BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018
for
Trusted Plattform Module SLB9670_2.0
v7.83.3358.00, v7.83.3360.00
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.21
BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018 (*)
Trusted Platform Module
Trusted Plattform Module SLB9670_2.0
v7.83.3358.00, v7.83.3360.00
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Protection Profile, TPM Library specification Family
“2.0”, Level 0 Revision 1.16, December 10, 2014,
Version 1.0, Trusted Computing Group
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1 and AVA_VAN.4
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the
Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC
18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 23 July 2018
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................8
6. Publication.....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................15
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................16
6. Documentation............................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................19
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................20
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................20
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................24
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................25
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Trusted Plattform Module SLB9670_2.0, v7.83.3358.00, v7.83.3360.00 has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-
CC-1021-V2-2017. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1021-V2-
2017 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Trusted Plattform Module SLB9670_2.0, v7.83.3358.00,
v7.83.3360.00 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 19 June 2018. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 23 July 2018
is valid until 22 July 2023. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018 Certification Report
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Trusted Plattform Module SLB9670_2.0, v7.83.3358.00, v7.83.3360.00 has
been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-
Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Trusted Platform Module SLB9670_2.0 (or
SLB9670_2.0 in short), version v7.83.3358.00 and v7.83.3360.00, including related
guidance documentation as described in the Security Target. The versions v7.83.3358.00
and v7.83.3360.00 include the identical source code, where the version v7.83.3360.00 is
used for field upgrade.
The TOE is an integrated circuit and software platform that provides computer
manufacturers with the core components of a subsystem used to assure authenticity,
integrity and confidentiality in e-commerce and internet communications within a Trusted
Computing Platform. The SLB9670_2.0 is a complete solution implementing the version
2.0 of the TCG Trusted Platform Module Library Family “2.0” Specification and the TCG
PC Client Specific Platform TPM Profile (PTP) Family “2.0”.
The SLB9670_2.0 uses the Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) for the integration into existing
PC mainboards. The SLB9670_2.0 is basically a secure controller with the following added
functionality:
● Random number generator (DRBG),
● Asymmetric key generation (RSA keys with key length up to 2048 bit, EC keys with
key length 256 bits),
● Symmetric key generation (AES keys),
● Symmetric and asymmetric key procedures (encryption/decryption, generation and
verification of digital signatures),
● Hash algorithms (SHA-1, SHA-256) and MAC (HMAC),
● Secure key and data storage,
● Identification and Authorization mechanisms.
The TOE is delivered in different derivatives. The hardware and firmware/software of the
derivatives are identical, the only differences between the derivatives are the temperature
range (standard or enhanced temperature range), the packaging and the intermediated
IFX certificates.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Protection Profile, TPM Library specification Family “2.0”, Level 0
Revision 1.16, December 10, 2014, Version 1.0, Trusted Computing Group [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.1 and AVA_VAN.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 7.2. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_CRY Cryptographic Support
SF_I&A Identification and Authentication
SF_G&T General and Test
SF_OBH Object Hierarchy
SF_TOP TOE Operation
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 8.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.1;
all taken from the underlying PP [8]. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is
defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is
briefly outlined in the Security Target [6], chapters 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3; all derived from the
underlying PP [8].
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8 of this
report.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Trusted Plattform Module SLB9670_2.0,
v7.83.3358.00, v7.83.3360.00
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No
.
Type Item / Identifier Release /
Version
Form of Delivery
1. HW/S
W
Trusted Platform Module
SLB9670_2.0
v7.83.3358.00
and
v7.83.3360.00
Packaged module
2. DOC OPTIGATM TPM 2.0 Trusted
Platform Module Application Note
User Guidance
Revision 1.90,
2018-02-28
PDF-file
3. DOC OPTIGATM TPM SLB 9670 TPM
2.0 FIPS Databook
Revision 1.12,
2017-10-27
PDF-file
4. DOC OPTIGATM TPM SLB 9670 TPM
2.0 Errata and Updates
Revision 2.6,
2018-02-09
PDF-file
5. DOC TPM Library Part 1 Architecture,
Family “2.0”, Level 00
Revision 01.16,
2014-10-30
Public document,
downloadable from
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018 Certification Report
No
.
Type Item / Identifier Release /
Version
Form of Delivery
https://www.trustedcomputing
group.org
6. DOC TPM Library Part 2 Structures,
Family “2.0”, Level 00
Revision 01.16,
2014-10-30
Public document,
downloadable from
https://www.trustedcomputing
group.org
7. DOC TPM Library Part 3 Commands,
Family “2.0”, Level 00
Revision 01.16,
2014-10-30
Public document,
downloadable from
https://www.trustedcomputing
group.org
8. DOC TPM Library Part 4 Supporting
Routines, Family “2.0”, Level 00
Revision 01.16,
2014-10-30
Public document,
downloadable from
https://www.trustedcomputing
group.org
9. DOC TCG PC Client Specific Platform
TPM Profile for TPM TPM 2.0
(PTP), Family “2.0”, Level 00
Revision 00.43,
2015-01-26
Public document,
downloadable from
https://www.trustedcomputing
group.org
10. DOC ERRATA, Errata Version 1.5,
September 21, 2016 FOR TCG
Trusted Platform Module Library,
Specification Version 2.0, Revision
1.16, October 30, 2014, TCG
Published
Version 1.5,
2016-09-21
Public document,
downloadable from
https://www.trustedcomputing
group.org
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
TOE Identification
The TOE hardware and firmware is identified by name and version number as listed in the
following table:
Type Name Version number
Security IC with integrated firmware Trusted Platform Module SLB9670_2.0 v7.83.3358.00 and
v7.83.3360.00
Table 3: Identifiers of the TOE
The fabricated modules are contained in a VQFN-32-13 package. They are physically
labelled with the TOE reference by printing.
Line Content Remark
1 SLB9670 –
2 VQ20 yy or XQ20 yy The <yy> is an internal FW indication (only at
manufacturing due to field upgrade option)
3 <Lot number> H <datecode> –
Table 4: Labelling of TOE module, package VQFN-32-13
The version information of the TOE can be read out electronically with the command
TPM2_GetCapability. In the Databook [10] chapter 4.6.2 the vendor specific return values
for the TOE are defined as listed in the following table:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018
Property Vendor specific value
TPM_PT_MANUFACTURER “IFX”
TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_1 “SLB9”
TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_2 “670”
TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_3 NULL
TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_4 NULL
TPM_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_1 Major and minor version, e.g. 0x00070053 indicates v7.83
TPM_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_2 Build number and Common Criteria certification state (for
instance, 0x000CB400 or 0x000CB402)
Byte 1: reserved for future use (0x00)
Byte 2 and 3: Build number (for instance, 0x0CB4)
Byte 4: Common Criteria certification state, 0x00 means TPM
is CC certified, 0x02 means TPM is not certified
Table 5: Vendor specific properties of TPM2_GetCapability
TOE Delivery
The TOE is a Trusted Platform Module and will be delivered only in form of complete
mounted ICs. Only TOEs which have undergone and passed all the production tests are
delivered. At the delivery they are in user mode, the test mode is locked and not
accessible.
The production of the TOE wafers will be performed at IFX Dresden.
The production site sends the TOE to one of the distribution centres: DHL Singapore (DC-
A: Distribution Center Asia), K&N Großostheim (DC-E: Distribution Center Europe), K&N
Hayward (DC-U: Distribution Center USA), G&D Neustadt (backup distribution center), IFX
Morgan Hill (backup distribution center).
The real shipment is done in the following manner:
1. The customer picks up the TOE directly at one of the distribution centres. After a
positive check of the proof of the identity of the recipient (the customer has to
announce the recipient and Infineon Technologies checks the identity of the
recipient controlling the consignment notes and the passport of the recipient) is
done, the TOE is delivered to the recipient (e.g. Transport Company of the
customer). The recipient has to sign an acknowledgement of receipt that contains
the date of the delivery, the number of parts, the specific product name (TOE) and
the name of the recipient. The customer can choose the transport company and is
responsible for the transport security.
2. The distribution centres send the TOE to the customer (Platform Manufacturer).The
transport is secured by the following process: For the transport only evaluated
haulage companies are used, which are chosen by the Infineon Technologies AG.
The assessment and approvement of the used haulage companies is done by a
department of the Infineon Technologies AG.The sender informs the receiver (other
distribution centre or customer) that a delivery was started. After the delivery was
received the delivery is checked according to the consignment notes. If any delay or
failure occurs the receiver has to inform the sender about this fact. This process is
integrated in an electronic process and controlled by a system called Assist4.
Manipulation of the TOE is not possible without destroying it. This is assured by the
TOE itself which is – in this stage – already in user mode. The transport of the TOE
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018 Certification Report
from the distribution centre to the customer is done with the same process used for
the transport between the DCs.
Most of the deliverables are classified as confidential and therefore only delivered to
persons with special legitimacy. The delivery of the TOE related documentation is done
from the Infineon Technologies department AE at the site Munich. Deliverables send in
paper form are personalised and only send on request by the Platform Manufacturer.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Cryptographic Support: generation of random numbers, generation of asymmetric
key pairs, RSA and ECC digital signature (generation and verification), RSA, ECC
and AES data encryption and decryption, key destruction, the generation of hash
values and the generation and verification of MAC values.
● Identification and Authentication: mechanisms for the identification and
authentication capability to authorize the use of a Protected Object and Protected
Capability using authentication values or policies.
● General and Test: provision and enforcement of the TPM role model, startup- and
self tests, preservation of secure state in case of failures or shutdown, and
resistance to physical manipulation or probing.
● Object Hierarchy: state control on all subjects, objects and operations, modification
of security attributes, provision of TPM hierarchy model, monitoring of data storage,
enforcement of object hierarchy.
● TOE Operation: access control on different subjects, objects and operations,
enforcement of different rules of operation and interaction between subjects and
objects, enabling and disabling of functions, enforcement of NVM restrictions, and
creation of evidence of origin.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in chapter
8 of the Security Target [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: (Details can be found in the PP [8], chapters 4.4 and 5.2).
● OE.Configuration: The TOE must be installed and configured properly for starting
up the TOE in a secure state. The security attributes of subjects and objects shall
be managed securely by the authorised user.
● OE.Locality: The developer of the host platform must ensure that trusted processes
indicate their correct locality to the TPM and untrusted processes are able to assert
just the locality 0 or Legacy only to the TPM.
● OE.Credential: The IT environment must create EK and AK credentials by
trustworthy procedures for the root of trust for reporting.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018
● OE.Measurement: The platform part of the root of trust for measurement provides a
representation of embedded data or program code (measured values) to the TPM
for measurement.
● OE.FieldUpgradeInfo: The developer via AGD documentation will instruct the admin
doing the upgrade how to do the upgrade and that the admin should inform the end
user regarding the Field Upgrade process , its result, whether the installed firmware
is certified or not, and the version of the certified TPM.
● OE.ECDAA: The ECDAA issuer must support a procedure for attestation without
revealing the attestation information based on the ECDAA signing operation.
5. Architectural Information
The SLB9670_2.0 consists of hardware and firmware components.
The hardware of the TOE consists of the following parts: Security Peripherals (filters,
sensors), Core System, Memories, Coprocessors, Random number generator (RNG),
Interrupt module (INT), Timer (TIM), Buses (BUS), Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) and
the Tick Counter.
The firmware of the TOE includes an operating system that provides the functionality
specified by the Trusted Platform Module Library specification. The chip initialisation
routine with security checks and identification mode as well as test routines for production
testing are located in a separate test ROM. The firmware also provides the mechanism for
updating the protected capabilities once the TOE is in the field as defined in the
TPM_FieldUpgrade process of the Trusted Platform Module Library specification.
One part of the firmware is the operating system which includes the TPM application, the
System Management, the Endorsement Primary Seed (EPS) and the Endorsement Keys
and is used to operate the IC. The operating system includes also the capability for
updating the protected capabilities once the TOE is in the field (TPM_FieldUpgrade).
The entire operating system of the TOE is comprised of: TPM Secure Operating System,
OS Abstraction Layer, Crypto Engine, Platform, Storage, Support, TPM Commands, PCR,
Authorization, Attack Logic and the Command Execution Engine.
The other firmware parts are the Self Test Software (STS), Service Algorithm Minimal
(SAM), Resource Management System (RMS) and the Flash Loader.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
The tests performed by the developer according to ATE_FUN were divided into six
categories: Simulation Tests (design verification), Qualification Tests, Verification Tests,
Security Evaluation Tests, Production Tests, and Software Tests.
Developer’s testing approach: All TSF and related security mechanisms, subsystems and
modules, except those that are not used by the TOE and internally blocked, are tested in
order to assure complete coverage of all SFR.
Overall developer testing results: The TOE has passed all tests except such tests which
were waived by the developer. For these tests the developer provided a sufficient
justification why the tests were waived. The evaluator analyzed the impact on the TOE and
comes to the conclusion that all of these tests will not have any impact on the security and
functionality of the TOE, so that all TSF has been successfully tested regarding FSP, TDS
and ARC.
The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TSFs behave as specified.
7.2. Evaluator Tests – Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
The evaluator’s testing effort according to ATE_IND is described as follows, outlining the
testing approach, configuration, depth and results.
The evaluator's objective regarding this aspect was to test the functionality of the TOE as
described in [6], and to verify the developer's test results by repeating developer's tests
and additionally add independent tests. In the course of the evaluation of the TOE the
following classes of tests were carried out: Module tests, Simulation tests, Emulation tests,
Tests in user mode, Tests in test mode, Hardware tests, and Software tests. With this kind
of tests the entire security functionality of the TOE was tested.
TOE test configuration:
The tests are performed with the chips Trusted Platform Module SLB9670_2.0 uniquely
identified by their serial numbers and version information. For the tests different chip types
are prepared. One of these types is the configuration which is finally delivered to the user.
The others contain special download functionality for test programs or have some security
mechanisms deactivated. The entire functionality is the same for all chips.
All security features (portions of the TSF) and related interfaces were tested. Therefore no
selection criteria are applied. All security features and related interfaces are tested
regarding their functional behavior. The tests were chosen to perform at minimum one test
for each security feature of TSF and related interfaces.
Verdict for the activity:
The results of the specified and conducted independent evaluator tests confirm the TOE
functionality as described. The TSF and the interfaces were found to behave as specified.
The results of the developer tests, which have been repeated by the evaluator, matched
the results the developer. Overall the TSF have been tested against the functional
specification, the TOE design and the security architecture description. The tests
demonstrate that the TSF performs as specified.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018
Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN:
The penetration testing was partially performed using the developer’s testing environment,
partially using the test environment of the evaluation body. All configurations of the TOE
being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were tested. The overall test result
is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results;
moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential Moderate was actually successful.
Systematic search for potential vulnerabilities and known attacks in public domain sources,
use of a list of vulnerabilities [4, AIS26], and from a methodical analysis of the evaluation
documents. Analysis why these vulnerabilities are not exploitable in the intended
environment of the TOE. If the rationale is suspect in the opinion of the evaluator
penetration tests are devised. Even if the rationale is convincing in the opinion of the
evaluator penetration tests are devised for some vulnerabilities, especially to support the
argument of non-practicability of the exploiting time in case of SPA, DPA and FI attacks.
For implementation attacks the following test resources were used by the evaluator: Digital
Oscilloscope, Passive Probe, Active Differential Probe, EM Probe, Delay Generator, Laser
Fault Injection System and proprietary measuring/analyzing software.
Verdict for the sub-activity:
The evaluator has performed penetration testing based on the systematic search for
potential vulnerabilities and known attacks in public domain sources and from the
methodical analysis of the evaluation documents. During the evaluator’s penetration
testing of potential vulnerabilities the TOE operated as specified. All potential
vulnerabilities are not exploitable in the intended environment for the TOE. The TOE is
resistant to attackers with moderate attack potential in the intended environment for the
TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
Trusted Platform Module SLB9670_2.0 in version v7.83.3358.00 and v7.83.3360.00 as
described in [6] and [10].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used and guidance specific for the technology
of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of Common Criteria to Integrated Circuits.
(ii) For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 were used
(see [4]).
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018 Certification Report
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.1 and AVA_VAN.4 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1021-V2-2017, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Protection Profile, TPM Library specification Family “2.0”, Level
0 Revision 1.16, December 10, 2014, Version 1.0, Trusted
Computing Group [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1 and AVA_VAN.4
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in B chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The table 7 in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from
cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column
'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of
lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only.
Table 8 in annex C of part D lists the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE whose
cryptographic strength has not been rated.
Detailed results on conformance and non-conformance have been compiled into the report
[20].
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
Especially the following notice from the Security Target [6] should be taken into account:
The ECC Endorsement Key, the RSA Endorsement Key and the Endorsement Primary
Seed are generated outside the TPM with the TPM Personalization Certification Authority
(TPM-CA) located within the secure production area of the TOE in a secure room.
Moreover:
The RSA Endorsement Key (personalized during production) is generated from a proved
random number generator by a Hardware Security Module outside the TOE and not
derived from the Endorsement Seed.
The personalized Endorsement Keys RSA EK and ECC EK are not visible, changeable
and erasable from the user.
● In particular Annex G from [14] needs to be observed.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● In order to fulfil the “Key Requirements” as formulated in [9], the Annex D from [14] must
be followed.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018 Certification Report
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TPM Trusted Platform Module
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018, Version 1.1, April 18, 2018, ”Security
Target, Trusted Platform Module, SLB9670_2.0“, Infineon Technologies AG (public
document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 8, June 7, 2018, ”Evaluation Technical Report
Summary”, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Protection Profile, TPM Library specification Family “2.0”, Level 0 Revision 1.16,
December 10, 2014, Version 1.0, Trusted Computing Group
[9] Key Requirements on “Trusted Computing” and “Secure Boot”, by the German
Federal Government, August 2012
[10] OPTIGATM
TPM SLB 9670 TPM 2.0 FIPS Databook, Revision 1.12,
October 27, 2017, Infineon Technologies AG
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018 Certification Report
[11] OPTIGATM
TPM SLB 9670 2.0 Errata and Updates, Version 2.6,
February 9, 2018
[12] NIST Special Publication SP 800-108: Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
Pseudorandom Functions (revised), October 2009, National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST)
[13] NIST SP800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes
Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, (revised), May 2013, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST)
[14] OPTIGATM
TPM 2.0 Trusted Platform Module Application Note User Guidance,
Version 1.90, February 28, 2018, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential developer
document)
[15] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1: Architecture, Family “2.0”, Level 00 Revision
01.16, October 30, 2014, Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
[16] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures, Family “2.0”, Level 00 Revision
01.16, October 30, 2014, Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
[17] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 3: Commands, Family “2.0”, Level 00 Revision
01.16, October 30, 2014, Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
[18] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 4: Supporting Routines, Family “2.0”, Level 00
Revision 01.16, October 30, 2014, Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
[19] ERRATA, Errata Version 1.5, September 21, 2016 FOR TCG Trusted Platform
Module Library, Specification Version 2.0, Revision 1.16, October 30, 2014, TCG
Published
[20] SINGLE EVALUATION REPORT ADDENDUM to ETR-Part ASE, AVA, AGD, ADV –
Cryptographic Standards Compliance Verification (CSCV); Version 6, June 7, 2018,
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)
For references corresponding to cryptographic standards listed in Table 7 please
refer to Annex C.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
Annex C: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Trusted Plattform Module SLB9670_2.0, v7.83.3358.00, v7.83.3360.00
(Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using
the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by
Scheme Interpretations and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 23 July 2018, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.1, ALC_FLR.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1) are fulfilled for the development and
production sites of the TOE listed below:
Site ID Company name and address Functions of site
Development
IFX Augsburg Infineon Technologies AG
Alter Postweg 101
86159 Augsburg
Germany
• Development
IFX Bangalore Infineon Technologies India Pvt.
Ltd.
Mahatma Gandhi (M.G) Road No.
11, Bangalore-560001
India
• Development
IFX Bucharest Infineon Technologies Romania
Blvd. Dimitrie Pompeiu Nr. 6
Sector 2
020335 Bucharest
Romania
• Development
IFX Milpitas Infineon Technologies AG
Chip Card and Security
640 North McCarthy Blvd
Milpitas, CA 95035
USA
• Development
IFX Munich Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
Germany
• Development
• IT
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018 Certification Report
Site ID Company name and address Functions of site
IFX Graz Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Development Center Graz
Babenbergerstr. 10
8020 Graz
Austria
• Development
IFX Villach Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Siemensstr. 2
9500 Villach
Austria
• IT (Datacenter)
IFX Klagenfurt Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Lakeside B05
9020 Klagenfurt
Austria
• IT (Support)
IFX Melaka Infineon Technologies Sdn. Bhd.
Batu Berendam FTZ
75350, Melaka
Malaysia
• IT (Support)
Production
Amkor Manila Amkor Technology Philippines
Km. 22 East Service Rd.
South Superhighway
Muntinlupa City 1702
Philippines
• Pre-assembly
• Module assembly
• Module test
Amkor Technology Philippines
119 North Science Avenue
Laguna Technopark, Binan
Laguna 4024
Philippines
ARDT Hsin-
Chu
Ardentec Corporation
T site
No. 3, Gungye 3rd Rd.,
Hsin-Chu Industrial Park, Hu-Kou,
Hsin-Chu Hsien
Taiwan 30351, R.O.C.
• Wafer test
ARDT
Singapore
Ardentec Singapore Pte. Ltd.
12 Woodlands Loop #02-00
Singapore 738283
• Wafer test
DHL Singapore DHL Exel Supply Chain
Richland Business Centre
11 Bedok North Ave 4, Level 3,
Singapore 489949
• Distribution Center
Disco
Kirchheim
DISCO HI-TEC EUROPE GmbH
Liebigstrasse 8
85551 Kirchheim
Germany
• Pre-assembly
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Site ID Company name and address Functions of site
DNP Agrate DNP Photomask Europe S.p.A.
Via C. Olivetti 2/A
20041 Agrate Brianza
Italy
• Mask production
G&D Neustadt Giesecke & Devrient Secure Data
Management GmbH
Austraße 101b
96465 Neustadt bei Coburg
Germany
• Distribution Center
IFX Dresden Infineon Technologies Dresden
GmbH & Co. OHG
Königsbrücker Str. 180
01099 Dresden
Germany
• Wafer production
• Wafer test
IFX Morgan Hill Infineon Technologies North
America Corp.
18275 Serene Drive
Morgan Hill, CA 95037
USA
• Inlay test
• Distribution
IFX
Regensburg
Infineon Technologies AG
Wernerwerkstraße 2
93049 Regensburg
Germany
• Pre-assembly
• Assembly
• Module test
• Scrap
IFX Singapore Infineon Technologies Asia Pacific
PTE Ltd.
168 Kallang Way
Singapore 349253
• Module test
IFX Wuxi Infineon Technologies (Wuxi) Co.
Ltd.
No. 118, Xing Chuang San Lu
Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park
Wuxi 214028, Jiangsu
P.R. China
• Module assembly
• Module test
K&N
Großostheim
Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10 –
Building 8A
63762 Großostheim
Germany
• Distribution Center
K&N Hayward Kuehne & Nagel
30805 Santana Street
Hayward, CA 94544
USA
• Distribution Center
Toppan
Dresden
Toppan Photomask, Inc
Rähnitzer Allee 9
01109 Dresden
Germany
• Mask production
Table 6: List of relevant TOE sites
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018 Certification Report
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018
Annex C of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
No. Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementatio
n
Key Size in
Bits
Comments Security Level above
100 Bits
1. Authenticity RSA
signature
generation /
verification
[RFC3447] |Modulus| =
1024
[Main_1, B.1
– B.7] and
[Main_3,
20.2]
no
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1_5
according
Section 8.2
no
RSASSA_PSS according
Section 8.1
no
SHA-1, SHA-256 [FIPS180-4] no
2. Authenticity RSA
signature
generation /
verification
[RFC3447] |Modulus| =
2048
[Main_1, B.1
– B.7] and
[Main_3,
20.2]
yes
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1_5
[RFC3447, 8.2] yes
RSASSA_PSS [RFC3447, 8.1] yes
SHA-1, SHA-256 [FIPS180-4] no, yes
3. Authenticity EC
signature
generation/
verification
according to
[FIPS186-4] |k| = 256
ECC_NIST
_P256
[Main_Errata,
2.29]
yes
ECDSA [ISO_14888-3] yes
ECDAA [Main_Errata,
2.29]
yes
SHA-1, SHA-256 [FIPS180-4] no, yes
4. Authenticity EC
signature
generation/
verification
according to
[ISO_159346-5] |k| = 256
ECC_BN_P
256
[Main_Errata,
2.29]
no
ECDAA [Main_Errata,
2.29]
no
SHA-1, SHA-256 [FIPS180-4] no
5. Authenticity RSA
signature
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-
[RFC3447]
[ADV_IMP_FU]
|Modulus|=
2048
TPM-
FieldUpgrade
yes
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018 Certification Report
No. Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementatio
n
Key Size in
Bits
Comments Security Level above
100 Bits
v1_5)
SHA-1, SHA-256 [FIPS180-4] no, yes
6. Authentication
HMAC with SHA-1
[ISO_9797-2]
[ISO_10118-3]
|k| = 160 [Main_1,
11.4.3]
no
ECDEC [N856, 6.2.2.2] |k| = 256 [Main_1, C7] yes
[FIPS186-4] ECC_NIST
_P256
RSA decryption
RSAES-PKCS1-
v1_5
[RFC3447, 7.2] |Modulus| =
2048
yes
AES decryption in
CFB mode
[ISO_18033-3],
[ISO_10116]
|k| = 128 yes
7. Authentication
HMAC with SHA-
256
[ISO_9797-2],
[ISO_10118-3]
|k| = 256 [Main_1,
11.4.3]
yes
ECDEC [N856, 6.2.2.2] |k| = 256 [Main_1, C7] yes
[FIPS186-4] ECC_NIST
_P256
RSA decryption
RSAES-PKCS1-
v1_5
[RFC3447, 7.2] |Modulus| =
2048
yes
AES decryption in
CFB mode
[ISO_18033-3],
[ISO_10116]
|k| = 128 yes
8. Key Agreement
Diffie-Hellmann
(ECDH)
[N856, 6.2.2.2]
[FIPS186-4]
|k| = 256
ECC_NIST
_P256
[Main_1,
11.4.9.3]
yes
KDFe [N856] [Main_1, C7] yes
HMAC with SHA-
256 and
[ISO_9797-2],
[ISO_10118-3]
|k| = 256 yes
SHA-1 |k| = 160 yes
9. Key Agreement
KDFa
[Main_1,
11.4.9.1], [N808]
[Main_1,
11.4.9.1]
yes
HMAC with SHA-
256 and
[ISO_9797-2],
[ISO_10118-3]
|k| = 256 yes
SHA-1 |k| = 160 yes
10. Key Agreement
HMAC with SHA-
256
[ISO_9797-2],
[FIPS180-4]
[N808],
[ADV_IMP_FU]
|k| = 256 TPM-
FieldUpgrade
yes
11. Integrity HMAC
with SHA-256 and
[ISO_9797-2],
[ISO_10118-3] |k| = 256
[Main_1,
11.4.3]
yes
SHA-1 |k| = 160 no
12. Integrity HMAC
with SHA-256
[ISO_9797-2],
[ ISO_10118-3],
[N808],
[ADV_IMP_FU]
|k| = 256 TPM-
FieldUpgrade
yes
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No. Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementatio
n
Key Size in
Bits
Comments Security Level above
100 Bits
13. Confidentiality AES
in CFB mode
[ISO_18033-3],
[ISO_10116]
|k| = 128 [TPM] yes
14. Confidentiality RSA
encryption /
decryption
[RFC3447] |Modulus| =
1024
[Main_1, B.1
– B.7]
no
RSAES -PKCS1-
v1_5
[RFC3447, 7.2] [Main_3, 14] no
RSAES-OAEP [RFC3447, 7.1] no
15. Confidentiality RSA
encryption /
decryption
[RFC3447] |Modulus| =
2048
[Main_1, B.1
– B.7]
yes
RSAES -PKCS1-
v1_5
[RFC3447, 7.2] [Main_3, 14] yes
RSAES-OAEP [RFC3447, 7.1] yes
16. Confidentiality AES
in PCBC mode
[ISO_18033-3],
[N808],
[ADV_IMP_FU]
|k| = 128 TPM-
FieldUpgrade
yes
17. Cryptographic
Primitive SHA-256
[FIPS180-4] none [Main_1,
11.4.2]
yes
18. Cryptographic
Primitive SHA-1
[FIPS180-4] none [Main_1,
11.4.2]
no
19. Cryptographic
Primitive HMAC
with SHA-1
[ISO_9797-2],
[ISO_10118-3]
|k| = 160 [Main_1,
11.4.3]
no
20. Cryptographic
Primitive HMAC
with SHA-256
[ISO_9797-2],
[ISO_10118-3]
|k| = 256 [Main_1,
11.4.3]
yes
21. Cryptographic
Primitive
Deterministic RNG
DRG.3
[AIS20], [N890] |k| = 128 [Main_1,
11.4.10]
yes
22. Trusted Channel
HMAC with SHA-
256
[ISO_9797-2],
[ISO_10118-3]
|k| = 256 [TPM] yes
23. Trusted Channel
AES in CFB mode
[ISO_18033-3],
[ISO_10116]
|k| = 128 [TPM] yes
RSA [RFC3447] |k| = 1024,
|k| = 2048
no, yes
ECC [FIPS186-4],
[ISO_15946-1]
ECC_NIST
_P256,
|k| = 256
yes
HMAC (SHA-256) [ISO_9797-2],
[ISO_10118-3],
[N808]
|k| = 256 yes
24. Key Generation
RSA primary keys
[TPM],
[FIPS186-4],
[CSCV], [N890]
using
CRT_DRBG
|k| = 2048 – yes
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018 Certification Report
No. Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementatio
n
Key Size in
Bits
Comments Security Level above
100 Bits
25. Key Generation
RSA
[TPM],
[FIPS186-4],
[CSCV], [N890]
using
CRT_DRBG
|k| = 2048 – yes
27. Key Generation
ECC
[TPM],
[FIPS186-4],
[N890] using
CRT_DRBG
|k| = 256 – yes
ECC_NIST_P256 [FIPS186-4] yes
ECC_BN_P256 [ISO_15946-5] no
28. Key Generation
AES
[TPM], [N8133],
[N808]
|k| = 128 – yes
Table 7: TOE cryptographic functionality
For the Cryptographic Functionality TPM_RSAGEN2 used in conjunction with “Key
Generation RSA – Key size 1024 Bits” listed in Table 8 below no statement on the
respective cryptographic strength can be given:
No. Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Comments
26. Key Generation RSA [TPM], |k| = 1024 Infineon key generation
method
“TPM_RSAGEN2”
Table 8: TOE cryptographic functionality not rated
Reference of Legislatives and Standards specified in Tables 7 and 8 above:
[FIPS180-4] FIPS PUB 180-4 Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication Secure Hash Standard (SHS), August 2015, Information
Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and
Technology.
[FIPS186-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB
186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013, U.S. department
of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST).
[ISO_10116] ISO/IEC 10116: Information technology - Security techniques –
Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher, 2006, ISO/IEC.
[ISO_10118-3] ISO 10118-3: Information technology - Security techniques – Hash-
functions – Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions, 2003, ISO/IEC.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018
[ISO_14888-3] ISO 14888-3: Information technology - Security techniques – Digital
signatures with appendix -- Part 3: Discrete logarithm based
mechanisms, 2006, ISO/IEC.
[ISO_15946-1] ISO 15946-1: Information technology – Security techniques –
Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General,
2002, ISO/IEC.
[ISO_15946-5] ISO 15946-5: Information technology – Security techniques –
Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 5: Elliptic
curve generation, 2009, ISO/IEC.
[ISO_18033-3] ISO 18033-3: Information technology – Security techniques –
Encryption algorithms -- Part 3: Block ciphers, 2010, ISO/IEC.
[ISO_9797-2] Information technology - Security techniques- Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) - Part 2: Mechanisms using a
dedicated hash-function, 2011-06, ISO/IEC.
[Main_1] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1: Architecture, Family “2.0”,
Level 00 Revision 01.16, 2014-10-30, Trusted Computing Group
(TCG).
[Main_2] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures, Family “2.0”,
Level 00 Revision 01.16, 2014-10-30, Trusted Computing Group
(TCG).
[Main_3] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 3: Commands, Family “2.0”,
Level 00 Revision 01.16, 2014-10-30, Trusted Computing Group
(TCG).
[Main_4] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 4: Supporting Routines, Family
“2.0”, Level 00 Revision 01.16, 2014-10-30, Trusted Computing
Group (TCG).
[Main_Errata] ERRATA, Errata Version 1.5, September 21, 2016 FOR TCG Trusted
Platform Module Library, Specification Version 2.0, Revision 1.16,
October 30, 2014, TCG Published.
[N808] NIST Special Publication SP 800-108: Recommendation for Key
Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions (revised), October 2009,
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[N8133] NIST Special Publication 800-133, Recommendation for
Cryptographic Key Generation; December 2012
[N856] NIST SP800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography,
(revised), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[N890] NIST Special Publication 800-90A: Recommendation for Random
Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators.
January 2012, National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST).
[RFC3447] RFC 3447 - Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
Cryptography Specifications, Version 2.1, published by The Internet
Society, February 2003 (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt).
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1058-2018 Certification Report
[TPM] Trusted Platform Module Library, consisting of [Main_1], [Main_2],
[Main_3] and [Main_4].
[CSCV] refers to item [20] in the bibliography.
Note: End of report
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