BSI-DSZ-CC-0969-2015
for
Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. FabricOS
Version: 7.3.0a3
from
Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.13
BSI-DSZ-CC-0969-2015 (*)
Network and Network related Devices and Systems
Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. FabricOS
Version: 7.3.0a3
from Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 extended
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
Bonn, 8 December 2015
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0969-2015
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0969-2015 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0969-2015
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................16
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................18
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................18
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................23
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................25
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................27
11. Security Target............................................................................................................27
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................27
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................30
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................31
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................31
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................32
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................39
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0969-2015 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0969-2015
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08
September 2014, this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e.
for all assurance components selected.
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0969-2015 Certification Report
The product Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. FabricOS, Version: 7.3.0a3 has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. FabricOS, Version:
7.3.0a3 was conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation
was completed on 19 November 2015. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Brocade Communications
Systems, Inc..
The product was developed by: Brocade Communications Systems, Inc..
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 8 December
2015 is valid until 7 December 2020. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. FabricOS, Version: 7.3.0a3 has been
included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.
130 Holger Way
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0969-2015 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0969-2015
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.
FabricOS Version 7.3.0a3 running on Brocade Directors and Switches family of products.
They are configured as instructed by the preparatory documentation described in [9], [10],
[11], [12] and [13] which are provided by Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.. Brocade
Communications Systems, Inc. FabricOS Version 7.3.0a3 running on Brocade Directors
and Switches is a software solution utilizing hardware appliances that implement what is
called a 'Storage Area Network' or 'SAN'. SANs provide physical connections between
servers that are located in the environment and storage devices such as disk storage
systems and tape libraries that are also located in the environment.
The TOE provides the following major security features:
● auditing of user activity,
● identification and authentication of users,
● management based upon user roles,
● a SAN access policy,
● restrictions upon TOE access,
● encryption supporting communication with network peers, and
● encryption supporting administrative trusted path.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2
augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Security Audit The TOE generates Audit data. The Audit records include date, time of
the event, type and user identity that caused the event. The records are
sent to a syslog server in the environment.
User Data Protection The TOE provides the ability to restrict block-read and block-write
operations to connected storage devices that are initiated by host bus
adapters (HBA). Host bus adapter can only access storage devices that
are members of the same zone.
Identification and Authentication The TOE defines administrative users with user identity, password and
role. Role permissions determine the functions that administrators may
perform. The TOE authenticates administrative users using either its
own authentication mechanism or a RADIUS [14] or LDAP [15] server.
Passwords are chosen by a defined policy.
Security Management The TOE provides both serial terminal- and Ethernet network-based
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0969-2015 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
management interfaces. Each of these types of interfaces provides
equivalent management functionality.
TOE Access An IP Filter policy is a set of rules applied to the IP management
interfaces as a packet filtering firewall. The IP Filter policy permits or
denies traffic to go through the IP management interfaces according to
the policy rules
Trusted Path The TOE enforces a trusted path between the TOE administrators and
the TOE using SSHv2 connections for Ethernet connections from the
Administrator terminal to the TOE and configured network peers that
are providing syslog, RADIUS or LDAP services.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions and
Threats. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapters 3.1 and 3.2.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. FabricOS, Version: 7.3.0a3
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. FabricOS
Version 7.3.0a3
7.3.0a3 Pre-installed on
Brocade Director
Blade Models,
Director Models
and Switch
Appliance Models
(see list below)
2 DOC Brocade FabricOS v7.3.0a3 BSI Common Criteria
Configuration Guide [9]
SHA512 checksum:
155E7DB166A31DC8A8BA632DF174AC6CA39EC
97DA31215317ACACD414EC3AA70804FDCB5BA
15A0BB7474D3D9E5288AC31A66AF140C98C6C6
95672479C32E9108
#53-1003807-02,
21 October 2015
Password-protecte
d user-id for
registered users
(customers), web
download secured
with https
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
3 DOC Brocade - FabricOS Administrator’s Guide [10]
SHA512 checksum:
4DAF5FBFF885E23B50B26F1D72E21449A6B4D8
A67CDB8EE225DC18BBE2E617D04CFFC88EF67
81ADB65D957049FFF4FEA6ED6B087D7A60674C
925F977779EB798
#53-1003130-01,
27 June 2014
Password-protecte
d user-id for
registered users
(customers), web
download secured
with https
4 DOC Brocade – FabricOS Command Reference [11]
SHA512 checksum:
C0D3ED09340AEFEB6DD2B8BA6F595D7CBAE92
4D3A462DE6C4468CCB72AC099ED276BE468E4
15C9112C00F371A2269CA1B75B87EDB62DE548
E433150CC6FB24FE
#53-103131-01,
27 June 2014
Password-protecte
d user-id for
registered users
(customers), web
download secured
with https
5 DOC Brocade – FabricOS Message Reference [12]
SHA512 checksum:
A5281B722D4C2858178B2D62CBB8AEB3519876
952825A8343FCACFD7897020F306E7BF6F2D546
008B75228F36ED118E532AE9B9B4BBDF98B48D
4A03236D4C589
#53-1003140-01,
27 June 2014
Password-protecte
d user-id for
registered users
(customers), web
download secured
with https
6 DOC Brocade – FabricOS Troubleshooting and
Diagnostics Guide, Supporting FabricOS v7.3.0 [13]
SHA512 checksum:
DCA5B42E5EFD994B7F913AE0DAB0814EF0D50
FF515655B4B34BA8B8A6219B73DEBF8EE37A17
C1C193A8E4D554C99CAB94A66103860A027ECC
C738A15D2BF765F
#53-1003141-02,
15 August 2014
Password-protecte
d user-id for
registered users
(customers), web
download secured
with https
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The certified software, Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. FabricOS Version 7.3.0a3,
is certified for the following series and models of Brocade Director and switch products:
● Director Blade Models: FC16-32, FC16-48, FC16-64, CP8,CR16-4, CR16-8, FX8-24
● Director Models: DCX 8510-4, DCX 8510-8
● Switch Appliance Models: 6505, 6510, 6520, 7800, 7840
The software loading process is automated and solely controlled by Brocade’s engineers.
Brocade FabricOS images are retrieved by authorized Brocade personnel and are
transferred securely to factory sites across private networks. After the hardware is loaded
with FabricOS at the manufacturer´s site, the hardware is packaged with tamper-proof
security tape and the entire crate is shrink-wrapped afterwards. During all steps,
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity are ensured by Brocade’s engineers, by the
private network and at Brocade’s manufacturer’s site.
This shrink-wrapped crate is shipped to Brocade’s OEM/channel partners and then directly
to end customers using commercial carriers. After delivering products to the OEM the
responsibility for security needs is transferred from Brocade to the OEM, who will handle
the delivery to the end customer.
In the case that Brocade performs the delivery to end customers directly, transport is
per-formed by trusted C-TPAT certified carriers. Every delivery has an identifier from the
commercial carrier (e.g., tracking number) and contains a packaging list. Each stock
keeping unit (SKU) has a detailed bill of materials with numerous specification documents.
This ensures authenticity and integrity and confidentiality.
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The end customer can initiate an own commercial carrier transport of the pre-installed TOE
from Brocade to its site self-dependent. After leaving the manufacturer´s site the end
customer´s transport service has to ensure authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of the
TOE.
For documentation downloads, Brocade Partner Network and Brocade Connect sites are
given access only to registered-partners and end users respectively. Guidance documents
in these sites are authenticated with user-ID and password which are provided only to
these registered users. This documentation is authored by Brocade and transferred to the
Brocade web site (http://www.brocade.com) through a VPN that provides authentication of
Brocade as the document’s source. The web download of the documentation files is
secured with Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS).
Note 1: It is unequivocally stated in the BSI Common Criteria Configuration Guide [9] that
the download delivery which is also offered by the developer does not lead to a certified
version of the TOE.
Note 2: Using the BSI Common Criteria Configuration Guide [9] with a downloaded version
of FabricOS will not lead to a certified version.
2.1. Identification of the TOE by the User
On boot up, the user has to verify and confirm that the approved Brocade Communications
Systems, Inc. FabricOS Version 7.3.0a3 is pre-installed using the ‘firmwareshow’
command.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. The TOE implements a role-based access control policy to
control administrative access to the system. In addition, the TOE implements policies
pertaining to the following security functional classes:
● Security audit
● User data protection
● Identification and authentication
● Security management
● TOE access
● Trusted path
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.AUDIT - The environment will provide a syslog server and a means to present a
readable view of the audit data.
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● OE.AUTH_SVR - The authentication server will offer a password policy that requires
password length, password strength and a restriction of failed login attempts that is
consistent with the requirements of the Security Target [6].
● OE.NETWORK - The environment will physically protect network communication to and
from the TOE from unauthorized disclosure or modification.
● OE.MGMT_NET - The SSHv2 administration workstation, syslog server, and (when
utilized) the authentication servers that are connected to the management network are
operated in a secure environment.
● OE.CONFIG - The TOE will be installed, configured, managed and maintained in
accordance with its guidance documentation.
● OE.PHYCAL - The TOE will be located within controlled access facilities, which will
prevent unauthorized physical access.
● OE.HARDWARE - The TOE is assumed to run on models of Brocade Directors and
Switches that are listed in section 1.2, [6]. In particular it is assumed that the following
functionality is available to the TOE:
a) Hardware real time clock
b) A trustworthy bootloader
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Fabric Operating System (FabricOS) version 7.3.0a3
running on Brocade Directors and Switches hardware appliances. The Brocade Directors
and Switches hardware appliances are available in two form factors: a rack-mount Director
Chassis with a variable number of blades, or a self-contained switch appliance device.
This chapter gives an overview of the subsystems of the TOE and the corresponding TSF
which were objects of the evaluation.
The security functions of the TOE are enforced by the following two subsystems:
● Runtime Subsystem - supports the TSF “Security audit”
● FabricOS Subsystem - supports the TSF “Security audit”, “User data protection”,
“Identification and authentication”, “Security management”, “TOE access” and “Trusted
path”
Operating system capabilities of the FabricOS are executed by the Runtime Subsystem.
The Runtime Subsystem provides an execution environment for the FabricOS subsystem.
The following interactions are provided:
● hardware platform,
● device management capabilities,
● memory management,
● process abstractions,
● process control,
● interprocess communication facilities,
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● a file system for information storage,
● an IP protocol stack for use with management networking and
● an IP filtering capability.
The FabricOS subsystem provides the following major capabilities:
● logging functionality,
● crypto support functionality,
● admin functionality,
● AAA functionality,
● remote access functionality and
● SAN functionality.
The logging functionality is responsible for the collection of audit records from other TOE
software, the insertion of common fields into audit records (e.g., date/time stamps), the
short-term, local storage of audit records, the protection of local audit records, and the
transmission of audit records to a remote syslog server.
The crypto support functionality is responsible for the cyrptographic operations associated
with various network protocols (e.g., SSHv2, TLSv1.2). The crypto support functionality
also generates SSH & TLS keys.
The admin functionality provides a Command Line Interface (CLI) for the configuration and
management of the FabricOS subsystem over an SSH connection and ensures that all
users are identified and authenticated before being allowed to perform operations using
the CLI. Restrictions based upon administrative roles are enforced upon actions taken
through the CLI and supports the management of local user accounts and authentication
material.
The AAA functionality provides network protocol support for the RADIUS and LDAP
protocols. These protocols connect the FabricOS subsystem with an external
authentication server. The Runtime Environment provides a local repository for user
identification and authentication material. Together, the FabricOS subsystem can utilize
either locally defined accounts or accounts defined via LDAP and RADIUS for the
identification and authentication of administrators.
Over the management network interface, the Remote Access Functionality provides the
network protocol support for the SSH and TLS protocols which protect communication
between administrators and the FabricOS subsystem.
All networking performed by the FabricOS Subsystem occurs over either the management
network interface or over a SAN network interface. Each model of the TOE installed has at
least one management network port (a Director chassis may have more than one). The
number of SAN network interfaces varies by model. These SAN network interfaces are
used to connect the FabricOS Subsystem with HBAs and storage devices.
The SAN functionality implements the FabricOS Subsystem support for traffic on SAN
network interfaces, enforcing zoning rules and ensuring encryption of data as configuration
dictates. The SAN functionality also provides fibre channel (FC) protocol support for use
over physical FC SAN Data ports. The SAN functionality includes a fixed definition of IP
Filters that protect the FabricOS Subsystem and limit network protocols accepted through
network ports that are dedicated to SAN data (e.g. Ethernet SAN Data Ports).
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The management network is used exclusively to allow administrators to perform
management operations on the FabricOS subsystem, and to support communication with
external syslog, RADIUS and LDAP servers.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Developer Tests
Test Configuration and Test Approach
Brocade FabricOS runs on the complete range of Brocade platforms. In general it is the
case that tests for any security-relevant TOE function may be performed on any Brocade
hardware platform. None of the security-relevant functions contain behaviour that is unique
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Figure 1: TOE Architecture
BSI-DSZ-CC-0969-2015 Certification Report
to a particular platform. The test configuration can be applied to an arbitrary device of a
Switch Appliance equivalence class, 7840 equivalence class or Director equivalence class.
Tests are executed on every equivalence class (later also referred to as “Eq Cl”). See
Table 4 in Chapter 8 for details.
For testing purpose the TOE is configured following strictly the referenced BSI Common
Criteria Configuration Guide [9]. At the end of these steps an evaluated version is installed
on an above mentioned equivalence class and can be tested in a freshly installed state
providing the in the Security Target claimed security features.
Testing of the TOE security functions is provided by a series of automated and manual
tests. These tests demonstrate the security-relevant behaviour of the TOE at the interfaces
identified in the Functional Specification document and defined in the High-Level Design
documentation. The goal of the tests is to demonstrate that the TOE meets the security
functional requirements specified in the Security Target. Using the testing resources is
optimized by applying an adaptive, white box testing approach to exploit several properties
of the TOE.
Test Cases and Results
● Enable security auditing (FAU_GEN.1): This test enables security auditing and
verifies that set security alerts are triggered and reported correctly to the syslog server.
● Account lockout for non admin accounts and successful and unsuccessful login
(FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UID.2, FTA_TSE.1): This test verifies that an account
locks out after a configured number of unsuccessful authentication attempts and
remains locked for the configured time period.
● Use of management functions, including user / group modifications (FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1(1), FMT_MTD.1(2), FIA_ATD.1(1)): This test validates user
changes are reflected and admin role permissions supersede those of user role.
● Authenticate incoming and outgoing SSH user with RSA keys (FCS_CKM.1(2).1,
FCS_COP.1(2), FCS_CKM.1(1).1): Validation of RSA key authentication to and from the
FOS switch without a password.
● Key and secret creation and deletion (FCS_CKM.4): This test verifies that certificates
can be deleted successfully.
● Basic zoning on different hardware (FDP_ACF.1, FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.1,
FMT_MSA.3): This test verifies zoning of Brocade switches and validates the restriction
of access to storage or initiator ports.
● User class cannot supersede the default admin role (FIA_ATD.1(1), FMT_SMR.1): This
test covers that no non-admin defined class may supersede the default admin account
for that access right (“O” and “M”). Command permissions are defined as either M for
modify, O for observe, or N for No.
● Password policy management (FIA_ATD.1(1), FIA_ATD.1(2), FIA_SOS.1): This test
verifies the functionality of various password policy parameters in a fabric environment.
● Consistent user deny (FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2): This test verifies that password changes
for all user accounts that can access the switch will be denied if account verification is
rejected. Additionally verifies that no authentication data is feedbacked to the user while
inputting authentication data.
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● RADIUS and LDAP authentication (FTA_MCS.1, FIA_UAU.5): This test covers the
authentication facility available to firmware by communicating to RADIUS and LDAP
servers.
● Cipher configuration with SSH and TLS ciphers (FCS_CKM.1(1).1, FCS_COP.1(1),
FCS_COP.1(2), FCS_CKM.2, FTP_ITC.1, FTP_TRP.1): Validation of the correct cipher
suites in SSH and all TLS sessions.
● Maximum number of sessions for each role and closing of active sessions (FMT_SMR.1,
FTA_MCS.1): This test verifies that the total number of SSH sessions that are allowed is
limited to 32. The local authentication will limit users according to four sessions per
account with the exception of ‘admin’ which is only allowed two sessions.
● IPFILTER robustness (AVA_VAN.2): This test verifies that ports can be opened and
closed by changing the active IPFILTER policy.
● Verify import utility for validity of a certificate (FIA_ATD.1(1)): This test verifies that
invalid certificates cannot be imported into FOS for use with LDAP or the syslog server.
7.2. Independent Evaluator Tests
Overview
The independent testing was partially performed using the developer’s testing
environment, partially using the test environment of the evaluation facility.
The configuration of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation was
tested.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
TOE Test Configuration
The TOE was tested in DMZ with a stand-alone test computer and additional workstations.
The TOE was running on one machine of each equivalence class and was configured
according to chapter 1.4 of [6]. The evaluator has started the TOE and configured it
together with the developer. This was done by directly booting up the TOE after the
start-up the machine.
Besides the requirements described in chapter 1.4 of [6] the test environment also needs
to fulfil the security objectives for the environment. These security objectives are fulfilled by
the following services: The testers starting a syslog server in the test network (OE.AUDIT,
OE.MGMT_NET). Only a secure connection (SSH) is used to configure the TOE. The
authentication server is installed with username and password (OE.AUTH_SVR). The test
environment is located in a secured server room and in a distinct DMZ (OE.NETWORK,
OE.PHYCAL, OE.MGMT_NET). The installation instructions are used as outlined in 1.4.2
[6] (OE.CONFIG). Tests are executed only with Brocade Directors and Switches that are
listed in section 1.2 [6] (OE.HARDWARE).
These above described components match the needed components described in the BSI
Common Criteria Configuration Guide [9] to establish the TOE. The TOE environment and
the related test equipment for the tests are consistent with the described ones in [6] and
[9].
The tests of the TOE are carried out by executing the test environment. There are four
standard workstations and six appliances with the TOE installed. In detail there are three
appliances, one of each equivalence class with an redundant appliance. The four
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workstations represent the two authentication servers, syslog server and a testing
work-station. The entire developer test configuration and the test protocols were made
avail-able to the evaluator.
For testing the TOE the evaluators used the same configuration as used in the developer
tests. The machines and the developer test cases were analysed during a visit of SRC in
the test lab of Brocade in Denver (CO) USA. After that a remote connection to a test DMZ
was installed on a separated network segment at Brocade. The network configuration was
not changed by the evaluators. The description of the required non-TOE hardware,
software and firmware is described in section 1.4.2 of [6]. During the visit the evaluators
used the following test configuration:
Hardware 7800 (Eq Cl1)
7840 (Eq Cl2)
DCX CP0 / CP1 (Eq Cl3) 8510-4
Software Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. FabricOS Version 7.3.0a3
LDAP
Linux: OpenLDAP: slapd 2.4.23
Windows Server 2012 R2 Datacenter: AD DS (Active Directory Domain Services)
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Figure 2: Test Environment
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0969-2015
Hardware 7800 (Eq Cl1)
7840 (Eq Cl2)
DCX CP0 / CP1 (Eq Cl3) 8510-4
RADIUS
Linux: FreeRadius Version 2.1.5
Windows Server 2012 R2 Datacenter: RADIUS Client in Network Access Policy
SYSLOG Server
syslog-ng 3.5.6 on Debian 3.7.2-0 Linux and on kali8 x86_64 Linux
Storage Server
SANBlaze V7.2-64-3.5.0
SRC Test OS
Kali Linux Version 3.14-kali-amd64
Table 3: Test Configuration
This hardware and software configuration has been used to establish a complete testing
network including the TOE in every equivalence class.
During the tests the TOE runs on three different hardware appliances according to each
equivalence class. In most of the test cases the TOE communicates with a server (LDAP,
RADIUS or syslog). Additionally, the TOE has been set up between the systems and SRC
to conduct the evaluator tests. The systems are connected using Ethernet connection.
Test Cases and Results
All developer tests were redone during the visit of the test lab in Denver (CO) USA from
8th to 13th of March 2015. The following list shows six of the conducted developer tests as
examples:
● Login via SSH as LDAP user and verify that login is successful.
● This test covers that no non-admin defined class may supersede the default admin
account for that access right (“O” and “M”). Command permissions are defined as either
M for modify, O for observe, or N for No.
● Delete private key and known hosts.
● Create an initial Zone on the switch.
● Expire user password of ‘user’.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
The following list briefly summarizes the test subset devised by the evaluator:
● Try to connect TOE to server with imported certificate (Positive Test)
● Try to connect TOE to server with imported certificate and wrong cipher (Negative Test)
● Try to connect TOE to server with manipulated certificate on Syslog Server (Negative
Test)
● Try to establish SSH connection to TOE (Positive Test)
● Try to establish SSH connection to TOE after deleting known hosts (Positive Test)
● Test of the SSH connection timeout after establishment (Positive Test)
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● Test of the dev/random function (Negative Test)
The independent test subset consists of six individual tests. The first and last test case
were executed during the AVA penetration tests.
All actual test results were consistent with the expected test results.
7.3. Vulnerability Analysis
Overview
The penetration testing was partially performed using the developer’s testing environment,
partially using the test environment of the ITSEF. Equivalence classes of TOE
configurations were identified. At least one TOE configuration of every equivalence class
was tested.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential Basic was
actually successful.
The same test configuration as shown in table 3 was used.
Tests and Results
All SFRs taken from Cryptographic Support (FCS) regarding to RNG, SSH and TLS were
penetration tested. The remaining SFRs were analysed, but not penetration tested due to
non-exploitability of the related attack scenarios in the TOE’s operational environment and
assuming an attacker with a Basic attack potential.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential Basic was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
Having performed the vulnerability analysis, the evaluator determined that the TOE is free
of exploitable vulnerabilities as well as residual vulnerabilities.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The evaluated
configuration is the Brocade FabricOS version 7.3.0a3 software configured as instructed
by the preparatory documentation called “BSI Common Criteria Configuration Guide” [9]
and pre-installed on Brocade Directors and Switches hardware appliances.
The various models of the hardware supporting the TOE are mentioned in Chapter 2. By
using the preparatory documentation all models run the same configuration of the
FabricOS Version 7.3.0a3 software.
The Brocade Directors and Switches hardware appliances are available in two form
factors:
● a rack-mount Director chassis with a variable number of blades, or
● a self-contained switch appliance device.
The following table summarizes the hardware equivalence classes and the relevant
characteristics that distinguish each class:
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7840 Switch Appliance Director w/ CP blades
Platforms 7840 6505, 6510, 6520, 7800 DCX 8510-4, DCX 8510-8
ASIC Goldeneye2 Goldeneye2 and Condor3 Condor3
Speed 16Gb 4G to 16Gb 4G to 16Gb
Credit Buffers 700 8192 8192
SID CAM Table Size n/a n/a n/a
DID CAM Table Size n/a n/a n/a
Zones 4K 8K 8K
Max Trunk Ports 8 8 8
Table 4: Deliverables of the TOE
The evaluated configuration does not apply to all the features of the software. The
following is a list of product features that are excluded from the evaluation and must be
disabled or not configured for use in the TOE configuration:
● Redundancy or encryption provided by processing of user data by ASICs is not
evaluated.
● Fibre Channel over Ethernet (FCOE) cannot be configured to create SAN Ethernet
Ports.
● Fibre Channel over IP (FCIP) cannot be configured for use over SAN Ethernet Ports.
● The TOE is configured to exclude the use of Elliptic-Curve Cryptographic algorithms for
use with SSH by the use of certificates and keys defined using Elliptic-Curve
Cryptographic algorithms.
● Web-based administrator console interfaces called the “Brocade Advanced Web Tools”
cannot be used for administration of the TOE.
● The SNMP administrative interface cannot be used and must be disabled.
● Optional modem hardware for simulating a serial administration interface is not installed.
● The TOE cannot be operated in Access Gateway mode.
● Dynamic RBAC is not configured for use by administrators.
● Insecure protocols such as FTP and Telnet must not be used (or must be disabled) per
instructions in the guidance.
● IPsec features have not been evaluated and must be disabled per guidance instructions.
● Additionally, the TOE cannot be configured to prevent the use of Elliptic-Curve
Cryptographic algorithms supporting TLS other than by not creating (or deleting any
existing) certificates and keys based on Elliptic-Curve Cryptographic algorithms. The
Elliptic-Curve Cryptographic algorithms have not been evaluated.
● Note that the Brocade Network Advisor is a management tool which utilizes the SNMP
and web interfaces to communicate with the TOE. However, because both of those
interfaces are excluded, then the Brocade Network Advisor is also excluded
Applicable commands to configure or disable excluded features are detailed in the
pre-requisites and configuration chapters of the BSI Common Criteria Configuration Guide,
[9].
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9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 were used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 2 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None [8]
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
1 SSH: Key
Exchange
DH ([HaC]) with
Diffie-Hellman-group1
4-sha1
[RFC4253] (SSH v2.0),
[RFC3526] (MODP)
2048 yes
2 TLS: encrypted
exchange of
pre-master
secret
RSA-encryption
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5
(TLS_RSA)
[RFC5246] (TLS v1.2),
[PKCS#1 v2.1]
2048 yes
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
3 SSH Encryption
and decryption
SSH: AES in CBC
mode (aes128-cbc,
aes256-cbc)
[FIPS-197] (AES),
[SP 800-38A] (CBC),
[RFC4253] (SSH v2.0)
128, 256 yes
4 SSH Message
authentication
code generation
and verification
SSH: HMAC with
SHA-256, SHA-512
(hmac-sha2-256,
hmac-sha2-512)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC4253] (SSH v2.0),
[RFC6668] (SHA-2 for
SSH)
256, 512 yes
5 TLS Encryption
and decryption
TLS: AES in CBC
mode
(AES_128_CBC,
AES_256_CBC)
[FIPS-197] (AES),
[SP 800-38A] (CBC),
[RFC5246] (TLS v1.2)
128, 256 yes
6 TLS Message
authentication
code generation
and verification
TLS: HMAC with
SHA-1 or SHA-256
(SHA1, SHA256)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC5246] (TLS v1.2)
160, 256 yes
7 SSH Server and
client:
Authentication of
user
generation
(“publickey”:
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_
5)
PKCS#1 v2.1],
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC4252] (SSH-AUTH)
modulus
length ≥
2048
yes
Authentication based
on user name and
password
(“password”)
ch. 5 of [RFC4252]
(SSH-AUTH)
Guess
success
probability ε ≤
10-8
no
8 SSH Client:
Authentication of
host
RSA signature
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_
5 using
SHA1(rsa2048-sha1))
[PKCS#1 v2.1],
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC4432] (RSA for SSH)
modulus
length =
2048
yes
8 TLS:
Asymmetric
authentication
Public-key-based
authentication of the
server using
RSA-encryption
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5
using SHA-1
[PKCS#1 v2.1],
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC5246] (TLS v1.2)
Modulus
length = 2048
no
9 SSH Key
Derivation
Function
SSH: PRF based on
SHA-1
(diffie-hellman-group1
4-sha1)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC4253] (SSH v2.0)
|K| = variable yes
10 TLS Key
Derivation
Function
TLSv1.2: PRF based
on HMAC with
SHA-256
(tls_prf_sha256)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC5246] (TLS v1.2)
|K| = variable yes
11 TLS Key TLSv1.2: PRF based [FIPS180-4] (SHA), |K| = variable yes
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Derivation
Function
on HMAC with
SHA-384
(tls_prf_sha384)
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC5246] (TLS v1.2)
Table 5: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a
re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AAA Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CLI Command Line Interface
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
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DMZ Demilitarized Zone
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FC Fiber Channel
FCOE Fibre Channel over Ethernet
FCIP Fibre Channel over IP
HBA Host Bus Adapter
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
PP Protection Profile
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
RBAC Role-Based Access Control
SAN Storage Area Network
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
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Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation
Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0969-2015, Version 1.0, October 21, 2015, Brocade
Communications Systems, Inc. FabricOS Version 7.3.0a3 running on Brocade
Directors and Switches Security Target, Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.2, November 19, 2015, Evaluation Technical
Report (ETR) Summary, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential
document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, 16, October 21, 2015, Brocade Configuration
Management Plan (confidential document)
[9] Brocade FabricOS v7.3.0a3 BSI Common Criteria Configuration Guide, Publication
53-1003807-02, October 21, 2015
[10] FabricOS Administrator’s Guide, Publication #53-1003130-01, June 27, 2014
[11] FabricOS Command Reference, Publication #53-103131-01, June 27, 2014
[12] FabricOS Message Reference, Publication #53-1003140-01, June 27, 2014
[13] Troubleshooting and Diagnostics guide – Supporting Fabric OS v7.3.0, Publication
#53-1003141-02, August 15, 2014
[14] RFC 2865, Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS), June 2000.
[15] RFC 4511, Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): The Protocol, June 2006.
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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