authentication mechanism, the
TOE uses ISO/IEC 9796-2 compliant cryptography (scheme 1).
→ SM Encrypt/Decrypt PACE
FCS_COP.1.1/
PACE_ENC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and decryption
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES and TDES
in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 112 bits (for TDES) and
128, 192 and 256 bits (for AES) that meet the following: : FIPS 46-3
[21], NIST [24], ‘TR-03110’, and [14].
→ SM – MAC PACE
FCS_COP.1.1/
PACE_MAC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication
code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm CMAC
and Retail MAC and cryptographic key sizes 112, 128, 192 and 256
bits that meet the following[14], FIPS PUB 46-3 Data Encryption
Standard (DES) [21] and [23],[15] NIST [24] and [25].
Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1)
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers
that meet AIS31 class “P2 – SOF-High”.
Application note: This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers used for
the authentication protocols as required by FIA_UAU.4.
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6.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)
The following table provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used:
Name SFR for the TOE
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism
for Personalization Agents
FIA_UAU.4
Chip Authentication Protocol FIA_API.1, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6
Terminal Authentication Protocol FIA_UAU.5
Active Authentication Protocol FIA_API.1
PACE protocol FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/PACE
FIA_UAU.5/PACE
FIA_UAU.6/PACE
FIA_AFL.1/PACE
Note: the Chip Authentication Protocol as defined in the PP [5] includes:
• the BAC authentication protocol as defined in ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [11] in order to gain
access to the Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14,
• the asymmetric key agreement to establish symmetric secure messaging keys
between the TOE and the terminal based on the Chip Authentication Public Key and
the Terminal Public Key used later in the Terminal Authentication Protocol,
• the check whether the TOE is able to generate the correct message authentication
code with the expected key for any message received by the terminal.
The BAC mechanism does not provide a security function on its own. The Chip
Authentication Protocol may be used independent of the Terminal Authentication
Protocol. But if the Terminal Authentication Protocol is used the terminal shall use the
same public key as presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol.
Authentication Failure Handling (FIA_AFL.1)
→ PACE
FIA_AFL.1.1/
PACE
The TSF shall detect when a 1 unsuccessful authentication attempt
occurs related to authentication attempts using the PACE password
as shared password.
FIA_AFL.1.2/
PACE
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts
has been met, the TSF shall send the response to the
authentication request with exponentially increasing time delays
until the correct password is used
Application Note: The open assignment operation shall be performed according to a
concrete implementation of the TOE, whereby actions to be executed by the TOE may
either be common for all data concerned (PACE passwords, see [14]) or for an arbitrary
subset of them or may also separately be defined for each datum in question. Since all
non-blocking authorisation data (PACE passwords) being used as a shared secret within
the PACE protocol do not possess a sufficient entropy, the TOE shall not allow a quick
monitoring of its behaviour (e.g. due to a long reaction time) in order to make the first
step of the skimming attack requiring an attack potential beyond high, so that the threat
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T.Tracing can be averted in the frame of the security policy of the current PP. One of
some opportunities for performing this operation might be “consecutively increase the
reaction time of the TOE to the next authentication attempt using PACE passwords”.
Application Note: The count of consecutive unsuccessful authentications is stored in
non-volatile memory and is preserved across power-up and power-down cycles. After a
successful authentication the count is reset to zero.
Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)
FIA_UID.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [14],
3. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF
according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
4. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1
according to [12]68
5. to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1
according to [12]69
6. to carry out the Active Authentication Mechanism
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
Application note: In the Phase 2 “Manufacturing of the TOE” the Manufacturer is the
only user role known to the TOE which writes the Initialization Data and/or Pre-
personalization Data in the audit records of the IC. The MRTD manufacturer may
create the user role Personalization Agent for transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3
“Personalization of the MRTD”. The users in role Personalization Agent identify
themselves by means of selecting the authentication key. After personalization in the
Phase 3 the Document Basic Access Keys, the Chip Authentication data and Terminal
Authentication Reference Data are written into the TOE. The Basic Inspection System
(cf. PP MRTD BAC [3]) is identified as default user after power up or reset of the TOE
i.e. the TOE will use the Document Basic Access Key to run the BAC Authentication
Protocol, to gain access to the Chip Authentication Reference Data and to run the
Chip Authentication Protocol (i.e. the BAC mechanism is not seen as an independent
mechanism in this PP, it is a mandatory part within the Chip Authentication Protocol,
and thus noted here for reasons of completeness). After successful authentication of
the chip the terminal may identify itself as (i) Extended Inspection System by selection
of the templates for the Terminal Authentication Protocol or (ii) if necessary and
available by symmetric authentication as Personalization Agent (using the
Personalization Agent Key).
Application Note: User identified after a successfully performed PACE protocol is a
terminal. Please note that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but are
restricted revealable; i.e. it is either the travel document holder itself or an authorised other
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person or device (Basic Inspection System with PACE).
Application Note: The SFR FIA_UID.1/PACE in this ST covers the definition in the EAC
PP that, in turn, extends the definition in the PACE PP by EAC aspect 4. This extension
does not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)
FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [14],
3. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF
according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
4. to identify themselves by selection of the authentication
key,
5. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1
according to [12] 71,
6. to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version
1 according to [6] 72,
7. to carry out the Active Authentication mechanism
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions
on behalf of that user.
Application Note: The SFR FIA_UAU.1/PACE in this ST covers the definition in the EAC
PP that, in turn, extends the definition in the PACE PP by EAC aspect 5. This extension
does not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
Application Note: The user authenticated after a successfully performed PACE protocol
is a terminal. Please note that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but are
restricted revealable; i.e. it is either the travel document holder itself or an authorised other
person or device (BIS-PACE). If PACE was successfully performed, secure messaging is
started using the derived session keys (PACE-KMAC, PACE-KENC), cf. FTP_ITC.1/PACE.
Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)
FIA_UAU.4.1/PACE The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. PACE protocol,
2. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
3. Authentication Mechanism based on AES and TDES,
4. Active Authentication Protocol.
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Application note: The SFR FIA_UAU.4.1 in this ST covers the definition in the EAC
PP [5] that, in turn, extends the definition in PACE PP by the EAC aspect 3. This
extension does not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP. The generation of
random numbers (random nonce) used for the authentication protocol (PACE) and
Terminal Authentication as required by FIA_UAU.4/PACE is required by FCS_RND.1
from PACE PP.
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Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)
FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE The TSF shall provide
1. PACE protocol,
2. Passive authentication
3. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
4. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode,
5. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on TDES and
AES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity
according to the following rules:
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as
Personalization Agent by the Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Travel
Document Manufacturer by the Authentication Mechanism
with Travel Document Manufacturer Keys
3. Having successfully run the PACE protocol the TOE accepts
only received commands with correct message
authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with
the key agreed with the terminal by means of the PACE
protocol
4. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE
accepts only received commands with correct message
authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with
key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip
Authentication Mechanism.
5. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the
Terminal Authentication Protocol only if the terminal uses the
public key presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol
and the secure messaging established by the Chip
Authentication Mechanism.
Application note: Depending on the authentication methods used the Personalization
Agent holds a key for the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism. The Basic Access
Control Mechanism includes the secure messaging for all commands exchanged after
successful authentication of the inspection system. The Personalization Agent may
use Symmetric Authentication Mechanism without secure messaging mechanism as
well if the personalization environment prevents eavesdropping to the communication
between TOE and personalization terminal. The Basic Inspection System shall use the
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access
Keys and the secure messaging after the mutual authentication. The General
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Inspection System shall use the secure messaging with the keys generated by the
Chip Authentication Mechanism.
Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)
FIA_UAU.6.1/EAC The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip
Authentication Protocol shall be verified as being sent by the GIS.
Application note: The Basic Access Control Mechanism and the Chip Authentication
Protocol specified in [11] include secure messaging for all commands exchanged after
successful authentication of the Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure
messaging in MAC_ENC mode each command based on Retail-MAC whether it was
sent by the successfully authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/MAC for further
details). The TOE does not execute any command with incorrect message
authentication code. Therefore the TOE re-authenticates the user for each received
command and accepts only those commands received from the previously
authenticated user.
FIA_UAU.6.1/PACE The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful run of the PACE
Protocol shall be verified as being sent by the PACE terminal.
Application note: The PACE protocol specified in [14] starts secure messaging used
for all commands exchanged after successful PACE authentication. The TOE checks
each command by secure messaging in encrypt-then-authenticate mode based on
CMAC or Retail-MAC, whether it was sent by the successfully authenticated terminal
(see FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC for further details). The TOE does not execute any
command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore, the TOE re-
authenticates the terminal connected, if a secure messaging error occurred, and accepts
only those commands received from the initially authenticated terminal.
Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)
→ Chip Authentication Protocol
FIA_API.1.1/
CAP
The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol according to
[12] to prove the identity of the TOE.
Application note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication
Mechanism specified in [12]. The TOE and the terminal generate a shared secret using
the Diffie-Hellman Protocol (DH or EC-DH) and two session keys for secure messaging
in ENC_MAC mode according to [11], normative appendix 5, A5.1. The terminal verifies
by means of secure messaging whether the MRTD’s chip was able or not to run his
protocol properly using its Chip Authentication Private Key corresponding to the Chip
Authentication Key (EF.DG14).
→ Active Authentication Protocol
FIA_API.1.1/
AAP
The TSF shall provide an Active Authentication Protocol according
to [11] to prove the identity of the TOE.
Application note: The TOE may implement the Active Authentication Mechanism
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specified in [11] Part 1 Appendix 4 to section IV. This mechanism is a challenge
response protocol where TOE challenge response is calculated being digital signature
over the terminal’s 8 bytes nonce.
6.1.4 User data protection (FDP)
Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
FDP_ACC.1.1/
TRM
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals gaining
access to the User Data and data stored in the EF.SOD of the logical
travel document.
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
FDP_ACF.1.1/
TRM
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on
the following:
1. Subjects:
a. BIS-PACE,
b. Extended Inspection System
c. Terminal,
2. Objects:
a. data EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16, EF.SOD and
EF.COM of the logical MRTD,
b. data in EF.DG3 of the logical travel document,
c. data in EF.DG4 of the logical travel document,
d. all TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys stored in the travel
document,
3. Security attributes:
a. PACE authentication
b. authentication status of terminals,
c. Terminal Authentication.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
TRM
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
A BIS-PACE is allowed to read data objects from
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM according to [14] after a successful PACE
authentication as required by FIA_UAU.1/PACE.
FDP_ACF.1.3/
TRM
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: none.
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FDP_ACF.1.4/
TRM
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the rule:
1. Any terminal being not authenticated as PACE
authenticated BIS-PACE is not allowed to read, to write, to
modify, to use any User Data stored on the travel
Document
2. Terminals not using secure messaging are not allowed to
read, to write, to modify, to use any data stored on the
travel document
3. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as
Extended Inspection System with the Read access to DG3
(Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate holder
authorization encoding is not allowed to read the data
objects 2b) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
4. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as
Extended Inspection System with the Read access to DG4
(Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization
encoding is not allowed to read the data objects 2c) of
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM
5. Nobody is allowed to read the data objects 2d) of
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM
6. Terminals authenticated as CVCA or as DV are not
allowed to read data in the EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
Application note: The relative certificate holder authorization encoded in the CVC of
the inspection system is defined in [12], Annex A.5.1, table A.8. The TOE verifies the
certificate chain established by the Country Verifying Certification Authority, the
Document Verifier Certificate and the Inspection System Certificate (cf. FMT_MTD.3).
The Terminal Authorization is the intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorization in
the certificates of the Country Verifying Certification Authority, the Document Verifier
Certificate and the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate chain.
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Application Note: The SFR FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM in this ST covers the definition in the
EAC PP [5] that, in turn, extends the definition in PACE PP [6] by additional subjects
and objects. The SFRs FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM and FDP_ACF.1.3/TRM in this ST cover
the definition in PACE PP [6]. The SFR FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM in this ST covers the
definition in the EAC PP [5] that, in turn, extends the definition in PACE PP [6] by 3) to
6).These extensions do not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP
Application Note: FDP_UCT.1/TRM and FDP_UIT.1/TRM require the protection of
the User Data transmitted from the TOE to the terminal by secure messaging with
encryption and message authentication codes after successful Chip Authentication
Version 1 to the Inspection System. The Password Authenticated Connection
Establishment, and the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 establish different key sets to
be used for secure messaging (each set of keys for the encryption and the message
authentication key).
Application Note: Please note that the control on the user data transmitted between
the TOE and the PACE terminal is addressed by FTP_ITC.1/PACE.
Residual Information Protection (FDP_RIP.1)
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the deallocation of the resource
from the following objects.
1. Session Keys (immediately after closing related communication
session),
2. the ephemeral private key ephem-SKPICC-PACE (by having
generated a DH shared secret K).
Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)
FDP_UCT.1.1/
TRM
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit
and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorized
disclosure.
Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)
FDP_UIT.1.1/
TRM
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit
and receive user data in a manner protected from modification,
deletion, insertion and replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/
TRM
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
Specifications of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security
management functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Pre-personalization,
3. Personalization,
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4. Configuration.
Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1.1/
PACE
The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Terminal
4. PACE authenticated BIS-PACE
5. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
6. Document Verifier,
7. Domestic Extended Inspection System
8. Foreign Extended Inspection System.
9. Basic Inspection System
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application Note: The SFR FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE in this ST covers the definition in
the EAC PP that, in turn, extends the definition in PACE PP by 5) to 8). This extension
does not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
Application note: For explanation on the role Manufacturer and Personalisation
Agent please refer to the glossary. The role Terminal is the default role for any
terminal being recognised by the TOE as not PACE authenticated BIS-PACE
(‘Terminal’ is used by the travel document presenter).
The TOE recognises the travel document holder or an authorised other person or
device (BIS-PACE) by using PACE authenticated BIS-PACE (FIA_UAU.1/PACE).
6.1.5 Security management (FMT)
Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities
so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
1. User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
2. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
3. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
4. software to be reconstructed and
5. substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks.
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Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability
so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the
following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
1. User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
2. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
3. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
4. software to be reconstructed and
5. substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks.
Application note: The formulation of “Deploying Test Features …” in FMT_LIM.2.1 is
very misleading since the addressed features are no longer available (e.g. by disabling
or removing the respective functionality). Nevertheless the combination of FMT_LIM.1
and FMT_LIM.2 is introduced to provide an optional approach to enforce the same
policy.
Note that the term “software” in item 4 of FMT_LIM.1.1 and FMT_LIM.2.1 refers to
both IC Dedicated and IC Embedded Software.
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)
→ Writing of Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_ENA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data to the Manufacturer.
Application note: The pre-personalization Data includes but is not limited to the
authentication reference data for the Personalization Agent which is the symmetric
cryptographic Personalization Agent Key.
→ Disabling of Read Access to Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_DIS
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read out the Initialisation Data
and the Pre-personalisation Data to the Personalization Agent.
Application note: According to P.Manufact the IC Manufacturer and the MRTD
Manufacturer are the default users assumed by the TOE in the role Manufacturer
during the Phase 2 “Manufacturing” but the TOE is not requested to distinguish
between these users within the role Manufacturer. The TOE may restrict the ability to
write the Initialization Data and the Pre-personalization Data by (i) allowing to write
these data only once and (ii) blocking the role Manufacturer at the end of the Phase 2.
The IC Manufacturer may write the Initialization Data which includes but are not limited
to the IC Identifier as required by FAU_SAS.1. The Initialization Data provides a
unique identification of the IC which is used to trace the IC in the Phase 2 and 3
“personalization” but is not needed and may be misused in the Phase 4 “Operational
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Use”. Therefore the external read access shall be blocked. The MRTD Manufacturer
will write the Pre-personalization Data.
→ Initialization of CVCA Certificate and Current Date
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CVCA_INI
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
1. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,
3. initial Current Date
to the Personalization Agent.
Application note: The initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key may be
written by the Manufacturer in the production or pre-personalization phase or by the
Personalization Agent (cf. [12], section 2.2.6). The initial Country Verifying Certification
Authority Public Keys (and their updates later on) are used to verify the Country Verifying
Certification Authority Link-Certificates. The initial Country Verifying Certification Authority
Certificate and the initial Current Date is needed for verification of the certificates and the
calculation of the Terminal Authorization.
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→ Country Verifying Certification Authority
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CVCA_UPD
The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,
to Country Verifying Certification Authority.
Application note: The Country Verifying Certification Authority updates its asymmetric
key pair and distributes the public key be means of the Country Verifying CA Link-
Certificates (cf. [12], sec. 2.2). The TOE updates its internal trust-point if a valid Country
Verifying CA Link- Certificates (cf. FMT_MTD.3) is provided by the terminal (cf. [12], sec.
2.2.3 and 2.2.4).
→ Current date
FMT_MTD.1.1/
DATE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current date to
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
2. Document Verifier,
3. Domestic Extended Inspection System.
Application note: The authorized roles are identified in their certificate (cf. [12], sec. 2.2.4
and Table A.5) and authorized by validation of the certificate chain (cf. FMT_MTD.3). The
authorized role of the terminal is part of the Certificate Holder Authorization in the card
verifiable certificate provided by the terminal for the identification and the Terminal
Authentication (cf. to [12], annex A.3.3, for details).
→ Key Write
FMT_MTD.1.1/
KEY_WRITE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Basic
Access Keys to the Personalization Agent.
Application note: The Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key is the TSF data
for verification of the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Extended Inspection
Systems including the access rights for the Extended Access Control.
→ Chip Authentication Private Key
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CAPK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to load or generate the Chip
Authentication Private Key to the Personalization Agent.
Application note: The component FMT_MTD.1/CAPK was refined in this Security Target
by selecting both “create” and “load” operations. The verb “load” means here that the Chip
Authentication Private Key is generated securely outside the TOE and written into the TOE
memory: the generator, the modulus and the order. The verb “create” means here that the
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Chip Authentication Private Key order is generated by the TOE itself. See the instantiation
of the component FCS_CKM.1/PK as SFR for this key generation.
→ Active Authentication Private Key
FMT_MTD.1.1/
AAPK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to load the Active Authentication
Private Key to the Personalization Agent.
Application note: The “load” option is selected here and may be used by the successfully
authenticated Personalization Agent if he is willing to include the optional Active
Authentication Key in the MRTD. The verb “load” means here that the Active Authentication
Private Key is generated securely outside the TOE and written into the TOE memory..
→ Personalization agent
FMT_MTD.1.1/
PA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the SOD to the
Personalization Agent
→ Key Read
FMT_MTD.1.1/
KEY_READ
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
1. PACE passwords
2. Chip Authentication Private Key,
3. Personalization Agent Keys
4. Active Authentication Private Key
to none.
Secure TSF data (FMT_MTD.3)
FMT_MTD.3.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certificate
chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication
Protocol and the Access Control.
Refinement: The certificate chain is valid if and only if
1. the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct
with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of
the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
2. the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct
with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority
and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the
Current Date of the TOE,
3. the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority known to the TOE and the expiration date of the Certificate
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of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the
TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a
valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the
Extended Inspection System. The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations
contained in the certificates of a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal
Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection System.
Application note: The Terminal Authentication is used for Extended Inspection
System as required by FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5. The Terminal Authorization is
used as TSF data for access control required by FDP_ACF.1.
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit information of IC Power consumption in
excess of State of the Art values enabling access to
1. Chip Authentication Session Keys,
2. PACE session Keys,
3. The ephemeral private key,
4. Personalisation Agent Key(s),
5. Chip Authentication Private Key, and
6. Active Authentication Private Key.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. Chip Authentication Session Keys,
2. PACE session Keys,
3. The ephemeral private key,
4. Personalisation Agent Key(s),
5. Chip Authentication Private Key, and
6. Active Authentication Private Key.
Application note: The TOE prevents attacks against the listed secret data where the
attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks
may be observable at the interfaces of the TOE or may be originated from internal
operation of the TOE or may be caused by an attacker that varies the physical
environment under which the TOE operates. The set of measurable physical
phenomena is influenced by the technology employed to implement the smart card.
The MRTD’s chip provides a smart card contactless interface but may have also (not
used by the terminal but maybe by an attacker) sensitive contacts according to
ISO/IEC 7816-2 as well. Examples of measurable phenomena include, but are not
limited to variations in the power consumption, the timing of signals and the
electromagnetic radiation due to internal operations or data transmissions.
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Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur:
1. Exposure to operating conditions causing a TOE malfunction,
2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist Physical manipulation and physical probing to
the TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are
always enforced.
Application note: The TOE implements appropriate measures to continuously
counter physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks
(especially manipulation) the TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its
elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring
that the TSP could not be violated at any time. Hence, “automatic response” means
here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures
are provided at any time.
Application note: The SFRs “Non-bypassability of the TSF FPT_RVM.1” and “TSF
domain separation FPT_SEP.1” are no longer part of [1]. These requirements are now
an implicit part of the assurance requirement ADV_ARC.1.
TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to
verify the integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to
verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
Application note: self-test for the verification of the integrity of stored TSF executable
code are executed during initial start-up in the Phase 3 “Personalization” and Phase 4
“Operational Use”.
Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)
FTP_ITC.1.1/
PACE
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/
PACE
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
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FTP_ITC.1.3/
PACE
The TSF shall enforce communication via the trusted channel for any
data exchange between the TOE and the Terminal.
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6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
TOE Security Assurance Requirements as stated in section 6.2 of the claimed PP [5].
ALC_DVS is augmented from 1 to 2, and AVA_VAN is augmented from 3 to 5, compared
to the CC V3.1 package for EAL5.
6.2.1 SARs Measures
The assurance measures that satisfy the TOE security assurance requirements are the
following:
Assurance Class Component Description
ADV:
Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.5
Complete Semi-formal functional specification
with additional error information
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_TDS.4 Semi-formal modular design
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC:
Lifecycle support
ALC_CMC.4
Production support, acceptance procedures
and automation
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined lifecycle model
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ASE:
Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE:
Test
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.5
Advanced methodical vulnerability
analysis
Table 6. Assurance Requirements: EAL5 augmented
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6.2.2 SARs Rationale
The EAL5 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources.
EAL5 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an
existing product line. EAL5 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or
users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional
commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific engineering costs.
Augmentation results from the selection of:
ALC_DVS.2 Life-cycle support- Sufficiency of security measures
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security
of the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the
MRTD’s material.
The component ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies.
AVA_VAN.5 Vulnerability Assessment - Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the security
by vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an
attacker possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to
fulfil the security objectives OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof and
OT.AA_Proof.
The component AVA_VAN.5 has the following dependencies:
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL5 assurance package.
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6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Security Requirement Coverage
The following table associates the security requirements and the security objectives of
the TOE. The security requirements of the TOE correspond to at least one security
objective of the TOE. Moreover, some requirements correspond to the security objectives
of the TOE in combination with other objectives.
TOE SFR
/
TOE Security objectives
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Chip_Aut_Proof
OT.AA_Proof
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Aut
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Tracing
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
FAU_SAS.1 X X
FCS_CKM.1/CA X X X X X X
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE X X X
FCS_CKM.1/KP X
FCS_CKM.4 X X X X X
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC X X X X X
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC X X X X
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER X X
FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN X X
FCS_COP.1/SHA X X
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC X
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC X X
FCS_RND.1 X X X X X X
FIA_AFL.1/PACE X
FIA_UID.1/PACE X X X X X
FIA_UAU.1/PACE X X X X X
FIA_UAU.4/PACE X X X X X
FIA_UAU.5/PACE X X X X X
FIA_UAU.6/EAC X X X X X
FIA_UAU.6/PACE X X X
FIA_API.1/CAP X
FIA_API.1/AAP X
FDP_ACC.1/TRM X X X X
FDP_ACF.1/TRM X X X X
FDP_RIP.1 X X X
FDP_UCT.1/TRM X X X
FDP_UIT.1/TRM X X
FMT_SMF.1 X X X X X X
FMT_SMR.1/PACE X X X X X X
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TOE SFR
/
TOE Security objectives
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Chip_Aut_Proof
OT.AA_Proof
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Aut
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Tracing
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
FMT_LIM.1 X
FTM_LIM.2 X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA X X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS X X
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI X
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD X
FMT_MTD.1/DATE X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE X X
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK X X X
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK X X
FMT_MTD.1/PA X X X X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ X X X X X X
FMT_MTD.3 X
FPT_EMSEC.1 X X
FPT_FLS.1 X X
FPT_PHP.3 X X X
FPT_TST.1 X X
FTP_ITC.1/PACE X X X X
Table 7. Functional Requirement to TOE Security Objective Mapping
6.3.2 Security Requirements Sufficiency
TOE Security Requirements Sufficiency
OT.AA_Proof (Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity by Active Authentication) is
ensured by the Active Authentication Protocol provided by FIA_API.1/AAP enforcing the
identification and authentication of the MRTD’s chip. The Active Authentication protocol
requires FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge), and FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the
host challenge hashing) and FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN (for the signature generation). The
Active Authentication private Key is used. This TOE secret data is created during
Personalization (Phase 3) according to FCS_CKM.1/KP (for Key Pair generation
mechanism), and by authorized agent as required by FMT_MTD.1/ AAPK.
OT.AC_Pers (Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD) addresses the
access control of the writing the logical travel document. The justification for the SFRs
FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA and FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS arises from the justification
for OT.Identification above with respect to the Pre-personalization Data (including Active
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Authentication keys generated with FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN) loaded through
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK). The write access to the logical travel document data are defined by
the SFR FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FDP_ACC.1/TRM and FDP_ACF.1/TRM
in the same way: only the successfully authenticated Personalisation Agent is allowed to
write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document only
once. FMT_MTD.1/PA covers the related property of OT.AC_Pers (writing SOD and, in
generally, personalisation data). The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles (including
Personalisation Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions
(including Personalisation). The SFRs FMT_MTD.1./KEY_READ and FPT_EMS.1
restrict the access to the Personalisation Agent Keys and the Chip Authentication Private
Key.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalisation Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SFR FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. If the Personalisation
Terminal wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication
Protocol v.1 (after Chip Authentication v.1) with the Personalisation Agent Keys the TOE
will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge),
FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the derivation of the new session keys after Chip Authentication
v.1), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode
secure messaging), FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part of the Terminal Authentication
Protocol v.1) and FIA_UAU.6/EAC (for the re-authentication). If the Personalisation
Terminal wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Authentication
Mechanism with Personalisation Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to the
FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge) and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC (to verify
the authentication attempt). The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4
after use. The Personalization Agent also handles the security environment object
according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE.
OT.Data_Int (Integrity of personal data) data” requires the TOE to protect the integrity
of the logical travel document stored on the travel document’s chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. Physical manipulation is addressed by
FPT_PHP.3. Logical manipulation of stored user data is addressed by
(FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM): only the Personalisation Agent is allowed to write
the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document (FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM, rule
1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical travel document (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM). FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD
containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive
Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to
be considered as trustworthy. The Personalisation Agent must identify and authenticate
themselves according to FIA_UID.1/PACE and FIA_UAU.1/PACE before accessing
these data. FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some
required specific properties of the protocols used. The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE lists the
roles and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions.
Unauthorised modifying of the exchanged data is addressed, in the first line, by
FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TR and FTP_ITC.1/PACE using
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. For PACE secured data exchange, a prerequisite for
establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE Authentication (FIA_UID.1/PACE,
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FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE and possessing the special properties
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC. The trusted channel is
established using PACE, Chip Authentication v.1, and Terminal Authentication v.1.
FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for KMAC).
The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted
logical travel document data after Chip Authentication v.1. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and
FDP_UIT.1/TRM requires the integrity protection of the transmitted data after Chip
Authentication v.1 by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the generation of shared secret andfor the
derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys
are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip
Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards. The SFR
FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic operations needed.
OT.Data_Conf (Confidentiality of personal data) aims that the TOE always ensures
confidentiality of the User- and TSF-data stored and, after the PACE Authentication resp.
Chip Authentication, of these data exchanged. This objective for the data stored is mainly
achieved by (FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM). FIA_UAU.4/PACE,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the
protocols used. This objective for the data exchanged is mainly achieved by
FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM and FTP_ITC.1/PACE using
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC resp. FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC. A prerequisite for establishing this
trusted channel is a successful PACE or Chip and Terminal Authentication v.1
(FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE resp.
FCS_CKM.1/CA and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of
session keys (here: for KENC). The SFR FMT_MTD.1./KEY_READ restricts the access
to the PACE passwords and the Chip Authentication Private Key. FMT_MTD.1/PA
requires that SOD containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used
for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalisation Agent only
and, hence, is to be considered trustworthy. The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents the
general support for cryptographic operations needed. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and
FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
The security objective OT.Sense_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric
reference data” is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP_ACC.1/TRM and
FDP_ACF.1/TRM allowing the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by
successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System being authorized by a valid
certificate according FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER. The SFRs FIA_UID.1/PACE and
FIA_UAU.1/PACE require the identification and authentication of the inspection systems.
The SFR FIA_UAU.5/PACE requires the successful Chip Authentication (CA) v.1 before
any authentication attempt as Extended Inspection System. During the protected
communication following the CA v.1 the reuse of authentication data is prevented by
FIA_UAU.4/PACE. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FDP_UCT.1/TRM requires the
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confidentiality protection of the transmitted data after Chip Authentication v.1 by means
of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the terminal authentication challenge),
FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the generation of shared secret and for the derivation of the new
session keys), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to
FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read
afterwards.
The Personalization Agent manages the security environment object data required for
Chip Authentication and for Terminal Authentication according to SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE.
To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA’s public key
and certificate as well as the current date are written or update by authorized identified
role as of FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of travel document’s chip
authenticity” is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 provided by
FIA_API.1/CAP proving the identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1
defined by FCS_CKM.1/CA is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential
private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip
Authentication Protocol v.1 [6] requires additional TSF according to FCS_CKM.1/CA (for
the derivation of the session keys), FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
(for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging). The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and
FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
OT.Data_Aut (Authenticity of personal data) aims ensuring authenticity of the User-
and TSF data (after the PACE Authentication) by enabling its verification at the terminal-
side and by an active verification by the TOE itself. This objective is mainly achieved by
FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. A prerequisite for establishing this
trusted channel is a successful PACE or Chip and Terminal Authentication v.1
(FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE resp.
FCS_CKM.1/CA and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of
session keys (here: for KMAC). FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4
represent some required specific properties of the protocols used. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1./KEY_READ restricts the access to the PACE passwords and the Chip
Authentication Private Key. FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over
the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to
be written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered as
trustworthy. The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic
operations needed. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the
functions and roles related.
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OT.Tracing (Tracing travel document) aims that the TOE prevents gathering TOE
tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying the travel document remotely through
establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless interface of the TOE
without a priori knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (CAN, MRZ).This
objective is achieved as follows:
(i) while establishing PACE communication with CAN or MRZ (non-blocking
authorisation data) – by FIA_AFL.1/PACE;
(ii) for listening to PACE communication (is of importance for the current PP, since
SOD is card-individual) – FTP_ITC.1/PACE.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf (Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data) is
enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 allowing
the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by successfully authenticated Extended
Inspection System being authorized by a validly verifiable certificate according
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 requires the identification
and authentication of the inspection systems. The SFR FIA_UAU.5 requires the
successful Chip Authentication (CA) before any authentication attempt as Extended
Inspection System. During the protected communication following the CA the reuse of
authentication data is prevented by FIA_UAU.4.
The SFR FIA_UAU.6 and FDP_UCT.1 requires the confidentiality protection of the
transmitted data after chip authentication by means of secure messaging implemented
by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the
terminal authentication challenge), FCS_CKM.1/DH (for the generation of shared secret),
FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and
FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are
destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written
unauthorized or read afterwards. To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in
FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA’s public key and certificate as well as the current date are written
or update by authorized identified role as of FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
OT.Identification (Identification and Authentication of the TOE) addresses the
storage of Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in its non-volatile memory, whereby
they also include the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the TOE’s chip. This will
be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialisation and Pre-personalisation Data
(including the Personalisation Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS requires the
Personalisation Agent to disable access to Initialisation and Pre-personalisation Data in
the life cyclephase ‘operational use’. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE
support the functions and roles related.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof (Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity) is ensured by the Chip
Authentication Protocol provided by FIA_API.1/CAP proving the identity of the TOE. The
Chip Authentication Protocol defined by FCS_CKM.1/CA is performed using a TOE
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internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip Authentication Protocol [25] requires additional TSF
according to FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the session keys), FCS_COP.1/ENC
and FCS_COP.1/MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func (Protection against Abuse of Functionality) is ensured by the
SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of the TOE or
other features which may not be used after TOE Delivery.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak (Protection against Information Leakage) requires the TOE to
protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip against
disclosure
• by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines which is addressed by SFR FPT_EMSEC.1,
• by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by SFR FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_TST.1, and/or
• by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper (Protection against Physical Tampering) is covered by the
SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Malfunction (Protection against Malfunctions) is covered by (i) the SFR
FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of
authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR
FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating
conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
6.3.3 SFR Dependencies
Requirement Dependencies
Functional Requirements
FAU_SAS.1 No dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/CA FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC and FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE A Diffie-Hellman key agreement is used in order to have no key distribution,
therefore FCS_CKM.2 makes no sense in this case. FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/KP FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.1/KP and FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC CS_CKM.1/CA and FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC CS_CKM.1/CA and FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER CS_CKM.1/CA and FCS_CKM.4
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FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN FCS_CKM.1/KP, FCS_CKM.4 and FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_COP.1/SHA The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA does not need any key
material. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import
(FDP_ITC.1/2) is necessary., FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1 No dependencies
FIA_AFL.1/PACE FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UID.1/PACE No dependencies
FIA_UAU.1/PACE FIA_UID.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/PACE No dependencies
FIA_UAU.5/PACE No dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/EAC No dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/PACE No dependencies
FIA_API.1/CAP No dependencies
FIA_API.1/AAP No dependencies
FDP_ACC.1/TRM FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1/TRM FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_RIP.1 No dependencies
FDP_UCT.1/TRM FTP_ITC.1/PACE and FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_UIT.1/TRM FTP_ITC.1/PACE and FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies
FMT_SMR.1/PACE FIA_UID.1/PACE
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2
FTM_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/DATE FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRIT
E
FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/PA FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.3 FMT_MTD.1/ CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/ CVCA_UPD
FPT_EMSEC.1 No dependencies
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies
FTP_ITC.1/PACE No dependencies
Table 8. SFR Dependencies
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7. TOE summary specification
This set of TSFs manages the identification and/or authentication of the external user
and enforces role separation (FMT_SMR.1).
7.1 SF.Access Control
This function checks that for each operation initiated by a user, the security attributes for
user authorization and data communication required are satisfied.
7.2 SF.Card Personalization
This TSF provides MRTD’s chip personalization functions to allow the Personalization
Agent to create and set the initial MRTD’s LDS data.
7.3 SF.Personalizer Authentication
The Personalization Agent is required to be authenticated by the TOE.
7.4 SF.PACE
The Basic Access System and the travel document mutually authenticate by means of a
Basic Access Control mechanism, where after the PACE-enabled Basic Access System
and the travel document mutually authenticate by means of a PACE V2 protocol.
7.5 SF.Chip Authentication
This TSF provides the Chip Authentication protocol to allow the Extended Inspection
System to authenticate the TOE.
7.6 SF.Terminal Authentication
This TSF provides Terminal Authentication to allow the TOE to authenticate the terminal
using the public authentication material that is presented during the Chip Authentication
protocol (DH or ECDH), enforcing the Secure Messaging session.
7.7 SF.Active Authentication
Active Authentication is provided by this TSF based on the availability of DG15 in the
MRTD’s chip information data.
7.8 SF.Secure Messaging
Commands and responses are exchanged between the TOE and the external device.
This TSF provides a secure mean for the terminal and the card to exchange data.
7.9 SF.Crypto
This Security Function is responsible for providing cryptographic support to all the other
Security Functions including secure key generation, secure random generator, and data
hashing.
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7.10 SF.Protection
This Security Function is responsible for protection of the TSF data, user data, and TSF
functionality.
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8. Additional Rationale
8.1 SAR Dependencies Rationale
The functional and assurance requirements dependencies for the TOE are completely
fulfilled.
Requirement Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5 ADV_TDS.4, ADV_IMP.1
ADV_IMP.1 ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_INT.2 ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_TDS.4 ADV_FSP.5
AGD_OPE.1 ADV_FSP.5
AGD_PRE.1 No dependencies
ALC_CMC.4 ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.5 No dependencies
ALC_DEL.1 No dependencies
ALC_DVS.2 No dependencies
ALC_LCD.1 No dependencies
ALC_TAT.2 ADV_IMP.1
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1 No dependencies
ASE_INT.1 No dependencies
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1 No dependencies
ASE_TSS.1 ADV_FSP.5, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.2
ATE_COV.2 ADV_FSP.5, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.3 ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2 ADV_FSP.5, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2, ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.5
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4, ADV_IMP.1, AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1
Table 9. SAR Dependencies
8.2 Rationale for Extensions
Extensions are based on the Protection Profile [5] and have all been adopted by the
developer of the TOE:
• FAU_SAS.1 ‘Audit data storage’
• FCS_RND.1 ‘Generation of random numbers’
• FIA_API.1 ‘Authentication Proof of Identity’
• FPT_EMSEC.1 ‘TOE emanation’
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• FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 ‘limited capability and availability’
8.3 Assurance Measures Rationale
Each assurance requirement is covered by an assurance measure.
Assurance Requirements
/
Assurance Measures
AM_ADV
AM_AGD
AM_ALC
AM_ATE
AM_AVA
ADV X
AGD X
ALC X
ATE X
AVA X
Table 10. Mapping Assurance Requirements to Assurance Measures
8.4 PP Claim Rationale
This ST includes all the security objectives and requirements claimed by PPs [5] and [6],
and, all of the operations applied to the SFRs are in accordance with the requirements of
this PP.
8.4.1 PP compliancy
The TOE type is compliant with the claimed PPs: the TOE is an ICAO MRTD’s chip
providing all means of identification and authentication of the TOE itself, the MRTD’s
traveler and possibly the Terminal.
The TOE is compliant with the representation provided in the ICAO Machine Readable
Travel Document Chip with Extended Access Control PP [5] and PACE PP [6].
The compliance is strict: the addition of specific TOE security mechanisms to the security
principles of this Security Target required only the addition of four TOE Objectives related
to Active Authentication.
These additions do not affect the concept defined in the PP [5] and this ST is a suitable
solution to the generic security problem described in the PP.
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9. Terminology
Term Definition
Active
Authentication
Security mechanism defined in [11] option by which means the
MRTD’s chip proves and the inspection system verifies the identity
and authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD
issued by a known State of Organization.
Application note
Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting
information that is considered relevant or useful for the
construction, evaluation, or use of the TOE.
Audit records
Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to
store the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity
Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s
chip were created by the issuing State or Organization.
Basic Access
Control (BAC)
Security mechanism defined in [11] by which means the MRTD’s
chip proves and the inspection system protects their
communication by means of secure messaging with Document
Basic Access Keys (see there).
Basic Inspection
System (BIS)
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the
Basic Access Control Mechanism and authenticates itself to the
MRTD’s chip using the Document Basic Access Keys derived from
the printed MRZ data for reading the logical MRTD.
Biographical data
(biodata)
The personalized details of the MRTD holder of the document
appearing as text in the visual and machine readable zones on the
biographical data page of a passport book or on a travel card or
visa. [11]
Biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the
MRTD’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric
reference data.
CAN (Card
Access Number)
Password derived from a short number printed on the front side of
the data-page.
Certificate chain
Hierarchical sequence of Inspection System Certificate (lowest
level), Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifying
Certification Authority Certificates (highest level), where the
certificate of a lower level is signed with the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate of the next higher
level. The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate is
signed with the private key corresponding to the public key it
contains (self-signed certificate).
Counterfeit
An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security
document made by whatever means. [11]
Country Signing
CA Certificate
(CCSCA)
Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key
(KPuCSCA) issued by Country Signing Certification Authority
stored in the inspection system.
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Term Definition
Country Verifying
Certification
Authority
The country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and
creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. It
enforces the Privacy policy of the issuing State or Organization in
respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data
stored in the MRTD.
Current date
The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and
domestic Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is
used the validate card verifiable certificates.
CVCA link
Certificate
Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority signed with the old public key of the Country
Verifying Certification Authority where the certificate effective date
for the new key is before the certificate expiration date of the
certificate for the old key.
Document Basic
Access Key
Derivation
Algorithm
The [11], normative appendix 5, A5.1 describes the Document
Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm on how terminals may
derive the Document Basic Access Keys from the second line of
the printed MRZ data.
Document Basic
Access Keys
Pair of symmetric (two-key) TDES keys used for secure messaging
with encryption (key KENC) and message authentication (key
KMAC) of data transmitted between the MRTD’s chip and the
inspection system [11]. It is drawn from the printed MRZ of the
passport book to authenticate an entity able to read the printed
MRZ of the passport book.
Document
Security Object
(SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document
Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is
stored in the MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer
Certificate (CDS). [11]
Document Verifier
Certification authority creating the Inspection System Certificates
and managing the authorization of the Extended Inspection
Systems for the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided
by the issuing States or Organizations.
Eavesdropper
A threat agent with Enhanced-Basic attack potential reading the
communication between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection
system to gain the data on the MRTD’s chip.
Enrolment
The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the
subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference
templates representing that person's identity. [11]
Extended Access
Control
Security mechanism identified in [11] by which means the MRTD’s
chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection systems
authorized to read the optional biometric reference data, (ii)
controls the access to the optional biometric reference data and (iii)
protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric
reference data during their transmission to the inspection system
by secure messaging. The Personalization Agent may use the
same mechanism to authenticate itself with Personalization Agent
Private Key and to get write and read access to the logical MRTD
and TSF data.
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Term Definition
Extended
Inspection
System
A General Inspection System which (i) implements the Chip
Authentication Mechanism, (ii) implements the Terminal
Authentication Protocol and (iii) is authorized by the issuing State
or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving
State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
Extended
Inspection
System (EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in
addition to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State
or Organization to read the optional biometric reference data and
supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery
Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g.
changes to the biographical data or the portrait. [11]
General
Inspection
System
A Basic Inspection System which implements sensitively the Chip
Authentication Mechanism.
Global
Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated)
in different States throughout the world to exchange data, to
process data received from systems in other States, and to utilize
that data in inspection operations in their respective States. Global
interoperability is a major objective of the standardized
specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine
readable data in all MRTDs. [11]
IC Dedicated
Support Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which
provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC
Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is
used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not
provide any functionality thereafter.
IC Identification
Data
The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to
control the IC as MRTD material during the IC manufacturing and
the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer.
Impostor
A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a
false name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical
appearance to represent himself or herself as another person for
the purpose of using that person’s document. [11]
Improperly
documented
person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired
travel document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or
altered travel document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel
document or visa; or (d) no travel document or visa, if required. [11]
Initialization
Process of writing Initialization Data (see below) to the TOE (cf.
1.3.8.2 TOE lifecycle phase 2 step 3).
Initialization Data
Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the
non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer
(Phase 2). These data are for instance used for traceability and for
IC identification as MRTD’s material (IC identification data).
Inspection
The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveler
(the MRTD holder) and verifying its authenticity. [11]
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Term Definition
Inspection system
(IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the
receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler
and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD
holder.
Integrated circuit
(IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or
memory functions. The MRTD’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity
Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s
chip have not been altered from that created by the issuing State
or Organization.
Issuing
Organization
Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g.
the United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [11]
Issuing State The Country issuing the MRTD. [11]
Logical Data
Structure (LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional
capacity expansion technology [11]. The capacity expansion
technology used is the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD
Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [11] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated
circuit. It presents contactless readable data including (but not
limited to):
(1) personal data of the MRTD holder,
(2) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data,
EF.DG1),
(3) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(4) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris
image(s) (EF.DG4) or both and
(5) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16)
EF.COM and EF.SOD
Logical travel
document
Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by
ICAO in the contactless integrated circuit including (but not limited
to)
(1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory),
(2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and
(3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
Machine readable
travel document
(MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used
by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official
document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye
readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary, intended
for global use, reflecting essential data elements capable of being
machine read. [11]
Machine readable
visa (MRV)
A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter
collectively referred to as visas) conforming to the specifications
contained herein, formulated to improve facilitation and enhance
security for the visa holder. Contains mandatory visual (eye
readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary capable
of being machine read. The MRV is normally a label which is
attached to a visa page in a passport. [11]
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Term Definition
Machine readable
zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP
Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD,
containing mandatory and optional data for machine reading using
OCR methods. [11]
Machine-
verifiable
biometrics feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris
pattern, fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel
document in a form that can be read and verified by machine. [11]
MRTD application
Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating
system on the IC as the MRTD’s chip. It includes the file structure
implementing the LDS [11], the definition of the User Data, but does
not include the User Data itself (i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13,
EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF.SOD) and the TSF Data including the
definition the authentication data but except the authentication data
itself.
MRTD Basic
Access Control
Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging
between the inspection system and the MRTD’s chip based on
MRZ information as key seed and access condition to data stored
on MRTD’s chip according to LDS.
MRTD holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or
Organization personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip
A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443
and programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as
specified by ICAO.
MRTD’s chip
Embedded
Software
Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being developed by
the IC Designer. The MRTD’s chip Embedded Software is designed
in Phase 1 and embedded into the MRTD’s chip in Phase 2 of the
TOE life-cycle.
Optional
biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the
MRTD’s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii)
encoded iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note, that the
European commission decided to use only fingerprint and not to
use iris images as optional biometric reference data.
Password
Authenticated
Connection
Establishment
(PACE)
A communication establishment protocol defined in [3]. The PACE
Protocol is a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key
agreement protocol providing implicit password-based
authentication of the communication partners (e.g. smart card and
the terminal connected): i.e. PACE provides a verification, whether
the communication partners share the same value of a password
π). Based on this authentication, PACE also provides a secure
communication, whereby confidentiality and authenticity of data
transferred within this communication channel are maintained.
PACE password A password needed for PACE authentication, e.g. CAN or MRZ.
Passive
authentication
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security
Object and
(ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the
hash values contained in the Document Security Object
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Term Definition
Personalization
The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data
are applied to the document. This may also include the optional
biometric data collected during the “Enrolment” (cf. 1.3.8.3, TOE
lifecycle phase 3 step 6).
Personalization
Agent
The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or Organization
to personalize the MRTD for the holder by (i) establishing the
identity the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling
the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait,
the encoded finger image(s) or (ii) the encoded iris image(s) and
(iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the
holder.
Personalization
Agent
Authentication
Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the
Personalization Agent.
Personalization
Agent Key
Symmetric cryptographic authentication key used (i) by the
Personalization Agent to prove his identity and to get access to the
logical MRTD and (ii) by the MRTD’s chip to verify the
authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent.
Physical travel
Document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure
printing to present data including (but not limited to)
(1) biographical data,
(2) data of the machine-readable zone,
(3) photographic image and other data
Pre-
Personalization
Process of writing Pre-Personalization Data (see below) to the TOE
including the creation of the MRTD Application (cf. 1.3.8.2, TOE
lifecycle phase 2 step 5)
Pre-
personalization
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE
by the MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-
personalized MRTD’s and/or to secure shipment within or between
lifecycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to) the Active
Authentication Key Pair and the Personalization Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalized
MRTD’s chip
MRTD’s chip equipped with a unique identifier and a unique
asymmetric Active Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
Receiving State The Country to which the Traveler is applying for entry. [11]
Reference data
Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check
the verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in
an authentication attempt.
Secondary image
A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the
document by whatever means. [11]
Secure
messaging in
encrypted mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication
code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 Skimming Imitation of the
inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the
contactless communication channel of the TOE without knowledge
of the printed MRZ data.
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Term Definition
Terminal
Authorization
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations defined by the
Inspection System Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate
and Country Verifying Certification Authority which shall be all valid
for the Current Date.
Travel document
A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State
or Organization which may be used by the rightful holder for
international travel.
Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming
the identity of the MRTD holder.
TSF data
Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of
the TOE.
Un-personalized
MRTD
The MRTD that contains the MRTD Chip holding only Initialization
Data and Pre-personalization Data as delivered to the
Personalization Agent from the Manufacturer.
User data
Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation
of the TSF.
Verification
The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against
the biometric reference template of a single enrollee whose identity
is being claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrollee’s
template. [11]
Verification data
Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove
their identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the
verification data match the reference data known for the claimed
identity.
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10. References
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001, April
2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017.
[4] BSI-CC-PP0055 – Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Document with
“ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control – EAL 4+ – Version: 1.10, 25th March
2009
[5] BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012 – Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel
Document with „ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP)
– EAL 4+ – Version: 1.3.2, 05th December 2012
[6] BSI-CC-PP0068-V2-2011-MA-01 – Protection Profile — Machine Readable Travel
Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP) – EAL 4+ –
Version: 1.01, 22nd July 2014
[7] PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 1.5
[8] Specifications for the Java Card 3 Platform, Version 3.0.4 Classic Edition, Sept.
2011
- Virtual Machine Specification [JCVM]
- Application Programming Interface [JCAPI]
- Runtime Environment Specification [JCRE]
[9] - GlobalPlatform, Card Specification, Version 2.2.1, Jan. 2011 [GPC_SPE_034]
- GlobalPlatform Card ID Configuration, Version 1.0, Dec. 2011 [GPC_GUI_039]
- Confidential Card Content Management – Amendment A, v1.0.1, Jan 2011
- Secure Channel Protocol 03 – Amendment D, v1.1, Sept. 2009
[10] CCDB-2007-09-001 – Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar
devices – Version: 1.0, revision 1, September 2007
[11] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 – Machine Readable
Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization
[12] TR-03110, Technical Guideline Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), Version 1.11, BSI
[13] ICAO: Supplement to doc 9303 – Release 11 – November 17, 2011
[14] ICAO: Technical report supplemental access control for machine readable travel
documents – Version 1.01 – November 11, 2010
[15] Technical Guideline TR-03110-3, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents – Part 3 – Common Specifications, Version 2.10, 20.
March 2012
[16] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques — Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002
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[17] ISO/IEC 9796-2: Information technology — Security techniques — Signature
Schemes giving message recovery — Part 2: Integer factorization based
mechanisms, 2002
[18] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories
Technical Note, Version 1.4, Revised November 1, 1993
[19] Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO 15946.TR-ECC,
BSI 2006.
[20] FIPS PUB 180-2, FIPS Publication – Secure hash standard (+ Change Notice to
include SHA-224), 2002, NIST
[21] FIPS PUB 46-3, FIPS Publication – Data Encryption Standard (DES), Reaffirmed
1999 October 25, U.S. Department of Commerce/NIST
[22] IEEE 1363-2000 – IEEE Standard Specification for Public-Key Cryptography
[23] ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999, Information technology - Security techniques - Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, 1999
[24] NIST. Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), FIPS PUB 197-
2001
[25] NIST. Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC mode for
authentication, special publication 800-38B-2005
[26] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto
Library, Security Target, NXP Semiconductors, Rev. 1.5, 31 May 2019, BSI-DSZ-
CC-1040
[27] JCOP 4 P71 Security Target for JCOP 4 P71 / SE050, NXP Semiconductors, Rev.
3.4, 2019-06-06, NSCIB-CC-180212
[28] ChipDoc 3.0, User Guide Manual, Revision 2.5, Date: 07 October 2019
[29] ChipDoc 3.0, ICAO Personalization Guide, Revision: 2.5, Date: 20 August 2019
[30] ANSI X9.62-2005: Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: the
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), American National Standards
Institute (ANSI), 2005.
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11. Legal information
11.1 Definitions
Draft — The document is a draft version only. The content is still under
internal review and subject to formal approval, which may result in
modifications or additions. NXP Semiconductors does not give any
representations or warranties as to the accuracy or completeness of
information included herein and shall have no liability for the consequences
of use of such information.
11.2 Disclaimers
Limited warranty and liability — Information in this document is believed to
be accurate and reliable. However, NXP Semiconductors does not give any
representations or warranties, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy or
completeness of such information and shall have no liability for the
consequences of use of such information.
In no event shall NXP Semiconductors be liable for any indirect, incidental,
punitive, special or consequential damages (including - without limitation -
lost profits, lost savings, business interruption, costs related to the removal
or replacement of any products or rework charges) whether or not such
damages are based on tort (including negligence), warranty, breach of
contract or any other legal theory.
Notwithstanding any damages that customer might incur for any reason
whatsoever, NXP Semiconductors’ aggregate and cumulative liability
towards customer for the products described herein shall be limited in
accordance with the Terms and conditions of commercial sale of NXP
Semiconductors.
Right to make changes — NXP Semiconductors reserves the right to make
changes to information published in this document, including without
limitation specifications and product descriptions, at any time and without
notice. This document supersedes and replaces all information supplied prior
to the publication hereof.
Suitability for use — NXP Semiconductors products are not designed,
authorized or warranted to be suitable for use in life support, life-critical or
safety-critical systems or equipment, nor in applications where failure or
malfunction of an NXP Semiconductors product can reasonably be expected
to result in personal injury, death or severe property or environmental
damage. NXP Semiconductors accepts no liability for inclusion and/or use of
NXP Semiconductors products in such equipment or applications and
therefore such inclusion and/or use is at the customer’s own risk.
Applications — Applications that are described herein for any of these
products are for illustrative purposes only. NXP Semiconductors makes no
representation or warranty that such applications will be suitable for the
specified use without further testing or modification.
Customers are responsible for the design and operation of their applications
and products using NXP Semiconductors products, and NXP
Semiconductors accepts no liability for any assistance with applications or
customer product design. It is customer’s sole responsibility to determine
whether the NXP Semiconductors product is suitable and fit for the
customer’s applications and products planned, as well as for the planned
application and use of customer’s third party customer(s). Customers should
provide appropriate design and operating safeguards to minimize the risks
associated with their applications and products.
NXP Semiconductors does not accept any liability related to any default,
damage, costs or problem which is based on any weakness or default in the
customer’s applications or products, or the application or use by customer’s
third party customer(s). Customer is responsible for doing all necessary
testing for the customer’s applications and products using NXP
Semiconductors products in order to avoid a default of the applications and
the products or of the application or use by customer’s third party
customer(s). NXP does not accept any liability in this respect.
Export control — This document as well as the item(s) described herein
may be subject to export control regulations. Export might require a prior
authorization from competent authorities.
Evaluation products — This product is provided on an “as is” and “with all
faults” basis for evaluation purposes only. NXP Semiconductors, its affiliates
and their suppliers expressly disclaim all warranties, whether express,
implied or statutory, including but not limited to the implied warranties of non-
infringement, merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. The entire
risk as to the quality, or arising out of the use or performance, of this product
remains with customer.
In no event shall NXP Semiconductors, its affiliates or their suppliers be
liable to customer for any special, indirect, consequential, punitive or
incidental damages (including without limitation damages for loss of
business, business interruption, loss of use, loss of data or information, and
the like) arising out the use of or inability to use the product, whether or not
based on tort (including negligence), strict liability, breach of contract, breach
of warranty or any other theory, even if advised of the possibility of such
damages.
Notwithstanding any damages that customer might incur for any reason
whatsoever (including without limitation, all damages referenced above and
all direct or general damages), the entire liability of NXP Semiconductors, its
affiliates and their suppliers and customer’s exclusive remedy for all of the
foregoing shall be limited to actual damages incurred by customer based on
reasonable reliance up to the greater of the amount actually paid by
customer for the product or five dollars (US$5.00). The foregoing limitations,
exclusions and disclaimers shall apply to the maximum extent permitted by
applicable law, even if any remedy fails of its essential purpose.
11.3 Licenses
ICs with DPA Countermeasures functionality
NXP ICs containing functionality
implementing countermeasures to
Differential Power Analysis and Simple
Power Analysis are produced and sold
under applicable license from
Cryptography Research, Inc.
11.4 Trademarks
Notice: All referenced brands, product names, service names and
trademarks are property of their respective owners.
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12. List of figures
Fig 1. Components of the TOE ...................................3
Fig 2. TOE Life Cycle................................................11
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13. List of tables
Table 1. ST Reference and TOE Reference...................3
Table 2. Reference to Certified Micro Controller with IC
Dedicated Software and Crypto Library ............8
Table 3. Reference to certified Platform..........................9
Table 4. Delivery Items .................................................13
Table 5. Security Environment to Security Objectives
Mapping ..........................................................31
Table 6. Assurance Requirements: EAL5 augmented ..66
Table 7. Functional Requirement to TOE Security
Objective Mapping ..........................................69
Table 8. SFR Dependencies.........................................75
Table 9. SAR Dependencies.........................................78
Table 10. Mapping Assurance Requirements to Assurance
Measures ........................................................79
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For more information, visit: http://www.nxp.com
For sales office addresses, please send an email to: salesaddresses@nxp.com
Date of release: 12 February 2020
Document identifier:
14. Contents
1. ST Introduction (ASE_INT) .................................3
1.1 ST Reference and TOE Reference ....................3
1.2 TOE Overview....................................................3
1.2.1 TOE Usage and Security Features for
Operational Use .................................................4
1.3 TOE Description.................................................5
1.3.1 General ..............................................................5
1.3.2 MRTD’s Chip......................................................5
1.3.3 Basic Access Control .........................................6
1.3.4 PACE .................................................................7
1.3.5 Extended Access Control...................................7
1.3.6 Active Authentication..........................................8
1.3.7 TOE Components and Composite Certification..8
Micro Controller..................................................8
Security IC Dedicated IC Software.....................9
Security IC Embedded Software ........................9
1.3.8 TOE Lifecycle...................................................10
Phase 1 “Development” ...................................10
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”..................................10
Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”...........12
Phase 4 “Operational Use”...............................12
1.3.9 TOE Identification.............................................13
TOE Delivery....................................................13
Identification of the TOE...................................13
1.3.10 Evaluated Package Types................................13
2. Conformance Claims ........................................14
2.1 CC Conformance Claim ...................................14
2.2 Package Claim.................................................14
2.3 PP Claim ..........................................................14
3. Security Problem Definition .............................16
3.1 Assets ..............................................................16
3.2 Subjects ...........................................................17
3.3 Assumptions.....................................................19
3.4 Threat agent.....................................................20
3.5 Threats.............................................................20
3.6 Organisational Security Policies.......................22
4. Security Objectives ...........................................25
4.1 SOs for the TOE...............................................25
4.2 Objective on the Environment ..........................28
4.3 Security objectives rationale.............................31
4.3.1 Security Objectives Coverage ..........................31
4.3.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency ........................32
5. Extended Components Definition ....................35
5.1 Audit data storage (FAU_SAS).........................35
5.2 Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND) ...36
5.3 Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API)........37
5.4 Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM) 38
5.5 TOE emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1) ....................40
6. Security Requirements......................................41
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements ...........45
6.1.1 Security Audit (FAU).........................................45
Audit Storage (FAU_SAS.1).............................45
6.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)............................45
Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1) ...46
Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)...47
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)............47
Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1) ....48
6.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA) ..............49
Authentication Failure Handling (FIA_AFL.1) ...49
Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)..................50
Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)..............51
Single-use authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.4).....................................................51
Multiple authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.5).....................................................53
Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)........................54
Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1).....54
6.1.4 User data protection (FDP)...............................55
Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) ...............55
Security attribute based access control
(FDP_ACF.1)....................................................55
Residual Information Protection (FDP_RIP.1)..57
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For sales office addresses, please send an email to: salesaddresses@nxp.com
Date of release: 12 February 2020
Document identifier:
Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1) ...................................................57
Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1) ..............57
Specifications of Management Functions
(FMT_SMF.1)...................................................57
Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)............................58
6.1.5 Security management (FMT)............................58
Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) .....................58
Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2) ......................59
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1) .........59
Secure TSF data (FMT_MTD.3).......................62
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT) .............................63
TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)....................63
Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1) ....................................................64
Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3).....64
TSF testing (FPT_TST.1).................................64
Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)............64
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements...........66
6.2.1 SARs Measures ...............................................66
6.2.2 SARs Rationale................................................67
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale.....................68
6.3.1 Security Requirement Coverage ......................68
6.3.2 Security Requirements Sufficiency...................69
TOE Security Requirements Sufficiency ..........69
6.3.3 SFR Dependencies..........................................74
7. TOE summary specification .............................76
7.1 SF.Access Control ...........................................76
7.2 SF.Card Personalization ..................................76
7.3 SF.Personalizer Authentication........................76
7.4 SF.PACE..........................................................76
7.5 SF.Chip Authentication ....................................76
7.6 SF.Terminal Authentication..............................76
7.7 SF.Active Authentication ..................................76
7.8 SF.Secure Messaging......................................76
7.9 SF.Crypto.........................................................76
7.10 SF.Protection ...................................................77
8. Additional Rationale..........................................78
8.1 SAR Dependencies Rationale..........................78
8.2 Rationale for Extensions ..................................78
8.3 Assurance Measures Rationale........................79
8.4 PP Claim Rationale ..........................................79
8.4.1 PP compliancy..................................................79
9. Terminology.......................................................80
10. References .........................................................87
11. Legal information ..............................................89
11.1 Definitions.........................................................89
11.2 Disclaimers.......................................................89
11.3 Licenses ...........................................................89
11.4 Trademarks ......................................................89
12. List of figures.....................................................90
13. List of tables ......................................................91
14. Contents.............................................................92