BSI-DSZ-CC-0589-2015
for
TightGate-Pro (CC)
Version 1.4
from
m-privacy GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.13
BSI-DSZ-CC-0589-2015 (*)
Server Applications: Other Applications
TightGate-Pro (CC)
Version 1.4
from m-privacy GmbH
PP Conformance: Remote-Controlled Browsers Systems (ReCoBS),
Version 1.0, 26 February 2008,
BSI-CC-PP-0040-2008
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ALC_CMS.4, ALC_FLR.3
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
Bonn, 2 December 2015
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0589-2015
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0589-2015 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0589-2015
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................19
11. Security Target............................................................................................................20
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................20
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................23
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................25
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................26
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0589-2015 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0589-2015
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08
September 2014, this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e.
for all assurance components selected.
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0589-2015 Certification Report
The product TightGate-Pro (CC), Version 1.4 has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI.
The evaluation of the product TightGate-Pro (CC), Version 1.4 was conducted by
datenschutz cert GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 23 November 2015.
datenschutz cert GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: m-privacy GmbH.
The product was developed by: m-privacy GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on
is valid until 1 December 2020. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0589-2015
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product TightGate-Pro (CC), Version 1.4 has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
m-privacy GmbH
Werner-Voß-Damm 62
12101 Berlin
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0589-2015 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0589-2015
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Remote-Controlled Browser System (ReCoBS) which
is designed to be a modular part of a security gateway to enable almost unlimited access
to content on the World Wide Web (WWW) or via e-mail from a Local Computer (LC) of a
user inside a Local Network (LAN). At the same time it prevents both the local information
of users as well as the local computer and net devices (machines) on the LAN from
(negative) effects of malware contained in active content within web pages.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Remote-Controlled Browsers Systems (ReCoBS), Version 1.0, 26
February 2008, BSI-CC-PP-0040-2008 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 3
augmented by ALC_CMS.4, ALC_FLR.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus
the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Subset information flow control This is implemented by the XVNC Server which is supplying
the TOE protocol and enforces the settings and the use of the
TOE protocol. RSBAC RC provides the unbypassability.
Simple security attributes This is implemented by the XVNC Server which is supplying
the TOE protocol and enforces the settings and the use of the
TOE protocol. RSBAC RC provides the unbypassability.
The XVNC Server, by relaying the TOE protocol, transmits a
visual representation of the WWW content. IT provides
clipboard transfer according to the values of SECURITY
ATTRIBUTES COPYPASTEIN AND COPYPASTEOUT set by
the config administrator role. The audio content is relayed via
the PulseAudio sound daemon to a proxy server (not hosted
on the TOE host). The proxy server relays the audio to the LC.
Management of security attributes The restrictive default values “off” for COPYPASTEIN and
COPYPASTEOUT are installed with the mprivacytools-CC
packet. The restrictive default value can only be changed from
the menu system for the config administrator account.
Static attribute initialization This is implemented by the TightGate-Pro (CC) Version 1.4
RSBAC-configuration (provided via the rsbac-policytgpro-CC
packet). It allows only the VNC-Service to be accessed from
the defined client IP range. The client’s IP range must be set
by the config administrator (config menu).
Specification of Management This is implemented by the config administrator menu system
(config menu).
Security Roles This is implemented by predefined, task-specific
ADMINISTRATOR roles with separated duties (maint, config,
backuser, update). The association of roles is done at the
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0589-2015 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
organizational level and no user role can switch to any
administrative role on the TOE host.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 1.3.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.1.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
TightGate-Pro (CC), Version 1.4
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier / Integrity Protection Release Form of Delivery
1 SW TightGate-Pro (CC) Version 1.4 direct delivery from
manufacturer to
customer
2 DOC Installation Handbook
„TightGate-Pro, Dediziertes Remote-Controlled Browser System zum Schutz vor
Gefahren aus dem Internet – Installationshandbuch, AGD-PRE“, [11]
electronic signature
Version 1.41,
30.04.2015
download
3 DOC Administration Handbook
„TightGate-Pro, Dediziertes Remote-Controlled Browser System zum Schutz vor
Gefahren aus dem Internet – Administrationshandbuch, AGDOPE“,[12]
electronic signature
Version 2.3,
30/03/2015
download
4 DOC User Handbook
„TightGate-Pro, Dediziertes Remote-Controlled Browser System zum Schutz vor
Gefahren aus dem Internet – Benutzerhandbuch“, [13]
electronic signature
Version 2.56,
05/02/2015
download
5 SW TOE-Client: TG-Pro-vnc_2.0.7_CC_win32.msi
SHA-256:
e70c192045cf3fa862c9bcf21a0365b71beb853dcae8e0595f06fc44d2cf9190
n/a direct delivery from
manufacturer to
customer
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0589-2015
No Type Identifier / Integrity Protection Release Form of Delivery
6 SW TOE-Client: TG-Provnc_2.0.7_CC_win32_pw.msi
SHA-256:
9ae61300ae1a2369c3ef91a483d34127ee63bf28c9f77c3edba2fc586107a9cf
n/a direct delivery from
manufacturer to
customer
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Prior to the delivery, the TOE server is installed on the hardware selected by the customer.
The hardware requirements from chapter 1.2.2.5 of the ST [6] are taken into consideration.
The delivery of the boot-medium and the TOE being installed on the TOE-Host is carried
out personally by m-privacy GmbH. In addition to being delivered in person, the TOE client
is also made available via secure secure download. The customer can confirm its integrity
by checking the SHA-256 checksum.
The handbooks are available to the customer via download from the following address:
https://p.m-privacy.de/Dokumentation-TightGate-Pro-CC.zip
The corresponding detached signature is available via these direct links:
https://p.m-privacy.de/Dokumentation-TightGate-Pro-CC.zip.sig
https://p.m-privacy.de/Dokumentation-TightGate-Pro-CC.zip.asc
(once in binary format and once in ASCII format).
The customer can confirm the integrity of the handbooks by checking the signature. The
m-privacy key "m-privacy GmbH (m-privacy GmbH) <info@m-privacy.de>" has the
following fingerprint: FCBA 08F2 D39E B9D7 A7AD B3C5 49E3 C159 3AE8 3223
The link is encrypted via TLS with server authentication. The server certificate is issued to
CN=*.m-privacy.de,EMAIL=webmaster@m-privacy.de,C=DE
by
CN=avast! Web/Mail Shield Root,O=avast! Web/Mail Shield,OU=generated by avast!
antivirus for SSL/TLS scanning
and has the fingerprint:
AF987DA89A3B1A649FA18D5081DA8A709039170C
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: A role-based access control policy
to control administrative access to the system, a security policy with regard to the
communication between the TOE server and the TOE client. Specific information about the
above-mentioned security policies can be found in section 7 of the ST [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0589-2015 Certification Report
● The connection between the TOE host (located in the DMZ) and devices in the LAN as
well as the connection between the TOE host and the Internet are separated by a
firewall (cf. Figure 1).
● It must be ensured that TOE clients on the devices (LC) within the LAN are not
manipulated either by users or by software.
● The administrator must be trustworthy and competent and must not access WWW
contents using this role.
● The TOE host operates an independent identification & authentication system. It must be
ensured that users do not use the same credentials for logging on to the TOE host as for
other devices in the LAN, e.g., on the LC.
● The IT environment, especially the TOE host, must prevent that malware on the TOE
host can manipulate TSF data during normal operation.
● Programs that were started within a user’s session must always be closed completely at
the end of a session.
● In the IT environment, especially on the TOE host, only such programs must be
available which are needed for the operation of the TOE on the TOE host.
● The IT environment must offer the possibility to initialize the TOE in time intervals to be
defined and thus to restore it to a secure and known state.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a Remote-Controlled Browser System (ReCoBS) according to [8]. It consists of
three components: the TOE server, the TOE client, and the TOE protocol.
5.1. TOE Server
The TOE server is installed in a particular environment, the TOE host, as described in
chap. 1.2.2.5 [6]. The TOE server is divided into three subsystems:
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Figure 1: TOE Overview
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0589-2015
1. RSBAC
2. VNC
3. Management
The subsystem “RSBAC” consists of the interplay of the kernel extension RSBAC of the
TOE host OS and the associated RSBAC policy in the packet "rsbac-policy-tgprocc".
RSBAC protects the system through a combination of different access control models and
granular access restrictions. All of these are hard-coded and cannot be changed.
The VNC subsystem provides the TOE protocol. The TOE protocol offers the possibility of
using a “clipboard function” for exchanging data between the TOE server and a TOE client.
This function is controlled by this subsystem.
Subsystem Management consists of different administrative configuration menus:
1. config
2. maint
3. update
4. backuser
Each of these menus can only be accessed by the administrative role intended for it. In the
“config” menu, all further settings of the TOE server are performed except for user
administration. The “maint” menu serves for user administration. The “update” menu is
needed for installing updates or performing a reset. The “backuser” menu offers all
functions for configuring possible backup functions.
5.2. TOE Protocol
This is realized via an adapted VNC protocol.
5.3. TOE Client
This is an application that is installed on the local computer (LC) of a user. With the help of
the TOE client, the user can connect to the TOE server and can access contents in the
WAN with protection by the TOE. Via the VNC client menu, the user can approve or
disapprove the transmission of data via the clipboard on a case-by-case basis.
The TOE Client contains three TSFI:
1. Config menu,
2. Maint menu, and
3. VNC viewer menu (interface of TOE client)
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0589-2015 Certification Report
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Test Configuration
For the test environment, the evaluators restricted themselves to a reduced set-up needed
for testing the security functions of the TOE. Therefore, there is no print server and no mail
server. The set-up only includes a local computer (LC) on which the TOE client is
operated, the TOE server with connection to the WAN, and an attack computer (AC) for
the performance of the penetration tests. The LC and the AC are connected to the TOE
host via a switch.
TOE host corresponding to the hardware requirements specified in ST [6] chap. 1.2.2.5 (in
the case of the testing body tests: intel NUC with the model number “D34010WYK”).
● Intel™ i3 4010U Processor (1.7 GHz Dual-Core)
● 8GB RAM
● 250GB hard drive
The TOE server, TightGate-Pro (CC) 1.4 is installed on the TOE host.
Local computer (LC) / system B: A PC on x86- with Windows 7 SP1 (32 bit) as operating
system. The TOE client, TightGate-Pro (CC) 1.4, is installed on the LC via the Windows
Installer (“TG-Pro-vnc_2.0.7_CC_win32.msi”).
7.2. Tests Performed by the Manufacturer
The manufacturer performed the tests in the context of the evaluation both manually and
with tool support and logged them with the help of TestLink. The manufacturer has proven
with the help of a mapping table that all interfaces as well as all SFRs were completely
covered by the tests. To achieve this, the manufacturer defined and described test cases
and assigned these to the respective requirements. All results of the manufacturer tests
correspond to the expected results. Overall, the tests show that the TOE behaves as
specified.
7.3. Tests Performed by the Evaluation Body
The following test methodology was applied:
● The majority of the tests performed were black-box tests that consider the behavior at
the interfaces while taking into account the internal process; regarding the test
parameters to be tested, equivalence classes were created.
● In addition, white-box tests were performed to check the behavior of the TOE with
background knowledge about the functionality.
The tests were performed manually with tool support and were logged. Six test groups
were created:
● T1: Update Process
● T2: Operation
● T3: Configuration
● T4: TOE Client Menu
● T5: TOE Reset
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0589-2015
● T6: Vulnerability Tests
First, a reset (tests T5) was performed in order to restore the TOE to its delivery state.
Then it was checked whether the requirements on the default value are fulfilled and
whether the functional scope of the different roles in the delivery state is consistent with
the manufacturer documentation (tests T2).
Then the TOE was configured manually on the basis of the handbooks in order to bring it
into a completely operational state. While doing so, two users were created to allow later
tests on the access rights to be performed. The SFR-relevant tests of the manufacturer on
the “Config Menu” were repeated (tests T3).
As soon as configuration of the TOE was complete, a sniffer was started on the AC, which
from then on recorded all data traffic from and to the TOE server (tests T6). Now the TOE
client was started and the SFR-relevant tests on the TSFI “VNC Viewer Menu” were
performed (tests T4).
Finally, the update process was checked. Here it was tested, among other things, whether
a falsely signed update can be installed, and the changed version display following a
successful update was checked (tests T1).
The evaluators completely repeated the SFR-related tests on the TSFI “Config Menu” and
the “VNC Viewer Menu”. This ensures, on the one hand, the completeness of the checking
of the SFR; on the other hand, the demand by CEM [2] for repetition of the manufacturer
tests is fulfilled.
All test results corresponded to the expected results. Overall the tests show that the TOE
behaves as specified.
7.4. Vulnerability Tests
In test group T6, it was checked to which extent the security functionality of the TOE can
be circumvented. For this purpose, additional possibilities for attack were first sought.
Then all attack points identified in the first step and the interfaces defined in the functional
specification were checked with regard to vulnerabilities.
The vulnerability tests were set up systematically.
● Step 1: Identification. External port scan, internal port scan, internal vulnerability scan,
network analysis, brute-force attack on the user authentication
● Step 2: Attack via rights extension
● Step 3: Attack on the separation of the user-domains
● Step 4: Attack with the help of browser extensions
● Step 5: Use of an alternative VNC viewer instead of the TOE client
All test results corresponded to the expected results. Overall the tests showed that the
TOE behaves as specified. In the context of the vulnerability tests, no indication of
vulnerabilities was found.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The evaluated configuration is the TightGate-Pro (CC) Version 1.4 software configured as
instructed by the preparatory documentation [11], [12], [13].
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For the operation of the TOE, the following non-TOE hardware/software is assumed, cf. ST
[6], chap. 1.2.2.5:
The TightGate-Pro (CC) Version 1.4 server requires as a minimum the following hardware:
● Processor: 1.5ghz x86 compatible CPU(s)
● RAM: 2GB
● Storage: 20GB free
● Network: 100MBps
The TightGate-Pro (CC) Version 1.4 client requires Microsoft Windows 7 as operating
system.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used. As a result of the evaluation the verdict
PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:
● All components of the EAL 3 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_CMS.4, ALC_FLR.3 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Remote-Controlled Browsers Systems (ReCoBS), Version 1.0,
26 February 2008, BSI-CC-PP-0040-2008 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ALC_CMS.4, ALC_FLR.3
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, no such mechanisms were
part of the assessment.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
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The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a
re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DMZ Demilitarised Zone
DOS Denial of Service
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LAN Local Area Network
LC Local Computer
PP Protection Profile
ReCoBS Remote Controlled Browser System
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
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TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VNC Virtual Network Computing
WWW World Wide Web
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Malware - A programme (which might be an active content) which performs actions
without explicit consent by the user under which environment it is launched. This term
includes both remote controlled as well as autonomous programmes.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE client - Program running on a LC to connect to the TOE server via the TOE protocol.
TOE host - One or several machines located in the DMZ on which the TOE server runs.
The TOE host is not part of the TOE itself but forms an important part of the IT
environment (namely for the TOE server). The term TOE host includes all software
necessary to run the TOE server (including but not limited to the operating system) and
software required for WWW access (e.g. web browsers and extensions).
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
TOE server - Program(s) running on the TOE host to send the (audio-)visual
representation of web content to the TOE client (using the TOE protocol) and transfer the
user input from the TOE client (received via the TOE protocol) to the browsers running on
the TOE host.
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TOE transmission protocol - Set of commands and possible types of information which
the TOE client can send to the TOE server combined with the set of commands and
possible types of information which can be sent from the TOE server to the TOE client, cf.
Section 6.1.1. The general term for the connection between the TOE server and TOE client
is “TOE protocol”.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation
Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0589-2015, Version 1.15, Date 2013-03-21, Common
Criteria: Security Target for the TightGate-Pro(CC) Version 1.4, m-privacy GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.0, Date 11.11.2015, Evaluation Technical
Report – Summary, datenschutz cert GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Remote-Controlled Browsers Systems (ReCoBS), Version 1.0, 26 February 2008,
BSI-CC-PP-0040-2008
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, m-privacy GmbH, Date 24/07/2015, file:
“parts_of_the_TOE_20150724.gz” (confidential document).
[10] List of sourcefiles of the TOE, m-privacy GmbH, Date 20/07/2015, file:
“implementation_of_the_TOE_20150720.gz” (confidential document).
[11] Installation Handbook „TightGate-Pro, Dediziertes Remote-Controlled Browser
System zum Schutz vor Gefahren aus dem Internet – Installationshandbuch,
AGD-PRE“, Version 1.41, 30/04/2015
[12] Administration Handbook „TightGate-Pro, Dediziertes Remote-Controlled Browser
System zum Schutz vor Gefahren aus dem Internet – Administrationshandbuch,
AGD-OPE“, Version 2.3, 30/03/2015
[13] User Handbook „TightGate-Pro, Dediziertes Remote-Controlled Browser System
zum Schutz vor Gefahren aus dem Internet – Benutzerhandbuch“, Version 2.56,
05/02/2015
8
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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