SERTIT, P.O. Box 14, N-1306 Bærum postterminal, NORWAY
Phone: +47 67 86 40 00 Fax: +47 67 86 40 09 E-mail: post@sertit.no Internet: www.sertit.no
Sertifiseringsmyndigheten for IT-sikkerhet Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security
SERTIT-050 CR Certification Report
Issue 1.0 28 November 2013
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch
CERTIFICATION REPORT - SERTIT STANDARD REPORT TEMPLATE SD 009 VERSION 2.1 11.11.2011
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch EAL 4
Page 2 of 20 SERTIT-050 CR Issue 1.0
28 November 2013
ARRANGEMENT ON THE RECOGNITION OF COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATES IN
THE FIELD OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
SERTIT, the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security, is a member of the
above Arrangement and as such this confirms that the Common Criteria certificate
has been issued by or under the authority of a Party to this Arrangement and is the
Party’s claim that the certificate has been issued in accordance with the terms of
this Arrangement
The judgements contained in the certificate and Certification Report are those of
SERTIT which issued it and the Norwegian evaluation facility (EVIT) which carried
out the evaluation. There is no implication of acceptance by other Members of the
Agreement Group of liability in respect of those judgements or for loss sustained as
a result of reliance placed upon those judgements by a third party. [*]
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch EAL 4
SERTIT-050 CR Issue 1.0
28 November 2013
Page 3 of 20
Contents
1 Certification Statement 5
2 Abbreviations 6
3 References 7
4 Executive Summary 8
4.1 Introduction 8
4.2 Evaluated Product 8
4.3 TOE scope 8
4.3.1 System type and overview 8
4.3.2 Physical boundaries 9
4.3.3 Logical boundaries 9
4.4 Protection Profile Conformance 9
4.5 Assurance Level 10
4.6 Security Policy 10
4.7 Security Claims 10
4.8 Threats Countered 10
4.9 Threats Countered by the TOE’s environment 10
4.10 Threats and Attacks not Countered 10
4.11 Environmental Assumptions and Dependencies 10
4.12 IT Security Objectives 11
4.13 Non-IT Security Objectives 11
4.14 Security Functional Requirements 11
4.15 Security Function Policy 12
4.16 Evaluation Conduct 12
4.17 General Points 13
5 Evaluation Findings 14
5.1 Introduction 15
5.2 Delivery 15
5.3 Installation and Guidance Documentation 15
5.4 Misuse 15
5.5 Vulnerability Analysis 16
5.6 Developer’s Tests 16
5.7 Evaluators’ Tests 16
6 Evaluation Outcome 17
6.1 Certification Result 17
6.2 Recommendations 17
Annex A: Evaluated Configuration 18
TOE Identification 18
TOE Documentation 18
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch EAL 4
Page 4 of 20 SERTIT-050 CR Issue 1.0
28 November 2013
TOE Configuration 18
Environmental Configuration 20
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch EAL 4
1 Certification Statement
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch is a fiber optic switch that uses
multi-mode or single-mode fiber optics to transmit and receive a digital video pulse
stream without alteration or interpretation of the original signal.
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch has been evaluated under the
terms of the Norwegian Certification Scheme for lT Security and has met the Common
Criteria Part 3 (lS0/lEC 15408) conformant requirements of Evaluation Assurance
Level EAL 4 for the specified Common Criteria Part 2 (lS0/lEC 15408) conformant
functionality when running on the platforms specified in Annex A.
Author Rage, Arne Høy"e \, n
certlrler ,,V,"- \\fp !g
Lars Borgos / /n
oua lity Assu ra n", ,il't'-"' 4 "-/J
Ouality Assurance
;(
: Approved
Date approved
SERTIT-050 CR lssue 1.0
2B November 2013
Kjell W. Bergan
Head of SERTIT W,g.rj,\C$
v
Page 5 of 20
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch EAL 4
Page 6 of 20 SERTIT-050 CR Issue 1.0
28 November 2013
2 Abbreviations
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(ISO/IEC 15408)
CCRA Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the
Field of Information Technology Security
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EOR Evaluation Observation Report
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
EVIT Evaluation Facility under the Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT
Security
EWP Evaluation Work Plan
SERTIT Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security
SPM Security Policy Model
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch EAL 4
SERTIT-050 CR Issue 1.0
28 November 2013
Page 7 of 20
3 References
[1] Thinklogical VX 320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch Security Target,
version 1.2, August 2013.
[2] Common Criteria Part 1, CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[3] Common Criteria Part 2, CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[4] Common Criteria Part 3, CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[5] The Norwegian Certification Scheme, SD001E, Version 8.0, 20 August 2010.
[6] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report Common Criteria EAL4 Evaluation of
Thinklogical Router KVM Matrix Switches, Thinklogical MX 48 (SERTIT -
047), Thinklogical VX 80 (SERTIT - 048), Thinklogical VX 320 Audio
(SERTIT - 049), Thinklogical VX 320 Video (SERTIT - 050), Thinklogical VX
640 (SERTIT - 051), version 0.5, 28 November 2013.
[8] ALC.DEL_1_0.doc version 1.0 06/01/10
[9] Manual_VX40_VX80_VX160_VX320_Rev_N.pdf, VX40, VX80, VX160, VX320,
VX320Video, VX320Audio router KVM Matrix Switch Product Manual, Rev.
N September 2013
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch EAL 4
Page 8 of 20 SERTIT-050 CR Issue 1.0
28 November 2013
4 Executive Summary
4.1 Introduction
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security
evaluation of Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch to the Sponsor,
Thinklogical, and is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the
suitability of the IT security of the product for their particular requirements.
Prospective consumers are advised to read this report in conjunction with the
Security Target[1] which specifies the functional, environmental and assurance
evaluation requirements.
4.2 Evaluated Product
The product evaluated was Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch (VXR-
V00320 Rev A)
And Data Input/Output cards:
 Velocity Matrix Router 320 Data Input/Output Card, 16 Ports, SFP+, Multi
Mode (VXM-D00016 Rev A),
 Velocity Matrix Router 320 Data Input/Output Card, 16 Ports, SFP+, Single
Mode (VXM-D00S16 Rev A)
 Velocity Matrix Router 320 Data Input Retimer Card, 16 Ports, SFP+, Multi
Mode (VXM-D00T16 Rev A)
 Velocity Matrix Router 320 Data Input Retimer Card, 16 Ports, SFP+, Single
Mode (VXM-D0ST16 Rev A)
This product is also described in this report as the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The
developer was Thinklogical.
Details of the evaluated configuration, including the TOE’s supporting guidance
documentation, are given in Annex A.
4.3 TOE scope
4.3.1 System type and overview
The TOE is a single matrix routing system, which provides connection of 320 optical
inputs to any or all of the 320 optical outputs . The TOE consists of 20 Data
Input/Output Cards having 16 optical input and Output ports each. The TOE allows for
remote operation of shared computers using sets of shared peripherals, dynamically
connecting (switching) physical ports on a particular computer to a particular shared
peripheral set.
The TOE consists of the following hardware devices:
1. Thinklogical KVM Matrix Switch (VX320 Video Router)
2. 20 Data Input/Output Cards
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch EAL 4
SERTIT-050 CR Issue 1.0
28 November 2013
Page 9 of 20
Each Transmitter and Receiver Port Group is composed of two ports: T port and R
port. Two optical cables are then required to connect a Velocity Transmitter or
Receiver Extender to a Transmitter or Receiver Port Group on the Switch. One cable is
used to transmit data from the Extender to the Switch; the other cable is used to
transmit data from the Switch to the Extender. As a result, a bi-directional
connection is established, where data can flow in both directions.
All data types, including video, audio and serial data are converted to an optical
form and transmitted in a single optical cable.
The purpose of the Switch is to establish logical connections between Transmitter
and Receiver Port Groups, while preserving Data Separation Security Function Policy
(SFP).
Data Separation Security Function Policy (SFP) states that data shall flow between
Transmitter Port A and Receiver Port B if and only if a deliberate logical connection
has been established to connect A to B. There shall be no other data flow between a
Transmitter Port or a Receiver Port and any other physical port on the Switch.
The use of a restrict or partition table in the system overrides any deliberate logical
connection established between Transmitter Port A and Receiver Port B since the
restrict policy disallows connection of a higher priority input to a lower priority
output and the partition policy disallows connection of an input from one partition
going to the output of another partition.
The TOE connections are first controlled by restrict and priority tables and then
controlled, if not in conflict with the restrict or partition tables, over the serial RS-
232/console interface, a wired 10/100BASE-TX LAN connection.
4.3.2 Physical boundaries
VX 320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch is a hardware device. TOE Physical
Boundaries then correspond to the physical boundaries of the device.
4.3.3 Logical boundaries
TOE logical boundaries include all software and firmware components inside the VX
320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch.
The following Security Functions are provided by the TOE
 User Data Protection (enforces Data Separation SFP),
This Security Target includes all product security features. There are no security
features outside the scope of the evaluation.
4.4 Protection Profile Conformance
The Security Target[1] did not claim conformance to any protection profile.
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch EAL 4
Page 10 of 20 SERTIT-050 CR Issue 1.0
28 November 2013
4.5 Assurance Level
The Security Target[1] specified the assurance requirements for the evaluation.
Predefined evaluation assurance level EAL 4 was used. Common Criteria Part 3[4]
describes the scale of assurance given by predefined assurance levels EAL1 to EAL7.
An overview of CC is given in CC Part 1[2].
4.6 Security Policy
The TOE security policies are detailed in the Security Target [1].
4.7 Security Claims
The Security Target[1] fully specifies the TOE’s security objectives, the threats which
these objectives meet and security functional requirements and security functions to
elaborate the objectives. All of the SFR’s are taken from CC Part 2[3]; use of this
standard facilitates comparison with other evaluated products.
4.8 Threats Countered
 Residual data may be transferred between different port groups in violation of
data separation security policy.
 State information may be transferred to a port group other than the intended
one.
4.9 Threats Countered by the TOE’s environment
 The TOE may be delivered and installed in a manner which violates the security
policy.
 An attack on the TOE may violate the security policy.
4.10 Threats and Attacks not Countered
No threats or attacks that are not countered are described.
4.11 Environmental Assumptions and Dependencies
 The switch, the transmitters, the receivers, the optical connections from the
Switch to the transmitters and receivers and the wired network connections
from the Switch to the administrators are physically secure.
 The TOE meets the appropriate national requirements (in the country where
used) for conducted/radiated electromagnetic emissions.
 The TOE is installed and managed in accordance with the manufacturer’s
directions.
 The TOE users and administrators are non-hostile and follow all usage
guidance.
 Vulnerabilities associated with attached devices are a concern of the
application scenario and not of the TOE.
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch EAL 4
SERTIT-050 CR Issue 1.0
28 November 2013
Page 11 of 20
4.12 IT Security Objectives
 The TOE shall not violate the confidentiality of information which it processes.
Information generated within any peripheral set/computer connection shall
not be accessible by any other peripheral set/computer connection.
 No information shall be shared between switched computers and peripheral
sets via the TOE in violation of Data Separation SFP.
4.13 Non-IT Security Objectives
 The TOE shall meet the appropriate national requirements (in the country
where used) for conducted/radiated electromagnetic emissions.
 The TOE shall be installed and managed in accordance with the manufacturer’s
directions.
 The authorized user shall be non-hostile and follow all usage guidance.
 The Switch, the transmitters, the receivers, the optical connections from the
Switch to the transmitters and receivers and the wired network connections
from the TOE to the administrators shall be physically secure.
 Vulnerabilities associated with attached devices or their connections to the
TOE, shall be a concern of the application scenario and not of the TOE.
4.14 Security Functional Requirements
 FDP_ETC.1.1 Enforce the Data Separation Policy when exporting user data,
controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
 FDP_ETC.1.2 Export the user data without the user data's associated security
attributes.
 FDP_IFC.1.1 Enforce the Data Separation Policy on the set of Transmitter and
Receiver Port Groups, and the bi-directional flow of data and state
information between the shared peripherals and the switched computers.
 FDP_IFF.1.1 Enforce the Data Separation Policy based on the following types
of subject and information security attributes:
- Transmitter and Receiver Port Groups (subjects)
- peripheral data and state information (objects)
- port group IDs
- logical connections of Transmitter and Receiver Groups (attributes)
 FDP_IFF.1.2 Permit an information flow between a controlled subject and
controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold:
- peripheral data and state information can only flow between
Transmitter and Receiver port groups that have been previously
logically connected by the administrator using the TOE management
interface
 FDP_IFF.1.3 Enforce that Transmitter Port Group may be logically connected
to multiple Receiver Port Groups, out of which bi-directional information flow
will be established only with a single Primary Receiver Port Group selected by
the administrator. The remaining Non-Primary Receiver port groups will only
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch EAL 4
Page 12 of 20 SERTIT-050 CR Issue 1.0
28 November 2013
receive unidirectional multicast audio and video signals. Any Receiver Port
Group may only be logically connected to a single Transmitter Port Group.
 FDP_IFF.1.5 Explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules:
- No data or state information flow shall be allowed between logically
unconnected port groups.
- No data or state information flow shall be allowed between any two
Receiver Port Groups.
- No data or state information flow shall be allowed between any two
Transmitter Port Groups.
No data or state information flow shall be allowed between any Receiver or
Transmitter Port Group and any other non-optical physical port on the Switch
 FDP_ITC.1.1 Enforce the Data Separation Policy when importing user data,
controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
 FDP_ITC.1.2 Ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when
imported from outside the TOE.
4.15 Security Function Policy
The TOE logically connects Transmitter and Receiver Port Groups according to the
current switching configuration. The data flows between a particular Transmitter Port
Group and a set of Receiver Port Groups if and only if there is an active logical
connection connecting these. If there are multiple Receiver Port Groups connected to
a Transmitter Port Group, bi-directional information flow will be then established
between the Primary Receiver Port Group and the Transmitter Port Group. The
remaining Non-Primary Receiver Port Groups will receive uni-directional multi-cast
video and audio signals from the Transmitter Port Group.
4.16 Evaluation Conduct
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the
Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT Security as described in SERTIT Document
SD001E[5]. The Scheme is managed by the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT
Security (SERTIT). As stated on page 2 of this Certification Report, SERTIT is a
member of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in
the Field of Information Technology Security (CCRA), and the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the terms of this Arrangement.
The purpose of the evaluation was to provide assurance about the effectiveness of
the TOE in meeting its Security Target[1], which prospective consumers are advised to
read. To ensure that the Security Target[1] gave an appropriate baseline for a CC
evaluation, it was first itself evaluated. The TOE was then evaluated against this
baseline. Both parts of the evaluation were performed in accordance with CC Part
3[4] and the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)[6].
SERTIT monitored the evaluation which was carried out by the Norconsult AS IT
Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF/EVIT). The evaluation was completed when the EVIT
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch EAL 4
SERTIT-050 CR Issue 1.0
28 November 2013
Page 13 of 20
submitted the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)[7] to SERTIT on 28.11.2013. SERTIT
then produced this Certification Report.
4.17 General Points
The evaluation addressed the security functionality claimed in the Security Target[1]
with reference to the assumed operating environment specified by the Security
Target[1]. The evaluated configuration was that specified in Annex A. Prospective
consumers are advised to check that this matches their identified requirements and
give due consideration to the recommendations and caveats of this report.
Certification does not guarantee that the IT product is free from security
vulnerabilities. This Certification Report and the belonging Certificate only reflect
the view of SERTIT at the time of certification. It is furthermore the responsibility of
users (both existing and prospective) to check whether any security vulnerabilities
have been discovered since the date shown in this report. This Certification Report is
not an endorsement of the IT product by SERTIT or any other organization that
recognizes or gives effect to this Certification Report, and no warranty of the IT
product by SERTIT or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this
Certification Report is either expressed or implied.
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch EAL 4
Page 14 of 20 SERTIT-050 CR Issue 1.0
28 November 2013
5 Evaluation Findings
The evaluators examined the following assurance classes and components taken from
CC Part 3 [4]. These classes comprise the EAL 4 assurance package.
Assurance class Assurance components
Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the
TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance
procedures and automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
All assurance classes were found to be satisfactory and were awarded an overall
“pass” verdict.
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch EAL 4
SERTIT-050 CR Issue 1.0
28 November 2013
Page 15 of 20
5.1 Introduction
The evaluation addressed the requirements specified in the Security Target[1]. The
results of this work were reported in the ETR[7] under the CC Part 3[4] headings. The
following sections note considerations that are of particular relevance to either
consumers or those involved with subsequent assurance maintenance and re-
evaluation of the TOE.
5.2 Delivery
On receipt of the TOE, the consumer is recommended to check that the evaluated
version has been supplied, and to check that the security of the TOE has not been
compromised in delivery.
Thinklogical’s delivery procedure [8] describes how the TOE is shipped from
Thinklogical’s warehouse via Federal Express, UPS or DHL to the customer. The
procedure explains that all tracking and shipment information are logged, and upon
delivery of the TOE a signature is required. Each shipment is noted with dimension
and weight, and hard copies of each shipment are held in Thinklogical’s Sales Order
folder.
The product manual [9] describes that users has to verify and ensure that all parts of
the TOE has been delivered in the correct version. The text states that if the user has
ordered an EAL4 certified unit, the user has to verify that he or she has received the
proper materials.
5.3 Installation and Guidance Documentation
A description of the secure installation of the TOE and the secure preparation of the
operational environment in accordance with the security objectives in the ST [1] can
be found in the product manual[9].
The guidance documentation [9] describes the security functionality and interfaces
provided by the TSF, it provides instructions and guidelines for the secure use of the
TOE, it addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates prevention
and detection of insecure TOE states.
A list of all guidance documents evaluated can be found in Annex A.
5.4 Misuse
There is always a risk of intentional and unintentional misconfigurations that could
possibly compromise confidential information. Administrators should follow the
guidance for the TOE in order to ensure that the TOE operates in a secure manner.
The guidance document adequately describes the mode of operation of the TOE, all
assumptions about the intended environment and all requirements for external
security. Sufficient guidance is provided for the consumer to effectively administer
and use the TOE’s security functions
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch EAL 4
Page 16 of 20 SERTIT-050 CR Issue 1.0
28 November 2013
5.5 Vulnerability Analysis
The evaluators’ assessment of potential exploitable vulnerabilities in the TOE has
been addressed and shows that the vulnerability analysis is complete, and that the
TOE in its intended environment is resistant to attackers with an Enhanced-Basic
attack potential.
5.6 Developer’s Tests
The evaluators’ assessments of the developers’ tests shows that the developer testing
requirements is extensive and that the TSF satisfies the TOE security functional
requirements. The testing performed on the TOE by both the developer and evaluator
showed that the EAL 4 assurance components requirements are fulfilled.
5.7 Evaluators’ Tests
The evaluator have independently tested the TSFs and verified that the TOE behaves
as specified in the design documentation and confidence in the developer's test
results is gained by performing a sample of the developer's tests.
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch EAL 4
SERTIT-050 CR Issue 1.0
28 November 2013
Page 17 of 20
6 Evaluation Outcome
6.1 Certification Result
After due consideration of the ETR[7], produced by the Evaluators, and the conduct
of the evaluation, as witnessed by the Certifier, SERTIT has determined that
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch meets the Common Criteria Part
3 conformant requirements of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 for the specified
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant functionality in the specified environment, when
running on platforms specified in Annex A.
6.2 Recommendations
Prospective consumers of Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch should
understand the specific scope of the certification by reading this report in
conjunction with the Security Target[1]. The TOE should be used in accordance with a
number of environmental considerations as specified in the Security Target.
Only the evaluated TOE configuration should be installed. This is specified in Annex A
with further relevant information given in Section 4.3 “TOE Scope” and Section 5
“Evaluation Findings”.
The TOE should be used in accordance with the supporting guidance documentation
included in the evaluated configuration.
The above “Evaluation Findings” include a number of recommendations relating to the
secure receipt, installation, configuration and operation of the TOE.
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch EAL 4
Page 18 of 20 SERTIT-050 CR Issue 1.0
28 November 2013
Annex A: Evaluated Configuration
TOE Identification
The TOE consists of:
 Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch (VXR-V00320 Rev A)
And Data Input/Output cards:
 Velocity Matrix Router 320 Data Input/Output Card, 16 Ports, SFP+, Multi
Mode (VXM-D00016 Rev A),
 Velocity Matrix Router 320 Data Input/Output Card, 16 Ports, SFP+, Single
Mode (VXM-D00S16 Rev A)
 Velocity Matrix Router 320 Data Input Retimer Card, 16 Ports, SFP+, Multi
Mode (VXM-D00T16 Rev A)
 Velocity Matrix Router 320 Data Input Retimer Card, 16 Ports, SFP+, Single
Mode (VXM-D0ST16 Rev A)
TOE Documentation
The supporting guidance documents evaluated were:
[a] Cover Page AGD.OPE.3.doc, OPERATIONAL USER GUIDANCE REV. C
01/23/2013
[b] Manual_VX40_VX80_VX160_VX320_Rev_M.pdf, VX40, VX80, VX160, VX320,
VX320VIDEO, VX320AUDIO ROUTER KVM MATRIX SWITCH PRODUCT
MANUAL REV. N SEPTEMBER 2013
[c] Manual_X4 Configurator.pdf, X4 CONFIGURATOR PRODUCT MANUAL
OCTOBER 2012
[d] VxRouter-ASCII-API_4_1.pdf, VxRouter ASCII Interface 4.1 24/9-2012
[e] Using-the-ASCII-Interface_4_0.pdf, Using the VxRouter ASCII Interface 4.0
24/9-2012
[f] VX320V_Router_VEL-6_Quick_Start_Rev_A.pdf, QUICK-START GUIDE Router
VX320V KVM MATRIX Switch As used with Thinklogical’s Velocitydvi-6
Video Extension System Rev. A 10/01-2013
TOE Configuration
The following configuration was used for testing:
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch EAL 4
SERTIT-050 CR Issue 1.0
28 November 2013
Page 19 of 20
The figure shows the VX80 Router in an evaluated configuration, however the layout
is equivalent for the TOE.
For use in an evaluated configuration, the MX and VX Routers must be located in a
physically secure environment to which only authorized administrators has access.
Similarly, the server used to manage the MX and VX Routers must be physically
protected and have suitable identification/authentication mechanism to ensure that
only trusted administrators have access.
Some of the tools used during the evaluation were:
 Microsoft Office 2010
 Nmap port scanning 6.40
 Zenmap (Nmap Security Scanner GUI)
 Microsoft Hyperterminal
 Noyes optical power meter, Model OPM 4-D, Serialnumber 1v52NM024
 Putty Terminal Emulator
 WinSCP
 BusyBox v1.12.1
 Oscilloscope Tektronic TDS6154C, asset number 1054750
 Microsoft Telnet
Thinklogical VX320 Video Router KVM Matrix Switch EAL 4
Page 20 of 20 SERTIT-050 CR Issue 1.0
28 November 2013
Environmental Configuration
The TOE is a hardware device. The TOE provides remote connections from a set of
shared computers to a set of shared peripherals. The switching capability of the TOE
is used to connect ports on a particular computer to a particular peripheral set. The
corresponding electronic signal from a computer port is transformed into an optical
signal by the Velocity extender, transmitted through an optical fiber, switched by the
KVM Matrix Switch to another optical fiber, and then transformed back to an
electronic form by the Velocity extender. The resulting signal is used by the shared
peripherals.