BSI-DSZ-CC-0972-2015
for
z/OS Version 2 Release 1
from
IBM Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 V1.1 CC-Zert-327 V5.12
BSI-DSZ-CC-0972-2015 (*)
Operating System
z/OS
Version 2 Release 1
from IBM Corporation
PP Conformance: General-Purpose Operating System Protection
Profile Version 3.9, 6 December 2012, OSPP
Technical Community
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
Bonn, 14 September 2015
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0972-2015
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0972-2015 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0972-2015
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................9
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................15
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................17
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................17
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................17
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................19
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................19
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................23
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................27
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................34
11. Security Target............................................................................................................34
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................34
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................40
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................41
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................41
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................42
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................49
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0972-2015 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification, Procedural
Description (BSI 7138) [3]
● BSI certification: Requirements regarding the Evaluation Facility (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0972-2015
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. This Domain is linked to
a conformance claim to one of the related SOGIS Recommended Protection Profiles. In
addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the
assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and certificates for Protection Profiles and
for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA are government representatives
from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08
September 2014, this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e.
for all assurance components selected.
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
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The product z/OS, Version 2 Release 1 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0874-2014. Specific results from the
evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0874-2014 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product z/OS, Version 2 Release 1 was conducted by atsec
information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 29 July 2015. atsec
information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: IBM Corporation.
The product was developed by: IBM Corporation.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 14
September 2015 is valid until 10 August 2020. The validity date can be extended by
re-assessment or re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report and the
Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any
applicant of the product for the application and usage of the certified product,
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the product's evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and
production sites or processes, occur or the confidentiality of documentation and
information related to the product or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the product or resulting from
the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the product
deliverables according to the Certification Report part B chapter 2 to third parties,
permission of the Certification Body at BSI has to be obtained.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product z/OS, Version 2 Release 1 has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
IBM Corporation
2455 South Road P328
Poughkeepsie NY 12601
USA
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B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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1. Executive Summary
The Target of evaluation (TOE) is IBM z/OS, Version 2 Release 1.
z/OS is a general-purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking operating system for enterprise
computing systems. Multiple users can use z/OS simultaneously to perform a variety of
functions that require controlled, shared access to the information stored on the system.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this evaluation. It is conformant to the Protection
Profile "General-Purpose Operating System Protection Profile (GPOSPP)" [7].
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria ([CC]). z/OS meets the assurance
requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], section 7.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and from
GPOSPP [7] where some SFRs have been defined as extended components. Thus z/OS
is CC part 2 extended.
There also are requirements relevant for the operational environment of the TOE which are
outlined following an SFR-like notation in the Security Target ([6], chapter 6).
z/OS can be configured to two modes of operation, a standard mode and a Labeled
Security Mode.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
Identification and
Authentication
z/OS provides identification and authentication of users by the means of
• an alphanumeric RACF user ID and a system-encrypted password or (for
applications that support it) password phrase.
• an alphanumeric RACF user ID and a PassTicket, which is a
cryptographically-generated password substitute encompassing the user ID,
the requested application name, and the current date/time.
• an X.509v3 digital certificate presented to a server application that uses
System SSL or TCP/IP Application Transparent TLS (AT-TLS) to provide
TLS-based client authentication, and then “mapped” (using TOE functions)
by that server application or by AT-TLS to a RACF user ID.
• a Kerberos™ v5 ticket presented to a server application that supports the
Kerberos mechanism, and then mapped by that application through the
TOE-provided GSS-API programming services or alternate functions that
are also provided by the TOE (specifically the R_ticketServ, and R_GenSec
services). These functions enable the application server to validate the
Kerberos ticket, and thus the authentication of the principal. The application
server then translates (or maps) the Kerberos principal (using the TOE
provided function of R_userMap) to a RACF user ID.
• an LDAP LDBM bind DN (which is mapped to a RACF user ID by
information in the LDAP directory) or an LDAP ICTX or SDBM bind DN
(which contains a RACF user ID) together with a RACF password or
password phrase. The bind processing then passes the derived RACF user
ID, and the password/phrase, to RACF to complete the authentication
process.
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TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
• a digital certificate presented to LDAP over TLS (LDAP SASL bind with
EXTERNAL verification) which must map to a RACF USER ID.
Discretionary
Access Control
z/OS supports access controls that are capable of enforcing access limitations on
individual users and data objects. Discretionary access control (DAC) allows
individual users to specify how such resources as direct access storage devices
(DASD), DASD and tape data sets, and tape volumes that are under their control
are to be shared.
RACF makes access control decisions based on the user’s identity, security
attributes, group authorities, and the access authority specified with respect to the
resource profile.
z/OS provides the following DAC mechanisms:
1. The z/OS standard DAC mechanism is used for most traditional (non-UNIX)
protected objects.
2. The z/OS UNIX DAC mechanism is used for z/OS UNIX objects (files,
directories, etc.) except IPC objects
3. The z/OS UNIX IPC DAC mechanism is used for z/OS UNIX IPC objects
(shared memory segments, semaphores)
4. The z/OS LDAP LDBM DAC mechanism is used to protect LDAP objects in
the LDAP LDBM back-end data store.
Auditing The TOE provides an auditing capability that allows generating audit records for
security-critical events. RACF provides a number of logging and reporting functions
that allow resource owners and auditors to identify users who attempt to access
resources. Audit records are collected by the System Management Facilities (SMF)
into an audit trail, which is protected from unauthorized modification or deletion by
the DAC mechanisms. This audit trail can reside directly in MVS data sets, or in an
MVS log stream (which can be automatically off-loaded into MVS data sets), as
configured by the administrator.
Object Reuse Reuse of protected objects and of storage is handled by various hardware and
software controls, and by administrative practices.
All memory content of non-shared page frames is cleared before making it
accessible to other address spaces or data spaces. DASD data sets can be purged
during deletion with the RACF ERASE option and tape volumes can be erased on
return to the scratch pool. All resources allocated to UNIX objects are cleared before
reuse. Other data pools are under strict TOE control and cannot be accessed
directly by normal users.
Security
Management
z/OS provides a set of commands and options to adequately manage the TOE’s
security functions. Additionally, the TOE provides the capability of managing users,
groups of users, general resource profiles, and RACF SETROPTS options via the
z/OS LDAP server, which can accept LDAP-format requests from a remote
administrator and transform them into RACF administrative commands via its SDBM
backend processing. The TOE also provides a Java class that allows Java programs
to issue commands to manage users and groups. Both the LDAP SDBM and the
Java class ultimately create a RACF command and pass it to RACF using a
programming interface, and then RACF runs the command using the identity
associated with the SDBM session or the Java program. This behaves just the same
as when a local administrator issues the command, including all the same security
checking and auditing.
The TOE recognizes several authorities that are able to perform the different
management tasks related to the TOE’s security:
• General security options are managed by security administrators.
• Management of users and their security attributes is performed by security
administrators. Management of groups (and to some extent users) can be
delegated to group security administrators.
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TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
• Users can change their own passwords or password phrases, their default
groups, and their user names (but not their user IDs).
• Auditors manage the parameters of the audit system (a list of audited
events, for example) and can analyze the audit trail.
• Security administrators can define what audit records are captured by the
system.
• Discretionary access rights to protected resources are managed by the
owners of the applicable profiles (or UNIX objects) or by security
administrators.
Communication
Security
z/OS provides means of secure communication between systems.
In its evaluated configuration, z/OS supports trusted communication channels for
TCP/IP connections. The confidentiality and integrity of network connections are
assured by Secure Sockets Layer / Transport Layer Security (TLS) encrypted
communication for TCP/IP connections ( [TLSV1.1], [TLSV1.2]), which can be used
explicitly by applications or applied transparently to their communications (AT-TLS)
without changing the applications using it (assuming the applications that do not
make use of the SSL/TLS capabilities that allow clients to authenticate to the system
using a client-supplied X.509 digital certificate. If applications accept client
certificates then they do need to have specific SSL/TLS-related processing within
the applications.).
In addition to the SSL/TLS connection, z/OS also supports the IP Security (IPSec)
protocol with Internet Key Exchange (IKE) as the key exchange method. This is an
additional way to set up a trusted channel to another trusted IT product for IP-based
connections. z/OS also provides centralized policy management for IPSec and
AT-TLS policies across multiple z/OS systems in the network. It also provides
centralized management for digital certificates, message signing, and message
verification for IPSec across multiple z/OS systems in the network.
z/OS also supports Kerberos™ version 5 networking protocols, via the Integrated
Security Services Network Authentication Service component, hereafter called z/OS
Network Authentication Service These protocols enable both the client and the
server to mutually authenticate. This authentication mechanism can be utilized with
the GSS-API services provided by the z/OS Network Authentication Service to
provide security services to applications. These services enable encrypted
communications channels between clients and servers that may reside on the same
or on different systems.
z/OS also supports, via the optional add-on product IBM Ported Tools for z/OS, the
SSH v2 protocol and the ssh-daemon provided services of ssh (secure shell), scp
(secure copy), and sftp (secure ftp) ([SSHV2])
TCP/IP-based communication can be further controlled by the access control
function for TCP/IP connections, which allows controlling of the connection
establishment based on access to the TCP/IP stack in general, specific network
zones and individual ports on a per-application or per-user basis.
z/OS provides also a variety of network services, all of which use RACF for
identification, authentication, and access control. In the evaluated configuration,
terminal services are provided by TN3270, telnet, rlogin, rsh, and rexec. File transfer
services are provided by the File Transfer Protocol (FTP), sftp and scp, Web serving
functions are provided by the z/OS HTTP Server.
TSF self
protection
TSF protection is based on several protection mechanisms that are provided by the
underlying abstract machine:
• Privileged processor instructions are only available to programs running in
the processor’s supervisor state
• Semi-privileged instructions are only available to programs running in an
execution environment that is established and authorized by the TSF
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TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
• While in operation, all address spaces, as well as the data and tasks
contained therein, are protected by the memory protection mechanisms of
the underlying abstract machine
The TOE’s address space management ensures that programs running in problem
state cannot access protected memory or resources that belong to other address
spaces.
Access to system services – through supervisor call (SVC) or program call (PC)
instructions, for example – is controlled by the system, which requires that subjects
who want to perform security-relevant tasks be authorized appropriately.
In addition to the protection mechanism of the underlying abstract machine, the TOE
also uses software mechanisms like the authorized program facility (APF) or specific
privileges for programs in the UNIX system services environment to protect the TSF.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 1.4.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.3, 3.2.3, and 3.4, respectively.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
z/OS, Version 2 Release 1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
z/OS Version 2 Release 1 (z/OS V2.1, program number 5650-ZOS) Common Criteria Evaluated Base
Package
1 SW z/OS V2.1 Common Criteria Evaluated Base
(IBM program number 5650-ZOS)
V2R1 Tape
2 DOC z/OS V2.1 Program Directory GI11-9848-00 Hardcopy
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
3 DOC z/OS V2.1 Documentation Collection
Hashsum for download (ftp://public.dhe.ibm.com/eserver/zseries/zos/racf/pdf/k4t49490.zip)
SHA256:
c8e55de4fc5d1ce72cf91bd8d1ffc4dd08ba9e3a8e030d77cd72ab595623d35b
4 DOC ServerPac: IYO (Installing Your Order) n/a Hardcopy
5 DOC Memo to Customers of z/OS V2.1 Common Criteria
Evaluated Base
n/a Hardcopy
6 DOC z/OS V2.1 Planning for Multilevel Security and the
Common Criteria
GA32-0891-00 Hardcopy
IBM Print Services Facility Version 4 Release 4 for z/OS (PSF V4.4.0, program number 5655-M32)
7 SW IBM Print Services Facility Version 4 Release 4 for
z/OS (PSF V4.4.0, program number 5655-M32)
V4R4 Tape
8 DOC PSF V4.4 CDROM Library Collection SK5T-8814-00 CD-ROM
OGL/370 V1.1.0 (program number 5688-191)
9 SW Overlay Generation Language Version 1
(OGL V1R1, program number 5688-191)
V1R1 Tape
10 DOC OGL/370 V1.1.0: Getting Started G544-3691-00 Hardcopy
11 DOC OGL/370 V1.1.0: LPS G544-3697-00 Hardcopy
12 DOC OGL: Command Summary and Quick Reference S544-3703-01 Hardcopy
13 DOC Program Directory OGL/370 GI10-0212-01 Hardcopy
IBM Ported Tools for z/OS V1.2 (program number 5655-M23)
14 SW IBM Ported Tools for z/OS V1.2
(program number 5655-M23, optional)
V1.2 Tape
15 DOC Program Directory IBM Ported Tools for z/OS V1.2.0 GI10-0769-06 Hardcopy
16 DOC IBM Ported Tools for z/OS License Information GA22-7986-08 Hardcopy
Additional Media
17 SW PTFs for the following APARs (required):
OA41946, OA38971, OA41985, OA43423,
OA42093, OA41809, PM91543, OA43149,
OA42679, PM87944, OA43712, OA43935,
OA43539, OA43457, PI06650, OA43550, OA43536,
OA43350, OA43794, 0A43650, OA43812,
OA43741, OA43398
to be obtained electronically from ShopzSeries
(https://www.ibm.com/software/shopzseries)
n/a Electronic
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
2.1. Overview of Delivery Procedure:
The evaluated version of z/OS can be ordered via an IBM sales representative or via the
ShopzSeries web application (http://www.ibm.com/software/shopzseries). When filing an
order via (secured) internet services, IBM requires customers to have an account with a
login name and password. Registration for such an account in turn requires a valid
customer ID from IBM.
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The delivery of the tapes, CD-ROM and Documentation occurs in one package, which is
manufactured specifically for this customer and shipped via courier services. Additional
maintenance then needs to be downloaded by the customer via the ShopzSeries web site,
following the instructions delivered with the package.
The download of the TOE guidance (see item #3 in Table 2 above) is described in the
guidance [10] (see item #6 in Table 2 above), i.e. the customer downloads a guidance
package from an IBM FTP Server and then verifies the package against the hashsums
provided in the guidance or this report.
2.2. Identification of the TOE by the User:
The media and documents delivered to the customer are labeled with the product,
document and version numbers as indicated in the table above and can be checked by the
users installing the system. The TOE reference can be verified by the administrator during
initial program load (IPL), when the system identification is displayed on the system
console. The operator can also issue the operator command “D IPLINFO”, to display the
z/OS version. The string "z/OS 02.01.00" should be displayed among other information.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
• Identification and Authentication
• Discretionary Access Control
• Auditing
• Object Reuse
• Security Management
• Communication Security
• TSF self protection
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: Trained and trustworthy administrators, trusted remote IT, environmental
support for protection of information, correct TOE setup, maintenance, prevention of
physical attacks, recovery procedures and correct implementation of security protocols by
the remote IT. Details can be found in the Security Target [6], section 4.2 and chapter 6.
5. Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the z/OS operating system with the software
components as listed in table 2 of this report. z/OS is a general-purpose, multi-user,
multi-tasking operating system for enterprise computing systems. Multiple users can use
z/OS simultaneously to perform a variety of functions that require controlled, shared
access to the information stored on the system.
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For purposes of evaluation, the TOE is seen as one instance of z/OS running on an
abstract machine as the sole operating system and exercising full control over this abstract
machine.
This abstract machine can be provided by one of the following:
● a logical partition provided by a certified version of PR/SM on an IBM System z™
processor (zEnterprise 114, zEnterprise 196, or zEnterprise EC12) with CP Assist for
Cryptographic Functions (CPACF) DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 active, with or
without the zEnterprise BladeCenter Extension (zBX), optionally with CryptoExpress3 or
CryptoExpress4 (zEC12 only) card.
● a certified version of IBM z/VM® executing in a logical partition provided by PR/SM on
one of the above-listed System z™ processors.
If the configuration includes a zEnterprise BladeCenter Extension (zBX), the operating
systems running in the zBX are not part of the TOE. They are external systems, connected
to z/OS only via the built-in TCP/IP networking facilities included in the zEnterprise System
and zBX.
Most of the abstract machine itself is not part of the TOE, rather, it belongs to the TOE
environment. Nevertheless the correctness of separation and memory protection
mechanisms implemented in the abstract machine is analyzed as part of the evaluation
since those functions are crucial for the security of the TOE. The exemption are
cryptographic instructions implementing the AES, Triple-DES, SHA-1 and SHA-2
algorithms provided by the CPACF feature of the processor.
Cryptographic functions implemented by the (optional) CEX3 or CEX4 coprocessors are
still part of the TOE environment and therefore have not been evaluated to the degree
required by the target assurance level. In order to use only the cryptographic functions
provided by the TOE a user needs to configure the TOE such that either no cryptographic
coprocessor is installed or that the use of those functions is disabled.
A user that wants to use cryptographic functions provided by a coprocessor should be
aware that although those functions have been tested during the evaluation for functional
correctness, no further analysis of the design and implementation of those cryptographic
functions implemented on the coprocessors has been performed. Especially no analysis
for potentially exploitable side channels of the implementation of the cryptographic
functions of the coprocessors has been performed.
Multiple instances of the TOE may be connected in a basic sysplex or in a parallel sysplex
with the instances sharing their RACF® database.
The platforms selected for the evaluation consist of IBM products that are available when
the evaluation has been completed and will remain available for a substantial period of
time afterwards.
The individual instances of z/OS can be run alone or within a network as a set of
cooperating hosts, operating under and implementing the same set of security policies.
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) network services, connections
and communication that occur outside of a sysplex are restricted to one security label; that
is, each system regards its peers as single-label hosts. Other network communication is
disallowed, with the exception of the Job Entry System 2 Network Job Entry protocol.
Most of the TOE security functions are provided by the z/OS operating system Base
Control Program and the Resource Access Control Facility (RACF), a z/OS component
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that is used by different services as the central instance for identification and
authentication and for access control decisions. z/OS comes with management functions
that allow configuring of the TOE security functions to tailor them to the customer's needs.
Some elements have been included in the TOE that do not provide security functions.
These elements run in authorized mode, so they could compromise the TOE if they do not
behave properly. Because these elements are essential for the operation of many
customer environments, the inclusion of these elements subjects them to the process of
scrutiny during the evaluation and ensures that they may be used by customers without
affecting the security status of the TOE.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Test Configuration
The Security Target requires the software packages comprising the TOE to be run on an
abstract machine implementing the z/Architecture machine interface as defined in the
"z/Architecture Principles of Operation" [11]. The hardware platforms implementing this
abstract machine are:
● IBM zEnterprise 114 with CPACF DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 active ,
optionally with CryptoExpress3 card, and with or without the zEnterprise BladeCenter
Extension (zBX).
● IBM zEnterprise 196 with CPACF DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 active,
optionally with CryptoExpress3 card, and with or without the zEnterprise BladeCenter
Extension (zBX).
● IBM zEnterprise zEC12 with CPACF DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 active,
optionally with Crypto Express3 or Crypto Express4s card, and with or without the
zEnterprise BladeCenter Extension (zBX).
Note that the above mentioned CryptoExpress cards are not part of z/OS and therefore the
implementation of the cryptographic functions provided by those cards has not been
analyzed. Testing has been performed using those cards to ensure that the cryptographic
functions provided by those cards work in principle. No vulnerability analysis or side
channel analysis for those cryptographic functions has been performed. The claims made
in the Security Target concerning the cryptographic functions therefore apply to those
functions implemented in software or by the CPACF feature.
The TOE may be running on those machines within a logical partition provided by a
certified version of IBM PR/SM. In addition, the TOE may run on a virtual machine
provided by a certified version of IBM z/VM.
For the peripherals that can be used with the TOE, please refer to the Security Target,
section 1.4.3.2.
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IBM has tested the platforms (hardware and combinations of hardware with IBM PR/SM
and/or IBM z/VM) for z/OS individually for their compliance to the z/Architecture using the
Systems Assurance Kernel (SAK) suite of tests. These tests ensure that every platform
provides the abstract machine interface that z/OS requires.
The test systems were running z/OS Version 2 Release 1 in the evaluated configuration.
Due to the massive amount of tests, testing was performed throughout the development of
the TOE. To ensure proper testing of all security relevant behaviour of the TOE, the
evaluators verified that all tests that might have been affected by any security-relevant
change introduced late in the development cycle had been run on the evaluated
configuration.
7.2. Developer Testing
This section provides a brief summary of the developer testing activities:
● IBM tests the platforms for z/OS individually for their compliance to the z/Architecture
using the Systems Assurance Kernel (SAK) suite of tests. These tests ensure that every
platform provides the abstract machine interface that z/OS requires to be run. SAK
testing is important not only to the z/OS evaluation, but to other evaluations (PR/SM,
z/VM) as well.
● FVT for z/OS is largely performed on the VICOM test system. This is an enhanced z/VM
system implementing the z/Architecture abstract machine interface. It allows testers to
bring up individual, virtual test machines running z/OS with access to virtualized
peripherals such as disks and network connections. For the purpose of the security
function tests, this environment is fully equivalent to the machines running z/OS. This
environment was also used by the evaluators for their independent testing.
● IBM has provided a common test framework for tests that can be automated. COMSEC
is an environment that can be operated in standard mode or Labeled Security mode.
The BERD (Background Environment Random Driver) test driver submits the testcases
as JES2 jobs. IBM's intention is to move tests to this automated environment.
Additionally, most test teams ran their manual tests in the COMSEC test environment,
which provides a complete test environment in the evaluated configuration of the TOE in
the different modes of operation.
● The test systems were running z/OS version 2 release 1 in the evaluated configuration.
The SDF team provided a pre-installed system image for VICOM and for the machines
running the COMSEC tests, thus ensuring that the CCEB software version was used for
all tests. The additional PTFs were applied to the VICOM and COMSEC systems as
they became available, with any security-relevant tests for the PTFs being successfully
re-run.
IBM's general test approach is defined in the process for Integrated Product Development
(IPD) with developer tests, functional verification tests (FVT), and system verification tests
(SVT). Per release, an overall effort of more than 100 person years is spent on FVT and
SVT for the z/OS components. FVT and SVT is performed by independent test teams, with
testers being independent from the developers. The different test teams have developed
their own individual test and test documentation tools, but all implement the requirements
set forth in the IPD documentation.
For the purpose of the evaluation, FVT is of interest to the evaluators, since the single
security functions claimed in the Security Target [6] are tested here. IBM decided to create
a test bucket with the tests for the security functions, summarizing the tests in individual
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test plans, so that the evaluators had a chance to deal with the otherwise overwhelming
complexity of the z/OS testing.
IBM's test strategy for the evaluation had three cornerstones:
• The major internal security interface was the interface to RACF, which is tested
exhaustively by the RACF test group.
• Components requiring Identification and Authentication or Access Control services
call RACF (with the exception of LDAP LDBM, which implements its own access
control). For most of these services, it is sufficient to demonstrate that these
interfaces call RACF, once the testing of the RACF interface (see above) has
established confidence in the correct inner workings of RACF.
• Due to the design of z/OS, a large number of internal interfaces is also visible
externally, although the interfaces are not intended to be called by external,
unprivileged subjects. For these interfaces, which are basically authorized
programs, operator commands, certain callable services, SVC and PC routines,
testing established only that these interfaces cannot be called by unauthorized
callers.
Apart from these tests, all components providing external interfaces for security functions
were tested intensively. For the current version of z/OS this included additional tests for
enhancements of the already existing TOE components. All new test cases were
determined to follow the approach of the already existing tests for the respective
component.
For components providing cryptographic functions, testing was performed with and without
hardware cryptographic support in order to test the correct usage of the hardware
cryptographic functions, if present, and the correct implementation of the software
implementation within the TOE.
The test results provided by the sponsor were generated on the configurations as
described above. Although different test teams used different tools and test tracking
databases, the evaluators verified that all provided results showed that tests had executed
successfully and yielded the expected results.
The testing provided was valid for both the standard mode and the Labeled Security mode
of operation, with the exception of tests for multilevel security features, which were
relevant to Labeled Security mode only. The test systems configured for Labeled Version
Security mode are compliant to standard mode as well, so that tests run on these systems
were always applicable to both modes of operation. For COMSEC, all applicable tests
were run in dedicated Labeled Security mode and standard mode configurations.
For test coverage the developer provided a mapping between the TSF of the Security
Target [6], the TSFI in the functional specification and the tests performed. The evaluator
checked this mapping and examined the test cases to verify whether the tests covered the
functions and their interfaces. Although exhaustive testing is not required, the developer
provided evidence that significant detail of the security functions have been tested.
The evaluators determined that developer tests provided the required coverage: Testing
covered all TSF identified in the Security Target on all interfaces identified in the functional
specification.
Test depth was verified against the TOE subsystems and the security enforcing modules:
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• For most security functions relevant to this evaluation, subsystems invoke RACF
functions to take security-relevant decisions; access control, identification and
authentication, security management and the generation of security-relevant audit
records are mostly handled by RACF.
• All other security-relevant functions are implemented within the subsystems
themselves, thus keeping security functions isolated within them.
• For cryptographic functions, hardware support provided by the IT environment of
the TOE is accessed through the ICSF component.
• For the self-protection, BCP and the underlying abstract machine work together to
provide memory protection and different authorization mechanisms such as APF or
AKM.
The evaluators verified that all security-relevant details of the TOE design at the level of
subsystems had been taken into account for testing. In particular, testing of the RACF
subsystem interfaces was performed directly at these interfaces as well as over the
subsystems invoking RACF.
7.3. Evaluator Independent Testing
The independent evaluator testing followed the CEM guidance to test every security
function, without striving for exhaustive testing. For their own tests, the evaluators decided
to focus on the most important security functions of the TOE in order to provide
independent verification of their correct operation:
• Identification and authentication: The evaluators would only devise some basic,
mostly implicit testing of the Identification and authentication functions in TSO/E, ftp,
su and JES, since these functions would be exercised extensively during the test
activity by the testers. The tests focused on the Kerberos based authentication
mechanisms. In addition the testers exercised the newly added sudo function with
regard to I&A.
• Discretionary access control: The evaluators focused on UNIX System Services
ACLs, which also implicitly test UNIX permission bits. Other DAC tests involved
◦ USS IPC (all system calls for messages, semaphores and shared memory)
◦ DAC for different USS objects (device special files, IPC objects, directories)
◦ z/OS dataset access
◦ security-relevant USS system calls
• Mandatory Access Control: The evaluators re-ran their own tests on mandatory
access control checks for data sets and Unix System Services files as their own
regression tests. Testing of the writedown override capability provided by FACILITY
class profiles was also performed.
• Communication security: The evaluators chose to ensure that secure
communications channels (SSL, Kerberos and Intrusion Detections functions) did
not contain hidden platform specific implementation errors by testing interoperability
with non-zSeries systems. Application-transparent TLS (AT-TLS) was also tested to
work with a non-z/OS platform, checking different policy settings.
• Audit: Tests were used to check auditing of changes to the system clock.
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• Security Management: The evaluators decided to devise no special tests here,
since the setup of the test environment and the setup/cleanup of the tests would
already include a major portion of the TSF found here.
• TOE Self Protection: The only function to be suitably testable is object re-use,
where the evaluators decided to focus on the issue of memory pages probably
containing left-over information. All other self-protection features are properties that
could not be easily be "challenged" by evaluator tests.
For the set of developer tests to be re-run and observed, the evaluators chose an
approach supplementing their own tests and focusing on functionality changed since the
previous evaluation.
The evaluators decided to focus on security functions claimed in the Security Target and
not to run tests demonstrating that functions requiring authorization would fail when
invoked unprivileged. This was in part due to the fact that the evaluators had experienced
already sufficient issues with protection of security functions while bringing up the system
in its evaluated configuration, following the guidance in [10].
Apart from the tests re-run by the evaluators or during dedicated sessions set up for the
evaluators to observe the testers running those tests, the evaluators gained confidence in
the developers’ test efforts during their extended stay at the developer site, where they
discussed with testers issues of testing or interpretations of the CC requirements, and
were witnessing test executions while the test bucket was being created. The evaluators
had already interviewed testers during the site visits and examined the test databases with
test cases and test results and test execution records.
All tests were run on the VICOM test system that had been set up by the evaluators
according to the specifications found in the guidance [10], and on the COMSEC system
set up by IBM and verified by the evaluators to be in the evaluated configuration.
During their testing, the evaluators could verify that the test functions behaved as
expected.
7.4. Evaluator Penetration Testing
Since this evaluation was a re-evaluation of a product where several previous versions
had been evaluated before, and since the changes made were mainly to internals, the
evaluator concentrated his penetration testing on the only area where he identified a
potential vulnerability (the NOSECURITY option when mounting a file system) and new
potential side-channels in the software implementation of cryptographic algorithms. It can
be easily seen that the only possible source of side-channels in a mainframe system is
timing, since power analysis, emanation analysis, and fault injection can be excluded.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The z/OS V2R1 Common Criteria Evaluated Base package, and (if used) IBM Ported
Tools for z/OS must be installed according to the directions delivered with the media and
configured according to the instructions in [10]. Also all required PTFs as listed as item #17
in table 2 above must be installed.
Installations may choose not to use any of the elements delivered within the ServerPac,
but are required to install, configure, and use at least the RACF component of the z/OS
Security Server element.
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In addition, any software outside the TOE may be added without affecting the security
characteristics of the system, if it cannot run:
• in supervisor state
• as APF-authorized
• with keys 0 through 7
• with UID(0)
• with authority to FACILITY resources BPX.DAEMON, BPX.SERVER, or
BPX.SUPERUSER
• with authority to UNIXPRIV resources
This explicitly excludes:
• replacement of any element in the ServerPac providing security functions relevant
to this evaluation by other third-party products;
• installing system exits that run authorized (supervisor state, system key, or
APF-authorized), with the exception of the sample ICHPWX11 and its associated
IRRPHREX routine;
• installing IBM Tivoli Directory Server plug-ins that have not been evaluated;
• using the Authorized Caller Table (ICHAUTAB) in RACF to allow unauthorized
programs to issue RACROUTE REQUEST=VERIFY (RACINIT) or RACROUTE
REQUEST=LIST (RACLIST).
The evaluated software configuration is not necessarily invalidated by installing and
operating other appropriately-certified components that possibly run authorized. However
the evaluation of those components must show that the component and the security
policies implemented by the component do not undermine the security policies described
in this document.
The IBM Tivoli Directory Server for z/OS component may be used as the LDAP server, but:
• For client authentication via digital certificates the administrator must configure the
LDAP server to map the certificate to a RACF user ID and to fail the bind if the
certificate does not map to a RACF user ID. The allowable LDAP configuration
provides three options for forming an LDBM subject:
◦ LDAP may use the original DN from the certificate; or
◦ LDAP may replace the original DN with an SDBM-format DN based on the
RACF user ID; or
◦ LDAP may add the SDBM-format DN to the LDAP subject, giving a subject with
two DNs, either of which will work in LDAP ACLs.
• Client authentication using the Kerberos mechanism has not been evaluated for
LDAP and cannot be used in the evaluated configuration.
• Authentication via passwords stored in LDAP cannot be used. Authentication must
occur using RACF passwords or password phrases. Note that if an LDBM bind DN
is specified when binding to the server, the password/phrase specified must be for
the RACF user ID associated with that bind DN by the LDAP administrator;
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• In Labeled Security Mode, only the ICTX or LDBM configurations can be used. In
standard mode the LDBM, CDBM, and SDBM back-ends and the ICTX plug-in may
be used. Other LDAP back-end configurations and plug-ins have not been
evaluated and must not be used.
• (Labeled Security Mode only) Each running instance of the LDAP server must run
with a single, non-SYSMULTI, non-SYSNONE, security label. Multiple server
instances may run at the same time, with the same or different security labels.
Each running instance of the HTTP server must run with a security label that is neither
SYSMULTI nor SYSNONE.
The SSH daemon sshd (from IBM Ported Tools for z/OS), may be used, but if used:
• must be configured to use protocol version 2 and either TDES or one of the AES-
based encryption suites,
• must be configured in privilege separation mode, and
• must be configured to allow only password-based (including password phrase)
authentication of users or public-key based authentication of users with the public
keys stored in RACF keyrings. Rhost-based and public-key based user
authentication with the keys stored elsewhere may not be used in the evaluated
configuration. In Labeled Security Mode sshd should be configured with the
SYSMULTI security label.
The Network Authentication Service component of the Integrated Security Services
component, if used, and applications exploiting it, must satisfy the following constraints:
• The Network Authentication Service must use the SAF (RACF) registry. The NDBM
registry is not a valid configuration for this evaluation.
• Cross Realm Trust relationships with foreign Kerberos realms is allowed, but the
foreign KDC must be capable of supporting the same cipher as does the z/OS KDC.
• In order to ensure strong cryptographic protection of Kerberos tickets, Triple DES or
AES should be utilized by the z/OS KDC and any KDC participating in a cross-
realm trust relationship with the z/OS KDC. DES should only be used in network
environments where the threat of cryptographic attacks against the tickets and
Kerberos-protected sessions is deemed low enough to justify the use of these
weaker encryption protocols.
• Applications supporting Kerberos may use a combination of application specific
protocols and the GSS-API functions or the equivalent native platform callable
services (the SAFR_TicketServ and R_GenSec callable services) to authenticate
clients, and in client-server authentication. Only the Kerberos mechanism may be
used by applications that utilize GSS-API or the equivalent native platform
functions. The GSS-API and R_GenSec services also enable the encryption of
sensitive application messages passed via application specific protocols. These
services enable the secure communication between client and server applications.
The GSS-API services include the message integrity and privacy functions that
validate the authenticity and secure the communications between clients and
servers.
The Network File System (NFS) Server may be used, but must be configured with the SAF
or SAFEXPORT option, to ensure that all file and directory access (except possibly
directory mounting) has appropriate RACF security checks made.
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TLS (Transport Layer Security) processing, if used, must use TLS V1.1 or TLS V1.2
protocols. TLS (Transport Layer Security), if used, must use one of the cipher suites listed
in the FTP_ITC.1 SFR of the ST [6].
IPSec (IP Security) processing, if used, must use the ciphers listed in the FTP_ITC.1 SFR.
Any application performing client authentication using client digital certificates over TLS
must be configured to use RACF profiles in the RACDCERT or DIGTRING classes or
PKCS#11 tokens in ICSF to store the keyrings that contain the application private key and
the allowed Certificate Authority (CA) certificates that may be used to provide the client
certificates that the application will support. The use of gskkyman for this purpose is not
part of the evaluated configuration.
Any client that is delivered with the product that executes with the user's privileges must
be used with care, since the TSF can not protect those clients from potentially hostile
programs. Passwords/phrases a user enters into those client programs that those clients
use to pass to the corresponding server to authenticate the user may potentially be
spoofed by hostile programs running in the user's address space. This includes client
programs for telnet, TN3270, ftp, r-commands, ssh, all LDAP utilities and Kerberos
administration utilities that require the user to enter his password/phrase. When using
those client programs the user should take care that no untrusted potentially hostile
program has been called during his session.
The following elements and element components cannot be used in an evaluated system,
either because they violate the security policies stated in this Security Target or because
they have been removed from the evaluated configuration due to time and resource
constraints of the evaluation. As they are part of the base system, either they must be not
configured for use or they must be deactivated, as described in Chapter 7, "The evaluated
configuration for the Common Criteria" in z/OS Planning for Multilevel Security and the
Common Criteria [10]:
• All Bulk Data Transfer (BDT) elements: BDT, BDT File-to-File , and BDT Systems
Network Architecture (SNA) NJE
• The DFSTM Server Message Block (SMB) components of the Distributed File
Service element
• Infoprint® Server
• JES3
• IBM Ported Tools for z/OS HTTP Server V7.0
In addition the following cannot be used in the certified configuration:
• The Advanced Program-to-Program Communication / Multiple Virtual Storage
(APPC/MVS) component of the BCP
• The DFSMS Object Access Method for content management type applications
• The RACF remote sharing facility in remote mode.
• JES2 NJE communication via TCP/IP. JES2 NJE must use SNA or BSC in the
certified configuration.
• JES2 Execution Batch Monitor (XBM) facility
• Most functions of Enterprise Identity Mapping (EIM). For details, see the manual
z/OS Planning for Multilevel Security and the Common Criteria [10]
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For the Communications Server:
• The z/OS FTP server and client, and the z/OS TN3270 server, support both
manually-configured TLS, or AT-TLS. This evaluation has considered only AT-TLS
configurations, and as a result manual configuration of those components to use
TLS is not allowed for evaluated configurations.
• The z/OS FTP server and client can support either the protocols from the draft
standard for securing FTP with TLS, or the protocols from the formal RFC 4217
level of Security FTP with TLS [RFC4217]. This evaluation has considered only the
formal RFC 4217 level of support, and as a result that option must be used in the
evaluated configuration.
• The following applications must not be used in Labeled Security configurations, as
noted in the Communications Server IP Configuration Guide: HOMETEST
command, IUCV, LPD, LPQ command, LPR command, LPRM command, LPRSET
command, NCPROUTE, NPF, Portmapper, SMTP, SNMP NetView client, TELNET
client command, TESTSITE command, TNF, VMCF, z/OS UNIX Network SLAPM2
subagent, z/OS UNIX OMPROUTE SNMP subagent, z/OS UNIX popper, z/OS
UNIX RSVP agent, z/OS UNIX SNMP client command, z/OS UNIX SNMP server
and agent, and z/OS UNIX Trap Forwarder Daemon.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the PP [7] and the Security Target [6] were followed
in the course of the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components claimed in the PP [7], Part 2: General Approach and Assurance Activities
for OSPP Evaluations [12] and defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a
re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0874-2014, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was the conformance to
General-Purpose Operating System Protection Profile Version 3.9, 6 December 2012,
OSPP Technical Community [7].
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance:
General-Purpose Operating System Protection Profile Version 3.9, 6 December
2012, OSPP Technical Community [7]
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● for the Functionality:
PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
System SSL
# Purpose
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comments
Protocol specifics
1 Trusted Channel FTP_ITC.1 [ST], sec.
7.1.7.1
TLS v1.2
[RFC5246]
(TLSv1.2)
and cf. all lines below
See below yes Security level
depending on
aggregated security
level of the selected
mechanisms as listed
below.
no
2 Authenticity RSA signature
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1-
5) using SHA-1
[RFC3447] (PKCS#1
v2.1)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
Modulus length:
1024,
2048,
4096
no Verification of
certificate signatures
provided for
authentication of
peers.
Server and client
certificates (optional)
are used.
Algorithms used
depending on the
signature algorithm /
hash algorithm used
for signing the
certificates and the
accepted signature
algorithms accepted
by the peers.
Certificates are not
generated by the
TOE.
3 RSA signature
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1-
5) using SHA-256,
SHA-384)
[RFC3447](PKCS#1
v2.1)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
Modulus length:
2048,
4096
yes
4 DSA signature
verification using
SHA-1
[FIPS186-4] (DSA)
[FIPS-180-4] (SHA-1)
L= 1024
N= 160
no
5 ECDSA signature
verification using
SHA-1
[ANSI X9.62]
(ECDSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
Key sizes
corresponding
to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP{224,
no
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# Purpose
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comments
256,320,384,51
2} r1
[RFC 5639]
and
secp{256,384,5
21}r1 [SEC2]
6 ECDSA signature
verification using
SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
[ANSI X9.62]
(ECDSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
Key sizes
corresponding
to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP{224,
256,320,384,
512} r1
[RFC 5639]
and
secp{256,384,
521}r1 [SEC2]
yes
7 Authentication RSA signature
generation and
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1-
5 using SHA-1)
(TLS_DHE_DSS)
[RFC3447]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
Modulus length:
1024,
2048,
4096
no For Server depending
on the cipher
specified for
keyexchange (& cert
key usage).
For Client depending
on the cert key
usage).
Negotiated
algorithms.
8 RSA signature
generation and
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1-
5 using SHA-256,
SHA-384)
(TLS_DHE_RSA)
[RFC3447]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
Modulus length:
1024
no
Modulus length:
2048,
4096
yes
9 DSA signature
generation and
verification using
SHA-1
(TLS_DHE_DSS)
[FIPS186-4] (DSA)
[FIPS-180-4] (SHA-1)
[RFC5246]
(TLSv1.2
plength= 1024
qlength= 160
no
10 ECDSA signature
generation and
verification using
SHA-1
(TLS_ECDHE_ECDS
A)
[ANSI X9.62]
(ECDSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC4492]
(ECC for TLS)
Key sizes
corresponding
to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP{224,
256,320,384,51
2} r1
[RFC 5639]
and
secp{256,384,5
21}r1 [SEC2]
no
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# Purpose
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comments
11 ECDSA signature
generation and
verification using
SHA-256, SHA-384
(TLS_ECDHE_ECDS
A)
[ANSI X9.62]
(ECDSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC4492]
(ECC for TLS)
Key sizes
corresponding
to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP{224,
256,320,384,
512} r1
[RFC 5639]
and
secp{256,384,
521}r1 [SEC2]
yes
12 HMAC with SHA-256,
SHA-384
[RFC2104] (HMAC)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
[RFC5246] (TLSv1.2)
|k| = 256, 384 yes Finished message
(TLS handshake)
13 Key
establishment
RSA
(TLS_RSA)
RSA encryption
(client) and
decryption (server)
(RSAES-PKCS1-v1-5
)
[RFC3447]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
Modulus size
1024
no
Modulus size
2048, 4096
yes
14 DH / DHE
(TLS_DH_,
TLS_DHE)
[RFC2631] Groups with
modulus size
1024
no
Modulus size
2048, 4096
yes
15 ECDHE
(TLS_ECDHE_)
[RFC4492]
(ECC for TLS)
[TR-03111]
(ECC)
Key sizes
corresponding
to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP{224,
256,320,384,
512} r1
[RFC 5639]
and
secp{256,384,
521}r1 [SEC2]
yes
16 Confidentiality AES in CBC and
GCM mode
(AES_{128|256}_{CB
C|GCM})
[FIPS197] (AES)
[SP800-38A] (CBC)
[SP800-38D] (GCM)
[RFC5289]
(Elliptic Curve Cipher
Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES
(GCM)
|k| = 128, 256 yes CPACF
(bulk data encryption
record layer)
GCM – authenticated
encryption
17 Integrity &
authenticity
HMAC with
SHA-1 or SHA-256 or
SHA-384)
(SHA), (SHA256),
(SHA384)
[RFC2104] (HMAC
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
|k| = 160, 256,
384
yes CPACF
(message
authentication record
lay
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OpenSSH
# Purpose
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comments
1 Trusted Channel FTP_ITC.1 [ST], sec.
7.1.7.1
SSH v2
[RFC4250] (lists the
RFCs defining SSH
V2):
RFC 4251,
RFC 4252,
RFC 4253,
RFC 4254
See below yes Security level
depending on
aggregated security
level of the selected
mechanisms as listed
below.
no
2 Authentication RSA signature
generation &
verification
RSASSAPKCS1-v1_
5 using SHA-1
(ssh-rsa)
[RFC3447] (PKCS#1
v2.1)
[FIPS-180-4] (SHA-1)
[RFC4253]
(SSH-TRANS)
for host authentication
[RFC4252], sec 7
(SSH-USERAUTH) for
user authentication
method: “publickey”
Modulus length:
1024, 2048 and
4096
no Pubkeys are
exchanged
trustworthy out of
band.
Authenticity is not part
of the TOE.
3 DSA signature
generation &
verification using
SHA-1
(ssh-dss)
[FIPS186-4] (DSA)
[FIPS-180-4] (SHA-1)
[RFC4253]
(SSH-TRANS)
for host authentication
[RFC4252], sec 7
(SSH-USERAUTH) for
user authentication
method: “publickey”
L= 1024
N= 160
no
4 Key
establishment
DH-Group1-SHA1 RFC4253]
(SSH-TRANS)
supported by
[RFC2409] (DH groups
IKE)
[FIPS-180-4] (SHA-1)
plength 1024 no
5 DH-Group14-SHA1 [RFC4253]
(SSH-TRANS)
supported by
[RFC3526] (DH groups
IKE)
[FIPS-180-4] (SHA-1)
plength=2048 yes
6 Confidentiality AES128-CBC
AES192-CBC
AES256-CBC
[FIPS-197] (AES),
[SP 800-38A] (CBC),
|k| = 128, 192,
256
yes Binary packet
protocol: encryption
7 3DES-CBC [FIPS46-3] (DES)
[SP 800-67]
(TDES/TDEA)
|k| = 168 yes
8 Integrity &
authenticity
HMAC-SHA1
HMAC-SHA1-96 [FIPS 180-2] (SHA),
[RFC 2104] (HMAC)
|k| = 160 yes Binary packet
protocol: message
authentication
9 HMAC-MD5
[RFC1321] (MD5),
|k| = 128 yes
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# Purpose
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comments
HMAC-MD5-96
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC4253] (SSH v2.0)
Table 3.2: TOE cryptographic functionality
IPSec / IKE
# Purpose
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comments
1 Trusted Channel FTP_ITC.1 [ST], sec.
7.1.7.1
IKEv1, IKEv2, IPsec
[RFC4301] (IPSec), [
RFC4303] (ESP),
[RFC2409] (IKEv1),
[RFC5996] (IKEv2)
See below yes Security level
depending on
aggregated security
level of the selected
mechanisms as listed
below.
no
2 Authenticity RSA signature
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1-
5) using SHA-1
[RFC3447]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
Modulus length:
1024,
2048,
4096
no Certificate signature
verification.
See also system SSL.
3 RSA signature
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1-
5) using SHA-256,
SHA-384)
[RFC3447]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
Modulus length:
2048,
4096
yes
4 DSA signature
verification using
SHA-1
[FIPS186-4] (DSA)
[FIPS-180-4] (SHA-1)
L= 1024
N= 160
no
5 ECDSA signature
verification using
SHA-1
[ANSI X9.62]
(ECDSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
Key sizes
corresponding
to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP{224,
256,320,384,51
2} r1
[RFC 5639]
and
secp{256,384,5
21}r1 [SEC2]
no
6 ECDSA signature
verification using
SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
[ANSI X9.62]
(ECDSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
Key sizes
corresponding
to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP{224,
256,320,384,
512} r1
[RFC 5639]
and
secp{256,384,
521}r1 [SEC2]
yes
7 Authentication RSA signature
generation and
[RFC2409] (IKEv1), Modulus length
1024
no
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# Purpose
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comments
verification for
authentication
(Auth. Method 1)
IKEv1:
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5
encryption scheme
with private key
encryption for signing
and public
keydecryption for
signature. verification.
[RFC3447]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
Modulus length
2048, 4096
yes
ECDSA (secp{224,
256, 384, 521}r1,
brainpoolP{224, 256,
320, 384, 512}r1)
PKCS#1 v2.1,
FIPS180-4 (SHA),
RFC5996 (IKEv2)
|k| = 224, 256,
320, 384, 512,
521
yes
8 RSA signature
generation +
verification
(Auth Method 1)
IKEv2:
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_
5) using SHA-1
[5996] (IKEv2)
[RFC3447] (RSA)
Modulus length:
1024
2048,
4096
no
9 ECDSA signature
generation +
verification using one
of SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
(ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521)
[RFC4754] ECDSA
within IKEv1 and
IKEv2
[5903] ECP groups
[ANSI X9.62]
(ECDSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
Key sizes
corresponding
to the used
elliptic curves
secp256, 384,
521}r1 ([SEC2])
yes
10 Key
establishment
(key agreement)
DH with DH groups:
1,2,5
[RFC2409] (IKEv1),
[RFC5996] (IKEv2),
[DH] (DH as
referenced in
[RFC2409] &
[RFC5996])
plength
= 1024, 1024,
1534
no
11 14 (2048-bit MODP), [RFC3526] plength=2048 yes
12 24 (2048-bit MODP
with 256-bit POS),
MODP with
subgroups
[RFC5114] plength = 2048
(256)
yes
13 19 (256-bit elliptic
curve),
20 (384-bit elliptic
curve),
21 (521-bit elliptic
curve)
[RFC5114] plength
= 256, 384, 521
yes
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# Purpose
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comments
14 Confidentiality
(bulk encryption)
AES-CBC-128
AES-CBC-256
AES-GCM-128
AES-GCM-256
RFC 4106:
[FIPS-197] (AES),
[SP 800-38A] (CBC),
[RFC3602] (AES-CBC
with ESP),
[RFC5996] (IKv2)
|k| = 128, 256 yes IKE ESP / IPSec ESP
15 Integrity &
authenticity
HMAC-SHA1-96
AES-XCBC-MAC-96 [FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC2404]
(HMAC-SHA-1-96),
[RFC5996] (IKEv2)
[FIPS-197] (AES),
[RFC3566]
(XCBC-MAC),
[RFC5996] (IKEv2)
|k| = 160, 128 yes
Table 3.3: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a
re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
ACEE Accessor Environment Element
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
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APF Authorized program facility
AT-TLS Application-Transparent TLS
BCP Base Control Program
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEX CryptoExpress
CMP Certificate Management Protocol
CN Common Name
CPACF CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions
DAC Discretionary access control
DFSMS Data Facility Storage Management Subsystem
DIT Directory Information Tree
DN Distinguished Name
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FVT Functional Verification Tests
ICR Identity Context Reference
ICSF Integrated Cryptographic Services Facility
ICTX Identity Context Extension
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IOCDS Input/Output configuration Data Set
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JCL Job Control Language
JES Job Entry System
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LDBM Lightweight Database Manager
MAC Mandatory Access Control
MVS Multiple Virtual Storage
NSS Network Security Service
PADS Program Access to Data Sets
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PDSE Partitioned Data Set Extended
PKCS Public Key Cryptographic Standard
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PKM Program Key Mask
POSIX Portable Operating System Interface for UNIX
PP Protection Profile
PR/SM Processor Resource/Systems Manager
PTF Program Temporary Fix
RACF Resource Access Control Facility
SAF System Authorization Facility
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMF System Management Facilities
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TLS Transport Layer Security
TSO Time Sharing Option
TSF TOE Security Functions
VTOC Volume Table of Content
12.2. Glossary
Abstract Machine - A processor design that is not intended to be implemented as
hardware, but which is the notional executor of a particular intermediate language
(abstract machine language) used in a compiler or interpreter. An abstract machine has an
instruction set, a register set, and a model of memory. It may provide instructions that are
closer to the language being compiled than any physical computer or it may be used to
make the language implementation easier to port to other platforms.
Access - If an authorized user is granted a request to operate on an object, the user is
said to have access to that object. There are numerous types of access. Examples include
read access, which allows the reading of objects, and write access, which allows the
writing of objects.
Access Control Policy - A set of rules used to mediate user access to TOE-protected
objects. Access control policies consist of two types of rules: access rules, which apply to
the behavior of authorized users, and authorization rules, which apply to the behavior of
authorized administrators.
Accessor Environment Element - A RACF control block that describes the current user’s
security environment.
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
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Authorization - If an authorized user is granted a requested service, the user is said to
have authorization to the requested service or object. There are numerous possible
authorizations. Typical authorizations include auditor authorization, which allows an
administrator to view audit records and execute audit tools, and DAC override
authorization, which allows an administrator to override object access controls to
administer the system.
Authorized Administrator - An authorized user who has been granted the authority to
manage all or a defined subset of the functions of the TOE. Authorized administrators are
expected to use this authority only in the manner prescribed by the guidance that is given
to them.
Authorized User - A user who has been properly identified and authenticated. Authorized
users are considered to be legitimate users of the TOE. (Note: this is different from the
z/OS concept of an “authorized program” which is a program running in supervisor state,
or system key, or with APF authority.)
Category - See security category.
Classification (MLS) - A hierarchical designation for data that represents the sensitivity of
the information. The equivalent IBM term is security level. Common Name (CN) - One
component of an LDAP object’s complete name, usually specified as cn=name.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) - An access control policy that allows authorized
users and authorized administrators to control access to objects based on individual user
identity or membership in a group (PROJECTA, for example).
Distinguished Name (DN) - The complete name of an object in an LDAP directory, or the
complete name of the subject or issuer of a digital certificate.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) - A client/server protocol for accessing a
directory service.
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) - An access control policy that determines access
based on the sensitivity (SECRET, for example) and category (PERSONNEL or MEDICAL,
for example) of the information that is being accessed and the clearance of the user who is
trying to gain access to that information.
Mediation - When DAC and MAC policy rules are invoked, the TOE is said to be
mediating access to TOE-protected objects.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - A named set of either functional or assurance requirements (e.g. EAL 3).
Password - For the purposes of this evaluation, a 6 to 8 character secret value used
during some forms of user authentication, and allowing upper- and lower-case alphabetic,
numeric, or national ($, #, @) characters. Passwords are initially assigned by
administrators, but may be changed by the user to whom they are assigned.
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Password Phrase - A 14 to 100 character secret value used in a manner similar to a
password, except for its length and an expanded set of valid characters (upper- and lower-
case alphabetic, special (including blanks), or numeric). In addition to assigning a
password, administrators may assign a password phrase to a user. Note: Phrase may be
shorter (down to 9 characters) if enabled by an administrator-installed exit (ICHPWX11)
that RACF supplies.
Password/Phrase - A shorthand term for “password or password phrase” sometimes used
in this security target when statements apply equally to passwords or to password
phrases.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
SECLABEL - Synonym for security label.
SECLEVEL - Synonym for security level (IBM).
Security Category - A special designation for data at a certain level, which indicates that
only people who have been properly briefed and cleared for access to data with this
category can receive permission for access to the information.
Security Label - A name that represents the combination of a hierarchical level of
classification (IBM security level) and a set of non-hierarchical categories (security
category). Security labels are used as the base for Mandatory Access Control decisions.
Security labels are sometimes referred to as SECLABELs.
Security Level (IBM) - A hierarchical designation for data that represents the sensitivity of
the information. Security levels are sometimes referred to as SECLEVELs. The equivalent
MLS term is classification.
Security Level (MLS policy in the Bell-LaPadula model) - The combination of a
hierarchical classification (called security level in z/OS) and a set of non-hierarchical
categories that represents the sensitivity of information is known as the security level. The
equivalent term in other IBM documentation is security label.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Sensitivity Label - A specific marking attached to subjects or objects that indicates the
security level. The equivalent to this MLS term in other IBM documentation is security
label.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
Trusted channel - A means by which a TSF and a remote trusted IT product can
communicate with necessary confidence.
User - A person who is trying to invoke a service that is offered by the TOE.
User data - Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the operation of the TSF.
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User ID - In z/OS, a string of up to eight characters defined as a RACF USER profile that
uniquely identifies a user. Users who may use UNIX services will additionally have a
numerical user identifier (UID) that is used by the UNIX subsystem for access decisions.
The user name is an additional attribute that usually holds the user’s full name. While
users can modify their user names, only administrators can change user IDs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
[3] BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification of products,
protection profiles and sites (BSI 7138) and Requirements regarding the Evaluation
Facility for the Evaluation of Products, Protection Profiles and Sites under the CC
and ITSEC (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0972-2015, Version 1.7, 17. July 2015, Security Target
for IBM z/OS Version 2 Release 1 for Compliance with the NIAP/BSI OSPP, IBM
Corporation
[7] General-Purpose Operating System Protection Profile Version 3.9, 6 December
2012, OSPP Technical Community
[8] Final Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, 08. April 2015 , atsec information
security GmbH, (confidential document)
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, 2014-04-01, file name: CM.LISTS-V2R1.zip and
Configuration List for the Publications, CM.PUBS-V2R1.txt (confidential documents)
[10] MLSGUIDE z/OS Planning for Multilevel Security and the Common Criteria, Version
GA32-0891-00, April 2014
[11] z/Architecture Principles of Operation, Tenth Edition, Version SA22-7832-09,
September 2012.
[12] General-Purpose Operating System Protection Profile - Part2: General Approach
and Assurance Activities for OSPP Evaluations Version 3.9, OSPP Technical
Community
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, 15 May 2013, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, 3 August 2010, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 38, Version 2, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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