BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 for MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / (SLE78CLX) M7820 from MaskTech International GmbH BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111 Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.71 BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Security IC with MRTD EAC Application MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / (SLE78CLX) M7820 from MaskTech International GmbH PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0056-2009 Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement for components up to EAL 4 The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. Bonn, 21 December 2012 For the Federal Office for Information Security Bernd Kowalski L.S. Head of Department for components up to EAL 4 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 This page is intentionally left blank. 4 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Certification Report Preliminary Remarks Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products. Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor. A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria. The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself. The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results. The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user. 1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821 5 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Contents A Certification........................................................................................................................7 1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7 2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7 3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8 4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9 5 Publication......................................................................................................................9 B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11 1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12 2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13 3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14 5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15 6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15 7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................15 8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................16 9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................19 10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................21 11 Security Target............................................................................................................21 12 Definitions...................................................................................................................21 13 Bibliography................................................................................................................24 C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27 CC Part1:........................................................................................................................27 CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................28 D Annexes...........................................................................................................................37 6 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Certification Report A Certification 1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following: ● BSIG2 ● BSI Certification Ordinance3 ● BSI Schedule of Costs4 ● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior) ● DIN EN 45011 standard ● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3] ● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15 [1] ● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2] ● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4] 2 Recognition Agreements In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed. 2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA) The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical domains only. The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined. It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement. 2 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821 3 Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230 4 Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519 5 Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730 7 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung. The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above. 2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA) An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC. As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org. The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above. This evaluation contains the components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant. 3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings. The product MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / (SLE78CLX) M7820 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. The evaluation of the product MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / (SLE78CLX) M7820 was conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 07 December 2012. The SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6 recognised by the certification body of BSI. For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: MaskTech International GmbH. The product was developed by: MaskTech International GmbH. The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI. 6 Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility 8 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Certification Report 4 Validity of the Certification Result This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that ● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed, ● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target. For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report. The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis. In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies. 5 Publication The product MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / (SLE78CLX) M7820 has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111. Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7 of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above. 7 MaskTech International GmbH Nordostpark 16 90411 Nürnberg 9 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 This page is intentionally left blank. 10 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Certification Report B Certification Results The following results represent a summary of ● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation, ● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and ● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body. 11 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 1 Executive Summary The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) [20] and providing Basic Access Control (BAC), Active Authentication and Extended Access Control (EAC) according to the ICAO documents [21] [22] [23], Chip Authentication according to the technical report TR-03110 [24] and the security mechanism PACE according to the ICAO document [25]. The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0056-2009 [7]. Please note that in consistency to the claimed protection profile BSI-CC-PP-0056-2009 the security mechanism Extended Access Control is in the focus of this evaluation process. The further security mechanism Basic Access Control and PACE are subjects of separate evaluation processes BSI-DSZ-CC-0763-2012 (BAC) [26] and BSI-DSZ-CC-0768 (PACE, evaluation is estimated to be finished in 2013). The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended. The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functions: TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue F.IC_CL Security Functions of the Hardware (IC) and Crypto Library F.Access_Control Regulates all access by external entities to operations of the TOE which are only executed after this TSF allowed access F.Identification_Authentication Provides identification/authentication of the user roles F.Management Provides management and administrative functionalities F.Crypto Provides a high level interface to the used algorithms and implements the used hash algorithms F.Verification TOE internal functions to ensure correct operation Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7. The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of 12 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Certification Report Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.2 to 3.4. This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE (for details refer to chapter 8 of this report): ● the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC), ● the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software, ● the IC Embedded Software (operating system), ● the MRTD application, and ● the associated guidance documentation. The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. 2 Identification of the TOE The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called: MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / (SLE78CLX) M7820 The following table outlines the TOE deliverables: No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery 1 HW/ SW MTCOS Passport operating system and a file-system in the context of the ICAO application with the contactless security IC Infineon Technologies AG M7820 A118 MTCOS Pro 2.2, ROM Mask: MT07 SW implemented in ROM and EEPROM memory, chip initialised and tested, but without antenna. Delivery type: MCC8 or FTM8 module. 2 DOC User Guidance MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC Version 1.2, 15.03.2012 [11] Document in electronic form 3 DOC MaskTech GmbH. MTCOS Standard & Pro V2.1: Part 1 - Filesystem and Security Architecture Version 1.03, 27.10.2010 [12] Document in electronic form 4 DOC MaskTech GmbH. MTCOS Standard & Pro V2.1: Part 2 - Basic Access Control and Secure Messaging Version 1.01, 18.10.2010 [13] Document in electronic form 8 For details on the MRTD chip and the IC Dedicated Software see the evaluation documentation under the Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0728-2011 [16]. 13 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery 5 DOC MaskTech GmbH. MTCOS Pro V2.1: Part 3 - Digital Signature Version 1.0, 02.04.2008 [14] Document in electronic form 6 DOC MaskTech GmbH. MTCOS Pro V2.1: Part 5 - Advanced Security Mechanisms Extended Access Control Version 1.01, 20.06.2008 [15] Document in electronic form Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE The customer specific ROM mask is labelled by Infineon Technologies AG as MT07. The name of the ROM file transferred from MaskTech to Infineon is mtcos-maske.hex.asc together with the control file mt07_ctl.hex.asc. The commercial numbering of the IC embedded software by Infineon is as follows: Commercial Product Types: ● SLN 52GLA036AM (with Filesystem Layout E) ● SLN 52GLA080AM (with Filesystem Layouts A, B and 0) ● SLN 52GLA128AM (with Filesystem Layout C) ● SLN 52GLA160AM (with Filesystem Layout D and 0) The TOE is finalized at the end of phase 2 according to the MRTD EAC PP [7]. Delivery is performed from the initialization facility to the personalisation facility as a secured transport to a specific person of contact at the personalization site. The TOE itself will be delivered as an initialized module but without hardware for contactless interface. The inlay production including the application of the antenna is not part of the TOE and takes part after the delivery to the personalization site. Furthermore, the personalizer receives information about the personalization commands and process requirements. To ensure that the personalizer receives this evaluated version, the procedures to start the personalisation process as described in the User's Guide [11] have to be followed. 3 Security Policy The Security Policy of the TOE is defined according to the MRTD EAC PP [7] by the Security Objectives and Requirements for the contactless chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The Security Policy address the advanced security methods Basic and Extended Access Control as well as Chip Authentication and Active Authentication. 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance: Personalization of the MRTD’s chip, Inspection Systems for global interoperability, PKI for Passive Authentication and PKI for Inspection Systems. Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.2. 14 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Certification Report 5 Architectural Information The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit, IC Embedded Software and Part Application Software. While the IC Embedded software contains the operating system MTCOS Pro 2.2, the Part Application Software contains the MRTD Application. As all these parts of software are running inside the IC, the external interface of the TOE to its environment can be defined as the external interface of the IC, the Infineon Technologies AG M7820 A11. For details concerning the CC evaluation of the Infineon IC see the evaluation documentation under the Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC- 0728-2011 [16]. Please note that the hardware for the contactless interface (i.e. antenna) is not part of the TOE. The inlay production including the application of the antenna takes part after delivery. The Security Functions of the TOE are: ● F.Access_Control ● F.Identification_Authentication ● F.Management ● F.Crypto ● F.Verification ● F.IC_CL According to the TOE design these Security Functions are enforced by the following subsystems: ● Application data (supports the TSF F.Access_Control, F.Identification_Authentication) ● Kernel (supports the TSF F.Access_Control, F.Identification_Authentication, F.Management, F.Crypto, F.Verification) ● HAL (supports the TSF F.Crypto, F.Identification_Authentication, F.Verification) ● Hardware (supports the TSF F.IC_CL) 6 Documentation The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target. Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed. 7 IT Product Testing The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with emulator tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to demonstrate its expected behavior including error cases. Hereby a representative sample including all boundary values of the parameter set, e.g. all command APDUs with valid and invalid inputs were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs. Repetition of developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests. Since many Security Functions can be tested by TR-03110 APDU command sequences, the evaluators performed these tests with real cards. This is considered to be a reasonable 15 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 approach because the developer tests include a full coverage of all security functionality. Furthermore penetration tests were chosen by the evaluators for those Security Functions where internal secrets of the card could maybe be modified or observed during testing. During their independent testing, the evaluators covered ● testing APDU commands related to Access Control, ● testing APDU commands related to Identification and Authentication, ● testing APDU commands related to the Secure Messaging Channel, ● testing APDU commands related to the Creation of Digital Signatures, ● penetration testing related to verify the Reliability of the TOE, ● source code analysis performed by the evaluators, ● testing the commands which are used to execute the EAC protocol, ● side channel analysis for SHA, ● fault injection attacks (laser attacks), ● testing APDU commands for the initialization, personalization and usage phase, and ● testing APDU commands for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms. The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential during their penetration testing. The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results. 8 Evaluated Configuration This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE: MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / (SLE78CLX) M7820 consisting of ● the Infineon Technologies Smart Card IC (Security Controller) M7820 A11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.008, EC v1.02.008 and SHA-2 v1.01 libraries and Toolbox v1.02.008 libraries and with specific IC dedicated software, ● the embedded software, and ● a file system in the context of the ICAO application. The IC embedded software consists of the operating system MTCOS Pro 2.2 and an application layer, consisting of the ICAO application. The customer specific ROM mask is labelled by Infineon as MT07. The name of the ROM file transferred from MaskTech International GmbH to Infineon is mtcos-maske.hex.asc together with the control file mt07_ctl.hex.asc. Since an MRTD may have different file structures here the certified configuration of the TOE is addressed. The certified configuration of the TOE has 30 different variations due to a total of seven layouts, concretely the four layouts (LayoutA-80, LayoutB-80, LayoutC- 128, and LayoutD-150) each with six curves (BP224r1, BP256r1, BP320r1, NISTP224, NISTP256 and NISTP384), and the three Layouts (LayoutE-36, Layout0-80, and Layout0- 150) with the two curves (BP256r1 and NISTP256). Thus the TOE consists of the hardware applied with the following different initialisation / pre-personalisation files: 16 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Certification Report ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-Layout0-150-BP.txt ● Dummy–FSP-preperso-Layout0-150-BP256r1.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-Layout0-150-NIST.txt ● Dummy–FSP-preperso-Layout0-150-NIST256.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-Layout0-80-BP.txt ● Dummy–FSP-preperso-Layout0-80-BP256r1.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-Layout0-80-NIST.txt ● Dummy–FSP-preperso-Layout0-80-NIST256.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-BP224r1.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-BP256r1.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-BP320r1.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-NISTP224.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-NISTP256.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-NISTP384.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-BP224r1.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-BP256r1.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-BP320r1.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-NISTP224.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-NISTP256.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-NISTP384.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutC-128-BP224r1.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutC-128-BP256r1.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutC-128-BP320r1.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutC-128-NISTP224.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutC-128-NISTP256.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutC-128-NISTP384.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutD-150-BP224r1.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutD-150-BP256r1.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutD-150-BP320r1.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutD-150-NISTP224.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutD-150-NISTP256.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutD-150-NISTP384.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutE-36-BP256r1.txt ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutE-36-NISTP256.txt 17 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 In case the initialisation/pre-personalisation is performed by Infineon (waferfab), the following memory dumps are applied. The certified configuration of the TOE consists of the hardware applied with EEPROM loaded from the following memory dump files: ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-Layout0-150-BP.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-Layout0-150-NIST.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-Layout0-80-BP.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-Layout0-80-NIST.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-BP224r1.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-BP256r1.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-BP320r1.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-NISTP224.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-NISTP256.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-NISTP384.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-BP224r1.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-BP256r1.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-BP320r1.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-NISTP224.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-NISTP256.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-NISTP384.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutC-128-BP224r1.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutC-128-BP256r1.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutC-128-BP320r1.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutC-128-NISTP224.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutC-128-NISTP256.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutC-128-NISTP384.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutD-150-BP224r1.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutD-150-BP256r1.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutD-150-BP320r1.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutD-150-NISTP224.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutD-150-NISTP256.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutD-150-NISTP384.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutE-36-BP256r1.hex ● Dummy–FSP-initscript-LayoutE-36-NISTP256.hex 18 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Certification Report 9 Results of the Evaluation 9.1 CC specific results The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE. The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34). The following guidance specific for the technology was used: ● For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36 (see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 36) were used. ● Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36). According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e. on hardware [10], [14]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation. A document ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 has not been provided in the course of this certification procedure. It could be provided by the ITSEF and submitted to the certification body for approval subsequently. As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components: ● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report) ● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation. The evaluation has confirmed: ● PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0056-2009 [10] ● for the Functionality: PP conformant Common Criteria Part 2 extended ● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report. The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above. 9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy: 19 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Algorithm Bit Length Purpose Security Function Standard of Implementati on Standard of Usage Validity Period SHA-1 - Computing hash value for key derivation (Basic Access Control); Signature verification of ECDSA (Extended Access Control – Terminal Authentication) F.Crypto FIPS 180-2 TR-03110 [24] -9 SHA-224 - Signature verification of ECDSA (Extended Access Control – Terminal Authentication) F.Crypto FIPS 180-2 TR-03110 [24] - SHA-256 - Signature verification of ECDSA (Extended Access Control – Terminal Authentication) F.Crypto FIPS 180-2 TR-03110 [24] - Triple-DES 112 bit Secure Messaging F.Crypto F.IC_CL F.Identifica tion _Authentic ation FIPS 46-3 TR-03110 [24] - Retail-MAC 112 bit Secure Messaging F.Crypto F.IC_CL F.Identifica tion _Authentic ation ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2) TR-03110 [24] - ECDH 224 bit, 256 bit, 320 bit or 384 bit ECC Key Agreement Extended Access Control – Chip Authentication F.IC_CL F.Identifica tion _Authentic ation TR-03110, Annex A.1 TR-03110 [24] - 9 The SHA-1 algorithm as well as the following cryptographic algorithms are implemented by the TOE because of the standards building the TOE application (e.g. TR-03110 [24]). For that reason an explicit validity period is not given for the SHA-1 and also not for the following cryptographic algorithms. 20 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Certification Report Algorithm Bit Length Purpose Security Function Standard of Implementati on Standard of Usage Validity Period ECDSA 224 bit, 256 bit, 320 bit or 384 bit Signature verification (Extended Access Control – Terminal Authentication) F.IC_CL F.Identifica tion _Authentic ation FIPS 186-2 TR-03110 [24] - RSA 1536 bit Active Authentication F.IC_CL ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 MRTD-PKI [21] - Tabelle 3: Cryptografic Algorithms used by the TOE The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). According to Technical Guideline BSI-TR-03110, Version 1.11 [24], and the ICAO document [21] the algorithms are suitable for securing originality and confidentiality of the stored data for machine readable travel documents (MRTDs). 10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE. The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate. 11 Security Target For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]). 12 Definitions 12.1 Acronyms AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme APDU Application Protocol Data Unit BAC Basic Access Control BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany 21 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation EAC Extended Access Control EAL Evaluation Assurance Level ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography EEPROM Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory ES Embedded Software ETR Evaluation Technical Report IC Integrated Circuit ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation IT Information Technology ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility LDS Logical Data Structure MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment PP Protection Profile RAM Random Access Memory RNG Random Number Generator ROM Read Only Memory SAR Security Assurance Requirement SF Security Function SFP Security Function Policy SFR Security Functional Requirement ST Security Target TOE Target of Evaluation TSF TOE Security Functionality Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES 12.2 Glossary Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package. Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC. Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well- established mathematical concepts. 22 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Certification Report Informal - Expressed in natural language. Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations. Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type. Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE. Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics. Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects. Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance. TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs 23 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 13 Bibliography [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009 Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009 Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009 [2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009 [3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE10 . [5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also in the BSI Website [6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012, Version 1.5, 15.03.2012, Security Target – Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application” Extended Access Control MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC/ (SLE78CLX) M7820, MaskTech International GmbH (confidential document) [7] Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0056-2009, BSI [8] Security Target lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012, Version 1.1, 04.10.2012, Security Target – Public Version – Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application” Extended Access Control MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC/ (SLE78CLX) M7820, MaskTech International GmbH (sanitised public document) [9] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.3, 08.10.2012, MaskTech MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC/ (SLE78CLX) M7820, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document) [10] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 0.5, 20.03.2012, Configuration List of MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC/ (SLE78CLX) M7820, MaskTech GmbH (confidential document) [11] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.2, 15.03.2012, User Guidance MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC, MaskTech International GmbH 10 specifically • AIS 25, Version 7, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document • AIS 26, Version 8, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document • AIS 31, Version 2, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren • AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema • AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1) • AIS 35, Version 2.0, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies • AIS 36, Version 3, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document 24 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Certification Report [12] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.03, 27.10.2010, MTCOS Standard & Pro V2.1: Part 1 - Filesystem and Security Architecture, MaskTech International GmbH [13] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.01, 18.10.2010, MTCOS Standard & Pro V2.1: Part 2 - Basic Access Control and Secure Messaging, MaskTech International GmbH [14] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.0, 02.04.2008, MTCOS Pro V2.1: Part 3 - Digital Signature, MaskTech International GmbH [15] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.01, 20.06.2008, MTCOS Pro V2.1: Part 5 - Advanced Security Mechanisms Extended Access Control, MaskTech International GmbH [16] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0728-2011 for Infineon Technologies Smart Card IC (Security Controller) M7820 A11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.008, EC v1.02.008 and SHA-2 v1.01 libraries and Toolbox v1.02.008 libraries and with specific IC dedicated software from Infineon Technologies AG, Version 1.0, BSI, 05.05.2011 [17] ETR FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR-COMP), Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC- 0813-2012, TOE M7820 A11, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH – Evaluation Body for IT Security, Version 1.0, 01.06.2012 (includes ETR for Composition of BSI-DSZ-CC- 0728-2011) [18] Security Target M7820 A11 including optional Software Libraries RSA - EC – SHA-2, Infineon Technologies AG Chipcard and Security, Evaluation Documentation, Version 0.6, 15.04.2011 [19] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0007-2011 for Inlay Production and Initialisation of SMARTRAC Site Bangkok of SMARTRAC TECHNOLOGY Ltd. Thailand, BSI, 2011 [20] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision – 1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization, LDS 1.7, 18.05.2004 [21] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date – October 01, 2004, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization [22] ICAO, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports. International Civil Aviation Organization, 2006 [23] ICAO, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 3 - Machine Readable Official Travel Documents. International Civil Aviation Organization, 2008 [24] Technical Guideline TR-03110: Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), Version 1.11, BSI, 2008 [25] International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS, TECHNICAL REPORT, Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents, Version 1.00, November 2010 25 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 [26] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0763-2012 for MTCOS Pro 2.2 BAC / (SLE78CLX) M7820 from MaskTech International GmbH, Version 1.0, BSI, 21.12.2012 [27] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0004-2010 for Assembly of Inlays and Similar Products and Initialisation of HID Global Ireland Teoranta, BSI, 2010 26 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Certification Report C Excerpts from the Criteria CC Part1: Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4) “The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC conformance claim that: ● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance. ● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either: – CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or – CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2. ● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either: – CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or – CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3. Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to packages, in which case it consists of one of the following: ● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package (e.g. EAL) if: – the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or – the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package. ● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package if: – the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the package. – the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the package. Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant. Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection Profiles: ● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result. ● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.” 27 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 CC Part 3: Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10) “Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent, and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP. Assurance Class Assurance Components Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation APE_INT.1 PP introduction APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition” Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11) “Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.” 28 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Certification Report Assurance Class Assurance Components Class ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_INT.1 ST introduction ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design summary ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition Security assurance components (chapter 7) “The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance classes, families, and components.“ “Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.” “Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.” The following table shows the assurance class decomposition. Assurance Class Assurance Components ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional formal specification ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model ADV_TDS.1 Basic design ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high- level design presentation 29 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Assurance Class Assurance Components AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures ALC: Life cycle support ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts ATE: Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis Assurance class decomposition 30 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Certification Report Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8) “The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE. It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.” Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1) “Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable. As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements). These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed. While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended assurance requirements. 31 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Assurance Class Assurance Family Assurance Components by Evaluation Assurance Level EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7 Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1 ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6 ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2 ADV_INT 2 3 3 ADV_SPM 1 1 ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6 Guidance Documents AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Life cycle Support ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5 ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5 ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1 ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2 ALC_FLR ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2 ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3 Security Target Evaluation ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1 ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3 ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4 ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2 ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5 Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary” 32 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Certification Report Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3) “Objectives EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information. EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through security objectives. EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay. An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation.” Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4) “Objectives EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time. EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.” Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5) “Objectives EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practises. EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.” 33 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed (chapter 8.6) “Objectives EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.” Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7) “Objectives EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large. EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.” Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested (chapter 8.8) “Objectives EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks. EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.” 34 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Certification Report Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter 8.9) “Objectives EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.” Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16) “The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.” Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1) "Objectives Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate the SFRs. Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.” 35 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 This page is intentionally left blank 36 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Certification Report D Annexes List of annexes of this certification report Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document. Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development and production environment 39 37 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 This page is intentionally left blank. 38 / 40 BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Certification Report Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 Evaluation results regarding development and production environment The IT product MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / (SLE78CLX) M7820 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. As a result of the TOE certification, dated 21 December 2012, the following results regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1) are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below: a) MaskTech International GmbH, Nordostpark 16, 90411 Nuremberg, Germany b) Smartrac Ltd., 142 Moo1, Hi-Tech Industrial Estate, Tambon Ban Laean, Amphor Bang-pa-in, Phra Nakorn Si Ayutthaya, 13160 Thailand, Site Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0007-2011 [19] (Initialisation / Pre-Personalisation) c) HID Global Ireland Teoranta, Pairc Tionscail na Tulaigh, Baile na hAbhann, Co. Galway, Ireland, Site Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0004-2010 [27] (Initialisation / Pre-Personalisation) For development and production sites regarding the Infineon Technologies Smart Card IC (Security Controller) M7820 A11 refer to the certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0728-2011 [16]. For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites. 39 / 40 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0762-2012 This page is intentionally left blank. 40 / 40