BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V5-2021
for
Infineon Security Controller M5073 G11 with
specific IC dedicated Firmware, including the
Flash Loader enhanced by the Mutual
Authentication Extension (MAE)
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V5-2021(*)
Smartcard Controller
Infineon Security Controller M5073 G11 with specific IC dedicated
Firmware, including the Flash Loader enhanced by the Mutual
Authentication Extension (MAE)
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Functionality: PP conformant plus Product specific Security
Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC
and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 21 October 2021
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V5-2021
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V5-2021 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................10
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................11
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................16
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................19
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................20
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................20
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................20
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................25
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................26
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V5-2021
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V5-2021 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V5-2021
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon Security Controller M5073 G11 with specific IC dedicated Firmware,
including the Flash Loader enhanced by the Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE), has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-
CC-0951-V4-2019. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V4-
2019 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Infineon Security Controller M5073 G11 with specific IC
dedicated Firmware, including the Flash Loader enhanced by the Mutual Authentication
Extension (MAE), was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 14 October 2021. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V5-2021 Certification Report
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 21 October
2021 is valid until 20 October 2026. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Infineon Security Controller M5073 G11 with specific IC dedicated Firmware,
including the Flash Loader enhanced by the Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE), has
been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-
Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V5-2021
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Security Controller M5073 G11 with specific
IC dedicated firmware. The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible
to the Intel 80251 architecture. The major components of the core system are the dual
CPU (Central Processing Units), the MMU (Memory Management Unit) and MED (Memory
Encryption/Decryption Unit). The dual interface controller is able to communicate using
either the contact based or the contactless interface.
The TOE consists of a hardware, a firmware part as well as the user guidance.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security relevant
applications and for its previous use as developing platform for smart card operating
systems. The term Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating
systems and applications stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the
Smartcard Embedded Software.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [18].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_DPM Device Phase Management:
The life cycle of the TOE is split up into several phases. Different operation
modes help to protect the TOE during each phase of its lifecycle.
SF_PS Protection against Snooping:
The TOE uses various means to protect from snooping of memories and
busses and prevents single stepping.
SF_PMA Protection against Modifying Attacks:
This TOE implements protection against modifying attacks of memories,
alarm lines and sensors.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V5-2021 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks:
The memory access control of the TOE uses a memory management unit
(MMU) to control the access to the available physical memory by using
virtual memory addresses and to segregate the code and data to a privilege
level model. The MMU controls the address permissions of up to seven
privileged levels and gives the software the possibility to define different
access rights.
SF_CS Cryptographic Support:
The TOE is equipped with hardware accelerators to support the standard
symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic operations. The components are a
symmetric co-processor, supporting the DES and AES algorithms and an
asymmetric co-processor to support RSA and EC cryptographic operations.
Please note that in contrast to the symmetric co-processer, the asymmetric
co-processor does not implement any SFR.
Furthermore, the TOE is equipped with an AIS31 conformant TRNG that
meets the functionality class PTG.2.
SF_MAE Mutual Authentication Extension (optional):
In TOE provides a mutual authentication between production equipment and
the TOE according to ISO 9798-2. Only if the production equipment was
successfully authenticated by an external authenticate command, the Flash
Loader is activated to download software to the TOE’s Non Volatile Memory.
Furthermore, it contains an internal authenticate command by which the
authenticity of a copy of the TOE can be verified.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 8.1 – 8.6.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 4.1.3. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon Security Controller M5073 G11 with specific IC dedicated Firmware,
including the Flash Loader enhanced by the Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE)
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V5-2021
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW M5073 Smart Card IC G11(produced in
Tainan)
Complete modules, with or
without inlay mounting, with or
without inlay antenna mounting,
in form of plain wafers, in any IC
case, as bare dies or in
whatever type of package
2 FW STS Self-Test Software (the IC
Dedicated Test Software)
FW Identifier
78.023.01.2
3 RMS Resource Management System
(the IC Dedicated Support Software)
FW Identifier
78.023.01.2
Stored in reserved area of the
ROM on the IC (patch in SOLID
FLASH™)
4 Service Algorithm (SA)
5 Flash Loader
6 NRG software interface routines (not
part of the TSF)
7 Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE) V8.00.006 Optional
8 SW7
ROM code (including Embedded
Software)
– Stored in User ROM on the IC
9 SW8
NVM image (including Embedded
Software)
– Stored in Flash memory on the
IC
10 Doc M5073 Hardware Reference Manual 2019-07-31 Mandatory user guidance
11 SLx 70 Family Production and
Personalization User’s Manual
2015-04-01
12 16-bit Security Controller Family SLE 70
Programmer’s Reference Manual
2019-12-03
13 16-bit Security Controller - M5073
Security Guidelines
2020-07-17
14 M5073 Errata Sheet 2019-09-29
15 Crypto@2304T User Manual 2010-03-23 Optional user guidance
16 AMM Advanced Mode for NRG SAM
Addendum to M5073 Hardware
Reference Manual
2019-07-16
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The delivery documentation describes all procedures that are necessary to maintain
security when distributing versions of the TOE or parts of it to the user’s site including the
necessary intermediate delivery procedures.
The delivery documentation describes in a sufficient manner how the various procedures
and technical measures provide for the detection of modifications and any discrepancies
between the TOE respective parts of it sent by the TOE Manufacturer and the version
received by the Composite Product Manufacturer.
Therefore three different delivering procedures have to be taken into consideration:
7
Only in case the IC Embedded Software Developer provides Infineon with code for ROM.
8
Only in case the IC Embedded Software Developer provides Infineon with code for Flash Memory.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V5-2021 Certification Report
1. Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance)
from the TOE Manufacturer to the IC Embedded Software Developer.
2. Delivery of the IC Embedded Software (Flash or ROM data, initialisation and pre-
personalization data, Bundle Business package) from the IC Embedded Software
Developer to the TOE Manufacturer.
3. Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE Manufacturer to the Composite Product
Manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers,
after phase 4 in form of modules (with or without inlay antenna).
Respective distribution centers are listed in Appendix B (see below).
The GCIM allows unique identification of each hardware via an individual chip identification
number together with the design step. The GCIM further includes the firmware identifier
and provides several detailed production parameters as well as the fabrication facility,
tracking information, wafer number, production start (year and week) and lot. For clear
differentiation between the mask sets, each of it has assigned an individual value in the
data output of the GCIM. Thereby, the exact and clear identification of any product with its
exact configuration of this TOE is given.
Note that any hardware configuration comes with its own chip identifier byte. The chip
identifier bytes are aimed to be used for the logistical processes but are available to the
user as well. For the user’s clear TOE identification, the development code allowing
reading out the present configuration of the TOE is sufficient.
The GCIM is accessible by a dedicated power-on sequence and also by the customer
software. Further information regarding the GCIM is documented in the Hardware
Reference Manual [10], section 7.10.3.
The version of the optional MAE firmware can be identified (i) either by comparing the
hash signature of the provided file with the one given in the Security Target [6] or [9]
chapter 10 or (ii) by using the FLASH_GET_CHIP_STATUS command, as described in the
Manual “Production and Personalization Mutual Authentication Extension for the SLx 70
family in 90 nm” [16], section 5.3.
The version numbers of firmware are listed in Table 2.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application, thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithm (Triple-DES and AES) to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data
by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a True
Random Number Generator (TRNG).
Furthermore, the TOE provides an optional MAE software, which enables the secure
download of the user software or parts of it to the SOLID FLASH™ NVM .
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during AES, Triple-DES cryptographic functions performed by the
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V5-2021
TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and
against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
7 of the Security Target (ST) [6] or [9].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
The ST only includes one security objective for the IC Embedded Software Developer, the
objective OE.Resp-Appl.
The objective OE.Resp-Appl states that the IC Embedded Software Developer shall treat
user data (especially keys) appropriately. The IC Embedded Software Developer gets
sufficient information on how to protect user data adequate in the security guidelines [15].
The ST includes four security objectives for the operational environment, which are
relevant for the Composite Product Manufacturer, the objective OE.Process-Sec-IC,
OE.Lim_Block_Loader, OE.Loader_Usage/Package1+ and OE.TOE_Auth:
OE.Process-Sec-IC states that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by
the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-consumer to maintain confidentiality and
integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy,
modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use).
OE.Lim_Block_Loader states that the Composite Product Manufacturer will protect the
Loader functionality against misuse, limit the capability of the Loader and terminate
irreversibly the Loader after intended usage of the Loader.
OE.Loader_Usage/Package1+ states that the authorized user must fulfil the access
conditions required by the Loader, whereby the OE.TOE_Auth states that the operational
environment shall support the authentication verification mechanism and know
authentication reference data of the TOE.
The Composite Product Manufacturer is informed about these requirements resulting from
OE.Process-Sec-IC and OE.Lim_Block_Loader in [11] and [12] section 15.1.
The requirements resulting from OE.Loader_Usage/Package1+ and OE.TOE_Auth are
given in [16].
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.3.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible to the Intel 80251
architecture. The major components of the core system are the dual CPU (Central
Processing Units), the MMU (Memory Management Unit) and MED (Memory
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V5-2021 Certification Report
Encryption/Decryption Unit). The dual interface controller is able to communicate using
either the contact based or the contactless interface.
The TOE consists of a hardware, a firmware part as well as the user guidance.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security relevant
applications and for its previous use as developing platform for smart card operating
systems. The term Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating
systems and applications stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the
Smartcard Embedded Software.
An overview of the hardware of the TOE is given in the Security Target [6] or [9], section
1.1 / 2.2.1.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into five categories:
● Simulation tests (design verification),
● Qualification tests,
● Verification Tests,
● Security Evaluation Tests,
● Production Tests.
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer by using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the ITSEF or at the developer’s
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. For the developer tests, repeated by the evaluators, other test
parameters were used and the test equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE
realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators during
layout inspections both in design data and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators considered all security functionalities. Intensive
penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for the
underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered both
the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks, which do not modify the TOE physically.
The results of the penetration tests confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with high
attack potential in the intended environment for the TOE.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V5-2021
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Smartcard IC M5073 G11
Hardware Configuration
The hardware of the TOE can be ordered in various configurations, as described in the
Security Target [6],[9] section 1.1.
Regarding the security functionality of the TOE, the Symmetric Crypto coprocessor (SCP)
is of special importance. The SCP provides functionalities for symmetric cryptography. The
TOE can be ordered with or without the SCP. If a TOE is ordered without SCP, it is
deactivated during the manufacturing process and cannot be reactivated by the user.
Deselecting the SCP has no impact on any other security policy of the TOE. It is exactly
equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the functionality.
Further, the TOE can be ordered with or without an Asymmetric Crypto Coprocessor
(Crypto@2304T). If a TOE is ordered without Crypto@2304T, it is deactivated during the
manufacturing process and cannot be reactivated by the user. Please note that the
Crypto@2304T does not implement any SFR.
An overview of the hardware of the TOE is given in the Security Target [6],[9] section 1.1 /
2.2.1.
Firmware Configuration
There is only one firmware variant (firmware package) with the following identifier:
● 78.023.01.2
The firmware can be delivered with or without the optional Mutual Authentication Extension
(MAE). The firmware consists of the following components:
● Resource Management System (RMS),
● Self-Test Software (STS),
● Service Algorithm Minimal (SA),
● Flash Loader (FL),
● NRG software interface routines,
● Optional Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE, v8.00.006).
The NRG software interface does not provide any TOE Security Functionality (TSF) and is
not part of the evaluation.
The Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE) is an optional firmware component9
and is as
such not included in the firmware package.
An overview of the software/firmware is given in in the Security Target [6],[9] section 2.2.2.
9
Please note that if the Flash Loader is already permanently deactivated during delivery, the MAE is not
present on the TOE and cannot be (re-)installed either.
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9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits,
● The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards,
● Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators,
● Terminology and preparation of Smartcard evaluations,
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31, as well as AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [8] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this platform
evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V4-2019, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on changes to the
software of the TOE, the security relevant changes to the user guidance of the TOE,
hardware and firmware remain unchanged in comparsion of the TOE. Furthermore,
changes are made in the developer documentation due to the updated guidance
documents and the exclusion of the optional software.
The evaluation has confirmed:
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-
2014 [18]
for the Functionality: PP conformant plus Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
augmented by ALC_FLR.1
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For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key
Size in
Bits
Security Level above 100
Bits
1. Cryptographic
Primitive
TDES [NIST SP800-
67_2017],
|k| = 112 no
ECB mode [NIST SP800-38A] no
CBC mode [NIST SP800-38A] no
2. Cryptographic
Primitive
TDES [NIST SP800-
67_2017],
|k| = 168 yes
ECB mode [NIST SP800-38A] no
CBC mode [NIST SP800-38A] yes
3. Cryptographic
Primitive
TDES |k| = 112 no
Recrypt mode no
BLD mode no
4. Cryptographic
Primitive
TDES |k| = 168 yes
Recrypt mode yes
BLD mode no
5. Cryptographic
Primitive
AES [FIPS197] |k| =
128,
192, 256
yes
ECB mode [NIST SP800-38A] no
CBC mode [NIST SP800-38A] yes
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key
Size in
Bits
Security Level above 100
Bits
6. Cryptographic
Primitive
Physical True RNG
PTG.2
[AIS31] N/A -
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the Embedded Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes
guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the
developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which
measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or
system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively
implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite
product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document
"ETR for composite evaluation" [8].
The following references provide more in-depth information on obligations and hints on
proper usage of the TOE:
● As the TOE is delivered to the Composite Product Manufacturer and to the Security IC
Embedded Software Developer. The actual end-consumer obtains the TOE from the
Composite Product Issuer together with the application, which runs on the TOE.
The Security IC Embedded Software Developer receives all necessary recommendations
and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in the delivered documents [10], [12], [13], [14], [15] and [17]
have to be considered.
The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints
to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [11] and [16] have to be considered.
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In addition the following hints resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect
has to be considered:
● The Security IC Embedded Software Developer can deliver his software either to
Infineon to let them implement it in the TOE (in Flash memory or ROM) or to the
Composite Product Manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash memory.
● The delivery procedure from the Security IC Embedded Software Developer to the
Composite Product Manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is
required.
Please also note, that at the point in time when evaluation and certification results are
reused there might be an update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation"
available. Therefore, the certified products list on the BSI website has to be checked for
latest information on reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for
the product.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office
for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining Mode
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CIM Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI)
CPU Central Processing Unit
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
Crypto2304T Asymmetric Cryptographic Processor
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
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EBC Electronic Code Book Mode
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GCIM Generic Chip Identification Mode
HW Hardware
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MMU Memory
MED Memory Encryption and Decryption
NVM Non-Volatile Memory
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOLID FLASH™ An Infineon Trade Mark and Stands for Flash EEPROM Technology
ST Security Target
STS Self-Test Software
TDES Triple DES
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
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Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
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[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE10
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V5-2021, Version 3.9, 2021-09-06, “Security
Target M5073 G11”, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report for BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V5-2021, Version 2.0, 2021-10-
14, “Evaluation Technical Report Summary (ETR Summary)”, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH – Evaluation Body for IT Security, (confidential
document)
[8] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product BSI-DSZ-CC-
0951-V5-2021, Version 2.0 , 2021-10-14, “Evaluation Technical Report for
Composite Evaluation (ETR Comp)”, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH – Evaluation
Body for IT Security (confidential document)
[9] Public Security Target for BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V5-2021, Version 3.9, 2021-09-06,
“Security Target Lite M5073 G11”, Infineon Technologies AG
[10] Hardware Reference Manual, Version 2.0, 2019-07-31, “M5073 Hardware
Reference Manual”, Infineon Technologies AG
10
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an den Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical
Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 19, Version 9, Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS)
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 23, Version 4, Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 37, Version 3, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluationen
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 39, Version 3, Formal Methods
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweisen für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 47, Version 1.1, Regelungen zu Site Certification
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[11] Production and Personalization User’s Manual, 2015-04-01, “SLx 70 Family
Production and Personalization User’s Manual”, Infineon Technologies AG
[12] Programmer’s Reference Manual, Version 9.14, 2019-12-03 , “16-bit Security
Controller Family SLE 70 Programmer’s Reference Manual”, Infineon Technologies
AG
[13] Security Guidelines, Version 1.02-2583, 2020-07-17, “16-bit Security Controller -
M5073 Security Guidelines”, Infineon Technologies AG
[14] Errata Sheet, Version 4.1, 2019-09-29, “M5073 Errata Sheet”, Infineon Technologies
AG
[15] AMM Advanced Mode for NRG SAM Addendum to M5073 Hardware Reference
Manual, Version 2.0, 2019-07-16, Infineon Technologies AG
[16] Production and Personalization Mutual Authentication Extension for the SLx70
family in 90 nm, Version 1.2, 2017-07-26, Infineon Technologies AG
[17] Crypto@2304T User Manual, 2010-03-23, Infineon Technologies AG
[18] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0,
13January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V5-2021
Evaluation results regarding
development and production environment
The IT product Infineon Security Controller M5073 G11 with specific IC dedicated
Firmware, including the Flash Loader enhanced by the Mutual Authentication Extension
(MAE) (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility
using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended
by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL
5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 21 October 2021, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.3) are fulfilled for the all sites involved.
The distribution sites of the TOE are listed below:
Distribution Center name Address
DHL Singapore DHL Supply Chain Singapore Pte Ltd., Advanced
Regional Center
Tampines LogisPark
1 Greenwich Drive
Singapore 533865
G&D Neustadt Giesecke & Devrient Secure Data Management GmbH
Austraße 101b
96465 Neustadt bei Coburg
Germany
K&N Großostheim Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10
63762 Großostheim
Germany
KWE Shanghai KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Pudong Airport Pilot Free Trade Zone
No. 530 Zheng Ding Road
Shanghai,
P.R. China
For all sites involved, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with
the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives and
requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target
[6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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