BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015
for
Infineon Security Controller M5073 G11 with
optional RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008, EC v2.03.008,
SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v2.03.008 libraries and
with specific IC dedicated software (firmware)
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.13
BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015 (*)
Infineon Security Controller M5073 G11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v2.03.008, EC v2.03.008, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v2.03.008 libraries
and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware)
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also
published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
Bonn, 11 November 2015
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................9
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................16
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................17
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................17
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................18
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................18
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................19
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................21
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................25
11. Security Target............................................................................................................26
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................26
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................30
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................33
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................33
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................34
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................41
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08
September 2014, this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up
to and including CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contains the components
ADV_FSP.5, ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.3, ADV_SPM.1, ADV_TDS.5, ALC_CMC.5,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.3, ATE_COV.3, ATE_DPT.3, ATE_FUN.2 and
AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the
CCRA-2000, for mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are
relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015 Certification Report
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon Security Controller M5073 G11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v2.03.008, EC v2.03.008, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v2.03.008 libraries and with specific
IC dedicated software (firmware) has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is
a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-2015. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-2015 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Infineon Security Controller M5073 G11 with optional
RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008, EC v2.03.008, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v2.03.008 libraries
and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware) was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 6 November 2015. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 11 November
2015 is valid until 10 November 2020. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product Infineon Security Controller M5073 G11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v2.03.008, EC v2.03.008, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v2.03.008 libraries and with specific
IC dedicated software (firmware) has been included in the BSI list of certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Security Controller M5073 G11 with optional
RSA2048/4096 (v2.03.008), EC (v2.03.008), SHA-2 (v1.01) and Toolbox (v2.03.008)
libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware).
The major components of the core system are the two CPUs (Central Processing Units),
the MMU (Memory Management Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit).
The two CPUs control each other in order to detect faults and serve by this for data
integrity. The TOE implements a full 16 MByte linear addressable memory space for each
privilege level, a simple scalable Memory Management concept and a scalable stack size.
The flexible memory concept consists of ROM- and Flash-memory as part of the non
volatile memory (NVM), respectively Infineon® SOLID FLASH™8
.
The TOE is intended to be used in any applications and devices with highest security
requirements. For example in smart cards and also in other applications, such as for
example secure element in various mobile devices. This new product family features a
progressive security philosophy focusing on data integrity. By that three main principles
combined in close synergy are utilized in the new security concept called the “Integrity
Guard”. The Integrity Guard implements the main principles full error detection, full
encryption and intelligent active shielding. With these capabilities this TOE can be used
almost everywhere, where highly secure applications are in use and of course in any other
application as well. This TOE is deemed for governmental, corporate, transport and
payment markets, or wherever a secure root of trust is required. Various types of
applications can use this TOE, for example in closed loop logical access controls, physical
access controls, secure internet access control and internet authentication, or as
multi-application token or simply as encrypted storage.
The coprocessor block contains the two co-processors for cryptographic operations are
implemented on the TOE: The Crypto2304T for calculation of asymmetric algorithms like
RSA and Elliptic Curve (EC) and the Symmetric Cryptographic Processor (SCP) for
dual-key or triple-key triple-DES and AES calculations.
The security peripherals block contains the small remaining set of sensors and filters. This
small set of sensors is left in order to detect excessive deviations from the specified
operational range, while not being over-sensitive. These features do not need adjustment
or calibration.
The memory block contains the ROM, RAM and the SOLID FLASH™ (NVM). All data of
the memory block is encrypted and all memory types are equipped with an error detection
code (EDC), the SOLID FLASH™ (NVM) in addition with an error correction code (ECC).
Errors in the memories are automatically detected (EDC) and in terms of the SOLID
FLASH™ NVM 1-Bit-errors are also corrected (ECC).
The peripherals block is constituted out of PTRNG, DRNG, CRC, Timer & WDT, the RFI
and the UART. The TRNG respectively PTRNG is specially designed for smart cards, but
can also be used in any other application where excellent physical random data are
required. The TRNG respectively PTRNG fulfills the requirements from the functionality
class PTG.2 of the AIS31 and produces genuine random numbers which then can be used
directly.
8
SOLID FLASH™ is an Infineon Trade Mark and stands for Flash EEPROM technology.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015 Certification Report
TheTOE can come with both cryptographic co-processors accessible, or with a blocked
SCP or with a blocked Crypto2304T, or with both cryptographic co-processors blocked.
The blocking depends on the user’s choice.
The TOE implements optionally the so called Bill-Per-Use (BPU) ability. This solution
enables the customer to tailor the product on his own to the required configuration –
project by project. By that BPU allows for significant reduction of logistic cost at all
participating parties and serves for acceleration of delivery of tailored product to the
end-user. Depending on the order, the Flash Loader comes with the BPU-software
enabling for TOE configuration at user premises. After completion of the download and/or
final configuration of the TOE, and prior delivery to the end user, the user is obligated to
lock the Flash Loader. Locking is the permanent deactivation of the Flash Loader meaning
that if once locked it can no more be reactivated and used. Note that the Flash Loader
routines are always present, but are deactivated in case of the derivatives ordered without
the software download option. This TOE is represented by various products, differentiated
by various configuration possibilities, done either by Infineon settings during production or,
after delivery, by means of blocking at customer premises.
The GCIM mode is explained and detailed in the user guidance document hardware
reference manual.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_DPM Device Phase Management
SF_PS Protection against Snooping
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
SF_CS Cryptographic Support
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 4.1.2 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon Security Controller M5073 G11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008, EC
v2.03.008, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v2.03.008 libraries and with specific IC
dedicated software (firmware).
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW M5073 Smart Card IC G11 (produced in
Tainan)
Complete modules, with or
without inlay mounting, with
or without inlay antenna
mounting, in form of plain
wafers, in any IC case , as
bare dies or in whatever
type of package.
2 FW Flash Loader FW Identifier
78.023.01.2
Stored in reserved area of
IFX ROM on the IC (patch
in NVM)
3 FW STS Self Test Software (the IC
Dedicated Test Software)
FW Identifier
78.023.01.2
Stored in Test ROM on the
IC (patch in NVM)
4 FW RMS Resource Management
System (the IC Dedicated Support
Software)
FW Identifier
78.023.01.2
Stored in reserved area of
IFX ROM on the IC (patch
in NVM)
5 FW SA library FW Identifier
78.023.01.2
Stored in reserved area of
IFX ROM on the IC (patch
in NVM)
6 SW9
ROM code (including Embedded
Software and crypto libraries)
– Stored in User ROM on the
IC
7 SW10
NVM image (including Embedded
Software and crypto libraries)
– Stored in Flash memory on
the IC
9
Only in case the IC Embedded Software Developer provides Infineon with code for ROM.
10
Only in case the IC Embedded Software Developer provides Infineon with code for Flash memory.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
8 SW RSA library (optional) RSA2048
v2.03.008
RSA4096
v2.03.008
Object code in electronic
form
9 SW EC library (optional) EC v2.03.008 Object code in electronic
form
10 SW Toolbox (optional) Toolbox
v2.03.008
Object code in electronic
form
11 SW SHA-2 library (optional) SHA-2v1.01 Object code in electronic
form
12 DOC AMM Advanced Mode for
Mifare-Compatible Technology
Addendum to M5073 Hardware
Reference Manual
2014-11-04 Hardcopy or pdf-file
13 DOC M5073 SOLID FLASH Controller
for Security Applications 16-bit
Security Controller Family
Hardware Reference Manual
2015-05-22 Hardcopy or pdf-file
14 DOC M5073 SOLID FLASH Controller
for Security Applications 16-bit
Security Controller Family 90 nm
Technology Errata Sheet
2015-05-27 Hardcopy or pdf-file
15 DOC 16-bit Security Controller – M5073
SOLID FLASH Controller for
Security Applications Security
Guidelines
2015-08-21 Hardcopy and pdf-file
16 DOC 16-bit Controller Family SLE 70
Programmer’s Reference Manual
2015-05-06 Hardcopy and pdf-file
17 DOC SLE70 Asymmetric Crypto Library
for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC /
Toolbox (2.03.008)
2014-07-31 Hardcopy and pdf-file
18 DOC Crypto@2304T User Manual 2010-03-23 Hardcopy and pdf-file
19 DOC SLx70 Family Secure Hash
Algorithm SHA-2 (SHA 256/224,
SHA 512/384) Library Version
V1.01
2009-11-06 Hardcopy and pdf-file
20 DOC SLx 70 Family Production and
Personalization User’s Manual
2015-04-01 Hardcopy and pdf-file
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
A processing step during production testing incorporates the chip-individual features into
the hardware of the TOE. The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its serial
number. The hardware part of the TOE is identified by M5073 G11. Another characteristic
of the TOE are the chip identification data. These chip identification data is accessible via
the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM). The production of the TOE is performed at
TSMC in Tainan/Taiwan.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015
This dual interface controller is able to communicate using either the contact based or the
contactless interface. For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 1.2.
The firmware parts are the RMS library, the Service Algorithm Minimal (SA), the STS
firmware for test purpose, providing some functionality via an API to the Smartcard
Embedded Software, the Flash Loader for downloading user software to the SOLID
FLASH™ (NVM) and the Mifare compatible software interface. The entire firmware is
located in the ROM and the belonging patches are stored in the SOLID FLASH™ (NVM).
The software parts are differentiated into the cryptographic libraries RSA, EC and SHA-2
and the supporting libraries Toolbox and Base. In the descriptive context of the Security
Target, it is regardless which version of the cryptographic libraries is addressed. RSA, EC,
SHA-2 and Toolbox provide certain functionality via an API to the Smartcard Embedded
Software. The Base Library is only used internally by the RSA, EC and Toolbox libraries
and has no user interface. If none the three libraries RSA, EC and Toolbox is delivered,
also the Base Library is not on board. The SHA-2 library does not use the Base Library.
The RSA library is used to provide a high level interface to the RSA cryptography
implemented on the hardware component Crypto2304T. The RSA library is delivered as
object code and in this way integrated in the user software.
The EC library is used to provide a high level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography. The
routines are used for ECDSA signature generation, ECDSA signature verification, ECDSA
key generation and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement. The EC library is
delivered as object code and in this way integrated in the user software.
The SHA-2 library provides the calculation of a hash value of freely chosen data input in
the CPU. The SHA-2 library is delivered as object code and is in this way available for the
user software.
The toolbox library does not provide cryptographic support or additional security
functionality as it provides only the following basic long integer arithmetic and modular
functions in software, supported by the cryptographic coprocessor.
The Base Library provides the low level interface to the asymmetric cryptographic
coprocessor and has no user available interface. The base library does not provide any
security functionality, implements no security mechanism, and does not provide additional
specific security functionality. For more details please refer to Security Target [6] and
Security Target Lite [9], chapter 2.2.2.
The cryptographic libraries RSA, EC and SHA-2 are delivery options. Therefore the TOE
may come with free combinations of or without these libraries. In the case of coming
without one or any combination of these libraries the TOE does not provide the Additional
Specific Security Functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA) and/or Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (EC) and/or SHA-2.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithm (Triple-DES and AES) to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data
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by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a True
Random Number Generator (TRNG).
The RSA Library is used to provide a high level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto2304T and includes
countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The EC Library is used to provide a
high level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography implemented on the hardware
component Crypto2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA
attacks.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during AES, Triple-DES, RSA and EC cryptographic functions
performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: OE.Resp-Appl, OE.Lim_Block_Loader and OE.Process-Sec-IC. Details can
be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is an integrated circuit (IC) providing a platform for an operating sytem and
application software used in smartcards but also in any other device or form factor
requiring a high level of resistance against attackers. A top level block diagram and a list of
subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target [6], chapter
2.1.
The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible to the Intel 80251
architecture. The major components of the core system are the two CPUs (Central
Processing Units), the MMU (Memory Management Unit) and MED (Memory
Encryption/Decryption Unit). The two CPUs control each other in order to detect faults and
serve by this for data integrity. The TOE implements a full 16 MByte linear addressable
memory space for each privilege level, a simple scalable Memory Management concept
and a scalable stack size. The flexible memory concept consists of ROM- and
Flash-memory as part of the non volatile memory (NVM), respectively Infineon® SOLID
FLASH™. For the Infineon® SOLID FLASH™ memory the Unified Channel Programming
(UCP) memory technology is used. Note that there is no user available on-chip ROM
module anymore. The user software and data are now located in a dedicated and
protected part of the Infineon® SOLID FLASH™.
The two cryptographic co-processors serve the need of modern cryptography: The
symmetric co-processor (SCP) combines both AES and Triple-DES with dual-key or
triple-key hardware acceleration. The Asymmetric Crypto Co-processor, called
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Crypto2304T in the following, is an optimized version of the Crypto@1408 used in the
SLE88-family with performance improvements for RSA-2048 bit (4096-bit with CRT) and
Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptography.
The software part of the TOE consists of the cryptographic RSA-, EC- and the SHA-2
libraries and the supporting Toolbox and Base libraries. If RSA or EC or Toolbox or
combinations hereof are part of the shipment, automatically the Base Library is included.
The Flash Loader is a firmware located in the IFX-ROM (Read-Only Memory) and enables
the download of the user software or parts of it to the Infineon® SOLID FLASH™ memory.
After completion of the download the Flash Loader shall be locked by the by the user.
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 1.2 and 2.2.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories:
1. Technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against
the specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the
circuitry (this testing is not strictly related to Security Functionalities);
2. Tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the
analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE;
3. Regression tests of the hardware within a simulation environment based on special
software dedicated only for the regression tests;
4. Regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software and for
the IC Dedicated Support Software on emulator versions of the TOE and within a
software simulation of chip in special hardware;
5. Characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production:
a) used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different operating
conditions and varied process parameters (often also referred to as characterisation
tests);
b) special verification tests for Security Functionalities which were done with
samples of the TOE (referred also as developers security evaluation) and which
include also layout tests by automatic means and optical control, in order to verify
statements concerning the layout;
6. Functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct
functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3).
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
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The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developers
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. The tests of the developer were repeated by sampling, by
repetition of complete regression tests and by software routines developed by the
evaluators and computed on samples with an evaluation operating system. For the
developer tests repeated by the evaluators other test parameters were used and the test
equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout
measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in design data
and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities using bespoke equipment and expert
know how. The penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and
attacks which do not modify the TOE physically. The penetration tests results confirm that
the TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack potential in the intended environment for
the TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Smartcard IC M5073 G11 (Tainan).
Depending on the blocking configuration, the TOE can have a different user available
configuration as described in Security Target Lite [6] and [9], chapter 1.1. For example, the
TOE can come in one project with the fully available Infineon® SOLID FLASH™ or in
another project with any other Infineon® SOLID FLASH™ -size below the physical
implementation size, or with a different RAM size. And more, the user has the free choice,
whether he needs the symmetric co-processor SCP, or the asymmetric co-processor
Crypto2304T, or both, or none of them. In addition, the user decides, whether the TOE
comes with a free combination of software libraries or without any. And, to be even more
flexible, various interface options can be chosen as well.
All possible TOE configurations equal and/or within the below specified ranges are
covered by the certificate. Note that there is no user available on-chip ROM module any
more. The user software and data are now located in a dedicated and protected part of the
SOLID FLASH™. According to the BPU option, a non limited number of configurations of
the TOE may occur in the field. The number of various configurations depends on the
order and purchase contract only. The following table lists the configuration options:
Blocking object Blocking options
Solid Flash 0 to 628 kByte
User ROM 0 to 444 kByte
User RAM 1 to 12 kByte
System Frequency 1,031 MHz up to 50 MHz
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Blocking object Blocking options
Crypto@2304T accessible / blocked
SCP accessible / blocked
ISO 7816-3 slave Available / not available
Inter Integrated Circuit I2C Available / not available
RFI – ISO 14443 generally Available / not available
RFI Input Capacity 27pF, 56pF, 78pF
ISO 14443 Type A card mode Available / not available
ISO 14443 Type B card mode Available / not available
ISO 18092 NFC passive mode Available / not available
Direct Data Transfer (DDT) Available / not available
Buffered Data Transfer (BDT) Available / not available
Advanced Communication Mode (ACM) Available / not available
Software controlled Input Output (SWIO) Available / not available
Mifare hardware support for card mode Available / not available
Advanced Mode for Mifare Technology (AMM) Available / not available
SW support for Mifare compatible 4k cards Available / not available
SW support for Mifare compatible 1k cards Available / not available
SW support for Mifare compatible readers Available / not available
ACLB Available / not available
Hot Spot Distribution in SOLID FLASH™ NVM Available / not available
RSA2048 v2.03.008 / not available
RSA4096 v2.03.008 / not available
EC v2.03.008 / not available
SHA v1.01 / not available
Toolbox v2.03.008 / not available
FW version / identifier 78.023.01.2
Table 3: TOE configurations
The entire configuration is done during the manufacturing process of the TOE according to
the choice of the user or by Bill Per Use (BPU). BPU allows a customer to block chips on
demand at the customer´s premises. Customers, who intend to use this feature receive the
TOEs in a predefined configuration. The blocking information is part of a chip configuration
area. Dedicated blocking information can be modified by customers using specific APDUs.
Once final blocking is done, further modifications are disabled.
Type Name Version Number
Firmware FW Identifier including RMS, STS, FL, SA and
Mifare
78.023.01.2
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Type Name Version Number
Software RSA crypto library (optional) RSA2048 v2.03.008,
RSA4096 v2.03.008
EC library (optional) v2.03.008
Toolbox (optional) v2.03.008
SHA-2 library (optional) v1.01
Table 4: TOE identification (Firmware and software parts)
The RSA (optional), EC (optional), SHA-2 (optional), Toolbox (optional), and Base Library
(optional) as separate software parts of the TOE are identified by their unique version
numbers. The user can identify these versions by calculating the hash signatures of the
provided library files. The mapping of these hash signatures to the version numbers is
provided in the Security Target Lite [9], chapter 10. The version numbers of firmware and
software are listed above.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits,
● The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards,
● Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators,
● Terminology and preparation of Smartcard evaluations,
(see [4] AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31, as well as AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
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● The component ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a
re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-2015, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on isolated hardware
and firmware changes.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[8],
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended,
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Key Agreement ECDH [ANS X9.63],
[IEEE_P1363],
[ISO_11770-3]
Key sizes corresponding to
the used elliptic curves P-192,
K-163 [FIPS186-4] and
brainpoolP{160, 192}r1,
brainpoolP{160, 192}t1
[RFC5639]
No
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Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
100 Bits
ECDH [ANS X9.63],
[IEEE_P1363],
[ISO_11770-3]
Key sizes corresponding to
the used elliptic curves
P-{224, 256, 384, 521},
K-{233, 409}, B-{233, 283,
409} [FIPS186-4],
brainpoolP{224,256,320,384,
512}r1,
brainpoolP{224,256,320,384,
512}t1 [RFC5639]
Yes
Cryptographic
Primitive
TDES in ECB
mode
[NIST SP800-67],
[NIST SP800-38A]
|k| = 112, 168 No
TDES in CBC,
CBC-MAC,
CBC-MAC-ELB,
BLD mode
[NIST SP800-67],
[NIST
SP800-38A],
[ISO_9797-1]
|k| = 112 No
TDES in Recrypt
mode
– |k| = 112 No
TDES in CBC,
CBC-MAC,
CBC-MAC-ELB,
BLD mode
[NIST SP800-67],
[NIST
SP800-38A],
[ISO_9797-1]
|k| = 168 Yes
TDES in Recrypt
mode
– |k| = 168 Yes
AES in ECB
mode
[FIPS197], [NIST
SP800-38A],
[ISO_10118-3],
[ISO_18033-3]
|k| = 128, 192, 256 No
AES in CBC
mode
[FIPS197] , [NIST
SP800-38A],
[ISO_10118-3],
[ISO_18033-3]
|k| = 128, 192, 256 Yes
RSA encryption /
decryption /
signature
generation /
verification (only
modular
exponentiation
part)
[PKCS #1],
[IEEE_P1363]
Modulus length =
1976 - 4096
Yes
ECDSA signature
generation /
verification / key
generation
[ANS X9.62],
[IEEE_P1363],
[ISO_14888-3]
Key sizes corresponding to
the used elliptic curves P-192,
K-163 [FIPS186-4] and
brainpoolP{160, 192}r1,
brainpoolP{160, 192}t1
[RFC5639]
No
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Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
100 Bits
ECDSA signature
generation /
verification / key
generation
[ANS X9.62],
[IEEE_P1363],
[ISO_14888-3]
Key sizes corresponding to
the used elliptic curves
P-{224, 256, 384, 521},
K-{233, 409}, B-{233, 283,
409} [FIPS186-4],
brainpoolP{224,256,320,384,
512}r1,
brainpoolP{224,256,320,384,
512}t1 [RFC5639]
Yes
Physical True
RNG PTG.2
[AIS31] N/A N/A
SHA-{256, 512} [FIPS180-4] None Yes
Table 5: TOE cryptographic functionality
[ANS X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services ANS X9.62-2005,
Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA),
November 16, 2005, American NationalStandards Institute.
[ANS X9.63] American National Standard for Financial Services X9.63-2001,
Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Key
Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography,
November 20, 2001, American National Standards Institute.
[FIPS 186-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB
186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013, U.S. department
of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST).
[RFC5639] RFC 5639 - Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard
Curves and Curve Generation, IETF Trust and the persons identified
as the document authors, March 2010.
[NIST SP800-67] NIST Special Publication 800-67, Recommendation for the Triple
Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, Revised January
2012, Revision 1, National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
[AIS31] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS),
AIS 31, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197,
November 26, 2001, Announcing the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION
STANDARD (AES), National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[PKCS#1] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, v2.1, June 14, 2002, RSA
Laboratories
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[IEEE_P1363] IEEE P1363. Standard specifications for public key cryptography.
IEEE, 2000.
[ISO_10118-3] ISO 10118-3: Information technology -- Security techniques --
Hash-functions -- Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions, 2004.
[ISO_11770-3] ISO 11770-3: Information technology - Security techniques – Key
management Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques,
1999.
[ISO_14888-3] ISO/IEC 14888-3, Information technology – Security techniques –
Digital signatures with appendix – Part 3: Discrete logarithm based
mechanisms, 2006-11-15.
[ISO_18033-3] ISO/IEC 18033-3: Information technology -- Security techniques --
Encryption algorithms -- Part 3: Block ciphers, 2010.
[ISO_9797-1] Information technology - Security techniques - Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms using a block
cipher, 2011-03-01, ISO/IEC.
[NIST SP800-38A] NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation, 2001-12, National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S. Department
of Commerce.
[FIPS180-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB
180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), March 2012, Information
Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional
configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Support
Software or Embedded Software. For this reason the TOE includes guidance
documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the developer of
the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which measures
have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of
the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be
examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the
product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must
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also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10].
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● All security hints described in the delivered documents [12] to [19] have to be
considered.
The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints
to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [20] have to be considered.
In addition the following hint resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect has
to be considered:
● The IC Embedded Software Developer can deliver his software either to Infineon to let
them implement it in the TOE (in Flash memory) or to the Composite Product
Manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash memory.
● The delivery procedure from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the Composite
Product Manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is required.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
APB™ Advanced Peripheral Bus
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
API Application Programming Interface
AXI™ Advanced eXtensible Interface Bus Protocol
BPU Bill Per Use
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CI Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI)
CIM Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI), same as CI
CPU Central Processing Unit
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CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
Crypto2304T Asymmetric Cryptographic Processor
CRT Chinese Reminder Theorem
DCLB Digital Contactless Bridge
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DFA Differential Failure Analysis
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECC Error Correction Code
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EDC Error Detection Code
EDU Error Detection Unit
EEPROM Electrically Erasable and Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA Electro Magnetic Analysis
Flash EEPROM Flash Memory
FL Flash Loader software
FW Firmware
GCIM Generic Chip Identification Mode
HW Hardware
IC Integrated Circuit
ICO Internal Clock Oscillator
ID Identification
IMM Interface Management Module
IRAM Internal Random Access Memory
IT Information Technology
ITP Interrupt and Peripheral Event Channel Controller
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
I/O Input/Output
MED Memory Encryption and Decryption
MMU Memory Management Unit
NVM Non-Volatile Memory
OS Operating system
ST Security Target
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PEC Peripheral Event Channel
PP Protection Profile
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
PROM Programmable Read Only Memory
RAM Random Access Memory
RMS Resource Management System
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rives-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SAM Service Algorithm Minimal
SCP Symmetric Cryptographic Processor
SF Security Feature
SFR Special Function Register, as well as Security Functional Requirement,
the specific meaning is given in the context
SO Security Objective
SOLID FLASH™ An Infineon Trade Mark and Stands for Flash EEPROM Technology
SPA Simple Power Analysis
STS Self Test Software
SW Software
TOE Target of Evaluation
TM Test Mode (STS)
TRNG True Random Number Generator
TSC TOE Security Functions Control
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
UM User Mode (STS)
UmSLC User Mode Security Life Control
WDT Watch Dog Timer
XRAM eXtended Random Access Memory
3DES Triple DES Encryption Standards
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
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Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation
Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE11
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015, Version 0.8, 2015-10-30, Security Target
M5073 G11, including optional Software Libraries RSA - EC - SHA-2 – Toolbox, for
Common Criteria EAL6 augmented (EAL6+), Infineon Technologies AG (confidential
document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2015-11-03, Evaluation Technical Report -
Summary, TÜV Informationstechnik, (confidential document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13
January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
11
Specifically
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an den Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 19, Version 9, Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS)
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting
Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document
and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL
6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 37, Version 3, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluationen
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015, Version 0.6, 2015-10-30, Security Target
Lite M5073 G11, including optional Software Libraries RSA - EC - SHA-2 – Toolbox,
for Common Criteria EAL6 augmented (EAL6+), Infineon Technologies AG
(sanitised public document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product M5073 G11,
Version 2, 2015-11-03, EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT FOR COMPOSITE
EVALUATION, TÜVIT Informationstechnik (confidential document)
[11] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 0.7, 2015-08-21, “Life Cycle Support
ALC_CMC, ALC_TAT, ALC_FLR for Common Criteria with Evaluation Assurance
Level EAL6 augmented (EAL6+) M5073 G11 Including optional Software Libraries
RSA - EC - SHA-2 – Toolbox” (confidential document)
[12] SLE70 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox User
Interface (v2.03.008), Version 2.03.008. 2014-07-31, Infineon Technologies AG
[13] Crypto@2304T User Manual, 2010-03-23, Infineon Technologies AG
[14] 16-bit Controller Family SLE 70 Programmer’s Reference Manual, Version 8.4,
2015-05-06, Infineon Technologies AG
[15] M5073 SOLID FLASH Controller for Security Applications 16-bit Security Controller
Family 90 nm Technology Errata Sheet, Version 1.1, 2015-05-27, Infineon
Technologies AG
[16] M5073 SOLID FLASH Controller for Security Applications 16-bit Security Controller
Family Hardware Reference Manual, Version 1.1, 2015-05-22, Infineon
Technologies AG
[17] AMM Advanced Mode for Mifare-Compatible Technology Addendum to M5073
Hardware Reference Manual, Version 1.0, 2014-11-04, Infineon Technologies AG
[18] SLx 70 Family Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-2 (SHA 256/224, SHA 512/384) Library,
Version 1.01, 2009-11, Infineon Technologies AG
[19] 16-bit Security Controller – M5073 SOLID FLASH Controller for Security
Applications Security Guidelines, 2015-08-21, Infineon Technologies AG
[20] SLx 70 Family Production and Personalization User’s Manual,
2015-04-01, Infineon Technologies AG
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon Security Controller M5073 G11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v2.03.008, EC v2.03.008, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v2.03.008 libraries and with specific
IC dedicated software (firmware) (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 11 November 2015, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.3) are fulfilled for the
development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Name of site /
Company name
Address Type of site
Agrate - DNP DNP Photomask Europe S.p.A.
Via C. Olivetti 2/A
20041 Agrate Brianza
Italy
Mask Production
Augsburg Infineon Technologies AG
Alter Postweg 101
86159 Augsburg
Germany
Development
Bangalore Infineon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd.
Kalyani Platina, Sy. No. 6 & 24
Kundanahalli Village
Krishnaraja Puram Hobli
Bangalore
"India – 560066
India"
SW Development and
Testing
Bangkok - SmarTrac
covered by [AIS47]
Smartrac Technology Ltd.
142/121/115 Moo
Hi-Tech Industrial Estate
Tambon Ban Laean
Amphor Bang-Pa-In
13160 Ayutthaya
Thailand
Inlay Mounting
Bukarest Infineon Technologies Romania
Blvd. Dimitrie Pompeiu Nr. 6
Sector 2
020335 Bucharest
Romania
Development
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Name of site /
Company name
Address Type of site
Burlington - ASK ASK-intTag, LLC
Building 966
1000 River St., Essex Junction,
Vermont 05452
USA
Inlay Mounting
Corbeil Essones -
Toppan
Toppan Photomask, Inc.
European Technology Center
Boulevard John Kennedy 224
91105 Corbeil Essonnes
France
Mask Production
Dresden - Toppan Toppan Photomask, Inc
Rähnitzer Allee 9
01109 Dresden
Germany
Mask Production
Graz / Villach /
Klagenfurt
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Development Center Graz
Babenbergerstr. 10
8020 Graz
Austria
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Siemensstr. 2
9500 Villach
Austria
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Lakeside B05
9020 Klagenfurt
Austria
Development, IT
Großostheim - K&N Infineon Technology AG
DCE
Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10 – Building 8A
63762 Großostheim
Germany
Distribution Center
Hayward - K&N Kuehne & Nagel
30805 Santana Street
Hayward, CA 94544
USA
Distribution Center
Hsin-Chu - ARDT Ardentec Corporation
No. 3, Gungye 3rd
Rd.,
Hsin-Chu Industrial Park, Hu-Kou,
Hsin-Chu Hsien, Taiwan 30351, R.O.C.
Taiwan 30351, R.O.C.
Wafer Test
Manila - Amkor Amkor Technology Philippines
Km. 22 East Service Rd.
South Superhighway
Muntinlupa City 1702
Philippines
Amkor Technology Philippines
119 North Science Avenue
Laguna Technopark, Binan
Laguna 4024
Philippines
Module Mounting
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Name of site /
Company name
Address Type of site
Morgan Hill Infineon Technologies North America Corp.
18275 Serene Drive
Morgan Hill, CA 95037
USA
Inlay Testing, Distribution
Center
Munich Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
Germany
Development
Regensburg-West Infineon Technologies AG
Wernerwerkstraße 2
93049 Regensburg
Germany
Module Mounting, Inlay
Mounting, Distribution
Center
Round Rock - Toppan Toppan Printing Company America, Inc.
Round Rock Site
2175 Greenhill Drive
Round Rock, Texas 78664
USA
Inlay Mounting
Singapore - DHL DHL Exel Supply Chain
Richland Business Centre
11 Bedok North Ave 4, Level 3,
Singapore 489949
Distribution Center
Singapore Kallang Infineon Technologies Asia Pacific PTE Ltd.
168 Kallang Way
Singapore 349253
Module Mounting, Electrical
module testing
Tainan - TSMC Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company
Ltd.
1, Nan-Ke North Rd.
Tainan Science Park
Tainan 741-44
Taiwan
Mask & Wafer Production,
Initialization and
Pre-personalization
Wuxi Infineon Technologies (Wuxi) Co. Ltd.
No. 118, Xing Chuang San Lu
Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park
Wuxi 214028, Jiangsu
P.R. China
Module Mounting,
Distribution Center
Tabelle 6: Addresses of developer / production sites
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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