National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
416 Maetan-3dong, Yeongtong-gu, Suwon-si,
Gyeonggi-do, 443-742 Korea
Samsung Galaxy Devices on
Android 8
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10898-2018
Dated: May 29, 2018
Version: 0.4
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 8 Validation Report Version 0.4, May 29, 2018
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
John Butterworth
Joanne Fitzpatrick
Stelios Melachrinoudis
Linda Morrison
The MITRE Corporation
Jerome Myers
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
James Arnold
Tammy Compton
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 8 Validation Report Version 0.4, May 29, 2018
iii
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 4
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 5
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 6
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 6
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 6
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 6
4.3 User data protection ............................................................................................ 7
4.4 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 7
4.5 Security management.......................................................................................... 7
4.6 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 7
4.7 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 8
4.8 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 8
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 8
6 Clarification of Scope ................................................................................................. 9
7 Documentation............................................................................................................ 9
8 IT Product Testing .................................................................................................... 10
8.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................. 10
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................. 10
9 Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 10
10 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 12
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 12
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................ 12
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 12
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................... 13
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 13
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 13
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 13
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 14
12 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 17
13 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 17
14 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 17
15 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 18
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1
1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 8 solution
provided by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of
the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either
expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in May 2018. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security
Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the Protection
Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017, General Purpose
Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile
Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08
February 2016 and PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.1, 05
October 2017.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 8.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Samsung Electronics
Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 8 (MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21)
Security Target, Version 0.4, May 15, 2018 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
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2
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 8
Protection Profile
(Specific models identified in Section 3.1)
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017,
General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device
Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area
Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016 and PP-Module for
Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.1, 05 October 2017
ST Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 8 Security Target, Version 0.4, May 15,
2018
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for amsung Galaxy Devices on Android 8, version
0.4, May 22, 2018
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Developer Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators John Butterworth
The MITRE Corporation
Joanne Fitzpatrick
The MITRE Corporation
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Item Identifier
Stelios Melachrinoudis
The MITRE Corporation
Linda Morrison
The MITRE Corporation
Jerome Myers
The Aerospace Corporation
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The TOE is a mobile device based on Android 8 with a built-in IPsec VPN client and
modifications made to increase the level of security provided to end users and enterprises.
The TOE is intended for use as part of an enterprise mobility solution providing mobile staff
with enterprise connectivity.
The TOE includes a Common Criteria mode (or “CC mode”) that an administrator can invoke
using an MDM. The TOE must meet the following prerequisites in order for an administrator
to transition the TOE to CC configuration.
 Require a screen lock password (swipe, PIN, pattern, accessibility (direction), or
facial recognition screen locks are not allowed).
 The maximum password failure retry policy should be less than or equal to 50.
 A screen lock password required to decrypt data on boot.
 Revocation checking must be enabled.
 External storage must be encrypted.
 Password (non-container) recovery policy and password history must not be enabled.
When CC mode has been enabled, the TOE behaves as follows:
 The TOE sets the system wide Android CC mode property to enabled.
 The TOE prevents loading of custom firmware/kernels and requires all updates occur
through FOTA (Samsung’s Firmware Over The Air firmware update method).
 The TOE utilizes CAVP approved cryptographic ciphers for TLS.
 The TOE ensures FOTA updates utilize 2048-bit PKCS #1 RSA-PSS formatted
signatures (with SHA-512 hashing).
The TOE includes a containerization capability, Knox Workspace Container, which is part
of the Knox Platform. This container provides a way to segment applications and data into
two separate areas on the device, such as a personal area and a work area, each with its own
separate apps, data and security policies. For this effort the TOE was evaluated both without
and with a Knox Workspace container created (and to create a Knox Workspace container,
one must purchase an additional license). Thus, the evaluation includes several Knox-
specific claims that apply to a Knox Workspace container when created.
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4
There are different models of the TOE, the Error! Reference source not found., and these
models differ in their internal components (as described in Evaluated Configuration section
below).
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The model numbers of the mobile devices used during evaluation testing are as follows:
Device Name
Model
Number
Chipset
Vendor
CPU
Build
Arch/ISA
Android
Version
Kernel
Version
Build
Number
Galaxy S9+ SM-G965F Samsung
Exynos
9810
A64 8.0 4.9.65
R16NW
Galaxy S9+ SM-G965U Qualcomm SDM845 A64 8.0 4.9.59 R16NW
Galaxy S8 SM-G950F Samsung
Exynos
8895
A64 8.0 4.4.13
R16NW
Galaxy S8+ SM-G955U Qualcomm MSM8998 A64 8.0 4.4.78 R16NW
Table 1 Evaluated Devices
In addition to the evaluated devices, the following device models are claimed as equivalent
with a note about the differences between the evaluated device and the equivalent models.
Evaluated Device CPU Equivalent Devices Differences
Galaxy S9+ (Qualcomm) SDM845 Galaxy S9 (Qualcomm) S9+ is larger
Galaxy S9+ (Samsung) Exynos 9810 Galaxy S9 (Samsung) S9+ is larger
Galaxy S8+ (Qualcomm) MSM8998
Galaxy S8 (Qualcomm) S8+ is larger
Galaxy Note8 (Qualcomm)
Note8 includes S Pen &
functionality to take advantage
of it for input (not security
related)
Galaxy S8 Active
S8+ is larger
S8 Active has a IP68 & MIL-
STD-810G certified body
Galaxy S8 (Samsung) Exynos 8895
Galaxy S8+ (Samsung) S8+ is larger
Galaxy Note8 (Samsung)
Note8 is larger
Note8 includes S-Pen
Table 2 Equivalent Devices
In general, the devices include a final letter or number at the end of the name that denotes
that the device is for a specific carrier or region (for example, U = US Carrier build and F =
International, which were used during the evaluation). The following list of letters/numbers
denotes the specific models that may be validated:
J – KDDI,
D – NTT Docomo,
U – All US Carriers (unified US model),
N – All Korean Carriers (unified Korean model),
F/C/I – International
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For each device there are specific models which are validated. This table lists the specific
carrier models that have the validated configuration (covering both evaluated and equivalent
devices).
Device Name Base Model Number Carrier Models
Galaxy S9 (Qualcomm) SM-G960 U, SC-02K*
, SCV38*
Galaxy S9 (Samsung) SM-G960 N, F
Galaxy S9+ (Qualcomm) SM-G965 U
Galaxy S9+ (Samsung) SM-G965 N, F
Galaxy Note8 (Qualcomm) SM-N950 U, SC-01K*
, SCV37*
Galaxy Note8 (Samsung) SM-N950 N, F
Galaxy S8 (Qualcomm) SM-G950 U
Galaxy S8 (Samsung) SM-G950 N, F
Galaxy S8+ (Qualcomm) SM-G955 U
Galaxy S8+ (Samsung) SM-G955 N, F
Galaxy S8 Active SM-G892 A, U, None
Table 3 Carrier Models
The carrier models marked by * are explicit model numbers for those carriers and do not
follow the standard specified for other models. Where Carrier Models specifies “None” that
means a device without a suffix is also a device that can be placed into a validated
configuration.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE combines with a Mobile Device Management solution (note that this evaluation
does not include an MDM agent nor server) that enables the Enterprise to watch, control and
administer all deployed mobile devices, across multiple mobile service providers as well as
facilitate secure communications through a VPN. This partnership provides a secure mobile
environment that can be managed and controlled by the environment and reduces the risks
that can be introduced through a Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD) model which can be
extended to Corporate-Owned-Personally-Enabled (COPE) or other corporate-owned
deployments.
Data on the TOE is protected through the implementation of Samsung On-Device Encryption
(ODE) that utilizes a CAVP certified cryptographic algorithms to encrypt device storage.
This functionality is combined with a number of on-device policies including local wipe,
remote wipe, password complexity, automatic lock and privileged access to security
configurations to prevent unauthorized access to the device and stored data.
The Samsung Knox Software Development Kit (SDK) builds on top of the existing Android
security model by expanding the current set of security configuration options to more than
600 configurable policies and including additional security functionality such as application
whitelisting and blacklisting.
The Knox Platform for Enterprise provides a set of flexible deployment options for Work
environments, including the ability to enhance the BYOD or COPE models by creating a
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separate container for the Enterprise (the Workspace). Within the Knox Workspace, the
Enterprise can provision separate applications and ensure they are kept separate from
anything the user may do outside the Knox Workspace. The Enterprise can use policy
controls to manage a Work environment on the device as a whole or within the Knox
Workspace container specifically, as needed by the organization.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a multi-user mobile device based on Android 8 that incorporates the Samsung
Knox SDK. The TOE does not include the user applications that run on top of the operating
system, but does include controls that limit application behavior. The TOE includes an IPsec
VPN client integrated into the firmware (as opposed to a downloadable application). Within
an Enterprise environment, the Enterprise can manage the configuration of the mobile device,
including the VPN client, through a compliant device management solution.
The TOE communicates and interacts with 802.11-2012 Access Points and mobile data
networks to establish network connectivity, and the through that connectivity interacts with
MDM servers that allow administrative control of the TOE.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. User data protection
4. Identification and authentication
5. Security management
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE access
8. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE generates logs for a range of security relevant events. The TOE stores the logs
locally so they can be accessed by an administrator or they can be exported to an MDM.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes multiple cryptographic libraries with CAVP certified algorithms for a
wide range of cryptographic functions including: asymmetric key generation and
establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and
keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random bit
generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key
storage, and key and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are
used to implement security protocols such as TLS, EAP-TLS, IPsec, and HTTPS and to
encrypt the media (including the generation and protection of data and key encryption keys)
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used by the TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to
applications running on the TOE.
4.3 User data protection
The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of
the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE protects user and other sensitive data
using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected. The
functionality provided by a Knox Workspace container enhances the security of user data by
providing an additional layer of separation between different categories of apps and data
while the device is in use. The TOE ensures that residual information is protected from
potential reuse in accessible objects such as network packets.
4.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a
user perspective, except for making phone calls to an emergency number, a password or
Biometric Authentication Factor (BAF) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. In
addition, even when the TOE is unlocked the password must be re-entered to change the
password or re-enroll the biometric template. Passwords are obscured when entered so they
cannot be read from the TOE's display, the frequency of entering passwords is limited and
when a configured number of failures occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents.
Passwords can be constructed using upper and lower case characters, numbers, and special
characters and passwords between 4 and 16 characters are supported.
The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can use X.509v3 and validate
certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS and IPsec exchanges. The TOE can also act as a client or
server in an authenticated Bluetooth pairing. In addition to storing X.509 certificates used
for IPsec connections, the TOE can also securely store pre-shared keys for VPN connections.
4.5 Security management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions (including
the VPN client) identified throughout this Security Target as well as other functions
commonly found in mobile devices. Many of the available functions are available to users of
the TOE while many are restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device
Management solution once the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and
then un-enrolled, it removes all MDM policies and disables CC mode.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and
integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as cryptographic
keys so that they are not accessible or exportable. It also provides its own timing mechanism
to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability). It enforces
read, write, and execute memory page protections, uses address space layout randomization,
and stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize the potential to exploit application
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8
flaws. It also protects itself from modification by applications as well as isolates the address
spaces of applications from one another to protect those applications.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking
so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the
TOE will not go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of
the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring
that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital
signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation.
4.7 TOE access
The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of
inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an advisory message (banner) when
users unlock the TOE for use.
The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
4.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of 802.11-2012, 802.1X, EAP-TLS, TLS, HTTPS and IPsec to
secure communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017,
General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device Fundamentals
Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)
Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016 and PP-Module for Virtual Private Network
(VPN) Clients, Version 2.1, 05 October 2017
That information has not been reproduced here and the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21
should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
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9
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile and
General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device Fundamentals
Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)
Clients and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients PP-Module and performed by the
evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21 and applicable
Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the
TOE were not covered by this evaluation. Any non-security related functional
capabilities of the TOE were not covered in this evaluation.
 While an MDM can be used in configuring the TOE into CC Mode, an MDM agent
and server were not included and thus MDM functionality was not evaluated.
 The security functionality provided by the Knox Workspace container is limited to
the Knox-specific claims made in this evaluation. All other functionality provided by
the container is out of scope.
7 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 Samsung Android 8 on Galaxy Devices Administrator Guide, Version 4.0, May 15,
2018
 Samsung VPN Client on Galaxy Devices, Version 4.0, March 28, 2018
These are the only documents that should be trusted by the administrator in setting up the
TOE into its evaluated configuration. Section 3.7 of the Samsung Android 8 Administrator
Guide references procedures an end user must follow to ensure the TOE remains in the
evaluated configuration (such as setting up a password). Device-specific documentation
referenced by these documents (such as those references listed in Section 1.5 of the Samsung
Android 8 Administrator Guide) serve as supplemental information for applying specific
settings. These device-specific references are not to be used alone without consulting the two
documents listed in this section.
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Assurance Activity Report
(MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21) for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 8, Version
0.2, May 10, 2018 (AAR).
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21 including the
tests associated with optional requirements. The AAR lists the tested devices in Section 1.1
(Device Equivalence) and provides a list of test tools and diagrams for the test environment
in Section 3.4.1 (Independent Testing Conformance (ATE_IND.1)). More detailed results of
testing can be found in the proprietary Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator.
9 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following series and models:
Device Name
Model
Number
Chipset
Vendor
CPU
Build
Arch/ISA
Android
Version
Kernel
Version
Build
Number
Galaxy S9+ SM-G965F Samsung
Exynos
9810
A64 8.0 4.9.65
R16NW
Galaxy S9+ SM-G965U Qualcomm SDM845 A64 8.0 4.9.59 R16NW
Galaxy S8 SM-G950F Samsung
Exynos
8895
A64 8.0 4.4.13
R16NW
Galaxy S8+ SM-G955U Qualcomm MSM8998 A64 8.0 4.4.78 R16NW
Table 4 Evaluated Devices
In addition to the evaluated devices, the following device models are claimed as equivalent
with a note about the differences between the evaluated device and the equivalent models.
Evaluated Device CPU Equivalent Devices Differences
Galaxy S9+ (Qualcomm) SDM845 Galaxy S9 (Qualcomm) S9+ is larger
Galaxy S9+ (Samsung) Exynos 9810 Galaxy S9 (Samsung) S9+ is larger
Galaxy S8+ (Qualcomm) MSM8998
Galaxy S8 (Qualcomm) S8+ is larger
Galaxy Note8 (Qualcomm)
Note8 includes S Pen &
functionality to take advantage
of it for input (not security
related)
Galaxy S8 Active S8+ is larger
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11
S8 Active has a IP68 & MIL-
STD-810G certified body
Galaxy S8 (Samsung) Exynos 8895
Galaxy S8+ (Samsung) S8+ is larger
Galaxy Note8 (Samsung)
Note8 is larger
Note8 includes S-Pen
Table 5 Equivalent Devices
In general, the devices include a final letter or number at the end of the name that denotes
that the device is for a specific carrier or region (for example, U = US Carrier build and F =
International, which were used during the evaluation). The following list of letters/numbers
denotes the specific models that may be validated:
J – KDDI,
D – NTT Docomo,
U – All US Carriers (unified US model),
N – All Korean Carriers (unified Korean model),
F/C/I – International
For each device there are specific models which are validated. This table lists the specific
carrier models that have the validated configuration (covering both evaluated and equivalent
devices).
Device Name Base Model Number Carrier Models
Galaxy S9 (Qualcomm) SM-G960 U, SC-02K*
, SCV38*
Galaxy S9 (Samsung) SM-G960 N, F
Galaxy S9+ (Qualcomm) SM-G965 U
Galaxy S9+ (Samsung) SM-G965 N, F
Galaxy Note8 (Qualcomm) SM-N950 U, SC-01K*
, SCV37*
Galaxy Note8 (Samsung) SM-N950 N, F
Galaxy S8 (Qualcomm) SM-G950 U
Galaxy S8 (Samsung) SM-G950 N, F
Galaxy S8+ (Qualcomm) SM-G955 U
Galaxy S8+ (Samsung) SM-G955 N, F
Galaxy S8 Active SM-G892 A, U, None
Table 6 Carrier Models
The carrier models marked by * are explicit model numbers for those carriers and do not
follow the standard specified for other models. Where Carrier Models specifies “None” that
means a device without a suffix is also a device that can be placed into a validated
configuration.
The products must be configured in accordance with the guidance listed in the
Documentation section (Section 7 of this VR).
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10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Samsung
Galaxy Devices on Android 8 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained
in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21.
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 8
products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21
related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
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conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21 and
recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
proprietary Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability
analysis includes a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities
did not uncover any residual vulnerability. The vulnerability analysis was performed on
April 1, 2018.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) with the following search terms: “Samsung Galaxy S9”,
“Samsung S9”, “Samsung Galaxy S8”, “Samsung S8”, “Knox”, “Android”, “BoringSSL”,
“strongswan”, “charon”.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
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The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The evaluated configuration requires that software updates to the TOE be restricted to FOTA.
The evaluators were unable to directly exercise this mechanism since it would have involved
placing invalid updates on the live public servers that are currently in use by present
customers. Hence, the evaluators had to take the products out of the evaluated configuration
to test the update features.
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated
configuration of the device(s). The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the
security functional requirements specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality
implemented by the SFR’s within the Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality
provided by the devices, to include software that was not part of the evaluated configuration,
needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness.
The validators encourage the consumers of these products to understand the relationship
between the products and any functionality that may be provided via Mobile Device
Management (MDM), Enterprise Device Management (EDM), and Enterprise Mobility
Management (EMM) solutions (hereafter collectively referred to as MDM solutions). This
evaluation neither covers, nor endorses, the use of any particular MDM solution; only the
MDM-like interfaces of the products were exercised as part of the evaluation. In practice,
the Samsung EDMapp and STIGtool are not available, though its settings could be
managed via a suitable MDM solution and corresponding agent. Samsung does not intend
to make the EDMApp and STIGtool available; however, the APIs used by these tools have
been made available by Samsung. Per Section 2.3.2 of the Admin Guide, “this EDM should
support the Samsung Knox APIs to enable the capabilities documented in this guide.”
Further, the Admin Guide states that the “Common Criteria Configuration section provides
the specific information about the Knox APIs that are necessary to support this
configuration….” Because the EDMApp and STIGtool apps are not available and do not
intend to be made available, an a compatible MDM solution is required for the TOE to be
placed in CC Mode, which in turn, places it in the evaluated configuration.
Over-The-Air (OTA) updates were not available during the evaluation; these are created by
Google and the mobile device vendors, then distributed to the wireless carriers (Verizon,
AT&T, etc.), for deployment to the respective devices via the carrier’s network. Therefore,
the OTA update functionality was not tested. Users and enterprise administrators should
remain cognizant of OTA updates and the update cycles offered by the carriers.
Specific considerations referring to biometrics requirements follow in the sections below.
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11.1 Additional considerations for Biometrics
A few considerations need to be made when allowing for a biometric factor at initial
configuration.
11.1.1 Hybrid Authentication to the KNOX Container
Hybrid authentication to the KNOX container (also referred to as multi-factor) does not
precisely follow the definition in the MDF PP. Hybrid authentication is defined as “one
where a user has to submit a combination of PIN and biometric samples with both to pass
and without the user being made aware of which factor failed, if either fails.”
In the evaluated configuration, a password is used in lieu of a PIN, but the user is made aware
of whether the password or biometric fails. While the vendor notes in the TSS that “the
TOE’s design ensures that no more than the configured maximum number of attempts is
possible”, compromise of the password still reduces the security of the authentication system
(the SAFAR) to that of the weaker biometric authentication factor in the worst case. Parts e)
and f) of the “password and fingerprint authentication example” in Appendix H.4 of MDF
PP v3.1 (pgs 180-181) explain the risks of providing authentication feedback (i.e. whether
the password or biometric failed) in hybrid authentication.
11.1.2 Traditional Risks Associated with Using Biometrics
Because hybrid or multi-factor authentication is not supported at lockscreen, it is
recommended for customers and sponsors to understand and assume the risks provided when
configuring the evaluated device to allow for a biometric factor separate from the password
factor.
For this evaluation, biometric fingerprint has only been certified to the security strength of a
four-digit numerical PIN (1:10000 FAR), which is much lower than that of a minimum 4-
character password with 93 possible characters that can be used. CC evaluations providing
for a stronger security strength for biometrics are currently infeasible to complete in a 3-6-
month period. Thus, stronger claims must be assessed separately by specialized biometrics
testing labs. In addition, the mitigation of threats of compromise to biometric templates, as
well as system compromise through presentation attacks, is outside the scope of this
evaluation because the corresponding objective requirements in the MDF PP have not been
claimed.
11.2 TRRT Requests and Technical Decisions
Four TRRT requests were made throughout the evaluation, two of which led to Technical
Decisions (TD0301 and TD0303). These TRRT requests are as follows:
11.2.1 FIA_PSK_EXT.1 – No Practical Maximum
This issue concerns FIA_PSK_EXT.1 of the VPN Client PP-Module v2.1, which includes
an Assurance Activity requiring the evaluator to test a pre-shared key above the maximum
length. The concern raised by the lab was that while the vendor declared a maximum pre-
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shared key length of 64 characters in the SFR text, it is entirely possible to show that pre-
shared key lengths greater than 64 characters can be used. In particular, the lab showed pre-
shared keys over 1024 characters demonstrating successful connections. As a fix, the lab
suggested that the “above the maximum” test be excluded or be optional.
After consultation with the IA SME, it was concluded that the “above the maximum” test
should remain because there is no guarantee that pre-shared keys above the maximum length
are preserved and may be truncated. Thus, it could create an interoperability issue when
connecting to a different vendor product, as well as a usability issue where the user may
assume they are getting a longer PSK than the declared maximum but is truncated. The
vendor should explain what is happening with pre-shared keys with lengths greater than the
maximum.
Thus, the TRRT disagreed with the suggestions in the request. Modifications to the VPN
Client PP-Module to support testing ensuring the pre-shared key is not truncated beyond the
declared maximum length are suggested and will be addressed in the next PP-Module update.
11.2.2 FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 – IKEv1 With Only XAUTH
This issue concerns FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 of the VPN Client PP-Module v2.1, which
includes a selection for IKEv1 and a selection for XAUTH support, as well as applicable test
cases. The corresponding test for “support for XAUTH” requires that if IKEv1 and XAUTH
are supported, then IKEv1 must be tested with and without XAUTH. For this TOE, only a
configuration of IKEv1 with XAUTH is supported; XAUTH cannot be turned off. The lab
proposed that the Test Assurance Activities be revised to account for all corresponding
combinations as appropriate.
The TRRT agreed that the TOE may, but is not required, to support IKEv1 with XAUTH
and IKEv1 without XAUTH. Thus, the test would be revised to account for the various
combinations.
The test was revised with the corresponding TRRT response reflected in TD0303, which is
documented on the NIAP website under Technical Decisions.
11.2.3 FCS_CKM.1.1 – Generation vs. Import VPN Client Key
This issue concerns FCS_CKM.1.1 of the VPN Client PP-Module v2.1, which includes a
requirement for key generation, particularly for IKE peer authentication. Although the
requirement states that the VPN client or OS shall generate asymmetric keys for IKE peer
authentication, it is unclear whether it allows these keys to be imported from the operational
environment, especially for RSA or ECDSA as reflected in the TRRT request.
The TRRT disagreed that importing keys from the operational environment was allowed.
Instead, the TRRT stated that the “intent of the IKE key generation requirement is for the
key generation to be part of the evaluation. The TOE or its underlying OS (platform) must
generate the keys and it is not acceptable to import the keys.”
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Thus, no changes to the VPN Client PP-Module were suggested.
11.2.4 FMT_SMF_EXT.3 SFR mismatch with AA
This issue concerns FMT_SMF_EXT.3 of the MDF PP v3.1, which includes a requirement
to “provide a mechanism that allows users to view a list of currently authorized
administrators and the management functions that each administrator is authorized to
perform.” The Assurance Activity requires that the evaluator should be able to view the list
of policies that are currently in place from an administrator. The lab stated that the mobile
device TOE may be unaware of specific policies from administrators even if the TOE is
aware of the settings applied to the TOE. Instead, MDM agents and servers may likely be
more aware of policies being applied to mobile device TOEs. As a result, the lab suggested
removing the part of the Assurance Activity requiring the administrators to view specific
policies.
The TRRT agreed with the request to remove the part of the test to require the administrator
to view the list of policies in place. The response is captured in TD0301. It should be noted
that TD0301 also includes an update for biometric FAR, which is separate from the issue for
FMT_SMF_EXT.3 discussed in this subsection. NIAP is working on an update to the
wording of Labgram #105/Valgram #125 to allow for the application of TDs that only apply
in part. For example, a mobile device vendor could theoretically declare FMT_SMF_EXT.3
but not support biometrics.
12 Annexes
Not applicable
13 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 8
(MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21) Security Target, Version 0.4, May 15, 2018.
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
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are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
[4] Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017,
General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device Fundamentals
Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)
Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016 and PP-Module for Virtual Private Network
(VPN) Clients, Version 2.1, 05 October 2017.
[5] Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 8 (MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21)
Security Target, Version 0.4, May 15, 2018 (ST).
[6] Assurance Activity Report (MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21) for Samsung
Galaxy Devices on Android 8, Version 0.3, May 15, 2018 (AAR).
[7] Detailed Test Report (MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21) for Samsung Galaxy
Devices on Android 8, Version 0.3, May 22, 2018 (DTR).
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 8, Version
0.4, May 22, 2018 (ETR)