Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006
for
ABox 1.0
from
T-Systems International GmbH
System Integration
Project Center Product Support & Services
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5455, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.30
BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006
Softwareproduct
ABox 1.0
from
T-Systems International GmbH
System Integration
Project Center Product Support & Services
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version
2.3, (ISO/IEC 154082005) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL3
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 14. August 2006
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-5455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.35
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product ABox 1.0 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product ABox 1.0 was conducted by SRC Security
Research & Consulting GmbH. The SRC Security Research & Consulting
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
T-Systems International GmbH
System Integration
Project Center Product Support & Services
Dachauer Strasse 651
80995 München
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 14. August 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-18.
The product ABox 1.0 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
T-Systems International GmbH
System Integration
Project Center Product Support & Services
Dachauer Strasse 651
80995 München
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 9
3 Security Policy 9
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 10
5 Architectural Information 10
6 Documentation 11
7 IT Product Testing 11
8 Evaluated Configuration 12
9 Results of the Evaluation 13
10 Comments/Recommendations 14
11 Annexes 14
12 Security Target 15
13 Definitions 15
14 Bibliography 16
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a software, the so-called ABox 1.0 that
provides security services, mainly:
• encryption and decryption of sensitive data;
• pseudonymisation of sensitive data and resolution of the pseudonyms;
• authorisation of users to read and write sensitive data on basis of a user
group concept.
The TOE consists of two parts, the ABox Core and the ABox Admin Client (the
shaded parts in Figure 1). The scope of delivery comprises the executables,
libraries, configuration files and installation scripts for the ABox Core and ABox
Admin Client, furthermore user and installation guidance (the user guidance
covers also administration aspects). The ABox Core consists of the three
indicated sub-systems, the ABox Admin Client constitutes a fourth subsystem.
ABox Core
Crypto
Card
Local
Data-
base
Operating System
Environment
Crypto Subsystem
Input/Output Subsystem
Authorisation Subsystem
ABox
Admin
Client
Figure 1 - Architecture of the "local ABox system"
The ABox Core is embedded into a local system (“local ABox system”) in which
it is connected to an operating system environment (application software), to a
database (“ABox database”) and optionally to a crypto card. TOE users interact
with the TOE via the operating system environment. TOE management and
configuration data are stored in the ABox database and are administered via an
administrative interface, the ABox Admin Client.
The IT product ABox 1.0 was evaluated by SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 03. July 2006. The SRC
Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is
T-Systems International GmbH
System Integration
Project Center Product Support & Services
Dachauer Strasse 651
80995 München
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL3 (Evaluation Assurance Level 3).
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) are taken from CC part 2:
Requirement Identifier
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data excahnge confidentiality
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Table 1: TOE security functional requirements
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘basic’ (SOF-basic) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target ([6], chapter 6.1).
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006 Certification Report
1.4 Summary of Threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The assets to be protected by the TOE and its environment are as follows:
Name of asset Description
sensitive user data Confidential user data stored or processed in the system.
user authentication
data
The user identifier and password entered by a user to authenticate himself
to the system, and the reference values stored in the ABox database used
for verification.
management data Definition of user groups and their read/write members, the group specific
data desensitisation method (pseudonymisation respectively which
encryption algorithm with which key; software or hardware encryption).
encryption
passwords
Passwords used for the key generation.
cryptographic keys Keys used in the system for the encryption and decryption of sensitive
user data.
pseudonym lists Group specific lists stored in the ABox database indicating what
pseudonyms are actually used in this group to reference sensitive user
data and what contents each pseudonym stands for.
blacklists Group specific lists of words that must not be contained in an input.
TOE software code The programming code the TOE consists of.
Table 2: Assets to be protected by the TOE and its environment
The Security Target [6] considers the following subjects, which can interact with
the TOE:
Name of subject Description
ABox user The ABox user is the legitimate user of the ABox Core.
supervisor The supervisor defines users, user groups, their group owners and
configuration data.
group owner The group owner manages a particular user group, assigns and revokes
users’ write or read permissions for this group, may create user
configurations, but may assign read or write permission only for the own
group. Also he can designate a deputy.
deputy The deputy continues the group owner’s tasks (except for deputy
designation) in his absence.
ABox database The ABox database is connected to the TOE and stores the user
authentication data, the cryptographic keys, the management data, and
the pseudonym lists.
ABox WAN The wide area network the ABox is embedded in, into which input stream
is directed (after passage through the ABox Core) and from which output
stream is received (which is directed through the ABox Core).
other person All persons who interact with the TOE without being so authorised (as one
of the preceding roles).
Table 3: Subjects that can interact with the TOE
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006
The TOE and its environment shall comply to the following organisational
security policies (which are security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines
imposed by an organisation upon its operations).
OSP.Desens: Data marked as sensitive shall leave the local ABox system
only after being desensitised.
OSP.Conceal: Data marked as sensitive shall not be output (browser
display, printer, …) to the user who has not the right to see it, in the case of
pseudonymisation even not the belonging pseudonym (instead a constant
message stating the non-availability of the data).
OSP.Administration: The configuration data of user groups and the
assignment of users to user groups may be managed by supervisors, group
owners and deputies as indicated in Table 3 about Subjects. It shall be possible
that users with write permission for more than one user group may choose at
the runtime which they want to exercise.
The TOE shall avert the threat as specified below:
T.Compromise: An attacker tries to acquire and disclose sensitive data.
As potential attackers all kinds of subjects as listed in Table 3 are considered,
as far as they
• try to perform actions, which they are not allowed to by their access rights as
defined in this ST and
• may have expertise, resources and motivation as expected from an attacker
with low attack potential.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
Configuration setup
Before the ABox system components can be installed, the operation system
environment has to be installed. This includes:
• LINUX Enterprise Server 9 for X86 with Service Pack 2 with module
• Pwauth 2.2.8
The operating system must be installed according to the EAL4+ Evaluated
Configuration Guide for SUSE LINUX Enterprise Server on IBM Hardware
• Apache Webserver 2.0.54 with the following module
• Mod_auth_external 2.2.10
• Oracle Database Client 10.2 g for Linux
• Oracle Database Server 10.2 g for linux
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006 Certification Report
• PHP-Runtime environment 5.05
• Utimaco CryptoServer 2000 (optional)
The ABox Core relies on a set of libraries which are provided by the Linux
system or have to be installed during the system setup (see [14], sec. 3).
After installing the ABox the supervisors have to define the user groups and the
group administrators (group owners and their deputies). Once a group
administrator is defined, he will configure his user group. He will add and
remove ABox users to or from his group and configure parameters like the
encryption algorithm, MIME-Types, etc.
Each user must be a member of at least one group but can be member of more
than one group. The user may have different rights in different groups. The data
access to a target server is defined by the possible rights which may be read or
write access.
ABox user configuration
A user may be authorised for several groups. In order to allow this, it must be
recognised during the runtime which of the group definitions is valid, e.g. for
writing. This will be done using a web dialog and allow the user to choose for
what group definition he wishes to perform input/output operations. Initially,
each user has a default user group assignment. The user can change his group
assignment dynamically, within his authorised write groups, by invoking an
ABox page in the browser.
In particular, the ABox Core provides a browser based dialog where the user
has the possibility to change the active write group. The left column of the
browser provides radio buttons where the user can actually set the active write
group. The column in the middle indicates the assigned read groups (they can
only be modified by an administrator). The right column just shows the ID and
name of the group. The select-button stores the new user selection to the
database.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following assumptions hold for the usage environment:
A.Users: The users of the local ABox system will use the TOE according to
the guidance and all other security instructions.
A.Administrators: The authorised administrators of the local ABox system will
use the local ABox database according to the guidance and all other security
instructions.
A.ABox_Access: The local ABox system is physically protected and access-
controlled so that it may be accessed only by authorised users.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006
A.WAN: All storage media and transmission lines in the ABox WAN are
protected against tapping of the transmitted data. The personnel having access
to the data is trustworthy and will not compromise sensitive user data.
Local ABox system
OSE
ABox
WAN
ABox
Data-
base
ABox Core
Browser
Crypto
Card
Basic Security Zone: Access only for ABox users
High Security Zone: Access only for ABox administrators
Figure 2 - Graphical representation of the access assumptions
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006 Certification Report
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
ABox 1.0
The TOE consists of:
TOE
component
Designation Type Transfer Form
TOE
software
Provides the functionality of the
TOE
SW Electronic form
Installation
Guide
Guidance for the installation of the
TOE (Installation Guide for ABox
1.0, Version 1.1, T-Systems,
26.06.2006)
DOC Document in paper
/ electronic form
Installation
scripts
Scripts used for the installation of
the TOE
SW Electronic form
User
Guidance
Guidance for the usage of the TOE
by users and administrators (User
Guidance for ABox 1.0, Version 1.3,
T-Systems, 20.06.2006)
DOC Document in paper
/ electronic form
Checksums MD5 checksums to verify the
integrity of the files
SW Electronic form
Table 4: Deliverables of the TOE
3 Security Policy
The TOE shall comply to the following security policies:
• Data marked as sensitive shall leave the local ABox system only after being
desensitised.
• Data marked as sensitive shall not be output (browser display, printer, …) to
the user who has not the right to see it, in the case of pseudonymisation
even not the belonging pseudonym (instead a constant message stating the
non-availability of the data).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Assumptions
A.Users - Trustworthiness of ABox users
The users of the local ABox system will use the TOE according to the
guidance and all other security instructions.
A.Administrators - Trustworthiness of ABox administrators
The authorised administrators of the local ABox system will use the local
ABox database according to the guidance and all other security
instructions.
A.ABox_Access - Access to the local ABox system
The local ABox system is physically protected and access-controlled so
that it may be accessed only by authorised users.
A.WAN - Security of the ABox WAN
All storage media and transmission lines in the ABox WAN are protected
against tapping of the transmitted data. The personnel having access to
the data is trustworthy and will not compromise sensitive user data.
4.2 Clarification of scope
none.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is a software product and comprises four subsystems: The
Input/Output filter, the Crypto Subsystem, the Authorisation Subsystem and the
Administration Subsystem.
Subsystem Input/Output filter
The Input/Output Subsystem is the main subsystem of the TOE. There is only
one main entry point to the subsystem. Over the defined apache module hook
function the input and output HTTP requests respectively responses reach the
TOE. Over this hook function the in-put/output filter subsystem process the
HTTP streams using the same code base.
Crypto Subsystem
The Crypto Subsystem provides cryptographic services based on a software
library or (optional) using a hardware module.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006 Certification Report
Authorisation Subsystem
The Authorisation Subsystem allows the user to change his/her active user
(write) group within the active session. A script based dialog shows all groups
the user is assigned to, and allows the user to select one and transmit the
decision to the TOE. The active user (write) group is written to the database. It
takes immediately effect for the next stream processing.
Administration Subsystem
This subsystem allows authorised users to administer the ABox configuration
data. In this respect the ABox configuration data consist of groups and their
parameters as well as user configuration data. The subsystem supports a role
based access model. The three administrator roles supervisor, group owner and
deputy are defined. It depends on the role of the user which workflow is
accessible for him/her.
6 Documentation
The following documents are provided for a customer, who purchases the TOE:
• User Guidance for ABox 1.0, Version 1.3, T-Systems, 20.06.2006 [13]
• Installation Guide for ABox 1.0, Version 1.1, T-Systems, 26.06.2006 [14]
7 IT Product Testing
Tests of the Developer
The developer installed and tested the TOE on the platform as specified in
chapter 1.5. The test settings contain two servers (one ABox server and one
Oracle Database server) and dedicated test instances.
The following tools were specifically used for testing:
• the Internet Explorer Developer Toolbar
• the SAP Easy Access Tool 4.7
• the TBox, a specially developed tool for testing the ABox.
The developer tested the security mechanisms, the security functions, the
subsystems and the external interfaces of the TOE.
Testing approach for coverage:
Most of the security properties indicated in the Functional Specification (FSP)
were not tested separately, but in combinations. All TSF interface and all
security properties of the FSP are mapped to tests.
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Testing approach for depth:
Most of the security properties were tested in combinations. The TSF as defined
in the high-level design (HLD) was completely mapped to the tests and the test
documentation.
Tests of the Evaluator
These tests were conducted on 24.04.2006 and from 19.06.2006 to 20.06.2006
in Leinfelden-Echterdingen/Germany using the test environment of the
developer. Bevore the evaluators started testing, they have checked the
configuration of the test environment. Evaluator testing was carried out using
the browser interface and the SAP easy access tool.
The evaluators assessed the developer’s testing approach, coverage, depth
and results. This included the following:
• the evaluators checked that the developer’s testing approach covered the
TOE’s security mechanisms, security functions, subsystems and external
interfaces;
• the evaluators repeated all of the developer’s tests;
• the evaluators performed independently-devised functional tests to cover the
security functions.
The evaluators’ findings confirmed that:
• the developer’s testing approach, depth, coverage and results were all
adequate;
• the developer’s tests covered the TOE’s security mechanisms, security
functions, subsystems and external interfaces;
• the actual results of the evaluator tests and the independently-devised
functional tests were consistent with the expected test results.
The evaluators did not identify any obvious vulnerabilities during evaluation
activities. Nevertheless the evaluators devised some supplementary test cases
that could be considered as penetration tests.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is a software, the so-called ABox 1.0 together with guidance
documentation. The TOE comprises two parts, the ABox Core and the ABox
Admin Client. The ABox Core consists of the three indicated subsystems, the
ABox Admin Client constitutes a fourth subsystem.
The ABox Core is embedded into a local system (“local ABox system”) in which
it is connected to an operating system environment (application software), to a
database (“ABox database”) and optionally to a crypto card. TOE users interact
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006 Certification Report
with the TOE via the operating system environment. TOE management and
configuration data are stored in the ABox database and are administered via an
administrative interface, the ABox Admin Client.
The local ABox system is embedded into a larger system (“ABox WAN”)
including a remote central database which can be accessed via a network
(connected to the operating system environment) and including further local
ABox systems.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL3.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL3 and
the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are summarised in the
following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Authorisation controls ACM_CAP.3 PASS
TOE CM coverage ACM_SCP.1 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Delivery Procedures ADO_DEL.1 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Informal functional specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0365-2006
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Examination of guidance AVA_MSU.1 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Developer vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.1 PASS
Table 5: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 conformant
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
• TSF_Key_Generation
• TSF_Crypt
• TSF_Pseudonymisation
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the ABox 1.0. The validity
can be extended to new versions and releases of the product, provided the
sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the modified
product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation of
the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documents [13] + [14] contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Annexes
none
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12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [6] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. This document represents the
complete Security Target used for evaluation.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
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Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
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[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target for ABox 1.0, BSI-DSZ-0365-2006, Version V1.3, T-
Systems, 21.06.2006)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.1, 30.06.2006, ABox 1.0, BSI-
DSZ-0365-2006)
[8] Functional Specification for ABox 1.0, Version 1.2, T-Systems,
21.06.2006
[9] High-level Design for ABox 1.0, Version 1.1, T-Systems, 26.06.2006
[10] Test Documentation for ABox 1.0, Version 1.2, 12.05.2006
[11] Testcrypto Algorithmen for ABox 1.0, Version 1.1, 08.06.2006
[12] Test Coverage and test depth for ABox 1.0, Version 1.0, 26.06.2006
[13] User Guidance for ABox 1.0, Version 1.3, T-Systems, 20.06.2006
[14] Installation Guide for ABox 1.0, Version 1.1, T-Systems, 26.06.2006
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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