BSI-DSZ-CC-0852-2013
for
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11
Service Pack 2 on IBM System z
from
SUSE Linux Products GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.71
BSI-DSZ-CC-0852-2013
Operating System
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11
Service Pack 2 on IBM System z
from SUSE Linux Products GmbH
PP Conformance: Operating System Protection Profile, Version 2.0,
01 June 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0067-2010
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 1 March 2013
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber L.S.
Head of Division
for components up
to EAL 4
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0852-2013
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0852-2013 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0852-2013
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................18
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................18
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................20
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................20
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................22
11 Security Target............................................................................................................22
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................22
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................24
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................25
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................26
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0852-2013 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0852-2013
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom.Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11 Service Pack 2 on IBM System z has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-
CC-0787-2013. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0787-2013 were
re-used.
The evaluation of the product SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11 Service Pack 2 on IBM
System z was conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 1 March 2013. The atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: SUSE Linux Products GmbH.
The product was developed by: SUSE Linux Products GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
5 Publication
The product SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11, Service Pack 2 on IBM System z has been
included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
SUSE Linux Products GmbH
Maxfeldstr. 5
90409 Nürnberg
Germany
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0852-2013 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11 Service Pack 2
(SLES11-SP2).
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server is a highly-configurable Linux-based operating system
which has been developed to provide a good level of security as required in commercial
environments. It also meets all requirements of the Operating System Protection Profile
[7].
The TOE is a Linux-based multi-user multi-tasking operating system. The TOE may
provide services to several users at the same time. After successful login, the users have
access to a general computing environment, allowing the start-up of user applications,
issuing user commands at shell level, creating and accessing files. The TOE provides
adequate mechanisms to separate the users and protect their data. Privileged commands
are restricted to administrative users.
The TOE is intended to operate in a networked environment with other instantiations of the
TOE as well as other well-behaved peer systems operating within the same management
domain. All those systems need to be configured in accordance with a defined common
security policy.
It is assumed that responsibility for the safeguarding of the user data protected by the TOE
can be delegated to human users of the TOE if such users are allowed to log on and
spawn processes on their behalf. All user data is under the control of the TOE. The user
data is stored in named objects, and the TOE can associate a description of the access
rights to that object with each named object.
The TOE enforces controls such that access to data objects can only take place in
accordance with the access restrictions placed on that object by its owner, and by
administrative users. Ownership of named objects may be transferred under the control of
the access control policies implemented by the TOE.
Discretionary access rights (e.g. read, write, execute) can be assigned to data objects with
respect to subjects identified with their UID, GID and supplemental GIDs. Once a subject
is granted access to an object, the content of that object may be used freely to influence
other objects accessible to this subject.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Operating System Protection Profile, Version 2.0, 01 June 2010, BSI-
CC-PP-0067-2010 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
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TOE Security Functions Addressed issue
Audit The Lightweight Audit Framework (LAF) is designed to be an audit system
for Linux, compliant with the requirements from Common Criteria. LAF is
able to intercept all system calls as well as retrieving audit log entries from
privileged user space applications. The subsystem allows configuring the
events to be actually audited from the set of all events that are possible to
be audited. Those events are configured in a specific configuration file and
then the kernel is notified to build its own internal structure for the events
to be audited.
Cryptographic services The TOE provides cryptographically secured network communication
channels to allow remote users to interact with the TOE. Using one of the
following cryptographically secured network channels, a user can request
the following services:
The OpenSSH application provides access to the command line interface
of the TOE. Users may employ OpenSSH for interactive sessions as well
as for non-interactive sessions. The console provided via OpenSSH
provides the same environment as a local console. OpenSSH implements
the SSHv2 protocol.
In addition to the cryptographically secured communication channels, the
TOE also provides cryptographic algorithms for general use.
Packet filter The Linux kernel's network stack implementation follows the layering
structure of the network protocols. It implements the code for handling the
link layer as well as the network layer. For those layers, independent filter
mechanism are provided:
Link layer: ebtables implements the filtering mechanism for bridges
Network layer: netfilter/iptables implements the filtering mechanism for
non-bridge interfaces.
Identification and
Authentication
User identification and authentication in the TOE includes all forms of
interactive login (e.g. using the SSH protocol or log in at the local console)
as well as identity changes through the su and sudo commands. These all
rely on explicit authentication information provided interactively by a user.
In addition, the key-based authentication mechanism of the OpenSSH
server is another form of of authentication.
Discretionary Access
Control
DAC provides the mechanism that allows users to specify and control
access to objects that they own. DAC attributes are assigned to objects at
creation time and remain in effect until the object is destroyed or the
object attributes are changed. DAC attributes exist for, and are particular
to, each type of named object known to the TOE. DAC is implemented
with permission bits and, when specified, ACLs.
Confidentiality protected
data storage
The Linux operating systems offers the use of an additional layer between
the file systems and the physical block device to encrypt and decrypt any
data transmitted between the file system and the block device. The
dm_crypt functionality uses the Linux device mapper to provide such
encryption and decryption operation that is transparent to the file system
and therefore to the user.
Security Management The security management facilities provided by the TOE are usable by
authorized users and/or authorized administrators to modify the
configuration of TSF. The configuration of TSF are hosted in the following
locations:
Configuration files (or TSF databases)
Data structures maintained by the kernel and within the kernel memory
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
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For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● IBM System z based on z/Architecture version 10 processors
For details refer to chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11 Service Pack 2 on IBM System z
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Form of Delivery
1. ISO SLES-11-SP2-DVD-x390x-GM-DVD1.iso
SHA256: 7738fb01e5c9ac1406d23ada746ccc23af90cf641abac4fcc8ade2625c26f11d
Download
2. ISO SLES-11-SP2-DVD-x390x-GM-DVD2.iso
SHA256: 78e5161d7bffdd01a052295ffb8b2617a536c978363c624838636ef9a6b9e54b
Download
3. ISO SLES-11-SP2-DVD-x390x-GM-DVD3.iso
SHA256: e3eafc71bb94715300b6b4dbc45d1a1d093e2457af2a6c5ae692962dbca96142
Download
4. RPM certification-sles-eal4-11.2-0.9.1.noarch.rpm 8
Download
5. RPM libopenssl0_9_8-0.9.8j-0.44.1.rpm,
libopenssl0_9_8-32bit-0.9.8j-0.44.1.rpm,
libopenssl0_9_8-hmac-0.9.8j-0.44.1.rpm,
libopenssl0_9_8-hmac-32bit-0.9.8j-0.44.1.rpm
Download
6. RPM openssl-0.9.8j-0.44.1.rpm Download
7. RPM kernel-default-3.0.34-0.7.9.rpm,
kernel-default-base-3.0.34-0.7.9.rpm
Download
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The delivery of the TOE is electronic download only in the form of DVD ISO images
according to the Evaluated Configuration Guide [10] . The TOE's downloadable parts are
shown in table 2. The user must verify the integrity of the ISO image by checking the hash
values listed in table 2.
8
NOTE: This RPM contains the "Evaluated Configuration Guide" [10].
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The packages that make up the TOE are digitally signed using GPG. The key of the
developer is contained on the installation DVD. The developer provides and operates the
download site and provides checksums for the downloaded images that enable the user to
verify the integrity of the download. The Evaluated Configuration Guide defines how to
install and configure the TOE. It is being shipped as a signed RPM package and is thus
integrity protected as well.
On the system, /etc/SuSE-release identifies the system as:
“
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11 (s390x)
VERSION = 11
PATCHLEVEL = 2
“
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Audit
● Cryptographic services
● Packet filter
● Identification and Authentication
● Discretionary Access Control
● Confidentiality protected data storage
● Security Management
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: Appropriate physical security; management by competent individuals;
authorized users act in a cooperating manner; users are sufficiently trained and trusted;
corruption of security-enforcing or security-relevant files of the TOE will be detected;
remote trusted IT systems; protected connections to and from remote trusted IT systems
and between physically-separate parts of the TSF.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is structured in much the same way as many other operating systems, especially
Unix-type operating systems. It consists of a kernel, which runs in the privileged state of
the processor and provides services to applications (which can be used by calling kernel
services via the system call interface). Direct access to the hardware is restricted to the
kernel, so whenever an application wants to access hardware like disk drives, network
interfaces or other peripheral devices, it has to call kernel services. The kernel then checks
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if the application has the required access rights and privileges and either performs the
service or rejects the request.
The kernel is also responsible for separating the different user processes. This is done by
the management of the virtual and real memory of the TOE which ensures that processes
executing with different attributes cannot directly access memory areas of other processes
but have to do so using the inter-process communication mechanism provided by the
kernel as part of its system call interface.
The TSF of the TOE also include a set of trusted processes, which when initiated by a
user, operate with extended privileges. The programs that represent those trusted
processes on the file system are protected by the file system discretionary access control
security function enforced by the kernel.
In addition, the execution of the TOE is controlled by a set of configuration files, which are
also called the TSF database. Those configuration files are also protected by the file
system discretionary access control security function enforced by the kernel.
Normal users – after they have been successfully authenticated by a defined trusted
process – can start untrusted applications where the kernel enforces the security policy of
the TOE when those applications request services from the kernel via the system call
interface.
The kernel itself is structured into a number of subsystems which are explained in detail in
the high-level design of the TOE. Those are:
● File and I/O Subsystem: Implements all file system object related functions. Functions
include those that allow a process to create, maintain, interact and delete file-system
objects, such as regular files, directories, symbolic links, hard links, device special files,
named pipes, and sockets.
● Process Subsystem: Implements functions related to process and thread
management. Functions include those that allow the creation, scheduling, execution,
and deletion of process and thread subjects.
● Memory Subsystem: Implements functions related to the management of a system’s
memory resources. Functions include those that create and manage virtual memory,
including management of page tables and paging algorithms.
● Networking Subsystem: This subsystem implements UNIX and internet domain
sockets as well as algorithms for scheduling network packets.
● IPC Subsystem: Implements functions related to inter-process communication
mechanisms. Functions include those that facilitate controlled sharing of information
between processes, allowing them to share data and synchronize their execution in
order to interact with a common resource.
● Audit Subsystem: Implements the kernel functions required to intercept system calls
and audit them in accordance with the auditing policy defined by the system
administrator.
● Kernel Modules Subsystem: This subsystem implements an infrastructure to support
loadable modules. Functions include those that load and unload kernel modules.
● Device Driver Subsystem: Implements support for various hardware devices through
common, device independent interface.
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● AppArmor Subsystem: This subsystem implements a process centered policy, with
process “profiles” being created and loaded from user space. Processes that do not
have a profile defined for them execute in an unconfined state which tells AppArmor to
not apply any restrictions onto these processes.
● Cryptographic mechanisms: Cryptographic mechanisms implemented in the kernel
which can be used as a library for other kernel parts, if needed. The trusted processes
include the following subsystems:
● Identification and Authentication: This subsystem includes all the processes that are
require to identify and authenticate users. All those processes share a common set of
functions (pluggable authentication modules (PAM)) that ensure that the same policy will
be enforced with respect to identification and authentication of users. Successful as well
as unsuccessful authentication attempts can be audited.
● Network Applications: This subsystem includes the trusted processes implementing
networking functions. The TOE supports SSH. The secure configuration as defined in
the Security Target restricts the cipher suites that can be used for secure
communication.
● System Management: This subsystem includes the trusted commands a system
administrator can use to manage users and groups, set the time and date and check the
integrity of the installed packages.
● Batch Processing: This subsystem includes the cron and at trusted processes that
allow to execute user programs at predefined time schedules. They ensure that the
users are restricted to the same security policy restrictions that also apply when they
start programs interactively.
● User Level Audit: This subsystem includes all the trusted processes and commands
outside of the kernel required to collect, store and process audit records.
In addition to those functions the TOE includes a secure system initialization function
which brings the TOE into a secure state after it is powered on or after a reset. This
function ensures that user interaction with the TOE can only occur after the TOE is
securely initialized and in a secure state.
The TOE provides the following security functionality:
● Auditing: The Lightweight Audit Framework (LAF) is designed to be an audit system
making Linux compliant with the requirements from Common Criteria. LAF is able to
intercept all system calls as well as retrieving audit log entries from privileged user
space applications. The subsystem allows configuring the events to be actually audited
from the set of all events that are possible to be audited.
● Cryptographic support: The TOE provides cryptographically secured communication
channels as well as cryptographic primitives that unprivileged users can utilize for
unspecified purposes. The TOE provides cryptographically secured communication to
allow remote entities to log into the TOE. For interactive usage, the SSHv2 protocol is
provided.
● Packet filter: The TOE provides a stateless and stateful packet filter for regular IP-based
communication. Layer 3 (IP) and layer 4 (TCP, UDP, ICMP) network protocols can be
controlled using this packet filter. Ethernet frames routed through bridges are controlled
by a separate packet filter which implements a stateless packet filter for the TCP/IP
protocol family.
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● Identification and Authentication: User identification and authentication in the TOE
includes all forms of interactive login (e.g. using the SSH protocol or log in at the local
console) as well as identity changes through the su or sudo command. These all rely on
explicit authentication information provided interactively by a user.
● Discretionary Access Control: DAC allows owners of named objects to control the
access permissions to these objects. These owners can permit or deny access for other
users based on the configured permission settings. The DAC mechanism is also used to
ensure that untrusted users cannot tamper with the TOE mechanisms.
● Confidentiality protected data storage: Using dm-crypt, the Linux operating system offers
administrators and users cryptographically protected storage space. Only with the
passphrase can the session key used for encryption or decryption be obtained and
used. Any data stored on the devices protected by dm-crypt is encrypted and cannot be
accessed even when the TOE is not operational. An operational TOE is needed to
unlock the device session key.
● Security Management: The security management facilities provided by the TOE are
usable by authorized users and/or authorized administrators to modify the configuration
of TSF.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
7.1.1 Test configuration
The test results provided by the sponsor were generated on the following systems:
● IBM s390x (z architecture)
The sponsor has performed his tests on the above listed hardware platforms. The software
was installed and configured as defined in the Evaluated Configuration Guide [10] with
additional software packages identified in the test plan. The test plan presents the
arguments that those additional packages are within the boundary defined by the Security
Target and do not constitute a violation of the evaluated configuration.
7.1.2 Testing Approach
The test plan is focused on the security functions of the TOE and ignores other aspects
typically found in developer test plans. The test cases are mapped to the corresponding
functional specification and HLD.
The sponsor uses one test suite which pulls in tests from older test suites (Linux Test
Project) for some specific cases, but the actual handling of this is transparent to the user.
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The test suite has a common framework for the automated tests in which individual test
cases adhere to a common structure for setup, execution and cleanup of tests. Each test
case may contain several tests of the same function, stressing different parts (for example,
base functionality, behavior with illegal parameters and reaction to missing privileges).
7.1.3 Testing Results
All test results from all tested environments show that the expected test results are
identical to the actual test results.
The developer did not test all CPUs of the family mentioned in the ST [6].
7.1.4 Test Coverage
The functional specification has identified the following different TSFI:
● System Calls
● Trusted programs (and the corresponding network protocol SSH v2.)
● TSF database files (security critical configuration files)
● AppArmor interfaces including its configuration and control files
● Miscellaneous interfaces that don't fit into the categories above, either because there
are no external interfaces, or the security functionality is not directly visible at the
interface.
The mapping provided by the sponsor shows that the tests cover all individual TSFI
identified for the TOE. An extension to this mapping developed by the evaluator as
documented in the test case coverage analysis document shows that also significant
details of the TSFI have been tested with the sponsor’s test suite.
7.2 Evaluator Testing
7.2.1 Test configuration
The evaluator verified the test systems according to the documentation in the Evaluated
Configuration Guide [10] and the test plan. The evaluator’s configuration is consistent with
the ST [6].
7.2.2 Independent Tests
In addition to running all the automated developer tests, the evaluator devised tests for a
subset of the TOE. The evaluator has chosen these tests for the following reasons:
● The test cases examine some of the security functions of the TOE in more detail than
the sponsor-supplied test cases. (Object reuse and DAC).
● The test cases cover aspects not included in the developer testing (verification of the
ACL support in the archival tool, the use of /dev/random instead of /dev/urandom) and
the use of address space randomization.
● As the sponsor-supplied test cases already cover the TOE in a broad sense the
evaluator has devised only a small set of test cases.
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The evaluator created several test cases for testing a few functional aspects where the
sponsor test cases were not considered by the evaluator to be broad enough. During the
evaluator's review of the test cases provided by the sponsor, the evaluator gained
confidence in the sponsor testing effort and the depth of test coverage in the sponsor
supplied test cases. The analysis has shown a very wide coverage of the TSF, therefore
the evaluator devised only a small number of test cases.
All the test results conformed to the expected test results from the test plan, except for
failures due to entropy starvation, as was expected.
In addition to repeating the tests that were provided by the developer according to the test
plan from the developer, the evaluator decided to run some additional test cases on the
provided test systems as defined:
● Permission settings of relevant configuration files
● Verification of the use of SHA512 passwords
● Verification that SSH uses /dev/random instead of /dev/urandom
● Verification that SUID programs do not change the real UID
● Testing of object reuse in regular file system objects
● Check for data import / export with DAC enforcement
● Verification that the permission check during open() is enforced during read() and write()
● Verification of cleaning of environment for SUID/SGID binaries
● Verification of address space randomization
All evaluator written tests passed successfully.
7.2.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator developed testable flaw hypotheses for the penetration testing effort. For
each hypothesis, tests were developed to show that the TOE is not vulnerable. The test
cases were executed on a s390x platform. The tests were executed and recorded.
The test results were negative and did not indicate that the TOE was in fact vulnerable to
the identified potential vulnerabilities.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The evaluated configuration is presented in [10] and the ST [6]. It defines a hardware
platform in [10], section 1.3.1 as well as in [6], section 1.4.3:
● IBM System z based on z/Architecture version 10 processors
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
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The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and 31 were used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.3 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0787-2013, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Operating System Protection Profile, Version 2.0, 01 June 2010,
BSI-CC-PP-0067-2010 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for:
● the TOE Security functionality according to the following table and
● for other usage of encryption and decryption within the TOE.
Algorithm Key length (bits) Intended purpose Implementation standard
RSA 1024, 2048, 3072 SSH U.S. NIST FIPS PUB186-3
DSA L=1024, N=160 bits SSH U.S. NIST FIPS PUB186-3
AES 128, 192, 256 SSH, dm-crypt FIPS PUB 197
Triple-DES 168 SSH FIPS PUB 46-3
Twofish 128, 192, 256 dm-crypt n/a
Serpent 128, 192, 256 dm-crypt n/a
HMAC-SHA1 n/a message authentication RFC 4253
Table 3: Cryptographic Functions
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10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE9
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0852-2013, Version 1.3, 2013-02-19, SUSE Linux
Enterprise Server 11 SP2 on IBM System z, SUSE Linux Products GmbH
[7] Operating System Protection Profile, Version 2.0, 01 June 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0067-
2010
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 5, 2013-02-28, Final Evaluation Technical
Report, atsec information security GmbH, (confidential document)
[9] Configuration list for the TOE: [CM.OBS] Configuration List OBS, 2012-08-29,
[CM.SAR] Configuration List CC Related Items, 2012-09-04, [CMLIST] SUSE
Configuration Management Lists, 2012-08-21, (confidential document)
[10] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.1, 2013-02-19, Common Criteria
EAL4+ Evaluated Configuration Guide for SUSE LINUX Enterprise Server 11 SP2
9
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 2, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 31, Version 2, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 38, Version 2.9, Reuse of evaluation results
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim Release 3 = chapter 10.4
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0852-2013 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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