Infoblox Trinzic Appliances with NIOS 7.1
Validation Report, Version 1.0
National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Infoblox Trinzic Appliances with NIOS 7.1
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10624-2015
Dated: December 21, 2015
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory National Security Agency
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Paul A. Bicknell
Patrick Mallett
Brad O’Neill
Jay Vora
Evaluation Team
Cheryl Dugan
Eve Pierre
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Computer Sciences Corporation
7459A Candlewood Road
Hanover, Maryland 21076
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification
Agent for the end-user with determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product in their environment. End-users should review both the Security Target
(ST), which is where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this
Validation Report (VR), which describes how those security claims were evaluated.
This report documents the assessment by the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of the Infoblox Trinzic Appliances with NIOS
7.1, the Target of Evaluation (TOE), performed by Computer Sciences Corporation. It
presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This
report is not an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. government, and no
warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) of Hanover,
MD in accordance with the United States evaluation scheme and completed on December
21, 2015. The information in this report is largely derived from the ST, the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and the functional testing report. The evaluation was performed
to conform to the requirements of the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4, dated September 2012 at Evaluation
Assurance Level 1, and the Common Evaluation Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
The TOE is a network appliance that provides delivery of IP network services and
management including: DNS, DHCP, IPAM, FTP, TFTP and HTTP.
The Evaluation Team performed an analysis of the international interpretations of the
CC, CEM and determined that none of the international interpretations issued by the
Common Criteria Interpretations Management Board (CCIMB) were applicable to this
evaluation.
The TOE is also compliant with all International interpretations with effective dates on or
before September 19, 2011.
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2. IDENTIFICATION
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform
trusted product evaluations. Under this program, commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1 through EAL 4 in
accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation conduct security evaluations.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security
evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated;
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product;
 The conformance result of the evaluation;
 Any Protection Profile to which the product is conformant;
 The organizations participating in the evaluation.
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Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Target of Evaluation Infoblox Trinzic Appliances with NIOS 7.1
Protection Profile
NIAP Peripheral Sharing Switch for Human Interface Devices Protection
Profile, Version 3.0, February 13, 2015
Security Target Infoblox Trinzic Appliances with NIOS 7.1, version 2.3, December, 2015
Dates of evaluation August 31, 2015 – December 21, 2015
Evaluation Technical Report Infoblox Trinzic Appliances with NIOS 7.1 Assurance Activity Report, v1.0
Conformance Result
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2012-09-001,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB-2012-09-002,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2012-09-003,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
4. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2012-09-004, Version
3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
The following CC conformance:
 Part 2 extended
 Part 3 conformant
5. Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 1.1, 08 June 2012
6. Security Requirements for Network Devices Errata #3, 03 November
2014.
Common Criteria version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version
3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) version
CEM version 3.1R4, September 2012
Sponsor Infoblox
Developer Infoblox
Evaluators Cheryl Dugan, Eve Pierre
Validation Team
Paul A. Bicknell, Patrick Mallett, Brad O’Neill, Jay Vora
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3. SECURITY POLICY
The TOE is intended to be used in a range of security settings (i.e. computers coupled to
a single TOE can vary from non-classified Internet connected to those protected in
accordance with national security policy). Any data leakage across the TOE may cause
severe damage to the organization and therefore must be prevented.
4. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
4.1.Assumptions
The ST identified the following security assumptions:
Table: Secure Usage Assumptions
Assumption Definition
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE It is assumed that there are no general-purpose computing
capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) available
on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the
operation, administration and support of the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and
the data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the
environment.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators and users are trusted to follow and apply all
guidance in a trusted manner.
4.2.Threats
The ST identified the following threats addressed by the TOE:
Table: Threats
Threat Definition
T.ADMIN_ERROR An administrator may unintentionally install or configure the TOE
incorrectly, resulting in ineffective security mechanisms.
T.TSF_FAILURE Security mechanisms of the TOE may fail, leading to a compromise of
the TSF.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIONS Malicious remote users or external IT entities may take actions that
adversely affect the security of the TOE. These actions may remain
undetected and thus their effects cannot be effectively mitigated.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS A user may gain unauthorized access to the TOE data and TOE
executable code. A malicious user, process, or external IT entity may
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masquerade as an authorized entity in order to gain unauthorized access
to data or TOE resources. A malicious user, process, or external IT
entity may misrepresent itself as the TOE to obtain identification and
authentication data.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE A malicious party attempts to supply the end user with an update to the
product that may compromise the security features of the TOE
T.USER_DATA_REUSE User data may be inadvertently sent to a destination not intended by the
original sender.
4.3.Organizational Security Policies
The Security Target identifies the following Organizational Security Policies
(OSPs) to which the TOE must comply.
Table 2: Organizational Security Policies
OSP Definition
P.ACCESS_BANNER The TOE shall display an initial banner describing
restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other
appropriate information to which users consent by
accessing the TOE.
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5. ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION
5.1. Physical Scope and Boundary
This section provides an overview of the Infoblox Trinzic Appliances running NIOS 7.1
Target of Evaluation (TOE). The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The
hardware is comprised of the following: ND-800, TE-810, TE-820, TE-1410, TE-1420,
PT-1400, ND-1400, TE-2210, TE- 2220, PT-2200, ND-2200, IB-4010, IB-4020, PT-
4000, PT-4000-10G, IB-4030, IB-4030-10G, ND-4000. The software is comprised of the
NIOS 7.1.
Common hardware characteristics of all models listed above are as follows:
 The TE and IB versions are identical in terms of hardware, but based on a
software license, the CPU clock may be throttled to a lower performance
level.
 The ND versions have additional memory, additional disk storage and an
additional processor socket compared to the Base Appliance.
 The TR versions have additional disk storage compared to the Base
Appliance.
Figure 2 below depicts the typical physical aspects of the Infoblox Trinzic Appliances.
Figure 1: Infoblox Trinzic Appliance
5.1.1. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software, and Firmware
The TOE incorporates all hardware, software and firmware of the appliances listed in
Table 1 of the ST. Depending on the administrator defined configuration, the TOE may
require the following services to be present in the environment:
 Active Directory when the TOE is configured to use an external
authentication source
 NTP server when the TOE is configured to use an NTP server
 Kerberos server where GSS-TSIG or external authentication is enabled
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5.1.2. Evaluated Configuration
In the evaluated configuration the TOE is deployed as described in the guidance
documents which are delivered with the TOE. The TOE is evaluated using the following
configuration settings:
 TSIG is configured for dynamic DNS updates from ISC DHCP servers
and DNS clients (if applicable to the environment)
 GSS-TSIG is configured for dynamic DNS updates from Microsoft DHCP
servers and DNS servers and clients (if applicable to the environment)
 bloxTools is disabled
 SSH is disabled (CLI access is performed via the local console port)
 RADIUS authentication is disabled
 TACACS+ authentication is disabled
 Secure Copy (SCP) is disabled / not used
 Grid must NOT be configured
5.2.Logical Scope and Boundary
The TOE logical boundary is comprised of the following security functions:
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic Support
 Full Residual Information Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channels
These features are described in more detail in the subsections below. In addition, the TOE
implements all SFRs of the NDPP v1.1 as necessary to satisfy testing/assurance measures
prescribed therein.
Given that this Security Target conforms to the NDPP, the security claims focus on the
TOE as a secure network infrastructure device and do not focus on other key functions
provided by the TOE, such as Secure DNS. However, those functions can be freely used
without affecting the claimed and evaluated security functions; they simply have not been
evaluated to work correctly themselves.
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5.2.1. Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records associated with use of the administrative functions.
Audit records may be stored locally and sent to a syslog server. The TOE deletes the
oldest records if the audit trail exceeds a defined maximum. A local time source supports
reliable time stamps for the audit function. Auditable events include those requirements
stated in Table 1 of the U.S. Government Protection Profile for Security Requirements
for Network Devices (NDPP) ver. 1.1, dated June 8, 2012.
Note: if the TOE is configured to transmit its audit logs to an external syslog server then
that
5.2.2. Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of Infoblox Trinzic security functionality. All
algorithms have been validated against CAVP requirements
(http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/). See table 2 below for certificate references.
Table 3: FIPS References
Algorithm Support Mode CAVP Cert. #
SHS Intel Xeon, Intel Pentium 1839
RSA/ rDSA Intel Xeon, Intel Pentium 1085
AES Intel Xeon, Intel Pentium 2115
HMAC Intel Xeon, Intel Pentium 1287
RNG Intel Xeon, Intel Pentium 1086
DRBG Intel Xeon, Intel Pentium 835
The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are described in Table 3 below.
Table 4: TOE Provided Cryptography
Cryptographic Method Use within the TOE
SHS Used to provide TLS traffic integrity verification
RSA/ rDSA Used in TLS session establishment, trusted update signature
verification
AES Used to encrypt TLS session traffic
RNG Used in TLS session establishment
DRBG Used in random number Generation
5.2.3. Full Residual Information Protection
The TOE ensures that all information flows from the TOE do not contain residual
information from previous traffic. Residual data is never transmitted from the TOE. The
TOE ensures that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable
upon the allocation of the resource to all objects by clearing the residual information
before network packets are sent from the TOE.
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5.2.4. Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOEs
secure CLI administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to
authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The
TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters as well as
mandatory password complexity rules. The TOE provides administrator authentication
against a local user database. Password based authentication can be performed on the
serial console
5.2.5. Security Management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE
configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE
administration occurs either through a secure TLS session or via a local console
connection. The TOE provides the ability to securely manage:
 All TOE administrative users;
 All identification and authentication;
 All audit functionality of the TOE;
 All TOE cryptographic functionality;
 The timestamps maintained by the TOE;
 Update to the TOE; and
 TOE configuration file storage and retrieval.
A user must have an admin account to log in to the TOE. Each admin account belongs to
an admin group, which contains roles and permissions that determine the tasks a user can
perform.
The TOE provides a default superuser admin group, called admin-group, with one
superuser administrator, admin. The default superuser admin can log in to the TOE, using
the default user name admin and password infoblox.Superuser admins are the security
admins and have full access and control of all the operations of a TOE. Note that you
must change the default user name and password of the default superuser admin to
prevent unauthorized access to the TOE.
Only superusers can do the following:
 Create admin accounts and groups.
 Set password parameters.
 Create the login banner.
 Set the session timeout
Limited-access admin groups provide their members with read-only or read/write access
to specific resources. These admin groups can access the appliance through the GUI, API,
or both. They cannot access the appliance through the console. In addition, limited-access
admins are not allowed to perform the following tasks:
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 Download the support bundle.
 Enable SNMP on Grid members.
 Upload files that are larger than 100 MB.
If the file size is greater than the maximum size allowed, the Upload dialog box closes
and an error message is displayed in the feedback panel. The attempt to upload a file that
exceeded the maximum will be logged to syslog. non‐superusers only are able to upload
files for file distribution and do CSV import.
5.2.6. Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by
implementing identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to
Authorized Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and
passwords.
5.2.7. TOE Access
The TOE provides administrative access via a console port (local) and HTTPS (remote).
The TOE provides a password-based logon mechanism for local and remote access and
enforces a defined password complexity and expiration policy. The TOE optionally
supports authentication against an Active Directory server.
The TOE enforces Role Based Access Control (RBAC), session timeouts and displays an
advisory banner at login.
The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable
time period. Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-
authenticate to establish a new session.
The TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the CLI
management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
5.2.8. Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE initiates outbound TLS tunnels to transmit audit logs to remote syslog servers.
In addition, TLS is used to secure the session between the TOE and the authentication
servers.
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6. DOCUMENTATION
The following guidance documents are provided with the TOE upon delivery in
accordance with the PP:
 Infoblox 800 Series Installation Guide
 Infoblox 1400 Series Installation Guide
 Infoblox NIOS Administrator Guide, Release 7
All documentation delivered with the product is relevant to and within the scope of the
TOE.
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7. IT PRODUCT TESTING
This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team.
7.1. Evaluation team independent testing
The evaluation team conducted independent testing at the Infoblox facilities in Santa
Clara, California. The evaluation team configured the TOE according to vendor
installation instructions and the evaluated configuration as identified in the Security
Target.
The evaluation team confirmed the technical accuracy of the setup and installation guide
during installation of the TOE. The evaluation team confirmed that the TOE version
delivered for testing was identical to the version identified in the ST.
The evaluation team used the Protection Profile test procedures as a basis for creating
each of the Independent tests as required by the Assurance Activities.
Each Assurance Activity was tested as required by the conformant Protection Profiles and
the evaluation team verified that each test passed.
7.2.Vulnerability analysis
The evaluation team performed a vulnerability analysis of the TOE evidence and a search
of publicly available information to identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE. Based
on the results of this effort, there were no identifiable vulnerabilities found at the time of
certification.
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8. RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme (CCEVS) processes and procedures. The TOE was evaluated against
the criteria contained in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1R4. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to
conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1R4.
Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) has determined that the product meets the security
criteria in the Security Target, which specifies conformance to the Protection Profile for
Network Devices, version 1.1, June 8, 2012 and the Security Requirements for Network
Devices Errata #3, November 3, 2014. A team of Validators, on behalf of the CCEVS
Validation Body, monitored the evaluation. The evaluation effort was finished on
December 21, 2015.
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VALIDATOR COMMENTS
The validation team’s observations support the evaluation team’s conclusion that the
Infoblox Trinzic Appliances with NIOS 7.1 meets the claims stated in the Security
Target.
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9. ANNEXES
None
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10. SECURITY TARGET
Infoblox Trinzic Appliances with NIOS 7.1 Security Target, version 2.3, December 2015.
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11. GLOSSARY
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL): An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP)
and approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Evaluation: The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence: Any tangible resource (information) required from the
sponsor or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE): A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security
evaluation under the CC.
 Threat: Means through which the ability or intent of a threat agent to adversely
affect the primary functionality of the TOE, facility that contains the TOE, or
malicious operation directed towards the TOE. A potential violation of security.
 Validation: The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body: A governmental organization responsible for carrying out
validation and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria
Evaluation and Validation Scheme.
 Vulnerabilities: A vulnerability is a hardware, firmware, or software flaw that
leaves an Automated Information System (AIS) open for potential exploitation. A
weakness in automated system security procedures, administrative controls, physical
layout, internal controls, and so forth, which could be exploited by a threat to gain
unauthorized access to information or disrupt critical processing.
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12. BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1 Revision 4,
September 2012.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Components, CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 Revision 4,
September 2012.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 Revision 4,
September 2012.
4. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012.
5. Infoblox Trinzic Appliances with NIOS 7.1, version 2.3
6. Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC): Infoblox Trinzic Appliances with NIOS
7.1 Assurance Activity Report, v1.0