Acronis SCS
Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition Agent
v12.5
Security
Target
Document Version: 0.11
Prepared for: Prepared by:
Acronis SCS Corsec Security, Inc.
6370 E. Thomas Road, Suite 250 13921 Park Center Road, Suite 460
Scottsdale, AZ 85251 Herndon, VA 20171
United States of America United States of America
Phone: +1 781 782 9000 Phone: +1 703 267 6050
www.acronisscs.com www.corsec.com
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................4
1.1 Purpose .....................................................................................................................................................4
1.2 Security Target and TOE References.........................................................................................................4
1.3 Product Overview......................................................................................................................................5
1.3.1 Product Components........................................................................................................................5
1.4 TOE Overview............................................................................................................................................6
1.4.1 TOE Environment..............................................................................................................................7
1.5 TOE Description.........................................................................................................................................8
1.5.1 Physical Scope ..................................................................................................................................8
1.5.2 Logical Scope ................................................................................................................................. 10
1.5.3 Product Physical/Logical Features and Functionality not included in the TOE............................. 11
1.5.4 Scope of Evaluation....................................................................................................................... 11
2. Conformance Claims....................................................................................................................................... 12
3. Security Problem Definition............................................................................................................................ 13
3.1 Threats ................................................................................................................................................... 13
3.2 Assumptions........................................................................................................................................... 13
3.3 Organizational Security Policies............................................................................................................. 13
4. Security Objectives ......................................................................................................................................... 14
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ............................................................................................................. 14
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment........................................................................... 14
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale ................................................................................................................ 15
5. Extended Components ................................................................................................................................... 16
5.1 Extended TOE Security Functional Components ................................................................................... 16
5.2 Extended TOE Security Assurance Components.................................................................................... 16
6. Security Assurance Requirements.................................................................................................................. 17
7. Security Functional Requirements.................................................................................................................. 18
7.1 Conventions ........................................................................................................................................... 18
7.2 Security Functional Requirements......................................................................................................... 18
7.2.1 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support.................................................................................................. 19
7.2.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection.................................................................................................... 22
7.2.3 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication................................................................................. 23
7.2.4 Class FMT: Security Management................................................................................................. 24
7.2.5 Class FPR: Privacy .......................................................................................................................... 24
7.2.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF.................................................................................................... 24
7.2.7 Class FTP: Trusted Path/Channel................................................................................................... 26
8. TOE Summary Specification............................................................................................................................ 27
8.1 TOE Security Functionality ..................................................................................................................... 27
8.1.1 Cryptographic Support .................................................................................................................. 28
8.1.2 User Data Protection..................................................................................................................... 30
8.1.3 Identification and Authentication ................................................................................................. 30
8.1.4 Security Management ................................................................................................................... 31
8.1.5 Privacy ........................................................................................................................................... 32
8.1.6 Protection of the TSF..................................................................................................................... 32
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8.1.7 Trusted Path/Channels.................................................................................................................. 33
8.2 Timely Security Updates ........................................................................................................................ 33
9. Rationale......................................................................................................................................................... 35
9.1 Conformance Claims Rationale.............................................................................................................. 35
9.1.1 Variance Between the PP and this ST............................................................................................ 35
9.1.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ................................................................................ 35
10. Acronyms.................................................................................................................................................... 36
Appendix A: Supported Platform APIs..................................................................................................................... 38
Appendix B: Included Third-party Libraries............................................................................................................. 39
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Physical TOE Boundary ..............................................................................................................................9
List of Tables
Table 1 – ST and TOE References ...............................................................................................................................4
Table 2 – Environmental Components.......................................................................................................................7
Table 3 – Guidance Documentation...........................................................................................................................9
Table 4 – CC and PP Conformance .......................................................................................................................... 12
Table 5 – Threats ..................................................................................................................................................... 13
Table 6 – Assumptions............................................................................................................................................. 13
Table 7 – Security Objectives for the TOE............................................................................................................... 14
Table 8 – Security Objectives for the Operational Environment............................................................................. 15
Table 9 – Extended TOE Security Assurance Components...................................................................................... 16
Table 10 – Security Assurance Requirements ......................................................................................................... 17
Table 11 – TOE Security Functional Requirements ................................................................................................. 18
Table 12 – Mapping of TOE Security Functionality to Security Functional Requirements...................................... 27
Table 13 – Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes ............................................................................................... 28
Table 14 – Acronyms ............................................................................................................................................... 36
Table 15 – Included Third-party Windows Libraries................................................................................................ 39
Table 16 – Included Third-party Linux Libraries ...................................................................................................... 39
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1. Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), and the organization of the ST. The TOE
is the Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition Agent developed by Acronis SCS and will hereafter be
referred to as the TOE throughout this document. The TOE is the Backup Agent component of the Acronis Cyber
Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition solution, which consists of a Management Server and multiple Backup Agents.
Backup Agents are responsible for performing specific backup, recovery, replication and data-manipulation tasks
on their host machines. The Backup Agents are able to work independently from the Management Server to run
their scheduled backup operations.
1.1 Purpose
This ST is divided into 10 sections, as follows:
• Introduction (Section 1) – Provides a brief summary of the ST contents and describes the organization of
other sections within this document. It also provides an overview of the TOE security functionality and
describes the physical and logical scope for the TOE as well as the ST and TOE references.
• Conformance Claims (Section 2) – Provides the identification of any Common Criteria (CC), Protection
Profile (PP), and Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) package claims. It also identifies whether the ST contains
extended security requirements.
• Security Problem (Section 3) – Describes the threats, organizational security policies, and assumptions
that pertain to the TOE and its environment.
• Security Objectives (Section 4) – Identifies the security objectives that are satisfied by the TOE and its
environment.
• Extended Components (Section 5) – Identifies new components (extended Security Functional
Requirements (SFRs) and extended Security Assurance Requirements (SARs)) that are not included in CC
Part 2 or CC Part 3.
• Security Assurance Requirements (Section 6) – Presents the SARs met by the TOE.
• Security Functional Requirements (Section 7) – Presents the SFRs met by the TOE.
• TOE Summary Specification (Section 8) – Describes the security functions provided by the TOE that satisfy
the SFRs and objectives.
• Rationale (Section 9) – Presents the conformance claims rationale for the selected PP.
• Acronyms (Section 10) – Defines the acronyms used within this ST.
1.2 Security Target and TOE References
Table 1 below shows the ST and TOE references.
Table 1 – ST and TOE References
ST Title Acronis SCS Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition Agent v12.5 Security Target
ST Version Version 0.10
ST Author Corsec Security, Inc.
ST Publication Date July 16, 2020
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TOE Reference Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition Agent v12.5
1.3 Product Overview
The Product Overview provides a high-level description of the product that is the subject of the evaluation. The
following section, TOE Overview, will provide the introduction to the parts of the overall product offering that are
specifically being evaluated.
Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition is an advanced data protection solution that provides reliable
backup and recovery of physical, virtual, and cloud workloads with a wide range of storage options. It may be used
to protect data residing on-premises, in remote locations, in the cloud, and on mobile devices. Centralized and
remote management of backups is performed via the Management Server’s web-based Management Console,
with customizable dashboards, advanced reporting, and auditing. Backup Agents installed on protected platforms
perform data backup and recovery of physical or virtual machines, hypervisors, applications, and mobile devices.
Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition supports application-aware backup and recovery features for
Oracle database, Microsoft Office 365, Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft SQL1
Server, Microsoft SharePoint, and
Microsoft Active Directory.
Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition may be deployed in an on-premise or cloud configuration. With
the on-premise configuration, the Management Server is installed on a customer’s local network. With the cloud
configuration, it is installed in a secure Acronis Data Center. Both the Management Server and Backup Agents are
supported on both Windows and Linux platforms.
Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition includes the Acronis SCS Cryptographic Library and Acronis SCS
Protocol Library in both the Management Server and Backup Agents. They provide the underlying cryptographic
and protocol functionality necessary to support the use of secure communications protocols, encrypted backups,
and secure file sharing.
1.3.1 Product Components
The following paragraphs provide a brief description of the product components.
1.3.1.1 Management Server
The Management Server provides the means to configure, monitor, and manage backups and provides the web
server (Web UI) for the Management Console. The Management Server is comprised of a number of management
services responsible for management functions of Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition. The
Management Server also includes an API2
Gateway to communicate with the Backup Agents. The Management
Server does not actually perform backup, recovery, or other data-manipulation operations. These are performed
by the Backup Agents installed on each protected machine.
The Management Console allows an administrator to create a backup plan, or set of rules, to specify how data will
be backed up on a given machine. This includes specifying what to back up (for example, disks or volumes), where
to back it up to, and the schedule (by event or time) for backups. The same backup plan can be applied to groups
1 SQL – Structured Query Language
2 API – Application Programming Interface
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of machines of the same type to simplify management of a large number of machines. Backup infrastructures can
be organized into departments allowing for role-based administration of separate resources. The Management
Server also allows a user to recover an entire machine or individual files, folders, VM3
s, or databases from a backup.
The Management Server uses a built-in SQLite database by default to store its operational data but may be
configured at installation to use Microsoft SQL server instead.
The Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition Monitoring Service provides monitoring and reporting
features. Its dashboard provides a number of customizable, dynamic widgets that give an overview of a backup
infrastructure and backed-up devices, allowing an administrator to easily monitor the current state of a backup
infrastructure. The reporting feature generates on-demand and scheduled reports about the backup
infrastructure. The Reports section is available only with an Advanced license. The option to install the
Monitoring Service component is provided through a custom install. If installed, the Management Console
will show Dashboard and Reports sections under the Overview tab.
1.3.1.2 Backup Agents
Backup Agents are installed as a number of services to perform the actual backup and recovery operations on
each machine that requires protection. They are typically installed on each machine that requires protection and
then added to the Management Server. However, they are able to operate independently from the Management
Server. Backup Agents are supported on both Windows and Linux OS4
s. Different agent types are used to protect
different data sources, but they all share the same architecture, communication protocols, and the vast majority
of the functionality.
A command-line interface (CLI) is installed with the Backup Agents to allow for management of the Backup Agents
separately from the Management Console.
1.3.1.3 Version-Check Tool
A separately installed version-check tool can be found in Acronis’s GitHub repository to allow the user to check
the version of the Backup Agent currently running on the platform. If an internet connection is present, the script
will compare the Backup Agent’s installed version to the version in the repository and display whether or not an
update is available. If no internet connection is present, the script will compare the Backup Agent’s version against
the version contained within the script and display whether or not an update is available.
1.4 TOE Overview
The TOE Overview summarizes the usage and major security features of the TOE. The TOE Overview provides a
context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the TOE type, describing the product, and defining the specific
evaluated configuration.
The software-only TOE is the Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition Agent v12.5. It is a standalone
software application that runs on both Windows and Linux operating systems and provides backup and restore
functionality for the host machine. Its security features include securely storing the application token, checking
for updates and patches to the application software, using a digital signature to protect the integrity of the
installation and update files, versioning the software with SWID tags, and using anti-exploitation capabilities such
as not mapping memory to explicit addresses, file permission protections, and stack buffer overflow protections.
3 VM – Virtual Machine
4 OS – Operating System
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It also secures communications between itself and the Management Server. The TOE implements the
cryptographic functionality for cryptographic services, including TLS5
v1.2, through its embedded Acronis SCS
Cryptographic Library and Acronis SCS Protocol Library. The TOE also includes the separately downloaded version-
check tool that will query the current version of the TOE and report if an update is available.
In the evaluated configuration, the TOE is setup in two configurations: one where the Windows Agent is installed
on a Windows 10 machine that is on a network connected to the Management Server in the TOE environment,
and the other is where the Linux Agent is installed on a RHEL v7.6 machine on a network connected to the
Management Server in the TOE environment. Note that both of these configurations can be setup and used on
the same network and use the same Management Server without interfering with each other. Both setups will
also include separate installations of the version-check tool on the same machine as the Backup Agent.
The Protection Profile for Application Software specifies several use cases that may be implemented by
conformant TOEs. The Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition Agent is considered to implement both
content creation and content consumption.
1.4.1 TOE Environment
Table 2 defines the environmental component requirements. In the evaluated configuration, the TOE is provided
as an Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition setup program. The TOE is installed on a computer running
either Microsoft Windows 10 or RHEL v7.6.
Table 2 – Environmental Components
Component Requirements
Management Server This machine is used to host the Management Server software and Monitoring Service. The following are
required:
• Microsoft Windows Server 2016 OS
• Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition Server v12.5 software with licenses
• 200 MB6 of RAM7 and 1.7 GB8 of free space on the system volume
• Intel Xeon E-2136 CPU9
Windows Agent Computer This machine is a general-purpose computer that will have the Windows Agent installed on it. The following
are required:
• Microsoft Windows 10 OS
• Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition Agent for Windows v12.5 software
• Acronis SCS Version-check v1.8
• 720 MB disk space and 130 MB RAM
• Intel Core i7-8650U CPU
5 TLS – Transport Layer Security
6 MB – Megabyte
7 RAM – Random-Access Memory
8 GB – Gigabyte
9 CPU – Central Processing Unit
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Component Requirements
Linux Agent Computer This machine is a general-purpose computer that will have the Linux Agent installed on it. The following
are required:
• RHEL v7.6 OS
• Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition Agent for Linux v12.5 software
• Acronis SCS Version-check v1.8
• 850 MB disk space and 150 MB RAM
• Intel Core i5-8350U CPU
CA10 Server A CA server is used for certificate creation/signing and to host the CRL11 for certificate validation. This
connection is over HTTP12. No specific CA server is required as long as it follows RFC 5280.
The TOE relies on an embedded SQLite database to store configuration data that is downloaded from the
Management Server. This database is part of the TOE.
1.5 TOE Description
This section primarily addresses the physical and logical components of the TOE that are included in the evaluation.
1.5.1 Physical Scope
Figure 1 illustrates the physical scope and the physical boundary of the overall solution and ties together all of the
components of the software-only TOE and the constituents of the TOE environment.
10 CA – Certificate Authority
11 CRL – Certificate Revocation List
12 HTTP – Hypertext Transfer Protocol
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Figure 1 – Physical TOE Boundary
The TOE Boundary includes all the Acronis SCS developed parts of the Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened
Edition Agent product. Any third-party source code or software that Acronis SCS has modified is considered to be
TOE Software.
1.5.1.1 Guidance Documentation
Table 3 lists the TOE Guidance Documentation to install, configure, and maintain the TOE.
Table 3 – Guidance Documentation
Document Name Description
Acronis SCS Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition User
Guide
Contains steps for the basic initialization and setup of the TOE. Also
contains guidance on how to use and maintain the TOE.
Acronis SCS Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition
Command-Line Reference
Acronis SCS Acronis Cyber Backup 12.5 SCS Hardened Edition
Agent v12.5 Guidance Documentation Supplement Document
Version: 0.10
Contains information regarding specific configuration for the TOE
evaluated configuration.
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1.5.2 Logical Scope
The logical boundary of the TOE is broken down into the following security classes, which are further described in
Sections 7 and 8 of this ST. The logical scope also provides the description of the security features of the TOE. The
SFRs implemented by the TOE are usefully grouped under the following Security Function Classes.
1.5.2.1 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptographic functions to secure sessions between the Management Server and the TOE using
TLS v1.2. The Acronis SCS Cryptographic Library and Acronis SCS Protocol Library are used to provide the required
algorithms and protocols for all cryptographic operations. The TOE also stores its application token in the Windows
Data Protection API (DPAPI) and the Linux keyring, depending on the OS.
1.5.2.2 User Data Protection
The TOE protects sensitive data in non-volatile memory according to the requirements in FCS_STO_EXT.1. The
TOE restricts its access to network connectivity provided by the platform’s hardware resources. Specifically, it will
only use network connectivity for connections from itself to the Management Server, from itself to the CA server,
and from itself to GitHub for version checking. The TOE does not access any of the platform’s sensitive information
repositories.
1.5.2.3 Identification and Authentication
To facilitate secure communications using TLS, the TOE provides a mechanism to validate X.509v3 certificates as
defined by RFC13
5280. The TOE uses a CRL to check the certificate’s revocation status and will not permit
certificates to be used when the CRL is not available or if the certificate is invalid.
1.5.2.4 Security Management
The TOE does not provide default credentials. It uses the service accounts on the platform and does not have an
authenticated user interface. The TOE does not provide any management features that write or change settings.
Non-security-related settings are stored on the Management Server and are queried when performing tasks. The
TOE and its data are protected against unauthorized access by default file permissions. Section 8.1.4 provides a
list of security-relevant management functions provided by the TOE.
1.5.2.5 Privacy
The TOE does not transmit personally identifiable information (PII).
1.5.2.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE does not allocate memory with both write and execute permissions and does not write user-modifiable
files to directories that contain executable files. The TOE is compiled with the /GS flag to enable stack-based buffer
overflow protection on the Windows Agent and Stack Smashing Protector (SSP) on the Linux Agent. Both agents
are compatible with their platform’s security features. The TOE uses standard platform APIs and includes only the
third-party libraries it needs to perform its functionality. The TOE is versioned with SWID14
tags that comply with
the minimum requirements from ISO15
/IEC16
19770-2:2015 and provides the ability to check for updates to the
application software.
13 RFC – Request for Comments
14 SWID – Software Identification
15 ISO – International Organization for Standardization
16 IEC – International Electrotechnical Commission
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The TOE is distributed as an additional software package to the platform OS. The TOE is packaged such that its
removal results in the deletion of all traces of the application, except for configuration settings, output files, and
audit/log events. The TOE does not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
1.5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE provides trusted channels using its cryptographic functions to encrypt transmitted sensitive data. The
TOE secures communications using TLS v1.2 between itself and the Management Server.
1.5.3 Product Physical/Logical Features and Functionality not
included in the TOE
Features and Functionality that are not part of the evaluated configuration of the TOE are:
• Remote and cloud storage locations
• Cloud configuration deployments
• Functionality of the Management Server
1.5.4 Scope of Evaluation
The evaluation is limited in scope to the secure features described in the Protection Profile for Application
Software v1.3; March 01, 2019 (AS PP) and the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1,
12 February 2019 (TLS-PKG) and detailed in Section 1.5.2.
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2. Conformance Claims
This section provides the identification for any CC, PP, Technical Decisions (TD), and EAL package conformance
claims. Rationale is provided for any extensions or augmentations to the conformance claims. Rationale for CC
and PP conformance claims can be found in Section 9.1.
Table 4 – CC and PP Conformance
Common Criteria (CC)
Identification and
Conformance
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April
2017; CC Part 2 extended; CC Part 3 extended; PP claim to the Protection Profile for Application
Software v1.3; March 01, 2019 conformant; Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS),
Version 1.1, 12 February 2019.
PP Identification
Exact Conformance17 to the Protection Profile for Application Software v1.3; March 01, 2019 and
the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019.
TD Conformance
Conformance to the following TDs and Technical Queries are claimed for the Application Software
PP:
• TD0521: Updates to Certificate Revocation (FIA_X509_EXT.1)
• TD0519: Linux symbolic links and FMT_CFG_EXT.1
• TD0498: Application Software PP Security Objectives and Requirements Rationale
• TD0495: FIA_x509_EXT.1.2 Test Clarification
• TD0465: Configuration Storage for .NET Apps
• TD0445: User Modifiable File Definition
• TD0437: Supported Configuration Mechanism
• TD0435: Alternative to SELinux for FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3
• TD0434: Windows Desktop Applications Test
• TD0427: Reliable Time Source
• TD0416: Correction to FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Test Activity
Conformance to the following TDs is claimed for the TLS functional package:
• TD0442: Updated TLS Ciphersuites for TLS Package
• TD0513: CA Certificate loading
• TD0499: Testing with pinned certificates
17 Exact Conformance is a type of strict conformance such that the set of SFRs and the SPD/Objectives are exactly as presented within the
accepted PP and Extended PP without changes.
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3. Security Problem Definition
This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used and the manner in
which the TOE is expected to be employed. It provides the statements for the TOE security environment’s threats,
assumptions, and Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) as identified in the AS PP.
3.1 Threats
Table 5 describes the threats that the TOE is expected to address as defined in the AS PP.
Table 5 – Threats
Threat Description
T.LOCAL_ATTACK An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the same computing platform on which the
application executes. Attackers may provide maliciously formatted input to the application in the form of
files or other local communications.
T.NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure.
Attackers may engage in communications with the application software or alter communications between
the application software and other endpoints in order to compromise it.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure.
Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged between the application and other endpoints.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.
3.2 Assumptions
Table 6 describes the assumptions that are assumed to exist in the TOE’s operating environment as defined in the
AS PP.
Table 6 – Assumptions
Assumption Description
A.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a reliable time clock for its execution. This
includes the underlying platform and whatever runtime environment it provides to the TOE.
A.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers
the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
A.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software in
compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
There are no OSPs defined in the AS PP.
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4. Security Objectives
This section identifies the security objectives for the TOE and its supporting environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
Table 7 describes the security objectives that the TOE is required to meet as defined in the AS PP.
Table 7 – Security Objectives for the TOE
Objective Description
O.INTEGRITY Conformant TOEs ensure the integrity of their installation and update packages, and also leverage
execution environment-based mitigations. Software is seldom, if ever, shipped without errors. The ability
to deploy patches and updates to fielded software with integrity is critical to enterprise network security.
Processor manufacturers, compiler developers, execution environment vendors, and operating system
vendors have developed execution environment-based mitigations that increase the cost to attackers by
adding complexity to the task of compromising systems. Application software can often take advantage of
these mechanisms by using APIs provided by the runtime environment or by enabling the mechanism
through compiler or linker options.
Addressed by: FDP_DEC_EXT.1, FMT_CFG_EXT.1, FPT_AEX_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.1
O.MANAGEMENT To facilitate management by users and the enterprise, conformant TOEs provide consistent and supported
interfaces for their security-relevant configuration and maintenance. This includes the deployment of
applications and application updates through the use of platform-supported deployment mechanisms and
formats, as well as providing mechanisms for configuration. This also includes providing control to the user
regarding disclosure of any PII.
Addressed by: FMT_SMF.1, FPT_IDV_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FPR_ANO_EXT.1, FCS_COP.1(3)
O.PROTECTED_COMMS To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet modification) network attack threats,
conformant TOEs will use a trusted channel for sensitive data. Sensitive data includes cryptographic keys,
passwords, and any other data specific to the application that should not be exposed outside of the
application.
Addressed by: FTP_DIT_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.2, FCS_CKM_EXT.1, FCS_CKM.2,
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1, FDP_NET_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.1
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of user data in the event of loss of physical control of the
storage medium, conformant TOEs will use data-at-rest protection. This involves encrypting data and keys
stored by the TOE in order to prevent unauthorized access to this data. This also includes unnecessary
network communications whose consequence may be the loss of data.
Addressed by: FDP_DAR_EXT.1, FCS_STO_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_CKM.1(3), FCS_COP.1(1),
FCS_COP.1(2), FCS_COP.1(4)
O.QUALITY To ensure quality of implementation, conformant TOEs leverage services and APIs provided by the runtime
environment rather than implementing their own versions of these services and APIs. This is especially
important for cryptographic services and other complex operations such as file and media parsing.
Leveraging this platform behavior relies upon using only documented and supported APIs.
Addressed by: FMT_MEC_EXT.1, FPT_API_EXT.1, FPT_API_EXT.2, FPT_LIB_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.2,
FCS_CKM.1(1)
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Table 8 describes the security objectives that the TOE’s operating environment is required to meet as defined in
the AS PP.
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Table 8 – Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Assumption Description
OE.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This includes the underlying
operating system and any discrete execution environment provided to the TOE.
OE.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers
the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
OE.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software within
compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
Please refer to section 4.3 of the AS PP for a description of how the assumptions, threats, and organizational
security policies map to the security objectives defined in the AS PP.
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5. Extended Components
This section defines the extended SFRs and extended SARs met by the TOE.
5.1 Extended TOE Security Functional Components
Table 11 in section 7.2 below identifies the extended SFRs implemented by the TOE. These extended SFRs’
definitions are not repeated in this ST because they are taken directly from the AS PP and TLS-PKG.
5.2 Extended TOE Security Assurance Components
Table 9 identifies the extended SARs claimed for the TOE. These extended SARs’ definitions are taken directly from
the AS PP and are not repeated in this ST.
Table 9 – Extended TOE Security Assurance Components
Name Description
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
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6. Security Assurance Requirements
The AS PP identifies the SARs to frame the extent to which the evaluator assesses the documentation applicable
for the evaluation and performs independent testing.
This section lists the set of SARs that are required in evaluations against the AS PP. The AS PP is conformant to
Parts 2 (extended) and 3 (extended) of CC V3.1, Revision 5.
The general model for evaluation of TOEs against STs written to conform to PPs is as follows: after the ST has been
approved for evaluation, the ITSEF18
will obtain the TOE, supporting environment (if required), and the guidance
documentation for the TOE. The ITSEF is expected to perform actions mandated by the Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) for the ASE and ALC SARs. The ITSEF also performs the Assurance Activities contained within
the AS PP. The Assurance Activities that are captured in the AS PP also provide clarification as to what the
developer needs to provide to demonstrate the TOE is compliant with the PP.
The TOE security assurance requirements are identified in Table 10.
Table 10 – Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance Requirements
Security Target (ASE) Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ.1)
Security requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
Security problem definition (ASE_SPD.1)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Development (ADV) Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance documents (AGD) Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life Cycle Support (ALC) Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
TOE CM19 coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Timely Security Updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1)
Tests (ATE) Independent testing – Conformance (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability assessment (AVA) Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)
18 ITSEF – Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
19 CM – Configuration Management
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7. Security Functional Requirements
The individual SFRs are specified in the sections below. SFRs in this section are mandatory SFRs that any
conformant TOE must meet. Based on selections made in these SFRs, it will also be necessary to include some of
the selection-based SFRs in Appendix B. Optional or Objective SFRs may also be adopted from those listed in
Appendix A and Appendix C respectively.
The Assurance Activities defined in AS PP describe actions that the evaluator will take in order to determine
compliance of a particular TOE with the SFRs. The content of these Assurance Activities will therefore provide
more insight into deliverables required from TOE Developers.
7.1 Conventions
The conventions used in descriptions of the SFRs are as follows:
• Refinement: Indicated with bold text (e.g., [refinement]).
• Selection: Indicated with underlined text surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection]).
• Assignment: Indicated with italicized text surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment]).
• Assignment within a Selection: Indicated with italicized and underlined text surrounded by brackets (e.g.,
[assignment within a selection]).
• Refinement within a Selection: Indicated with bold and underlined text surrounded by brackets (e.g.,
[assignment within a selection]).
• Iteration: Indicated by appending the iteration number in parenthesis, e.g., (1), (2), (3).
• Extended SFRs are identified by having a label ‘EXT’ at the end of the SFR name.
Operations such as assignments and selections performed by the PP author are identified as shown above;
however, they do not appear within brackets. This is done intentionally to delineate between selections or
assignments made by the PP author and those made by the ST author. No refinements have been made by the ST
author other than grammatical and formatting corrections, or those made in places where a table reference differs
from that of the PP.
7.2 Security Functional Requirements
This section specifies the SFRs for the TOE and organizes the SFRs by CC class. Table 11 identifies all SFRs
implemented by the TOE and indicates the ST operations performed on each requirement. Note that some column
headers use the following abbreviations: S=Selection; A=Assignment; R=Refinement; I=Iteration.
Table 11 – TOE Security Functional Requirements
Name Description S A R I
Required SFRs
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services ✓
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services ✓
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials ✓ ✓
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Name Description S A R I
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data ✓
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources ✓ ✓
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications ✓ ✓
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions ✓ ✓
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information ✓
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities ✓ ✓
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions ✓ ✓
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 User of Third Party Libraries ✓
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update ✓
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit ✓
Selection-based SFRs
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation ✓ ✓ ✓
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment ✓ ✓
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption ✓ ✓ ✓
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation – Hashing ✓ ✓ ✓
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation – Signing ✓ ✓ ✓
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application ✓
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol ✓
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol ✓
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client Support for Renegotiation
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension ✓
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation ✓
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication ✓
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
7.2.1 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1(1)
The application shall [implement functionality] to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [
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• RSA20
schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048 bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS
PUB21
186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Appendix B.3",
• ECC22
schemes using “NIST23
curves” P-256, P-384 and [P-521] that meet the following: FIPS PUB
186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4
].
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1
The application shall [implement functionality] to perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key establishment method: [
• RSA-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as
specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017, “Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1”,
• Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST Special
Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes
Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”,
].
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1
The application shall [implement asymmetric key generation].
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1.1(1)
The application shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [
• AES24
-GCM25
(as defined in NIST SP26
800-38D) mode
] and cryptographic key sizes [128-bit, 256-bit] .
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation – Hashing
FCS_COP.1.1(2)
The application shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [SHA27
-256, SHA-384] and message digest sizes [256, 384] bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub
180-4.
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation – Signing
FCS_COP.1.1(3)
20 RSA – Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
21 PUB – Publication
22 ECC – Elliptic Curve Cryptography
23 NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology
24 AES – Advanced Encryption Standard
25 GCM – Galois Counter Mode
26 SP – Special Publication
27 SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm
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The application shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS
PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 4
].
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
FCS_COP.1.1(4)
The application shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm
• HMAC28
-SHA-256
and [
• SHA-384
] with key sizes [256, 384] and message digest sizes 256 and [384] bits that meet the following:
FIPS Pub 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code and FIPS Pub 180-4 Secure Hash
Standard.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The application shall [implement DRBG29
functionality] for its cryptographic operations.
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application
FCS_RBG_EXT.2.1
The application shall perform all deterministic random bit generation (DRBG) services in accordance with
NIST Special Publication 800-90A using [CTR30
_DRBG (AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.2.2
The deterministic RBG31
shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from a platform-
based DRBG and [a hardware-based noise source] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal
to the greatest security strength (according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1
The application shall [invoke the functionality provided by the platform to securely store [the application
token]] to non-volatile memory.
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1
The product shall implement [TLS as a client].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1
28 HMAC – Hash-based Message Authentication Code
29 DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator
30 CTR – Counter Mode
31 RBG – Random Bit Generation
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The product shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [no earlier TLS versions] as a client that supports the
cipher suites [
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288,
• TLS_ECDHE32
_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
] and also supports functionality for [session renegotiation].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2
The product shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier according to RFC
6125.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3
The product shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid [with no exceptions].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client Support for Renegotiation
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4.1
The product shall support secure renegotiation through use of the “renegotiation_info” TLS extension in
accordance with RFC 5746.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension
FCS_TLS_EXT.5.1
The product shall present the Supported Groups Extension in the Client Hello with the supported groups
[
• secp256r1,
• secp384r1,
• secp521r1,
].
7.2.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1
The application shall [protect sensitive data in accordance with FCS_STO_EXT.1] in non-volatile memory.
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1
The application shall restrict its access to [network connectivity].
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2
The application shall restrict its access to [no sensitive information repositories].
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FDP_NET_EXT.1.1
32 ECDHE – Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Ephemeral
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The application shall restrict network communication to [
• user-initiated communication for [checking for updates],
• [application-initiated TLS connections to the Management Server for configuration updates and
HTTP network communication for access to a CA server]
].
7.2.3 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1
The application shall [implement functionality] to validate certificates in accordance with the following
rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
• The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the
basicConstraints extension, that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and
that any path constraints are met.
• The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the
key usage field.
• The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [CRL as
specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3]
• The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage (EKU) field according to the
following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall
have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose
(id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the EKU field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-
kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the
Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose
(id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.
o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA)
purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2
The application shall treat a certificate as a CA certificate only if the basicConstraints extension is present
and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1
The application shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [TLS].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2
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When the application cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the
application shall [not accept the certificate].
7.2.4 Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1
The application shall provide only enough functionality to set new credentials when configured with
default credentials or no credentials.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2
The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect the application binaries
and data files from modification by normal unprivileged users.
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1
The application shall [invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform vendor for storing and
setting configuration options.]
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [
• [Query the version of the TOE
• Check for updates to the TOE]
].
7.2.5 Class FPR: Privacy
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
FPR_ANO_EXT.1.1
The application shall [not transmit PII over a network].
7.2.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1
The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for [no explicit exceptions].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2
The application shall [not allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3
The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the platform vendor.
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FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4
The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files unless
explicitly directed by the user to do so.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5
The application shall be built with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled.
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_API_EXT.1.1
The application shall use only documented platform APIs.
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_IDV_EXT.1.1
The application shall be versioned with [SWID tags that comply with minimum requirements from
ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015].
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 User of Third Party Libraries
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1
The application shall be packaged with only [the list of third-party libraries in Appendix B: Included Third-
Party Libraries].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
The application shall [provide the ability] to check for updates and patches to the application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The application shall [provide the ability] to query the current version of the application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4
The application installation package and its updates shall be digitally signed such that its platform can
cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5
The application is distributed [as an additional software package to the platform OS].
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1
The application shall be distributed using the format of the platform-supported package manager.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2
The application shall be packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of all traces of the
application, with the exception of configuration settings, output files, and audit/log events.
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7.2.7 Class FTP: Trusted Path/Channel
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1
The application shall [encrypt all transmitted [sensitive data] with [TLS as defined in the TLS Package]]
between itself and another trusted IT33
product.
33 IT – Information Technology
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8. TOE Summary Specification
This section presents information to detail how the TOE meets the functional requirements described in previous
sections of this ST.
8.1 TOE Security Functionality
Each of the security requirements and the associated descriptions correspond to the security functions. Hence,
each function is described by how it specifically satisfies each of its related requirements. This serves to both
describe the security functions and rationalize that the security functions satisfy the necessary requirements.
Table 12 – Mapping of TOE Security Functionality to Security Functional Requirements
TOE Security Function SFR ID34 Description
Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation – Hashing
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation – Signing
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client Support for Renegotiation
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension
User Data Protection FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
Identification and Authentication FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
Security Management FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Privacy FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
34 ID – Identification
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TOE Security Function SFR ID34 Description
Protection of the TSF FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 User of Third Party Libraries
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
Trusted Path / Channels FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
8.1.1 Cryptographic Support
The TOE implements the Acronis SCS Cryptographic Library to provide the required algorithms for all cryptographic
operations. Each of the cryptographic algorithms supported by the TOE have been tested and certified by the
CAVP35
. See Table 13 below for the cryptographic operations implemented by the TOE.
Table 13 – Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes
Cryptographic Operation Usage Algorithm Key Lengths / Curves / Moduli Certificate
Encryption/Decryption TLS AES-GCM 128, 256 CAVP C1351
Key Pair Generation TLS RSA 2048, 3072 CAVP C1351
ECDSA NIST P curves with sizes 256, 384, and 521 CAVP C1351
Digital Signature Generation
Digital Signature Verification
TLS RSA 2048, 3072 CAVP C1351
Key Establishment TLS RSA 2048, 3072, 4096 N/A36
ECDHE NIST P curves with sizes 256, 384, and 521 CAVP C1351
Message Digest TLS SHA-256,
SHA-384
256, 384 CAVP C1351
Message Authentication TLS HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384
256, 384 CAVP C1351
Deterministic Random Bit Generation DRBG CTR_DRBG (AES) 256 CAVP C1351
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 and FCS_CKM.1(1)
The TOE implements asymmetric key generation. The schemes implemented by the TOE to generate asymmetric
cryptographic keys for key establishment and entity authentication are the RSA and ECC schemes. The RSA keys
and key sizes listed in Table 13 are generated for key establishment and entity authentication for TLS. The ECDHE
keys and NIST P curves listed in Table 13 are generated for key establishment and entity authentication for TLS.
Both RSA and ECC key generation schemes that are implemented by the TOE meet FIPS PUB 186-4.
35 CAVP – Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
36 N/A – Not Applicable
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FCS_CKM.2
The TOE implements both RSA and elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes for TLS. The RSA-based
schemes meet RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017. The elliptic-curve based schemes for
ECDHE meet NIST SP-800 56A. The key sizes and curves used for the key establishment schemes are listed in Table
13.
FCS_COP.1(1)
The TOE performs AES encryption and decryption for TLS v1.2 trusted channel communications. The AES algorithm
operates in GCM mode with key sizes of 128 and 256 bits. In TLS sessions, the TOE acts as a TLS client for
connections to the Management Server from itself. Please refer to FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 for more information on the
implementation of the TLS protocol.
FCS_COP.1(2) and FCS_COP.1(4)
Hashing services are performed by the TOE with the SHA-256 and SHA-384 algorithms and the message digest
sizes of 256 and 384 in accordance with FIPS Pub 180-4. The hash functions are used with other TOE cryptographic
functions, including digital signature verification and MACs37
. The HMAC-SHA-256 cryptographic algorithm uses
the SHA-256 hash function with a cryptographic key size of 256 bits and 256-bit message digest size in accordance
with FIPS Pub 198-1. The HMAC-SHA-384 cryptographic algorithm uses the SHA-384 hash function with a
cryptographic key size of 384 bits and 384-bit message digest size in accordance with FIPS Pub 198-1.
FCS_COP.1(3)
For signature generation and verification, the TOE uses the RSA algorithm. The RSA algorithm meets FIPS PUB 186-
4 Section 4 and uses the key sizes of 2048 and 3072 bits. The RSA algorithm is used for TLS connections.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and FCS_RBG_EXT.2
The TOE implements the SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG (AES) for all deterministic random bit generation services. The
CTR_DRBG is seeded with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy via RDRAND that accumulates entropy from the Intel
DRNG. The amount of entropy used to seed the CTR_DRBG corresponds to the greatest security strength of the
algorithms included in the ST (AES-256). Refer to Tables 2 and 3 of NIST SP 800-57A for more information on the
algorithm security strengths.
FCS_STO_EXT.1
The TOE leverages the Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI) to securely store the TOE’s application token for the
Windows Agent. On Linux, the application token is securely stored using the Linux keyring. The application token
is used by the TOE to identify itself to the Management Server when downloading configuration settings. The
initial application token is generated by the Management Server when the TOE is installed and added as a device
to the Management Server.
FCS_TLS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.4, and FCS_TLSC_EXT.5
The TOE only implements TLS as a client and is not a TLS server.
The TOE implements client-side TLS v1.2 for secure connections from itself to the Management Server. The client-
side TLS v1.2 connections support the following cipher suites:
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288
37 MAC – Message Authentication Code
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• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
The TOE looks for the common name in the subject name or the DNS name in the subject alternative name (SAN)
of the server’s certificate as the identifier for the Management Server. The reference identifier is established
during installation when the Management Server’s name is entered in the connection information. Use of IP
addresses and wildcards as the identifiers is supported but are discouraged as identifiers. When constructing the
certificate, the SAN is mandated for IP identifiers and not mandated for DNS identifiers. The use of certificate
pinning is not supported.
If the server’s certificate is not valid, the TOE will not establish a connection.
The TOE also supports functionality for session renegotiation. The TOE supports the "renegotiation_info" TLS
extension in accordance with RFC 5746. It includes the renegotiation_info extension in ClientHello messages.
The TOE uses its Acronis SCS Cryptographic Library to support elliptic curves in TLS and presents the Supported
Groups Extension in the ClientHello with NIST curves secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FCS_CKM.1(1), FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM_EXT.1, FCS_COP.1(1),
FCS_COP.1(2), FCS_COP.1(3), FCS_COP.1(4), FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.2, FCS_STO_EXT.1, FCS_TLS_EXT.1,
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.4, FCS_TLSC_EXT.5
8.1.2 User Data Protection
FDP_DAR_EXT.1
The TOE protects sensitive data in accordance with FCS_STO_EXT.1 when it is stored in non-volatile memory. The
application token used to identify the TOE to the Management Server is the only sensitive data that the TOE stores.
No other forms of sensitive data are stored by the TOE. The TOE runs as a service in the evaluated configuration
and does not require any user credentials to operate.
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 and FDP_NET_EXT.1
The TOE restricts its access to platform hardware resources to network connectivity. This is for the TLS connections
described in FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 and the HTTP connections to the CA server in the TOE environment. The TLS
connections include the TOE initiating a TLS v1.2 connection to the Management Server’s API Gateway and a user-
initiated TLS v1.2 connection to the internet for an update check. The TOE initiates communication with the CA
server when preforming certificate revocation checking.
The TOE does not access any of the sensitive information repositories on the host platform.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FDP_DAR_EXT.1, FDP_DEC_EXT.1, FDP_NET_EXT.1
8.1.3 Identification and Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1 and FIA_X509_EXT.2
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 when it acts as a TLS client for TLS. The TOE does not
support TLS mutual authentication but will validate the Management Server’s certificate before establishing a
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connection. The TOE implements the following rules when validating the Management Server’s certificate when
connecting to it:
• Certificate validation and certificate path validation as per RFC 5280.
• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
• The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension,
that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and that any path constraints are met.
• The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the key usage field.
• The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using a CRL as specified in RFC 5280
Section 6.3.
• The application shall reject expired certificates.
• The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with
OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
If the TOE cannot establish a connection to the CA server’s CRL to determine the revocation status of a certificate,
it does not accept the certificate.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2
8.1.4 Security Management
FMT_CFG_EXT.1
The TOE does not install with any default credentials. Rather, it uses the platform’s service accounts to run and is
available to any user logged into the platform. It is configured by default with file permissions that protect the
application binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged users. This prevents a standard user
from modifying the application or its data files.
FMT_MEC_EXT.1
The TOE does not store or set any security-related settings. Non-security-related settings are stored on the
Management Server and are queried when performing tasks. The TOE does not provide any management features
that write or change settings.
FMT_SMF.1
The TOE contains the version-check tool that provides the security-related management functionality. Any user
that is logged into the platform may access the TOE’s version-check tool. The TOE is capable of performing the
following security-related management functions:
• Query the version of the TOE. Using the version-check tool, a user can see the current version of the
TOE.
• Check for updates to the TOE. Using the version-check tool, a user can check if there are any updates
available for the TOE.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FMT_CFG_EXT.1, FMT_MEC_EXT.1, FMT_SMF.1
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8.1.5 Privacy
FPR_ANO_EXT.1
The TOE does not transmit PII.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FPR_ANO_EXT.1
8.1.6 Protection of the TSF
FPT_AEX_EXT.1
The TOE does not make requests to map memory at an explicit address and is compiled with ASLR enabled. The
TOE does not allocate any memory regions with write and execute permissions. The TOE is compatible with the
platform’s security features. More specifically, the application can run successfully with Windows Defender Exploit
Guard configured with the following minimum mitigations enabled: Control Flow Guard (CFG), Randomize
memory allocations (Bottom-Up ASLR), Export address filtering (EAF), Import address filtering (IAF), and Data
Execution Prevention (DEP). The TOE is also compatible with SELinux enabled and in enforcing mode. The TOE
does not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files. The Windows Agent is compiled
with the /GS flag enabled by default for stack-based buffer overflow protection and the /NXCOMPAT flag to enable
DEP protections for the application. The Linux Agent uses the __stack_chk_fail symbol in ELF executable files for
stack-based buffer overflow protection.
FPT_API_EXT.1
The TOE uses only the documented platform APIs listed in Appendix A: Supported Platform APIs.
FPT_IDV_EXT.1
The TOE is versioned with SWID tags that comply with the minimum requirements from ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015.
FPT_LIB_EXT.1
The TOE is packaged with the third-party libraries listed in Appendix B: Included Third-Party Libraries.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 and FPT_TUD_EXT.2
The TOE provides the ability to check for updates and patches to the application software. To check for an update,
the user of the platform runs the TOE’s shell script “Update.ps1” for Windows or “Update.sh” for Linux. If no
update is found, the script will report the current version of the TOE and “Installed version is the latest, no update
available”. If an update is found, the script will report the current version and “Update Available”.
The TOE does not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code. The TOE’s Windows and Linux
installation packages and its updates are digitally signed so that the platform can verify their signatures before
installation. The packages are digitally signed using a 2048-bit RSA key and SHA-256 digest algorithm. The
authorized sources of the Linux and Windows installer signatures are Acronis International GmbH, issued by
GlobalSign and Acronis SCS, Inc., issued by DigiCert respectively.
The TOE is distributed as an additional software package to the platform OS. The Windows Agent is packaged in
the standard executable (.exe) format and the Linux Agent is packaged as an executable binary (.x86_64). The TOE
is packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of all traces of the application, with the exception of
configuration settings, output files, and audit/log events.
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TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FPT_AEX_EXT.1, FPT_API_EXT.1, FPT_IDV_EXT.1, FPT_LIB_EXT.1,
FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.2
8.1.7 Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_DIT_EXT.1
The TOE encrypts all transmitted sensitive data between itself and the Management Server with TLSv1.2. Please
refer to the section FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 for more details.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FTP_DIT_EXT.1
8.2 Timely Security Updates
To keep the TOE secure, Acronis SCS plans to fix security issues depending on the following severity:
• Critical: hotfix and workaround are immediately required.
• High: hotfix or nearest update, if update is within 3-4 weeks (15-20 business days).
• Low-Medium: next major version or update.
Issues severity are calculated according to CVSSv3 methodology. For some issues custom severity can be set by
security team when CVSSv3 is not appropriate. For example, privacy issues may be
prioritized much beyond CVSS score.
If issue was reported by 3rd-party and is subject for public disclosure, the fixes will be released within the
negotiated disclosure period.
Acronis SCS will disclose the following information for vulnerabilities:
• Release Notes will contain information that security issues were fixed in a specific release or update.
• Release Notes will contain issue IDs and severity in a qualitative form if they are worth mentioning.
• In special cases, the details of security issues may be disclosed to customers when it's important to let
customers know if their systems/data are at risk.
• Acronis SCS will not disclose details of vulnerabilities in documentation.
The Acronis SCS Support team will notify customers about security issues related to the TOE in following cases:
1. Issue severity is Critical
2. Issue severity is High and the issue is known to 3rd-party (external report or a known exploitation).
The notification will be sent to the most relevant group of customers and include enough information to
understand the following:
1. The risk associated with the issue
2. Conditions under which a customer’s system is vulnerable
3. Necessary steps to mitigate the risk
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Customers that purchase the TOE may email appsupport@acronisscs.com to report security issues pertaining to
the TOE. A public key and disclosure policy are posted to the Acronis SCS GitHub
(https://github.com/acronisscs/public_disclosure) for use in securing the contents of any security related email.
Any update that is released, related to security fixes or not, is deployed to the Acronis SCS website for download.
Customers may refer to the email or use the check for update process to see if a new version is available for their
installation. Updates can then be downloaded and applied to the TOE as needed.
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9. Rationale
9.1 Conformance Claims Rationale
This Security Target extends Part 2 and extends to Part 3 of the Common Criteria Standard for Information
Technology Security Evaluations, Version 3.1 Revision 5. This ST conforms to the AS PP and TLS-PKG.
9.1.1 Variance Between the PP and this ST
There is no variance between the AS PP, TLS-PKG, and this ST.
9.1.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The assumptions, threats, OSPs, and objectives defined in this ST are those specified in the AS PP and TLS-PKG.
This ST maintains exact conformance to the AS PP and TLS-PKG, including the assurance requirements listed in
Section 5 of the AS PP. The TOE is a standalone application that runs on a Windows and Linux desktop platforms
and is applicable to the AS PP and TLS-PKG.
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10. Acronyms
Table 14 defines the acronyms used throughout this document.
Table 14 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
AS PP Protection Profile for Application Software v1.3; March 01, 2019
ASLR Address Space Layout Randomization
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
CFG Control Flow Guard
CLI Command Line Interface
CM Configuration Management
CTR Counter Mode
DEP Data Execution Protection
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSS Digital Signature Standard
EAF Export address filtering
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDHE Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Ephemeral
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GB Gigabyte
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hypertext Transport Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transport Protocol Secure
IAF Import address filtering
ID Identification
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information Technology
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Acronym Definition
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MAC Message Authentication Code
MB Megabyte
N/A Not Applicable
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OS Operating System
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PII Personally Identifiable Information
PP Protection Profile
PUB Publication
RAM Random Access Memory
RBG Random Bit Generation
RFC Request for Comments
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SP Special Publication
SQL Structured Query Language
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
ST Security Target
SWID Software Identification
TD Technical Decisions
TLS Transport Layer Security
TLS-PKG Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019
TOE Target of Evaluation
UI User Interface
VM Virtual Machine
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Appendix A: Supported Platform APIs
The following is a list of the supported platform APIs that the TOE uses:
• For Windows:
o ReadFile
o WriteFile
o NtQueryInformationFile
o UnlockFile
o LockFile
o Send
o Recv
o RegQueryInfoKeyA
o RegOpenKey
o RegSetInfoKey
o RegQueryValue
o RegCloseKey
o RegQueryMutlipleValueKey
o ExitThread
o CreateThread
• For Linux:
o mount
o mkdir
o exec
o mv
o sudo
o chroot
o uname
o gawk
o echo
o cp
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Appendix B: Included Third-party Libraries
Table 15 provides a list of the included third-party libraries that the Windows Agent uses.
Table 15 – Included Third-party Windows Libraries
Library Library Library
curl.dll icudt38.dll mspack.dll
tcmalloc.dll zstd.dll python35.dll
icu38.dll re2.dll winpthreads4.dll
Table 16 provides a list of the included third-party libraries that the Linux Agent uses.
Table 16 – Included Third-party Linux Libraries
Library Library Library
_ctypes.so libftp_item_provider.so libpybind_tol_supp.so
_multiprocessing.so libgtob_backup_command_addon.so libpython35.so
_psycopg.so
libgtob_ensure_backup_invariants_comma
nd_addon.so libre2.so
_socket.so libgtob_restore_command_addon.so libremote_facade.so
_sqlite3.so libhotplug_supp.so libresource.so
_ssl.so libhttp.so librestore_vm_addon.so
acrort.so libhuman_resolving_mms.so librsm_commands_addon.so
libabr10cli.so libicu38.so librsmdb_upgrade.so
libabr11cli.so libicudt38.so libscsi.so
libaccess_manager.so libinfra_upgrade.so libsecurity_core.so
libaccount_server_client.so libipc_client.so libselect_media_addon.so
libagent_live_upgrade.so libipc_server.so libservice_commands_addon.so
libagent_protection_addon.so libjwt.so libsession_manager.so
libaio.so libkvm.so libsettings.so
libalerts.so liblibatq.so libsettings_upgrade.so
libamsdb_upgrade.so liblibcrypto10.so libslang.so
libarchive_mount_helper.so liblibevent.so libsmb_file_item_provider.so
libarchive3.so liblibsmtp.so libsmb_supp.so
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Library Library Library
libarchive3_adapter.so liblibssl10.so libsqlite3.so
libasn_upgrade.so liblocal_file_item_provider.so libssl10.so
libasndb_upgrade.so liblog_commands_addon.so libstaging_command.so
libasync_service.so liblogging.so libsync_connectivity_agent_addon.so
libasyncipc.so liblogs_upgrade.so libsysinfo_download_addon.so
libatp_upgrade.so liblx_supp.so libtcmalloc.so
libauto_update_addon.so libMachineInstanceProvider.so libthread_pool.so
libboot_assist.so libmake_shallow_copy_command.so libtm_client.so
libcommon_archive_addon.so libmms_recovery_assistant_addon.so libtol_tools.so
libcore_workers_shared_context.so libmms_rest_api.so libulxmlrpcpp.so
libcounter_service_addon.so libmms_text_bundle.so libunified_access_upgrade.so
libcounters.so libmmsdb_upgrade.so libunwind.so
libcrypto10.so libmsp_license_addon.so libupgrade_host.so
libcurl.so libmsp_mms.so libvirt_gtob_addon.so
libdbus-1.so libmspack.so libvirt_task_handlers_registry.so
libdelayed_delivery.so libmsvpc_wst.so libVirtualMachineInstanceProvider.so
libdisk_item_provider.so libnewt.so libvmb_upgrade.so
libDiskBundle.so libnfs_item_provider.so libvmware_srv.so
libdml.so libnfs_supp.so libzmq_infra.so
libdml_sqlite_addon.so libnfs_vfs_addon.so libzstd.so
libdms_provider.so libnotification_upgrade.so pyastorage_client.so
libdms_tapes_provider.so libonline_archives_upgrade.so pyexpat.so
libdsk_supp.so libpcs_io.so select.so
libexpat.so libpopt.so ujson.so
libfile_backup.so libpor.so unicodedata.so
libfiles_tree_download_addon.so libporconv.so
Prepared by:
Corsec Security, Inc.
13921 Park Center Road, Suite 460
Herndon, VA 20171
United States of America
Phone: +1 703 267 6050
Email: info@corsec.com
http://www.corsec.com