BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013
for
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D080/052/040yVC including IC Dedicated
Software with MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or with
MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire
EV1
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.72
BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013
Smartcard Controller
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC including IC
Dedicated Software with MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or with MIFARE
Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version
1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, AVA_VAN.5
and ALC_DVS.2
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 19 December 2013
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
SOGIS Recognition
Agreement
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................15
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................16
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................16
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................17
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................18
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................18
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................20
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................20
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................22
11 Security Target............................................................................................................22
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................23
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................25
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................27
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................28
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................37
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ASE_TSS.2, ATE_DPT.3 and AVA_VAN.5 that are
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC including IC
Dedicated Software with MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or with MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0
and MIFARE DESFire EV1 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC
including IC Dedicated Software with MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or with MIFARE Plus
MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 24 October 2013. TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH.
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
5 Publication
The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC including IC
Dedicated Software with MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or with MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0
and MIFARE DESFire EV1 has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Stresemannallee 101
22529 Hamburg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is named NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D080/052/040yVC including IC Dedicated Software with MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or
with MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1. In this document the TOE is
abbreviated to NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the IC hardware platform NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P60D080/052/040yVC with IC Dedicated Software and documentation
describing the Instruction Set and the usage. The TOE is delivered with a customer
specific Security IC Embedded Software.
In case MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or MIFARE DESFire EV1 Software is meant the term
MIFARE Software will be used.
The IC hardware platform NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC is a
microcontroller incorporating a central processing unit, memories accessible via a Memory
Management Unit, cryptographic coprocessors, other security components and two
communication interfaces. The central processing unit supports a 32-/24-/16-/8-bit
instruction set optimized for smart card applications, which is a super set of the 80C51
family instruction set. The first and in some cases the second byte of an instruction are
used for operation encoding. On-chip memories are ROM, RAM and EEPROM. The
non-volatile EEPROM can be used as data or program memory. It consists of reliable
memory cells, which guarantee data integrity. The EEPROM is optimized for applications
requiring reliable non-volatile data storage for data and program code. Dedicated security
functionality protects the contents of all memories.
The IC Dedicated Software comprises IC Dedicated Test Software for test purposes and
IC Dedicated Support Software. The IC Dedicated Support Software consists of Boot-ROM
Software controlling the boot process of the hardware platform and Firmware Operating
System (FOS) which can be called by the Security IC Embedded Software. The Firmware
Operating System provides an interface for programming of the internal EEPROM
memory, which is mandatory for use by the Security IC Embedded Software when
programming the EEPROM memory. Furthermore FOS provides an interface for the Post
Delivery Configuration functionality. OS Emulation MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or OS
Emulations MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1 are included in the FOS
and are therefore part of the TOE.
The MIFARE Software provides a set of functions used to manage the data stored in the
non-volatile EEPROM memory owned by MIFARE Software respectively.
NXP has developed MIFARE Software to be used with Proximity Coupling Devices (PCDs)
according to ISO14443 Type A. The communication protocol complies to part ISO 14443-3
and 14443-4. MIFARE Software is primarily designed for secure contact-less transport
applications and related loyalty programs as well as access management systems. It fully
complies with the requirements for fast and secure data transmission, flexible data storage
and interoperability with existing infrastructures.
The TOE with MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 supports the virtual card architecture by
providing a selection mechanism for virtual cards. This allows using the TOE in a complex
environment where multiple virtual cards are stored in one physical object; however the
TOE does support only one virtual card of type MIFARE MF1PLUSx0 and optionally in
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013 Certification Report
addition one virtual card of type MIFARE DESFire EV1. The TOE with MIFARE DESFire
EV1 does not support the virtual card architecture.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ASE_TSS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Functions Addressed issue
SS.RNG Random Number Generator
SS.HW_DES Triple-DES coprocessor
SS.HW_AES AES coprocessor
SS.CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
SS.RECONFIG Post Delivery Configuration
SS.MFP_AUTH Authentication
SS.MFP_ENC Encryption
SS.MFP_MAC Message Authentication Code
SS.MFP_ACC_CTRL Access Control
SS.DF_AUTH Authentication
SS.DF_ENC Encryption
SS.DF_MAC Message Authentication Code
SS.DF_ACC_CTRL Access Control
SS.DF_TRANS Transaction mechanism
SF.OPC Control of Operating Conditions
SF.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation
SF.LOG Logical Protection
SF.COMP Protection of Mode Control
SF.MEM_ACC Memory Access Control
SF.SFR_ACC Special Function Register Access Control
SF.FFW Firmware Firewall
SF.FIRMWARE Firmware Support
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.
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The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.2 and 3.3.
This certification covers several configurations of the TOE. For details refer to chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013 Certification Report
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC including IC Dedicated
Software with MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or with MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and
MIFARE DESFire EV1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
1 HW NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC nameplate
9049A
Wafer,
module,
inlay or
package
2a SW Test ROM Software (Security IC Dedicated Test Software),
Test-ROM on the chip acc. to
9049A_LA001_TESTROM_v1_btos_0Av05_fos_6v10.hex, for
major configurations P60D080/052/040MVC
Version
0A.05,
2012-05-07
stored in
ROM on
the chip
2b SW Test ROM Software (Security IC Dedicated Test Software),
Test-ROM on the chip acc. to
9049A_LF097_TESTROM_v1_btos_0Av09_fos_8v00.hex, for
major configurations P60D080/052/040DVC and
P60D080/052/040JVC
Version
0A.09,
2012-12-17
stored in
ROM on
the chip
3a SW Boot ROM Software (part of the Security IC Dedicated Support
Software), Boot-ROM on the chip acc. to
9049A_LA001_TESTROM_v1_btos_0Av05_fos_6v10.hex, for
major configurations P60D080/052/040MVC
Version
0A.05,
2012-05-07
stored in
ROM on
the chip
3b SW Boot ROM Software (part of the Security IC Dedicated Support
Software), Boot-ROM on the chip acc. to
9049A_LF097_TESTROM_v1_btos_0Av09_fos_8v00.hex, for
major configurations P60D080/052/040DVC and
P60D080/052/040JVC
Version
0A.09,
2012-12-17
stored in
ROM on
the chip
4a SW Firmware Operating System FOS including MIFARE Plus
MF1PLUSx0 (part of the Security IC Dedicated Support Software),
Firmware Operating System on the chip acc. to
9049A_LA001_TESTROM_v1_btos_0Av05_fos_6v10.hex, for
major configurations P60D080/052/040MVC
Version
06.12,
2012-05-07
stored in
ROM on
the chip
4b SW Firmware Operating System FOS including MIFARE Plus
MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1Software (part of the
Security IC Dedicated Support Software), Firmware Operating
System on the chip acc. to
9049A_LF097_TESTROM_v1_btos_0Av09_fos_8v00.hex, for
major configurations P60D080/052/040DVC and
P60D080/052/040JVC
Version
08.00,
2012-12-17
stored in
ROM on
the chip
5 DOC Product Data Sheet, SmartMX2 family P60x040/052/080 VC, NXP
Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification
Rev. 3.1,
2013-08-30
electronic
form
6 DOC Instruction set for the SmartMX2 family, Secure smart
cardcontroller, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification
Rev. 3.1,
2012-02-02
electronic
form
7 DOC NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60x040/052/080VC,Information on Guidance and Operation,
Guidance andOperation Manual
Rev. 1.0,
2012-11-22
electronic
form
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013
No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
8 DOC Wafer and delivery specification, SmartMX2 family
P60x040/052/080 VC, Product data sheet addendum, NXP
Semiconductors
Rev. 3.0,
2012-10-18
electronic
form
9 DOC Product Data Sheet Addendum, SmartMX2 family, Post Delivery
Configuration, NXP Semiconductors
Rev. 3.2,
2013-02-04
electronic
form
10 DOC Product Data Sheet Addendum, SmartMX2 family, Chip Health
Mode, NXP Semiconductors
Rev. 3.0,
2012-05-11
electronic
form
11 DOC Product Data Sheet Addendum, SmartMX2 family, Firmware
Interface Specification, Firmware, NXP Semiconductors
Rev. 3.6,
2013-04-22
electronic
form
12 DOC MIFARE Plus, Functionality of implementations on smart card
controllers, NXP Semiconductors
Rev. 3.2,
2013-02-27
electronic
form
13 DOC NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60xeeey, MIFARE Plus
MF1PLUSx0 Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual, User
Guidance Manual, NXP Semiconductors
Rev. 1.5,
2013-06-21
electronic
form
14 DOC NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60xeeey, MIFARE DESFire
EV1 Guidance, Delivery and Operation, User Guidance Manual,
NXP Semiconductors
Rev. 1.3,
2013-06-10
electronic
form
15 DOC MIFARE DESFire EV1, Functionality of implementations on smart
card controllers, NXP Semiconductors
Rev. 2.0,
2013-02-06
electronic
form
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and is
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE provides
countermeasures against: leakage of information, physical probing, malfunctions, physical
manipulations, access to code, access to data memory, abuse of functionality.
Hence the TOE shall maintain
• the integrity and the confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories,
• the different CPU modes with the related capabilities for configuration and memory
access and
• the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functionality
provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
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Name Assumption Title
OE.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing
OE.Check-Init Check of initialisation data by the Security IC Embedded Software
OE.Check-OriginalityKey Check of the Originality Key of the MIFARE Software
OE.Secure-Values Generation of secure values
OE.Terminal-Support Terminal support to ensure integrity, confidentiality and use of random numbers
Tabelle 3: Objectives for the TOE-Environment
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.4.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE consists of the following 15 subsystems:
Subsystem Description
Hardware
IC.LOGIC_BLK
The IC.LOGIC_BLK comprises the instance id_smx2_kernel except the contacts and
the memory blocks. Furthermore, it is stated in the developer documentation that the
hardware instantiation id_smx2_kernel instantiates and connects all digital IPs.
IC.RAM
This subsystem is in charge for the TOE’s RAM memory operations. In comparison to
the previous subsystem, the subsystem IC.RAM is not that complex, nevertheless
several modules are associated to it.
IC.EEPROM This subsystem is in charge for the TOE’s EEPROM memory and its operations.
IC.ROM This subsystem is in charge for the TOE’s ROM memory and its operations.
IC.ANALOG
This subsystem consists of two major parts:
• a power conversion unit including a contactless part with voltage supply for
contactless operation, clock recovery and demodulation of the contactless
signal,
• various sensors, a part of the random number generator, the internal oscillator
and further circuitry to monitor the operating conditions and provide reference
signals.
IC.PADS
This subsystem contains the physical interfaces of the TOE which can be divided into
ISO contacts and non-ISO contacts.
IC.COVER
This subsystem comprises only passive metal structures. It is not included in the design
hierarchy because it is not part of the functional design of the device.
Software
SW.Iso
The subsystem SW.Iso is part of SW.Framework and implements the IC Dedicated
Support software interface to use the ISO 14443-3 and 14443-4 communication layers.
The evaluator remarks that this subsystem serves merely to group a semantically
similar group of modules and is to be interpreted as part of the subsystem IC.ROM. This
is reasonable, as all firmware resides in the TOE’s ROM.
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Subsystem Description
SW.Framework
The subsystem SW.Framework is part of the IC Dedicated Support Software. It
operates in the firmware mode of M.CPU and is located in IC.ROM protected by
M.MMU, i.e. access from Security IC Embedded Software to the external interface of
the SW.Framework can only be done via an FVEC call. The evaluator remarks that this
subsystem serves merely to group a semantically similar group of modules and is to be
interpreted as part of the subsystem IC.ROM. This is reasonable, as all firmware
resides in the TOE’s ROM.
SW.CommonHal
The SW.CommonHal is part of the IC Dedicated Support Software and implements the
interface to use the hardware blocks M.CRC, M.CIU, M.EEIF_CTRL, M.SBC-IF,
M.RNG-DIG, M.TIMER, M.COPY-MACHINE and M.CPU. The evaluator remarks that
this subsystem serves merely to group a semantically similar group of modules and is to
be interpreted as part of the subsystem IC.ROM. This is reasonable, as all firmware
resides in the TOE’s ROM.
SW.MfpCore
This subsystem implements the core MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 functionality and
provides the interface to the different MIFARE Plus security levels.
SW.MfpOs
This subsystem provides a well-structured implementation of the MIFARE Plus
MF1PLUSx0 basic operations needed by SW.MfpCore.
SW.MfpHal
This subsystem implements a hardware abstraction layer for MIFARE Plus
MF1PLUSx0 related HW and provides the low-level functions to SW.MfpCore and
SW.MfpOs.
SW.MdfCore
This subsystem provides the core functionality for MIFARE DESFire EV1 emulation
mode.
SW.MdfHal
This subsystem is part of MIFARE DESFire EV1 and supports the implementation of the
DESFire relevant Hardware Abstraction Layer.
Table 4: TOE Subsystems
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The developer’s testing effort can be summarised in the following aspects:
TOE test configuration and Developer’s testing approach:
• The tests are performed with the TOE in different test environments and
configurations depending on the test classes and groups.
• All TSF and related security mechanisms, subsystems and modules are tested in
order to assure complete coverage of all SFR.
• Test categories/classes were:
◦ Production testing on wafers using test functions implemented in the IC
Dedicated Software.
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◦ Simulation tests (design verification) which are performed to verify functionality,
which is not visible at the accessible interfaces of the TOE including automated
regression testing and manual simulation tests.
◦ Characterization tests to verify the electrical properties of the device, which are
specified with regard to limiting values, thresholds and timings of several
electrical parameters like voltages, currents, frequencies, capacitors,
resistances and latches.
◦ Verification tests which are performed on single samples of the device to verify
specific security functionality, which is not testable for each device during
production test or within the scope of characterization testing. Such tests include
standard tests of the Random Number Generator, AES coprocessor and
Triple-DES coprocessor.
◦ Test of configurations
◦ Functional verification and validation (MIFARE MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE
DESFire EV1) including firmware tests, MIFARE Plus Acceptance/Regression
Tests, MIFARE Plus Backwards Compatibility Tests, Anti-Tearing Test,
◦ System Stability Verification (MIFARE MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1)
including Robot Arm test and Multiple PICC Test,
◦ Performance Verification (MIFARE MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1) of
each individual command and of standard transactions,
◦ External test (MIFARE MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1), consisting of a
“Test plan for MIFARE® Compatibility for Certification of Terminals and
Qualification of Contactless Readers”.
The independent testing was partly performed in the developer’s testing environment and
partly at TÜViT GmbH, information security department, in Essen. The same platforms and
tools as for the developer tests were used.
The evaluators’ testing effort can be summarised in the following aspects.
Testing approach:
• The evaluator's objective regarding this aspect was to test the functionality of the
TOE and to verify the developer's test results by repeating developer's tests and
additionally add independent tests.
• In the course of the evaluation of the TOE the following classes of tests were
carried out:
◦ Module tests
◦ Simulation tests
◦ Emulation tests
◦ Tests in user mode
◦ Tests in test mode
◦ Hardware tests
• With this kind of tests the entire security functionality of the TOE was tested.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The P60D080/052/040yVC hardware platform was tested including all major configurations
as well as all minor configuration options that can be selected based on Tables 6 – 10 in
chapter 1.4.2.2 of [6]. All major and minor configurations are available to the evaluator.
Besides the differences listed in Table 9 of [6] there are no other differences between the
major configurations. The major configuration does not have dependencies to security
features. All minor configuration options that are part of the evaluation were tested and
behave as specified. Therefore the results described in this document are applicable for
the major configurations P60D080MVC, P60D052MVC, P60D040MVC, P60D080DVC,
P60D052DVC, P60D040DVC, P60D080JVC, P60D052JVC and P60D040JVC as well as
for all minor configurations described in [6].
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(iii) Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ASE_TSS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June
2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7]
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● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
Purpose Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Authentication (MFP) AES in CBC
mode
[FIPS-197] (AES),
[SP 800-38A] (CBC)
|K| = 128 yes
Authentication (DF) AES in CBC
mode
[FIPS-197] (AES),
[SP 800-38A] (CBC)
|K| = 128 yes
Three-key TDES
in CBC mode
[FIPS-46-3] (DES),
[SP 800-38A] (CBC)
|K| = 168 yes
Key Agreement
(MFP)
FTP_TRP.1[MFP] -- -- no
Key Agreement (DF) FTP_TRP.1[DF] -- -- no
Confidentiality (MFP) AES in CBC
mode
[FIPS-197] (AES),
[SP 800-38A] (CBC)
|K| = 128 yes
Confidentiality (DF) AES in CBC
mode
[FIPS-197] (AES),
[SP 800-38A] (CBC)
|K| = 128 yes
Integrity (MFP) AES in CMAC
mode
[FIPS-197] (AES),
[SP800-38B] (CMAC)
|K| = 128 yes
Integrity (DF) AES in CMAC
mode
[FIPS-197] (AES),
[SP800-38B] (CMAC)
|K| = 128 yes
Trusted Channel
(MFP)
MIFARE Plus
MF1PLUSx0
-- -- no
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Purpose Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Trusted Channel
(DF)
MIFARE Desfire
EV1
-- -- no
Cryptographic
Primitives
Two-key TDES [FIPS-46-3] (DES) |K| = 112 no
Three-key TDES [FIPS-46-3] (DES) |K| = 168 yes
AES [FIPS-197] (AES) |K| = 128, 192,
256
yes
Table 5: Cryptographic TOE Security Functionalities
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be considered by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional
configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Support
Software or Embedded Software.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
guidelines for the developer of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Embedded
Software on how to securely use the microcontroller chip and which measures have to be
implemented in the software in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security
Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the software.
Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the
evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10].
In addition, the following aspect needs to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
The implementation of the encryption/decryption operation of the MIFARE Plus
MF1PLUSx0 may expose some bits of the XOR difference between pairs of plaintext using
the principles of a watermark attack.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
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12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CMAC Cipher-based MAC
DES Data Encryption Standard
DF Desfire
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FOS Firmware Operating System
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MFP Mifare Plus
PCD Proximity Coupling Device
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
ROM Read Only Memory
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TDES Triple-DES
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013, Version 1.3, 17 October 2013, NXP
Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC Security Target, NXP
Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification (confidential document)
[7] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
[8] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013, Version 1.3, 17 October 2013, NXP
Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC Security Target Lite, NXP
Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification (sanitised public document)
[9] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 4, 2 December 2013, EVALUATION
TECHNICAL REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY), TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH – Evaluation Body for IT Security, (confidential document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36, Version 4, 2 December 2013,
ETR FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR-COMP), TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH – Evaluation Body for IT Security (confidential document)
[11] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC Configuration List,
v01.10, 10 September 2013, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification and
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC, Customer specific
Appendix of the Configuration List, v01.10, 10 September 2013, NXP
8
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 8,Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 2.1, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 3, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC, Appendix of the
Configuration List for composite evaluation, v01.10, 10 September 2013, NXP
Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification
[12] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60x040/052/080VC, v1.0, Information on
Guidance and Operation, Guidance and Operation Manual 22 November 2012, NXP
Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification and
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60xeeey with MF1PLUSx0, MIFARE Plus
MF1PLUSx0 Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual, User Guidance Manual,
v1.5, 21 June 2013, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification and
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60xeeey, MIFARE DESFire EV1 Guidance,
Delivery and Operation, User Guidance Manual, v1.3, 10 June 2013, NXP
Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification
[13] Product Data Sheet, Version 3.1, 30 August 2013, SmartMX2 family
P60x040/052/080 VC, Secure high-performance smart card controller, NXP
Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 2 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-2013
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC including IC
Dedicated Software with MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or with MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0
and MIFARE DESFire EV1 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond
EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 19 December 2013, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2) are fulfilled for the development and
production sites of the TOE listed below:
Site and address Function
NXP Semiconductors Hamburg
Business Unit Identification (BU ID)
Stresemannallee 101
22569 Hamburg
Germany
Development, Delivery and
customer support
NXP Semiconductors
Interleuvenlaan 80
3001 Leuven
Belgium
Development support
TSMC, Fab 2 and 5
No. 121 Park Ave. III
Hsinchu Science Park
Hsinchu, Taiwan 300, R.O.C.
Mask data preparation
TSMC, Fab 7
No. 6, Creation Rd. II
Hsinchu Science Park
Hsinchu, Taiwan 300, R.O.C.
Mask data preparation
TSMC, Fab 6 and Fab 14
No. 1, Nan-Ke North Rd.
Tainan Science Park
Tainan, Taiwan 741, R.O.C.
Mask and wafer production
Chipbond Technology Corporation
No. 3, Li-Hsin Rd. V
Science Based Industrial Park
Hsin-Chu City
Taiwan, R.O.C.
Bumping
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Site and address Function
NXP Semiconductors GmbH
Hamburg Test Center Europe - Hamburg (TCE-H)
Stresemannallee 101
22569 Hamburg
Germany
Test Center and
configuration of the Fabkey
Assembly Plant Bangkok
303 Moo 3 Chaengwattana Rd.
Laksi, Bangkok 10210
Thailand
Test Center, Delivery and
Module assembly
Assembly Plant Kaohsiung
NXP Semiconductors Taiwan Ltd
#10, Jing 5th Road, N.E.P.Z, Kaohsiung 81170
Taiwan, R.O.C
Module assembly and test
center
SMARTRAC Technology Ltd. Bangkok
142 Moo, Hi-Tech Industrial Estate
Tambon Ban Laean, Amphor Bang-Pa-In
13160 Ayutthaya
Thailand
Inlay assembly
SMARTRAC TECHNOLOGY GERMANY GmbH
Gewerbeparkstr. 10
51580 Reichshof-Wehnrath
Germany
Note: The validity period for the site SMARTRAC
Reichshof-Wehnrath expires on October 4, 2013, and no
re-certification is planned here. Therefore the site is out of
evaluation scope from October 4, 2013, on.
Inlay assembly
HID Global Teoranta
Paic Tionscail na Tulaigh
Balle na hAbhann
Co. Galway
Ireland
Inlay assembly
NXP Semiconductors Austria GmbH Styria
Business Unit Identification (BU ID)
Mikron-Weg 1
8108 Gratkorn
Austria
Document control
NedCard B.V.
Bijsterhuizen 25-29
6604 LM Wijchen
The Netherlands
Module assembly
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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