BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009
for
STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1
from
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.29
BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009
STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1
from Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile electronic Health
Card (eHC) – elektronische Gesundheitskarte (eGK),
Version 2.60, 2008-07-29, BSI-PP-0020-V2-2007-
MA02
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice
of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the
product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 30 April 2009
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................8
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................15
7.1 Developer Tests according to ATE_FUN...............................................................16
7.2 Evaluator Tests......................................................................................................16
7.2.1 Independent Testing according to ATE_IND ..................................................16
7.2.2 Penetration Testing according to AVA_VLA....................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................18
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................19
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................20
11 Security Target............................................................................................................21
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................21
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................21
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................22
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................24
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
● Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became initially effective in March 1998.
This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April
1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates
issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The
Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF),
AVA_MSU.3 (Analysis and Testing for insecure States) and AVA_VLA.4 (Highly Resistant) that
are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1 has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0406-2007. Specific results from the
evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0406-2007 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1 was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 23 April 2009. The TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009 Certification Report
The product was developed by: Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required
and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance
continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1 has been included in the BSI list of the certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://www.bsi.bund.de) and [5].
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Prinzregentenstraße 159
81677 München
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009
1 Executive Summary
The Target of evaluation (TOE) is the STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1, a contact based
smart card with applications for the German health system according to “Gesetz zur
Modernisierung der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung” (GKV-Modernisierungsgesetz –
GMG), the “Sozialgesetzbuch” (SGB) and the privacy legislation (“Datenschutzgesetze
des Bundes und der Länder”). The TOE is intended to be used as electronic Health Card
(eHC) within the German Health Care System and is based on the specification
documents [13] and [14].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Common Criteria Protection Profile electronic Health Card (eHC) –
elektronische Gesundheitskarte (eGK), Version 2.60, 2008-07-29, BSI-PP-0020-V2-2007-
MA02 [10].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ADV_IMP.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.ACCESS Checks if the operation specific requirements on
user authorisation and protection of
communication data are fulfilled
SF.ADMIN The administration of the TOE is managed by this
Security Function
SF.AUTH The authentication of the eHC card holder is
managed by this Security Function
SF.CRYPTO Provides the cryptographic support
SF.TRUST Manages Card-to-Card authentication
SF.PROTECTION Protects the TSF functionality, TSF data and user
data
SF.IC_SF Covers the Security Functions of the IC
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.1.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'high' (SOF-high) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.1 is confirmed. The rating of the
Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this
report.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009 Certification Report
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
The TOE comprises the following parts:
● NXP P5CC080VOB Secure Smart Card Controller, consisting of the circuitry of the
eHC’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) and the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC
Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software
● IC Embedded Software (Operating System STARCOS 3.4)
● eHC applications (data structures and their content)
● Guidance documentation delivered together with the TOE ([16] to [20]) and
● Smart Card Application Verifier Tool8
(Smart Card Application Verifier, Version 2.1, build
2.1.1, including the configuration file)
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: STARCOS 3.4 Health
eGK C1. For details please refer to chapter 8.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/
SW
NXP P5CC080V0B Secure Smart Card
Controller
Mask Identifier:
P5CC080X0/
T0B36
Smart card modules, ROM mask
of the TOE already mounted into
an ID-1 smart card
2 SW Card Operating System STARCOS 3.4 0103 Software on the smart card
3 SW EEPROM image of STARCOS 3.4
Health eGK
Identifier of
valid images
published on
the G&D
website
Image on the smart card
4 DOC Administrator Guidance, Part 1:
Initialisation, STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK
C1, STARCOS 3.4 Health QES C1
Version 1.5 /
2009-02-09
Document in paper / electronic
form
8
The Smart Card Application Verifier Tool is part of the TOE, but not part of the TOE delivery. Since
the TOE may be initialised with different initialisation tables that have to be compliant to the
Spezifikation Generische Applikation [16] without exceeding the CC certificate, the developer has to
ensure this compliance by checking the initialisation table with the Smart Card Application Verifier
Tool.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
5 DOC Administrator Guidance, Part 2:
Personalisation, STARCOS 3.4 Health
eGK C1, STARCOS 3.4 Health QES C1
Version 1.4 /
2009-02-06
Document in paper / electronic
form
6 DOC Benutzerhandbuch STARCOS 3.4
Health eGK C1
Version 3.6 /
2009-04-01
Document in paper / electronic
form
7 DOC Spezifikation Generische Applikation,
STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1
Version 0.60 /
2009-04-01
Document in paper / electronic
form
8 DOC Installation, generation and startup,
STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1 /
STARCOS 3.4 Health QES C1
Version 1.7 /
2009-02-09
Document in paper / electronic
form
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Basically the life cycle of STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1 consists of the development
phase and the operational phase. The initialisation phase completely belongs to the
operational use. The TOE will be delivered as hardware, as initialisation data and as
documentation. No modifications by a third party is possible (e.g. by the party loading the
initialisation data into the hardware).
For the evaluation process the whole life-cycle of the TOE was considered during
evaluation as far as the developer/manufacturer of the TOE is directly involved. Any
delivery of the chip modules is done via a G&D security transport or a security transport
maintained by another initialiser to avoid the delivery of fake chips.
To verify the ID of the initialisation table of the TOE (and therefore also the composite
TOE), the user executes the command GET PROTOCOL DATA (see [19], chap. 5).
The user can check the version of the
● IC manufacturer data (Chipherstellerdaten)
● OS version (Betriebssystemversion)
● completion state (Komplettierungsstand) and
● initialisation table (Initialisierungstabelle)
The numbers of valid initialisation tables are published on the Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
website https://certificates.gi-de.com for comparison.
3 Security Policy
The TOE is the composition of an IC, IC Dedicated Software and Smart Card Embedded
Software and will be used as electronic Health Card (eHC) within the German Health Care
System. The security policy is expressed by the set of security functional requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● modification and disclosure of IC assets / smart card embedded software / application
data
● compromise / forge / misuse of confidential user or TSF data including information
leakage
● interception of communication
● abuse of TOE functionality (including its eHC applications)
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009 Certification Report
● malfunction due to environmental stress as well as physical tampering
● physical attacks through the TOE interfaces
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The security objectives
related to the environment of the TOE´s dedicated eHC Application can be found in the
protection profile [10] in chapter 4.2 and 4.3. See also the Security Target [6] and [9]
chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1 is composed of the already certified NXP
P5CC080V0B Secure Smart Card Controller, the operating system STARCOS 3.4 and the
eGK health applications from Giesecke & Devrient, see also figure 1 in [7].
The TOE is composed of the following subsystems:
● Access Control
● Setup
● Commands
● Application Data and Basic Functions
● Crypto Functions
● Secure Messaging
● Hardware
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The tests were performed with the composite smartcard product. The physical format of
the test configuration for TOE testing was either
● a card which is usable for all automatic or non-recoverable test cases or
● a simulator which is required for all interactive test cases.
The test targets (TT) were:
● TT1a: Card completed / initialized / personalized with eHC/QES application, (TOE TT),
plus test applications loaded onto the TOE by the tests
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009
● TT1b: Simulator completed / initialized / personalized with eHC/QES application, (Non-
TOE TT), plus test applications loaded onto the TOE by the tests
● TT2a: Uncompleted card + eHC/QES applications in form of an initialization image,
(non-TOE TT)
● TT2b: Simulator in uncompleted state + eHC/QES application in form of an initialization
imagel (non-TOE TT)
These four different test targets were necessary to test the single aspects of the TOE
relevant for testing:
● Operating system contained in ROM code and EEPROM patch code
● Applications which were initialized / loaded
● Completion state: card in usage phase or in uncompleted state
7.1 Developer Tests according to ATE_FUN
All TSF as specified in [6] with related sub-functions and subsystems were tested in order
to assure complete coverage. The test strategy was that all commands stated in the
functional specification were tested to cover the requirements on TSF data, the security
functional effects and the most important return codes given there and moreover all
interfaces described in the high-level design.
7.2 Evaluator Tests
7.2.1 Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
The approach for the evaluator’s independent testing was
● Examination of developer’s testing amount, depth and coverage analysis and of the
developer’s test goal and plan for identification of gaps
● Examination whether the TOE, in its intended environment, is operating as specified
using iterations of developer’s tests
● Independent testing was performed by the evaluator in the evaluation facility with the
TOE development environment using script based developer test tools with automated
comparison of expected and actual test results
During sample testing the evaluator has chosen to repeat all developer functional tests at
the Evaluation Body for IT-Security. The evaluator has verified the developer’s test results
by executing all tests in the developer’s test documentation and verifying the test log files
of a sample thereof.
The independent test results demonstrate that the TOE performs as expected.
7.2.2 Penetration Testing according to AVA_VLA
The approach for the evaluator’s penetration testing was:
● Examination of developer’s vulnerability analysis and of the developer’s rationale
based on for why the vulnerabilities are not exploitable in the intended environment of
the TOE
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009 Certification Report
● Examination whether the TOE, in its intended environment, is susceptible to
vulnerabilities not considered by the developer by considering current information
regarding obvious public domain vulnerabilities
Penetration testing was performed by the evaluator at the Evaluation Body for IT-Security
with the TOE development environment using script based developer test tools with
automated comparison of expected and actual test results. All security functions were
penetration tested.
During the penetration testing the TOE operated as specified. The vulnerabilities
discussed in the vulnerability analysis are not exploitable in the intended environment for
the TOE.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE as an electronic Health Card only features one fixed configuration STARCOS 3.4
Health eGK C1 which cannot be altered by the user. The evaluation is therefore only valid
for this configuration of the TOE.
The TOE comprises the parts TOE_IC, TOE_ES, TOE_APP, Documentation and the
Smart Card Application Verifier Tool as described below
TOE_IC: Consists of the circuitry of the eHC’s chip, the NXP P5CC080V0B and the IC
Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support
Software (Certification ID: BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007-MA-04). The chip hardware of TOE_IC
includes:
● Security logic (SEC)
● Microcontroller with an 8-bit architecture (CPU) that has an extended instruction set
compared with the 80C51 family instruction set
● External memory comprising:
• 224 kBytes ROM
• 6144 Bytes RAM, 3584 Bytes general purpose RAM and 2560 FameXE RAM
• 200 kBytes Application-ROM and 24 kBytes Test-ROM
• a total of 80 kBytes EEPROM, with 128 Bytes of the EEPROM are always reserved
for the manufacturer and can not be read and written by the smart card embedded
software
• True random number generator (RNG), SOF-high, AIS 31
• FameXE co-processor
The TOE_IC firmware consists of a RSA crypto library, which is not used in this evaluation
project.
TOE_ES: The IC Embedded Software (operating system), STARCOS 3.4
TOE_APP: The eHC application (data structures and their content)
Documentation: Documents delivered together with the TOE ([16] to [20])
Smart Card Application Verifier Tool: Smart Card Application Verifier, Version 2.1 (build
2.1.1), including the configuration file (version 0.60)
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009
However, to reach this version of the TOE, different initialization tables can be used which
differ only in non-security relevant parts. The requirements for those inizialization tables
are listed as generic initialization tables in [16]. The initialization tables listed in Table 3 all
fulfil the requirements of [16].
Table Identifier
01 03 03 e1 ff e8 89 ea 76 cb 4a 1b
01 03 03 e2 d2 16 c9 9d 3e 69 0c c1
01 03 03 e3 64 3e 27 66 17 43 d6 81
01 03 03 e4 96 b3 2a d5 0b 1d 4e 70
Table 3: Identifiers for valid Initialisation Tables
The identification of the TOE is described in [19], chapter 5.2. The relevant identifier for the
evaluated initialization table can be found on the dedicated web page:
https://certificates.gi-de.com. New initialization tables have to be checked with the
evaluated Smart Card Verifier Tool before updating the above mentioned web page.
Please note that the usage of the TOE within the scope of this certification is limited in
accordance with the validity of the used cryptographic algorithms, see chapter 10 of this
report.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
● Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards
● Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators
(see [4], AIS 1, AIS 14, AIS 19, AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 34, AIS 36, AIS 37, AIS38.)
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the class ASE
● All components of the EAL 4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009 Certification Report
● The components ADV_IMP.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0406-2007, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the change of the underlying
hardware platform [12], a new version of the claimed Protection Profile [10], integration of
the new Gematik specifications of the German Health Card [13] and [14] and changes in
the bitlength of the used hash- and cryptoalgorithms.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile electronic Health Card
(eHC) – elektronische Gesundheitskarte (eGK), Version 2.60,
2008-07-29, BSI-PP-0020-V2-2007-MA02 [10]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
● The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function: high
• SF.AUTH - The authentication of the eHC card holder is managed by this
Security Function
• SF.CRYPTO - Provides the cryptographic support
• SF.IC_SF - Covers the Security Functions of the IC
In order to assess the Strength of Function the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 26
(see [4]) were used.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
Hash functions:
● SHA-256 according to FIPS 180-2
Algorithms for the encryption and decryption:
● 3-key Triple-DES, 168 bit, according to FIPS PUB 46-3
● RSA 2048
This holds for the following security function:
● SF.CRYPTO - Provides the cryptographic support
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation
(see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). According to “Technische Richtlinie für die eCard-
Projekte der Bundesregierung” BSI TR-03116 [15] the algorithms are suitable for
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encryption and decryption. The validity period of each algorithm is mentioned in the official
catalogue [15] and summarized in chapter 10 of this report.
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In particular, the
user and administrator guidance makes the following constraints for TOE use:
● The ChipPWD shall be kept confidential ([18], chapter 4.1.4)
● The Initialiser must perform the self tests of the TOE ([17], chapters 6.2, 6.3 and 6.15)
● The chosen User PIN has to be random. It should not be possible to guess it ([19],
chapter 2.3.1)
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● The identification of the TOE is described in [19], chapter 5.2. The relevant identifier for
the evaluated initialization table can be found on the dedicated web page:
https://certificates.gi-de.com
● The card issuer is responsible for choosing only values which are permitted by [16]
● When Giesecke & Devrient modifies the non-TOE part of the initialization table (e.g.
when Giesecke & Devrient implements the initialisation table with the values of the card
issuer), that initialization table has to be checked before updating the above mentioned
web page
● Giesecke & Devrient is supported in this task with an automatic verification tool that
checks the consistency to [16], e.g. FCPs for MF/DFs or the access rules for MF/DFs
● CV-certificates have to be generated immediately after generation of the authentication
keys stored on the card. This must be done in a way that an attacker is not able to
modify any content of the certificates, in particular the ICCSN ([19], 4.2.3.1)
As mentioned in Chapter 9.2 of this report, the BSI TR-03116 [15] is applied. The following
restrictions arise from that paper:
Security Funciton (SF) Algorithm Valid to
SF.Crypto 1 SHA-256 End of 2013
SF.Crypto 2 3TDES and retail-MAC (Triple-DES with 168 bit) valid
SF.Crypto 3 Random number generation
Authentication: AIS20, K4
Key generation: AIS31, P2 high
valid
SF.Crypto 4
SF.Crypto 5
RSA, 2048 bit
RSA, 2048 bit (Client/Server authentication)
End of 2013
End of 2013
Table 4: Validity period of the used cryptographic and hash algorithms
For the expiry of the cryptographic algorithms please refer to the relevant and applicable
national directives. The usage of the TOE within the scope of this certification is limited in
accordance with the validity of the used cryptographic algorithms.
The automatic verification tool cannot check the validity of the used cryptographic
algorithms, hence by-and-by less of the initialisation tables on the above mentioned web
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site will fall under this certificate. If a valid CC certificate is required, the card issuer is
responsible for only using initialisation tables where the used cryptoalgorithms are valid
according to the then effective Technische Richtlinie für die eCard-Projekte der
Bundesregierung [15].
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
ATE Assurance class Test Activity
ATE_IND Independant testing
AS Application Software
AVA Assurance class Vulnerability Assessment Activity
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Errichtungsgesetz
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Evaluation Methodology
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
DOC Document
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EHC Electronic Health Card
ES Embedded Software
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
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OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman Algorithmus
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SOF Strength of Function
SPA Simple Power Analysis
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis
for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
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SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and
distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.9
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009, Version 1.0, 16.04.2009, Security Target
STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, 23.04.2009, Evaluation Technikal Report for
STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential
document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.7, 16.04.2009, Configuration List
STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1 (confidential document)
[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009, Version 1.0, 16.04.2009, Security Target
Lite STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (sanitised public
document)
[10] Protection Profile – electronic Health Card (eHC) – elektronische Gesundheitskarte
(eGK), BSI-PP-0020-V2-2007-MA02, Version 2.60, 29.07.2008, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
9
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 1, 2 December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie
für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including
JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte
Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen
ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
• AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for
EAL5+
• AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document
and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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[11] ETR-lite for composition according to AIS 36 for the Product NXP P5CD080V0B
Secure Smart Card Controller, Version 1.1, 23.04.2008, BSI-DSZ-CC-430-2008,
T-Systems (confidential document)
[12] Certification Report for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B,
P5CN080V0B and P5CC080V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software, BSI-
DSZ-CC-410-2007, 05.07.2007, BSI
[13] Spezifikation der elektronischen Gesundheitskarte, Teil 1: Spezifikation der
elektrischen Schnittstelle, Version 2.2.2, 16.09.2008, gematik
[14] Spezifikation der elektronischen Gesundheitskarte, Teil 2: Grundlegende
Applikationen, Version 2.2.1, 19.06.2008, gematik
[15] Technische Richtlinie für die eCard-Projekte der Bundesregierung, TR-03116,
Version 1.0, 23.03.2007, BSI
[16] Spezifikation Generische Applikation STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1 (includes
document & verifier files), Version 0.60, 01.04.2009, Giesecke & Devrient
[17] Administrator Guidance Part 1: Initialisation, STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1,
STARCOS 3.4 Health QES C1, Version 1.5, 09.02.2009, Giesecke & Devrient
[18] Administrator Guidance Part 2: Personalisation, STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1,
STARCOS 3.4 Health QES C1, Version 1.4, 06.02.2009, Giesecke & Devrient
[19] Benutzerhandbuch STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1, Version 3.6, 01.04.2009,
Giesecke & Devrient
[20] Installation, generation and startup STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1 / STARCOS 3.4
Health QES C1, Version 1.7, 09.02.2009, Giesecke & Devrient
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
• CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
• CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
• CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
• CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
• Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the
conformance result.
• Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages
listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
• PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
ACM: Configuration management
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support
Development security (ALC_DVS)
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests
Coverage (ATE_COV)
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2
Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment 37
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product STARCOS 3.4 Health eGK C1 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the
product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version
2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 30 April 2009, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria Security Assurance
Requirements
● ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2),
● ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
● ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
(a) Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (Site: “GDTC”), Prinzregentenstraße 159, 81677
Munich (Development and Production)
(b) Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (Site: “ZAM”), Zamdorfer Straße 88, 81677 Munich
(Development)
For development and productions sites regarding the NXP chip P5CD080V0B refer to the
certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 [12].
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified that the Threats, Security Objectives
and Requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0533-2009
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