BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022
for
MTCOS Smart Tachograph V2 / SLE78CFX4000P
from
MaskTech International GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022(*)
Digital Tachograph: Tachograph Cards
MTCOS Smart Tachograph V2 / SLE78CFX4000P
from MaskTech International GmbH
PP Conformance: Digital Tachograph - Tachograph Card (TC PP)
Version 1.0, 19 May 2017, BSI-CC-PP-0091-2017
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and
AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5, CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1 and in
accordance with the COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2016/799 and
2021/1228. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 3 June 2022
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................16
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................16
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................17
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................20
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................20
12. Tachograph Regulation-specific Aspects.................................................................20
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................21
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................24
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................27
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................28
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 3 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 519
6 / 29
BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC Part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product MTCOS Smart Tachograph V2 / SLE78CFX4000P has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product MTCOS Smart Tachograph V2 / SLE78CFX4000P was
conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed
on 31 May 2022. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: MaskTech International
GmbH.
The product was developed by: MaskTech International GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 3 June 2022
is valid until 2 June 2027. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022 Certification Report
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product MTCOS Smart Tachograph V2 / SLE78CFX4000P has been included in the
BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
MaskTech International GmbH
Nordostpark 45
90411 Nürnberg
Germany
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product MTCOS Smart Tachograph V2 /
SLE78CFX4000P developed and provided by MaskTech International GmbH.
The TOE is a second generation version 2 Tachograph Card in the sense of
COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2016/799 [15] and COMMISSION
IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/1228 [17], Annex 1C. It is intended to be used
in the 1st
generation and 2nd
generation version 2 Digital Tachograph Systems, which
contain additionally further components as motion sensors (of the 1st
or 2nd
generation),
vehicle units (of the 1st
or 2nd
generation), remote early detection communication readers
and, if applicable, external GNSS modules and remote communication facilities.
The TOE provides different configurations and is implemented in the four different card
types as driver card, workshop card, control card and company card in accordance with
the Digital Tachograph System specifications given by COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING
REGULATION (EU) 2016/799 [15] and COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION
(EU) 2021/1228 [17], Annex 1C, Appendix 2, Appendix 10 and Appendix 11.
Note: The COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2016/799 [15] in its
consolidated version covers the COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU)
2018/502 [16] and is therefore not mentioned explicitly in the following.
The TOE is interoperable with both Digital Tachograph Systems. It contains two
Tachograph Card Applications, the first application being usable within the 1st
generation
Digital Tachograph System, the second one being usable within the 2nd
generation
version 2 system. Both applications are fully specified in [15] and [17], Annex 1C and
related appendices.
The major security features of the TOE are:
● preservation of card identification data and user identification data stored during the
card personalization process (used afterwards by the vehicle unit to identify the
human user and to provide functions and data access rights accordingly),
● preservation of user data stored in the card by vehicle units, and
● restriction of certain write operations onto the cards to only authenticated vehicle
units.
The TOE MTCOS Smart Tachograph V2 / SLE78CFX4000P is realised as a contact-based
smart card and comprises of
● the Infineon Security Controller SLE78CFX4000P (M7892) in design step B11 with
its IC Dedicated Software including Test and Support Software from Infineon
Technologies AG,
● the IC Embedded Software with the ISO/IEC 7816 compliant and interoperable
multi-application smart card operating system MTCOS Pro Smart Tachograph
developed by MaskTech International GmbH,
● the Application Layer consisting of the two Tachograph Card Applications for the
1st
generation and 2nd
generation version 2 Digital Tachograph Systems developed
by MaskTech International GmbH,
● the TOE user guidance, and
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022
● configuration scripts for the configuration of the card type.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Digital Tachograph - Tachograph Card (TC PP) Version 1.0, 19 May
2017, BSI-CC-PP-0091-2017 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
F.IC_CL This Security Function covers the security functions of the hardware
(IC) as well as of the cryptographic library.
F.Access_Control This Security Function regulates all access by external entities to
operations of the TOE which are only executed after this Security
Function allowed access.
F.Identification_Authentication This Security Function provides identification and authentication of user
roles.
F.Management This Security Function provides management and administrative
functionalities.
F.Crypto This Security Function provides a high-level interface to cryptographic
functions.
F.Verification This Security Function addresses TOE internal functions that ensure
correct operation.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionality
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 6.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [7],
chapter 3.1.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [7], chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022 Certification Report
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
MTCOS Smart Tachograph V2 / SLE78CFX4000P
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/SW MTCOS Smart Tachograph V2 /
SLE78CFX4000P
consisting of:
Delivery as
initialised / pre-
personalised
module (including
the operating
system and the
application layer /
file system
configured as driver
card)
Delivery together
with delivery note
1. Hardware Platform:
SLE78CFX4000P (M7892) secure
dual-interface controller of Infineon
Technologies AG in design step B11
(BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5 [13]).
SLE78CFX4000P (M7892) in
design step B11 with
FW version: 78.015.14.2
CL version: 2.07.003
2. IC Embedded Software:
Operating system MTCOS Pro Smart
Tachograph
OS version: 2.5
OS build date: 2022-03-04
Patch version: 0
Patch build date: 2022-03-04
3. Application Layer:
Tachograph Card applications for the
1st
generation and 2nd
generation
version 2 Digital Tachograph
Systems, both configured as driver
card
(Revision 394 and 397, 2022-
05-10)
2 DATA Configuration scripts (for
configuration of card type):
• Script to remove the
application DFs on driver
card
• Script to create a workshop
card
• Script to create a company
card
• Script to create a control card
delete-DriverCard.txt
(Revision 367, 2021-11-12)
repreperso-WorkshopCard.txt
repreperso-CompanyCard.txt
repreperso-ControlCard.txt
(Revision 385, 2022-04-05)
PGP-encrypted e-
mail to issuing
authority or the
party acting on
behalf of it
3 DOC User Guidance – MTCOS Smart
Tachograph V2 / SLE78CFX4000P
[11]
Version 1.3 Password-
protected download
from secure
webserver or PGP-
encrypted e-mail
4 DATA Personalisation key n/a PGP-encrypted and
signed e-mail, via
sealed and
registered letter or
on a smart card via
a trustworthy
transport service
provider
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022
2.1. Delivery Items and associated Delivery Methods
TOE in development and production phase (before TOE delivery in the sense of the CC):
The internal shipment of the TOE and its parts (in particular for flash image production)
between MaskTech International GmbH and Infineon Technologies AG makes use of the
secure delivery procedures as these are covered by BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5 [13].
TOE for personalization: The pre-personalized chips including all software are securely
delivered from Infineon Technologies AG to the issuing authority performing the TOE’s
personalization or party acting on behalf of it. Configuration scripts for the re-configuration
of the intended card type are sent via PGP-encrypted e-mail.
Sensitive electronic data: The delivery of sensitive electronic data is performed via PGP-
encrypted e-mail. The guidance documentation can alternatively be obtained by password-
protected download from the MaskTech International GmbH website (refer to
http://www.masktech.com). Transport keys are securely delivered via PGP-encrypted and
signed e-mail, via a sealed and registered letter or on a smart card via a trustworthy
transport service provider.
2.2. Identification of the TOE by the User
For the customer (personalization agent) to be able to check the correct delivery visually, a
delivery note together with the product stating the product type and certification reference
number is provided.
The following procedures ensure that the user can unambiguously identify an authentic
Tachograph Card (refer to the TOE user guidance [11], chapter 2.2 and chapter 3.4):
● The user can check the correct delivery visually via a delivery note provided
together with the product and stating the product type and certification reference
number.
● The user can check the chip identification information (in particular concerning the
IC and operating system) by means of the command GET CHIP INFORMATION,
refer to the TOE user guidance [11], Annex A.6. Please take into account that in
[11], Annex A.6 an example for possible response values of the command GET
CHIP INFORMATION is provided, whereby the values of chip specific DOs, e.g. the
serial number, as well as the option byte and initialization key identifier may vary
from the manual. However, the first byte of the ROM-key identifier has to show the
same value as the option byte, and the first nibble of the option byte must be a ’C’.
● The user can check the product identifier stored in the file EF.KVC, refer to the TOE
user guidance [11], chapter 3.4. The first 8 bytes of the unmodified product identifier
are: ‘92 10 B3 F8 59 08 EF 38‘. Please take into account that the value described in
[11], chapter 3.4 may have been changed along with the personalization keys; in
this case, the value should be passed to the party performing the personalization.
The value can be retrieved by using the command READ BINARY within the MF.
● The card type can be determined by using the READ BINARY command on the file
EF.Application_Identification.G1/G2.
● The most important check is done implicitly by the correct working of the
authentication process using the personalization key stored in the file EF.PERS.
The response of the chip to the EXTERNAL / MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
command is verified by using Secure Messaging. Because the personalization keys
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022 Certification Report
are provided by MaskTech International GmbH and can only be changed after
authentication against this key, they will work only with the correct product.
2.3. Life-Cycle Model of the TOE
The life-cycle model of the TOE is described in the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter
1.2.4. For the evaluation process the whole life-cycle of the TOE was considered during
the evaluation as far as the developer / manufacturer of the TOE is directly involved.
The TOE is securely delivered as an initialised module from Infineon Technologies AG to
the issuing authority for personalization or the party acting on behalf of it. Note that the
embedding of the chip into the plastic card takes place after TOE delivery and is beyond
the scope of the certification. The delivered TOE contains all software and the data
structures as defined for a Tachograph Card of type driver card, but is not yet
personalised.
The loading of the dedicated embedded and application software (driver card file system)
is performed at Infineon Technologies AG and covered by the IC hardware evaluation
(BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5 [13]). The IC‘s flash loader is deactivated permanently before
delivery of the TOE in the sense of the CC.
The TOE is delivered of type driver card, but can be re-configured afterwards prior to its
personalization into a card of type workshop, company or control card by using the
respective configuration files.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The TOE is a second generation version 2 Tachograph Card in the sense of
COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2016/799 [15] and COMMISSION
IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/1228 [17], Annex 1C. It is intended to be used
in the 1st
generation and 2nd
generation version 2 Digital Tachograph Systems, which
contain additionally further components as motion sensors (of the 1st
or 2nd
generation),
vehicle units (of the 1st
or 2nd
generation), remote early detection communication readers
and, if applicable, external GNSS modules and remote communication facilities.
The TOE implements physical and logical security functionality in order to protect user
data and TSF data stored and operated on the smart card when used in a hostile
environment. Due to the nature of its intended application, the TOE will be issued after
personalization to end-users and in general might not be directly under the control of
trained and dedicated administrators.
Hence, the TOE effectively and securely maintains the integrity and confidentiality of code
and data stored in its memories, all modes of operation with the related capabilities for
configuration and memory access, the TOE’s correct operation and the integrity and
confidentiality of the security functionality provided by the TOE. The TOE's overall policy is
to protect against malfunction, leakage, physical manipulation and probing. Besides, the
TOE's life cycle is supported as well as the user Identification whereas the abuse of
functionality is prevented. Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policy
can be found in the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 7.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE operational environment. The
following topics are of relevance:
Security Objectives for the
operational environment
defined in ST
Description according to ST Reference to TOE
user guidance
OE.Personalization_Phase Secure Handling of Data in Personalization Phase [11], chapter 3.5.10
OE.Crypto_Admin Implementation of Tachograph Components [11], chapter 3.5.10
OE.EOL End of life [11], chapter 3.5.10
Table 3: Security Objectives for the operational environment
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is set up as a composite product. In architectural view it is composed of
● the Infineon Security Controller SLE78CFX4000P (M7892) in design step B11 with
its IC Dedicated Software including Test and Support Software from Infineon
Technologies AG,
● the IC Embedded Software with the operating system MTCOS Pro Smart
Tachograph developed by MaskTech International GmbH, and
● the Application Layer consisting of the two Tachograph Card Applications for the
1st
generation and 2nd
generation version 2 Digital Tachograph Systems developed
by MaskTech International GmbH.
Hereby, the TOE makes partly use of the Crypto Libraries of the Infineon hardware
platform.
The IC including its Crypto Libraries is certified according to EAL 6 augmented by
ALC_FLR.1. For details concerning the CC evaluation of the underlying IC with its
cryptographic functionality refer to the evaluation documentation under the Certification ID
BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5 ([12], [13]).
According to the TOE design the Security Functions of the TOE as listed in chapter 1 are
implemented by the following subsystems:
● Application Data: application layer including the Tachograph Card Applications
● Operating System Kernel: HW independent part of the IC Embedded Software
● Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL): HW dependent part of the IC Embedded
Software
● Hardware: HW including libraries (e.g. for cryptographic functionality)
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6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target [6] and [7].
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The test cases are dedicated to the demonstration of the proper implementation of all
security functions, card commands and operating system functionalities. For all commands
or functionalities respectively, test cases are specified in order to demonstrate the
expected behaviour including error cases. Each security function is covered by at least
one test case. From all existing file system setups, a representative subset of
configurations was chosen for evaluator testing. The conducted tests can be categorized
into two groups: tests with real cards and tests with the emulator. The latter are used for
situations where the test result cannot be verified externally (e.g. the secure deletion of
data). For the chosen file system setups the evaluators conducted all test cases of the
developer’s test suite for non-interactive tests. The evaluators decided to focus their own
independent tests on tests with real cards, but emulator tests were also conducted. For
these tests the evaluators derived some test ideas from the developer tests under
consideration of the described security functionality.
All test cases were executed successfully and ended up with the expected result. No
results indicating a wrong implementation could be found.
Concerning penetration testing, all relevant information as well as evaluation
documentation were taken into account for the analysis by the evaluators. For the
penetration analysis the evaluator analysed the CC deliverables for potential vulnerabilities
already during the evaluation work for the corresponding aspects. The evaluators found no
exploitable vulnerabilities in the evaluation deliverables.
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically and thoroughly against high attack
potential during their penetration testing. These tests covered in particular side channel
analysis, fault (injection) analysis, fuzz testing and source code analysis.
The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results. No attack scenario with
the attack potential high was actually successful in the TOE’s operational environment as
defined in the Security Target provided that all measures required by the developer are
applied.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. Potential vulnerabilities cannot be exploited during the personalisation
and usage phase.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers for the TOE
MTCOS Smart Tachograph V2 / SLE78CFX4000P
the following configuration as outlined in the Security Target [6] and [7]:
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The TOE consists of
● the Infineon Security Controller SLE78CFX4000P (M7892) in design step B11 with
its IC Dedicated Software including Test and Support Software from Infineon
Technologies AG,
● the IC Embedded Software with the operating system MTCOS Pro Smart
Tachograph developed by MaskTech International GmbH,
● the Application Layer consisting of the two Tachograph Card Applications for the
1st
generation and 2nd
generation version 2 Digital Tachograph Systems developed
by MaskTech International GmbH,
● the TOE user guidance, and
● configuration scripts for the configuration of the card type.
Hereby, in view of the Application Layer with the Tachograph Card Applications, the TOE
provides different file system setups due to four different card types, concretely the card
types driver card (DC), workshop card (WC), company card (CC) and control card (PC),
each with six cipher suites (based on BrainpoolP256r1, NIST P-256, BrainpoolP384r1,
NIST P-384, BrainpoolP512r1 and NIST P-521, refer to [18] and [19]). However, the TOE
is delivered in exactly one configuration as driver card. It is up to the Personalization Agent
to select one of the other card types (if necessary) and to select the cipher suite to be
used.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices according to AIS
36 (see [4]). On base of this concept the relevant guidance documents of the
underlying IC platform (refer to the guidance documents covered by [13]) and the
document ETR for composite evaluation from the IC’s evaluation ([14]) have been
applied in the TOE evaluation. Concerning AIS 36 the updated version of the JIL
document ‘Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices’,
version 1.5.1, May 2018 was taken into account.
(ii) Guidance for Smartcard Evaluation (AIS 37, see [4]).
(iii) Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices (AIS 26, see [4]).
(iv) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards (AIS 26, see [4]).
(v) Application of CC to Integrated Circuits (AIS 25, see [4]).
(vi) Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices
(AIS 25, see [4]).
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(vii) Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ and EAL6 (AIS 34,
see [4]).
(viii) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical and deterministic
random number generators (AIS 20 and AIS 31, see [4]).
(ix) Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende
Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren (AIS 46, see [4]).
For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 34,
AIS 36, AIS 37 and AIS 46 (see [4]) were used. For RNG assessment the scheme
interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 were used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC
(see also part C of this report).
● The components ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Digital Tachograph - Tachograph Card (TC PP)
Version 1.0, 19 May 2017, BSI-CC-PP-0091-2017 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and
AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The table presented in Annex B of the Security Target [6] and [7] gives an overview of the
cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines the
standard of application where its specific appropriateness is stated.
The strength of these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
According to the Digital Tachograph System specification given by COMMISSION
IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2016/799 [15], Annex 1C, Appendix 11, Part A and B
the cryptographic algorithms of the TOE as a Tachograph Card are suitable for
authentication and key agreement and for supporting integrity, authenticity and
confidentiality of the data stored in and processed by the TOE. The suitability of the
cryptographic algorithms used in the framework of personalization processes is given
analogously. An explicit validity period is therefore not given here.
The cryptographic algorithms and protocols as outlined in the table of Annex B in the
Security Target [6] and [7] are implemented in the card operating system and hereby make
use of the IC SLE78CFX4000P and its related Crypto Libraries provided by Infineon
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Technologies AG. In particular, the core routines for RSA (encryption, decryption, signature
generation, signature verification), ECC (ECDSA signature generation, ECDSA signature
verification, ECDH), DES and AES in CBC mode are taken from the IC with its Crypto
Libraries. For random number generation the TOE uses the PTG.2 provided by the IC (and
supplements a PTG.3 related cryptographic post-processing). The security evaluation of
these cryptographic algorithms was performed in the framework of the certification of the
IC with its related Crypto Libraries (refer to the Certification Report [13] and the
corresponding Security Target [12]). The TOE relies on the correct (i.e. standard-conform)
and secure implementation of these cryptographic algorithms. The remaining
cryptographic implementation is part of the TOE’s operating system and was analysed in
the framework of the present composite evaluation of the TOE.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in Table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of
the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Tachograph Regulation-specific Aspects
The IT product identified in this certificate fulfils the certified
● Common Criteria Protection Profile Digital Tachograph - Tachograph Card (TC PP)
Version 1.0, 19 May 2017, BSI-CC-PP-0091-2017 [8]
and complies with the requirements for Tachograph Cards outlined in the
● COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2016/799 of 18 March 2016
implementing Regulation (EU) 165/2014 of the European Parliament and of the
Council laying down the requirements for the construction, testing, installation,
operation and repair of tachographs and their components, European Commission,
2016 (consolidated version of 2020-02-26) [15], and
● COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/1228 of 16 July 2021
amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 as regards the requirements for
the construction, testing, installation, operation and repair of smart tachographs and
their components, European Commission, 2021 [17].
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Therefore, the IT product certified is technically suitable to be a compliant Tachograph
Card according to COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2016/799 [15],
Annex 1C, Appendix 10 provided that the following operational conditions are followed:
● The obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE have to be followed as outlined
in chapter 10 of this report.
● The Tachograph Card issuer has to follow the operational requirements from the
regulation as relevant for a compliant Tachograph Card as well as to follow all
related obligations from any Digital Tachograph System related supervisory body.
● The Tachograph Card issuer shall consider the results of the certification and the
operational conditions listed above within the system risk management process for
the product usage. Specifically, the evolution of limitations of cryptographic
algorithms and parameters as well as the evolution of attack methods related to the
product or to the type of product has to be considered e.g. by a regular re-
assessment of the TOE assurance.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining mode
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CC Company Card
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CL Crypto Library
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DC Driver Card
DES Data Encryption Standard
DF Dedicated File
DO Data Object
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EF Elementary File
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
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FW Firmware
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
HW Hardware
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PC Control Card
PP Protection Profile
PTG Physical True Random Number Generator
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman Algorithm
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
SW Software
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
WC Workshop Card
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - Named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements.
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
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Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen)
https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website
https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
7
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report)
für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 19, Version 9, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation
Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria) und ITSEC
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
(but with usage of updated JIL document ‘Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar
devices’, version 1.5.1, May 2018)
• AIS 37, Version 3, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen
• AIS 38, Version 2.9, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
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[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022, Security Target – MTCOS Smart
Tachograph V2 / SLE78CFX4000P, Digital Tachograph – Tachograph Card,
Version 1.0, 10 March 2022, MaskTech International GmbH (confidential document)
[7] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022, Security Target lite – MTCOS Smart
Tachograph V2 / SLE78CFX4000P, Digital Tachograph – Tachograph Card,
Version 1.2, 06 April 2022, MaskTech International GmbH (sanitised public
document)
[8] Common Criteria Protection Profile Digital Tachograph – Tachograph Card (TC PP),
Version 1.0, 19 May 2017, BSI-CC-PP-0091
[9] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022, Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) – MTCOS Smart Tachograph V2 / SLE78CFX4000P, Version 1.5,
12 May 2022, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[10] Configuration List BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022, Configuration List – MTCOS Smart
Tachograph V2 / SLE78CFX4000P, Version 0.6, 10 May 2022, MaskTech
International GmbH (confidential document)
[11] User Guidance BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022, User Guidance – MTCOS Smart
Tachograph V2 / SLE78CFX4000P, Version 1.3, 06 April 2022, MaskTech
International GmbH
[12] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5, Confidential Security Target M7892 B11
Recertification Common Criteria CCv3.1 EAL6 augmented (EAL6+), Version 4.1,
21 October 2020, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5, Security Target Lite M7892 B11
Recertification Common Criteria CCv3.1 EAL6 augmented (EAL6+), Version 4.1,
21 October 2020, Infineon Technologies AG (sanitised public document)
[13] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5 for Infineon Security Controller M7892
B11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, EC v1.02.013 or
v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL v2.02.012, Base v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, and Toolbox
v1.02.013 or v2.07.003 libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware)
from Infineon Technologies AG, 26 November 2020, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
[14] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation (ETR COMP), BSI-DSZ-CC-
0782-V5, Version 5, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[15] COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2016/799 of 18 March 2016
implementing Regulation (EU) 165/2014 of the European Parliament and of the
Council laying down the requirements for the construction, testing, installation,
operation and repair of tachographs and their components, European Commission,
2016 (consolidated version of 2020-02-26)
[16] COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2018/502 of 28 February 2018
amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 laying down the requirements for
the construction, testing, installation, operation and repair of tachographs and their
components, European Commission, 2018
[17] COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/1228 of 16 July 2021
amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 as regards the requirements for
the construction, testing, installation, operation and repair of smart tachographs and
their components, European Commission, 2021
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[18] RFC 5480, Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information, S. Turner,
D. Brown, K. Yiu, R. Housley, and T. Polk, 2009
[19] RFC 5639, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and
Curve Generation, M. Lochter and J. Merkle, 2010
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC Part 1 chapter 10.5.
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1.
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8.
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12.
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17.
• The table in CC Part 3, Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/.
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target Lite [7] provided within a separate document
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1088-2022
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product MTCOS Smart Tachograph V2 / SLE78CFX4000P (Target of Evaluation,
TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme
Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 3 June 2022, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) MaskTech International GmbH, Nordostpark 45, 90411 Nürnberg (Germany) for
Development and Testing.
b) For development and production sites regarding the underlying IC platform
please refer to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5 ([13]).
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6] and [7]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security
objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the
Security Target [6] and [7]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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