KECS-CR-12-63
Ucard UBJ31-G11 V1.1
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-ISIS-0419-2012
2012. 10. 31
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2012.10.31 -
Certification report for Ucard UBJ31-G11 V1.1
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for Ucard UBJ21-G11 V1.1 of
UBIVELOX.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association. (TTA)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................6
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................8
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................9
5. Architectural Information ..................................................................................10
6. Documentation................................................................................................... 11
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................ 11
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................12
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................13
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................13
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................14
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................15
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV) ..............................................................16
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................16
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................17
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................18
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................19
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................19
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................20
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................22
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the EAL4+ evaluation of Ucard UBJ31-G11 V1.1 with reference to the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter) [1].
It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the composite product which is consisting of the
certified contact/contactless integrated circuit chip, and embedded software(IC chip
operating system(COS), Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM), Java Card Runtime
Environment (JCRE), Java Card API (JCAPI), Card Manager & GP API) in accordance
with the Sun‟s Java Card 2.2.2 [7], [8], [9], the Global Platform Card Specification [10],
the Visa Global Platform Card Specification [11], and the Korean Finance IC Card
Standard [12]. The TOE provides Java Card Platforms for multiple applications by
allowing them to be loaded and deleted, cryptographic services to be used by
applications installed on the Java Card Platform.
The TOE Ucard UBJ31-G11 V1.1 is composed of the following components:
 IC chip SB23YR80B provided by STMicroelectronics, see ANSSI-CC-2010/02
[13] and ANSSI-2010/02-M01 [14], and
 Embedded software UBJ31-G11_DEL provided by UBIVELOX.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Telecommunications Technology
Association (TTA) and completed on Oct 5, 2012. This report grounds on the evaluation
technical report (ETR) TTA had submitted [16] and the Security Target (ST) [17].
The ST is based on the certified Protection Profile (PP) Java CardTM
System Protection
Profile Open Configuration, Version 2.6, 19 April 2010 [19]. All Security Assurance
Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only upon assurance component in CC Part
3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3
conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both
functional components in CC Part 2 and a newly defined component in the Extended
Component Definition chapter of the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST.
Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
[Figure 1] shows the operational environment of the TOE.
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CAD device APDU TOE
[Figure 1]Operational environment of the TOE
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification
The TOE is composite product consisting of the following components and related
guidance documents.
Type Identifier Release Delivery Form
HW/SW SB23YR80B Secure
Microcontrollers
Revision B
(dedicated
software
ANC,
K2M0BFB
mask set)
-
(Note: The SW is
contained in ROM and
EEPROM. The delivery of
smart card product is not
covered by the evaluation.)
Cryptographic library NesLib
3.0 SB
V3.0
SW UBJ31-G11_DEL V2.0
DOC Ucard UBJ31-G11 V1.1 V1.3 Softcopy
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Type Identifier Release Delivery Form
Operation User Guidance
Ucard UBJ31-G11 V1.1
Preparative procedure
V1.3
[Table 1] TOE identification
The TOE is finalized at Phase 3 (Security IC manufacturing) in accordance with the
Java CardTM
System PP [19], and the delivery of JCS is in phase 3. After the TOE
finalization, the IC Packaging Manufacturer and the Composite Product Manufacturer
are responsible for IC packaging, smart card product finishing process and testing. The
smart card product delivery is in phase 7.
For details on the IC chip and the crypto library, see the documentation under ANSSI-
CC-2010/02 [13] and ANSSI-2010/02-M01 [14].
The certified IC chip which is a component of the TOE provides SHA-224, it is not used
by the TOE. Thus it is out of TOE scope.
[Table 2] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(September 1, 2009)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Regulation for IT Security
(February 1, 2012)
TOE Ucard UBJ31-G11 V1.1
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-001 ~
CCMB-2009-07-003, July 2009
EAL EAL4+ (augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5)
Developer UBIVELOX
Sponsor UBIVELOX
Evaluation Facility Telecommunications Technology Association. (TTA)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
October 5, 2012
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 2] Additional identification information
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3. Security Policy
The ST [17] for the TOE claims demonstrable conformance to the Java CardTM
System
PP [19], and the TOE complies security policies defined in the Java CardTM
System PP
[19] by security objectives and security requirements based on the Sun‟s Java Card
2.2.2 [7], [8], [9]. Thus the TOE provides security features defined in the Java CardTM
System PP [19] as follows.
 Core with logical channels, ensures the runtime environment of the Java Card
System implementing logical channels. This includes the firewall policy and the
requirements related to the Java Card API.
 Installation, ensures the installation of post-issuance applications. It does not
address card management issues in the broad sense, but only those security
aspects of the installation procedure that are related to applet execution.
 Applet deletion, ensures erasure of installed applets from the card.
 Remote method invocation, ensures the remote method invocation feature,
which provides a new protocol of communication between the terminal and the
applets.
 Object deletion, ensures the object deletion capability. This provides a safe
memory recovering mechanism.
 Secure carrier, ensures secure downloading of applications on the card. This
provides security features for preventing, in those configurations that do not
support on-card static or dynamic bytecode verification, the installation of a
package that has not been bytecode verified, or that has been modified after
bytecode verification.
 Card manager, ensures security policies for controlling access to card content
management operations and for expressing card issuer security concerns. Also,
this group contains the security requirements to fulfill GP specific objectives.
 Smart card platform, ensures smart card platform, that is, operating system
and chip that the Java Card System is implemented upon.
Furthermore, the TOE is composite product based on the certified IC chip, the TOE
utilizes and therefore provides some security features covered by the IC chip
certification such as security monitoring and control register, clock random jitter, active
Shields against physical attacks, memory scrambling and encryption, glue logic, secure
cryptographic services, and a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) for AIS31-
compliant Random Number Generation. For more details refer to the Security Target
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Lite for the IC chip [15].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The following assumptions describe the security aspects of the operational
environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used:
 Applets loaded post-issuance do not contain native methods. The Java Card
specification explicitly "does not include support for native methods" ([JCVM22],
§3.3) outside the API.
 All the bytecodes are verified at least once, before the loading, before the
installation or before the execution, depending on the card capabilities, in order
to ensure that each bytecode is valid at execution time.
 It is assumed that cryptographic keys, which are stored outside the TOE and
which are used for secure communication and authentication between Smart
Card and terminals are protected in their own (off-card) storage environment.
 It is assumed that the CVM values are generated maintained and used off card
in a secure manner during personalization phases. It is assumed that the Card
Holder keeps his personal code secret.
 It is assumed that the Card Administrator is the sole Application Provider and
also plays the roles of Application Loader and Verification Authority.
Furthermore, some aspects of threats and organisational security policies are not
covered by the TOE itself, thus these aspects are addressed by the TOE environment.
 After Card manufacturing and initialization, the card administrator shall move
the Card in the OP_READY state before any GP function or service is used.
The card Issuer shall issue the card to the Cardholders with the card set to
SECURED life cycle state. A security domain shall be moved into the
PERSONALIZED life cycle state before any security domain User or
Application uses the services of that Security Domain.
 Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in during initialization,
personalization and other operations before Issuance. During these operations,
security procedures shall be used to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the
TOE manufacturing and test data.
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5. Architectural Information
[Figure 2] show the physical scope of the TOE. The TOE is the composite product
which is consisting of the certified contact/contactless IC chip and the embedded
software (i.e., COS and JCS).
[Figure 2]Physical boundary of the TOE
 The JCRE consists of the Java Card virtual machine (JCVM), the Java Card
API (JCAPI), and its associated native methods. This concerns all those
dynamic features that are specific to the execution of a Java program in a
smart card, like applet lifetime, applet isolation and object sharing, transient
objects, the transaction mechanism, and so on. The basic runtime security
feature imposed by the JCRE enforces isolation of applets using an applet
firewall. It prevents objects created by one applet from being used by another
applet without explicit sharing. This prevents unauthorized access to the fields
and methods of class instances, as well as the length and contents of arrays.
 The JCVM provides the embedded interpreter of bytecodes. The JCVM is the
component that enforces separation between applications (firewall) and
enables secure data sharing.
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 The card manager and GP API are responsible for the management of applets
in the card.
 The native layer including COS and NesLib provided by the IC chip, which
processes commands and manages files according to ISO/IEC 7816-3, 4 [20],
provides the basic functionalities (memory management, I/O management and
cryptographic libraries) with native interface with the dedicated IC. The
cryptographic library provides high-level routines to perform RSA, SHA, AES
and ECC operation using NESCRYPT for highly secure IC.
 The IC chip provides security features such as security monitoring and
controlling register, clock random jitter, active Shields against physical attacks,
memory scrambling and encryption, glue logic, secure cryptographic services,
and a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) for AIS31-compliant Random
Number Generation.
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
Ucard UBJ31-G11 V1.1 Operation User Guidance V1.3 September 20, 2012
Ucard UBJ31-G11 V1.1 Preparative procedure V1.3 September 20, 2012
[Table 3] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the component of the TOE and the
respective specification of each component. Physically, the embedded software is not
separated, but logically, it can be divided into Java card system in accordance with
Sun‟s Java Card 2.2.2 [7], [8], [9], card manager in accordance with Visa Global
Platform Card Specification [11], and other API in accordance with the Korean Finance
IC Card Standard [12].
Tests for Java card system were conducted for compliance to those specifications and
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security mechanisms for self-protection and domain separation:
 771 functional tests for API,
 120 functional tests for JCRE, and
 759 functional tests for JCVM.
Tests for card manager were conducted for compliance the the specification and
security mechanism for non-bypassability:
 607 functional tests for APDU,
 618 functional tests for API, and
 433 functional tests for SD.
Tests for other API were conducted for compliance to the specification:
 17 functional tests for API used for SEED cryptographic operation and FICCS
API for digital signature generation.
The developer tested all the TSF and analyzed testing results according to the
assurance component ATE_COV.2. This means that the developer tested all the TSFI
defined for each life cycle state of the TOE, and demonstrated that the TSF behaves as
described in the functional specification.
The developer tested subsystems (including their interactions), and analyzed testing
results according to the assurance component ATE_DPT.1.
The evaluator performed all the developer‟s tests listed in this report chapter 7.1, and
conducted independent testing based upon test cases devised by the evaluator.
Also, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test cases devised by
the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential vulnerabilities. These
test cases cover testing APDU commands, perturbation attacks, observation attacks
such as SPA/DPA and SEMA/DEMA, fault injection attacks, and so on. No exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing high attack potential were found from
penetration testing.
The evaluator confirmed that all the actual testing results correspond to the expected
testing results. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth,
and results are summarized in the ETR [16].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is Ucard UBJ31-G11 V1.1. The TOE is composite product consisting of the
following components:
 IC chips: SB23YR80B Secure Microcontrollers with cryptographic library
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NesLib 3.0 SB
 Embedded software: UBJ31-G11_DEL V2.0
The TOE is identified by the name and version number. The TOE identification
information is provided by the command-response APDU following:
 Command APDU: 00CA9F7F
 Response APDU: 5342 5942 5542 2007 8011 1225 53009A00 81D4 55422100
5542 0000000000000000000000000000000000009000
 „5342‟: SB (Chip Manufacture/Chip Manufacture NesLib)
 „5942‟: YB (Chip Type/Revision)
 „5542‟: UBIVELOX (Operating system identifier)
 „80‟: EEPROM Size
 „11‟: TOE final version
And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, [Table 3] were evaluated
with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [16] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2], and CCRA supporting
documents for the Smartcard and similar device [22], [23], [24], [25]. Also the
evaluation facility utilized German scheme‟s Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance
Class for EAL5+ and EAL6 [27] under confirmation of the CB.
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components of EAL4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
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The Security Problem Definition clearly defines the security problem intended to be
addressed by the TOE and its operational environment. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_SPD.1.
The Security Objectives adequately and completely address the security problem
definition and the division of this problem between the TOE and its operational
environment is clearly defined. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.2.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined,
and it is necessary. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent and the SFRs meet the security objectives of the TOE. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.2.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the ST of the composite TOE does not contradict the
ST of the IC chip according to the CCRA supporting document Composite Product
Evaluation [15].
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has used a documented model of the TOE life-cycle. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_LCD.1.
The developer has used well-defined development tools (e.g. programming languages
or computer-aided design (CAD) systems) that yield consistent and predictable results.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_TAT.1.
The developer has clearly identified the TOE and its associated configuration items,
and the ability to modify these items is properly controlled by automated tools, thus
making the CM system less susceptible to human error or negligence. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMC.4.
The configuration list includes the TOE, the parts that comprise the TOE, the TOE
implementation representation, security flaws, and the evaluation evidence. These
configuration items are controlled in accordance with CM capabilities. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMS.4.
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The developer's security controls on the development environment are adequate to
provide the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation that is
necessary to ensure that secure operation of the TOE is not compromised. Additionally,
sufficiency of the measures as applied is intended be justified. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ALC_DVS.2.
The delivery documentation describes all procedures used to maintain security of the
TOE when distributing the TOE to the user. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_DEL.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the embedded software is
installed onto/into the correct version of the underlying IC chip, and the delivery
procedures of IC chip and embedded software developers are compatible with the
acceptance procedure of the composite product integrator according to the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [15].
Thus, the security procedures that the developer uses during the development and
maintenance of the TOE are adequate. These procedures include the life-cycle model
used by the developer, the configuration management, the security measures used
throughout TOE development, the tools used by the developer throughout the life-cycle
of the TOE, the handling of security flaws, and the delivery activity.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
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9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The TOE design provides a description of the TOE in terms of subsystems sufficient to
determine the TSF boundary, and provides a description of the TSF internals in terms
of modules. It provides a detailed description of the SFR-enforcing modules and
enough information about the SFR-supporting and SFR-non-interfering modules for the
evaluator to determine that the SFRs are completely and accurately implemented; as
such, the TOE design provides an explanation of the implementation
representation.Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_TDS.3.
The developer has completely described all of the TSFI in a manner such that the
evaluator was able to determine whether the TSFI are completely and accurately
described, and appears to implement the security functional requirements of the
ST.Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.4.
The TSF is structured such that it cannot be tampered with or bypassed, and TSFs that
provide security domains isolate those domains from each other.Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ADV_ARC.1.
The implementation representation made available by the developer is suitable for use
in other analysis activities (analyzing the TOE design). Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ADV_IMP.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the requirements on the embedded software,
imposed by the IC chip, are fulfilled in the composite product according to the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [15].
Thus, the design documentation is adequate to understand how the TSF meets the
SFRs and how the implementation of these SFRs cannot be tampered with or
bypassed. Design documentation consists of a functional specification (which
describes the interfaces of the TSF), a TOE design description (which describes the
architecture of the TSF in terms of how it works in order to perform the functions
related to the SFRs being claimed), and an implementation description (a source code
level description). In addition, there is a security architecture description (which
describes the architectural properties of the TSF to explain how its security
enforcement cannot be compromised or bypassed).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer has tested all of the TSFIs, and that the developer‟s test coverage
evidence shows correspondence between the tests identified in the test documentation
Certification Report Page 17
and the TSFIs described in the functional specification. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ATE_COV.2.
The developer has tested all the TSF subsystems against the TOE design and the
security architecture description. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_DPT.1.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the design documentation, and had confidence in the
developer‟s test results by performing all of the developer‟s tests. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.2.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that composite product as a whole exhibits the properties
necessary to satisfy the functional requirements of its ST according to the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [15].
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing High attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE.Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.5.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that there is no exploitability of flaws or weakness in the
composite TOE as a whole in the intended environment according to the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [15].
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or
quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security
mechanisms), don‟t allow attackers possessing High attack potential to violate the
SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
Certification Report Page 18
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_OBJ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_REQ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_LCD.1 ALC_LCD.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_TAT.1 ALC_TAT.1.1E PASS PASS
ALC_CMS.4 ALC_CMS.4.1E PASS PASS
ALC_CMC.4 ALC_CMC.4.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.2 ALC_DVS.2.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.2.2E PASS
ALC_DEL.1 ALC_DEL.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_TDS.3 ADV_TDS.3.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_TDS.3.2E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.4 ADV_FSP.4.1E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.4.2E PASS
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV_IMP.1 ADV_IMP.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE ATE_COV.2 ATE_COV.2.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_DPT.1 ATE_DPT.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2 ATE_IND.2.1E PASS PASS
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ATE_IND.2.2E PASS
ATE_IND.2.3E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.5 AVA_VAN.5.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.5.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.5.3E PASS
AVA_VAN.5.4E PASS
[Table 4] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 The TOE provides cryptographic algorithm DES and SHA-1 not used by the
TOE itself but used by future applications. Application developers should be
careful when they use these weak algorithms in unavoidable situations.
 The TOE is Java card platform with open configuration, users can load and
install, therefore use Java applets on the TOE. The applet itself and applet
data are stored in the EEPROM, users should consider additional security
countermeasures (e.g., integrity check or encryption) to protect those data.
 The TOE complies Visa Global Platform Card Specification [11], thus the TOE
should be operated in accordance with the life-cycle status defined in the
Global Platform Card Specification [10] which is referenced by Visa Global
Platform Card Specification [11].
11. Security Target
Ucard UBJ31-G11 V1.1 Security Target V1.2, September 20, 2012 [17] is included in
Certification Report Page 20
this report by reference. For the purpose of publication, it is provided as sanitized
version [18] according to the CCRA supporting document ST sanitizing for publication
[26].
12. Acronyms and Glossary
AID Application Identifier
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
CC Common Criteria
CVM Cardholder Verification Method
DES Data Encryption Standard
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
GP Global Platform
JCAPI Java Card API
JCRE Java Card Runtime Environment
JCVM Java Card Virtual Machine
JCS Java Card System
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SD Security Domain
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
Application Protocol
Data Unit(APDU)
Standard communication messaging protocol between a
card accepting device and a smart card
Application (Applet) The name is given to a Java Card technology-based
user application. An application is the basic piece of
code that can be selected for execution from outside the
card. Each application on the card is uniquely identified
by its AID.
Cardholder The end user of a card
Cardholder Verification
Method (CVM)
A method to ensure that the person presenting the card
is the person to whom the card was issued
Certification Report Page 21
Card Manager Generic term for the 3 card management entities of a
GlobalPlatform card i.e. the OPEN, Issuer Security
Domain and the Cardholder Verification Method Services
provider
Global Platform (GP) Global Platform, GP is an organization that has been
established by leading companies from the payments
and communications industries, the government sector
and the vendor community, and is the first to promote a
global infrastructure for smart card implementation
across multiple industries. Its goal is to reduce barriers
hindering the growth of cross-industry, multiple
Application smart cards. The smart card issuers will
continue to have the freedom to choose from a variety of
cards, terminals and back-end systems.
JCRE The Java Card runtime environment consists of the Java
Card virtual machine, the Java Card API, and its
associated native methods. This notion concerns all
those dynamic features that are specific to the execution
of a Java program in a smart card, like applet lifetime,
applet isolation and object sharing, transient objects, the
transaction mechanism, and so on.
JCVM The embedded interpreter of bytecodes. The JCVM is
the component that enforces separation between
applications (firewall) and enables secure data sharing.
Logical channel A logical link to an application on the card. A new feature
of the Java Card System, version 2.2.2, that enables the
opening of up to four simultaneous sessions with the
card, one per logical channel. Commands issued to a
specific logical channel are forwarded to the active
applet on that logical channel.
Certification Report Page 22
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-001 ~ CCMB-2009-07-003, July 2009
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-004, July 2009
[3] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (September 1,
2009)
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (February 1, 2012)
[5] Java Card Platform, version 2.2 Runtime Environment (Java Card RE)
Specification. June 2002. Published by Sun Microsystems, Inc.
[6] Java Card Platform, version 2.2 Virtual Machine (Java Card VM) Specification.
June 2002. Published by Sun Microsystems, Inc.
[7] Java Card Platform, version 2.2.2 Runtime Environment (Java Card RE)
Specification. March 2006. Published by Sun Microsystems, Inc.
[8] Java Card Platform, version 2.2.2 Virtual Machine (Java Card VM)
Specification. Beta release, October 2005. Published by Sun Microsystems,
Inc.
[9] Java Card Platform, version 2.2.2 Application Programming Interface, March
2006. Published by Sun Microsystems, Inc.
[10] GlobalPlatform Card Specification, Version 2.1.1, March 2003
[11] Visa GlobalPlatform 2.1.1 Card Implementation Requirements, Version 2.0,
July 2007
[12] Finance IC card standard revision – Open platform – October 2010
[13] Certification Report ANSSI-CC-2010/02 – SA23YR48/80B and SB23YR48/80B
Secure Microcontrollers, including the cryptographic library NesLib v2.0 or
v3.0, in SA or SB configuration, February 1 2010, ANSSI
[14] Maintenance Report ANSSI-2010/02-M01 – Secured microcontrollers
SA23YR48/80B and SB23YR48/80B, including the cryptographic libraries
NesLib v2.0 or v3.0, in SA or SB configurations, March 19 2010, ANSSI
Certification Report Page 23
[15] STMicroelectronics SA23YR48B / SB23YR48B / SA23YR80B / SB23YR80B
Security Target – Public Version, SMD_Sx23Yrxx_ST_09_002 Rev 02.01,
November 2009
[16] TTA-CCE-11-027 Ucard UBJ31-G11 V1.1 Evaluation Technical Report V1.1,
Oct 5, 2012
[17] Ucard UBJ31-G11 V1.1 Security Target V1.2, September 20, 2012
(Confidential Version)
[18] Ucard UBJ31-G11 V1.1 Security Target Lite V1.0, September 20, 2012
(Sanitized Version)
[19] Java CardTM
System Protection Profile Open Configuration, Version 2.6, 19
April 2010
[20] ISO/IEC 7816 Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts
[21] ISO/IEC 14443 Identification cards – Contactless ICCs - Proximity cards
[22] Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar devices Version 1.0
Revision 1, CCDB-2007-09-01, September 2007
[23] Application of Attack Potential to Smartcard Version 2.7 Revision 1, CCDB-
2009-03-001, March 2009
[24] The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits Version 3.0 Revision 1, CCDB-
2009-03-002, March 2009
[25] Requirements to perform Integrated Circuit Evaluations, Version 1.0 Revision
1, CCDB-2009-03-003, September 2009
[26] ST sanitising for publication, CCDB-2006-04-004, April 2006
[27] Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS), AIS 34, Version 3,
BSI, March 9, 2009