BSI-DSZ-CC-0784-2013
for
NXP J3D081_M59, J2D081_M59, J3D081_M61,
J2D081_M61 Secure Smart Card Controller of
JCOP V2.4.2 R2
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.71
BSI-DSZ-CC-0784-2013
Smart Cards and similar devices: Operation Systems and Applications
NXP J3D081_M59, J2D081_M59, J3D081_M61, J2D081_M61 Secure
Smart Card Controller of JCOP V2.4.2 R2
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance: Java Card System - Open Configuration Protection
Profile, Version 2.6, 19 April 2010,
ANSSI-CC-PP-2010/03
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ASE_TSS.2,
AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 31 July 2013
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber L.S.
Head of Division
for components up
to EAL 4
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0784-2013
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0784-2013 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0784-2013
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................16
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................19
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................20
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................22
11 Security Target............................................................................................................24
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................24
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................26
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................29
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................29
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................30
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................39
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0784-2013 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0784-2013
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ASE_TSS.2, ATE_DPT.3 and and AVA_VAN.5 that
are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product NXP J3D081_M59, J2D081_M59, J3D081_M61, J2D081_M61 Secure Smart
Card Controller of JCOP V2.4.2 R2 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product NXP J3D081_M59, J2D081_M59, J3D081_M61,
J2D081_M61 Secure Smart Card Controller of JCOP V2.4.2 R2 was conducted by
Brightsight BV. Brightsight BV is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbHNXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product NXP J3D081_M59, J2D081_M59, J3D081_M61, J2D081_M61 Secure Smart
Card Controller of JCOP V2.4.2 R2 has been included in the BSI list of certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Stresemannallee 101
22529 Hamburg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0784-2013 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0784-2013
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Java Card product. The TOE consists of the Java Card
Operating System, the NXP Crypto Library for SmartMX v2.7 (certified under
BSI-DSZ-CC-0630-2010) and the hardware platform P5CD081V1A or P5CC081V1A
(certified under BSI-DSZ-CC-555-2009).
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Java Card System - Open Configuration Protection Profile, Version 2.6,
19 April 2010, ANSSI-CC-PP-2010/03 [7]8
.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ASE_TSS.2, AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Functions Addressed issue
SF.AccessControl enforces the access control
SF.Audit Audit functionality
SF.CryptoKey Cryptographic key management
SF.CryptoOperation Cryptographic operation
SF.I&A Identification and authentication
SF.SecureManagement Secure management of TOE resources
SF.PIN PIN management
SF.LoadIntegrity Package integrity check
SF.Transaction Transaction management
SF.Hardware TSF of the underlying IC
SF.CryptoLib TSF of the certified crypto library
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 3.2 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: NXP J3D081_M59,
J3D081_M61, J2D081_M59 and J2D081_M61 all on top of the P5CD081V1A or
P5CC081V1A hardware chip. For details refer to chapter 8.
8
NXP had decided to use the certified PP version 2.6 and not the latest version 3.0 of the PP certified
by ANSSI
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0784-2013 Certification Report
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG
Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
NXP J3D081_M59, J2D081_M59, J3D081_M61, J2D081_M61 Secure Smart Card
Controller of JCOP V2.4.2 R2
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
Product Component Version/ID Form of delivery89
J3D081_M59 P5CD081V1A hardware platform
Crypto library
ROM Code (Mask ID)
Mask name
Patch Code (Patch ID)
V1A
V2.7
59
NX212A
05
Wafer, modules and
packages (dice include
identification T046B)
J3D081_M61 P5CD081V1A hardware platform
Crypto library
ROM Code (Mask ID)
Mask name
Patch Code (Patch ID)
V1A
V2.7
61
NX212B
05
Wafer, modules and
packages (dice include
identification T046B)
J2D081_M59 P5CC081V1A hardware platform
Crypto library
ROM Code (Mask ID)
Mask name
Patch Code (Patch ID)
V1A
V2.7
59
NX212A
05
Wafer, modules and
packages (dice include
identification T046B)
J2D081_M61 P5CC081V1A hardware platform
Crypto library
ROM Code (Mask ID)
Mask name
V1A
V2.7
61
NX212B
Wafer, modules and
packages (dice include
identification T046B)
9
According to the ST of the certified hardware [15]
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0784-2013
Product Component Version/ID Form of delivery8
Patch Code (Patch ID) 05
Guidance
Documentation
(for all products)
Administrator Manual (AGD_PRE) [11]
User Manual (AGD_OPE) for the applet
developer [12]
Secure Box User Manual [13]
Product hardware data sheet [14]
3.1 (15.01.2013)
3.3 (27.02.2013)
3.3 (28.02.2013)
3.0 (17.10.2011)
encrypted files
(restricted distribution)
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
In chapter 2 of [11] the user is instructed to use the IDENTIFY command to verify the
identity of the product. According to [12] Chapter 7, the identify command returns
identification data. The data items that are relevant for the unique identification of the TOE
are as follows:
Name Expected
FabKey ID xx (check OEF)
Patch ID x3 (3 = Patch ID 3)
x4 (4 = Patch ID 4)
x5 (5 = Patch ID 5) ← this is the TOE
Target ID 01
Mask ID 3B = Mask 59
3D = Mask 61
Custom Mask ID 00 00 00 00 = Default mask
Mask Name NX212A = Mask 59
NX212B = Mask 61
Fused State 00 = Not fused
01 = Fused
ROM Info Length 03
ROM Info e.g. 065BFE = JxD145_M59
FIPS 00 = FIPS disabled
Table 3: EEPROM data for TOE identification (xx for FABKEY ID)
The actual TOE identification is the combination FabKey ID, Mask ID.
• The FabKey is the area in EEPROM with user dependent content. The FabKey ID
refers to a so called “Order Entry Form” (OEF) that specifies the user configuration
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data10
and also identifies the hardware platform for the customer product and his
FabKey ID.
• The size of the FabKey ID is 3 nibbles, which allows for 212
FabKey identifications
per Mask ID.
• The ROM Info gives a checksum value calculated over the entire ROM mask. This
value will differ depending on the Mask ID and the hardware platform.
• In addition also customer applets and native library in the Secure Box can be
installed in ROM. These may lead to additional customer mask IDs and further
differences in the ROM Info checksum.
The TOE is delivered by NXP either as wafer in phase 3 (IC production) or in packaged
form in phase 4 (packaging) of the smart card life cycle as defined in the Smart Card IC
Protection Profile.
Applets and native libraries in the Secure Box can be loaded in ROM or EEPROM.
Loading in ROM is possible in Phase 3. Loading of the native library (in the Secure Box)
software in EEPROM is only possible by NXP in Phase 4. Loading of applets in EEPROM
is possible in Phases 3, 4, 5 (composite product manufacturer, applet loading) or 6 (applet
personalisation). Applets and native libraries in the Secure Box are outside the scope of
the TOE. In the guidance [11] as part of the delivery procedure it is explained that when
the TOE is powered for the first time it is in the “prepersonalization” state. In this state a so
called “Root Applet” is available to configure OS parameters. For a detailed description of
the delivery procedure of the native library to the developer is referred to chapter 9 of [13].
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: It provides a protected
environment on the card where multiple applications, within dedicated memory areas, can
be hosted by using Java Card Technology.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
• OE.APPLET: No applet loaded post-issuance shall contain native methods.
• OE.VERIFICATION: All the bytecodes shall be verified at least once, before the
loading, before the installation or before the execution, depending on the card
capabilities, in order to ensure that each bytecode is valid at execution time. See
#.VERIFICATION ([8] p.34) for details.
• OE.USE_DIAG Secure TOE communication protocols shall be supported and used
by the environment.
10
The user configuration data are the configuration settings that partly determine the behaviour of the
TOE. Examples are the protocol communication parameters such as e.g. waiting time extension,
selection of SCP protocol etc.
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• OE.USE_KEYS During the TOE usage, the terminal or system in interaction with
the TOE, shall ensure the protection (integrity and confidentiality) of their own keys
by operational means and/or procedures.
• OE.PROCESS_SEC_IC Protection during composite product manufacturing
Security procedures shall be used after TOE Delivery up to delivery to the
end-consumer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its
manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention,
theft or unauthorised use). This means that Phases after TOE Delivery up to the
end of Phase 6 (refer to Section 1.3.3) must be protected appropriately.
Details can be found in the Security Target [8], chapter 3 and 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
The target of evaluation (TOE) is the NXP J3D081_M59, J2D081_M59, J3D081_M61,
J2D081_M61 Secure Smart Card Controller of JCOP V2.4.2 R2. It consists of:
• Smart card platform (parts of the hardware platform and hardware abstraction layer,
Crypto Library)
• Embedded software (Java Card Virtual Machine, Runtime Environment, Java Card
API, Card Manager)
• Native MIFARE application (physically always present but logical availability
depends on configuration)
Logical Architecture:
The JCOP v2.4.2 R2 TOE from NXP is a Java Card (version. 3.0.1) and Global Platform
(version 2.2.1) allowing post-issuance loading and installation of applets. Furthermore, the
TOE supports the deletion of Applets and objects and implements a SecureBox. The
SecureBox feature of the TOE allows the execution of a (unknown) native library in a from
JCOP separated mode, using the (certified) MMU of the underlying hardware platform.
This native library is loaded preissuance by the card manufacturer in ROM or EEPROM
and is only accessible through the JCOPX API. The TOE supports a variety of crypto
algorithms, supported through the Java Card API and the JCOPX API.
The TOE does not include any software on the application layer (Java Card applets). This
is shown schematically in [8], Figure 1 in Chapter 1.3.1.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 TOE test configuration
The developer provided the evaluator with test samples in a DIL package in
prepersonalised state.
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7.2 Developer testing
The Developer used a variety of test tools from which the TOE was tested both in its final
configuration and in an emulator tool. The following test tools were used by the developer:
• GlobalPlatform test suite (The GlobalPlatform test suite is an industrial standard test
suite used to test if the TOE complies with the GlobalPlatform standard. The
GlobalPlatform 2.1.111
)
• Visa GlobalPlatform test suite (The Visa GlobalPlatform test suite is the Visa
addition to the GlobalPlatform test suite.)
• Unit tests (The unit test test suite is developed along with the TOE development to
test the developed functionalities of the TOE.)
• JCTCK (Java Card Technology compatibility Kit – JCTCK – The JCTCK test bench
is the official test bench of Oracle and tests all compliance aspects of Java Card.)
• NXPTCK (The NXPTCK test bench is using the Oracle JT Harness environment
that is also used by Oracle in JCTCK. The environment is used to implement tests
for the JCOPX API.)
• Add1 test (The Add1 test bench is proprietary to NXP)
• Add2 test (The Add2 test bench is proprietary to NXP)
• Adv test (The Adv test bench is based on JUnit and provides more flexible test
creation.)
Typically some tests can only be performed in an emulator test environment. Testing these
security mechanisms is done using the Unit test tool and a specially build TOE with
additional test software. This allows changing TOE data and interrupting TOE execution, in
order to test the checksums and attack counter mechanism.
7.3 Evaluator independent developer testing
The evaluators sampled test scripts and test applets per test suite. Next the tests were
performed and the respective test logs were compared with the expected test results.
The evaluator independent developer tests have been conducted on products with the
M59 and M61 software masks and different underlying hardware platforms. Because the
evaluator independent testing concerns logical testing on the firmware masks M59 and
M61 the tests on the other products are considered applicable for this TOE. Therefore,
samples of each test suite for each test tool has been conducted for the TOE.
7.4 Evaluator independent testing
The evaluator has judged the developer’s tests to be so extensive that testing specific
interfaces would lead to tests that are only superficially different from the developer’s
testing. The evaluator therefore judges that tests, supplementing the developer’s tests,
should be defined based on how well the TOE security functions are implemented, rather
than on how well the different standards are met.
Therefore the evaluator selected the following to be tested:
a) Integrity/error testing on the emulator:
11
This testset is for an earlier version than the GlobalPlatform version implemented in the TOE. During
ATE testing it is determined that the used version is sufficient to test the implemented GlobalPlatform
functionality that complies to version 2.2.1
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• Test to show that the TOE terminates upon detection of EEPROM write Error
• Test to show that the TOE halts when an integrity error of a KEY/PIN object is
detected
• Test to show that the TOE halts upon detecting FabKey integrity error
• Test to show that the TOE terminates itself upon detecting applet life cycle
inconsistency
• Test to show that the memory is indeed cleared after the garbage collector removes
the unreferenced objects
b) Testing of Unsupported APIs, this means verification that the VM will throw an Exception
in case unused or switched off (as a result of a build flag) functionality is invoked.
c) Testing for obvious logical mistakes using the Brightsight Java Card Test Suite. The
Brightsight Java Card Test Suite consists of more than 500 test cases, where each test
case is performed by executing a script (and different test applets that are loaded as
part of the test). The test suite interprets the test verdicts in pass, mild fail, and fail
verdicts. Any inconclusive test results are analysed by the evaluator using knowledge of
the implementation.
The integrity/error testing (at item 1.) has been performed on an Ashling EPKSCSmartMX
emulator for the M59 mask using a specially developed test applet. The tested behavior is
equal in the M61 mask.
The testing of Unsupported APIs (at item 2.) has been conducted on card products with
the help of a specially developed test applet. The Brightsight Java Card testing (at item 3.)
has also been conducted on card products. The testing of Unsupported APIs and the
Brightsight Java Card testing have been conducted on the J3D081_M59 TOE product for
the M59 mask, on J3D120_M60, which is part of a different certification and the
J3D081_M61_DF product, which has been evaluated simultaneously under certification ID
BSI-DSZ-CC-0860.
Because the testing concerns logical testing the test results for the J2D081_M61_DF
product are considered applicable for the TOE products with mask M61 which are part of
this certification.
The testing results show that the TOE exhibits the expected behaviour. No deviations were
found.
7.5 Penetration testing
The penetration tests were devised after performing the Evaluator Vulnerability Analysis.
This was done in the following steps.
1. Inventory of required resistance
This step uses the JIL attack list as a reference for completeness and studies the
ST claims to decide which attacks in the JIL attack list apply for the JCOP 2.4.2 R2.
2. Validation of security functionalities
This step identifies the implemented security functionalities and performs evaluator
independent tests to verify implementation and to validate proper functioning of the
security functions (ATE).
3. Vulnerability analysis
In this step the design of the implemented security functionalities is studied and an
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analysis is performed to determine whether the design possibly contains
vulnerabilities against the respective attacks of step 1. This step also analyses the
design from the attack perspective as defined in 1. Based on this design analysis
the evaluators determine whether the design provides sufficient assurance or
whether penetration testing is needed to provide sufficient assurance. The
evaluators have also considered the results of the AVA kick-off meeting that took
place (AVA).
4. Penetration testing
This step performs the penetration tests identified in step 3. (AVA)
5. Conclusions on resistance
This step performs a rating on the results of the penetration tests in relation with the
assurance already gained by the design analysis. Based on the ratings the
evaluators draw conclusions on the resistance of TOE against attackers possessing
a high attack potential.
The evaluator performed a wide variety of penetration tests on the concluded potential
vulnerabilities comprising of side-channel tests, light-manipulation perturbation tests and
Java Card testing. The overall conclusion is that the four JCOP 2.4.2 R2 products
J3D081_M59, J3D081_M61, J2D081_M59 and J2D081_M61 are protected against
attackers possessing a high attack potential, provided the user guidance is followed.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The JCOP 2.4.2 R2 contains 12 single products based on different combinations of
hardware controller and mask used and EEPROM data setting. All of them have a P5
secure smart card controller, a Version 2.7 Cryptographic Library and JCOP 2.4.2 R2
functionality.
The TOE incudes the following 4 products: NXP J3D081_M59, J2D081_M59,
J3D081_M61, J2D081_M61. All these 4 TOE products are composite TOEs each
consisting of:
• P5Cx081V1A secure smart card controller;
• Version 2.7 Cryptographic Library;
• Native MIFARE application (depending on the hardware configuration);
• Embedded JCOP 2.4.2 R2 software consisting of Java Card Virtual Machine,
Runtime Environment, Java Card API and Card Manager.
Table 2 above outlines the specific hardware platform, Crypto library version, ROM Code
(Mask ID), Mask name and Patch Code (Patch ID).
The difference between Mask 59 and Mask 61 is that Mask 61 does not implement Korean
Seed (crypto algorithm), and no SCP03 protocol. Mask 59 implements Korean Seed and
allows using either SCP02 or SCP03. The two different masks are the result of a build
process in which different options have been selected. Since Korean Seed is not claimed
by the TOE, both configurations support the same set of SFRs. The Mask Name identifies
the version of the Mask ID which is among other based on the date of TOE generation.
Other product differences are the result of differences in hardware configuration. The
J3D081_M59 and J3D081_M61 have a contactless T=CL communication protocol
interface enabled while for the J2D081_M59 and J2D081_M61 this protocol interface is
disabled.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(iii) Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation
(iv) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations
(i.e. on hardware [15], [17] and crypto library [16] and [18]) have been applied in the
TOE evaluation.
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and 31 were used (see [4]).
A document ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 has not been provided in
the course of this certification procedure. It could be provided by the ITSEF and submitted
to the certification body for approval subsequently.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
• All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC
(see also part C of this report)
• The components ALC_DVS.2, ASE_TSS.2, AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
• PP Conformance: Java Card System - Open Configuration Protection Profile, Version
2.6, 19 April 2010, ANSSI-CC-PP-2010/03 [7]
• for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
• for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ASE_TSS.2, AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
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9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG
Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for the TOE Security functionalities
Algorithm Bit length Purpose Implementation standard
AES in one of the
following modes of
operation:
ECB, CBC with padding
method 1 or method 2 or
without padding
128, 192, 256
bits
encryption and
decryption
FIPS Publication 197, Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), NIST Special
Publication 800-38A, 2001 (ECB and
CBC mode) and ISO 9797-1, padding
method 1 or method 2 (CBC mode)
Triple-DES in one of the
following modes of
operation: ECB, CBC,
with padding method 1 or
method 2 or without
padding
double-length
(112 bit) or
triple-length
(168 bit)
encryption and
decryption
ANSI X9.52-1998 (ECB and CBC mode)
and ISO 9797-1, padding method 1 and
method 2 (CBC mode)
FIPS 46-3 (TDES)
Triple-DES in CBC-MAC
mode
MAC algorithm 1 without
padding
algorithm 3 with padding
method 1 or method 2
double-length
(112 bit) or
triple-length
(168 bit)
signature
generation and
verification
ISO 9797-1, Algorithm 1 without padding
and Algorithm 2 with padding method 1
and method 2 (CBC-MAC mode)
FIPS 46-3 (TDES)
AES CBC-MAC mode
MAC algorithm 1 without
padding
128, 192, 256
bits
MAC generation
and verification
ISO 9797-1, Algorithm 1 without padding
(CBC-MAC mode)
FIPS Publication 197, Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)
Triple-DES CMAC mode double-length
(112 bit) or
triple-length
(168 bit)
MAC generation
and verification
NIST special publication 800-38B, section
5 and 6
FIPS 46-3 (TDES)
AES CMAC mode 128, 192, 256
bits
MAC generation
and verification
NIST special publication 800-38B, section
5 and 6
FIPS Publication 197, Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)
RSA without or with
EME-PKCS1-v1_5
encoding method
1976 bits to
2048 bits
encryption and
decryption
PKCS #1, v2.1 (RSAEP, RSADP,
RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT,
RSAESPKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT)
RSA with EMSA-PSS
encoding method
1976 bits to
2048 bits
signature
generation and
verification
PKCS #1, v2.1 (RSASSA-PSS)
RSA with
EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5
encoding method
1976 bits to
2048 bits
signature
generation and
verification
PKCS #1, v2.1 (RSASSA-PKSCS1-v1.5)
RSA 1976 bits to
2048 bits
(Straight
signature
generation and
verification
ISO 9796-2:2002
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Algorithm Bit length Purpose Implementation standard
Forward) or
1976 to 2048
bits (CRT)
ECDSA over GF(p) 160, 192, 224,
256, 320 bits
signature
generation and
verification
ISO 14888-3
ECC over GF(p) 160, 192, 224,
256, 320 bits
secure point
addition
ISO 14888-3
ECDH over GF(p) 160, 192, 224,
256, 320 bits
Diffie-Hellman Key
Exchange
ISO 11770-3
Diffie-Hellman key
exchange (RSA
exponentiation)
1976 bits to
2048 bits
Diffie-Hellman Key
Exchange
PKCS#3
SHA-224 and SHA-256 none cryptographic
checksum
generation
FIPS 180-3 section 6
Table 4: Cryptographic functions
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks
with high attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for this
functionalites it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for
the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the
'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The Cryptographic [Functionalities, Functionality] 2-key Triple DES (2TDES), Triple-DES in
ECB-Mode, AES in ECB-Mode, ECC 160 provided by the TOE achieves a security level of
maximum 80 Bits only (in general context).
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional
configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the application software on top.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
guidelines for the developer of the application software on how to securely use the TOE
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and which measures have to be implemented in the software in order to fulfil the security
requirements of the Security Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system on top it must be
examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the
application software.
The user of the TOE – the applet developer - must implement the advices of the user
guidance [12], especially:
• All applets have to verified with a byte code verifier at least once.
• None of the applets may use APDU.Sendbyteslong method with a data length of
more than 1456 byte.
• Applets using the method SACAccelerator.unwrapAPDU need to implement an
additional MAC verification while processing the received APDU.
• The length of RSA keys generated using the method KeyPair.genKeyPair has
to be checked after key generation for the proper length.
• For security critical random data checks should be implemented for RandomData
API parameters (i.e. length). Also it should be checked that the requested number
of random data bytes have been generated and stored in the destination array.
• Adequate integrity protection mechanisms to detect changes in critical data caused
by perturbation attacks should be implemented. This applies to persistent data
which is not protected by the operating system, e.g. data in simple byte arrays. Note
that Java Card key objects and OwnerPIN are protected by the operating system.
Depending on the application of the TOE and usage of the AES algorithm, the composite
evaluator must determine whether confidentiality of input data of the AES algorithm is
claimed and if this is the case, the composite evaluator must consider testing to provide
assurance.
As explained in section 2 it is possible in the “prepersonalization” state to change the
behaviour of the TOE with a number of configuration settings using the ROOT applet.
However, if one of the following settings is changed it will result in a non-certified product
configuration:
• The TOE does not allow the use of multiple logical channels.
• The TOE does not allow changes in the setting for the attack counter, or modifying
the behaviour upon detection of a potential attack using FEATURE_MODE3.
• The TOE does also not allow the use of the FIPS mode. In the certified
configuration this should be disabled.
• The power configuration (clock settings and HIGHSEC) are fixed.
• Configuration for security domains (e.g. Supplementary Security Domains) which
relates to the Mandated DAP option is always enabled on the TOE.
• The Patch identification
• The developer default settings for MIFARE FLEX and DESFire must not be
changed.
• The developer is responsible for making sure that the appropriate addresses are
initialised for the PHEAP end address, transaction buffer size and extended patch.
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11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
API Application Programming Interface
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
DES Data Encryption Standard
DIL Dual In-Line
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Read Only Memory
ES Embedded Software
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HAL Hardware Abstraction Layer
HW Hardware
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDS Logical Data Structure
OEF Order Entry Form
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
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ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE12
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0784-2013, Rev. 01.13, 18 March 2013, D NXP
J3D081_M59, J3D081_M61, J2D081_M59, and J2D081_M61, Secure Smart Card
Controller Revision 2 Security Target, NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
(confidential document)
[7] Java Card System - Open Configuration Protection Profile, Version 2.6, 19 April
2010, ANSSI-CC-PP-2010/03
[8] Security Target lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0784-2013, Rev. 01.13, 18 March 2013, NXP
J3D081_M59, J3D081_M61, J2D081_M59, and J2D081_M61, Secure Smart Card
Controller Revision 2 Security Target, NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
(sanitised public document)
[9] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2.1, Evaluation Technical Report NXP
J3D081_M59, J3D081_M61, J2D081_M59, J2D081_M61, Secure Smart Card
Controller, Brightsight (confidential document)
[10] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.3, NXP J3D145 J2D145 J3D081 J2D081
J3D081DF Secure Smart Card Controller, NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
(confidential document)
[11] Administrator manual JCOP V2.4.2 Revision 2 secure smart card controller, Rev.
3.1, 15 January 2013, Doc.No. 209431, NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
(confidential document)
12
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 7, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 8,Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2.0, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 3, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.9, Reuse of evaluation results
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[12] User manual JCOP V2.4.2 Revision 2 secure smart card controller, Rev. 3.3, 27
February 2013, Doc.No. 209233, NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
(confidential document)
[13] UM Secure Box JCOP V2.4.2, Rev. 3.3, 28 February 2013, Doc.No. 22113313
, NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH (confidential document)
[14] Product hardware data sheet JCOP V2.4.2 Revision 2 J3D081 and J2D081 secure
smart card controller, Rev. 3.0, 17 October 2011, Doc.No. 219430, NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH (confidential document)
[15] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 for NXP Smart Card Controller
P5CD081V1A and its major configurations P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A,
P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A each with IC dedicated Software
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH Business Line Identification, Version
1.0, 10 November 2009, BSI, (plus related Maintenance Reports MA-01 and MA-02)
[16] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-2010 for Crypto Library V2.7 on
P5CD081V1A / P5CC081V1A / P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A / P5CD021V1A /
P5CD016V1A from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, Version 1.0, 19
November 2010, BSI
[17] ETR for composition, BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 for NXP Smart Card Controller
P5CD081V1A and its major configurations P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A,
P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A, Version 1.35, 28 October 2011,
T-Systems (confidential document)
[18] ETR for composition, BSI-DSZ-CC-0633, Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD081V1A /
P5CC081V1A / P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A / P5CD021V1A / P5CD016V1A, 27
February 2012, Brightsight (confidential document)
13
Please note that [6] and [8] contain incorrect references to older versions of the document
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0784-2013 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (Release 3 = chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0784-2013
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product NXP J3D081_M59, J2D081_M59, J3D081_M61, J2D081_M61 Secure
Smart Card Controller of JCOP V2.4.2 R2 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated
at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 31 July 2013, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) NXP Semiconductors Hamburg (software development and TOE integration)
NXP Semiconductors GmbH, Business Unit Identification, Development Center,
Stresemannallee 101, 22529 Hamburg
b) NXP Semiconductors Gratkorn (software development and document control)
NXP Semiconductors GmbH, Business Unit Identification, Document Control Office,
Mikron-Weg 1, A-8101 Gratkorn
c) NXP Semiconductors Leuven (software (crypto) development)
NXP Semiconductors, Interleuvenlaan 80, B-3001 Leuven, Belgium
d) NXP Bangalore (tool development)
NXP Semiconductors India Private Limited, Information Technology Park, Nagawara
Village, Kasaba Hobli,Bangalore 560 045 India
e) For the list of sites used as part of the platform development and production see annex
B of [15] and [16]
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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