Security Target – Public Version
Machine Readable Travel Document
with “ICAO Application”,
Extended Access Control
MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC/P5CD081
MASKTECH INTERNATIONAL GMBH
Document number: BSI-DSZ-CC-0702, ST-lite, Version 1.1
Created by: Gudrun Schürer
Date: 2011-09-28
Signature:
Released by Management:
Date:
Signature:
Change history
Version Date Reason Remarks
1.0 2011-09-21 Public version based on version 1.5
1.1 2011-09-28 Update of references
1
Contents
1 ST Introduction (ASE INT.1) 4
1.1 ST Reference and TOE reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 TOE Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Conformance Claims (ASE CCL.1) 10
2.1 CC Conformance Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 PP Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 PP Additions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4 Package Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5 Conformance rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3 Security Problem Definition (ASE SPD.1) 12
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3 Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.4 Organizational Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4 Security Objectives (ASE OBJ.2) 21
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.3 Security Objective Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5 Extended Components Definition (ASE ECD.1) 30
6 Security Requirements (ASE REQ.2) 31
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.1.5 Class FMT Security Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.1.6 Class FPT Protection of Security Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
6.3.2 Dependency Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6.3.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency . . . 64
7 TOE Summary Specification (ASE TSS.1) 66
7.1 TOE Security Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
7.1.1 TOE Security Functions from Hardware (IC) and Crypto Library . . . . 66
7.1.2 TOE Security Functions from Embedded Software (ES) – Operating
system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
7.2 Assurance Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
7.2.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
7.3 Statement of Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7.3.1 Relevance of Hardware TSFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7.3.2 Compatibility: TOE Security Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
7.3.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
8 Glossary and Acronyms 86
3
1 ST Introduction (ASE INT.1)
1.1 ST Reference and TOE reference
Title Security Target – Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Appli-
cation, Extended Access Control (ST-MRTD EAC)
Version 1.1, 2011-09-28
Editors Gudrun Schürer
Compliant to Common Criteria Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Docu-
ment with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control, version 1.10,
BSI-CC-PP-0056
CC Version 3.1 (Revision 3)
Assurance Level The assurance level for this ST is EAL4 augmented
TOE name MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC/P5CD081, operation system for secure passports
TOE Hardware NXP Semiconductors P5CD081V1A, dual interface Smartcard IC
TOE version MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC
Keywords ICAO, machine readable travel document, extended access control
1.2 TOE Overview
This security target defines the security objectives and requirements for the contactless chip of
machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations
of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It addresses the advanced security
methods Basic Access Control, Extended Access Control and Chip Authentication similar to
the Active Authentication in the Technical reports of ’ICAO Doc 9303’ [1].
MTCOS Pro is a fully interoperable multi-application smart card operating system compli-
ant to ISO/IEC 7816 [2]. It provides public and secret key cryptography and supports also other
applications like e-purses, health insurance cards and access control.
The operating system software is implemented on the NXP Semiconductors P5CD081V1A
secure dual-interface controller (BSI-DSZ-CC-0555 [3]) with the Secured Crypto Library (BSI-
DSZ-CC-0633 [4]), which is certified according to CC EAL5 augmented compliant to the Pro-
tection Profile BSI-PP-0035 [5]). This means, that the TOE consists of software and hardware.
4
TOE definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine read-
able travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure
(LDS) [6] and providing Basic Access Control, Active Authentication and Extended Access
Control according to the ICAO documents [1, 7] and Chip Authentication according to the
technical report TR-03110 [8].
The TOE comprises of
• the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC)
• the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated
Support Software
• the IC Embedded Software (operating system)
• the MRTD application
• the associated guidance documentation [9, 10, 11, 12, 13]
The TOE is based on ISO/IEC 7816 [2] commands and is intended to be used inside a
MRTD as storage of the digital data and supports Basic Access Control and Extended Access
Control. For further details concerning BAC, see the Security Taget of BSI-DSZ-CC-0703.
The TOE provides following services for MRTDs:
• Storage of the MRTD data, e.g. data groups and signature
• Organization of the data in a file system as dedicated and elementary files
• Mutual Authenticate and Secure Messaging as specified in TrPKI [7] for Basic Access
Control
• Extended Access Control (EAC) as specified in TR-03110 [8]
• Active Authentication as specified in TrPKI [7]
• Contactless communication according to ISO/IEC 14443 [14]
• Protection of the privacy of the passport holder with functions like random UID and Basic
Access Control
TOE Usage and Security Features for Operational Use
State or organization issues MRTD to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveler
presents a MRTD to the Inspection System to prove his or her identity. The MRTD in context
of this Security Target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the
holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR
methods in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD’s chip
according to LDS [6] for contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveler is
based on (i) the possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity
as given on the biographical data page and (ii) biometrics using the reference data stored in
5
the MRTD. The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine
MRTD’s. The receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
For this Security Target the MRTD is viewed as unit of
the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents visual
readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
1. the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book
2. the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ)
3. the printed portrait
the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Struc-
ture [6] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless
readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
1. the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1)
2. the digitized portraits (EF.DG2)
3. the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both
4. the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16)
5. the Document Security Object
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain
the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and
the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the document number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper,
security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational
security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [1]. These security
measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created
by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of
the MRTD’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional
advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active Authentication of
the MRTD’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of sensitive biometrics
as optional security measure in the ICAO Doc 9303 [1]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism
and the Data Encryption are performed completely and independently of the TOE by the TOE
environment.
This Security Target addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by write-
only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Extended
Access Control Mechanism. This Security Target addresses the Chip Authentication described
in [8] as an alternative or as an addition to the Active Authentication stated in [1].
The confidentiality by Basic Access Control is a mandatory security feature that shall be im-
plemented by the TOE, too. Nevertheless this is not explicitly covered by BSI-CC-PP-0056 [15]
as there are known weaknesses in the quality (i.e. entropy) of the BAC keys generated by the
environment. Therefore, the MRTD has additionally to fulfill the ’Common Criteria Protection
6
Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control’
BSI-CC-PP-0055 [16]. Due to the fact that [16] does only consider extended basic attack poten-
tial to the Basic Access Control Mechanism (i.e. AVA VAN.3) the MRTD has to be evaluated
and certified separately. The evaluation and certification process is carried out contemporaneous
to the current process as a re-certification.
For BAC, the Inspection System (i) reads optically the MRTD, (ii) authenticates itself as
Inspection System by means of Document Basic Access Keys. After successful authentication
of the Inspection System the MRTD’s chip provides read access to the logical MRTD by means
of private communication (Secure Messaging) with this Inspection System according to [1],
normative appendix 5.
The Security Target requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication defined in [8]
and the Active Authentication described in [7]. Both protocols provide evidence of the MRTD’s
chip authenticity where the Chip Authentication prevents data traces described in [1], informa-
tive appendix 7, A7.3.3. The Chip Authentication is provided by the following steps: (i) the
Inspection System communicates by means of Secure Messaging established by Basic Access
Control, (ii) the Inspection System reads and verifies by means of the Passive Authentication
the authenticity of the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Public Key using the Document Security
Object, (iii) the Inspection System generates a ephemeral key pair, (iv) the TOE and the Inspec-
tion System agree on two session keys for Secure Messaging in ENC MAC mode according
to the Diffie-Hellman Primitive and (v) the Inspection System verifies by means of received
Message Authentication Codes whether the MRTD’s chip was able or not to run this protocol
properly (i.e. the TOE proves to be in possession of the Chip Authentication Private Key cor-
responding to the Chip Authentication Public Key used for derivation of the session keys). The
Chip Authentication requires collaboration of the TOE and the TOE environment.
The Security Target requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control as de-
fined in [8]. The Extended Access Control consists of two parts (i) the Chip Authentication
Protocol and (ii) the Terminal Authentication Protocol. The Chip Authentication Protocol (i)
authenticates the MRTD’s chip to the inspection system and (ii) establishes secure messaging
which is used by Terminal Authentication to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sen-
sitive biometric reference data during their transmission from the TOE to the inspection system.
Therefore Terminal Authentication can only be performed if Chip Authentication has been suc-
cessfully executed. The Terminal Authentication Protocol consists of (i) the authentication of
the inspection system as entity authorized by the receiving State or Organization through the
issuing State, and (ii) an access control by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive biometric
reference data only to successfully authenticated authorized inspection systems. The issuing
State or Organization authorizes the receiving State by means of certification the authentication
public keys of Document Verifiers who create Inspection System Certificates.
TOE Life Cycle
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases. With respect to [5], the
TOE life cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 step.
Phase 1: Development (Step 1) The TOE is developed in Phase 1. The IC developer devel-
ops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation
associated with these TOE components.
(Step 2) The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated cir-
7
cuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and
develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the
guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and
the Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM) is se-
curely delivered to the IC manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile
programmable memories, the MRTD application and the guidance documentation is se-
curely delivered to the MRTD manufacturer.
Phase 2: Manufacturing (Step 3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced con-
taining the MRTD’s chip Dedicated Software and the parts of the MRTD’s chip Embed-
ded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufac-
turer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as MRTD material
during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer. The IC
is securely delivered from the IC manufacturer to the MRTD manufacturer.
If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the non-
volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM).
(Step 4) The MRTD manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contactless
interface in the passport book.
Note: The inlay production including the application of the antenna is not part of the
TOE.
(Step 5) The MRTD manufacturer (i) creates the MRTD application and (ii) equips
MRTD’s chips with pre-personalization Data. The Initialization and Pre-personalization
described in this step is performed by SmartTrac, Thailand (see [17]), HID Global, Gal-
way (see [18]) and MASKTECH INTERNATIONAL.
Note: For file based operating systems, the creation of the application implies the creation
of MF and ICAO.DF.
The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from
the MRTD manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The MRTD manufacturer also
provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
Phase 3: Personalization of the MRTD (Step 6) The personalization of the MRTD includes
(i) the survey of the MRTD holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrollment of the MRTD
holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric
reference data), (iii) the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical MRTD,
(iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical MRTD and (v)
configuration of the TSF if necessary. The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization
Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of (i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1),
(ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii) the Document security object.
The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [1] finalizes the per-
sonalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD (to-
gether with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the MRTD
holder for operational use.
Phase 4: Operational Use (Step 7) The TOE is used as MRTD chip by the traveler and the
Inspection Systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according
to the security policy of the issuing State or Organization and can be used according to
the security policy of the issuing State but they can never be modified.
8
Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to perform its
claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the complete operating
system and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and the booklet
(holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete MRTD, nevertheless these parts
are not inevitable for the secure operation of the TOE.
9
2 Conformance Claims (ASE CCL.1)
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This security target claims conformance to
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and General Model; CCMB-2009-07-001, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009 [19]
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Func-
tional Requirements; CCMB-2009-07-002, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009 [20]
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security As-
surance Requirements; CCMB-2009-07-003, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009 [21]
as follows
• Part 2 extended
• Part 3 conformant
The
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Method-
ology; CCMB-2009-07-004, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009 [22]
has to be taken into account.
2.2 PP Reference
The conformance of this ST to the Common Criteria Protection Profile - Machine Readable
Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control, version 1.10, BSI-CC-
PP-0056 [15] is claimed.
10
2.3 PP Additions
Active Authentication based on ICAO PKI v1.1 [7] has been added. This implies the following
augmentations:
1. Extension of existing Assumptions for the TOE
• A.Pers Agent: Inclusion of Active Authentication
• A.Insp Sys: Inclusion of Active Authentication
2. Addition of new TOE Objectives
• OT.Active Auth Proof
3. Addition of new IT Environment Objectives
• OE.Active Auth Key MRTD
4. Addition of new SFRs for the TOE
• FCS COP.1/RSA MRTD AA
• FIA API.1/AA
• FMT MTD.1/AAPK
5. Extension of existing SFRs for the TOE
• FMT MTD.1/KEY READ AA: Inclusion of the Active Authentication Private Key
• FPT EMSEC.1/AA: Inclusion of the Active Authentication Private Key
Table 6.3 takes the dependencies of the SFRs into account.
2.4 Package Claim
The assurance level for the TOE is CC EAL4 augmented augmented with ALC DVS.2 and
AVA VAN.5 defined in CC part 3 [21].
2.5 Conformance rationale
Since this ST is not claiming conformance to any other protection profile, no rationale is neces-
sary here.
11
3 Security Problem Definition (ASE SPD.1)
3.1 Introduction
Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
(with different security needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [6].
These data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with
the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG 16 contain personal data of the MRTD
holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG 14) is used by the Inspection System for
the Chip Authentication and the Active Authentication Public Key (EF.DG15) for Active Au-
thentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the
logical MRTD.
Due to interoperability reasons the ’ICAO Doc 9303’ [1] specifies only the BAC mecha-
nisms with resistance against enhanced basic attack potential granting access to
• Logical MRTD standard User Data (i.e. Personal Data) of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1,
EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16)
• Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14
• Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15
• Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD
• Common data in EF.COM
The TOE prevents read access to sensitive User Data
• Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
12
A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the
issuing State or Organization for the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession
of a genuine MRTD.
Subjects
This Security Target considers the following subjects:
Manufacturer The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and
the MRTD Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the
default user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish be-
tween the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer. During
pre-personalization the MRTD manufacturer (so-called Pre-Personalization Agent) prepares the
TOE for the personalization, e.g. creation of data files.
Personalization Agent The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to
personalize the MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities: (i) establishing
the identity of the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric
reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the
encoded iris image(s), (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder
as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data
and (v) signing the Document Security Object defined in [6].
Country Verifying Certification Authority The Country Verifying Certification Authority
(CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing State or Organization with respect to the
protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRTD. The CVCA represents
the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier
Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in the
form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
Document Verifier The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving
State with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the
Extended Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Ex-
tended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by the
issuing States or Organizations in form of the Document Verifier Certificates.
Terminal A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the con-
tactless interface.
13
Inspection system (IS) A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiv-
ing State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and
(ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains
a terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the ter-
minals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the
logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts
of the passport book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a
Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) im-
plements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or
Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive bio-
metric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System
Certificates. Optionally all the Inspection Systems can implement Active Authentication.
MRTD Holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalized the MRTD.
Traveler Person presenting the MRTD to the Inspection System and claiming the identity of
the MRTD holder.
Attacker A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, (ii)
to read sensitive biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG3, EF.DG4) or (iii) to forge a genuine
MRTD.
Note: An attacker trying to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip remotely
(i.e. without knowing or optically reading the physical MRTD) is not considered by this ST
since this can only be averted by the BAC mechanism using the “weak” Document Basic Access
Keys that is covered by [16]. The same holds for the confidentiality of the user data EF.DG1,
EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 as well as EF.SOD and EF.COM.
Note: An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent
on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of
successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
3.2 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be
used or is intended to be used.
A.MRTD Manufact (MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6) It is assumed that appropriate
functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security procedures are used during
all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and
of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft
or unauthorized use).
14
A.MRTD Delivery (MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6) Procedures shall guarantee the
control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its objectives:
• Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and stor-
age.
• Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in
the delivery process and storage.
• Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the
required skill.
A.Pers Agent (Personalization of the MRTD’s chip) The Personalization Agent ensures the
correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic
Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) and Active Authentication
Public Key (EF.DG15)f stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key
Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document
Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to
authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp Sys (Inspection Systems for global interoperability) The Inspection System is used
by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the
traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic
Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and
the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements
the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [7]. The Basic Inspection System reads the log-
ical MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the
logical MRTD.
The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System implements the
Chip Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip during inspection and establishes Secure Messaging with keys established by the
Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System in addition to the General
Inspection System (i) supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by
the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read
the sensitive biometric reference data. Optionally all the Inspection Systems can implement
Active Authentication.
15
A.Signature PKI (PKI for Passive Authentication) The issuing and receiving States or Or-
ganizations establish a public key infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digital signature
creation and verification for the logical MRTD. The issuing State or Organization runs a Cer-
tification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA
Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to
distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its
integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over
the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer
Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Doc-
ument Security Objects of the MRTDs. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for
the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and Organizations.
A.Auth PKI (PKI for Inspection Systems) The issuing and receiving States or Organiza-
tions establish a public key infrastructure for card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access
Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended
Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding
the access control rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States
or Organizations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document Veri-
fiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving States or
Organizations. The issuing States or Organizations distribute the public keys of their Country
Verifying Certification Authority to their MRTD’s chip.
3.3 Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration
with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational
environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Read Sensitive Data (Read the sensitive biometric reference data)
Adverse action An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the
communication interface of the MRTD’s chip.
The attack T.Read Sensitive Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming in respect of the
attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on the
MRTD’s chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive biometric
reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e.
knowing Document Basic Access Keys) and therefore the possible attack methods.
Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored only on the MRTD’s chip
as private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are visually
readable on the physical MRTD as well.
Threat agent Having high attack potential, knowing the Document Basic Access Keys,
being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset Confidentiality of sensitive logical MRTD (i.e. biometric reference) data.
16
T.Forgery (Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip)
Adverse action An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any
part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system
by means of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may
alter the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in
the printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler.
The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the
visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication
mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data
to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system.
The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new
forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric
reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD’s
chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this
MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another
contactless chip.
Threat agent Having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRTDs.
Asset Authenticity of logical MRTD data.
T.Counterfeit (MRTD’s chip)
Adverse action An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or
reproduction of a genuine MRTD’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD.
This violates the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for authentication of a traveler
by possession of a MRTD.
The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data
from a genuine MRTD’s chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate
this genuine MRTD’s chip.
Threat agent Having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRTDs.
Asset Authenticity of logical MRTD data.
17
The TOE shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Abuse-Func (Abuse of Functionality)
Adverse action An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in “Op-
erational Use” phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore,
bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to
disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the person-
alization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
Threat agent Having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset Confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Information Leakage (Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip)
Adverse action An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during
its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be
inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O char-
acteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This
leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely re-
lated to measurement of operating parameters which may be derived either from mea-
surements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact
to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the
specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic
Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker
may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential
Fault Analysis).
Threat agent Having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset Confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data.
18
T.Phys-Tamper (Physical Tampering)
Adverse action An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order
(i) to disclose TSF Data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software. An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify
security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of
the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF
data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation
of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the Inspection System) or
TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation
of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g.
to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires
direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed
in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that,
the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified.
Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data
may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a
security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
Threat agent Having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset Confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Malfunction (Malfunction due to Environmental Stress)
Adverse action An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Em-
bedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify
security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify
security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating
conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing
administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information
about the functional operation.
Threat agent Having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset Confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
19
3.4 Organizational Security Policies
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as security
rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations (see
CC part 1, sec. 3.2 [19]).
P.BAC-PP (Fulfillment of the Basic Access Control Protection Profile) The issuing States
or Organizations ensures that successfully authenticated Basic Inspection Systems have read ac-
cess to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16 the ’ICAO Doc 9303’ [1] as well as to the
data groups Common and Security Data. The MRTD is successfully evaluated and certified in
accordance with the ’Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control’ [16] in order to ensure the confidentiality of
standard user data and preventing the traceability of the MRTD data.
P.Sensitive Data (Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data) The biometric reference
data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive private personal data of the
MRTD holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by Inspection Systems
which are authorized for this access at the time the MRTD is presented to the Inspection Sys-
tem (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing State or Organization authorizes the Document
Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the authorization of Inspection Systems within the
limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The MRTD’s chip shall protect the con-
fidentiality and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the
Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
P.Manufact (Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip) The Initialization Data are written by
the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-
personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.
P.Personalization (Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only)
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed
portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical
MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is
performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
20
4 Security Objectives (ASE OBJ.2)
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the
TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into secu-
rity objectives for the development and production environment and security objectives for the
operational environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified
threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
OT.AC Pers (Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD) The TOE must ensure
that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object according
to LDS [6] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The
logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and
cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by
authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG3 to EF.DG16 are added.
Note: The OT.AC Pers implies that
1. the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for MRTD holder (at least
EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be changed by write access after personalization
2. the Personalization Agents may (i) add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not written
yet, and (ii) update and sign the Document Security Object accordingly. The support for
adding data in the “Operational Use” phase is optional.
OT.Data Int (Integrity of personal data) The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical
MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing.
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the
General Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
OT.Sens Data Conf (Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data) The TOE must
ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) by
granting read access only to authorized Inspection Systems. The authorization of the Inspection
System is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful authentication
and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate
in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or
21
Organization. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their
transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric
reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Identification (Identification and Authentication of the TOE) The TOE must provide
means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its non-volatile memory. The
IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 Manufac-
turing and Phase 3 Personalization of the MRTD. The storage of the Pre-Personalization Data
includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s).
OT.Chip Auth Proof (Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity) The TOE must support the Gen-
eral Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as issued by
the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip Authentication as defined
in [8]. The authenticity proof provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with
high attack potential.
The following TOE Security Objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s chip
independent on the TOE environment.
OT.Prot Abuse-Func (Protection against Abuse of Functionality) After delivery of the
TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support functions that
may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate critical User Data of
the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software or (iv) bypass,
deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test
Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot Inf Leak (Protection against Information Leakage) The TOE must provide pro-
tection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip
• by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption,
clock, or I/O lines and
• by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
• by a physical manipulation of the TOE
Note This Security Objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal
processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. Details
correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.
22
OT.Prot Phys-Tamper (Protection against Physical Tampering) The TOE must provide
protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and the MRTD’s
chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with high attack potential by
means of
• measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface
except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
• measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between
charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
• manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
• controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
• reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot Malfunction (Protection against Malfunctions) The TOE must ensure its correct
operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where
reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The
environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage
(on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
Note: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with ele-
ments on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the objective
OT.Prot Phys-Tamper) provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE’s internals.
OT.Active Auth Proof (Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity) The TOE shall support the
Basic Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as issued
by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Active Authentication as defined
in [7]. The authenticity proof provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with
high attack potential.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organization
The Issuing State or Organization will implement the following Security Objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.MRTD Manufact (Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing) Appropriate functional-
ity testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through
phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and
test data.
23
OE.MRTD Delivery (Protection of the MRTD delivery) Procedures shall ensure protection
of TOE material/information under delivery including the following objectives:
• Non-disclosure of any security relevant information
• Identification of the element under delivery
• Meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledg-
ment)
• Physical protection to prevent external damage
• Secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s)
• Traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
– Origin and shipment details
– Reception, reception acknowledgment
– Location material/information
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in
the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality con-
vention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department)
dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to
meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expecta-
tions.
OE.Personalization (Personalization of logical MRTD) The issuing State or Organization
must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organiza-
tion (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the MRTD,
(ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded fin-
ger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder
together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality
and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass Auth Sign (Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature) The issuing State or
Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure
the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a
secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA
Public Key to receiving States and organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The
issuing State or organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key
Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security
Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the
Certificate of the Document Signing Public Key to receiving States and organizations. The
digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all data in the data in EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [6].
24
OE.Auth Key MRTD (MRTD Authentication Key) The issuing State or Organization has
to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i) generate the MRTD’s Chip
Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip
Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 and (iii) support Inspection Systems of receiving
States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by
certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
OE.Authoriz Sens Data (Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data)
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in
order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD’s holders to authorized
receiving States or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing
State or Organization generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized
Document Verifier only.
OE.Active Auth Key MRTD (MRTD Active Authentication Key) The issuing State or Or-
ganization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i) generate the
MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Active Authentication Public
Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support Inspection Sys-
tems of receiving States or Organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used
for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active Authentication Public Key by means of the
Document Security Object.
OE.BAC PP (Fulfillment of the Basic Access Control Protection Profile) It has to be en-
sured by the issuing State or Organization, that the TOE is additionally successfully evaluated
and certified in accordance with the ’Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable
Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control’ [16]. This is necessary to
cover the BAC mechanism ensuring the confidentiality of standard user data and preventing
the traceability of the MRTD data. Note that due to the differences within the assumed attack
potential the addressed evaluation and certification is a technically separated process.
Receiving State or organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Exam MRTD (Examination of the MRTD passport book) The Inspection System of
the receiving State must examine the MRTD presented by the traveler to verify its authentic-
ity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical
MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Sign-
ing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and
(ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [7]. Additionally General Inspec-
tion Systems and Extended Inspection Systems perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to
verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
25
OE.Passive Auth Verif (Verification by Passive Authentication) The border control officer
of the receiving State uses the Inspection System to verify the traveler as MRTD holder. The
Inspection Systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security Objects
and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States
and Organizations must manage the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all Inspection Systems.
OE.Prot Logical MRTD (Protection of data of the logical MRTD) The Inspection System
of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the data read
from the logical MRTD. The Inspection System will prevent eavesdropping to their commu-
nication with the TOE before Secure Messaging is successfully established based on the Chip
Authentication Protocol. The receiving State examining the logical MRTD being under Basic
Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic Ac-
cess Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the
transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection Systems).
OE.Ext Insp Systems (Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems) The Document
Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorize Extended Inspection Systems by cre-
ation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data of the
logical MRTD. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip
for access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key
and its Inspection System Certificate.
26
4.3 Security Objective Rationale
The Active Authentication functionality (for better readability the Security Objectives in ques-
tion are highlighted by an underline) is included in the Security Objective Rationale. The ta-
ble 4.1 provides an overview for Security Objectives coverage.
OT.AC
Pers
OT.Data
Int
OT.Sens
Data
Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Chip
Auth
Proof
OT.Prot
Abuse-Func
OT.Prot
Inf
Leak
OT.Prot
Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot
Malfunction
OT.Active
Auth
Proof
OE.MRTD
Manufact
OE.MRTD
Delivery
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass
Auth
Sign
OE.Auth
Key
MRTD
OE.Authoriz
Sens
Data
OE.Active
Auth
Key
MRTD
OE.BAC-PP
OE.Exam
MRTD
OE.Passive
Auth
Verif
OE.Prot
Logical
MRTD
OE.Ext
Insp
Systems
T.Read Sens. Data x x x
T.Forgery x x x x x x
T.Counterfeit x x x x x
T.Abuse-Func x
T.Inf. Leakage x
T.Phys-Tamper x
T.Malfunction x
P.BAC-PP x
P.Sensitive Data x x x
P.Manufact x
P.Personalization x x x
A.MRTD Manufact t t t t t t t t t x
A.MRTD Delivery t t t t t t t t t x
A.Pers Agent t t t t t t t t t x
A.Insp Sys t t t t t t t t t x x
A.Signature PKI t t t t t t t t t x x
A.Auth PKI t t t t t t t t t x x
Table 4.1: Security Objective Rationale (including Active Authentication)
The OSP P.BAC-PP is directly addressed by the OE.BAC-PP.
The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique identification
of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data as
being fulfilled by OT.Identification.
The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organiza-
tion only” addresses the (i) the enrollment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent
as described in the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Person-
alization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for the user data and TSF data as de-
scribed by the security objective OT.AC Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical
MRTD”. Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent Key(s) accord-
ing to OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective
OT.AC Pers limits the management of TSF data and the management of TSF to the Personal-
ization Agent.
27
The OSP P.Sensitive Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data” is fulfilled and
the threat T.Read Sensitive Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” is countered
by the TOE-objective OT.Sens Data Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference
data” requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric
reference data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required
that the transmission of these data ensures the data’s confidentiality. The authorization bases
on Document Verifier certificates issued by the issuing State or Organization as required by
OE.Authoriz Sens Data “Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference data”. The
Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by cre-
ating appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference
data as demanded by OE.Ext Insp Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems”.
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent alteration
of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective OT.AC Pers
“Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD” requires the TOE to limit the write ac-
cess for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization).
The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD according the security objec-
tive OT.Data Int “Integrity of personal data” and OT.Prot Phys-Tamper “Protection against
Physical Tampering”. The examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to
OE.Exam MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” shall ensure that passport book
does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical
MRTD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital
signature which will be created according to OE.Pass Auth Sign “Authentication of logical
MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according OE.Passive Auth Verif
“Verification by Passive Authentication”.
The threat T.Counterfeit “MRTD’s chip” addresses the attack of unauthorized copy or
reproduction of the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an identification
and authenticity proof required by OT.Chip Auth Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authentica-
tion” using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organization. The
Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and signed by means of Docu-
ments Security Objects as demanded by OE.Auth Key MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key”.
According to OE.Exam MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” the General In-
spection system has to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the authenticity of
the MRTD’s chip. Additionally, this attack is thwarted through the chip by an identification
and authenticity proof required by OT.Active Auth Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authentica-
tion” using an authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organization. The
Public Active Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG15 and signed by means of Docu-
ments Security Objects as demanded by OE.Active Auth Key MRTD “MRTD Authentication
Key”.
The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks of misusing MRTD’s
functionality to disable or bypass the TSFs. The security objective for the TOE OT.Prot Abuse-
Func “Protection against abuse of functionality” ensures that the usage of functions which may
not be used in the “Operational Use” phase is effectively prevented. Therefore attacks intend-
ing to abuse functionality in order to disclose or manipulate critical (User) Data or to affect
the TOE in such a way that security features or TOE’s functions may be bypassed, deactivated,
changed or explored shall be effectively countered. Additionally this objective is supported
by the security objective for the TOE environment: OE.Personalization “Personalization of
logical MRTD” ensuring that the TOE security functions for the initialization and the personal-
ization are disabled and the security functions for the operational state after delivery to MRTD
holder are enabled according to the intended use of the TOE.
28
The threats T.Information Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”,
T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering” and T.MalfunctionC “Malfunction due to Environmen-
tal Stress”are typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack
potential. The protection of the TOE against these threats is addressed by the directly related se-
curity objectives OT.Prot Inf Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”, OT.Prot Phys-
Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” and OT.Prot Malfunction “Protection against
Malfunctions”.
The assumption A.MRTD Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6” is covered
by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD Manufact “Protection of the
MRTD Manufacturing” that requires to use security procedures during all manufacturing steps.
The assumption A.MRTD Delivery “MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD Delivery “Protection of the MRTD
delivery” that requires to use security procedures during delivery steps of the MRTD.
The assumption A.Pers Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical
MRTD” including the enrollment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the
MRTD holder personal data.
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp Sys
“Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the
TOE environment OE.Exam MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” which re-
quires the inspection system to examine physically the MRTD, the Basic Inspection System
to implement the Basic Access Control, and the General Inspection Systems and Extended In-
spection Systems to implement and to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the
Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip. The security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Prot Logical MRTD “Protection of data from the logical MRTD” require the Inspection
System to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling.
The assumption A.Signature PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly covered by
the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Pass Auth Sign “Authentication of logical
MRTD by Signature” covering the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair
and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The implementation of the signature verification proce-
dures is covered by OE.Exam MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book”.
The assumption A.Auth PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the security ob-
jective for the TOE environment OE.Authoriz Sens Data “Authorization for use of sensitive
biometric reference data” requires the CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive biometrics
by issuing Document Verifier certificates for authorized receiving States or Organizations only.
The Document Verifier of the receiving State is required by OE.Ext Insp Systems “Authoriza-
tion of Extended Inspection Systems” to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating
Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the receiving issuing State or Organization has to
establish the necessary public key infrastructure.
29
5 Extended Components Definition
(ASE ECD.1)
This Security Target uses the components defined in chapter 5 of BSI-CC-PP-0056 [15]. No
other components are used.
30
6 Security Requirements (ASE REQ.2)
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement, se-
lection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph C.4 of Part 1 of the CC [19]. Each
of these operations is used in this ST.
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts
a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by the word “refinement” in
bold text and the added/changed words are in bold text. In cases where words from a CC
requirement were deleted, a separate attachment indicates the words that were removed.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating
a requirement. Selections that have been made by the PP authors are denoted as underlined text
and the original text of the component is given by a footnote. Selections filled in by the ST
author are denoted as double-underlined text.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter,
such as the length of a password. Assignments that have been made by the PP authors are
denoted by showing as underlined text and the original text of the component is given by a
footnote. Assignments filled in by the ST author are denoted as double-underlined text.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations.
Iteration is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the component
identifier.
The definition of the subjects “Manufacturer”, “Personalization Agent”, “Extended Inspec-
tion System”, “Country Verifying Certification Authority”, “Document Verifier” and “Termi-
nal” used in the following chapter is given in section 3.1. Note, that all these subjects are acting
for homonymous external entities. All used objects are defined either in chapter 8 or in the fol-
lowing table. The operations “write”, “modify”, “read” and “ disable read access” are used in
accordance with the general linguistic usage. The operations “store”, “create”, “transmit”, “re-
ceive”, “establish communication channel”, “authenticate” and “ re-authenticate” are originally
taken from [20]. The operation “load” is synonymous to “import” used in [20].
Definition of security attributes
Terminal authentication status
none (any Terminal) default role (i.e. without authorization after start-up)
CVCA roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf. [8], A.5.1); Terminal is
authenticated as Country Verifying Certification Authority after successful CA and
TA
31
DV (domestic) roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf. [8], A.5.1);
Terminal is authenticated as domestic Document Verifier after successful CA and
TA
DV (foreign) roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf. [8], A.5.1); Ter-
minal is authenticated as foreign Document Verifier after successful CA and TA
IS roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf. [8], A.5.1); Terminal is
authenticated as Extended Inspection System after successful CA and TA
Terminal Authorization none
DG4 (Iris) Read access to DG4: (cf. [8], A.5.1)
DG3 (Fingerprint) Read access to DG3: (cf. [8], A.5.1)
DG3 (Fingerprint) / DG4 (Iris) Read access to DG3 and DG4: (cf. [8], A.5.1)
Overview of the keys and certificates used in this ST
Country Verifying Certification Authority Private Key (SKCVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) holds a private key (SKCVCA) used
for signing the Document Verifier Certificates.
Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key (PKCVCA)
The TOE stores the Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key (PKCVCA) as
part of the TSF data to verify the Document Verifier Certificates. The PKPKCVCA has the
security attribute Current Date as the most recent valid effective date of the Country Ver-
ifying Certification Authority Certificate or of a domestic Document Verifier Certificate.
Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate (CCVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate may be a self-signed certificate
or a link certificate (cf. [8] and Glossary). It contains (i) the Country Verifying Certi-
fication Authority Public Key (PKCVCA) as authentication reference data, (ii) the coded
access control rights of the Country Verifying Certification Authority, (iii) the Certificate
Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Document Verifier Certificate (CDV)
The Document Verifier Certificate CDV is issued by the Country Verifying Certification
Authority. It contains (i) the Document Verifier Public Key (PKDV) as authentication ref-
erence data (ii) identification as domestic or foreign Document Verifier, the coded access
control rights of the Document Verifier, the Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate
Expiration Date as security attributes.
Inspection System Certificate (CIS)
The Inspection System Certificate (CIS) is issued by the Document Verifier. It contains (i)
as authentication reference data the Inspection System Public Key (PKIS), (ii) the coded
access control rights of the Extended Inspection System, the Certificate Effective Date
and the Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Chip Authentication Public Key Pair
The Chip Authentication Public Key Pair (SKICC, PKICC) are used for Key Agreement
Protocol: Diffie-Hellman (DH) according to RFC 2631 [23] or Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman according to ISO 15946 [24].
32
Chip Authentication Public Key (PKICC)
The Chip Authentication Public Key (PKICC) is stored in the EF.DG14 Chip Authentica-
tion Public Key of the TOE’s logical MRTD and used by the Inspection System for Chip
Authentication of the MRTD’s chip. It is part of the user data provided by the TOE for
the IT environment.
Chip Authentication Private Key (SKICC)
The Chip Authentication Private Key (SKICC) is used by the TOE to authenticate itself as
authentic MRTD’s chip. It is part of the TSF data.
Active Authentication Public Key Pair
The Active Authentication Public Key Pair (SKAA, PKAA) are used for Active Authen-
tication according to TrPKI [7]. (Included in addition to EAC-PP to take the Active
Authentication functionality into account.)
Active Authentication Public Key (PKAA)
The Active Authentication Public Key (PKICC) is stored in the EF.DG15 Active Authen-
tication Public Key of the TOE’s logical MRTD and used by the inspection system for
Active Authentication of the MRTD’s chip. It is part of the user data provided by the
TOE for the IT environment.
Active Authentication Private Key (SKAA)
The Active Authentication Private Key (SKICC) is used by the TOE to authenticate itself
as authentic MRTD’s chip. It is part of the TSF data.
Country Signing Certification Authority Key Pair
Country Signing Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization signs the
Document Signer Public Key Certificate with the Country Signing Certification Authority
Private Key and the signature will be verified by receiving State or Organization (e.g. a
Basic Inspection System) with the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key.
Document Signer Key Pairs
Document Signer of the issuing State or Organization signs the Document Security Object
of the logical MRTD with the Document Signer Private Key and the signature will be
verified by a Basic Inspection Systems of the receiving State or Organization with the
Document Signer Public Key.
Document Basic Access Keys
The Document Basic Access Key is created by the Personalization Agent, loaded to the
TOE, and used for mutual authentication and key agreement for Secure Messaging be-
tween the Basic Inspection System and the MRTD’s chip.
BAC Session Keys
Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key agreed between the TOE and a
BIS in result of the Basic Access Control Authentication Protocol.
Chip Session Key
Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key agreed between the TOE and a
GIS in result of the Chip Authentication Protocol.
Note: The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a Document Verifier as “do-
mestic” in the Document Verifier Certificate if it belongs to the same State as the Country
33
Verifying Certification Authority. The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a
Document Verifier as “foreign” in the Document Verifier Certificate if it does not belong to the
same State as the Country Verifying Certification Authority. From MRTD’s point of view the
domestic Document Verifier belongs to the issuing State or Organization.
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into subsections follow-
ing the main security functionality.
6.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU SAS.1)” as specified below (Com-
mon Criteria Part 2 [20] extended).
FAU SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store
the IC Identification Data in the audit records.
Note: The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the TOE in the Phase 2
Manufacturing. The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer in the Manufacturer role
write the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data as TSF Data of the TOE. The audit
records are write-only-once data of the MRTD’s chip (see FMT MTD.1/INI DIS).
6.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS CKM.1)” as speci-
fied below (Common Criteria Part 2 [20]). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic
key generation algorithms to be implemented and keys to be generated by the TOE.
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Diffie-Hellman Keys by the
TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS COP.1 Cryptographic operation ]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm ECDH and spec-
ified cryptographic key sizes 112 bits that meet the following:
TR-03110 [8], Annex A.1
Note: The TOE generates a shared secret value with the terminal during the Chip Authenti-
cation Protocol, see [8], sec. 3.1 and Annex A.1. This protocol is based on the ECDH compliant
to ISO 15946 (i.e. an elliptic curve cryptography algorithm) (cf. [8], Annex A.1, [25] and [24]
34
for details). The shared secret value is used to derive the Triple-DES key for encryption and
the Retail-MAC Chip Session Keys according to the Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Algorithm [1], normative appendix 5, A5.1, for the TSF required by FCS COP.1/SYM and
FCS COP.1/MAC.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS CKM.4)” as speci-
fied below (Common Criteria Part 2 [20]).
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with the
cryptographic key destruction method physical deletion of key
value that meets the following: FIPS PUB 140-2 [26].
Note: The TOE shall destroy the Triple-DES encryption key and the Retail-MAC message
authentication keys for secure messaging (specified in BSI-CC-PP-055 [16]). The TOE shall
destroy the BAC Session Keys (i) after detection of an error in a received command by verifi-
cation of the MAC, and (ii) after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol. The TOE
shall destroy the Chip Session Keys after detection of an error in a received command by veri-
fication of the MAC. The TOE shall clear the memory area of any session keys before starting
the communication with the terminal in a new power-on-session.
Cryptographic Operation (FCS COP.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS COP.1)” as specified be-
low (Common Criteria Part 2 [20]). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algo-
rithms to be implemented by the TOE.
FCS COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS COP.1.1/SHA The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 and
cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following: FIPS
180-2 [27].
35
FCS COP.1/SYM Cryptographic operation – Symmetric Encryption / Decryption
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS COP.1.1/SYM The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging - encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
Triple-DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that
meet the following: TR-03110 [8].
Note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitives (i.e. Triple-
DES) for secure messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are agreed be-
tween the TOE and the terminal as part of the Chip Authentication Protocol according to the
FCS CKM.1. Furthermore the SFR is used for authentication attempts of a terminal as Person-
alization Agent by means of the symmetric authentication mechanism.
FCS COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation – MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS COP.1.1/MAC The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging - message authentication
code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail
MAC and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following:
TR-03110 [8].
Note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure mes-
saging with encryption and message authentication code over the transmitted data. The key is
agreed between the TSF by Chip Authentication Protocol according to the FCS CKM.1. The
Retail-MAC as part of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism according to the
FCS CKM.1 (cf. [16]) is DES resp. two-key Triple-DES base.
FCS COP.1/SIG VER Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS COP.1.1/
SIG VER
The TSF shall perform digital signature verification in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA with SHA-1,
SHA-224 or SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes 224, 256, 320
and 384 bits that meet the following: FIPS 186-2 [27].
36
Note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure mes-
saging with encryption and message authentication code over the transmitted data. The key
is agreed between the TSF by the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism according
to the FCS CKM.1 and FIA UAU.4 (specified in BSI-CC-PP-0055 [16]). The signature ver-
ification is used to verify the card verifiable certificates and the authentication attempt of the
terminal creating a digital signature for the TOE challenge.
Note: The inclusion of the SHA-1 functionality for ECDSA is on costumer’s request.
FCS COP.1/RSA MRTD AA Cryptographic operation – Signature creation by MRTD –
AA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS COP.1.1/
RSA MRTD AA
The TSF shall perform digital signature creation in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA with SHA-1 and
cryptographic key sizes 1536 bits that meet the following:
ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 [28].
(This SFR is defined in addition to BSI-CC-PP-0056 [15] to include the Active Authentica-
tion functionality.)
Random Number Generation (FCS RND.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS RND.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended [20]).
FCS RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers
that meet class P2 defined in AIS31 [29].
Note: This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers used for the authentication
protocols as required by FIA UAU.4.
6.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
Note: Table 6.1 provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used.
37
Name SFR for the TOE
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism for Personalization Agents FIA UAU.4
Chip Authentication Protocol FIA API.1,
FIA UAU.5,
FIA UAU.6
Terminal Authentication Protocol FIA UAU.5
Active Authentication (specified in addition to BSI-CC-PP-0056 [15]) FIA API.1/AA
Table 6.1: Overview on authentication SFR
Note the Chip Authentication Protocol as defined in BSI-CC-PP-0056 [15] includes
• the BAC authentication protocol as defined in ’ICAO Doc 9303’ [1] in order to gain access
to the Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14
• the asymmetric key agreement to establish symmetric secure messaging keys between
the TOE and the terminal based on the Chip Authentication Public Key and the Terminal
Public Key used later in the Terminal Authentication Protocol
• the check whether the TOE is able to generate the correct message authentication code
with the expected key for any message received by the terminal
The BAC mechanism does not provide a security function on its own (nevertheless it is listed
in table 6.1 for completeness). The Chip Authentication Protocol may be used independent of
the Terminal Authentication Protocol. But if the Terminal Authentication Protocol is used the
terminal shall use the same public key as presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA UID.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [20]).
FIA UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel
2. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF
according to FMT MTD.1/INI DIS
3. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Note: In the Phase 2 “Manufacturing of the TOE” the Manufacturer is the only user role
known to the TOE which writes the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data in the
38
audit records of the IC. The MRTD manufacturer creates the user role Personalization Agent
for transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The users in role Per-
sonalization Agent identify themselves by means of selecting the authentication key. After
personalization in the Phase 3 the Document Basic Access Keys, the Chip Authentication data
and Terminal Authentication Reference Data are written into the TOE. The Basic Inspection
System (cf. BSI-CC-PP-0055 [16]) is identified as default user after power up or reset of the
TOE i.e. the TOE will use the Document Basic Access Key to run the BAC Authentication
Protocol, to gain access to the Chip Authentication Reference Data and to run the Chip Authen-
tication Protocol (i.e. the BAC mechanism is a mandatory part within the Chip Authentication
Protocol). After successful authentication of the chip the terminal may identify itself as (i) Ex-
tended Inspection System by selection of the templates for the Terminal Authentication Protocol
or (ii) if necessary and available by symmetric authentication as Personalization Agent (using
the Personalization Agent Key).
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA UAU.1)” as specified be-
low (Common Criteria Part 2 [20]).
FIA UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA UID.1 Timing of identification.
FIA UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel
2. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF
according to FMT MTD.1/INI DIS
3. to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
4. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA UAU.4)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [20]).
FIA UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the Ter-
minal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Terminal Authentication Protocol
2. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
39
Note: The authentication mechanisms use a challenge freshly and randomly generated by
the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in a successful authentication
attempt.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA UAU.5)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [20]).
FIA UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide
1. Terminal Authentication Protocol
2. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode
3. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
to support user authentication.
FIA UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according
to the following rules:
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as
Personalization Agent by the following mechanism
(a) the Terminal Authentication Protocol with
Personalization Agent Keys
2. After run of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the TOE
accepts only received commands with correct message
authentication code sent by means of Secure Messaging
with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip
Authentication Mechanism
3. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of
the Terminal Authentication Protocol only if the terminal
uses the public key presented during the Chip Authentication
Protocol and the Secure Messaging established by the Chip
Authentication Mechanism
Note: The Personalization Agent holds an asymmetric key pair for the Terminal Authen-
tication Protocol. The Basic Access Control Mechanism includes the secure messaging for
all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the inspection system. The Ba-
sic Inspection System shall use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the
Document Basic Access Keys and the secure messaging after the mutual authentication. The
General Inspection System shall use the secure messaging with the keys generated by the Chip
Authentication Mechanism.
40
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA UAU.6)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [20]).
FIA UAU.6 Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip
Authentication Protocol shall be verified as being sent by the GIS.
Note: The Basic Access Control Mechanism and the Chip Authentication Protocol speci-
fied in [1] include secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentica-
tion of the Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messaging in MAC ENC mode each
command based on CMAC, Retail-MAC or EMAC whether it was sent by the successfully au-
thenticated terminal (see FCS COP.1/MAC for further details). The TOE does not execute any
command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore the TOE reauthenticates the
user for each received command and accepts only those commands received from the previously
authenticated user.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA API.1)” as speci-
fied below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended [20]).
FIA API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol according
to [8] to prove the identity of the TOE.
Note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication Mechanism speci-
fied in [8]. The TOE and the terminal generate a shared secret using the Diffie-Hellman Protocol
(EC-DH) and two session keys for secure messaging in ENC MAC mode according to [1], nor-
mative appendix 5, A5.1. The terminal verifies by means of Secure Messaging whether the
MRTD’s chip was able or not to run his protocol properly using its Chip Authentication Private
Key corresponding to the Chip Authentication Key (EF.DG14).
FIA API.1/AA Authentication Proof of Identity – AA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA API.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide an Active Authentication Mechanism
according to [7] to prove the identity of the TOE.
(This SFR is defined in addition to BSI-CC-PP-0056 [15] to take the Active Authentication
functionality into account.)
41
6.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP ACC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [20]).
FDP ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals
gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM,
EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP ACF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [20]).
FDP ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on
the following:
1. Subjects:
(a) Personalization Agent
(b) Extended Inspection System
(c) Terminal,
2. Objects:
(a) data EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD
(b) data EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD
(c) data in EF.COM
(d) data in EF.SOD
3. Security attributes:
(a) authentication status of terminals
(b) Terminal Authorization
42
FDP ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an opera-
tion among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is
allowed to write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
2. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System
with the Read access to DG 3 (Fingerprint) granted by the
relative certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed
to read the data in EF.DG3 of the logical MRTD
3. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System
with the Read access to DG 4 (Iris) granted by the relative
certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to read
the data in EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD
FDP ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects
based on the following sensitive rules: none
FDP ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the rule:
1. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data
in the EF.DG3
2. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data
in the EF.DG4
3. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in
the EF.DG3
4. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in
the EF.DG4
5. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
6. Any terminal not being successfully authenticated as
Extended Inspection System is not allowed to read any of the
EF.DG3 to EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD
43
Note: The relative certificate holder authorization encoded in the CVC of the Inspection
System is defined in [8], Annex A.5.1, table A.8. The TOE verifies the certificate chain es-
tablished by the Country Verifying Certification Authority, the Document Verifier Certificate
and the Inspection System Certificate (cf. FMT MTD.3). The Terminal Authorization is the
intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorization in the certificates of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority, the Document Verifier Certificate and the Inspection System Certificate
in a valid certificate chain.
Note: Note the BAC mechanism controls the read access of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1,
EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP UCT.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [20]).
FDP UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FTP ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel or
FTP TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to
transmit and receive objects in a manner protected from unautho-
rized disclosure after Chip Authentication.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP UIT.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [20]).
FDP UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel or
FTP TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able
to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from
modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors after Chip Au-
thentication.
FDP UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred after
Chip Authentication.
Rationale for Refinement: Note that the Access Control SFP (cf. FDP ACF.1.2) allows the
Extended Inspection System (as of [1] and [16]) to access the data EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1,
44
EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD. Nevertheless there is explicitly no rule
for preventing access to these data. More over their data integrity (cf. FDP UIT.1) and con-
fidentiality (cf. FDP UCT.1) is ensured by the BAC mechanism being addressed and covered
by [16] (see FDP UIT.1).
Note: FDP UCT.1and FDP UIT.1 require the protection of the User Data transmitted from
the TOE to the terminal by secure messaging with encryption and message authentication codes
after successful Chip Authentication to the General Inspection System. The authentication
mechanism as part of Basic Access Control Mechanism and the Chip Authentication Protocol
establish different key sets to be used for secure messaging (each set of keys for the encryption
and the message authentication key).
6.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
Note: The SFR FMT SMF.1 and FMT SMR.1 provide basic requirements to the management
of the TSF data.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT SMF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [20]).
FMT SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FMT SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security
management functions:
1. Initialization
2. Pre-personalization
3. Personalization
45
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT SMR.1)” as specified below (Com-
mon Criteria Part 2 [20]).
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:
1. Manufacturer
2. Personalization Agent
3. Country Verifier Certification Authority
4. Document Verifier
5. Domestic Extended Inspection System
6. Foreign Extended Inspection System
FMT SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles
Note: Note that the MRTD also maintains the role Basic Inspection System due to a direct
consequence of P.BAC-PP resp. OE.BAC-PP. Nevertheless this role is not explicitly listed in
FMT SMR.1.1, since the TSF cannot maintain the role with respect to the assumed high attack
potential due to the known weaknesses of the Document Basic Access Keys.
Note: The SFR FMT LIM.1 and FMT LIM.2 address the management of the TSF and TSF
data to prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over the life cycle phases.
46
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT LIM.1” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [20] extended).
FMT LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability
(FMT LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated
2. Sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed
3. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
4. Software to be reconstructed
5. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT LIM.2)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [20] extended).
FMT LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities
(FMT LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated
2. Sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed
3. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
4. Software to be reconstructed
5. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks
47
Note: The formulation of “Deploying Test Features ...” in FMT LIM.2.1 might be a little bit
misleading since the addressed features are no longer available (e.g. by disabling or removing
the respective functionality). Nevertheless the combination of FMT LIM.1and FMT LIM.2
is introduced provide an optional approach to enforce the same policy. Note that the term
“software” in item 4 of FMT LIM.1.1 and FMT LIM.2.1 refers to both IC Dedicated and IC
Embedded Software.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT MTD.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 [20]). The iterations address different management functions
and different TSF data.
FMT MTD.1/INI ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and
Prepersonalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.1.1/
INI ENA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data to the Manufacturer
Note: The Pre-personalization Data include but are not limited to the authentication refer-
ence data for the Personalization Agent which is the symmetric cryptographic Personalization
Agent Key.
FMT MTD.1/INI DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to Initializa-
tion Data and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.1.1/
INI DIS
The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to
the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent
Note: According to P.Manufact the IC Manufacturer and the MRTD Manufacturer are the
default users assumed by the TOE in the role Manufacturer during the Phase 2 “Manufactur-
ing” but the TOE is not requested to distinguish between these users within the role Manufac-
turer. The TOE restricts the ability to write the Initialization Data and the Prepersonalization
Data by (i) allowing to write these data only once and (ii) blocking the role Manufacturer at the
end of the Phase 2. The IC Manufacturer writes the Initialization Data which includes but are not
limited to the IC Identifier as required by FAU SAS.1. The Initialization Data provides a unique
identification of the IC which is used to trace the IC in the Phase 2 and 3 “personalization” but
is not needed and may be misused in the Phase 4 “Operational Use”. Therefore the external
read access will be blocked. The MRTD Manufacturer will write the Pre-personalization Data.
48
FMT MTD.1/CVCA INI Management of TSF data – Initialization of CVCA Certificate
and Current Date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.1.1/
CVCA INI
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
1. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
2. Initial Country Verifier Certification Authority Certificate
3. Initial Current Date
to the Personalization Agent
Note: The initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key is written by the
Personalization Agent (cf. [8], sec. 2.2.6). The initial Country Verifying Certification Authority
Public Keys (and their updates later on) are used to verify the Country Verifying Certification
Authority Link-Certificates. The initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
and the initial Current Date is needed for verification of the certificates and the calculation of
the Terminal Authorization.
FMT MTD.1/CVCA UPD Management of TSF data – Country Verifier Certification Au-
thority
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.1.1/
CVCA UPD
The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
2. Country Verifier Certification Authority Certificate
to the Country Verifier Certification Authority
Note: The Country Verifying Certification Authority updates its asymmetric key pair and
distributes the public key be means of the Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates (cf. [8], sec.
2.2). The TOE updates its internal trust-point if a valid Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates
(cf. FMT MTD.3) is provided by the terminal (cf. [8], sec. 2.2.3 and 2.2.4).
49
FMT MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data – Current date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.1.1/
DATE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current date to
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority
2. Document Verifier
3. Domestic Extended Inspection System
Note: The authorized roles are identified in their certificate (cf. [8], sec. 2.2.4 and Table
A.5) and authorized by validation of the certificate chain (cf. FMT MTD.3/EAC). The autho-
rized role of the terminal is part of the Certificate Holder Authorization in the card verifiable
certificate provided by the terminal for the identification and the Terminal Authentication (cf.
to [8], annex A.3.3, for details).
FMT MTD.1/KEY WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.1.1/
KEY WRITE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Basic
Access Keys to the Personalization Agent
Note: The Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key is the TSF data for verifica-
tion of the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Extended Inspection Systems including
the access rights for the Extended Access Control.
FMT MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication Private Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.1.1/
CAPK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to load the Chip Authentication
Private Key to the Personalization Agent
Note: The verb “load” means here that the Chip Authentication Private Key is generated
securely outside the TOE and written into the TOE memory.
50
FMT MTD.1/AAPK Management of TSF data – Active Authentication Private Key –
AA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.1.1/
AAPK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to load the Active Authentication
Private Key to the Personalization Agent
(This SFR is defined in addition to BSI-CC-PP-0056 [15] to take the Active Authentication
functionality into account.)
FMT MTD.1/KEY READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.1.1/
KEY
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
1. Document Basic Access Keys
2. Chip Authentication Private Key
3. Personalization Agent Keys
to none
FMT MTD.1/KEY READ AA Management of TSF data – Key Read – AA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.1.1/
KEY READ AA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the Active Authentication
Private Key to none
(This SFR has been added to BSI-CC-PP-0056 [15] to take the Active Authentication func-
tionality into account.)
FMT MTD.3 Secure TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT MTD.3.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certificate
chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication
Protocol and the Access Control
51
Refinement: The certificate chain is valid if and only if
1. the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct
with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of
the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
2. the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct
with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Author-
ity and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the
Current Date of the TOE,
3. the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Au-
thority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Cer-
tification Authority known to the TOE and the expiration date of the Certificate of
the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the
TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in
a valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Ex-
tended Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates
of a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful
authenticated Extended Inspection System.
Note: The Terminal Authentication is used for Extended Inspection System as required by
FIA UAU.4 and FIA UAU.5. The Terminal Authorization is used as TSF data for access control
required by FDP ACF.1.
6.1.6 Class FPT Protection of Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF
Data. The security functional requirement FPT EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent leakage.
With respect to the forced leakage they have to be considered in combination with the secu-
rity functional requirements “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT FLS.1)” and “TSF
testing (FPT TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT PHP.3)” on
the other. The SFR “Non-bypassability of the TSP (FPT RVM.1)” and “TSF domain sepa-
ration (FPT SEP.1)” together with “Limited capabilities (FMT LIM.1)”, “Limited availability
(FMT LIM.2)” and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT PHP.3)” prevent bypassing, deactiva-
tion and manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE functions.
52
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT EMSEC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [20] extended).
FPT EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit information about IC power consumption
and command execution time in excess of non-useful information
enabling access to Personalization Agent Authentication Keys
and Chip Authentication Private Keys and Manufacturer
Authentication Keys and none.
FPT EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following in-
terface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to Personalization
Agent Authentication Keys and Chip Authentication Private Keys
and Manufacturer Authentication Keys and none.
Note: The TOE shall prevent attacks against the listed secret data where the attack is based
on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may be observable at
the interfaces of the TOE or may be originated from internal operation of the TOE or may be
caused by an attacker that varies the physical environment under which the TOE operates. The
set of measurable physical phenomena is influenced by the technology employed to implement
the smart card. The MRTD’s chip has to provide a smart card contactless interface but may
have also (not used by the terminal but maybe by an attacker) sensitive contacts according to
ISO/IEC 7816-2 as well. Examples of measurable phenomena include, but are not limited to
variations in the power consumption, the timing of signals and the electromagnetic radiation
due to internal operations or data transmissions.
FPT EMSEC.1/AA TOE Emanation – AA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT EMSEC.1.1/AA The TOE shall not emit information about IC power consumption
and command execution time in excess of non-useful information
enabling access to Active Authentication Private Keys and none.
FPT EMSEC.1.2/AA The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the follow-
ing interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to Active
Authentication Private Keys and none.
(This SFR has been added to BSI-CC-PP-0056 [15] to take the Active Authentication func-
tionality into account.)
53
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit in-
formation leakage including physical manipulation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT FLS.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [20]).
FPT FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur:
1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where
therefore a malfunction could occur
2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT TST.1
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT TST.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 [20]).
FPT TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up and
at the condition “request of random numbers“ to demonstrate the
correct operation of the TSF.
FPT TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to ver-
ify the integrity of TSF data.
FPT TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to ver-
ify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT PHP.3)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 [20]).
FPT PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing
to the TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are
always enforced.
Note: The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter physical ma-
nipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation)
the TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection
54
against these attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not be violated at any time. Hence,
“automatic response” means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii)
countermeasures are provided at any time.
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are those
taken from the
Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4)
and augmented by taking the following components:
• ALC DVS.2
• AVA VAN.5
Note: The TOE shall protect the assets against high attack potential under the assumption
that the inspection system will prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE
before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol
(OE.Prot Logical MRTD). Otherwise the confidentiality of the standard data shall be protected
against attacker with at least Enhanced-Basic attack potential (AVA VAN.3).
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The table 6.2 provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage.
55
OT.AC
Pers
OT.Data
Int
OT.Sens
Data
Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Chip
Auth
Proof
OT.Prot
Abuse-Func
OT.Prot
Inf
Leak
OT.Prot
Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot
Malfunction
OT.Active
Auth
Proof
FAU SAS.1 x
FCS CKM.1 x x x x
FCS CKM.4 x x x
FCS COP.1/SHA x x x x
FCS COP.1/SYM x x x x
FCS COP.1/MAC x x x x
FCS COP.1/SIG VER x x
FCS COP.1/RSA MRTD AA x
FCS RND.1 x x
FIA UID.1 x x x
FIA UAU.1 x x x
FIA UAU.4 x x x
FIA UAU.5 x x x
FIA UAU.6 x x x
FIA API.1 x
FIA API.1/AA x
FDP ACC.1 x x x
FDP ACF.1 x x x
FDP UCT.1 x
FDP UIT.1 x
FMT SMF.1 x x
FMT SMR.1 x x
FMT LIM.1 x
FMT LIM.2 x
FMT MTD.1/INI ENA x
FMT MTD.1/INI DIS x
FMT MTD.1/CVCA INI x
FMT MTD.1/CVCA UPD x
FMT MTD.1/DATE x
FMT MTD.1/KEY WRITE x
FMT MTD.1/CAPK x x x
FMT MTD.1/AAPK x
FMT MTD.1/KEY READ x x x x
FMT MTD.1/KEY READ AA x
FMT MTD.3 x
FPT EMSEC.1 x x
FPT EMSEC.1/AA x
FPT TST.1 x x
FPT FLS.1 x x
FPT PHP.3 x x
Table 6.2: Coverage of Security Objectives for the TOE by SFR
56
OT.AC Pers The security objective OT.AC Pers “Access Control for Personalization of log-
ical MRTD” addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access
to the logical MRTD data are defined by the SFR FIA UID.1, FIA UAU.1, FDP ACC.1 and
FDP ACF.1 in the same way: only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is al-
lowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once. The
SFR FMT SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT SMF.1
lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization). The Personalization Agent
handles the Document Basic Access Keys according to the SFR FMT MTD.1/KEY WRITE as
authentication reference data for Basic Access Control.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SFR FIA UAU.4 and FIA UAU.5. If the Personalization Terminal want to authen-
ticate itself to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol (after Chip Authenti-
cation) with the Personalization Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS RND.1
(for the generation of the challenge), FCS CKM.1, FCS COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the
new session keys after Chip Authentication), and FCS COP.1/SYM and FCS COP.1/MAC (for
the ENC MAC Mode Secure Messaging), FCS COP.1/SIG VER (as part of the Terminal Au-
thentication Protocol) and FIA UAU.6 (for the re-authentication). If the Personalization Termi-
nal wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Symmetric Authentication Mecha-
nism with Personalization Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS RND.1 (for
the generation of the challenge) and FCS COP.1/SYM (to verify the authentication attempt).
The session keys are destroyed according to FCS CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/KEY READ prevents read access to the secret key of the Person-
alization Agent Keys and ensures together with the SFRs FPT EMSEC.1 the confidentially of
these keys.
OT.Data Int The security objective OT.Data Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the
TOE to protect the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is defined
by the SFR FDP ACC.1 and FDP ACF.1 in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is
allowed to write the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP ACF.1.2, rule
1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD (cf. FDP ACF.1.4). The Personalization Agent must identify and authenticate
themselves according to FIA UID.1 and FIA UAU.1 before accessing these data. The SFR
FMT SMR.1 lists the roles and the SFR FMT SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions.
The TOE supports the Inspection System detect any modification of the transmitted logical
MRTD data after Chip Authentication. The authentication of the terminal as Personalization
Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SFR FIA UAU.4, FIA UAU.5 and FIA UAU.6.
The SFR FIA UAU.6 and FDP UIT.1 requires the integrity protection of the transmitted data
after chip authentication by means of Secure Messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS CKM.1 (for the generation of shared secret), FCS COP.1/SHA (for
the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS COP.1/SYM and FCS COP.1/MAC for the
ENC MAC Mode Secure Messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS CKM.4
after use.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/CAPK and FMT MTD.1/KEY READ requires that the Chip Au-
thentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
57
OT.Sens Data Conf The security objective OT.Sense Data Conf “Confidentiality of sensi-
tive biometric reference data” is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP ACC.1
and FDP ACF.1/ allowing the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by successfully
authenticated Extended Inspection System being authorized by a validly verifiable certificate
according FCS COP.1/SIG VER.
The SFR FIA UID.1 and FIA UAU.1 requires the identification and authentication of the
Inspection Systems. The SFR FIA UAU.5 requires the successful Chip Authentication before
any authentication attempt as Extended Inspection System.During the protected communica-
tion following the CA the reuse of authentication data is prevented by FIA UAU.4. The SFR
FIA UAU.6 and FDP UCT.1 require the confidentiality protection of the transmitted data after
chip authentication by means of Secure Messaging implemented by the cryptographic func-
tions according to FCS RND.1 (for the generation of the terminal authentication challenge),
FCS CKM.1 (for the generation of shared secret), FCS COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the
new session keys), and FCS COP.1/SYM and FCS COP.1/MAC for the ENC MAC Mode Se-
cure Messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS CKM.4 after use. The SFR
FMT MTD.1/CAPK and FMT MTD.1/KEY READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key
cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT MTD.3 the CVCA’s public key
and certificate as well as the current date are written or update by authorized identified role as
of FMT MTD.1/CVCA INI, FMT MTD.1/CVCA UPD and FMT MTD.1/DATE.
OT.Identification The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentica-
tion of the TOE” address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the
MRTD’s chip in its non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR
FAU SAS.1.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/INI ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data
and Pre-personalization Data (including the Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT MTD.1/
INI DIS allows the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the
phase 4 “Operational Use” violates the security objective OT.Identification.
OT.Chip Auth Proof The security objective OT.Chip Auth Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip
authenticity” is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol provided by FIA API.1 proving
the identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol defined by FCS CKM.1 is performed
using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT MTD.1/CAPK and
FMT MTD.1/KEY READ. The Chip Authentication Protocol [8] requires additional TSF ac-
cording to FCS COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the session keys), FCS COP.1/SYM and
FCS COP.1/MAC (for the ENC MAC Mode Secure Messaging).
OT.Prot Abuse-Func
The security objective OT.Prot Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” is
ensured by the SFR FMT LIM.1 and FMT LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of
the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE Delivery.
58
OT.Prot Inf Leak
The security objective OT.Prot Inf Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” re-
quires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip
against disclosure
• by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption,
clock, or I/O lines which is addressed by the SFRs FPT EMSEC.1 and FPT EMSEC.1/AA
• by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT FLS.1 and
FPT TST.1, and/or
• by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT PHP.3
OT.Prot Phys-Tamper
The security objective OT.Prot Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is
covered by the SFR FPT PHP.3.
OT.Prot Malfunction
The security objective OT.Prot Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is covered
by (i) the SFR FPT TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and
tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code and (ii) the SFR
FPT FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating conditions
possibly causing a malfunction.
OT.Active Auth Proof The security objective OT.Active Auth Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip
authenticity” is ensured by the Active Authentication Protocol provided by FIA API.1/AA
proving the identity of the TOE. The Active Authentication Protocol defined by FIA API.1/AA
is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT MTD.1/
AAPK and FMT MTD.1/KEY READ AA. The Active Authentication Protocol [7] requires
additional TSF according to FCS COP.1/RSA MRTD AA.
6.3.2 Dependency Rationale
The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for mu-
tual support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied.
All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-dissolved
dependencies are appropriately explained.
59
Table 6.3 shows the dependencies between the SFR of the TOE.
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FAU SAS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FCS CKM.1 [FCS CKM.2 Cryptogr. key distribu-
tion or
FCS COP.1 Cryptogr. operation],
Fulfilled by
FCS COP.1/SYM, and
FCS COP.1/MAC,
FCS CKM.4 Cryptogr. key destruc-
tion
Fulfilled by FCS CKM.4
FCS CKM.4 [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data with-
out security attributes,
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptogr. key genera-
tion]
Fulfilled by FCS CKM.1
FCS COP.1/SHA [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data with-
out security attributes,
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1/[BAC,EAC] Cryptogr.
key generation],
justification 1 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS CKM.4 Cryptogr. key destruc-
tion
Fulfilled by FCS CKM.4
FCS COP.1/SYM [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data with-
out security attributes,
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptogr. key genera-
tion],
Fulfilled by FCS CKM.1,
FCS CKM.4 Cryptogr. key destruc-
tion
Fulfilled by FCS CKM.4
FCS COP.1/MAC [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data with-
out security attributes,
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptogr. key genera-
tion],
Fulfilled by
FCS CKM.1,
FCS CKM.4 Cryptogr. key destruc-
tion
Fulfilled by FCS CKM.4
60
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FCS COP.1/
SIG VER
[FDP ITC.1 Import of user data with-
out security attributes,
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptogr. key genera-
tion],
Fulfilled by
FCS CKM.1,
FCS CKM.4 Cryptogr. key destruc-
tion
Fulfilled by FCS CKM.4
FCS COP.1/
RSA MRTD AA
[FDP ITC.1 Import of user data with-
out security attributes,
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptogr. key genera-
tion],
justification 2 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS CKM.4 Cryptogr. key destruc-
tion
justification 2 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS RND.1 No dependencies n.a.
FCS UID.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA UAU.1 FIA UID.1 Timing of identification Fulfilled by FIA UID.1
FIA UAU.4 No dependencies n.a.
FIA UAU.5 No dependencies n.a.
FIA UAU.6 No dependencies n.a.
FIA API.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA API.1/AA No dependencies n.a.
FDP ACC.1 FDP ACF.1 Security attribute based
access control
Fulfilled by FDP ACF.1
FDP ACF.1 FDP ACC.1 Subset access control, Fulfilled by FDP ACC.1,
FMT MSA.3 Static attribute initializa-
tion
justification 3 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FDP UCT.1 [FTP ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel,
or
FTP TRP.1 Trusted path],
justification 4 for non-satisfied
dependencies
[FDP ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
Fulfilled by FDP ACC.1
61
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FDP UIT.1 [FTP ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel,
or
FTP TRP.1 Trusted path],
justification 4 for non-satisfied
dependencies
[FDP ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
Fulfilled by FDP ACC.1
FMT SMF.1 No dependencies n.a.
FMT SMR.1 FIA UID.1 Timing of identification Fulfilled by FIA UID.1
FMT LIM.1 FMT LIM.2 Fulfilled by FMT LIM.2
FMT LIM.2 FMT LIM.1 Fulfilled by FMT LIM.1
FMT MTD.1/
INI ENA
FMT SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT SMF.1
FMT SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by FMT SMR.1
FMT MTD.1/
INI DIS
FMT SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT SMF.1
FMT SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by FMT SMR.1
FMT MTD.1/
CVCA INI
FMT SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT SMF.1
FMT SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by FMT SMR.1
FMT MTD.1/
CVCA UPD
FMT SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT SMF.1
FMT SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by FMT SMR.1
FMT MTD.1/
DATE
FMT SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT SMF.1
FMT SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by FMT SMR.1
FMT MTD.1/
KEY WRITE
FMT SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT SMF.1
FMT SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by FMT SMR.1
FMT MTD.1/
CAPK
FMT SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT SMF.1
FMT SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by FMT SMR.1
FMT MTD.1/
AAPK
FMT SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT SMF.1
FMT SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by FMT SMR.1
62
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FMT MTD.1/
KEY READ
FMT SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT SMF.1
FMT SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by FMT SMR.1
FMT MTD.1/
KEY READ AA
FMT SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT SMF.1
FMT SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by FMT SMR.1
FMT MTD.3 FMT MTD.1 Fulfilled by
FMT MTD.1/CVCA INI and
FMT MTD.1/CVCA UPD
FPT EMSEC.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT EMSEC.1/
AA
No dependencies n.a.
FPT FLS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT PHP.3 No dependencies n.a.
FPT TST.1 No dependencies n.a.
Table 6.3: Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE
No. 1 The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS COP.1/SHA does not need any key mate-
rial. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS CKM.1) nor an import (FDP ITC.1/2) is
necessary.
No. 2 The SFR FCS COP.1/RSA MRTD AA uses the asymmetric Authentication Key perma-
nently stored during the Pre-Personalization process (cf. FMT MTD.1/INI ENA) by the
manufacturer. Thus there is neither the necessity to generate or import a key during the
addressed TOE lifecycle by the means of FCS CKM.1 or FDP ITC. Since the key is
permanently stored within the TOE there is no need for FCS CKM.4, too.
No. 3 The access control TSF according to FDP ACF.1 uses security attributes which are de-
fined during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No
management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT MSA.1 and FMT MSA.3) is nec-
essary here.
No. 4 The SFR FDP UCT.1 and FDP UIT.1 require the use secure messaging between the
MRTD and the BIS respectively GIS. There is no need for the SFR FTP ITC.1, e.g. to
require this communication channel to be logically distinct from other communication
channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not provide a direct human
interface a trusted path as required by FTP TRP.1 is not applicable here.
63
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engi-
neering based upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate appli-
cation of specialist security engineering techniques. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is
likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is applicable
in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of indepen-
dently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive
security specific engineering costs.
The selection of the component ALC DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of
the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD’s
material.
The selection of the component AVA VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the security by
vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an attacker
possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfill the security
objectives OT.Sens Data Conf and OT.Chip Auth Proof.
The component ALC DVS.2 has no dependencies.
The component AVA VAN.5 has the following dependencies
• ADV ARC.1 Security architecture description
• ADV FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
• ADV TDS.3 Basic modular design
• ADV IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
• AGD OPE.1 Operational user guidance
• AGD PRE.1 Preparative procedures
• ATE DPT.1 Testing: Basic design
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
6.3.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security require-
ments for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the security
assurance requirements (SARs) together forms a mutually supportive and internally consistent
whole.
The analysis of the TOE’s security requirements with regard to their mutual support and
internal consistency demonstrates:
64
The dependency analysis in section 6.3.2 Dependency Rationale for the security functional
requirements shows that the basis for mutual support and internal consistency between all de-
fined functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional com-
ponents are analyzed, and non-satisfied dependencies are appropriately explained.
The assurance class EAL4 is an established set of mutually supportive and internally con-
sistent assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the additional assurance in sec-
tion 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale components shows that the assurance
requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent as all (additional) dependencies
are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there are
functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been shown not
to arise in sections 6.3.2 Dependency Rationale and 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements
Rationale. Furthermore, as also discussed in section 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements
Rationale, the chosen assurance components are adequate for the functionality of the TOE. So
the assurance requirements and security functional requirements support each other and there
are no inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of security requirements.
65
7 TOE Summary Specification (ASE TSS.1)
This chapter describes the TOE Security Functions and the Assurance Measures covering the
requirements of the previous chapter.
7.1 TOE Security Functions
This chapter gives the overview description of the different TOE Security Functions composing
the TSF.
7.1.1 TOE Security Functions from Hardware (IC) and Crypto Library
F.IC CL: Security Functions of the Hardware (IC) and Crypto Library
This Security Function covers the security functions of the hardware (IC) as well as of the
crypto library. The Security Target of the hardware [3] defines the following Security Services
and Security Features:
SS.RNG Random Number Generator
SS.HW DES Triple-DES coprocessor
SS.HW AES AES coprocessor
SF.OPC Control of Operating Conditions
SF.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation
SF.LOG Logical Protection
SF.COMP Protection of Mode Control
SF.MEM ACC Memory Access Control
SF.SFR ACC Special Function Register Access Control
The Security Target of the crypto library [4] defines the following Security Functionality:
F.AES AES Cryptographic Function
F.DES DES Cryptographic Function
66
F.RSA encrypt RSA Implementation for Data En- and Decryption
F.RSA sign (CRT-)RSA Impl. for Signature Generation and Verification
F.RSA public RSA Implementation for Computation of a Public Key
F.ECC GF p ECDSA ECC Signature Generation and Verification Functions
F.ECC GF p DH KeyExch Diffie Hellman Key Exchange Functions
F.RSA KeyGen Functions to Generate RSA Key Pairs
F.ECC GF p KeyGen Functions for ECC over GF(p) Key Generation
F.SHA Functions for Secure Hash Algorithms SHA-1, -224 and -256
F.RNG Access Implementation of Software RNG
F.Object Reuse Internal Security Measures to Clear Memory after Usage
F.COPY Functionality to Copy Memory Content Protected Against Side Channel Attacks
F.LOG Logical Protection (Identical to Hardware TSF)
7.1.2 TOE Security Functions from Embedded Software (ES) – Operat-
ing system
F.Access Control
This TSF regulates all access by external entities to operations of the TOE which are only
executed after this TSF allowed access. This function consists of following elements:
1. Access to objects is controlled based on subjects, objects (any file) and security attributes
2. No access control policy allows reading of any key
3. Any access not explicitly allowed is denied
4. Access Control in phase 2 – Initialization/Pre-personalization – enforces Initialization
and Pre-personalization policy: Configuration and initialization of the TOE, configuring
of Access Control policy and doing key management only by the manufacturer (Initial-
ization/ Pre-personalization Agent) or on behalf of him (see F.Management)
5. Access Control in phase 3 – Personalization – enforces Personalization policy: Writing
of user data, keys (Basic Access Control, Active Authentication, Chip Authentication)
and Terminal Authentication data (CVCA data and current date) and reading of initial-
ization data only by the Personalization Agent identified with its authentication key (see
F.Management)
6. Access Control in phase 4 – Operation – enforces operational use policy as described in
TR-03110 [8]: Reading of optional biometrics (EF.DG3, EF.DG4) by authenticated and
authorized EIS; Active Authentication, Chip Authentication, Terminal Authentication and
reading of other user data by BIS, GIS and EIS authenticated at least by Secure Messaging
with BAC.
67
F.Identification Authentication
This function provides identification/authentication of the user roles
• Manufacturer (Initialization/Pre-personalization Agent)
• Personalization Agent
• Country Verifier Certification Authority
• Document Viewer
• Basic Inspection System
• Extended Inspection System (domestic/foreign)
by the methods:
• Symmetric BAC authentication method [1, 7] with following properties
– The authentication is as specified by ICAO
– It uses a challenge from the MRTD
– The method can be configured by the administrator to delay the processing of the
authentication command after a failed authentication
– The cryptographic method for confidentiality is Triple-DES/CBC provided by F.Crypto
– The cryptographic method for authenticity is DES/Retail MAC provided by F.Crypto
– On error (wrong MAC, wrong challenge) the user role is not identified/authenticated
– On success the session keys are created and stored for Secure Messaging
For the BAC method, only an Enhanced-Basic Attack Potential is taken into account (see
also the Note in section 6.2).
• Secure Messaging with following properties
– The Secure Messaging is as specified by ICAO
– The cryptographic method for confidentiality is Triple-DES/CBC provided by F.Crypto
– The cryptographic method for authenticity is DES/Retail MAC provided by F.Crypto
– In a Secure Messaging protected command the method for confidentiality and the
method for authenticity must be present
– The initialization vector is an encrypted Send Sequence Counter (SSC)
– In phases 3 - 4 a session key is used
– On any command that is not protected correctly with the session keys these are
overwritten according to FIPS 140-2 [26] (or better) and a new BAC authentication
is required
– Keys in transient memory are overwritten after usage
• Active Authentication with following properties
68
– According to TrPKI [7] using RSA from F.IC CL
• Chip Authentication with following properties
– According to TR-03110 [8] using ECDH from F.IC CL
– Session keys are created and stored for Secure Messaging replacing existing session
keys.
• Terminal Authentication with following properties
– According to TR03110 [8] checking certificates with ECDSA from F.IC CL
– It uses a challenge from the MRTD
– Usable only in a Secure Messaging session with Chip Authentication key
– It distinguishes between the roles
∗ Country Verifier Certification Authority
∗ Domestic and foreign Document Verifier
∗ Domestic and foreign Extended Inspection System
– Update of CVCA certificate is allowed for CVCA
– Update of current date is allowed for CVCA, domestic and foreign Document Veri-
fier and domestic Extended Inspection System
– Only with a public key from an IS certificate the challenge-response authentication
itself is performed
– The bitwise AND of the Certificate Holder Authorizations of a certificate chain is
used for Terminal Authorization
– Verifying validity of certificate chain
∗ Certificates must be in the sequence: known CVCA [> CVCA]> DV > IS
∗ Expiration dates must not be before the current date
F.Management
In phase 2 the Manufacturer (Initialization/Pre-personalization Agent) performs the initial-
ization and configures the file layout including security attributes. In any case the layout deter-
mines that the parameters given in F.Access Control for phases 3 and 4 are enforced. The agent
can also do key management and other administrative tasks.
In phase 3 the Personalization Agent performs following steps:
• Formatting of all data to be stored in the TOE according to ICAO requirements which
are outside the scope of the TOE. The data to be formatted includes the index file, data
groups, Passive Authentication data, BAC key derived from the Machine Readable Zone
data, Active Authentication Private Key, Chip Authentication Private Key and Terminal
Authentication CVCA Public Keys and parameters
• Writing of all the required data to the appropriate files as specified in TrLDS [6]
• Changing the TOE into the end-usage mode for phase 4 where reading of the initialization
data is prevented
69
F.Crypto
This function provides a high level interface to
• DES (supplied by F.IC CL)
• Triple-DES/CBC
• DES/Retail MAC
This function implements the hash algorithms according to FIPS 180-2 [27]
• SHA-1
• SHA-224
• SHA-256
F.Verification
TOE internal functions ensures correct operation.
70
7.2 Assurance Measures
The assurance measures fulfilling the requirements of EAL4 augmented with ALC DVS.2 and
AVA VAN.5 are given in table 7.2.
ADV ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV FSP.4 Complete functional specification 4
ADV IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF 4
ADV TDS.3 Basic modular design
AGD OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures, automation
ALC CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ATE COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE DPT.2 Testing: modular design
ATE FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE IND.2 Independent testing – sample
AVA VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Table 7.1: Assurance Measures
71
7.2.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
Table 7.2 shows the coverage of the SFRs by TSFs.
SFR TSFs
FAU SAS.1 F.IC CL
FCS CKM.1 F.IC CL
FCS CKM.4 F.Identification Authentication
FCS COP.1/SHA F.Crypto
FCS COP.1/SYM F.IC CL, F.Crypto
FCS COP.1/MAC F.IC CL, F.Crypto
FCS COP.1/SIG VER F.IC CL
FCS COP.1/RSA MRTD AA F.IC CL
FCS RND.1 F.IC CL
FIA UID.1 F.Access Control
FIA UAU.1 F.Access Control
FIA UAU.4 F.Identification Authentication
FIA UAU.5 F.Access Control, F.Identification Authentication
FIA UAU.6 F.Identification Authentication
FIA API.1 F.Identification Authentication
FIA API.1/AA F.Identification Authentication
FDP ACC.1 F.Access Control
FDP ACF.1 F.Access Control
FDP UCT.1 F.Identification Authentication
FDP UIT.1 F.Identification Authentication
FMT SMF.1 F.Management
FMT SMR.1 F.Identification Authentication
FMT LIM.1 F.IC CL
FMT LIM.2 F.IC CL
FMT MTD.1/INI ENA F.IC CL, F.Access Control
FMT MTD.1/INI DIS F.Access Control, F.Management
FMT MTD.1/CVCA INI F.Access Control
FMT MTD.1/CVCA UPD F.Identification Authentication
FMT MTD.1/DATE F.Identification Authentication
72
SFR TSFs
FMT MTD.1/KEY WRITE F.Access Control
FMT MTD.1/CAPK F.Access Control
FMT MTD.1/AAPK F.Access Control
FMT MTD.1/KEY READ F.Access Control
FMT MTD.1/KEY READ AA F.Access Control
FMT MTD.3 F.Identification Authentication
FPT EMSEC.1 F.IC CL
FPT EMSEC.1/AA F.IC CL
FPT FLS.1 F.IC CL
FPT TST.1 F.IC CL, F.Verification
FPT PHP.3 F.IC CL
Table 7.2: Coverage of SFRs for the TOE by TSFs.
The SFR FAU SAS.1 requires the storage of the chip identification data which is addressed
in F.IC CL, SF.PHY, SF.COMP.
The SFR FCS CKM.1 requires the ECDH algorithm. This is provided by the crypto library
function F.IC CL, F.ECC GF p DH KeyExch.
The SFR FCS CKM.4 requires the destroying of cryptographic keys. This is done in
F.Identification Authentication (“Overwrites keys in transient memory after usage”).
The SFR FCS COP.1/SHA requires SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256. F.Crypto provides
these hash algorithms.
The SFR FCS COP.1/SYM requires Triple-DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key size
112 bit to perform Secure Messaging - encryption and decryption. This is provided in F.IC CL,
SS.HW DES (Triple-DES) and F.Crypto (provides DES/Retail MAC).
The SFR FCS COP.1/MAC requires Triple-DES in Retail MAC mode and cryptographic
key size 112 bit to perform Secure Messaging - Message Authentication Code. This is provided
in F.IC CL, SS.HW DES (Triple-DES) and F.Crypto (provides DES/Retail MAC).
The SFR FCS COP.1/SIG VER requires ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes 224, 256
and 320 bits to perform digital Signature Verification. F.IC CL, F.ECC GF p DH KeyExch
provides functions to verify signatures based on ECC.
The SFR FCS COP.1/RSA MRTD AA requires RSA. F.IC CL, F.RSA encrypt provides
functions.
The SFR FCS RND.1 requires the generation of random numbers which is provided by
F.IC CL, SS.RNG, SF.PHY. The provided random number generator produces cryptographi-
cally strong random numbers which are used at the appropriate places as written in the addition
there.
The SFR FIA UID.1 requires timing of identification. It is handled by F.Access Control
which enforces identification of a role before access is granted (“...only executed after this TSF
allowed access”). Also all policies prevent reading sensitive or user dependent data without
user identification.
73
The SFR FIA UAU.1 requires timing of authentication. It is handled by F.Access Control
which enforces authentication of a role before access is granted (“...only executed after this TSF
allowed access”). Also all policies prevent reading sensitive or user dependent data without user
authentication.
The SFR FIA UAU.4 requires prevention of authentication data reuse. This is in particular
fulfilled by using changing initialization vectors in Secure Messaging. Secure Messaging is
provided by F.Identification Authentication.
The SFR FIA UAU.5 requires Terminal Authentication protocol, Secure Messaging in MAC-
ENC mode and symmetric authentication mechanism based on Triple-DES. In addition SFR
FIA UAU.5 also requires the authentication of any user’s claimed identity. F.Identification
Authentication and F.Access Control fulfill these requirements.
The SFR FIA UAU.6 requires re-authentication for each command after successful authen-
tication. This is done by F.Identification Authentication providing Secure Messaging.
The SFR FIA API.1 requires the proving of the identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentica-
tion is done by F.Identification Authentication.
The SFR FIA API.1/AA requires the proving of the identity of the TOE. The Active Au-
thentication is done by F.Identification Authentication.
The SFR FDP ACC.1 requires the enforcement of the access control policy on termi-
nals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1
to EF.DG16. This is done by F.Access Control (based on the objects: “a. data EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 ...”).
The SFR FDP ACF.1 requires the enforcement of the access control policy which is done
by F.Access Control ( “Access to objects is controlled based on subjects, objects (any files) and
security attributes”).
The SFR FDP UCT.1 requires the transmitting and receiving data protected from unautho-
rized disclosure after Chip Authentication. This is done by using an encrypted communication
channel, which is based on Secure Messaging provided by F.Identification Authentication.
The SFR FDP UIT.1 requires the transmitting and receiving data protected from modifi-
cation, deletion, insertion and replay after Chip Authentication. This is done by using an
protected communication channel. This channel is based on Secure Messaging provided by
F.Identification Authentication. A send sequence counter makes each command unique while
the authenticity method makes it possible to detect modifications.
The SFR FMT SMF.1 requires security management functions for initialization, personal-
ization and configuration. This is done by F.Management: The Manufacturer (Initialization/Pre-
personalization Agent) performs the Initialization and configures the file layout in phase 2, the
Personalization agent performs the personalization in phase 3.
The SFR FMT SMR.1 requires the maintenance of roles. The roles are managed by
F.Identification Authentication.
The SFR FMT LIM.1 requires limited capabilities of test functions which is provided by
F.IC CL, SF.PHY, SF.COMP which controls what commands can be executed thereby pre-
venting external usable test functions to do harm. The IC Dedicated Test Software only is
available in the Test Mode.
The SFR FMT LIM.2 requirse limited availabilities of test functions which is provided
by F.IC CL, SF.PHY, SF.COMP which controls what commands can be executed thereby
preventing external usable test functions to do harm. The IC Dedicated Test Software only is
available in the Test Mode.
74
The SFR FMT MTD.1/INI ENA requires writing of Initialization data and Pre-personaliza-
tion data to the manufacturer. Writing of Pre-personalization and Installation data only by the
manufacturer is enforced by F.Access Control, which limits these operations to phase 2. In
addition F.IC CL, SF.MEM ACC stores this data in the User Read Only Area which cannot
be changed afterwards.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/INI DIS requires only the Personalization agent to be able to dis-
able reading of the Initialization data. This is provided by F.Management (Personalization
agent: “Changing the TOE into the end-usage mode for phase 4 where reading of the Initializa-
tion data is prevented”) and F.Access Control.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/CVCA INI requires only pre- and personalization agent to be able
to write initial Country Verifying Certification Authority public public key, initial Country Ver-
ifier Certification Authority certificate and initial date. This is provided by F.Access Control.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/CVCA UPD requires only country verifier certification authority
to be able to update Country Verifier Certification Authority public public key and Country
Verifier Certification Authority certificate. This is provided by F.Identification Authentica-
tion (properties of terminal authentication).
The SFR FMT MTD.1/DATE requires only country verifier certification authority, docu-
ment verifier and domestic extended Inspection System to be able to modify the current date.
This is provided by F.Identification Authentication (properties of terminal authentication).
The SFR FMT MTD.1/KEY WRITE requires the Personalization agent to be able to write
the Document Basic Access Keys. This is provided by F.Access Control allowing the person-
alization agent in phase 3 to write all necessary data.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/CAPK requires the Personalization agent to be able to load the Chip
Authentication Private Key. This is provided by F.Access Control allowing the personalization
agent in phase 3 to write all necessary data.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/AAPK requires the Personalization agent to be able to load the
Active Authentication Private Key. This is provided by F.Access Control allowing the person-
alization agent in phase 3 to write all necessary data.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/KEY READ requires the Document Chip Authentication Pri-
vate Key and the Personalization Agent Keys to never be readable. This is enforced by
F.Access Control, which does not allow reading of any key to any role.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/KEY READ AA requires the Active Authentication Private Key
to never be readable. This is enforced by F.Access Control, which does not allow reading of
any key to any role.
The SFR FMT MTD.3 requires only secure values of the certificate chain are accepted
for data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access Control. This is done by
F.Identification Authentication (Terminal Authentication properties).
The SFR FPT EMSEC.1 requires limiting of emanations. This is provided by F.IC CL,
SF.OPC.
The SFR FPT EMSEC.1/AA requires limiting of emanations. This is provided by F.IC CL,
SF.OPC.
The SFR FPT FLS.1 requires failure detection and preservation of a secure state. The
Control of Operating Conditions of F.IC CL, SF.OPC, SF.PHY is directly designed for this
SFR. It audits continually and reacts to environmental and other problems by bringing it into a
secure state.
75
The SFR FPT TST.1 requires testing for (a) correct operation, (b) integrity of data and (c)
integrity of executable code. F.Verification does this testing. F.IC CL, SF.PHY controls all
EEPROM and ROM content for integrity.
The SFR FPT PHP.3 requires resistance to physical manipulation and probing. This is
provided by F.IC CL, SF.PHY which is provided by the hardware to resist attacks.
7.3 Statement of Compatibility
This is a statement of compatibility between this Composite Security Target and the Security
Target of P5CD081V1A [3].
7.3.1 Relevance of Hardware TSFs
Table 7.3 shows the relevance of the hardware security functions for the composite Security
Target.
76
Hardware TSFs Relevant Not relevant
SS.RNG: Random Number Generator x
SS.HW DES: Triple-DES coprocessor x
SS.HW AES: AES coprocessor x
SF.OPC: Control of Operating Conditions x
SF.PHY: Protection against Physical Manipulation x
SF.LOG: Logical Protection x
SF.COMP: Protection of Mode Control x
SF.MEM ACC: Memory Access Control x
SF.SFR ACC: Special Function Register Access Control x
Crypto Library TSFs
F.AES: AES Cryptographic Function x
F.DES: DES Cryptographic Function x
F.RSA encrypt: RSA Implementation for Data En- and Decryption x
F.RSA sign: (CRT-)RSA Impl. for Signature Generation and Verification x
F.RSA public: RSA Implementation for Computation of a Public Key x
F.ECC GF p ECDSA: ECC Signature Generation and Verification Func-
tions
x
F.ECC GF p DH KeyExch: Diffie Hellman Key Exchange Functions x
F.RSA KeyGen: Functions to Generate RSA Key Pairs x
F.ECC GF p KeyGen: Functions for ECC over GF(p) Key Generation x
F.SHA: Functions for Secure Hash Algorithms SHA-1, -224 and -256 x
F.RNG Access: Implementation of Software RNG x
F.Object Reuse: Internal Security Measures to Clear Memory after Usage x
F.COPY: Functionality to Copy Memory Content Protected Against Side
Channel Attacks
x
F.LOG: Logical Protection (Identical to Hardware TSF) x
Table 7.3: Relevance of Hardware and Cryptolib TSFs for Composite ST
7.3.2 Compatibility: TOE Security Environment
Assumptions
The following list shows that neither assumptions of the TOE nor of the hardware have any
conflicts between each other. They are either not relevant for this Security Target or are covered
by appropriate Security Objectives.
• Assumptions of the TOE
77
– A.MRTD Manufact (MRTD manufacturing): No conflict
– A.MRTD Delivery (MRTD delivery): No conflict
– A.Pers Agent (Personalization of the MRTD’s chip): No conflict
– A.Insp Sys (Systems for global interoperability): No conflict
– A.Signature PKI (PKI for Passive Authentication): No conflict
– A.Auth PKI (PKI for Inspection Systems): No conflict
• Assumptions of the hardware
– A.Process-Sec-IC (Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization): No
conflict
– A.Plat-Appl (Usage of Hardware Platform): See OE.Plat-Appl; the correct usage of
the hardware platform becomes a Security Objective of the TOE and is proven by
the evaluation
– A.Resp-Appl (Treatment of User Data): Covered by Security Objective OT.Prot
Inf Leak
– A.Check-Init (Check of initialization data by the Security IC Embedded Software):
No conflict
– A.Key-Function (Usage of Key-dependent Functions): No conflict
• Assumptions of the crypto lib
– A.RSA-Key-Gen (Operational Environment for RSA Key Generation function): No
conflict
Threats
The Threats of the TOE and the hardware can be mapped (see Table 7.4) or are not relevant.
They show no conflicts between each other.
• Threats of the TOE
– T.Read Sensitive Data (Read the sensitive biometric reference data): No conflict
– T.Forgery (Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip): No conflict
– T.Counterfeit (MRTD’s chip): No conflict
– T.Abuse-Func (Abuse of Functionality): Matches T.Abuse-Func of the hardware ST
– T.Information Leakage (Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip): Matches T.Leak-
Inherent and T.Leak-Forced of the hardware ST
– T.Phys-Tamper (Physical Tampering): Matches T.Phys-Probing and T.Phys-Manipulation
of the hardware ST
– T.Malfunction (Malfunction due to Environmental Stress): Matches T.Malfunction
of the hardware ST
• Threats of the hardware
78
– T.Leak-Inherent (Inherent Information Leakage): Matches T.Information Leakage
of the TOE ST
– T.Phys-Probing (Physical Probing): Matches T.Phys-Tamper of the TOE ST
– T.Malfunction (Malfunction due to Environmental Stress): Matches T.Malfunction
of the TOE ST
– T.Phys-Manipulation (Physical Manipulation): Matches T.Phys-Tamper of the TOE
ST
– T.Leak-Forced (Forced Information Leakage): Matches T.Information Leakage of
the TOE ST
– T.Abuse-Func (Abuse of Functionality): Matches T.Abuse-Func of the TOE ST
– T.RND (Deficiency of Random Numbers): Basic threat concerning especially the
BAC functionality of the TOE; no conflict
T.Abuse-Func
T.Information
Leakage
T.Phys-Tamper
T.Malfunction
T.Leak-Inherent x
T.Phys-Probing x
T.Malfunction x
T.Phys-Manipulation x
T.Leak-Forced x
T.Abuse-Func x
Table 7.4: Mapping of hardware to TOE Threats (only threats that can be mapped directly are
shown)
Organizational Security Policies
The Organizational Security Policies of the TOE and the hardware have no conflicts between
each other. They are shown in the following list.
• Organizational Security Policies of the TOE
– P.BAC-PP (Fulfillment of the Basic Access Control Protection Profile): Not appli-
cable
– P.Sensitive Data (Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data): Not applicable
– P.Manufact (Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip): Covers P.Process-TOE of the
hardware ST
79
– P.Personalization (Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization
only): Not applicable
• Organizational Security Policies of the hardware
– P.Process-TOE (Protection during TOE Development and Production): Covered by
P.Manufact of the TOE ST
– P.Add-Components (Additional Specific Security Components): Covered by the
BAC-Security Policies of the TOE
– P.Add-Func (Additional Specific Security Functionality): Covered by
P.Sensitive Data of the TOE ST
Security Objectives
Some of the Security Objectives of the TOE and the hardware can be mapped directly (see
Table 7.5). None of them show any conflicts between each other.
• Security Objectives for the TOE
– OT.AC Pers (Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD): No conflicts
– OT.Data Int (Integrity of personal data): No conflicts
– OT.Sens Data Conf (Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data): Matches
O.Add-Components of the hardware ST
– OT.Identification (Identification and Authentication of the TOE - BAC): Matches
O.Identification of the hardware ST
– OT.Chip Auth Proof (Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity): No conflicts
– OT.Prot Abuse-Func (Protection against Abuse of Functionality): Matches O.Abuse-
Func of the hardware ST
– OT.Prot Inf Leak (Protection against Information Leakage): Matches O.Leak-Inherent
and O.Leak-Forced of the hardware ST
– OT.Prot Phys-Tamper (Protection against Physical Tampering – BAC): Matches O.Phys-
Probing and O.Phys-Manipulation of the hardware ST
– OT.Prot Malfunction (Protection against Malfunctions): Matches O.Malfunction of
the hardware ST
– OT.Active Auth Proof (Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity): Matches O.Add-Components
of the hardware ST
• Security Objectives for the hardware
– O.Leak-Inherent (Protection against Inherent Information Leakage): Covered by
OT.Prot Inf Leak of the TOE ST
– O.Phys-Probing (Protection against Physical Probing): Covered by OT.Prot Phys-
Tamper of the TOE ST
– O.Malfunction (Protection against Malfunctions): Covered by OT.Prot Malfunction
of the TOE ST
80
– O.Phys-Manipulation (Protection against Physical Manipulation): Covered by OT.Prot
Phys-Tamper of the TOE ST
– O.Leak-Forced (Protection against Forced Information Leakage): Covered by OT.Prot
Inf Leak of the TOE ST
– O.Abuse-Func (Protection against Abuse of Functionality): Covered by OT.Prot
Abuse-Func of the TOE ST
– O.Identification (TOE Identification): Covered by OT.Identification of the TOE ST
– O.RND (Random Numbers): Basic objective for the security of the TOE; no con-
flicts with any Security Objective of the TOE
– O.HW DES3 (Triple DES Functionality): No conflicts
– O.HW AES (AES Functionality): Not relevant
– O.MF FW (MIFARE Firewall) Not relevant
– O.MEM ACCESS (Area based Memory Access Control): Covered by OT.Prot Abuse-
Func of the TOE ST
– O.SFR ACCESS (Special Function Register Access Control): Covered by OT.Prot
Abuse-Func of the TOE ST
– OE.Plat-Appl (Usage of Hardware Platform): The correct usage of the hardware
platform becomes a Security Objective of the TOE and is proven by the evaluation
– OE.Resp-Appl (Treatment of User Data): No conflicts
– OE.Process-Sec-IC (Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization):
No conflicts
• Security Objectives for the cryptolib
– OE.Check-Init (Check of initialization data by the Smart Card Embedded Software):
No conflicts
– OE.RSA-Key-Gen (Operational Environment for RSA Key Generation function):
No conflicts
81
OT.Sens
Data
Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot
Abuse-Func
OT.Prot
Inf
Leak
OT.Prot
Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot
Malfunction
OT.Active
Auth
Proof
O.Leak-Inherent x
O.Phys-Probing x
O.Malfunction x
O.Phys-Manipulation x
O.Leak-Forced x
O.Abuse-Func x
O.Identification x
O.MEM ACCESS x x
O.SFR ACCESS x x
Table 7.5: Mapping of hardware to TOE Security Objectives including those of the environment
(only those that can be mapped directly are shown)
Security Requirements
The relevant Security Requirements of the TOE and the hardware can be mapped directly
(see Table 7.6). None of them show any conflicts between each other.
• Relevant Security Requirements of the TOE
– FAU SAS.1 (Audit storage) Matches FAU SAS.1 of the hardware ST
– FCS CKM.1 (Cryptographic key generation - Generation of Diffie-Hellman Keys
by the TOE): Matches FCS COP.1/Elliptic Curve cryptography operation of the
hardware ST
– FCS CKM.4 (Cryptographic key destruction): No conflicts
– FCS COP.1/SHA (Cryptographic operation - Hash for Key Derivation by MRTD):
Matches FCS COP.1/SHA-[1, 224, 256 ] operation of the hardware ST
– FCS COP.1/SYM (Cryptographic operation - Symmetric Encryption / Decryption):
Matches FCS COP.1/Elliptic Curve cryptography operation of the hardware ST
– FCS COP.1/MAC (Cryptographic operation - Retail MAC): Matches FCS COP.1/DES/
3DES operation of the hardware ST
– FCS COP.1/SIG VER (Cryptographic operation - Signature verification by MRTD):
Matches FCS COP.1/Elliptic Curve cryptography operation of the hardware ST
– FCS COP.1/RSA MRTD AA (Cryptographic operation - Signature creation by MRTD):
Matches FCS COP.1/RSA operation of the hardware ST
82
– FCS RND.1 (Quality metric for random numbers): Matches FCS RNG.1 of the
hardware ST
– Class FIA (Identification and Authentication): No conflicts
– FDP ACC.1 (User Data Protection - Subset access control): Matches FDP ACC.2
of the hardware ST
– FDP ACF.1 (User Data Protection - Security attribute based access control): Matches
FDP ACF.1 of the hardware ST
– Other Class FDP (User Data Protection): No conflicts
– FMT SMF.1 (Specification of Management Functions): Matches FMT SMF.1 of
the hardware ST
– FMT SMR.1 (Security roles): No conflicts
– FMT LIM.1 (Limited capabilities): Matches FMT LIM.1 of the hardware ST
– FMT LIM.2 (Limited availability): Matches FMT LIM.2 of the hardware ST
– Other Class FMT (Management of TSF data): No conflicts
– FPT EMSEC.1 (TOE Emanation): Matches FDP ITT.1, FPT ITT.1 and FDP IFC.1
of the hardware ST
– FPT EMSEC.1/AA (TOE Emanation): Matches FDP ITT.1, FPT ITT.1 and FDP IFC.1
of the hardware ST
– FPT FLS.1 (Failure with preservation of secure state): Matches FPT FLS.1, FRU FLT.2
and FPT PHP.3 of the hardware ST
– FPT TST.1 (TSF testing): Matches FRU FLT.2 of the hardware ST
– FPT PHP.3 (Resistance to physical attack): Matches FRU FLT.2 and FPT PHP.3 of
the hardware ST
• Security Requirements of the hardware
– FAU SAS.1 (Audit storage) Matches FAU SAS.1 of the TOE ST
– FRU FLT.2 (Limited fault tolerance): Covered by FPT FLS.1, FPT TST.1 and FPT PHP.3
of the TOE ST
– FPT FLS.1 (Failure with preservation of secure state): Covered by FPT FLS.1 and
FPT PHP.3 of the TOE ST
– FMT LIM.1 (Limited capabilities): Covered by FMT LIM.1 of the TOE ST
– FMT LIM.2 (Limited availability): Covered by FMT LIM.2 of the TOE ST
– FPT PHP.3 (Resistance to physical attack): Covered by FPT PHP.3 of the TOE ST
– FDP ITT.1 (Basic internal transfer protection): Covered by FPT EMSEC.1 and
FPT EMSEC.1/AA of the TOE ST
– FPT ITT.1 (Basic internal TSF data transfer protection): Covered by FPT EMSEC.1
and FPT EMSEC.1/AA of the TOE ST
– FDP IFC.1 (Subset information flow control): Covered by FPT EMSEC.1 of the
TOE ST
– FCS RNG.1 (Random number generation): Covered by FCS RND.1 of the TOE ST
83
– FDP ACC.1 (Subset access control) Covered by FDP ACC.1 of the TOE ST
– FDP ACF.1 (Security attribute based access control) Covered by FDP ACF.1 of the
TOE ST
– FMT MSA.3 (Static attribute initialization): Used implicitely, no conflicts to the
TOE SFRs
– FMT MSA.1 (Management of security attributes): Used implicitely, no conflicts to
the TOE SFRs
– FCS COP.1 (Cryptographic operation): Covered by FCS CKM.1, FCS COP.1/SHA,
FCS COP.1/SYM, FCS COP.1/MAC and FCS COP.1/SIG VER and FCS COP.1/
RSA MRTD AA of the TOE ST
– FMT SMF.1 (Specification of Management Functions): Covered by FMT SMF.1 of
the TOE ST
• Security requirements of the cryptolib
– FCS COP.1[SW-AES] (Cryptographic operation (AES)): Not relevant
– FCS COP.1[SW-DES] (Cryptographic operation (TDES)): Not relevant
– FCS COP.1[RSA encrypt] (Cryptographic operation (RSA encryption and decryp-
tion)): Covered by FCS COP.1/RSA MRTD of the TOE ST
– FCS COP.1[RSA public] (Cryptographic operation (RSA public key computation)):
Not relevant
– FCS COP.1[RSA sign] (Cryptographic operation (RSA signature generation and
verification)): Not relevant
– FCS COP.1[ECC GF p] (Cryptographic operation (ECC over GF(p) signature gen-
eration and verification)): Covered by FCS COP.1/SIG VER of the TOE ST
– FCS COP.1[ECC ADD] (Cryptographic operation (ECC over GF(p) point addi-
tion))
– FCS COP.1[ECC DHKE] (Cryptographic operation (ECC Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change)):Covered by FCS CKM.1 of the TOE ST
– FCS COP.1[SHA] (Cryptographic operation (SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256)):
Covered by FCS COP.1/SHA of the TOE ST
– FCS CKM.1[RSA] (Cryptographic key generation (RSA key generation)): Not rel-
evant
– FCS CKM.1[ECC GF p] (Cryptographic key generation (ECC over GF(p) key gen-
eration)): Covered by FCS CKM.1 of the TOE ST
– FCS CKM.4 (Cryptographic Key Destruction): No conflict
– FDP RIP.1 (Subset residual information protection): No conflict
– FDP ITT.1[COPY] (Basic internal (user data) transfer protection): No conflict
– FPT ITT.1[COPY] (Basic internal TSF data transfer protection): No conflict
84
FAU
SAS.1
FCS
CKM.1
FCS
COP.1/SHA
FCS
COP.1/SYM
FCS
COP.1/MAC
FCS
COP.1/SIG
VER
FCS
COP.1/RSA
MRTD
AA
FCS
RND.1
FDP
ACC.1
FDP
ACF.1
FMT
LIM.1
FMT
LIM.2
FMT
SMF.1
FPT
EMSEC.1
FPT
EMSEC.1/AA
FPT
FLS.1
FPT
TST.1
FPT
PHP.3
FAU SAS.1 x
FRU FLT.2 x x x
FPT FLS.1 x x
FMT LIM.1 x
FMT LIM.2 x
FMT SMF.1 x
FPT PHP.3 x
FDP ITT.1 x x
FPT ITT.1 x x
FDP IFC.1 x x
FCS RNG.1 x
FDP ACC.2 x
FDP ACF.1 x
FCS COP.1 x x x x x x
Table 7.6: Mapping of hardware to TOE Security SFRs (only SFRs that can be mapped directly
are shown)
Assurance Requirements
The level of assurance of the
• TOE is EAL4 augmented with ALC DVS.2 and AVA VAN.5
• Hardware is EAL5 augmented with ALC DVS.2 and AVA VAN.5
This shows that the Assurance Requirements of the TOE matches the Assurance Require-
ments of the hardware.
7.3.3 Conclusion
Overall no contradictions between the Security Targets of the TOE and the hardware can be
found.
85
8 Glossary and Acronyms
Active Authentication Security mechanism defined in [7] option by which means the MRTD’s
chip proves and the Inspection System verifies the identity and authenticity of the MRTD’s
chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known State of organization.
Application note / Note Optional informative part of the ST containing sensitive supporting
information that is considered relevant or useful for the construction, evaluation, or use
of the TOE (cf. CC part 1 [30], section B.2.7).
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTD’s chip to store the
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip were
created by the issuing State or Organization
Basic Access Control Security mechanism defined in [7] by which means the MRTD’s chip
proves and the Inspection System protects their communication by means of Secure Mes-
saging with Basic Access Keys (see there).
Basic Inspection System (BIS) An Inspection System which implements the terminals part of
the Basic Access Control Mechanism and authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip
using the Document Basic Access Keys drawn form printed MRZ data for reading the
logical MRTD.
Biographical data (biodata) The personalized details of the bearer of the document appear-
ing as text in the visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data page of a
passport book or on a travel card or visa. [1]
Biometric reference data Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the
MRTD’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data.
Certificate chain Hierarchical sequence of Inspection System Certificate (lowest level), Docu-
ment Verifier Certificate and Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificates (high-
est level), where the certificate of a lower lever is signed with the private key correspond-
ing to the public key in the certificate of the next higher level. The Country Verifying
Certification Authority Certificate is signed with the private key corresponding to the
public key it contains (self-signed certificate).
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made by
whatever means. [1]
Country Signing CA Certificate (CCSCA) Certificate of the Country Signing Certification
Authority Public Key (KPuCSCA) issued by Country Signing Certification Authority
stored in the Inspection System.
86
Country Verifying Certification Authority The country specific root of the PKI of Inspec-
tion Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. It enforces
the Privacy policy of the issuing Country or Organization in respect to the protection of
sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRTD. It is Current date The maximum
of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic Inspection System certificates
known to the TOE. It is used the validate card verifiable certificates.
CVCA link Certificate Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority
where the certificate effective date for the new key is before the certificate expiration date
of the certificate for the old key.
Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm The [7], Annex E.1 describes the Docu-
ment Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Document
Basic Access Keys from the second line of the printed MRZ data.
Document Basic Access Keys Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for Secure Messaging
with encryption (key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data transmit-
ted between the MRTD’s chip and the Inspection System [7]. It is drawn from the printed
MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity able to read the printed MRZ of the
passport book.
Document Security Object (SOD) A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the
Document Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in
the MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS). [7]
Document Verifier Certification authority creating the Inspection System Certificates and man-
aging the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the
MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing States or Organizations.
Eavesdropper A threat agent with low attack potential reading the communication between
the MRTD’s chip and the Inspection System to gain the data on the MRTD’s chip.
Enrollment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent
preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing that person’s iden-
tity. [31]
Extended Access Control Security mechanism identified in [7] by which means the MRTD’s
chip (i) verifies the authentication of the Inspection Systems authorized to read the op-
tional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the optional biometric reference
data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric refer-
ence data during their transmission to the Inspection System by Secure Messaging. The
Personalization Agent may use the same mechanism to authenticate themselves with Per-
sonalization Agent Authentication Private Key and to get write and read access to the
logical MRTD and TSF data.
Extended Inspection System A General Inspection System which (i) implements the Chip
Authentication Mechanism, (ii) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and
(iii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of
the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
87
Extended Inspection System (EIS) A role of a terminal as part of an Inspection System which
is in addition to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or Organization
to read the optional biometric reference data and supports the terminals part of the Ex-
tended Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the bio-
graphical data or the portrait. [1]
General Inspection System A Basic Inspection System which implements sensitively the Chip
Authentication Mechanism.
Global Interoperability The capability of Inspection Systems (either manual or automated)
in different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from
systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in their respective
States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the standardized specifications for
placement of both eye readable and machine readable data in all MRTDs. [31]
IC Dedicated Support Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which
provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software
might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is
used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality
thereafter.
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name and
identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to represent himself or
herself as another person for the purpose of using that person’s document. [1]
Improperly documented person A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an ex-
pired travel document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel doc-
ument or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no travel document or
visa, if required. [31]
Initialization Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-
volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are for
instance used for traceability and for IC identification as MRTD’s material (IC identifica-
tion data).
Inspection The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveler (the MRTD
holder) and verifying its authenticity. [31]
Inspection system (IS) A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving
State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and
(ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
Integrated circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or mem-
ory functions. The MRTD’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip have not
been altered from that created by the issuing State or Organization.
88
Issuing Organization Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the
United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [6]
Issuing State The Country issuing the MRTD. [6]
Logical Data Structure (LDS) The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the
optional capacity expansion technology [6]. The capacity expansion technology used is
the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [6]
as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless readable
data including (but not limited to)
1. personal data of the MRTD holder
2. the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1)
3. the digitized portraits (EF.DG2)
4. the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both
5. the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16)
Logical travel document Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by
ICAO in the contactless integrated circuit including (but not limited to)
1. data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory)
2. digitized photographic image (mandatory)
3. fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional)
Machine readable travel document (MRTD) Official document issued by a State or Orga-
nization which is used by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official
document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a sep-
arate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements
capable of being machine read. [6]
Machine readable visa (MRV) A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter
collectively referred to as visas) conforming to the specifications contained herein, formu-
lated to improve facilitation and enhance security for the visa holder. Contains mandatory
visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary capable of being ma-
chine read. The MRV is normally a label which is attached to a visa page in a passport. [6]
Machine readable zone (MRZ) Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or
MRP Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing mandatory
and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods. [6]
Machine-verifiable biometrics feature A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g.
an iris pattern, fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form
that can be read and verified by machine. [1]
MRTD application Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on
the IC as the MRTD’s chip. It includes
• the file structure implementing the LDS [6]
89
• the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself (i.e. content
of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG16)
• the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except the authen-
tication data itself.
MRTD Basic Access Control Mutual authentication protocol followed by Secure Messaging
between the Inspection System and the MRTD’s chip based on MRZ information as key
seed and access condition to data stored on MRTD’s chip according to LDS.
MRTD holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 [14] and
programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO, [32] p. 14.
MRTD’s chip Embedded Software Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being de-
veloped by the IC Designer. The MRTD’s chip Embedded Software is designed in Phase
1 and embedded into the MRTD’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
Optional biometric reference data Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder
in the MRTD’s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note, that the European commission decided to use only finger-
print and not to use iris images as optional biometric reference data.
Passive authentication (i) Verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Ob-
ject and (ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash values
contained in the Document Security Object.
Personalization The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are applied
to the document. [1]
Personalization Agent The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or organization to
personalize the MRTD for the holder by (i) establishing the identity the holder for the
biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD
holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) or (ii) the encoded iris image(s) and
(iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder.
Personalization Agent Authentication Information TSF data used for authentication proof
and verification of the Personalization Agent.
Personalization Agent Authentication Key Symmetric cryptographic key used (i) by the Per-
sonalization Agent to prove their identity and get access to the logical MRTD accord-
ing to the SFR FIA UAU.4/BT, FIA UAU.6/BT and FIA API.1/SYM PT and (ii) by the
MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent
according to the SFR FIA UAU.4/MRTD, FIA UAU.5/MRTD and FIA UAU.6/MRTD.
Physical travel document Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure
printing to present data including (but not limited to)
1. biographical data,
2. data of the machine-readable zone,
3. photographic image and
90
4. other data
Pre-personalization Data Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE
by the MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-personalized MRTD’s and/or
to secure shipment within or between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not lim-
ited to) the Active Authentication Key Pair and the Personalization Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalized MRTD’s chip MRTD’s chip equipped with a unique identifier and a unique
asymmetric Active Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
Receiving State The Country to which the MRTD holder is applying for entry. [6]
Reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the verifi-
cation data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an authentication attempt.
Secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the docu-
ment by whatever means. [1]
Secure messaging in encrypted mode Secure messaging using encryption and message au-
thentication code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 [33].
Skimming Imitation of the Inspection System to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the
contactless communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of the printed MRZ
data.
Terminal Authorization Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations defined by the
Inspection System Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifier Cer-
tification Authority which shall be all valid for the Current Date.
Travel document A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or organi-
zation which may be used by the rightful holder for international travel. [31]
Traveler Person presenting the MRTD to the Inspection System and claiming the identity of
the MRTD holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the TOE (CC part
1 [30]).
Unpersonalized MRTD MRTD material prepared to produce a personalized MRTD contain-
ing an initialized and pre-personalized MRTD’s chip.
User data Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF (CC
part 1 [30]).
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric
reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is being claimed, to determine
whether it matches the enrollee’s template. [31]
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity
to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match the reference data
known for the claimed identity.
91
Acronyms
BIS Basic Inspection System
CC Common Criteria
EIS Extended Inspection System
n.a. Not applicable
OSP Organizational security policy
PT Personalization Terminal
SAR Security assurance requirements
SFR Security functional requirement
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE security functions
92
Bibliography
[1] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 1 - Machine Readable Pass-
ports, ICAO, 2006.
[2] ISO/IEC 7816:2004-2007, Information technology – Identification cards – Integrated cir-
cuit(s) cards with contacts – Multipart Standard, ISO/IEC, 2004-2007.
[3] NXP. Security Target Lite ’NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016/021/041V1A
and P5Cx081V1A’. BSI-DSZ-CC-0555, Rev. 1.3. NXP, 2009-09-21.
[4] NXP. Security Target Lite ’Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD081V1A / P5CC081V1A /
P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A / P5CD021V1A / P5CD016V1A’. BSI-DSZ-CC-0633,
Rev. 1.2. NXP, 2010-11-09.
[5] BSI-PP-0035, Version 1.0, Security IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI, 2007-06-15.
[6] ICAO. Technical Report: Development of a Logical Data Structure - LDS - for optional
Capacity Expansion Technologies. International Civil Aviation Organization, 2004-05.
[7] ICAO. Technical Report: PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents offering ICC
read-only access. V1.1. International Civil Aviation Organization, 2004-10.
[8] TR-03110, Technical Guideline Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable
Travel Documents Extended Access Control (EAC), Version 1.11, BSI, 2008.
[9] MaskTech GmbH. MTCOS Standard & Pro V2.1: Part 1 - Filesystem and Security Ar-
chitecture, Version 1.03, 2010-10-27.
[10] MaskTech GmbH. MTCOS Standard & Pro V2.1: Part 2 - Basic Access Control and
Secure Messaging, Version 1.01, 2010-10-18.
[11] MaskTech GmbH. MTCOS Pro V2.1 : Part 3 - Digital Signature, Version 1.00, 2008-04-
02.
[12] MaskTech GmbH. MTCOS Standard & Pro V2.1: Part 5 - Advanced Security Mecha-
nisms Extended Access Control, Version 1.01, 2008-06-20.
[13] MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC/P5CD081 User Guidance, Version 1.2, G. Schürer, 2011-09-28.
[14] ISO/IEC 14443, Identification cards – Contactless integrated circuit(s) cards – Proximity
cards – Multipart Standard, ISO/IEC, 2000/2001.
[15] BSI-CC-PP-0056, Version 1.10, Common Criteria Protection Profile / Machine Readable
Travel Document with ’ICAO Application, Extended Access Control’, BSI, 2009-03-25.
93
[16] BSI-CC-PP-0055, Version 1.10, Common Criteria Protection Profile / Machine Readable
Travel Document with ’ICAO Application’, Basic Access Control, BSI, 2009-03-25.
[17] SmarTrac Technology Ltd. Site Security Target for SMT1. BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0002-2009,
Rev. 1.51 lite. SmarTrac Technology Ltd., 2009-09-30.
[18] HID Global GmbH. Site Security Target lite of HID Global Ireland Teoranta in Galway,
Ireland. BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0004, Rev. 002.02. HID Global GmbH, 2010-07-13.
[19] CCMB-2009-07-001, Version 3.1, Revision 3, Common Criteria for Information Technol-
ogy Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Common Criteria Main-
tenance Board, 2009-07.
[20] CCMB-2009-07-002, Version 3.1, Revision 3, Common Criteria for Information Tech-
nology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Requirements, Common Crite-
ria Maintenance Board, 2009-07.
[21] CCMB-2009-07-003, Version 3.1, Revision 3, Common Criteria for Information Tech-
nology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements, Common Crite-
ria Maintenance Board, 2009-07.
[22] CCMB-2009-07-004, Version 3.1, Revision 3, Common Criteria for Information Technol-
ogy Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Common Criteria Maintenance Board,
2009-07.
[23] E. Rescorla. Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method, RFC (Request for Comments) series
(online). Internet Engineering Task Force, 1999.
[24] ISO/IEC 15946:2002, Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Multipart Standard, ISO/IEC, 2002.
[25] TR-03111, Elliptic Curve Cryptography Based on ISO 1594, Version 1.00, BSI, 2007.
[26] FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, NIST, 2001-05.
[27] FIPS PUB 180-2, Secure Hash Standard, NIST, 2002-08.
[28] ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002, Information technology – Security techniques – Digital signa-
ture schemes giving message recovery – Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms,
ISO/IEC, 2008-03.
[29] AIS 31, Version 1.0, Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS), BSI,
2001-09-25.
[30] CCMB-2005-08-001, Version 2.3, Common Criteria for Information Technology Secu-
rity Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Common Criteria Maintenance
Board, 2005-08.
[31] ICAO. Biometrics Deployment of Machine Readable Travel Documents - Develop-
ment and Specification of Globally Interoperable Biometric Standards for Machine As-
sisted Identity Confirmation Using Machine Readable Travel Documents. ICAO TAG
MRTD/NTWG. International Civil Aviation Organization, 2003.
94
[32] ICAO. Facilitation (FAL) Division, twelfth session, Cairo. International Civil Aviation
Organization, 10-2004.
[33] ISO/IEC 7816-4: 2005, Information technology – Identification cards – Integrated cir-
cuit(s) cards with contacts – Part 4: Interindustry commands for interchange, ISO/IEC,
2005-01.
95