ChipDoc P60 on JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA)
SSCD
–
Security Target Lite
Version 1.0
July 02, 2017
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Revision History
Revision Date Description
1.0 2017-07-02 Initial Version of this Security Target Lite
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Contents
1. ST INTRODUCTION (ASE_INT).....................................................................................................................5
1.1. ST REFERENCE AND TOE REFERENCE...........................................................................................................5
1.2. TOE OVERVIEW.............................................................................................................................................5
1.3. TOE DESCRIPTION.........................................................................................................................................7
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS (ASE_CCL)......................................................................................................14
2.1. CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM..........................................................................................................................14
2.2. PACKAGE CLAIM .........................................................................................................................................14
2.3. PP CLAIM ....................................................................................................................................................14
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION (ASE_SPD) .....................................................................................15
3.1. ASSETS ........................................................................................................................................................15
3.2. SUBJECTS.....................................................................................................................................................15
3.3. ASSUMPTIONS..............................................................................................................................................16
3.4. THREATS......................................................................................................................................................17
3.5. ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES........................................................................................................18
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES (ASE_OBJ).........................................................................................................19
4.1. SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE..........................................................................................................19
4.2. SOS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT .......................................................................................................................21
4.3. SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE ..............................................................................................................22
5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION (ASE_ECD) ..........................................................................26
5.1. TOE EMANATION (FPT_EMSEC.1) ............................................................................................................26
6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS (ASE_REQ).................................................................................................27
6.1. TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.............................................................................................27
6.2. TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS..............................................................................................37
6.3. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE .......................................................................................................39
7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION (ASE_TSS)..........................................................................................42
7.1. SF.ACCESS CONTROL ..................................................................................................................................42
7.2. SF.ADMINISTRATION ...................................................................................................................................42
7.3. SF.SIGNATORY AUTHENTICATION ................................................................................................................42
7.4. SF.SIGNATURE CREATION ............................................................................................................................42
7.5. SF.SECURE MESSAGING...............................................................................................................................42
7.6. SF.CRYPTO ..................................................................................................................................................42
7.7. SF.PROTECTION ...........................................................................................................................................42
8. ADDITIONAL RATIONALE ..........................................................................................................................43
8.1. DEPENDENCIES RATIONALE .........................................................................................................................43
8.2. RATIONALE FOR EXTENSIONS ......................................................................................................................45
8.3. PP CLAIM RATIONALE .................................................................................................................................46
9. TERMINOLOGY..............................................................................................................................................47
10. REFERENCES..............................................................................................................................................49
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List of Tables
TABLE 1 - ST REFERENCE AND TOE REFERENCE ...........................................................................................................5
TABLE 2 - REFERENCE TO CERTIFIED MICRO CONTROLLER............................................................................................7
TABLE 3 - REFERENCE TO CERTIFIED CRYPTO LIBRARY .................................................................................................8
TABLE 4 – REFERENCE TO CERTIFIED OPERATING SYSTEM.............................................................................................8
TABLE 5 - DELIVERY ITEMS..........................................................................................................................................12
TABLE 6 - PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION ...........................................................................................................................12
TABLE 7 – IDENTIFY COMMAND FORMAT AND PARAMETER SETTINGS .......................................................................12
TABLE 8 – IDENTIFY RESPONSE DATA........................................................................................................................13
TABLE 9 – SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TO SECURITY OBJECTIVES MAPPING ..................................................................22
TABLE 10 – ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS: EAL5 AUGMENTED ....................................................................................37
TABLE 11 – FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT TO TOE SECURITY OBJECTIVE MAPPING .....................................................40
TABLE 12 – SAR DEPENDENCIES .................................................................................................................................43
TABLE 13 – SFR DEPENDENCIES..................................................................................................................................44
List of Figures
FIGURE 1 - COMPONENTS OF THE TOE...........................................................................................................................5
FIGURE 2 - TOE FORM FACTOR......................................................................................................................................6
FIGURE 3 – TOE LIFECYCLE ...........................................................................................................................................9
FIGURE 4 - SCOPE OF THE SSCD, STRUCTURAL VIEW ...................................................................................................11
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1. ST Introduction (ASE_INT)
1.1. ST Reference and TOE Reference
Title ChipDoc P60 on JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA) SSCD Security Target Lite
Version
Date
Product Type
TOE Reference
CC Version
Revision 1.0
2017-07-02
Java Card Applet
ChipDoc P60 on JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA) SSCD, Version v7b1
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version
3.1, Revision 4, September 2012 (Part 1 [1], Part 2 [2] and Part 3 [3])
Table 1 - ST Reference and TOE Reference
1.2. TOE Overview
Figure 1 - Components of the TOE
The TOE consists of an applet which is executed by a software stack that is stored on a Micro Controller.
For a complete picture of the TOE see Figure 1, and for details with regards to the different components
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see section 1.3.1. The TOE is delivered in closed configuration, meaning that all other interfaces apart from
the SSCD ones are locked and do not act as communication interfaces towards the environment.
The Protection Profiles [4] and [5] claimed by this Security Target assume a well-defined process signature-
creation to take place. Note that [33], stating Part 1 of Protection Profiles for secure signature creation
devices and being referenced by [4] and [5] has been superseded by [34]. The latter states, that the
functionality referred to as “Type 2” (specifying devices with key import) in the remainder of this ST, can be
found in [5], while the functionality referred to as “Type 3” (specifying devices with key generation) in the
remainder of this ST, can be found in [4]. The present chapter defines two possible SSCD implementations,
referred to as ‘SSCD types’. SSCD Type 2 and Type 3, both parts of the TOE.
If the SSCD holds the SVD and exports the SVD to a CGA for certification, a trusted channel is to be
provided. The CGA initiates SCD/SVD generation (“Init.”) and the SSCD exports the SVD for generation of
the corresponding certificate (“SVD into cert.”).
The signatory must be authenticated to create signatures that he sends his authentication data (e.g., a PIN)
to the SSCD Type 2 or Type 3 (e.g., a smart card). The data to be signed (DTBS) representation (i.e., the
DTBS itself, a hash value of the DTBS, or a pre-hashed value of the DTBS) shall be transferred by the SCA
to the SSCD only over a trusted channel. The same shall apply to the signed data object (SDO) returned
from a SSCD to the SCA.
The TOE implements a trusted channel with regards to commands and responses that are exchanged
between the TOE and any external device. Various data and processes such as DTBSs, signatures, public
keys, identification and authentication data, SVD Transfer or other user data are embedded in command
and response frames. Thus the TOE is capable of providing a secure communication channel between
legitimate end points both of the TOE and the external device.
SSCD Type 2 and 3 components are personalized components: they can be used for signature creation by
one specific user – the signatory - only.
The TOE is available in a variety of form factors where digital application software is masked in ROM:
1. Contactless interface cards and modules
(antenna embedded in plastic)
2. Dual interface cards and modules 3. Contact only cards and modules
(antenna
embedded in
plastic)
(contactless
interface absent or
disabled)
4. SOIC8 package 5. QFN44 package 6. Chip on Board (PCB)
Figure 2 - TOE Form Factor
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The TOE is linked to a card reader/writer via its HW and physical interfaces.
 The contact type interface of the TOE smartcard is ISO/IEC 7816 compliant.
 The contactless type interface of the TOE smartcard is ISO/IEC 14443 compliant.
 The interfaces of the TOE SOIC-8 are ISO 9141 compliant.
 The interfaces of the TOE QNF-44 are JEDEC compliant.
There are no other external interfaces of the TOE except the ones described above.
The antenna and the packaging are both out of the scope of this TOE.
The TOE smartcard form factors may be applied to a contact type card reader/writer or to a contactless
card reader/writer when the contactless interface of the smartcard is available. The card reader/writer is
connected to a computer such as a personal computer and allows application programs (APs) to use the
TOE.
1.3. TOE Description
1.3.1. TOE Components and Composite Certification
The certification of this TOE is a composite certification. This means that for the certification of this TOE
other certifications of components which are part of this TOE are re-used. In the following sections more
detailed descriptions of the components of Figure 1 are provided. In the description it is also made clear
whether a component is covered by a previous certification or whether it is covered in the certification of
this TOE.
1.3.1.1. Micro Controller
The Micro Controller is a secure smart card controller from NXP from the SmartMX2 family. The Micro
Controller contains a co-processor for symmetric cipher, supporting DES operations and AES, as well as
well as an accelerator for asymmetric algorithms. It contains volatile (RAM) and non-volatile (ROM and
EEPROM) memory. The Micro Controller has been certified in a previous certification and the results are
re-used for this certification.
The exact reference to the previous certification is given in the following Table:
Name NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB
Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0973
Reference [25]
Table 2 - Reference to certified Micro Controller
1.3.1.2. IC Dedicated Software
 Micro Controller Firmware: The Micro Controller Firmware is used for testing of the Micro Controller
at production, for booting of the Micro Controller after power-up or after reset, for configuration of
communication devices and for writing data to non-volatile memory. The MC FW has been certified in
a previous certification. It has been certified together with the Micro Controller and the same references
([25]) as given for the Micro Controller also apply for the Micro Controller Firmware.
 MIFARE Implementation: The NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB hardware of this TOE
can be configured as follows:
o P6022P VB: without MIFARE,
o P6022M VB: including MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0,
o P6022D VB: including MIFARE DESFire EV1,
o P6022J VB: including both, MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire EV1.
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The MIFARE Implementation has been certified in a previous certification. It has been certified
together with the Micro Controller and the same references ([25]) as given for the Micro Controller also
apply for the MIFARE Implementation. Only the P6022J VB configuration can be considered as
certified hardware configuration for the TOE in the scope of this Security Target.
 Crypto Library: The Crypto Lib is certified in a previous certification and the results are re-used for
this certification. The exact reference to the certification is given in the following Table:
Name Crypto Library V3.1 on P6022y VB
Certification ID NSCIB-CC-15-67206
Reference [26]
Table 3 - Reference to certified Crypto Library
 JCOP3 OSA: The Operating System consists of JCVM, JCRE, JCAPI and GP framework. It is
implemented according to the Java Card Specification and GlobalPlatform and has been certified in
the course of a previous certification, where the results are re-used for this certification. The exact
reference to the certification is given in the following Table:
Name JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA)
Certification ID NSCIB-CC-16-99111-CR2
Reference [28]
Table 4 – Reference to certified Operating System
1.3.1.3. IC Embedded Software
 ChipDoc Applet: The applet implements a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) in accordance
with the European Directive 1999/93/EC [15] as a smart card which allows the generation and
importation of signature creation data (SCD) and the creation of qualified electronic signatures. The
TOE protects the SCD and ensures that only an authorized Signatory can use it.
The TOE meets all the following requirements as defined in the European Directive (article 2.2):
(a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory
(b) it is capable of identifying the signatory
(c) it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control
(d) it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent change of the data
is detectable
1.3.2. TOE lifecycle
The TOE lifecycle is shown in 4.
The integration phase is added to the PP generic lifecycle as this particular TOE requires that card
production phase is refined.
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HW Design OS Design
Application
Design
HW Fabrication
OS and Application Implementation
Loading of General Application Data
Loading of Personal data
SCD/SVD import or generation
Signature-creation
Optional SCD/SVD generation
SSCD Destruction
Design
Fabrication
Initialisation
Personalisation
Usage
Development
Phase
Operational
Phase
IC Manufacturing
IC Packaging
Card Manufacturing
Integration
Figure 3 – TOE lifecycle
1.3.2.1. Design Phase
The TOE is developed in this phase. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated
Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
1.3.2.2. Fabrication Phase
The Operating System and applicative parts of the TOE are sent in a secure way for masking into ROM. In
addition to the TOE, the mask contains confidential data, knowledge of which is required in order to initialize
and personalize the chip. Java Card applets are included in the mask and the corresponding converted
files (.cap or.jca) are also provided.
1.3.2.3. Integration Phase
This phase corresponds to the integration of the hardware and firmware components into the final product
body. In the case of this TOE it will be a smart card, but it could also be a USB token. The TOE is protected
during transfer between various parties with a diversified (per card) Transport Key.
1.3.2.4. Initialization Phase
The initialization phase consists in OS configuration, applet instantiation and/or applet and OS patching
activities (in EEPROM)1. The TOE is protected during transfer by the confidential information which resides
in the card during mask production (transport key). Creation of the application implies applet instantiation
and the creation of MF and ChipDoc ADF. It is not the case of this TOE, but additional applets could be
loaded in the TOE at this point. Card Content Loading and Installing mechanism is terminated in this phase
1 The application of platform patches is only allowed on a CC certified site. If the TOE issuer is able to
provide such a facility NXP will supply all patching materials, otherwise the task is undertaken by NXP trust
provisioning service, prior to dispatch from NXP.
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(the platform is closed). The product becomes operational and is delivered after this initialization phase.
1.3.2.5. Personalization Phase
After unlocking the product with the transport key, NXP or 3rd Party Personalization facility which includes
the loading of Personal Application Data and optional generation of the SCD/SVD pair if loading does not
include importing an SCD/SVD pair. The product is considered in use phase.
1.3.2.6. Operational Phase
This ST addresses the functions used in the operational phases but developed during development phase.
Where upon the card is delivered from the Customer (the Card Issuer) to the End User and the End User
may use it for signature-creation including all supporting functionality (e.g., SCD storage and SCD use).
The product is considered in use phase.
1.3.2.7. Application note: Scope of SSCD PP application
This ST refers to qualified certificates as electronic attestation of the SVD corresponding to the signatory's
SCD that is implemented by the TOE.
While the main application scenario of a SSCD will assume a qualified certificate to be used in combination
with a SSCD, there still is a large benefit in the security when such SSCD is applied in other areas and
such application is encouraged. The SSCD may as well be applied to environments where the certificates
expressed as 'qualified certificates' in the SSCD do not fulfil the requirements laid down in Annex I and
Annex II of the Directive [15].
When an instance of a SSCD is used with a qualified certificate, such use is from the technical point of view
eligible for an electronic signature as referred to in Directive [15], article 5, paragraph 1. This Directive does
not prevent TOE itself from being regarded as a SSCD, even when used together with a non-qualified
certificate.
1.3.3. TOE Limits
The TOE is a secure signature-creation device (combination of SSCD type 2 and type 3) according to
Directive 1999/93/ec of the European parliament and of the council of 13 December 1999 on a Community
framework for electronic signatures [15].The destruction of the SCD is mandatory before the TOE generate
a new pair SCD/SVD or loads a new pair SCD/SVD.
A SSCD is a configured device used to implement the signature-creation data (SCD).
The TOE described in this ST is a product implemented on a smart card IC which is certified CC EAL 5+.
The TOE includes embeddable software in the NVM of the IC and a file system including the digital
signature application stored in EEPROM. Parts of the operating systems may be stored in EEPROM. NVM
(Non Volatile Memory) corresponds to ROM memory for the NXP P6022y VB IC [29, 8].
The TOE provides the following functions necessary for devices involved in creating qualified electronic
signatures:
(1) to import signature creation data (SCD) and, optionally, the correspondent signature verification
data (SVD),
(2) to export the SVD for certification,
(3) to generate the SCD and the correspondent signature-verification data (SVD)
(4) to create qualified Electronic Signatures
(a) after allowing for the Data To Be Signed (DTBS) to be displayed correctly by the
appropriate environment
(b) using appropriate hash functions that are, according to [5], agreed as suitable for qualified
electronic signatures
(c) after appropriate authentication of the signatory by the TOE
(d) using appropriate cryptographic signature function that employ appropriate cryptographic
parameters agreed as suitable according to [5]
The TOE is able to generate SCD/SVD key pair (Type 3), to export the SVD (Type 3) and import SCD (Type
2). Thus the TOE itself implements Type 2 and Type 3, where both SSCD Type 2 and Type 3 are parts of
the TOE, co-existing besides each other, not being subject to configuration to the user.
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The TOE implements all IT security functionality which are necessary to ensure the secrecy of the SCD. To
prevent the unauthorised usage of the SCD the TOE provides user authentication and access control. The
TOE provides a trusted channel for user authentication by its own, where in addition IT measures are
implemented to support a trusted path to a trusted human interface device.
This TOE does not implement, in addition to the functions of the SSCD, the signature-creation application
(SCA). The SCA presents the data to be signed (DTBS) to the signatory and prepares the DTBS-
representation the signatory wishes to sign for performing the cryptographic function of the signature. The
SCA is considered as part of the environment of the TOE.
The SSCD protects the SCD during the whole life cycle as to be solely used in the signature creation
process by the legitimate signatory. The TOE will be initialised for the signatory's use by
(1) importation of the SCD or generation of SCD/SVD pair
(2) personalization for the signatory by means of the signatory’s verification authentication data (VAD)
The SVD corresponding to the signatory's SCD will be included in the certificate of the signatory by the
certificate-service-provider (CSP). The TOE will destroy the SCD if the SCD is no longer used for signature
generation.
The TOE does not provide a Human Interface (HI) for user authentication itself, but IT measures implement
a trusted human interface device connected via a trusted channel with the TOE. The human interface device
is used for the input of VAD for authentication by knowledge. The TOE holds RAD to check the provided
VAD. The human interface implies appropriate hardware. The second approach allows to reduce the TOE
hardware to a minimum e. g. a smart card.
Figure 4 - Scope of the SSCD, structural view
Figure 4 shows the PP scope from the structural perspective. The SSCD, i.e. the TOE, comprises the
underlying hardware, the operating system (OS), the SCD/SVD generation, SCD storage and use, and
signature-creation functionality. The SCA and the CGA (and possibly other applications) are part of the
immediate environment of the TOE. They shall communicate with the TOE over a trusted channel, a trusted
path for the human interface provided by the SCA, respectively.
1.3.4. TOE Identification
The delivery comprises the following items:
Type Name Version Date
Hardware NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB See table 6
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ROM Code (Platform ID)
Patch Code (Patch ID)
Document ChipDoc SSCD, Preparation and Operation
Manual [31]
1.1 2017-03-06
Table 5 - Delivery Items
The ROM code includes IC Dedicated Software and IC Embedded Software as specified in Section 1.3.1.
The TOE can be identified by using the Platform ID and the Patch ID, where Table 6 lists identifiers for all
products that are in the scope of this TOE.
Product Short Name Platform ID Patch ID
J2H082S
J3H082S
J2H145S
J3H145S
JxHyyy0005860400
0x0200000000000000
0x0500000000000000
0x8500000000000000
Table 6 - Product Identification
The TOE comprises all products listed in Table 6, where the commercial product names of these JCOP
products follow a nomenclature as defined in [35] (for details please refer to section 1.3.3 “TOE
Identification” in [35]).
The Platform ID as stated in Table 6 uniquely identifies the products J2H082S, J3H082S, J2H145S and
J3H145S that are listed in Table 6. The Platform ID can be retrieved from the TOE by applying the IDENTIFY
command, where the command format is outlined in table 7 and the response data returned by the TOE is
listed in table 8. To verify the TOE, the Platform Build ID2 returned by the IDENTIFY command shall match
the Platform ID as stated in Table 6. Same holds for the Patch ID.
Code Value Parameter Settings
CLA 80 GlobalPlatform
INS CA GET DATA (IDENTIFY) - ISD
P1 00 High order tag value
P2 FE Low order tag value - proprietary data
Lc 02 Length of data field
Data DF28 Card identification data
Le 00 Length of response data
Table 7 – IDENTIFY command format and parameter settings
Field Length Content Comment
Tag value – proprietary data 01 FE Not present if sent to
2 Please note that „Platform Build ID“ and „Platform ID“ are synonyms
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Length of the Tag data
Tag value – proprietary data
Length of IDENTIFY response
Tag card identification data
Length of card identification data
01
01
01
02
01
39
FE
37
DF28
34
Config Applet
Tag EEPROM ID
Length EEPROM ID
EEPROM ID
01
01
0C
01
0C
var
Identifies the content in
EEPROM
Tag Patch ID
Length Patch ID
Patch ID
01
01
08
02
08
var
Identifies the Patch level
Tag Platform Build ID
Length Platform Build ID
Platform Build ID
01
01
10
03
10
var
Identifies the platform
Tag Custom Mask ID
Length Customer Mask ID
Custom Mask ID
01
01
08
04
08
var
Identifies the Custom
Mask
Status Word (SW) 02 9000h Normal ending
Table 8 – IDENTIFY response data
In addition, the following data must be retrieved from the TOE in order to uniquely identify the TOE:
 ISD AID = A000 0001 5100 0000h
 Chipdoc Package ID = A000 0001 6443 6869 7044 6F63 0xh (x=1 to 4)
 ChipDoc Applet class ID = A000 0001 6443 6869 7044 6F63 0101h
 ChipDoc Applet instance ID (your choice AID)
 Issuer Application ADF = Applet AID
After installation, the applet version has to be verified. It can be retrieved using the dedicated GET DATA
command (‘00CB 0003’) on the ChipDoc applet instance. The applet version returned by this product is
‘0007 0101'.
1.3.5. Evaluated Package Types
A number of package types are supported for this TOE. All package types, which are covered by the
certification of the used hardware (see [29]), are also allowed to be used in combination with each product
of this TOE. The commercial product names contain information about the used package type. The format
of the commercial product names is defined in section 1.3.4.
For a detailed description of the package type names please refer to [30]. The package types do not
influence the security functionality of the TOE. They only define which pads are connected in the package
and for what purpose and in which environment the chip can be used. Note that the security of the TOE is
not dependent on which pad is connected or not - the connections just define how the product can be used.
If the TOE is delivered as wafer the customer can choose the connection on his own.
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2. Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL)
2.1. CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target claims to be conformant to version 3.1 of Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation according to
 "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012" [1]
 "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012" [2]
 "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012" [3]
The following methodology will be used for the evaluation:
 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology,
Version 3.1, Revision 4" [27]
This Security Target claims to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant. The extended Security
Functional Requirements are defined in Section 6.
Extensions are based on the Protection Profiles (PP [4] and PP [5]) and presented in the Section 5:
- FPT_EMSEC.1 ‘TOE emanation’
2.2. Package Claim
This Security Target claims conformance to the assurance package EAL5 augmented. The augmentation
to EAL5 is AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis” and ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of
security measures”.
2.3. PP Claim
This ST claims strict compliance to the following Protection Profiles:
[4] Protection Profile for Secure Signature-Creation Device - Part 2
Version 2.0.1.
Date 01/2012
Identification prEN 14169-2:2012
Approved by AFNOR
Registration BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-01
[5] Protection Profile for Secure Signature-Creation Device - Part 3
Version 1.0.2
Date 07/2012
Identification prEN 14169-3:2012
Approved by AFNOR
Registration BSI-CC-PP-0075-2012
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3. Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD)
3.1. Assets
SCD
Private key used to perform a digital signature operation. The confidentiality, integrity and signatory’s
sole control over the use of the SCD must be maintained.
SVD
public key linked to the SCD and used to perform digital signature verification. The integrity of the SVD
when it is exported must be maintained.
DTBS and DTBS-representation
Set of data, or its representation, which the signatory intends to sign. Their integrity and the
unforgeability of the link to the signatory provided by the digital signature must be maintained.
Signature-creation function
Code of the SSCD dedicated to the generation of digital signature of DTBS using the SCD (The quality
of the function must be maintained so that it can participate to the legal validity of electronic signatures)
3.2. Subjects
This Security Target considers the following subjects:
Subjects Definition
User
End user of the TOE who can be identified as administrator or
signatory. The subject S.User may act as S.Admin in the role R.Admin
or as S.Sigy in the role R.Sigy.
Admin
User who is in charge to perform the TOE initialisation, TOE
personalisation or other TOE administrative functions. The subject
S.Admin is acting in the role R.Admin for this user after successful
authentication as administrator.
Signatory
User who hold the TOE and use it on their own behalf or on behalf of
the natural or legal person or entity they represent. The subject S.Sigy
is acting in the role R.Sigy for this user after successful authentication
as signatory.
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3.3. Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is
intended to be used:
A.CGA Trustworthy certification-generation application
The CGA protects the authenticity of the signatory’s name and the SVD in the qualified certificate by
an advanced signature of the CSP.
A.SCA Trustworthy signature-creation application
The signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA generates and sends the DTBS-representation
of data the signatory wishes to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE.
A.CSP Secure SCD/SVD management by CSP
The CSP uses only a trustworthy SCD/SVD generation device and ensures that this device can be
used by authorised user only. The CSP ensures that the SCD generated practically occurs only once,
that generated SCD and SVD actually correspond to each other and that SCD cannot be derived from
the SVD. The CSP ensures the confidentiality of the SCD during generation and export to the TOE,
does not use the SCD for creation of any signature and irreversibly deletes the SCD in the operational
environment after export to the TOE.
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3.4. Threats
3.4.1. Threat agents
Attacker
Human or process acting on their behalf located outside the TOE. The
main goal of the attacker is to access the SCD or to falsify the electronic
signature. The attacker has got a high attack potential and knows no
secret.
3.4.2. Threats to Security
T.Hack_Phys Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces
An attacker interacts with the TOE interfaces to exploit vulnerabilities, resulting in arbitrary security
compromises. This threat addresses all the assets.
T.SCD_Divulg Storing, copying, and releasing of the signature-creation data
An attacker can store, copy, the SCD outside the TOE. An attacker can release the SCD during
generation, storage and use for signature-creation in the TOE.
T.SCD_Derive Derive the signature-creation data
An attacker derives the SCD from public known data, such as SVD corresponding to the SCD or
signatures created by means of the SCD or any other data communicated outside the TOE, which is a
threat against the secrecy of the SCD.
T.SVD_Forgery Forgery of the signature-verification data
An attacker forges the SVD presented by the TOE to the CGA. This results in loss of SVD integrity in
the certificate of the signatory.
T.DTBS_Forgery Forgery of the DTBS-representation
An attacker modifies the DTBS-representation sent by the SCA. Thus the DTBS-representation used
by the TOE for signing does not match the DTBS the signatory intended to sign.
T.SigF_Misuse Misuse of the signature-creation function of the TOE
An attacker misuses the signature-creation function of the TOE to create SDO for data the signatory
has not decided to sign. The TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts possessing a high attack
potential with advanced knowledge of security principles and concepts employed by the TOE.
T.Sig_Forgery Forgery of the electronic signature
An attacker forges the signed data object maybe together with its electronic signature created by the
TOE and the violation of the integrity of the signed data object is not detectable by the signatory or by
third parties. The signature generated by the TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts possessing
a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security principles and concepts employed by the
TOE.
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3.5. Organizational Security Policies
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules,
procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations.
P.CSP_QCert Qualified certificate
The CSP uses a trustworthy CGA to generate the qualified certificate for the SVD generated by the
SSCD. The qualified certificates contains at least the elements defined in Annex I of the Directive, i.e.,
inter alias the name of the signatory and the SVD matching the SCD implemented in the TOE under
sole control of the signatory. The CSP ensures that the use of the TOE is evident with signatures
through the certificate or other publicly available information.
P.QSign Qualified electronic signatures
The signatory uses a signature-creation system to sign data with an advanced electronic, which is a
qualified electronic signature if it is based on a valid qualified certificate. The DTBS are presented to
the signatory and sent by the SCA as DTBS/R to the SSCD. The SSCD creates the digital signature
created with a SCD implemented in the SSCD that the signatory maintain under his sole control and is
linked to the DTBS/R in such a manner that any subsequent change of the data is detectable.
P.Sigy_SSCD TOE as secure signature-creation device
The TOE implements the SCD used for signature creation under sole control of the signatory. The SCD
used for signature generation can practically occur only once.
P.Sig_Non-Repud Non-repudiation of signatures
The lifecycle of the SSCD, the SCD and the SVD shall be implemented in a way that the signatory is
not able to deny having signed data if the signature is successfully verified with the SVD contained in
their unrevoked certificate.
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4. Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ)
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE
environment.
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be
countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
OT.EMSEC_Design Provide physical emanations security
Design and build the TOE in such a way as to control the production of intelligible emanations within
specified limits.
OT.Lifecycle_Security Lifecycle security
The TOE shall detect flaws during the personalisation and operational usage. The TOE shall provide
functionality to securely destroy the SCD.
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen Authorized SCD/SVD generation
The TOE provides security features to ensure that authorised users only invoke the generation of the
SCD and the SVD.
OT.SCD_Secrecy Secrecy of the signature-creation data
The secrecy of the SCD (used for signature generation) is reasonably assured against attacks with a
high attack potential.
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp Correspondence between SVD and SCD
The TOE shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD generated by the TOE. This
includes unambiguous reference of a created SVD/SCD pair for export of the SVD and in creating a
digital signature creation with the SCD.
OT.Tamper_ID Tamper detection
The TOE provides system features that detect physical tampering of a system component, and use
those features to limit security breaches.
OT.Tamper_Resistance Tamper resistance
The TOE prevents or resists physical tampering with specified system devices and components.
OT.SCD_Unique Uniqueness of the signature-creation data
The TOE shall ensure the cryptographic quality of the SCD/SVD pair for the qualified electronic
signature. The SCD used for signature generation can practically occur only once and cannot be
reconstructed from the SVD. In that context ‘practically occur once’ means that the probability of equal
SCDs is negligible low.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE Verification of the DTBS-representation integrity
The TOE must not alter the DTBS/R This objective does not conflict with a signature-creation process
where the TOE applies a cryptographic hash function on the DTBS/R to prepare for signature creation
algorithm.
OT.Sigy_SigF Signature generation function for the legitimate signatory only
The TOE provides the signature generation function for the legitimate signatory only and protects the
SCD against the use of others. The TOE shall resist attacks with high attack potential.
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OT.Sig_Secure Cryptographic security of the electronic signature
The TOE generates digital signatures that cannot be forged without knowledge of the SCD through
robust encryption techniques. The SCD cannot be reconstructed using the digital signatures or any
other data exported from the TOE. The digital signatures shall be resistant against these attacks, even
when executed with a high attack potential.
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp Authorized SCD import
The TOE shall provide security features to ensure that authorised users only may invoke the import of
the SCD.
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4.2. SOs for the Environment
Since ChipDoc SSCD is both SSCD type 2 and SSCD type 3 means that the TOE environment consists of
a CGA, an SCA and a specific development environment.
OE.CGA_QCert Generation of qualified certificates
The CGA generates a qualified certificate that includes, inter alias
(a) the name of the signatory controlling the TOE,
(b) the SVD matching the SCD stored in the TOE and controlled by the signatory,
(c) the advanced signature of the CSP.
The CGA confirms with the generated certificate that the SCD corresponding to the SVD is stored
in a SSCD.
OE.SVD_Auth Authenticity of the SVD
The operational environment ensures the authenticity of the SVD exported by the TOE to the CGA. The
CGA verifies the correspondence between the SCD in the SSCD of the signatory and the SVD in the
input it provides to the certificate generation function of the CSP.
OE.HID_VAD Protection of the VAD
If an external device provides the human interface for user authentication, this device will ensure
confidentiality and integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication method employed.
OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen Authorized SCD/SVD generation
The CSP shall provide security features to ensure that authorised users only may invoke the generation
of the SCD and the SVD.
OE.SSCD_Prov_Service Authentic SSCD provided by SSCD Provisioning Service
The SSCD Provisioning Service handles authentic devices that implement the TOE to be prepared for
the legitimate user as signatory, personalises and delivers the TOE as SSCD to the signatory.
OE.DTBS_Intend SCA sends data intended to be signed
The Signatory uses trustworthy SCA that
- generates the DTBS/R of the data that has been presented as DTBS and which the signatory
intends to sign in a form which is appropriate for signing by the TOE,
- sends the DTBS/R to the TOE and enables verification of the integrity of the DTBS/R by the TOE,
- attaches the signature produced by the TOE to the data or provides it separately.
OE.DTBS_Protect SCA protects the data intended to be signed
The operational environment shall ensure that the DTBS/R cannot be altered in transit between the
SCA and the TOE. In particular, if the TOE requires a trusted channel for import of the DTBS/R, the
SCA shall support usage of this trusted channel.
OE.Signatory Security obligation of the Signatory
The Signatory checks that the SCD stored in the SSCD received from SSCD provisioning service is in
non-operational state. The Signatory keeps his or her VAD confidential.
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp Correspondence between SVD and SCD
The SCD/SVD generation device shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD,
and shall verify the correspondence between the SCD sent to the TOE and the SVD sent to the CGA
or TOE.
OE.SCD_Secrecy SCD Secrecy
The CSP shall protect the confidentiality of the SCD during generation and export to the TOE. The CSP
shall not use the SCD for creation of any signature and shall irreversibly delete the SCD in the
operational environment after export to the TOE.
OE.SCD_Unique Uniqueness of the signature-creation data
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The SCD/SVD generation device shall ensure the cryptographic quality of the SCD/SVD pair for the
qualified electronic signature. The SCD used for signature generation can practically occur only once
and cannot be reconstructed from the SVD. In that context ‘practically occur once’ means that the
probability of equal SCDs is negligible low.
4.3. Security objectives rationale
All the security objectives described in the ST are traced back to items described in the TOE security
environment and any items in the TOE security environment are covered by those security objectives
appropriately.
4.3.1. Security Objectives Coverage
The following table indicates that all security objectives of the TOE are traced back to threats and/or
organizational security policies and that all security objectives of the environment are traced back to threats,
organizational security policies and/or assumptions.
Threats
Assumptions
Policies
/
Security
objectives
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD/SVD_Gen
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp
OE.CGA_Qcert
OE.SVD_Auth
OE.HID_VAD
OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OE.SSCD_Prov_Service
OE.DTBS_Intend
OE.DTBS_Protect
OE.Signatory
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OE.SCD_Secrecy
OE.SCD_Unique
T.Hack_Phys x x x x
T.SCD_Divulg x x x x
T.SCD_Derive x x x
T.SVD_Forgery x x x
T.DTBS_Forgery x x x
T.SigF_Misuse x x x x x x x
T.Sig_Forgery x x x x
A.CGA x x
A.SCA x
A.SCP x x x x
P.CSP_Qcert x x x x x x
P.Qsign x x x x
P.Sigy_SSCD x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
P.Sig_Non-Repud x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Table 9 – Security Environment to Security Objectives Mapping
4.3.2. Security Objectives Sufficiency
4.3.2.1. Policies and Security Objective Sufficiency
P.CSP_QCert (CSP generates qualified certificates) establishes the CSP generating qualified certificate or
non-qualified certificate linking the signatory and the SVD implemented in the SSCD under sole control of
this signatory. P.CSP_QCert is addressed by
- the TOE security objective OT.Lifecycle_Security, which requires the TOE to detect flaws during the
initialisation, personalisation and operational usage,
- the TOE security objective OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp, which requires the TOE to ensure the
correspondence between the SVD and the SCD during their generation, and
- the security objective for the operational environment OE.CGA_QCert for generation of qualified
certificates or non-qualified certificates, which requires the CGA to certify the SVD matching the SCD
implemented in the TOE under sole control of the signatory
- OT.Lifecycle_Security, which requires the TOE to detect flaws during the initialisation,
personalisation and operational usage,
- OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen, which ensures that the SCD/SVD generation can be invoked by authorized
users only,
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- OT.SCD_Auth_Imp which ensures that authorised users only may invoke the import of the SCD,
- OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp, which requires the CSP to ensure the correspondence between the SVD
and the SCD during their generation, and
- OE.CGA_QCert for generation of qualified certificates or non-qualified certificates, which requires the
CGA to certify the SVD matching the SCD implemented in the TOE under sole control of the signatory.
P.QSign (Qualified electronic signatures) provides that the TOE and the SCA may be employed to sign
data with an advanced electronic signature, which is a qualified electronic signature if based on a valid
qualified certificate. OT.Sigy_SigF ensures signatory’s sole control of the SCD by requiring the TOE to
provide the signature generation function for the legitimate signatory only and to protect the SCD against
the use of others. OT.Sig_Secure ensures that the TOE generates digital signatures that cannot be forged
without knowledge of the SCD through robust encryption techniques. OE.CGA_QCert addresses the
requirement of qualified or non-qualified electronic certificates building a base for the electronic signature.
The OE.DTBS_Intend ensures that the SCA provides only those DTBS to the TOE, which the signatory
intends to sign.
P.Sigy_SSCD (TOE as secure signature creation device) requires the TOE to meet the Annex II of the
directive [15]. This is ensured as follows
- OT.SCD_Unique meets the paragraph 1(a) of the directive [15], Annex III, by the requirements
that the SCD used for signature creation can practically occur only once.
- OT.SCD_Unique, OT.SCD_Secrecy and OE.SCD_Secrecy meet the paragraph 1(a) of the
directive [15], Annex III, by the requirements to ensure the secrecy of the SCD.
OT.EMSEC_Design and OT.Tamper_Resistance address specific objectives to ensure secrecy of
SCD against specific attacks.
- OT.SCD_Secrecy and OT.Sig_Secure meet the paragraph 1(b) of the directive [15], Annex III, by
the requirements to ensure that the SCD cannot be derived from SVD, the digital signatures or
any other data exported outside the TOE.
- OT.Sigy_SigF and OE.SCD_Secrecy meet the paragraph 1(c) of the directive [15], Annex III, by
the requirements to ensure that the TOE provides the signature creation function for the
legitimate signatory only and protects the SCD against the use of others.
- OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE meets the requirements the paragraph 2 of the directive [15], Annex III,
The TOE must not alter the DTBS/R.
The usage of SCD under sole control of the signatory is ensured by
- OT.Lifecycle_Security requiring the TOE to detect flaws during the initialisation, personalization and
operational usage
- OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen, which limits invocation of the generation of the SCD and the SVD to
authorised users only,
- OT.SCD_Auth_Imp, which limits SCD import to authorised users only,
- OE.SCD_Secrecy, which ensures the confidentiality of the SCD during generation and export to
the TOE, and deletes the SCD after export to the TOE. The CSP does not use the SCD for
signature creation.
- OT.Sigy_SigF, which requires the TOE to provide the signature creation function for the legitimate
signatory only and to protect the SCD against the use of others.
OE.SSCD_Prov_Service ensures that the signatory obtains an authentic copy of the TOE, initialised and
personalised as SSCD from the SSCD-provisioning service.
P.Sig_Non-Repud (Non-repudiation of signatures) deals with the repudiation of signed data by the
signatory, although the electronic signature is successfully verified with the SVD contained in his certificate
valid at the time of signature creation. This policy is implemented by the combination of the security
objectives for the TOE and its operational environment, which ensure the aspects of signatory’s sole control
over and responsibility for the digital signatures generated with the TOE. OE.SSCD_Prov_Service ensures
that the signatory uses an authentic TOE, initialised and personalised for the signatory. OE.CGA_QCert
ensures that the certificate allows to identify the signatory and thus to link the SVD to the signatory.
OE.SVD_Auth and OE.CGA_QCert require the environment to ensure authenticity of the SVD as being
exported by the TOE and used under sole control of the signatory. OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp ensures that
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the SVD exported by the TOE corresponds to the SCD that is implemented in the TOE. OT.SCD_Unique
provides that the signatory’s SCD can practically occur just once.
OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen, OE.SCD_Secrecy and OE.SCD_Unique ensure the security of the SCD in the
CSP environment. OE.SCD_Secrecy ensures the confidentiality of the SCD during generation, during and
after export to the TOE. The CSP does not use the SCD for creation of any signature and deletes the SCD
irreversibly after export to the TOE. OE.SCD_Unique provides that the signatory’s SCD can practically
occur just once. OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp ensures that the SVD in the certificate of the signatory
corresponds to the SCD that is implemented in the copy of the TOE of the signatory.
OE.CGA_QCert ensures that the certificate allows to identify the signatory and thus to link the SVD of the
signatory. OE.SVD_Auth and OE.CGA_QCert require the environment to ensure the authenticity of the
SVD as being exported by the TOE under sole control of the signatory. OE.CGA_QCert ensures that the
certificate allows to identify the signatory and thus to link the SVD of the signatory. OE.SVD_Auth and
OE.CGA_QCert require the environment to ensure the authenticity of the SVD as being exported by the
TOE under sole control of the signatory.
OE.Signatory ensures that the Signatory checks that the SCD, stored in the SSCD received from an SSCD
provisioning service is in non-operational state (i.e. the SCD cannot be used before the Signatory becomes
into sole control over the SSCD). OT.Sigy_SigF provides that only the signatory may use the TOE for
signature creation. As prerequisite OE.Signatory ensures that the Signatory keeps his or her SVAD
confidential. OE.DTBS_Intend, OE.DTBS_Protect and OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE ensure that the TOE
generates digital signatures only for a DTBS/R that the signatory has decided to sign as DTBS. The robust
cryptographic techniques required by OT.Sig_Secure ensure that only this SCD may generate a valid digital
signature that can be successfully verified with the corresponding SVD used for signature verification. The
security objective for the TOE OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security), OT.SCD_Secrecy (Secrecy of the
signature-creation data), OT.EMSEC_Design (Provide physical emanations security), OT.Tamper_ID (Tamper
detection) and OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper resistance) protect the SCD against any compromise.
4.3.2.2. Threats and Security Objective Sufficiency
T.SCD_Divulg (Storing, copying, and releasing of the signature-creation data) addresses the threat against
the legal validity of electronic signature due to storage and copying of SCD outside the TOE, as expressed
in recital (18) of The European Directive. This threat is countered by OE.SCD_Secrecy, which assures
the secrecy of the SCD in the CSP environment, and OT.SCD_Secrecy, which assures the secrecy of the
SCD during use by the TOE for signature creation.
Furthermore, generation and/or import of SCD known by an attacker is countered by
OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen, which ensures that only authorized SCD generation in the environment is
possible, and OT.SCD_Auth_Imp, which ensures that only authorised SCD import is possible.
T.SCD_Derive (Derive the signature-creation data) deals with attacks on the SCD via public known data
produced by the TOE, which are the SVD and the signatures created with the SCD. OT.SCD/SVD_Gen
counters this threat by implementing cryptographic secure generation (as well as OE.SCD_Unique)of the
SCD/SVD-pair. OT.Sig_Secure ensures cryptographic secure digital signatures.
T.Hack_Phys (Exploitation of physical vulnerabilities) deals with physical attacks exploiting physical
vulnerabilities of the TOE. OT.SCD_Secrecy preserves the secrecy of the SCD. OT.EMSEC_Design
counters physical attacks through the TOE interfaces and observation of TOE emanations. OT.Tamper_ID
and OT.Tamper_Resistance counter the threat T.Hack_Phys by detecting and by resisting tampering
attacks.
T.SVD_Forgery (Forgery of the signature-verification data) deals with the forgery of the SVD exported by
the TOE to the CGA to generation a certificate. T.SVD_Forgery is addressed by OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp
or OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp (depending if SCD/SVD generation occurs outside or in the TOE), which ensure
correspondence between SVD and SCD and unambiguous reference of the SVD/SCD pair for the SVD
export and signature creation with the SCD, and OE.SVD_Auth that ensures the integrity of the SVD
exported by the TOE to the CGA. T.SVD_Forgery is also addressed by OE.SVD_Auth, which ensures the
authenticity of the SVD given to the CGA of the CSP.
T.SigF_Misuse (Misuse of the signature-creation function of the TOE) addresses the threat of misuse of
the TOE signature-creation function to create SDO by others than the signatory to create a digital signature
on data for which the signatory has not expressed the intent to sign,. OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle
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security) requires the TOE to detect flaws during the initialisation, personalisation and operational usage
including secure destruction of the SCD, which may be initiated by the signatory. OT.Sigy_SigF (Signature
creation function for the legitimate signatory only) ensures that the TOE provides the signature-generation
function for the legitimate signatory only. OE.DTBS_Intend (Data intended to be signed) ensures that the
SCA sends the DTBS/R only for data the signatory intends to sign and OE.DTBS_Protect counters
manipulation of the DTBS during transmission over the channel between the SCA and the TOE.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE) prevents the DTBS/R from alteration inside the
TOE. If the SCA provides a human interface for user authentication, OE.HID_VAD (Protection of the VAD)
provides confidentiality and integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication method employed.
OE.Signatory ensures that the Signatory checks that an SCD stored in the SSCD when received from an
SSCD-provisioning service provider is in non-operational state, i.e. the SCD cannot be used before the
Signatory becomes control over the SSCD. OE.Signatory ensures also that the Signatory keeps his or her
VAD confidential.
T.DTBS_Forgery (Forgery of the DTBS/R) addresses the threat arising from modifications of the data sent
as input to the TOE's signature creation function that does not represent the DTBS as presented to the
signatory and for which the signature has expressed its intent to sign. The TOE IT environment addresses
T.DTBS_Forgery by the means of OE.DTBS_Intend, which ensures that the trustworthy SCA generates
the DTBS/R of the data that has been presented as DTBS and which the signatory intends to sign in a form
appropriate for signing by the TOE, and by means of OE.DTBS_Protect, which ensures that the DTBS/R
cannot be altered in transit between the SCA and the TOE. The TOE counters this threat by the means of
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE by ensuring the integrity of the DTBS/R inside the TOE.
T.Sig_Forgery (Forgery of the digital signature) deals with non-detectable forgery of the digital signature.
OT.Sig_Secure, OT.SCD_Unique and OE.CGA_Qcert address this threat in general. The
OT.Sig_Secure (Cryptographic security of the digital signature) ensures by means of robust cryptographic
techniques that the signed data and the digital signature are securely linked together. OT.SCD_Unique
ensures that the same SCD cannot be generated more than once and the corresponding SVD cannot be
included in another certificate by chance. OE.CGA_Qcert prevents forgery of the certificate for the
corresponding SVD, which would result in false verification decision on a forged signature.
OE.SCD_Unique ensures that the same SCD cannot be generated more than once and the corresponding
SVD cannot be included in another certificate by chance. OE.CGA_QCert prevents forgery of the certificate
for the corresponding SVD, which would result in false verification decision concerning a forged signature.
4.3.2.3. Assumptions and Security Objective Sufficiency
A.SCA (Trustworthy signature-creation application) establishes the trustworthiness of the SCA with respect
to generation of DTBS/R. This is addressed by OE.DTBS_Intend (Data intended to be signed) which ensures
that the SCA generates the DTBS/R for the data that has been presented to the signatory as DTBS and
which the signatory intends to sign in a form which is appropriate for being signed by the TOE.
A.CGA (Trustworthy certification-generation application) establishes the protection of the authenticity of the
signatory's name and the SVD in the qualified certificate by the advanced signature of the CSP by means
of the CGA. This is addressed by OE.CGA_QCert ( Generation of qualified certificates), which ensures the
generation of qualified certificates and by OE.SVD_Auth (Authenticity of the SVD), which ensures the
protection of the integrity and the verification of the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD that is
implemented by the SSCD of the signatory.
A.CSP (Secure SCD/SVD management by CSP) establishes several security aspects concerning handling
of SCD and SVD by the CSP. That the SCD/SVD generation device can only be used by authorized users
is addressed by OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen (Authorized SCD/SVD Generation), that the generated SCD is
unique and cannot be derived by the SVD is addressed by OE.SCD_Unique (Uniqueness of the signature
creation data), that SCD and SVD correspond to each other is addressed by OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp
(Correspondence between SVD and SCD), and that the SCD are kept confidential, are not used for
signature generation in the environment and are deleted in the environment once exported to the TOE is
addressed by OE.SCD_Secrecy (SCD Secrecy).
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5. Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD)
This ST contains the following extended component defined as extension to CC part 2 in the claimed PPs
[4,5]:
- SFR FPT_EMSEC.1 ‘TOE emanation’
5.1. TOE emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)
The additional family FPT_EMSEC (FPT_EMS in the PP) (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection
of the TSF) is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall
prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable
physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic
radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, radio emanation
etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations. The family
FPT_EMSEC belongs to the Class FPT because it is the class for TSF protection. Other families within the
Class FPT do not cover the TOE emanation.
FPT_EMSEC TOE Emanation
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component leveling:
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation has two constituents:
 FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
 FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions identified that shall be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data
generation is included in a PP or ST using FPT_EMSEC.1.
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of
TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to
[assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user
data].
FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation 1
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6. Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
This chapter gives the security functional requirements and the security assurance requirements for the
TOE.
Security functional requirements components given in section 6.1, except FPT_EMSEC.1 which is explicitly
stated, are drawn from Common Criteria part 2 v3.1.
Some security functional requirements represent extensions to [2]. Operations for assignment, selection
and refinement have been made and are designated by an underline, in addition, where operations that
were uncompleted in the PPs (performed in this ST) are also identified by italic underlined type.
The TOE security assurance requirements statement given in section 6.2 is drawn from the security
assurance components from Common Criteria part 3 [3].
6.1. TOE Security Functional Requirements
6.1.1. Cryptographic support (FCS)
6.1.1.1. Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate an SCD/SVD pair in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA and specified cryptographic key
sizes between 1024 bit and 2048 bit that meet the following: PKCS#1 v2.1:
RSAEP, RSADP, RSAP1, RSAVP1 [11].
6.1.1.2. Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in case of re-importation and
regeneration of a new SCD in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
destruction method overwriting old key with new key or random data that meets
the following: none.
Application note:
The cryptographic key SCD will be destroyed on demand of the Signatory or Administrator. The
destruction of the SCD is mandatory before the SCD/SVD pair is re-generated by the TOE.
Re-importation is not supported by the TOE.
6.1.1.3. Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform digital signature-generation in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm RSA and cryptographic key sizes 1024 bit, 1536 bit and
2048 bit that meet the following: RSA CRT with hashing SHA-1 or SHA-256 and
with padding PKCS#1 v2.1: EME-OAEP, EMSA-PSS [11].
FCS_COP.1.1/ENC The TSF shall perform data encryption/decryption for Administrator and
Signatory authentication and Secure Messaging in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm TDES CBC and cryptographic key sizes 16 bytes that
meet the following: FIPS PUB 46-3 Data Encryption Standard (DES) [22].
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC The TSF shall perform Message Authentication Code for Secure Messaging in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm TDES MAC and
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cryptographic key sizes 16 bytes that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9797-1: 2011
Information technology -- Security techniques – Message Authentication Codes
(MACs) [24].
6.1.2. User data protection (FDP)
6.1.2.1. Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/
SVD_Transfer
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP on
(1) subjects: S.User,
(2) objects: SVD
(3) operations: export
FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/
SCD_Import
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP on
(1). subjects: S.User,
(2) objects: DTBS/R, SCD,
(3) operations: import of SCD
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP on
(1) subjects: S.User,
(2) objects: SCD, SVD,
(3) operations: generation of SCD/SVD pair
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
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FDP_ACC.1.1/
Signature_Creation
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP on
(1) subjects: S.User,
(2) objects: DTBS/R, SCD,
(3) operations: signature creation.
6.1.2.2. Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
The security attributes for the user, TOE components and related status are:
User, subject or object the
attribute is associated with
Attribute Status
General attribute
User Role Administrator, Signatory
Initialization attribute
User SCD / SVD management Authorized, not authorized
SCD Secure SCD import allowed No, yes
Signature-creation attribute group
SCD SCD operational No, yes
DTBS, DTBS-representation sent by an authorized SCA No, yes
SVD Generation
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP to objects based on
the following: the user S.User is associated with the security attribute “SCD /
SVD Management “.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD / SVD Management” set to
“authorised” is allowed to generate SCD/SVD pair.
FDP_ACF.1.3/
SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD / SVD management” set to “not
authorised” is not allowed to generate SCD/SVD pair.
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SVD Transfer
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/
SVD_Transfer
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP to objects based on the following:
(1) the S.User is associated with the security attribute Role,
(2) the SVD.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
SVD_Transfer
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
R.Admin and R.Sigy are allowed to export SVD.
FDP_ACF.1.3/
SVD_Transfer
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
SVD_Transfer
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
SCD Import
FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/
SCD_Import
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP to objects based on the following: the
S.User is associated with the security attribute “SCD/SVD Management.”
FDP_ACF.1.2/
SCD_Import
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD/SVD Management” set to “authorised” is
allowed to import SCD.
FDP_ACF.1.3/
SCD_Import
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
SCD_Import
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD/SVD management” set to “not
authorised” is not allowed to import SCD.
Signature-creation
FDP_ACF.1/Signature creation Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/
Signature_Creation
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP to objects based on the f
following:
(1) the S.User is associated with the security attribute “Role” and
(2) the SCD with the security attribute “SCD Operational”
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FDP_ACF.1.2/
Signature_Creation
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
User with the security attribute “role” set to “Signatory” is allowed to create digital
signatures for DTBS-representation with SCD which security attribute “SCD
operational” is set to “yes”
FDP_ACF.1.3/
Signature_Creation
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
Signature_Creation
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rules:
S.User is not allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS/R with SCD which
security attribute “SCD operational” is set to “no”.
6.1.2.3. Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1)
FDP_ITC.1/SCD Import of user data without security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ITC.1.1/
SCD
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP when importing user data, controlled
under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/
SCD
The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data SCD
when imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/
SCD
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under
the SFP from outside the TOE: SCD shall be sent by an authorised SSCD from
outside the TOE.
6.1.2.4. Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)
FDP_UCT.1/SCD Basic data exchange confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1.1/
SCD
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP to be able to receive user data SCD in
a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
6.1.2.5. Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1)
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the de-allocation of the resource from the following objects: SCD.
6.1.2.6. Stored data integrity monitoring and action (FDP_SDI.2)
The following data persistently stored by TOE have the user data attribute "integrity checked persistent
stored data" (integrity redundancy code):
1. SCD
2. RAD
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3. SVD (if persistent stored by TOE)
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1/
Persistent
The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for
integrity error on all objects, based on the following attributes: integrity checked
persistent data.
FDP_SDI.2.2/
Persistent
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall
1. prohibit the use of the altered data
2. inform the S.Sigy about integrity error.
The DTBS-representation temporarily stored by TOE has the user data attribute "integrity checked stored
data":
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1/
DTBS
The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for
integrity error on all objects, based on the following attributes: integrity checked
stored DTBS.
FDP_SDI.2.2/
DTBS
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall
1. prohibit the use of the altered data
2. inform the S.Sigy about integrity error.
6.1.3. Identification and authentication (FIA)
6.1.3.1. Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when 10 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related
to consecutive failed authentication attempts.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met,
the TSF shall block RAD.
6.1.3.2. Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. Self test according to FPT_TST.1
2. Identification of the user by means of TSF required by FIA_UID.1.
3. Establishing a trusted path between the TOE and a SCD/SVD generation
component by means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/SCD.
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note:
The user mentioned in component FIA_UAU.1.1 is the local user using the trusted path provided between
the SGA in the TOE environment and the TOE.
6.1.3.3. Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
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1. Self test according to FPT_TST.1
2. Establishing a trusted channel between the TOE and a SCD/SVD
generation component by means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/SCD.
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.1.4. Security management (FMT)
6.1.4.1. Management of security functions behaviour (FMT_MOF.1)
FMT_MOF.1/
Sign
The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions signature-creation function
to Signatory.
6.1.4.2. Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
FMT_MSA.1/Admin Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1/
Admin
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP and SCD Import SFP to
restrict the ability to modify and none the security attributes SCD/SVD management
to R.Admin.
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1/
Signatory
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP to restrict the ability to modify
the security attributes SCD operational to R.Sigy.
6.1.4.3. Secure security attributes (FMT_MSA.2)
FMT_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for all security attributes.
6.1.4.4. Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP, SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP,
SVD_Transfer_SFP and Signature-creation_SFP to provide restrictive default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the Administrator to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is created.
6.1.4.1. Static attribute value inheritance (FMT_MSA.4)
FMT_MSA.4.1 The TSF shall use the following rules to set the value of security attributes:
If S.Admin successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair without Signatory being
authenticated the security attribute “SCD operational of the SCD” shall be set to
“no” as a single operation.
If S.Sigy successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair the security attribute “SCD
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operational of the SCD” shall be set to “yes” as a single operation.
If S.Admin imports SCD while S. Signatory is not currently authenticated, the
security attribute “SCD operational” of the SCD shall be set to “no” after import of
the SCD as a single operation
If S.Admin imports SCD while S. Signatory is currently authenticated, the security
attribute “SCD operational” of the SCD shall be set to “yes” after import of the SCD
as a single operation.
6.1.4.2. Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)
FMT_MTD.1/Admin The TSF shall restrict the ability to create the RAD to R.Admin
Application note:
The RAD can be unblocked by the Signatory after presentation of the PUK by the Signatory. in case of
a PIN. In case of a DES Key, the RAD cannot be unlocked.
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify or unblock the RAD to R.Sigy.
6.1.4.3. Specifications of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
(1) Creation and modification of RAD,
(2) Enabling the signature creation function,
(3) Modification of the security attribute SCD/SVD management, SCD operational,
(4) Change the default value of the security attribute SCD Identifier,
(5) Access Condition Management to files (according to [31]).
6.1.4.4. Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles R.Admin and R.Sigy.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
6.1.5. Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.1.5.1. TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit information of IC Power consumption in excess of non-
useful information enabling access to RAD and SCD.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any user is unable to use the following interface physical chip
contacts and contactless I/O to gain access to RAD and SCD.
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Application note:
The TOE shall prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data where the attack is based on
external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may be observable at the interfaces
of the TOE or may origin from internal operation of the TOE or may origin by an attacker that varies the
physical environment under which the TOE operates. The set of measurable physical phenomena is
influenced by the technology employed to implement the TOE. Examples of measurable phenomena are
variations in the power consumption, the timing of transitions of internal states, electromagnetic radiation
due to internal operation, radio emission.
Due to the heterogeneous nature of the technologies that may cause such emanations, evaluation
against state-of-the-art attacks applicable to the technologies employed by the TOE is assumed.
Examples of such attacks are, but are not limited to, evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation,
simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc.
6.1.5.2. Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
(1) self-test according to FPT_TST fails,
(2) IC sensors failure detection (RNG failure, EEPROM failure, out of range
temperature, clock and voltage of chip).
6.1.5.3. Passive detection of physical attack (FPT_PHP.1)
FPT_PHP.1.1 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might
compromise the TSF.
FPT_PHP.1.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering with
the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.
6.1.5.4. Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist Environment attacks (clock frequency and voltage tampering)
and Intrusive attacks (penetration of the module protective layers) to the IC
Hardware by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
6.1.5.5. TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up or before running a
secure operation to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
the TSF.
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6.1.6. Trusted k/channels (FTP)
6.1.6.1. Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)
FTP_ITC.1.1/
SCD
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a remote trusted
IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides
assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from
modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/
SCD
The TSF shall permit the remote trusted IT product to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/
SCD
The TSF or the trusted IT shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
Data exchange integrity according to FDP_UCT.1/SCD,
SCD Import, transfer of SVD,
Refinement:
The mentioned remote trusted IT products are: an SCD/SVD generation component for SVD import, the
CGA for the SVD export, and the SCA for DTBS Import.
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6.2. TOE Security Assurance Requirements
TOE Security Assurance Requirements as stated in section 9.2 and 10.3 of the claimed PPs [4,5],
respectively.
ALC_DVS is augmented from 1 to 2, and AVA_VAN is augmented from 3 to 5, compared to the CC V3.1
package for EAL5.
6.2.1. SARs Measures
The assurance measures that satisfy the TOE security assurance requirements are the following:
Assurance Class Component Description
ADV:
Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.5
Complete Semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_TDS.4 Semi-formal modular design
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC:
Lifecycle support
ALC_CMC.4
Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined lifecycle model
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ASE:
Security Target evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE:
Test
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA:
Vulnerability assessment
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Table 10 – Assurance Requirements: EAL5 augmented
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6.2.2. SARs Rationale
The EAL5 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, although rigorous, do not require substantial
specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL5 is the highest level at which it is likely to be
economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL5 is applicable in those circumstances where
developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional
commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific engineering costs.
Augmentation results from the selection of:
ALC_DVS.2 Life-cycle support- Sufficiency of security measures
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance with regards to the security
measures providing the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE.
The component ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies.
AVA_VAN.5 Vulnerability Assessment - Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
The TOE is intended to function in a variety of signature creation systems for qualified electronic signatures.
Due to the nature of its intended application, i.e., the TOE may be issued to users and may not be directly
under the control of trained and dedicated administrators. As a result, it is imperative that misleading,
unreasonable and conflicting guidance is absent from the guidance documentation, and that secure
procedures for all modes of operation have been addressed. Insecure states should be easy to detect. The
TOE shall be shown to be highly resistant to penetration attacks to meet the security objectives
OT.SCD_Secrecy, OT.Sigy_SigF and OT.Sig_Secure.
The component AVA_VAN.5 has the following dependencies:
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL5 assurance package.
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6.3. Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1. Security Requirement Coverage
The following table indicates the association of the security requirements and the security objectives of the
TOE. Some requirements correspond to the security objectives of the TOE in combination with other
objectives.
TOE SFRs
/
TOE Security objectives
OT.Lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp
FCS_CKM.1 X X X X
FCS_CKM.4 X X
FCS_COP.1 X X
FCS_COP.1/ENC X
FCS_COP.1/MAC X
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation X X
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer X
FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import X X
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation X X
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation X X
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer X
FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import X X
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation X X
FDP_ITC.1/SCD X
FDP_UCT.1/SCD X X
FDP_RIP.1 X X
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent X X X
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS X X
FIA_AFL.1 X
FIA_UAU.1 X X X
FIA_UID.1 X X X
FMT_MOF.1 X X
FMT_MSA.1/Admin X X
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory X X
FMT_MSA.2 X X X
FMT_MSA.3 X X X
FMT_MSA.4 X X X
FMT_MTD.1/Admin X X
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory X X
FMT_SMR.1 X X
FMT_SMF.1 X X X
FPT_EMSEC.1 X X
FPT_FLS.1 X
FPT_PHP.1 X
FPT_PHP.3 X X
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TOE SFRs
/
TOE Security objectives
OT.Lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp
FPT_TST.1 X X X
FTP_ITC.1/SCD X X
Table 11 – Functional Requirement to TOE Security Objective Mapping
6.3.2. Security Requirements Sufficiency
OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security) is provided by the SFR as follows.
The SCD import is controlled by TSF according to FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import, FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import and
FDP_ITC.1/SCD. The confidentiality of the SCD is protected during import according to FDP_UCT.1/SCD
in the trusted channel FTP_ITC.1/SCD.
For SCD/SVD generation FCS_CKM.1, SCD usage FCS_COP.1 and SCD destruction FCS_CKM.4 ensure
cryptographically secure lifecycle of the SCD. The SCD/SVD generation is controlled by TSF according to
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation and FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation. The SVD transfer for
certificate generation is controlled by TSF according to FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer and
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer.
The secure SCD usage is ensured cryptographically according to FCS_COP.1. The SCD usage is
controlled by access control FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation, FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation which is
based on the security attribute secure TSF management according to FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1/Admin,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory, FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MSA.4, FMT_MTD.1/Admin,
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory. The FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 defines security management rules and
functions. The test functions FPT_TST.1 provides failure detection throughout the lifecycle. The SFR
FCS_CKM.4 ensures a secure SCD destruction.
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp (Authorized SCD import) is provided by the security functions specified by the
following SFR. FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 ensure that the user is identified and authenticated before SCD
can be imported. FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import and FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import ensure that only authorised users
can import SCD.
OT.SCD/SVD_Gen (SCD/SVD generation) addresses that generation of a SCD/SVD pair requires proper
user authentication. The TSF specified by FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 provide user identification and user
authentication prior to enabling access to authorised functions. The
SFRFDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation and FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation provide access control for
the SCD/SVD generation. The security attributes of the authenticated user are provided by
FMT_MSA.1/Admin, FMT_MSA.2, and FMT_MSA.3 for static attribute initialisation. The SFR FMT_MSA.4
defines rules for inheritance of the security attribute “SCD operational” of the SCD.
OT.SCD_Unique (Uniqueness of the signature-creation data) implements the requirement of practically
unique SCD as laid down in Annex III, paragraph 1(a), which is provided by the cryptographic algorithms
specified by FCS_CKM.1.
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp (Correspondence between SVD and SCD) addresses that the SVD corresponds
to the SCD implemented by the TOE. This is provided by the algorithms specified by FCS_CKM.1 to
generate corresponding SVD/SCD pairs. The security functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/Persistent ensure
that the keys are not modified, so to retain the correspondence. Moreover, the SCD Identifier allows the
environment to identify the SCD and to link it with the appropriate SVD. The management functions
identified by FMT_SMF.1 and by FMT_MSA.4 allow R.Admin to modify the default value of the security
attribute SCD Identifier.
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OT.SCD_Secrecy (Secrecy of signature creation data) is provided by the security functions specified by
the following SFR. FDP_UCT.1/SCD and FTP_ITC.1/SCD ensures the confidentiality for SCD import. The
security functions specified by FDP_RIP.1 and FCS_CKM.4 ensure that residual information on SCD is
destroyed after the SCD has been use for signature creation and that destruction of SCD leaves no residual
information.
FCS_CKM.1 ensures the use of secure cryptographic algorithms for SCD/SVD generation. Cryptographic
quality of SCD/SVD pair shall prevent disclosure of SCD by cryptographic attacks using the publicly known
SVD.
The security functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that no critical data is modified which
could alter the efficiency of the security functions or leak information of the SCD. FPT_TST.1 tests the
working conditions of the TOE and FPT_FLS.1 guarantees a secure state when integrity is violated and
thus assures that the specified security functions are operational. An example where compromising error
conditions are countered by FPT_FLS.1 is fault injection for differential fault analysis (DFA).
The SFR FPT_EMSEC.1 and FPT_PHP.3 require additional security features of the TOE to ensure the
confidentiality of the SCD.
OT.Sig_Secure (Cryptographic security of the electronic signature) is provided by the cryptographic
algorithms specified by FCS_COP.1, which ensure the cryptographic robustness of the signature
algorithms. FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC strengthen Secure Messaging protocol with regards
to integrity and confidentiality of data exported from the TOE. Thus OT.Sig_Secure is supported with
regards to withstand attacks trying to forge signature data. FDP_SDI.2/Persistent corresponds to the
integrity of the SCD implemented by the TOE and FPT_TST.1 ensures self-tests ensuring correct signature
creation.
OT.Sigy_SigF (Signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only) is provided by SFR for
identification authentication and access control.
The FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1 that ensure that no signature creation function can be invoked before the
signatory is identified and authenticated. The security functions specified by FMT_MTD.1/Admin and
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory manage the authentication function. The SFR FIA_AFL.1 provides protection
against a number of attacks, such as cryptographic extraction of residual information, or brute force attacks
against authentication. The security function specified by FDP_SDI.2/DTBS ensures the integrity of stored
DTBS.
FDP_RIP.1 prevents misuse of any resources containing the SCD after de-allocation (e.g. after the
signature-creation process).”
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory restricts the ability to modify the security attributes SCD operational to the signatory.
The security functions specified by FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation and FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation
provide access control based on the security attributes managed according to the SFR
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory, FMT_MSA.1/Signatory, FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3 and FMT_MSA.4. FMT_MOF.1
ensures that only the signatory can enable/disable the signature creation function. The SFR FMT_SMF.1
and FMT_SMR.1 list these management functions and the roles. These ensure that the signature process
is restricted to the signatory.
Furthermore, the security functionality specified by FDP_RIP.1 will ensure that no attacker can get hold of
the SCD (to create signatures outside the TOE) once SCD have been deleted by the legitimate signatory.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE) ensures that the DTBS/R is not altered by
the TOE. The verification that the DTBS/R has not been altered by the TOE is provided by integrity functions
specified by FDP_SDI.2/DTBS.
OT.EMSEC_Design (Provide physical emanations security) covers that no intelligible information is
emanated. This is provided by FPT_EMSEC.1.1.
OT.Tamper_ID (Tamper detection) is provided by FPT_PHP.1 by the means of passive detection of
physical attacks.
OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper resistance) is provided by FPT_PHP.3 to resist physical attacks.
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7. TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
This set of TSFs manages the identification and/or authentication of the external user and enforces role
separation.
7.1. SF.Access Control
This function checks that for each operation initiated by a user, the security attributes for user
authorization and data communication required are satisfied.
7.2. SF.Administration
In Initialization Phase this TSF provides Card initialization and pre-personalization services as per
GlobalPlatform. This includes but is not restricted to card initialization, patch loading, applet installation and
instantiation.
7.3. SF.Signatory Authentication
This TSF manages the identification and authentication of the Signatory and enforces role separation
between the Signatory and the Administrator.
7.4. SF.Signature Creation
This TSF is responsible for signing DTBS data using the SCD by the Signatory, following successful
authentication of the Signatory.
7.5. SF.Secure Messaging
Commands and responses are exchanged between the TOE and the external device. This TSF provides a
secure communication channel between legitimate end points both of the TOE and the external device.
7.6. SF.Crypto
This Security Function is responsible for providing cryptographic support to all the other Security Functions
including secure key generation and operations on data such as encrypt and sign.
7.7. SF.Protection
This Security Function is responsible for protection of the TSF data, user data, and TSF functionality.
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8. Additional Rationale
8.1. Dependencies Rationale
8.1.1. SAR Dependencies
The functional and assurance requirements dependencies for the TOE are completely fulfilled.
Requirement Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5 ADV_TDS.4, ADV_IMP.1
ADV_IMP.1 ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_INT.2 ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_TDS.4 ADV_FSP.5
AGD_OPE.1 ADV_FSP.5
AGD_PRE.1 No dependencies
ALC_CMC.4 ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.5 No dependencies
ALC_DEL.1 No dependencies
ALC_DVS.2 No dependencies
ALC_LCD.1 No dependencies
ALC_TAT.2 ADV_IMP.1
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1 No dependencies
ASE_INT.1 No dependencies
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1 No dependencies
ASE_TSS.1 ADV_FSP.5, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.2
ATE_COV.2 ADV_FSP.5, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.3 ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2 ADV_FSP.5, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2, ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.5 ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4, ADV_IMP.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1
Table 12 – SAR Dependencies
8.1.2. Justification of Unsupported Dependencies
All dependencies are supported.
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8.1.3. SFR Dependencies
Requirement Dependencies
Functional Requirements
FCS_CKM.1 FCS_COP.1, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1, FDP_ITC.1/SCD
FCS_COP.1 FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FDP_ITC.1/SCD
FCS_COP.1/ENC FCS_CKM.4, FDP_ITC.1
FCS_COP.1/MAC FCS_CKM.4, FDP_ITC.1
FDP_ACC.1/ SCD/SVD_Generation FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer
FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation
FDP_ACF.1/ SCD/SVD_Generation FDP_ACC.1/ SCD/SVD_Generation, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ITC.1/SCD FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_UCT.1/SCD FTP_ITC.1/SCD, FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import
FDP_RIP.1 No dependencies
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent No dependencies
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS No dependencies
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/Admin
FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import, FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation,
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory FDP_ACC.1/ Signature _creation, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.2
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation, FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import,
FMT_MSA.1/Admin, FMT_MSA.1/Signatory, FMT_SMR.1
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation,
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1/ Admin, FMT_MSA.1/Signatory, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.4
FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import, FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation,
FMT_MTD.1/Admin FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1
FTP_EMSEC.1 No dependencies
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies
FPT_PHP.1 No dependencies
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies
FTP_ITC.1/SCD No dependencies
Table 13 – SFR Dependencies
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8.2. Rationale for Extensions
Extensions are based on the Protection Profiles [4,5] and have all been adopted by the developer of the
TOE:
- FPT_EMSEC.1 ‘TOE emanation’
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8.3. PP Claim Rationale
This ST includes all the security objectives and requirements claimed by the two claimed Protection Profiles
[4,5] and, all of the operations applied to the SFRs are in accordance with the requirements of these PPs.
The security requirements in the ST is a super-set of the requirements from the claimed PPs.
8.3.1. PP compliancy
The TOE type is compliant with the claimed PPs: the TOE is a Secure Signature-Creation Device
representing the SCD storage, SCD/SVD generation, and signature-creation component.
The TOE is compliant with the representation provided in both PPS:
- SSCD of Type 2 represents the SCD storage and signature-creation component.
- SCD generated on an SCD/SVD generation component shall be exported to an SSCD Type 2 over
a trusted channel.
- SSCD Type 3 is analogous to a combination of the SCD/SVD generation component and Type 2,
but no transfer of the SCD between two devices is provided.
- SSCD Type 2 and Type 3 are personalized components; it means that they can be used for
signature creation by one specific user – the signatory - only.
Actually, Type 2 and Type 3 are not necessarily to be considered mutually exclusive, as both PPs state.
The conformance to the PPs is strict
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9. Terminology
Term Definition
CC Common Criteria
CGA
Certification generation application (CGA) means a collection of application
elements which requests the SVD from the SSCD for generation of the qualified
certificate. The CGA stipulates the generation of a correspondent SCD / SVD
pair by the SSCD, if the requested SVD has not been generated by the SSCD
yet. The CGA verifies the authenticity of the SVD by means of the SSCD proof
of correspondence between SCD and SVD and checking the sender and
integrity of the received SVD.
CSP
Certification-service-provider (CSP) means an entity or a legal or natural
person who issues certificates or provides other services related to electronic
signatures (defined in the Directive, article 2.11).
DI Dual Interface
Directive
The Directive; DIRECTIVE 1999/93/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for
electronic signatures
DTBS
Data to be signed (DTBS) means the complete electronic data to be signed
(including both user message and signature attributes)
DTBS Representation
Data to be signed representation (DTBS-representation) means the
representation data sent by the SCA to the TOE for signing and is
- a hash-value of the DTBS or
- an intermediate hash-value of a first part of the DTBS and a remaining
part of the DTBS or
- the DTBS
The SCA indicates to the TOE the case of DTBS-representation, unless
implicitly indicated. The hash-value in case (a) or the intermediate hash-value
in case (b) is calculated by the SCA. The final hash-value in case (b) or the
hash-value in case (c) is calculated by the TOE.
OS Operating System
Qualified Certificate
Means a certificate which meets the requirements laid down in Annex I of the
Directive and is provided by a CSP who fulfils the requirements laid down in
Annex II of the Directive. (defined in the Directive, article 2.10)
RAD
Reference authentication data (RAD) means data persistently stored by the
TOE for verification of the authentication attempt as authorised user.
SCA
Signature-creation application (SCA) means the application used to create an
electronic signature, excluding the SSCD. I.e., the SCA is a collection of
application elements.
- to perform the presentation of the DTBS to the signatory prior to the
signature process according to the signatory's decision,
- to send a DTBS-representation to the TOE, if the signatory indicates by
specific non misinterpretable input or action the intend to sign,
- to attach the qualified electronic signature generated by the TOE to the
data or provides the qualified electronic signature as separate data.
SCD
Signature-creation data (SCD) means unique data, such as codes or private
cryptographic keys, which are used by the signatory to create an electronic
signature. (defined in the Directive, article 2.4)
SDO
Signed data object (SDO) means the electronic data to which the electronic
signature has been attached to or logically associated with as a method of
authentication.
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Term Definition
Signatory
Signatory means a person who holds a SSCD and acts either on his own behalf
or on behalf of the natural or legal person or entity he represents. (defined in
the Directive, article 2.3)
SSCD
Secure signature-creation device (SSCD) means configured software or
hardware which is used to implement the SCD and which meets the
requirements laid down in Annex III of the Directive. (SSCD is defined in the
Directive, article 2.5 and 2.6)
SVD
Signature-verification data (SVD) means data, such as codes or public
cryptographic keys, which are used for the purpose of verifying an electronic
signature. (defined in the Directive, article 2.7)
TS Tessera Sanitaria
VAD
Verification authentication data (VAD) means authentication data provided as
input by knowledge or authentication data derived from user’s biometric
characteristics.
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10. References
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - CCMB-2012-09-001 - Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - CCMB-2012-09-002 -Part 2:
Security functional requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - CCMB-2012-09-003 -Part 3:
Security assurance requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[4] prEN 14169-2:2009 – Protection profiles for Secure signature creation device — Part 2: Device
with key generation – Version: 1.03, 12/2009
[5] prEN 14169-3:2012 – Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 3: Device with
key import - Version: 1.0.2, 07/2012
[6] NXP P60D080JVC Technical Datasheet.
[7] NXP Toolbox Technical Datasheet.
[8] BSI-PP-0035-2007 – Security IC Platform Protection Profile – version 1.0 – EAL4+
[9] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0897-V2-2014 – for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D080/052/040yVC – NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH – v1.0
[10] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040yVC Security Target Lite – Rev 1.3 – 17
October 2013
[11] PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 2.1
[12] Specifications for the Java Card 3 Platform, Version 3.0.4 Classic Edition, Sept. 2011
- Virtual Machine Specification [JCVM]
- Application Programming Interface [JCAPI]
- Runtime Environment Specification [JCRE]
[13] GlobalPlatform, Card Specification, Version 2.2.1, Jan. 2011 [GPC_SPE_034]
- GlobalPlatform Card ID Configuration, Version 1.0, Dec. 2011 [GPC_GUI_039]
- Confidential Card Content Management – Amendment A, v1.0.1, Jan 2011
- Secure Channel Protocol 03 – Amendment D, v1.1, Sept. 2009
[14] CCDB-2007-09-001 – Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices – Version:
1.0, revision 1, September 2007
[15] DIRECTIVE 1999/93/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 13
December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures
[16] Algorithms and parameters for algorithms, list of algorithms and parameters eligible for electronic
signatures, procedures as defined in the directive 1999/93/EC, article 9 on the ‘Electronic Signature
Committee’ in the Directive.
[17] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques — Cryptographic techniques based
on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002
[18] ISO/IEC 9796-2: Information technology — Security techniques — Signature Schemes giving
message recovery — Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms, 2002
[19] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note, Version
1.4, Revised November 1, 1993
[20] Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO 15946.TR-ECC, BSI 2006.
[21] FIPS PUB 180-2, FIPS Publication – Secure hash standard (+ Change Notice to include SHA-224),
2002, NIST
[22] FIPS PUB 46-3, FIPS Publication – Data Encryption Standard (DES), Reaffirmed 1999 October 25,
NXP Semiconductors Draft
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U.S. Department of Commerce/NIST
[23] IEEE 1363-2000 – IEEE Standard Specification for Public-Key Cryptography
[24] ISO/IEC 9797-1: 2011 Information technology -- Security techniques – Message Authentication
Codes (MACs) -- Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher
[25] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB, Security Target, Rev. 1.11, 2016-06-14
[26] Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y VB, Security Target, Rev. 1.5, 2016-06-27
[27] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Evaluation Methodology,
Version 3.1 CCMB-2012-09-004, Revision 4, September 2012
[28] JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA), Security Target, Rev. 1.9, 2016-12-14.
[29] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB, Security Target, Rev. 1.1, 2016-03-23
[30] SmartMX2 P6022y_VB, Wafer and delivery specification, NXP Semiconductors, Rev. 2.2, 2016-
03-08.
[31] JCOP 3 SECID P60 ChipDoc v7b1 applet in SSCD configuration, Preparation and Operation
Manual, Revision 1.1, 2017-03-06
[33] prEN 14169-1:2010 – Protection profiles for Secure signature creation device — Part 1: Overview,
date 2012–01
[34] EN 419211-1:2011 – Protection profiles for Secure signature creation device — Part 1: Overview
[35] JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA), Security Target Lite, Rev. 1.4, 2016-10-12