BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014
for
MICARDO V4.0 R1.0 eHC v1.2
from
Morpho Cards GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.75
BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014
eHealth: Smart Cards
MICARDO V4.0 R1.0 eHC v1.2
from Morpho Cards GmbH
PP Conformance: Protection Profile for electronic Health Card (eHC)
- elektronische Gesundheitskarte (eGK), Version
2.9, 19 April 2011,
BSI-CC-PP-0020-V3-2010-MA-01
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 15 May 2014
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department SOGIS Recognition
Agreement
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................16
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................17
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................19
11 Security Target............................................................................................................20
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................20
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................22
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................25
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................26
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the component AVA_VAN.5 that is not mutually recognised in
accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4
components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product MICARDO V4.0 R1.0 eHC, v1.2 has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI.
The evaluation of the product MICARDO V4.0 R1.0 eHC, v1.2 was conducted by SRC
Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 30 April 2014.
SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised
by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Morpho Cards GmbH.
The product was developed by: Morpho Cards GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014 Certification Report
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product MICARDO V4.0 R1.0 eHC, v1.2 has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Morpho Cards GmbH
An der Talle 89
33102 Paderborn
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product MICARDO V4.0 R1.0 eHC v1.2 provided by
Morpho Cards GmbH. It is an electronic Health Card (eHC) representing a smart card with
contacts programmed according to ISO 7816-1 to 3 containing Electronic Health Card
Applications with the related user data and associated guidance documentation.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile for electronic Health Card (eHC) - elektronische Gesundheitskarte
(eGK), Version 2.9, 19 April 2011, BSI-CC-PP-0020-V3-2010-MA-01 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions of the Smartcard Embedded Software:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
F.ACS_SFP Security Attribute Based Access Control
F.IA_AKEY Key Based User / TOE Authentication Based on Asymmetric Cryptography
F.IA_SKEY Key Based User / TOE Authentication Based on Symmetric Cryptography
F.IA_PWD Password Based User Authentication
F.DATA_INT Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action
F.EX_CONF Confidentiality of Data Exchange
F.EX_INT Integrity and Authenticity of Data Exchange
F.RIP Residual Information Protection
F.FAIL_PROT Hardware and Software Failure Protection
F.SIDE_CHAN Side Channel Analysis Control
F.SELFTEST Self-Test
F.CRYPTO Cryptographic Support
F.GEN_DIGSIG RSA Generation of Digital Signatures
F.VER_DIGSIG RSA Verification of Digital Signatures
F.RSA_ENC RSA Encryption
F.RSA_DEC RSA Decryption
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.1.2.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 3.1.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014 Certification Report
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
MICARDO V4.0 R1.0 eHC, v1.2
There are two different delivery configurations for the TOE.
a) If delivered after phase 4 in the life-cycle model, the product is delivered to an external
initialiser as un-initialised smartcard or module. Dedicated initialisation files, the product
data sheet, and the guidance for the initialiser and the personaliser are included.
b) If delivered after phase 5 of the life-cycle model, the product is delivered to an external
personaliser as initialised smartcard or module. The product data sheet and the guidance
for the personaliser are included.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery a) b)
1 HW/SW NXP SmartMX2 P60C0808
Secure Smart Card
Controller (incl. its IC Dedicated Software,
covering in particular the NXP SmartMX2
P60C080PVC(y) Crypto Library)
V1.0 Delivery of
un-initialised /
initialised modules
or smartcards
yes yes
2 SW Smartcard Embedded Software / Part Basic
Software (implemented in ROM/EEPROM of the
microcontroller)
V4.0 Delivery of
initialisation files in
electronic form (if
applicable)
yes yes
3 SW Smartcard Embedded Software / Part Application
Software (containing the eHC Application
implemented in the EEPROM of the
microcontroller)
R10 Delivery of
initialisation files in
electronic form (if
applicable)
yes yes
4 DOC User guidance for the User of the MICARDO
Operating System platform [12]
X1.005 Document in paper
form / electronic file
yes yes
5 DOC User guidance for the Initialiser of the eHC Card
[11]
X1.004 Document in paper
form / electronic file
yes no
6 DOC User guidance for the Personaliser of the eHC
Card (in particular the eHC Application) [10]
X1.002 Document in paper
form / electronic file
yes yes
8
For details on the eHC's chip and the IC Dedicated Software see certification report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-2013
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery a) b)
7 DOC Data Sheet with information on the actual
identification data and configuration of the eHC
Card delivered to the customer
n.a. Document in paper
form / electronic file
yes yes
8 DOC File containing data needed for the initialisation
process
5161 Document in paper
form / electronic file
yes no
9 KEY Public part of the authentication key pair relevant
for the authenticity of the eHC Card
Note: The card's authentication key pair is
generated by Morpho Cards GmbH and depends
on the TOE's configuration delivered to the
customer. Furthermore, the key pair may be
chosen customer specifically.
n.a. Document in paper
form / electronic file
yes yes
10 KEY Personalisation key relevant for the
personalisation of the eHC Card
Note: The card's personalisation key pair is
generated by Morpho Cards GmbH and depends
on the TOE's configuration delivered to the
customer. Furthermore, the key may be chosen
customer specifically.
n.a. Document in paper
form / electronic file
yes yes
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The IC embedded software consists of the operating system MICARDO V4.0 R1.0 eHC
v1.2. The initialisation and personalisation agent can use the 'Get Data' command to read
out the chip information and identify the chip and its embedded software. The format of the
data returned is as follows:
Byte # Data type
1-2 offset bytes
3-4 ICC serial number
5 chip manufacturer
6 chip and mask identification
7-8 time stamp
9-13 batch number
14 wafer number
15 X-coordinate on wafer
16 Y-coordinate on wafer
Table 3: Retun data if 'Get Data'
The identification data must comply with the data given in Annex D of [10] in order for the
TOE to be verified as certified version.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014 Certification Report
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. The TOE is the composition of an IC with Smartcard Embedded
Software, including the eHC Application and will be used as electronic Health Card (eHC).
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to ensure an overall
smartcard system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement an algorithm to ensure the
confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication
protocols. The security policy of the TOE is also to provide protection against leakage of
information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of cryptographic keys during cryptographic
functions performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against
physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security Functions
(security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment.
The security objectives related to the environment of the TOE's dedicated eHC Application
can be found in the protection profile [7] in chapter 4.2 and 4.3. See also the Security
Target [6] and [8] chapter 4.2 and 4.3.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit, IC Embedded
Software and IC Application Software containing the eHC Applications. The IC Embedded
software contains the operating system MICARDO V4.0 R1.0 eHC v1.2. For details
concerning the CC evaluation of the NXP IC see the evaluation documentation under the
certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-2013 and for details concerning the CC evaluation of
the NXP cryptographic library see the evaluation documentation under the certification ID
NSCIB-CC-12-36243.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014
7 IT Product Testing
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with emulator
tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to
demonstrate its expected behavior including error cases. Hereby a representative sample
including all boundary values of the parameter set, e.g. all command APDUs with valid and
invalid inputs were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs.
Repetition of developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests.
The developer tests include a full coverage of all security functionality. Furthermore
penetration tests were chosen by the evaluators for those Security Functions where
internal secrets of the card might be modified or observed during testing. During their
independent testing, the evaluators covered
● testing APDU commands related to Access Control,
● testing APDU commands related to Identification and Authentication,
● testing APDU commands related to the Secure Messaging Channel,
● testing APDU commands related to the Creation of Digital Signatures,
● penetration testing related to verify the Reliability of the TOE,
● source code analysis performed by the evaluators,
● side channel analysis for SHA and RSA,
● fault injection attacks (laser attacks),
● fault injection attacks (alpha radiation attacks),
● statistical testing of the output of the deterministic random number generator,
● testing APDU commands for the initialization, personalization and usage phase,
● testing APDU commands for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms.
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential during
their penetration testing. The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated TOE configuration is defined by the notation: “MICARDO V4.0 R1.0 eHC
v1.2” and configured as described in the Guidance document [11] provided with the TOE.
The initialisation and personalisation agent can use the ‘GetData’ command to read out
the chip information and identify the chip. The following table (cf. Table 3) describes the
evaluated configuration:
Byte # Data type Data of evaluated TOE
1-2 offset bytes '0000'
3-4 ICC serial number '12A4'
5 chip manufacturer '04'
6 chip and mask identification '0A'
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Byte # Data type Data of evaluated TOE
7-8 time stamp '1A45'
9-13 batch number '91 65 53 00 00'
14 wafer number '10'
15 X-coordinate on wafer '07'
16 Y-coordinate on wafer '3C'
Table 4: Evaluated Configuration
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] and guidance specific for the technology of the
product [4] (AIS 34) was used.
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● Application of CC to Integrated Circuits (AIS 25)
● Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards (AIS 26)
● Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators (AIS 31)
● Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (AIS 36)
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying platform and
the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e. [14], [15], [16], [17],
[18]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(see [4], AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS 31, AIS 36).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 were used (see [4]).
A document ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 has not been provided in
the course of this certification procedure. It could be provided by the ITSEF and submitted
to the certification body for approval subsequently.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a
re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0673-2010, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The primary objective of the re-certification was the porting
of the HAL from P5CC080V0B to P60C080P_VC(y) including integration of P60
Crypto-Library and MICARDO V3.5 patches into the MICARDO V4.0 ROM mask.
Secondary objective was a review of the security architecture and evolution of the
development environment.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Protection Profile for electronic Health Card (eHC) -
elektronische Gesundheitskarte (eGK), Version 2.9, 19 April
2011, BSI-CC-PP-0020-V3-2010-MA-01 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Comments
Authenticity RSA
Signature
Generation
with padding
variantRSA_ISO
9796_2_DS1_SI
GN
PKCS#1
ISO 9796-2
Moduluslength=
2048
[19]
[20]
RSA Generation of
Digital Signatures
(FCS_COP.1/CCA_
SIGN)
RSA
Signature
Generation
with padding
variant
RSASSA-PSS-S
IGN
PKCS#1 Moduluslength=
2048
[19]
[20]
RSA Generation of
Digital Signatures
(FCS_COP.1/CSA)
RSA
Signature
Verification
with padding
variant
RSA_ISO9796_
2_DS1_VERIFY
PKCS#1
ISO 9796-2
Moduluslength=
2048
[19]
[20]
RSA Verification of
Digital Signatures
(FCS_COP.1/CCA_
VERIF)
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014 Certification Report
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Comments
Authentication Authentication
scheme based
on 3TDES in
CBC-Mode and
Retail-MAC
ANSI X9.52,
NIST 800-38B,
ANSI X9.19,
[21]
|k|=168 [19]
[20]
Key Based User /
TOE Authentication
Based on
Symmetric
Cryptography
(FCS_COP.1/SM)
Key
Agreement
SHA-256 FIPS 180-4 n.a. [19]
[20]
Hash for key
derivation
Cryptographic
Support
(FCS_COP.1/Hash,
FCS_CKM.1/SM)
Confidentiality 3TDES in
CBC-Mode
ANSI X9.52
NIST 800-38B
|k|=168 [19]
[20]
Secure Messaging
Confidentiality of
Data Exchange
Cryptographic
Support
(FCS_COP.1/Sym)
RSA Decryption
RSAESPKCS1-
V1_5
RSA-OAEP
PKCS#1 Moduluslength=
2048
[19]
[20]
RSA Decryption
(FCS_COP.1/Asym
_DEC)
Integrity Retail-MAC with
3TDES
ANSI X9.52,
ANSI X9.19
|k|=168 [19]
[20]
Cryptographic
Support
(FCS_COP.1/MAC)
Cryptographic
Primitive
DRG.3 AIS20 [4]
Custom solution
based on
ANSI X9.17 /
ANSI X9.31
n.a. [20] Cryptographic
Support
(FCS_RND.1)
Table 5: TOE cryptographic functionality
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
According to the mentioned standards of implementation the algorithms are suitable for the
purpose of their usage. An explicit validity period is not given.
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
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techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
eHC Electronic Health Card
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
HAL Hardware Abstraction Layer
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE9
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014, Version X1.00.19, 10 April 2014, Security
Target – MICARDO V4.0 R1.0 V1.2, Morpho Cards GmbH (confidential document)
[7] Protection Profile for electronic Health Card (eHC) - elektronische Gesundheitskarte
(eGK), Version 2.9, 19 April 2011, BSI-CC-PP-0020-V3-2010-MA-01, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (public document)
[8] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014, Version V1.00, 17 April 2014, Security
Target – MICARDO V4.0 R1.0 V1.2, Morpho Cards GmbH (public document)
[9] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0861, Version 1.8, 25 April 2014, SRC
Security Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[10] Preparative Procedures for the Personaliser for MICARDO V4.0 R1.0 V1.2, Version
X1.002, 17 January 2013, Morpho Cards GmbH (confidential document)
[11] Preparative Procedures for the Initialiser for MICARDO V4.0 R1.0 V1.2, Version
X1.004, 02 December 2013, Morpho Cards GmbH ()
[12] Operational User Guidance for MICARDO V4.0 R1.0 V1.2, Version X1.005, 04 July
2013, Morpho Cards GmbH ()c
[13] Configuration list for the TOE, Configuration List: Micardo v4.0 Release 1 (Software
Release Sheet – SRS), Version X1.0010, 10 April 2014, Morpho Cards GmbH
(confidential document)
9
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 7, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 8, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 35, Version 1, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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[14] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-2013 for NXP Smart Card Controller
P60D080PVC and its major configurations P60D052PVC, P60D040PVC,
P60C080PVC, P60C052PVC and P60C040PVC from NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH, 24 June 2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
[15] Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-2013-MA-01, 04
February 2014, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[16] ETR for composition according to AIS36, NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60x040/052/080 VC, BSI-DSZ-CC-0837, Version 5.0, 23 April 2013, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH
[17] ETR for composition according to AIS36, Crypto Library V1.0 on P60x080/052/040
PVC, NSCIB-CC-36243, Version 5.0, 24 July 2013, brightsight b.v.
[18] Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report, NSCIB-CC-12-36243-MA1, 09 April
2014, NLNCSA
[19] Spezifikation der elektronischen Gesundheitskarte, Teil 1: Spezifikation der
elektrischen Schnittstelle, as specified in the Base Roll-Out Release 0.5.3 eGK
V1.0.0 (including SRQ supplements), 11 April 2011, gematik mbH
[20] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116-1, Kryptographische Vorgaben für Projekte der
Bundesregierung, Teil 1: Telematikinfrastruktur, Version 3.18, 30 January 2014,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[21] DIN EN 14890-1:2008, Application Interface for smart cards used as Secure
Signature Creation Devices - Part 1: Basic services
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0861-2014
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product MICARDO V4.0 R1.0 eHC, v1.2 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 15 May 2014, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
No. Site Task within the evaluation
1 Morpho Cards GmbH
e-Documents Division
Riemekestraße 160
33106 Paderborn
Germany
Development
2 Morpho Cards GmbH
Konrad-Zuse-Ring 1
24220 Flintbek
Germany
Production, initialisation and card production site
3 Multiple sites Inlay manufacturing
The inlay of the TOE is assembled at the sites
covered by the hardware evaluation
BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-2013, see Annex B of [14]
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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