BİLİŞİM TEKNOLOJİLERİ TEST VE BELGELENDİRME DAİRESİ BAŞKANLIĞI
CCCS CERTIFICATION REPORT
Doküman Kodu: BTBD-03-01-FR-01 Yayın Tarihi: 04.08.2015 Revizyon Tarih/No: 06.03.2019/6
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Certification Report
EAL 4+ (ALC_DVS.2) Evaluation of
TÜBİTAK BİLGEM UEKAE
AKiS GEZGiN_N v1.0.1.0 BAC Configuration with
Active Authentication
issued by
Turkish Standards Institution
Common Criteria Certification Scheme
Certificate Number: 21.0.03/TSE-CCCS-71
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CCCS CERTIFICATION REPORT
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................................................................................................................2
DOCUMENT INFORMATION...............................................................................................................................................3
DOCUMENT CHANGE LOG .................................................................................................................................................3
DISCLAIMER ...........................................................................................................................................................................3
FOREWORD .............................................................................................................................................................................4
RECOGNITION OF THE CERTIFICATE............................................................................................................................5
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................................6
2 CERTIFICATION RESULTS...............................................................................................................................................8
2.1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION ..................................................................................................9
2.2 SECURITY POLICY ........................................................................................................................................................10
2.3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE ................................................................................................11
2.4 ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION ...........................................................................................................................11
2.5 DOCUMENTATION ........................................................................................................................................................13
2.6 IT PRODUCT TESTING..................................................................................................................................................13
2.7 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION.................................................................................................................................14
2.8 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION ...............................................................................................................................15
2.9 COMMENTS / RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................................................................15
3 SECURITY TARGET..........................................................................................................................................................18
4 GLOSSARY ..........................................................................................................................................................................19
5 BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................................................................................19
6 ANNEXES .............................................................................................................................................................................22
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Document Information
Date of Issue 12.03.2021
Approval Date 17.03.2021
Certification Report Number 21.0.03/21-003
Sponsor and Developer TÜBİTAK BİLGEM UEKAE
Evaluation Facility TÜBİTAK BİLGEM TDBY OKTEM
TOE AKiS GEZGiN_N v1.0.1.0 BAC Configuration with Active
Authentication
Pages 22
Prepared by
İbrahim Halil KIRMIZI
Reviewed by
Halime Eda BİTLİSLİ ERDİVAN
This report has been prepared by the Certification Expert and reviewed by the Technical Responsible of
which signatures are above.
Document Change Log
Release Date Pages Affected Remarks/Change Reference
1.0 19.02.2021 All First Release
DISCLAIMER
This certification report and the IT product defined in the associated Common Criteria document has been
evaluated at an accredited and licensed evaluation facility conformant to Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, version 3.1, revision 5, using Common Methodology for IT Products Evaluation, version 3.1,
revision 5. This certification report and the associated Common Criteria document apply only to the
identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. Evaluation has been conducted
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in accordance with the provisions of the CCCS, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
FOREWORD
The Certification Report is drawn up to submit the Certification Commission the results and evaluation
information upon the completion of a Common Criteria evaluation service performed under the Common
Criteria Certification Scheme. Certification Report covers all non-confidential security and technical
information related with a Common Criteria evaluation which is made under the ITCD Common Criteria
Certification Scheme. This report is issued publicly to and made available to all relevant parties for
reference and use.
The Common Criteria Certification Scheme (CCCS) provides an evaluation and certification service to
ensure the reliability of Information Security products. Evaluation and tests are conducted by a public or
commercial Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCTL = Common Criteria Testing Laboratory) under
CCCS’ supervision.
CCTL is a facility, licensed as a result of inspections carried out by CCCS for performing tests and
evaluations which will be the basis for Common Criteria certification. As a prerequisite for such
certification, the CCTL has to fulfill the requirements of the standard ISO/IEC 17025 and should be
accredited by accreditation bodies. The evaluation and tests related with the concerned product have been
performed by TÜBİTAK BİLGEM TDBY OKTEM, which is a public/commercial CCTL.
A Common Criteria Certificate given to a product means that such product meets the security requirements
defined in its security target document that has been approved by the CCCS. The Security Target
document is where requirements defining the scope of evaluation and test activities are set forth. Along
with this certification report, the user of the IT product should also review the security target document in
order to understand any assumptions made in the course of evaluations, the environment where the IT
product will run, security requirements of the IT product and the level of assurance provided by the
product.
This certification report is associated with the Common Criteria Certificate issued by the CCCS for AKiS
GEZGiN_N v1.0.1.0 BAC Configuration with Active Authentication whose evaluation was completed on
10.02.2021 and with the Security Target document with version no 10 of the relevant product.
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The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target document are posted on the
ITCD Certified Products List at bilisim.tse.org.tr portal and the Common Criteria Portal (the official web
site of the Common Criteria Project).
RECOGNITION OF THE CERTIFICATE
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo is printed on the certificate to indicate that this
certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA.
The CCRA has been signed by the Turkey in 2003 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based
on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL2. The current list of signatory nations and
approved certification schemes can be found on:
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report constitutes the certification results by the certification body on the evaluation results applied
with requirements of the Common Criteria for Information Security Evaluation.
Evaluated IT product name: AKiS GEZGiN_N BAC Configuration with Active Authentication
IT Product version: v1.0.1.0
Developer’s Name: TÜBİTAK BİLGEM UEKAE
Name of CCTL: TÜBİTAK BİLGEM TDBY OKTEM
Assurance Package: EAL 4+ (ALC_DVS.2)
Completion date of evaluation: 10.02.2021
1.1. Brief Description
The TOE is the composition of the contactless smartcard chips P71D320P of NXP SmartMX3 platform
with embedded software including electronic Machine Readable Travel Document (eMRTD) Application
1.2. Major Security Features
The TOE provides the following security services;
• Protection against modification, probing, environmental stress and emanation attacks,
• Passive Authentication (PA),
• Active Authentication (AA),
• Basic Access Control (BAC),
• SHA-1, SHA-2/224, SHA-2/256, SHA-2/384, SHA-2/512 Operations,
• True Random Number Generation,
• DES3 Encryption and Decryption,
• Retail MAC (DES3),
• Signature generation with ISO 9796-2 Scheme 1,
• Signature generation with ECDSA
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1.3. Threats
The threats are categorized into Hardware related threats and Terminal, Communication and Application
related threats.
Hardware Related Threats are;
• T.Phys-Tamper: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order to;
o disclose TSF Data or
o disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to;
o modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip,
o modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software,
o modify User Data
o modify TSF data
• T.Information_Leakage: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE
during its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be
inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker
• T.Malfunction: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to;
o deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or
o circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software
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• T.Abuse-Func: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase
“Operational Use” in order to
o manipulate User Data,
o manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the
TOE
o disclose or to manipulate TSF Data
• T.Counterfeit: An attacker produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine MRTD's
chip to be used as the chip of a counterfeit MRTD. The attacker may either
o generate a new data set from scratch
o extract completely or partially the data from a genuine MRTD's chip and then copy them
on another chip to imitate the genuine MRTD's chip
Terminal, Communication and Application related threats are;
• T.Chip_ID: An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the
MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to communications through the contactless
communication interface
• T.Skimming: An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a communication to
read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE
• T.Eavesdropping: An attacker is listening to an existing communication between the MRTD’s
chip and an inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system uses
the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not know these data in advance
• T.Forgery: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it
including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the
changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data.
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2. CERTIFICATION RESULTS
2.1. Identification of Target of Evaluation
Certificate Number 21.0.03/TSE-CCCS-71
TOE Name and Version AKiS GEZGiN_N v1.0.1.0 BAC Configuration with Active
Authentication
Security Target Title Security Target of AKIS GEZGIN_N v1.0.1.0 BAC
Configuration with Active Authentication
Security Target Version 10
Security Target Date 18.01.2021
Assurance Level EAL 4+ (ALC_DVS.2)
Criteria • Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017
• Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional
Components; CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017
• Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance
Components; CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017
Methodology Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology; CCMB-2017-04-004,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
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Protection Profile Conformance Common Criteria Protection Profile, Machine Readable
Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access
Control, BSI-CC-PP-0055, version 1.10, March 25th 2009
Platform SmartMX3 P71D320P, NXP Technologies
Secrurity Target Title of the
Platform Hardware
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7021 VA Security
Target Lite
Securirty Target Version and
Date of the Platform Hardware
Rev. 2.3, June 4th
2019
Crypto Library Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA Security Target Lite,
Rev. 2.3, June 5th 2019
Protection Profile Conformance
of the Platform Hardware
Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages, Version 1.0, Registered and Certified by
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Sponsor and Developer TÜBİTAK BİLGEM UEKAE
Evaluation Facility TÜBİTAK BİLGEM TDBY OKTEM
Certification Scheme TSE CCCS
2.2. Security Policy
Organizational Security Policies are;
• P.Manufact (Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip)
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The
MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the
Personalization Agent Key.
• P.Personalization (Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only)
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed
portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical
MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is
performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
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• P.Personal_Data (Personal Data protection policy)
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on MRTD’s chip, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data of finger(s), the biometric
reference data of iris image(s) and data according to LDS stored on the MRTD’s chip are
personal data of the MRTD holder.
2.3. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
Assumptions for the operational environment of the TOE are;
• A.MRTD_Manufact (MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6)
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that
security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain
confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of the manufacturing and test data (to prevent any
possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
• A.MRTD_Delivery (Delivery of the MRTD during steps 4 to 6)
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance
to its objectives:
o Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and
storage.
o Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in
the delivery process and storage.
o Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the
required skill.
• A.Pers_Agent (Personalization of the MRTD’s chip)
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of;
o the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder,
o the Document Basic Access Keys,
o the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and
o the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip).
The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object.
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• A.Insp_Sys (Inspection Systems for global interoperability)
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State for eMRTD
examining an MRTD presented by the user and verifying its authenticity and verifying the
traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability includes the
Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or
Organization, and implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control. The Basic
Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under BAC and performs the Passive Authentication
to verify the logical MRTD.
• A.BAC-Keys (Cryptographic quality of BAC Keys)
The Document BAC Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization
have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the "ICAO Doc 9303",
the Document BAC Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data.
It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on
the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Access Keys from the printed
MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.
• A.Pers_Agent_AA (Personalization of the MRTD’s chip including Active Authentication
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of the Active Authentication Public Key
(EF.DG15) if stored on the MRTD’s chip. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization
Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by mechanisms mentioned in
A.Pers_Agent.
• A.Insp_Sys_AA (Inspection Systems for global interoperability with Active Authentication)
The Inspection System may also implement the terminal part of the Active Authentication
Protocol if it wants to ensure the TOE is not cloned.
2.4. Architectural Information
TOE will be in form of a paper book or plastic card with an embedded chip and possibly an
antenna. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the
MRTD holder:
• The biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book/card,
• The printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) that identifies the MRTD and
• The printed portrait.
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For further information see Security Target.
2.5. Documentation
Documents below are provided to the customer by the developer alongside the TOE;
Name of Document Version Number Date
Security Target of AKIS GEZGIN_N v1.0.1.0 BAC
Configuration with Active Authentication
V10 18.01.2021
AKIS GEZGIN_N v1.0.1.0 BAC Configuration with Active
Authentication Admin and User Guide
V8 20.01.2021
AKIS GEZGIN_N v1.0.1.0 BAC Configuration with Active
Authentication SAC & EAC Configuration Admin and User
Guide
V5 20.01.2021
2.6. IT Product Testing
During the evaluation, all evaluation evidences of TOE were delivered and transferred completely to
CCTL by the developers. All the delivered evaluation evidences which include software, documents,
etc. are mapped to the assurance families Common Criteria and Common Methodology; so the
connections between the assurance families and the evaluation evidences has been established. The
evaluation results are available in the final Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) of AKIS GEZGIN_N
v1.0.1.0 BAC Configuration with Active Authentication.
It is concluded that the TOE supports EAL 4+ (ALC_DVS.2). There are 29 assurance families which
are all evaluated with the methods detailed in the ETR.
IT Product Testing is mainly described in two parts:
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2.6.1.Developer Testing
Developer has prepared TOE Test Document according to the TOE Functional Specification
documentation, TOE Design documentation which includes TSF subsystems and its interactions. All SFR-
Enforcing TSFIs have been tested by developer. Developer has conducted 262 functional tests in total.
2.6.2.Evaluator Testing
• Independent Testing: Evaluator has chosen 26 developer tests to conduct by itself. Additionally,
evaluator has prepared 23 independent tests. TOE has passed all 49 functional tests to demonstrate
that its security functions work as it is defined in the ST.
• Penetration Testing: TOE has been tested against common threats and other threats surfaced by
vulnerability analysis. As a result, 24 penetration tests have been conducted.
2.7. Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated TOE configuration is composed of;
• the IC Embedded Software including operating system and eMRTD application (AKIS
GEZGIN_N v1.0.1.0 BAC Configuration with Active Authentication),
• Secure IC (NXP Technologies, SmartMX3 P71D320P),
• the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support
Software,
• Guidance documents
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2.8. Results of the Evaluation
The table below provides a complete listing of the Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE. These
requirements consists of the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL 4) components as specified in Part 3 of
the Common Criteria, augmented with ALC_DVS.2.
Assurance Class Component Component Title
Development ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture Description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic Modular Design
ADV_COMP.1 Design compliance with the platform certification
report, guidance and ETR_COMP
Guidance Documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures
AGD_COMP.1
Life-Cycle Support ALC_CMC.4 Production Support, Acceptance Procedures and
automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
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ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_COMP.1 Integration of the application into the underlying
platform and Consistency check for delivery and
acceptance procedures
Security Target
Evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance Claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended Components Definition
ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security Objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived Security Requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE Summary Specification
ASE_COMP.1 Consistency of Security Target
Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of Coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: Basic Design
ATE_FUN.1
Functional Testing
ATE_IND.2
Independent Testing - Sample
ATE_COMP.1 Composite product functional testing
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Vulnerability Analysis AVA_VAN.3 Focused Vulnerability Analysis
AVA_COMP.1 Composite product vulnerability assessment
The Evaluation Team assigned a Pass, Fail, or Inconclusive verdict to each work unit of each EAL 4+
(ALC_DVS.2) assurance component. For Fail or Inconclusive work unit verdicts, the Evaluation Team
advised the developer about the issues requiring resolution or clarification within the evaluation evidence.
In this way, the Evaluation Team assigned an overall Pass verdict to the assurance component only when
all of the work units for that component had been assigned a Pass verdict. So for TOE “AKIS GEZGIN_N
v1.0.1.0 BAC Configuration with Active Authentication”, the results of the assessment of all evaluation
tasks are “Pass”.
2.9. Comments / Recommendations
It is recommended that all guidance outlined in the Guidance Documents be followed and all assumptions
are fulfilled in order to the secure usage of the TOE.
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CCCS CERTIFICATION REPORT
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3. SECURITY TARGET
The Security Target associated with this Certification Report is identified by the following terminology:
Title: Security Target of AKIS GEZGIN_N v1.0.1.0 BAC Configuration with Active Authentication
Version: 10
Date of Document: 18.01.2021
A public version has been created and verified according to ST-Santizing:
Title: Security Target Lite of AKIS GEZGIN_N v1.0.1.0 BAC Configuration with Active Authentication
Version: 02
Date of Document: 18.01.2021
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4. GLOSSARY
AA : Active Authentication
ADV : Assurance of Development
AES : Advanced Encryption Standard
AGD : Assurance of Guidance Documents
AKIS : Akıllı Kart İşletim Sistemi
ALC : Assurance of Life Cycle
ASE : Assurance of Security Target Evaluation
ATE : Assurance of Tests Evaluation
AVA : Assurance of Vulnerability Analysis
BAC : Basic Access Control
BİLGEM : Bilişim ve Bilgi Güvenliği İleri Teknolojiler Araştırma Merkezi
CC : Common Criteria (Ortak Kriterler)
CCCS : Common Criteria Certification Scheme (TSE)
CCRA : Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CCTL : Common Criteria Test Laboratory
CEM :Common Evaluation Methodology
CMC : Configuration Management Capability
CMS : Configuration Management Scope
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DEL : Delivery
DES : Data Encryption Standard
DF : Dedicated File
DVS : Development Security
EAC : Extended Access Control
EAL : Evaluation Assurance Level
EF : Elementary File
ICAO : International Civil Aviation Organization
MAC : Message Authentication Code
MRTD: Machine Readable Travel Document
OKTEM : Ortak Kriterler Test Merkezi
OPE : Opretaional User Guidance
OSP : Organisational Security PolicyPP : Protection Profile
PRE : Preperative Procedures
PP : Protection Profile
SAC : Supplemental Access Control
SAR : Security Assurance Requirements
SFR : Security Functional Requirements
ST : Security Target
TOE : Target of Evaluation
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TSF : TOE Secırity Functionality
TSFI : TSF Interface
TUBİTAK : Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu
UEKAE : Ulusal Elektronik ve Kriptoloji Araştırma Enstitüsü
5. BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April
2017,
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision
5, April 2017,
[3] Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, v1.5.1, May 2018
[4] Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, v2.9, May 2013
[5] DTR 74 TR 01 AKiS GEZGiN_N v1.0.1.0 BAC Configuration with Active Authentication EAL4+
(ALC_DVS.2) Evaluation Technical Report Rev1.0
[6] 0977-v2_ETR-COMP_170630_v2 Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation (ETR
COMP), v7, June 30th 2017
[7] 1019-v2_ETR-COMP_171020_v2 Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation (ETR
COMP), v7, October 20th 2017
[8] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application,
Basic Access control, BSI-PP-0055, version 1.10, March 25th 2009
[9] Security IC Protection Profile, BSI-PP-0035, version 1.0, June 15th 2007
[10] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 1 – Machine Readable Travel Passports,
Sixth Edition, 2006, ICAO
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[11] Technical Guideline TR-03110-3 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents, Part 3: Common Specifications, Version 2.10, March 10th 2012
6. ANNEXES
There is no additional information which is inappropriate for reference in other sections