TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Headoffice:
Westervoortsedijk 73
NL-6827 AV Arnhem
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info@nl.tuv.com
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Version
2020-2
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Certification Report
Voyager ePassport v2.20
Sponsor and developer: Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-15
85579 Neubiberg
Germany
Evaluation facility: Brightsight
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0112113
Report version: 1
Project number: 0112113
Author(s): Andy Brown
Date: 05 August 2020
Number of pages: 11
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS:
Foreword 3
Recognition of the certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.7 Re-used evaluation results 8
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Results of the Evaluation 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation,
the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC. Starting September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual
recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components
up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification
schemes can be found on: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by
Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy
joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification
schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
http://www.sogisportal.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
Voyager ePassport v2.20. The developer of the Voyager ePassport v2.20 is Infineon Technologies AG
located in Neubiberg, Germany and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A
Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT
security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a contactless chip of an ePassport including the Voyager ePassport application. It is
based on the requirements from the ICAO for machine readable travel documents, i.e.
[ICAO_9303_10] and [ICAO_9303_11].
The security IC hardware is a M7892 D11 or M7892 P11 device certified under BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V4-
2019 or BSI-DSZ-CC-1105-2020, respectively. It also contains firmware and asymmetric cryptographic
libraries (ACL). Besides the hardware platform, the TOE contains the Voyager OS and the Voyager
ePassport application (v2.20) that are placed on the hardware platform.
Depending whether BAC or PACE is used, the TOE is compliant with [PP-BAC] or [PP-PACE]
respectively.
The TOE has been evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The evaluation
was completed on 05-08-2020 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of
IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Voyager ePassport v2.20, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Voyager ePassport v2.20 are advised
to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration
to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provides sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets:
 the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality
when BAC is used. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of
security measures).
 the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality
when PACE is used. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of
security measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM], for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC].
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted that the certification results only apply
to the specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Voyager ePassport v2.20 from Infineon
Technologies AG located in Neubiberg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware
M7892 Hardware (BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-
V4-2019) including firmware and
asymmetric crypto library
M7892 Hardware (BSI-DSZ-CC-1105-
2020) including firmware and
asymmetric crypto library
DF296F4C789F98C317DBFBB0536D7F92
50FAFC994337EE7BA00D98638C689BD7
Software Voyager OS
2017.03
D3 92 D3 A0 2E 4E D6 B2 02 12 CA 06 EF A0
49 00
Voyager ePassport application
36 E3 C3 39 C8 95 25 62 F2 46 74 3C 23 E6
69 2B
Voyager pre-personalized file system
85 49 8B E1 55 71 43 F9 AA AA F1 D4 9B B7
2F 42
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the Voyager
ePassport v2.20. Details can be found in section 2.5 of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle refer to the [ST], chapter 1.4.5.
2.2 Security Policy
As an ePassport implementing the specification from ICAO for machine readable travel documents,
i.e. [ICAO_9303_10] and [ICAO_9303_11], compliant with [PP-BAC] and [PP-PACE], the TOE
security features in its operational use are:
 Only terminals possessing authorisation information (the shared secret MRZ optically retrieved
by the terminal) can get access to the user data stored on the TOE and use security
functionality of the travel document under control of the travel document holder,
 Verifying authenticity and integrity as well as securing confidentiality of user data in the
communication channel between the TOE and the terminal connected
 Averting of inconspicuous tracing of the travel document,
 Self-protection of the TOE security functionality and the data stored inside.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment can be found in section 4 “Security
Objectives” of the [PP-BAC] and [PP-PACE].
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2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that the ICAO MRTD infrastructure critically depends on the objectives for the environment to be
met. These are not weaknesses of this particular TOE, but aspects of the ICAO MRTD infrastructure
as a whole.
The environment in which the TOE is personalized must perform proper and safe personalization
according to the guidance and referred ICAO guidelines.
The environment in which the TOE is used must ensure that the inspection system protects the
confidentiality and integrity of the data send and read from the TOE.
2.4 Architectural Information
The logical architecture of the TOE can be depicted as follows (based on [ST]):
The TOE has the following features (please note that this list is not exhaustive):
 Communication: ISO/IEC 14443 Type B (contactless);
 BAC mutual authentication scheme with session key agreement according to
[ICAO_9303_11];
 PACE mutual authentication scheme with session key agreement according to
[ICAO_9303_11];
 Proprietary commands for personalization of the ePassport.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
Voyager: ePassport Data Book section 10 v2.08
Infineon Technologies Voyager ePassport User Guide v2.8
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2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
For the developer tests two types of test were used: white box (WB) testing and black box (BB)
testing. The WB testing is performed on the same product as the TOE although, more functionality is
available i.e., it is more open (EAC, more life cycle states, etc.). The BB testing is performed on the
TOE. The actual TOE is used to test all that is specific for the TOE (correct functionality available, life
cycle management conformant with the ICAO specifications, etc.).
For the evaluator tests, due to the high coverage by the developer, a limited set of independent tests
confirming presence of security features and absence of unwanted functionality were performed.
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
The penetration tests were devised after performing the Evaluator Vulnerability Analysis. The
reference for attack techniques against which smart card-based devices such as the TOE must be
protected against is the document "Attack methods for smart cards" [JIL-AM]. The vulnerability of the
TOE for these attacks has been analysed in a white box investigation conforming to AVA_VAN.3 for
BAC functionality and AVA_VAN.5 for PACE functionality. Since, no significant changes occurred
compared to the re-used certification results, and these changes did not have any negative security
impact on the TOE and the vulnerability analysis, the Penetration Testing from the previous
certification was repeated. For the Penetration Tests, samples including the P11 IC were used and the
test results were compared against the test results from the previous evaluation (on samples with the
D11 IC).
In total 1 perturbation and 1 side channel tests were performed at AVA_VAN.5 level.
2.6.3 Test Configuration
Testing was performed on the final version of the TOE in its evaluated configuration.
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e. from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
The algorithmic security level exceeds 100 bits for all evaluated cryptographic functionality as required
for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities. These activities revealed that the remaining security
level exceeds 100 bits after the best attack. So no exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the
independent penetration tests.
2.7 Re-used evaluation results
Documentary evaluation results re-use the evaluation results of NSCIB-CC-146301, but vulnerability
analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
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There has been extensive re-use of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the software component
of the TOE. Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform were re-used
by composition.
There has been extensive re-use of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of 2 site certificates.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Voyager ePassport v2.20. The
verification method of the TOE identifier is indicated in the User Guide referenced in section 2.5.
2.9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR] which references a ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Voyager ePassport v2.20, to
be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 4 augmented
with ALC_DVS.2 (when used with BAC) and EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
(when used with PACE). This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in
Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the [PP-BAC] (when BAC is used) and [PP-PACE]
(when PACE is used).
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against
attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the guidance for the administrator (personalizer) and the
user (inspection system following the ICAO guidelines).
There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user
guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details with respect to the resistance
against certain attacks.
In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: <none>.
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3 Security Target
The Security Target Voyager ePassport v2.20, Revision 1.6, 2020-07-15 [ST] is included here by
reference.
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
BAC Basic Access Control
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MRZ Machine Readable Zone
NSCIB Netherlands scheme for certification in the area of IT security
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, April 2017.
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report Voyager ePassport v2.20, 20-RPT-258, v3.0,17 July
2020.
[HW-CERT-D11] Certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V4-2019 for Infineon Security Controller,
M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, V1.0, 19 December 2019
[HW-CERT-P11] Certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-1105-2020 for Infineon Security Controller, M7892
Design Steps P11, V1.0, 30 June 2020
[HW-ETRfC-D11] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation, V2, 16 December 2019
[HW-ETRfC-P11] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation, V4, 02 June 2020
[HW-ST-D11] M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, revision 2.1, 25 November 2019
[HW-ST-P11] M7892 Design Steps P11, revision 2.4, 23 April 2020
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5, 28
March 2019.
[PP-BAC] BSI-CC-PP-0055: Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”,
Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, Issue 25.03.2009.
[PP-PACE] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection
Procedure with PACE, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-MA-01, Version 1.0.1, 22 July 2014,
BSI.
[ST] Security Target Voyager ePassport v2.20, Revision 1.6, 2020-07-15.
(This is the end of this report).