TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Head Office:
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NL-6827 AV Arnhem
P.O. Box 2220
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P.O. Box 37
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info@nl.tuv.com
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Tel. +31 (0)88 888 7 888
Fax +31 (0)88 888 7 879
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
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IBAN: NL61DEUT0265155096
Version
2021-3
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Certification Report
SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5
by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0– Java Card applet
configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic
Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC
option
Sponsor: Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1 – 15,
85579 Neubiberg
Germany
Developer: cv cryptovision GmbH
Munscheidstr. 14
45886 Gelsenkirchen
Germany
Evaluation facility: Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0189569-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0189569
Author(s): Jordi Mujal
Date: 21 June 2021
Number of pages: 13
Number of appendices: 0
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CONTENTS
Foreword 4
Recognition of the Certificate 5
International recognition 5
European recognition 5
1 Executive Summary 6
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 8
2.5 Documentation 9
2.6 IT Product Testing 9
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 9
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 9
2.6.3 Test configuration 10
2.6.4 Test results 10
2.7 Re-Used Evaluation Results 10
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 10
2.9 Results of the Evaluation 10
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 11
3 Security Target 12
4 Definitions 12
5 Bibliography 13
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the CC. Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual recognition
of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components up to and
including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be found at: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOG-IS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 effective since April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-
basic) is provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed
initially by Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. Italy joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations,
approved certification schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition
applies can be found at: http://www.sogisportal.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0– Java
Card applet configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110
for Official Use with BAC option. The developer of the SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet
Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0– Java Card applet configuration providing Machine-
Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option is cv
cryptovision GmbH located in Gelsenkirchen, Germany and Infineon Technologies AG was the
sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective
consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular
requirements.
The TOE consists of an applet and the certified Java Card platform (SECORA ID-X Javacard OS
platform) [PL-CERT] that can be configured to be used as an eMRTD as specified in [ST]. It provides
the Basic Access Control according to the ICAO documents referenced in the [ST].
The TOE is delivered during the preparation phase after which the initialisation and personalisation
are performed.
The TOE has been evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The evaluation
was completed on 21 June 2021 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of
IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with
ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0– Java Card applet configuration providing
Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option,
the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the
product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the SECORA™ ID X Applet
Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0– Java Card applet configuration
providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC
option are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to
give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification
report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4: augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the
evaluated security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of
security measures).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 and [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with
ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0– Java Card applet configuration providing
Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option
from cv cryptovision GmbH located in Gelsenkirchen, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware Hardware Platform IFX_CCI_000010
Software Firmware 80.102.06.1
Software
Asymmetric Crypto Library (ACL), including Base,
RSA4096, EC, and Toolbox libraries
2.07.003
Software Symmetric Crypto Library (SCL) 2.04.002
Software Hardware Support Library (HSL) 03.12.8812
Software Embedded OS SECORA™ ID X (v1.1) 1482
Software
Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by
cryptovision GmbH
internal version
3.5.1
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the SECORA™ ID X
Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0– Java Card applet
configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official
Use with BAC option. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle refer to the [ST], chapter 1.4.7.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a Java Card (SECORA ID-X Javacard OS platform) applet configured to provide a contact
and contactless integrated circuit chip containing components for a machine readable travel document
(MRTD chip). After instantiation and configuration of the according configuration it can be programmed
according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and provides the Basic Access Control according to the
ICAO documents referenced in the [ST] and the set of Security Functional Requirements defined in
the [ST] and implemented by the TOE.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 3.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
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Note that the ICAO MRTD infrastructure critically depends on the objectives for the environment to be
met. These are not weaknesses of this particular TOE, but aspects of the ICAO MRTD infrastructure
as a whole.
The environment in which the TOE is personalised must perform proper and safe personalisation
according to the guidance and referred ICAO guidelines.
The environment in which the TOE is used must ensure that the inspection system protects the
confidentiality and integrity of the data send and read from the TOE.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE consists of:
 The circuitry of the chip (the integrated circuit, IC) including the contact-based interface with
hardware for the contactless interface including contacts for the antenna, providing basic
cryptographic functionalities.
 The platform with the Java Card operation system SECORA ID-X (SLJ52GxAyyyzX; please
refer to the platform security target [PL-ST] for details of this designation),
 The guidance documentation of SECORA ID-X (SLJ52GxAyyyzX) according to [PL-ST],
section 1.4.1.4.
 SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v.3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version
1.0 – Java Card applet configuration providing Machine Readable Travel Document with
„ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control.
 The associated guidance documentation: Administrator and User Guidance in PDF format.
Multiple configurations (and hence support for different applications) can be present at the same
time by instantiating multiple applets with their distinct configurations. Such additional functionality
is independent of the functionality of the TOE as described in the [ST] and the guidance manuals.
This is ensured by the isolation properties of the Java Card platform.
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2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection v1.0 with cryptovision ePasslet Suite
v3.5 – Java Card applet configuration providing an ICAO MRTD
application with Extended Access Control (EACv1) or with Basic Access
Control (BAC) and Supplemental Access Control (SAC) - Preparation
Guidance (AGD_PRE).
1.0.5
SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection v1.0 with cryptovision ePasslet Suite
v3.5 – Java Card applet configuration providing an ICAO MRTD
application with Extended Access Control (EACv1) or with Basic Access
Control (BAC) and Supplemental Access Control (SAC) - Operational
Guidance (AGD_OPE).
1.0.4
SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection v1.0 with cryptovision ePasslet Suite
v3.5 – Java Card Applet Suite providing Electronic ID Documents
applications, Guidance Manual
1.0.9
SECORA™ ID X v1.1 Administration Guide 1.50
SECORA™ ID X v1.1 Security Guide 1.40
SECORA™ ID X v1.1 Databook 1.40
SECORA™ ID X v1.1 SLJ52GxxyyyzX System Release Notes 1.20
SECORA™ ID X v1.1 Product API Specification 1.00.1482
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and module
level. All parameter choices have been addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified have
been tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions have been covered
probabilistically. The testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites.
Test scripts were extensively used to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The underlying hardware, crypto-library and Javacard test results are extendable to composite
evaluations, as the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite
evaluation requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided samples and a test
environment. The evaluators have reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small
number of test cases designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
 When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers
whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified
behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
 For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE.
During this attack oriented analysis the protection of the TOE is analysed using the knowledge
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gained from all previous evaluation classes. This results in the identification of (additional)
potential vulnerabilities. For this analysis will be performed according to the attack methods in
[JIL-AAPS] and [JIL-AM]. An important source for assurance in this step is the ETR for
composition of the underlying platform [PL-CERT].
 All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed
by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 2 weeks. During that test campaign 50% of the
total time was spent on Perturbation attacks and 50% on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
It has been tested in pre-personalisation, personalisation and operational life-cycle states with applet
instance configurations specified in the Security Target [ST].
Functional testing was carried out by witnessing of the developer testing and by repeating some tests
by the Laboratory. A combination of standard commercial tools and proprietary developer tools were
used. Penetration testing was performed by using the Lab’s equipment.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Re-Used Evaluation Results
There is no re-use of evaluation results in this certification.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with
ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0– Java Card applet configuration providing
Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option.
The guidance documents describe how to verify the TOE and configure it.
2.9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the SECORA™ ID X Applet
Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0– Java Card applet configuration
providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC
option, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 4
augmented with ALC_DVS.2. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements
specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims strict conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
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2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: None.
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3 Security Target
The SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0 –
Java Card applet configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-
03110 for Official Use with BAC option - Security Target, Version 1.4, 2 June 2021 [ST] is included
here by reference.
Please note that for the need of publication a public version [ST-lite] has been created and verified
according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
BAC Basic Access Control
EAC Extended Access Control
eMRTD electronic MRTD
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] ETR EAL5+ SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by
cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0, 20-RPT-675, version 7.0, 18 June 2021.
[PL-CERT] Certification Report SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX), Report Number:
NSCIB-CC-0031318-CR2, TÜV Rhein-land Nederland B.V., 16 April 2021.
[PL-ST] SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX), Rev1.3, 22 March 2021.
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5, 28
March 2019
[PP] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”,
Basic Access Control (MRTD-PP), Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, registered
under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009
[ST] SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision
GmbH, version 1.0 –Java Card applet configuration providing Machine-
Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with
BAC option - Security Target, Version 1.4, 2 June 2021
[ST-lite] SECORA™ ID X Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v3.5 by cryptovision
GmbH, version 1.0 –Java Card applet configuration providing Machine-
Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with
BAC option - Security Target Lite, Version 1.5, 11 June 2021
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)