BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018
for
Infineon Security Controller M7893 B11 with
optional RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, EC
v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL v2.02.010
libraries and Toolbox v2.03.008 or v1.03.006 and
with specific IC dedicated software (firmware)
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.1 CC-Zert-327 V5.2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018 (*)
Infineon Security Controller M7893 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, EC v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL
v2.02.010 libraries and Toolbox v2.03.008 or v1.03.006 and with
specific IC dedicated software (firmware)
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 3 April 2018
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................7
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................7
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................7
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................8
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................9
5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................9
6. Publication...................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................14
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................17
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................18
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................18
6. Documentation............................................................................................................18
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................19
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................20
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................20
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................21
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................22
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................22
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................26
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................28
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................29
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
7 / 31
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018 Certification Report
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon Security Controller M7893 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, EC v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL v2.02.010 libraries
and Toolbox v2.03.008 or v1.03.006 and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware),
has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-
DSZ-CC-0879-V2-2015. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-
V2-2015 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Infineon Security Controller M7893 B11 with optional
RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, EC v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL
v2.02.010 libraries and Toolbox v2.03.008 or v1.03.006 and with specific IC dedicated
software (firmware) was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation
was completed on 27 March 2018. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 3 April 2018
is valid until 2 April 2023. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Infineon Security Controller M7893 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, EC v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL v2.02.010 libraries
and Toolbox v2.03.008 or v1.03.006 and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware) has
been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-
Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Security Controller M7893 B11 with optional
RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, EC v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL
v2.02.010 libraries and Toolbox v2.03.008 or v1.03.006 and with specific IC dedicated
software (firmware).
The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture. The major components of the core
system are the two CPUs (Central Processing Units), the MMU (Memory Management
Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The two CPUs control each other in
order to detect faults and serve by this for data integrity. The TOE implements a full 16
MByte linear addressable memory space for each privilege level, a simple scalable
Memory Management concept and a scalable stack size. The flexible memory concept
consists of ROM- and Flash-memory as part of the non volatile memory (NVM),
respectively Infineon SOLID FLASH. The memory block contains the ROM, RAM and the
SOLID FLASH™ NVM. All data of the memory block is encrypted and all memory types
are equipped with an error detection code (EDC), the SOLID FLASH™ (NVM) in addition
with an error correction code (ECC). This TOE stores user code and data in a linear 16-
MByte memory space, the SOLID FLASH™ (NVM).
The TOE consists of the hardware part, the firmware parts and the software parts. The
software parts are differentiated into: the cryptographic libraries RSA, EC, SCL (Symmetric
Cryptographic Library) and SHA-2 and the supporting libraries Toolbox and Base. RSA,
EC, SHA-2 and Toolbox provide certain functionality via an API to the Smartcard
Embedded Software. The Base Library is only used internally by the RSA, EC and Toolbox
libraries and has no user interface. If none the RSA, EC, SCL and Toolbox is delivered,
also the Base Library is not on board. The SHA-2 library does not use the Base Library.
The Base Library provides the low level interface to the asymmetric cryptographic
coprocessor and has no user available interface. The base library does not provide any
security functionality, implements no security mechanism, and does not provide additional
specific security functionality.
The TOE implements two cryptographic co-processors: The symmetric cryptographic
coprocessor (SCP) combines both AES and DES with one, two or triple-key hardware
acceleration. The Asymmetric Crypto Co-processor, called Crypto2304T, provides
optimized high performance calculations for the user software executing cryptographic
operations and is also used by the optional cryptographic libraries for RSA and Elliptic
Curve (EC) cryptography.
The firmware parts are the RMS library, the Service Algorithm (SA), the STS firmware for
test purpose, the Flash Loader for downloading user software to the SOLID FLASH™
NVM and the Mifare compatible software interface. The STS is implemented in a
separated Test-ROM being part of the TOE. The RMS and the Flash Loader provide some
functionality via an API to the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded
Software, i.e. the operating system and applications are not part of the TOE.The RMS
library providing some functionality via an API to the Smartcard Embedded Software
contains for example SOLID FLASH™ NVM service routines. The Service Algorithm
provides functionality for the tearing save write into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. The STS
firmware is used for test purposes during start-up and the Flash Loader allows
downloading user software to the SOLID FLASH™ NVM during the manufacturing
process. The firmware parts are implemented in the ROM and in access protected areas
of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. The multiple interface controller provides, depending on the
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018 Certification Report
used communication protocols, flexibility in terms of simultaneously respectively parallel
available communication ability.
The standard peripherals block contains finally the various interface modules enabling to
communicate using the contact based or the contactless interfaces in various
combinations and partly even simultaneously. The RFI and GPIO represent blocks on their
own but interact also with the controls located in the standard peripherals block. An
overview upon the various interface options is provided by the table 3 in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 2.1. For more details please refer to Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 1.2, 2.1 and 2.2.3.
This TOE is intended to be used in any application and device requiring the highest level of
security, for example as secure element in various devices. This TOE provides multiple
interface options for various applications and markets. Due to the interface flexibility the
product can be used in almost any application, within any device and almost any form
factor, i.e. as a build-in device: Due to these multiple communication possibilities, the TOE
can be seen as a stand-alone security device being capable to maintain a multitude of
data communication interfaces simultaneously. For example, one application
communicates via one interface, totally separated from another application,
communicating via a second interface, at the same time. The confidential security target
[6] contains an overview about the blocking options of the memory size ranges, certain
modules, peripherals and interface options. The blocking option can be applied and
configured by Infineon Technologies and partly within defined limits by the user. Within
those limitations the TOE configurations can vary under only one identical IC-hardware.
According to the blocking and order options, a not limited number of configurations of the
TOE may occur in the field. Basically, the number of various configurations depends on the
user and purchase contract only. This TOE can come with both crypto co-processors
accessible, or with a blocked SCP or with a blocked Crypto2304T, or with both crypto co-
processors blocked. The blocking depends on the customer demands prior to the
production of the hardware. In case the SCP is blocked, no AES and DES computation
supported by hardware is possible. In case the Crypto2304T is blocked, no RSA and EC
computation supported by hardware is possible. The use of the SHA-2 library is also
possible with both crypto coprocessors blocked. No accessibility of the deselected
cryptographic co-processors is without impact on any other security policy of the TOE; it is
exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the cryptographic
co-processors. Depending on the blocking configuration, a M7893 product can have
different user available configurations. A customer can identify the TOE and its
configuration using the Non-ISO ATR in combination with firmware functions. The TOE
answers the Non-ISO-ATR with the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM). The GCIM
outputs a chip identifier byte, design step, firmware identifier version and further
configuration information. The identification data and configuration details are described in
the confidential Security Target [6] and in the Family Hardware Reference Manual [13].
The user software can be implemented in various options depending on the user’s choice.
Thereby the user software, or parts of it, can be downloaded into the SOLID FLASH™
NVM, either during production of the TOE or at customer side. In the latter case, the user
downloads his software or the final parts of it at his own premises, using the Flash Loader
software. For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and Security Target Lite
[9], chapter 1.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-
CC-PP-0035-2007 [8].
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Features Addressed issue
SF_DPM Device Phase Management
SF_PS Protection against Snooping
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
SF_CS Cryptographic Support
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 8.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 4.1.2 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon Security Controller M7893 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008 or
v1.03.006, EC v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL v2.02.010 libraries and
Toolbox v2.03.008 or v1.03.006 and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware).
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW M7893 Smart Card IC B11 (produced in
Dresden)
Complete modules, with or
without inlay mounting, with or
without inlay antenna mounting,
in form of plain wafers, in an IC
case or in bare dies
2 SW RSA library (optional) RSA2048 / 4096:
v1.03.006 or
v2.03.008
Object code in electronic form
3 SW EC library (optional) EC:
v1.03.006 or
v2.03.008
Object code in electronic form
4 SW SHA-2 library (optional) SHA-2v1.01 Object code in electronic form
5 SW Toolbox (optional) Toolbo:
v1.03.006 or
v2.03.008
Object code in electronic form
6 SW SCL library (optional) V2.02.010 Object code in electronic form
7 FW STS Self Test Software (the
IC Dedicated Test Software)
FW-identifier
78.019.03.4
Stored in test ROM on the IC
(patch in SOLID FLASH)
8 FW RMS Resource
Management System (the IC
Dedicated Support
Software)
FW-identifier
78.019.03.4
Stored in reserved area of user
ROM on the IC (patch in SOLID
FLASH)
9 FW Service Algorithm (SA) FW-identifier
78.019.03.4
Stored in reserved area of user
ROM on the IC (patch in SOLID
FLASH)
10 FW Flash Loader FW-identifier
78.019.03.4
Stored in reserved area of user
ROM on the IC (patch in SOLID
FLASH)
11 SW7
ROM code (including
Embedded Software and
crypto libraries)
– Stored in User ROM on the IC
12 SW8
NVM image (including
Embedded Software and
crypto libraries)
– Stored in SOLID FLASH
memory on the IC
13 DOC SLx 70 Family Production
and Personalization User’
Manual
2015-04-01 Hardcopy and pdf-file
14 DOC M7893 SOLID FLASH
Controller for Security
Applications Hardware
Reference Manual
2013-06-06 Hardcopy or pdf-file
15 DOC M7893 SOLID FLASH
Controller for Security
Applications Errata Sheet
2017-06-23 Hardcopy or pdf-file
7
Only in case the IC Embedded Software Developer provides Infineon with code for ROM.
8
Only in case the IC Embedded Software Developer provides Infineon with code for Flash memory.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
16 DOC M7893 SOLID FLASH
Controller for Security
Application 16-bit Security
Controller Family Security
Guidelines
2017-07-19 Hardcopy or pdf-file
17 DOC 16-bit Controller Family SLE
70 Programmer’s Reference
Manual
2017-07-04 Hardcopy and pdf-file
18 DOC SLE70 Asymmetric Crypto
Library for Crypto@2304T
RSA / ECC / Toolbox User
Interface (1.03.006)
2017-06-20 Hardcopy and pdf-file
19 DOC SLE70 Asymmetric Crypto
Library for Crypto@2304T
RSA / ECC / Toolbox User
Interface (2.03.008)
2017-05-10 Hardcopy and pdf-file
20 DOC SCL78 Symmetric Crypto
Library for SCP v3,
DES/AES, 16-bit Security
Controller, User Interface
(2.02.010)
2016-10-14 Hardcopy and pdf-file
21 DOC Crypto@2304T User Manual 2010-03-23 Hardcopy and pdf-file
22 DOC SLx70 Family Secure Hash
Algorithm SHA-2 (SHA
256/224, SHA 512/384)
Library Version V1.01
2009-11 Hardcopy and pdf-file
23 DOC AMM Advanced Mode for
Mifare-Compatible
Technology Addendum to
M7893 Hardware Reference
Manual
2013-02-19 Hardcopy and pdf-file
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The delivery documentation describes all procedures that are necessary to maintain
security when distributing versions of the TOE or parts of it to the user’s site including the
necessary intermediate delivery procedures.
Furthermore, the delivery documentation describes in a sufficient manner how the various
procedures and technical measures provide for the detection of modifications and any
discrepancies between the TOE respective parts of it send by the TOE Manufacturer and
the version received by the Composite Product Manufacturer.
Three different delivery procedures have to be taken into consideration:
● Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance) from the
TOE Manufacturer to the IC Embedded Software Developer.
● Delivery of the IC Embedded Software (ROM / Flash data, initialisation and pre-
personalisation data) from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the TOE
Manufacturer.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018 Certification Report
● Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE Manufacturer to the Composite Product
Manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers, after
phase 4 in form of modules (with or without inlay antenna).
Respective distribution centers are listed in Appendix B (see below).
The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its identification data. The
identification data contains the lot number, the wafer number and the coordinates of the
chip on the wafer. Each individual TOE can therefore be traced unambiguously and thus
assigned to the entire development and production process.
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by M7892 B11. Another characteristic of the
TOE are the chip identification data. These chip identification data is accessible via the
Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM).
This GCIM outputs a variety of unique information in order to uniquely determine the
underlying hardware configuration. Additionally, a dedicated RMS function (see [16]
section 9.16) allows a customer to extract the present hardware configuration and the
original Chip Identifier Byte, which was valid before blocking.
The firmware part of the TOE is also identified also via the GCIM for all of the firmware
parts.
The SCL (optional), RSA (optional), EC (optional), SHA-2 (optional), Toolbox (optional),
and Base library (optional), as separate software parts of the TOE, are also identified by
their unique version numbers. The user can identify these versions by calculating the hash
signatures of the provided library files. The mapping of these hash signatures to the
version numbers is provided in the Security Target [6] and [9] section 10.
For further, detailed information regarding TOE identification see [9], section 1.2.
Please also note, that as the TOE is under control of the user software, the TOE
Manufacturer can only guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the
responsibility of the Composite Product Manufacturer to include mechanisms in the
implemented software (developed by the IC Embedded Software Developer) which allows
detection of modifications after the delivery.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
Symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithms (Triple-DES and AES), to ensure the
confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication
protocols and it will provide a random number generation of appropriate quality.
The RSA library is used to provide a high level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto2304T and includes
countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The EC library is used to provide a
high level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography implemented on the hardware
component Crypto2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA
attacks. The SHA-library provides the calculation of a hash value of freely chosen data
input in the CPU.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
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cryptographic keys during AES, Triple-DES, RSA and EC cryptographic functions
performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality.
Hence the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: OE.Plat-Appl (Usage of Hardware Platform), OE.Resp-Appl (Treatment of
User Data) and OE.Process-Sec-IC (Protection during Composite product manufacturing).
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is an integrated circuit (IC) providing a platform for an operating sytem and
application software used in smartcards but also in any other device or form factor
requiring a high level of resistance against attackers. A top level block diagram and a list of
subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target [6], chapter
2.1.
The TOE consists of a core system, memories, computing peripherals, system peripherals,
standard peripherals, an analogue module and the connecting busses. The major
components of the core system are the double CPU (Central Processing Units) including
the internal encryption leaving no plain data, the MMU (Memory Management Unit) and
MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The Block diagram provides a simplified
overview upon the hardware subsystems in the Security Target [6] and [9], figure 1.
The symmetric co-processor (SCP) combines both AES and Triple-DES with dual-key or
triple-key hardware acceleration. The Asymmetric Crypto Co-processor is called
Crypto2304T and provides hardware support for asymmetric algorithms like RSA and EC.
The software part of the TOE consists of the cryptographic RSA-, EC-, SCL- and the SHA-
2 libraries and the supporting Toolbox and Base libraries. If RSA or EC or Toolbox or
combinations hereof are part of the shipment, automatically the Base Library of the same
version is included.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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7. IT Product Testing
The developer performed five categories of tests:
● Simulation Tests (design verification): The simulation tests are carried out in the course
of the development of the TOE during the IC design phase. They verify that the designed
circuits satisfy the specifications.
● Qualification Tests: For each mask version a qualification test is performed. Via the
results of these tests a qualification report is generated. The positive result of the
qualification is one part of the necessary testing results documented with the
qualification report. The qualification report is completed after the verification testing
(see below) and the security evaluation (see below) are performed successfully. The
tests performed and their results are listed in the qualification report. The results of the
tests are the basis on which it is decided, whether the TOE is released to production.
● Verification Tests: With these tests in user mode the functionality of the end user
environment is checked.
● Security Evaluation Tests: In the context of security evaluation testing the security
mechanisms is tested again in the user mode only focusing on security. Here is not only
verified that the security functionality is working as this was already tested on every
single TOE during production, but also it is tested how well the security functionality is
working and the effectiveness is calculated. This step is necessary as the mechanisms
work together and that must be evaluated in the user mode.
● Production Tests: Before delivery on every chip production tests are performed. These
tests use the CRC checksums attained by the simulation tests. The aim of these tests is
to check whether each chip is functioning correctly.
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developers
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. The tests of the developer were repeated by sampling, by
repetition of complete regression tests and by software routines developed by the
evaluators and computed on samples with an evaluation operating system. For the
developer tests repeated by the evaluators other test parameters were used and the test
equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout
measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in design data
and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities using bespoke equipment and expert
know how. The penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and
attacks which do not modify the TOE physically. The penetration tests results confirm that
the TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack potential in the intended environment for
the TOE.
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8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE:
● Smartcard IC M7893 B11.
Depending on the blocking configuration, a M7893 product can have a different user
available configuration as described in Security Target Lite [6], chapter 1.1. The M7893
B11 allows for a maximum of configuration possibilities defined by the customer order
following the market needs. For example, a M7893 B11 product can come in one project
with the fully available ROM and SOLID FLASH™ Non Volatile Memory (NVM) or in
another project without any user available ROM and with any other SOLID FLASH™ NVM-
size below the physical implementation size, or with a different RAM size. Even more, the
user has the free choice, whether he needs the symmetric co-processor SCP, or the
asymmetric co-processor Crypto2304T, or both, or none of them. In addition, the user
decides, whether the TOE comes with a combination of software libraries or without any.
And, to be even more flexible, various interface options can be chosen as well.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits,
● The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards,
● Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators,
(see [4] e.g. AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report).
● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
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As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V2-2015, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on addition of the
optional Symmetric Cryptographic Library (SCL).
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June
2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of less than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The Security Target [6] and [9] (table 18 therein) provides a table detailing the available
cryptographic functionality. Any Cryptographic Functionality therein, that is marked as
'Security Level above 100 Bits', achieves a security level of at least 100 Bits (in general
context).
For the Cryptographic Functionality
● CryptoGeneratePrimeMask(), which might be used in conjunction with RSA Key
Generation in ACL v2.03.008,
no statement on the respective cryptographic strength can be given.
Please also note that the ACL v1.03.006 does not claim any TOE Security Functionality
regarding RSA key generation.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
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techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the application using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes guidance
documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the developer of
the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which measures
have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of
the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be
examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the
product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must
also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document "ETR for composite
evaluation" [10].
The TOE is delivered to the Composite Product Manufacturer and to the Security IC
Embedded Software Developer. The actual end-consumer obtains the TOE from the
Composite Product Issuer together with the application, which runs on the TOE.
The Security IC Embedded Software Developer receives all necessary recommendations
and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in the delivered documents [12] - [21], especially the
recommendations for secure usage in [20] and [16, section 2.11] have to be considered.
The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints
to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [21] have to be considered.
In addition the following hints resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect
has to be considered:
● The Security IC Embedded Software Developer can deliver his software either to
Infineon to let them implement it in the TOE (in Flash memory or ROM) or to the
Composite Product Manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash memory.
● The delivery procedure from the Security IC Embedded Software Developer to the
Composite Product Manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is
required.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
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AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APB™ Advanced Peripheral Bus
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
API Application Programming Interface
AXI™ Advanced eXtensible Interface Bus Protocol
BPU Bill Per Use
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CI Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI)
CIM Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI), same as CI
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
Crypto2304T Asymmetric Cryptographic Processor
CRT Chinese Reminder Theorem
DCLB Digital Contactless Bridge
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DFA Differential Failure Analysis
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECC Error Correction Code
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EDC Error Detection Code
EDU Error Detection Unit
EEPROM Electrically Erasable and Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA Electro Magnetic Analysis
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
Flash EEPROM Flash Memory
FL Flash Loader software
FW Firmware
GCIM Generic Chip Identification Mode
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HW Hardware
IC Integrated Circuit
ICO Internal Clock Oscillator
ID Identification
IMM Interface Management Module
IRAM Internal Random Access Memory
IT Information Technology
ITP Interrupt and Peripheral Event Channel Controller
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
I/O Input/Output
MED Memory Encryption and Decryption
MMU Memory Management Unit
NVM Non-Volatile Memory
OS Operating system
ST Security Target
PEC Peripheral Event Channel
PP Protection Profile
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
PROM Programmable Read Only Memory
RAM Random Access Memory
RMS Resource Management System
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rives-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SAM Service Algorithm Minimal
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCP Symmetric Cryptographic Processor
SF Security Feature
SFR Special Function Register, as well as Security Functional Requirement,
the specific meaning is given in the context
SO Security Objective
SOLID FLASH™ An Infineon Trade Mark and Stands for Flash EEPROM Technology
SPA Simple Power Analysis
ST Security Target
STS Self Test Software
SW Software
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TOE Target of Evaluation
TM Test Mode (STS)
TRNG True Random Number Generator
TSC TOE Security Functions Control
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
UM User Mode (STS)
UmSLC User Mode Security Life Control
WDT Watch Dog Timer
3DES Triple DES Encryption Standards
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE9
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
9
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 13, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an den Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 19, Version 9, Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS)
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 23, Version 3, Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting
Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document
and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL
6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 37, Version 3, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 41, Version 2, Anleitungen zur Erstellung von Protection Profiles and Security Targets
• AIS 45, Version 2, Erstellung und Pflege von Meilensteinplänen
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende Hinweise
für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 47, Version 1.1, Regelungen zur Zertifizierung von Entwicklungs- und Produktionsstandorten nach
Common Criteria (Site Certification)
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[6] Confidential Security Target for BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018, Version 2.2, 2017-10-
20, “Confidential Security Target M7893 B11 Common Criteria CCv3.1 EAL6
augmented (EAL6+)”, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report for BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018, Version 3, 2017-10-23,
“Evaluation Technical Report Summary (ETR Summary)”, TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-
0035-2007
[9] Public Security Target for BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018, Version 2.1, 2017-10-20,
“Public Security Target M7893 B11 Common Criteria CCv3.1 EAL6 augmented
(EAL6+)”, Infineon Technologies AG (sanitised public document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product BSI-DSZ-CC-
0879-V3-2018, Version 3, 2017-10-23, “Evaluation Technical Report for Composite
Evaluation (ETR Comp)”, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[11] Configuration list for the TOE of BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018, Version 2.0, 2017-07-
25, “Configuration Management Scope for Common Criteria with Evaluation
Assurance Level EAL6 augmented (EAL6+) M7893 B11”, Infineon Technologies AG
(confidential document)
[12] SLE70 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox User
Interface (2.03.008), v2.03.008, 2017-05-10, Infineon
and
SLE70 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox User
Interface (1.03.006), v1.03.006, 2017-06-20, Infineon
[13] Crypto@2304T User Manual, 2010-03-23, Infineon
[14] 16-bit Controller Family SLE 70 Programmer’s Reference Manual, v9.6, 2017-07-04,
Infineon
[15] M7893 Errata Sheet, v3.1, 2017-06-23, Infineon
[16] M7893 SOLID FLASH Controller for Security Applications Hardware Reference
Manual, v2.3, 2013-06-06, Infineon
[17] AMM Advanced Mode for Mifare-Compatible Technology Addendum to M7893
Hardware Reference Manual, v1.0, 2013-02-19, Infineon
[18] SLx70 Family Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-2 (SHA 256/221, SHA 512/384) Library
Version V1.01, 2009-11-06, Infineon
[19] SCL78 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCPv3 DES / AES User Interface (2.02.010),
2016-10-14, Infineon
[20] M7893 Security Guidelines, 2017-07-19, Infineon
[21] SLx 70 Family Production and Personalization User’s Manual, 2015-04-01, Infineon
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon Security Controller M7893 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, EC v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL v2.02.010 libraries
and Toolbox v2.03.008 or v1.03.006 and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware) (Ta
rget of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme
Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 3 April 2018, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.3) are fulfilled for the development and
production sites of the TOE.
Besides the production and development sites, the relevant TOE distribution centers are
as follows:
Distribution Center name Address
DHL Singapore DHL Exel Supply Chain
Richland Business Centre
11 Bedok North Ave 4, Level 3,
Singapore 489949
G&D Neustadt Giesecke & Devrient Secure Data Management
GmbH
Austraße 101b
96465 Neustadt bei Coburg
Germany
K&N Großostheim Infineon Technology AG
Distribution Center Europe (DCE)
Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10 – Building 8A
63762 Großostheim
Germany
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Distribution Center name Address
K&N Hayward Kuehne & Nagel
30805 Santana Street
Hayward, CA 94544
USA
Table 3: TOE Distribution Centers
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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