BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010
for
CardOS DI V4.2C CNS with Application for QES
from
Siemens IT Solutions and Services GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010
Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD)
CardOS DI V4.2C CNS with Application for QES
from Siemens IT Solutions and Services GmbH
PP Conformance: Protection Profile - Secure Signature-Creation
Device Type 3, Version 1.05, 25 July 2001,
BSI-PP-0006-2002
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 10 December 2010
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
2.1 Overview of the delivery procedure.......................................................................15
2.2 Identification of the TOE by the end user..............................................................15
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................16
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................16
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................17
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................18
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................18
7.1 Test and penetration concept.................................................................................18
7.2 Description of test configuration............................................................................19
7.3 Penetration testing.................................................................................................20
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................20
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................20
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................20
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................21
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................22
11 Security Target............................................................................................................22
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................22
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................22
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................24
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................25
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................37
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic).
The new agreement was initially signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010
Within the terms of this agreement the German Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI) recognises
● for the basic recognition level certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national
certification bodies of France, The Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
● for the higher recognition level in the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices
certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national certification bodies of France, The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
Historically, the first SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement Version 1 (ITSEC only)
became initially effective in March 1998. It was extended in 1999 to include certificates
based on the Common Criteria (MRA Version 2). Recognition of certificates previously
issued under these older versions of the SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement is being
continued.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the component AVA_VAN.5 that is not mutually recognised in
accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4
components of this assurance family is relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product CardOS DI V4.2C CNS with Application for QES has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0667-2010.
The evaluation of the product CardOS DI V4.2C CNS with Application for QES was
conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 29 October 2010.
The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010 Certification Report
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Siemens IT Solutions and Services GmbH.
The product was developed by: Siemens IT Solutions and Services GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
5 Publication
The product CardOS DI V4.2C CNS with Application for QES has been included in the BSI
list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Siemens IT Solutions and Services GmbH
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
81739 München
Deutschland
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is "CardOS DI V4.2C CNS with Application for QES". It is a
smartcard that is to be used as a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD). The
smartcard is based on the Infineon Dual Interface Chip SLE66CLX800PE with a contact
field and a contactless interface. The TOE allows to generate electronic signatures over
previously externally calculated hash values. The TOE generates the signature key pair
and ensures that the Signature Verification Data (SVD, i.e. public key) is protected from
modification and insertion errors during export. It is able to protect the secrecy of the
internally generated and stored Signature Creation Data (SCD, i.e. secret key) and
restricts the usage access to the authorised signatory only. The restriction on the access to
the secret key is done via a PIN authentication mechanism.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile - Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 3, Version 1.05, 25 July 2001,
BSI-PP-0006-2002 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and one
of them is newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionalities:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SS1 User Identification and Authentication
SS2 Access Control
SS3 SCD/SVD Pair Generation
SS4 Signature Creation
SS5 Protection
SS6 Secure Messaging
SS7 SVD Transfer
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.1 to 3.3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE: “CardOS DI V4.2C CNS with
Application for QES” and different personalisation ways given in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010 Certification Report
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
CardOS DI V4.2C CNS with Application for QES
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 Software
(Operating
System)
CardOS DI V4.2C C80C, 07.09.09 loaded in ROM /
EEPROM
2 V4.2C DI
Software
Application,
Digital
Signature
(Application /
Data Structure)
Pre-loaded variant 1:
V42C_DI_InitScript_1.csf
V42C_DI_InitScript_1_DF_DS_x.csf
V42C_DI_CAScript_1.csf
V42C_DI_CAScript_1_DF_DS_x.csf
V42C_DI_PersScript_1.csf
V42C_DI_PersScript_1_DF_DS_x.csf
V42C_DI_RAScript_1.csf
V42C_DI_RAScript_1_DF_DS_x.csf
#4(*), 17.09.10
#2(*), 11.06.10
#4(*), 17.09.10
#1(*), 23.10.09
#4(*), 17.09.10
#1(*), 23.10.09
#4(*), 17.09.10
#1(*), 23.10.09
Personalization
Script Files in CSF
format, after
whose execution
the ADS will be
loaded in
EEPROM
Pre-loaded variant 2:
V42C_DI_InitScript_2.csf
V42C_DI_InitScript_2_DF_DS_x.csf
V42C_DI_CAScript_2.csf
V42C_DI_CAScript_2_DF_DS_x.csf
V42C_DI_CaScript_2_DF_DS_x_cert.csf
V42C_DI_PersScript_2.csf
V42C_DI_PersScript_2_DF_DS_x.csf
V42C_DI_RAScript_2.csf
V42C_DI_RAScript_2_DF_DS_x.csf
#4(*), 17.09.10
#2(*), 11.06.10
#4(*), 17.09.10
#1(*), 23.10.09
#1(*), 23.10.09
#4(*), 17.09.10
#1(*), 23.10.09
#4(*), 17.09.10
#1(*), 23.10.09
Post-loaded variant:
V42C_DI_InitScript_Post.csf
V42C_DI_LRAScript_Post.csf
V42C_DI_LRAScript_Post_DF_DS_x.csf
#4(*), 17.09.10
#4(*), 17.09.10
#2(*), 11.06.10
All variants:
V42C_DI_Default.csf #1(*), 23.10.09
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
3 Service
Package
(mandatory)
Service Package 03h 04h 13h 01h
C8h 0Ch(**)
26.05.10
Personalization
Script Files in CSF
format, after
whose execution
the resp. code will
be loaded in
EEPROM
(included in
Init_Scripts)
4 Software
Command_Set
_Extension
Package
(mandatory)
CommandSet_Ext_Package 03h 04h 01h 01h
C8h 0Ch(**)
26.05.10
5 Software CNS
Package
(mandatory)
CNS Package 11h 04h 01h 03h
C8h 0Ch(**)
15.09.10
6 Software SISS
Package
(optional)
SISS Package 11h 04h 02h 01h
C8h 0Ch(**)
22.12.09
7 Software
SSCR Package
Technical
SSCR_Tech_Package 03h 04h 06h 01h
C8h 0Ch(**)
22.12.09
Personalization
Script Files in CSF
format (code only
temporarily in
EEPROM)
8 Software
SSCR Package
Organizational
SSCR_Org_Package 03h 04h 07h 01h
C8h 0Ch(**)
22.12.09
9 Documentation CardOS License Package Tool Manual [19] 1.3, 09/2005 Paper form or
PDF-File
10 Documentation CardOS V4.2B User’s Manual [14] 1.0, 09/2005
11 Documentation CardOS DI V4.2C Packages & Release
Notes [15]
3.0, 09/2010
12 Documentation CardOS DI V4.2C SISS, SSCR Packages &
Release Notes [20]
1.0, 05/2010
13 Admin
Documentation
CardOS DI V4.2C CNS Administrator
Guidance [11]
0.70, 09/2010
14 User
Documentation
CardOS DI V4.2C CNS User Guidance [12] 0.70, 09/2010
15 ADS
Documentation
CardOS DI V4.2C CNS ADS_Description
[21]
0.70, 09/2010
16 Hardware
(Chip)
Infineon SLE66CLX800PE m1581-a14
(Dresden)
Module
17 Firmware RMS RMS RMS_E V06 Stored in reserved
area of User ROM
18 Software crypto
library
RSA2048 crypto library Version 1.4 Loaded in ROM
19 Firmware STS Self Test Software V57.08.07 Stored in
Test ROM
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
(*) Last two characters of entry %VERSION%
(**) PID (package ID) containing package version
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010 Certification Report
There are the following different personalisation ways – pre-personalisation (scenario 1
and scenario 2) and post-personalisation (scenario 3) –, which represent, speaking the
language of the CC, different delivery and configuration procedures. The final TOE in its
operational phase resulting from any of these personalisation procedures will at the end of
the personalisation process always be the same object from its security and functional
behaviour point of view.
2.1 Overview of the delivery procedure
The delivery from the TOE software developer (SW-DVL) to the chip manufacturer (CPM)
is outlined in section 4.3 of [16] and the delivery to the trust center / certification authority
(TC/CA) is outlined in section 4.4 of [16] including the general processing chain. The
delivery to the card holder (CH) is explained in section 4.5 of [16]. The delivery of the
terminal developer (TD) is described in section 4.6 of [16].
The trust center / certification authority (TC/CA) receives the TOE specific hardware from
the CPM and the software and documentation parts of the TOE from the SW-DVL.
The TC/CA is responsible for handling the TOE (hardware, software and documentation) in
such a way that its confidentiality, integrity and authenticity are guaranteed in the domain
of TC/CA.
Before finally reaching the card holder (CH), the manufactured hardware passes the
following logical entities whose work items may or may not be executed by separate
organizational entities (e.g. in the domain of one TC):
● Embedder (EMB): Initialisation
● Certification Authority (CA): Key generation
● Personalizer (PERS): Personalization
● (Local) Registration Authority (LRA): Certificate installation
All these entities (EMB, CA, PERS, LRA) are compelled to accept the security policy
formulated and enforced by TC/CA. The TC/CA security policy should assert that each
entity applies the acceptance procedure detailed in the TOE’s administrator guidance and
that modification of the incomplete hardware is only possible after authentication with an
entity specific authentication key.
The delivery from the TC/CA to the card holder is subject to the TC/CA security policy, too.
The SW-DVL never interacts with the CH (the end user) directly. Therefore, there is no
direct interface between SW-DVL and CH.
The delivery from the TC/CA to the terminal developer (TD) is subject to the TC/CA
security policy, too.
2.2 Identification of the TOE by the end user
The end user (card holder) can identify his signature card by reading out i) the card name
and version, ii) information about the loaded packages, and iii) information about the chip.
This information can be retrieved by using the following steps (xyh stands for a byte xy in
hexadecimal notation, x and y are variables):
● The version of the operating system can be identified with the command GET DATA
using specific modes (see [14], chapter 3.20):
Mode 82h must return the OS version "C8h 0Ch"
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010
Mode 80h must return the product name, version and copyright string “CardOS V4.2C DI
(C) Siemens AG 1994-2009." (43h 61h 72h 64h 4Fh 53h 20h 56h 34h 2Eh 32h 43h 20h
44h 49h 20h 28h 43h 29h 20h 53h 69h 65h 6Dh 65h 6Eh 73h 20h 41h 47h 20h 31h 39h
39h 34h 2Dh 32h 30h 30h 39h 00h).
● Information about loaded packages can be checked with the command GET DATA using
mode 88h (see [14], chapter 3.20). Its response has to show the mandatory packages
Service Package:
E1h 09h 03h 04h 13h 01h C8h 0Ch 8Fh 01h 01h,
the Command_Set_Extension Package:
E1h 09h 03h 04h 01h 01h C8h 0Ch 8Fh 01h 01h
and CNS Package:
E1h 09h 11h 04h 01h 03h C8h 0Ch 8Fh 01h 01h.
It may as well show the optional package SISS:
E1h 09h 11h 04h 02h 01h C8h 0Ch 8Fh 01h 01h.
● Identification of the chip (hardware, RMS, crypto library, STS) can be done via GET
DATA in mode 81h (see [14], chapter 3.20), that must show 32 bytes whereby
the ninth byte (first index equals 1) contains the chip type, which must be A4h for the
SLE66CLX800PE,
and the eleventh byte the production line:
2xh for Dresden.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The TOE implements the Signature Creation Data (private key) used for signature creation
under sole control of the signatory. The TOE implements all IT security functionality which
is necessary to ensure the secrecy of the SCD. To prevent the unauthorised usage of the
SCD the TOE provides user authentication and access control.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against physical attacks through the TOE interfaces, against copying
and releasing of the signature-creation data, against deriving the signature-creation data,
against forgery and against misuse of the signature-creation function of the TOE. Hence
the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security Functions
(security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.CGA_QCert: Generation of qualified certificates
● OE.SVD_Auth_CGA: CGA verifies the authenticity of the SVD
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010 Certification Report
● OE.HI_VAD: Protection of the VAD
● OE.SCA_Data_Intend: Data intended to be signed
● OE.Env_KeyGen: Generation of SCD/SVD key pairs
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE (CardOS DI V4.2C CNS with Application for QES) is a secure signature-creation
device (SSCD) according to Directive 1999/93/ec of the European parliament and of the
council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures [17].
The TOE consists of i) configured software (OS, packages and signature application) ii)
the underlying hardware (SLE66CLX800PE from Infineon) used to implement the secure
signature-creation device (SSCD) and iii) the pertaining guidance documentation.
The operating system (the CardOS DI V4.2C, mask number C80Ch) is loaded into the
ROM, all packages are loaded in EEPROM and the application data structure is created by
personalization script files.
The external physical interface of the smartcard is given by a contact field and by a
contactless interface for data exchange. The TOE provides a logical interface being used
to exchange commands and responses between each IFD (interface device) and the TOE
by transferring APDUs (application protocol data unit).
The software description and instruction set of the CardOS DI V4.2 CNS operating system
can be found in the “User’s Manual CardOS V4.2B” [14]. Additional information (e.g.
modes of operation and application specific command sequences) are given in “CardOS
DI V4.2C CNS, User Guidance” [12], and in the “CardOS DI V4.2C CNS, Administrator
Guidance” [11].
The TOE is divided into the following eight subsystems:
Subsystem 1: Protocol Manager (monitors the correct data transfer)
Subsystem 2: Command Manager (implements the command identification)
Subsystem 3: Command Layer (contains the interpretation of all CardOS commands)
Subsystem 4: Service Layer (contains service and security routines)
Subsystem 5: System Layer (contains system and basic routines)
Subsystem 6: RMS_E V06 (contains writing routines for EEPROM, RNG tests, toggeling
the VPLL and analysing of error codes)
Subsystem 7: ADS (application digital signature, DF_DS)
Subsystem 8: IC (SLE66CLX800PE secure micro controller)
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components
mentioned above are realized within the software with the exception of subsystem 8 which
comprises the underlying IC and is therefore a hardware implementation.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
As this product is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0667-2010, some tests could be
re-used. This holds especially for tests concerning only packages as packages are
identical for both TOEs.
7.1 Test and penetration concept
The evaluators have spent adequate testing effort for the desired resistance of the TOE
against attackers with a high attack potential. The evaluators spent several days each
● for analysing the test specification and ensuring that the specification has been correctly
implemented in the test scripts,
● for creating ideas for independent evaluator tests,
● for ensuring that the test environment delivers correct test results and then for repeating
developer tests as well as carrying out independent tests.
Due to the test set-up, it was rather easy to check that the actual test results match the
expected test results, simply by searching full-text through the test protocol.
The following testing approach was chosen: Independent tests were identified based on
the developer tests already available. The developer tests have been compared with the
ST, the FSP and the TDS in order to determine the fields of further investigation.
According to EAL4, testing is performed down a depth of subsystem interfaces. Since
● the product type of the TOE is a smart card, the interfaces of which are most easily
accessible through the TSFI (command APDUs and response APDUs), and since
● testing via command APDUs provides additional advantages like easy repeatability (re-
run scripts) and protocol files (by logging the APDU traffic sent to and received from the
TOE),
the evaluators tried to perform as many test cases as possible through implementing test
scripts. However, the need arose to test effects that are not visible through the TSFI. For
such effects, tests using the simulator or the emulator have been carried out, which
allowed to selectively inspect and even manipulate memory content, to set breakpoints
and even to follow the program control flow in single step mode.
The tests showed that the TOE behaves as expected in all configurations that are
considered as part of the evaluation. The depth of testing is adequate for the evaluation
assurance level chosen (EAL4+). The TOE has successfully passed independent testing.
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7.2 Description of test configuration
The tested TOE configuration consists of the configured software (OS, packages and
signature application) used to implement the secure signature-creation device (SSCD).
The software runs on the security processor chip SLE66CLX800PE from Infineon.
For the tests, the operating system CardOS DI V4.2C (mask number C80Ch) resides in
the ROM. The application data structure is set using the personalization script files. The
TOE being tested also contained the packages Service Pack, Command_Set_Extension
Package, and CNS Package (SISS package is optional) loaded in the EEPROM.
The developer has tested the final TOE personalised according to each personalisation
procedure.
Most of the testing effort is realised by using automated script based tests. For these tests
the complete interaction with the TOE is given by the communication resp. the data traffic
(APDUs) transmitted over a card terminal. All security services, except SS5, are
completely addressed via this APDU interface.
Some tests addressing the SS5 focus also the interaction with the chip surface (hardware)
and internal security mechanisms that cannot be directly addressed by using APDUs.
These test procedures comprise manual test and emulator tests allowing to affect the TOE
in a way that is not intended by the ‘ordinary’ interfaces (e.g. object reuse, reaction on
checksum errors).
The test strategy was to test the single properties of the security enforcing function (their
behaviour). The single test cases (noted by unambiguous test-IDs) were produced and
performed for each external visible interface of each security service. The manual tests
covered the special properties of the security services having been not testable via the
external interfaces.
The test scripts implementing the automated tests contained also the expected test
results. The test environment of the developer reported of each deviation between the
expected and actual test results, so that the developer was able to search for, to find and
to correct all errors, if any.
The tests implemented by the developer include tests of all APDUs being relevant for the
TSF with their characteristic input parameters. This ensures coverage of the TSF in a
sense like ATE_COV.
The SS5 (Protection) and some other special properties of the TSFs (e.g. decrementing of
the retry counter, internal data padding, performing of the primality tests while generating
the signature key pair or clearing of the storage medium) could not be tested based on
APDUs only; for this TSF special tests have been carried out on a simulator or emulator.
In all, the developer tests covered all security services defined in the Security Target.
Where possible, the tests were performed at the APDU level, ensuring a coverage of at
least all FSP interfaces.
The test specification comprises over 200 test cases, the test logs in ASCII format
comprise around 32,0 MB. Overall, the developer testing results showed that the TOE
behaves as expected, i.e. as specified in the ADV documentation.
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7.3 Penetration testing
Potential vulnerabilities were identified in the evaluator’s vulnerability analysis. However,
the analysis shows that none of these potential vulnerabilities is exploitable by an attacker,
even with high attack potential.
The penetration tests have been performed using real cards, test cards and using the
emulator. Both pre- and post-personalisation have been tested. Where there was a
difference in the behaviour, the preconditions for each test are listed in the respective
documentation. Tests have also been performed with various key lengths, focusing on the
most commonly used key lengths, but testing also other modulus lengths, including
modulus lengths with an odd number of bytes.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: CardOS DI V4.2C CNS
with Application for QES with or without the optional package SISS Package.
There are three different signature card versions, two pre- and one post-personalisation
card. The pre-personalisation versions (scenario 1 and 2) are delivered to the CH
containing already the complete, previously installed Application Digital Signature (ADS).
The personalisation has already been performed.
● In scenario 1 the signatory has always to be present for the Self Signed Certificate
Request, whereas
● in scenario 2 the SSCR may also be performed by the CA without user presence. For
this version the card holder must have given his prior written consent to the CA, to allow
the special use of the signature key for the SSCR.
The post-personalisation version is delivered without containing the ADS. Only other
applications are accessible. In case the CH wants the signature applications to be
installed, the LRA (resp. CSP) has to be consulted to perform the installation.
To distinguish between the pre- and post personalisation versions, one has to select the
DF_DS_Keys which in the case of the only initialized post-personalisation card has to
result in the error message ‘File not found’ (6A68h).
After completion of the post-personalisation, all three card versions show the same
behavior.
For identification of the TOE, please refer to Chapter 2.2 of this report.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 (AIS 34) and
guidance specific for the technology of the product [4].
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
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● As the evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation, the ETR [8]
includes also the evaluation results of the composite evaluation activities in accordance
with CC Supporting Document, ETR for Composition: Annex A Composite smart card
evaluation [4, AIS 36].
● The ETR [8] builds up on the ETR for Composition documents of the evaluation of the
underlying hardware "SLE66CLX800PE / m1581-a14, SLE66CLX800PEM / m1580-a14,
SLE66CLX800PES / m1582-a14, SLE66CX800PE / m1599-a14, SLE66CLX360PE /
m1587-a14, SLE66CLX360PEM / m1588-a14, SLE66CLX360PES / m1589-a14,
SLE66CLX180PE / m2080-a14, SLE66CLX180PEM / m2081-a14, SLE66CLX120PE /
m2082-a14, SLE66CLX120PEM / m2083-a14, all with optional libraries RSA 2048 V1.5
and EC V1.1 from Infineon Technologies AG" [9].
● For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25 and AIS 26 (see
[4], AIS 25, AIS 26) were used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The component AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0667-2010, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on another version of the operating
system (DI V4.2C instead of V4.4) and on changes induced through a different HW
(Infineon CLX800PE instead of CX680PE).
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Protection Profile - Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 3,
Version 1.05, 25 July 2001, BSI-PP-0006-2002 [7] (strict
conformance)
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product
certification (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with
a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks
with high attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for these
functions it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the
intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische
Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (www.bsi.bund.de).
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The cryptographic functionalities 2-key Triple DES (2TDES) and RSA 1024 provided by the
TOE achieve a security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all
aspects of Assumptions, Threats and Policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● The software developer (Siemens IT Solutions and Services GmbH) and the chip
manufacturer (Infineon Technologies AG) are responsible to prevent misuse of the
PackageLoadKey; especially they have to ensure the confidentiality of this key.
● Besides the general recommendations concerning the quality of a PIN/PUK (e.g. length,
retry count, etc.) as stated in the user guidance [12], sec. 2.1, the user must be urged to
choose a non trivial PIN/PUK before using the TOE in its operational state.
● If the developer should consider using the TOEs implementation of the RSA1024 library
in another product, the following transitional change in the library must be assured.
During the transition of the library to another product, variations of appropriate
parameters must be implemented effectively and in such a manner, that characteristic
knowledge gained while analysing one products library cannot be used for the analysis
of the other product's library.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
ADS Application Digital Signature
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CA Certification authority
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CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CGA Certification Generation Application
CH Card Holder
CPM Chip Manufacturer
CSP Certification Service Provider
DOC Documentation / documents
DTBS Data to be signed
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EMB Embedder
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FSP Functional Specification
HW Hardware
IC Integrated Circuit
ID Identification Number
IFD Interface Device
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LRA Local Registration Authority
OS Operating System
PERS Personalizer
PIN Personal Identification Number
PP Protection Profile
PUK Personal Unblocking Key
QES Qualifizierte elektronische Signatur, qualified electronic signature
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCA Signature creation application
SCD Signature Creation Data (private key)
SFP Security Function Policy
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SFR Security Functional Requirement
SigG Signaturgesetz
SSCD Secure Signature Creation Device
SSCR Self Signed Certificate Request
ST Security Target
SVD Signature Verification Data
SW Software
SW-DVL Software developer
TC Trust Center
TD Terminal Developer
TDES Triple DES
TDS TOE Design Specification
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionalities
VAD Verification Authentication Data
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 1, September 2006
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 2, September 2007
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 2, September 2007
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list, published also
on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010, Version 0.50, 29.04.2010, Security Target
CardOS DI V4.2C CNS with Application for QES, Siemens AG
[7] Protection Profile - Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 3, Version 1.05, 25 July
2001, BSI-PP-0006-2002
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.01, 29 October 2010, T-Systems GEI GmbH
(confidential document)
[9] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product SLE66CLX800PE
/ m1581-a14, SLE66CLX800PEM / m1580-a14, SLE66CLX800PES / m1582-a14,
SLE66CX800PE / m1599-a14, SLE66CLX360PE / m1587-a14,
SLE66CLX360PEM / m1588-a14, SLE66CLX360PES / m1589-a14,
SLE66CLX180PE / m2080-a14, SLE66CLX180PEM / m2081-a14,
SLE66CLX120PE / m2082-a14, SLE66CLX120PEM / m2083-a14, all with optional
libraries RSA V1.5 and EC V1.1 from Infineon Technologies AG, Certification ID
BSI-DSZ-CC-0482, Version 5, 16.03.2010, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
(confidential document)
[10] CardOS DI V4.2C CNS with Application for QES Configuration List 10/2010 ,
Version 0.1, 11.10.2010 (confidential document)
[11] Administrator Guidance CardOS DI V4.2C CNS, Edition 09/2010, Version 0.70,
Siemens AG, 15.09.2010
8
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 7, 3 August 2010, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 6, 3 August 2010, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 2, 24 October 2008, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
(CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 36, Version 3, 19 October 2010, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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[12] User Guidance CardOS DI V4.2C CNS, Edition 09/2010, Version 0.70, Siemens AG,
13.06.2010
[13] Sequences of the personalisation scripts, Siemens AG, CardOS DI V42C
Personalization scripts dated 17.09.2010
[14] User’s Manual CardOS V4.2B, release 09/2005, Siemens AG, 09.2005
[15] Package & Release Notes CardOS DI V4.2C, Siemens AG, Edition 09/2010
[16] CardOS 4.4 (CNS) and CardOS DI V4.2C CNS, Life-cycle support, Siemens AG,
Version 0.30, Edition 02/2010, 20.01.2010
[17] Directive 1999/93/ec of the European parliament and of the council of 13 December
1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures
[18] Certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0482-2008 for SLE66CLX800PE / m1581-
e13a/a14, SLE66CLX800PEM / m1580-e13a/a14, SLE66CLX800PES / m1582,
SLE66CLX800PE / m1599-e13a/a14-e13a/a14, SLE66CLX360PE / m1587-
e13a/a14, SLE66CLX360PEM / m1588-e13a/a14, SLE66CLX360PES / m1589-
e13a/a14, SLE66CLX180PE / m2080-a14, SLE66CLX180PEM / m2081-a14,
SLE66CLX120PE / m2082-a14, SLE66CLX180PEM / m2083-a14,,all optional with
RSA 2048 V1.5 and ECC V1.1 and all with specific IC dedicated software from
Infineon Technologies AG, 27.Mai.2008, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
[19] CardOS License Package Tool Manual, Version 1.3, 09/2005, Siemens AG
[20] CardOS DI V4.2C SISS, SSCR Packages & Release Notes, Version 1.0, 05/2010,
Siemens AG
[21] CardOS DI V4.2C CNS ADS_Description, Version 0.70, 09/2010, Siemens AG
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (Chapter 9.4)
„The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 2 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment 39
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0665-2010
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product CardOS DI V4.2C CNS with Application for QES (Target of Evaluation,
TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the
Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology
of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 10 December 2010, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Siemens IT Solutions and Services GmbH, Otto-Hahn-Ring 6, 81739 Munich,
Germany (Software development, Testing, CMS, TOE (i.e. MASK) generation,
Documentation)
b) Siemens IT Solutions and Services GmbH, Allee am Röthelheimpark 3A,
91052 Erlangen, Germany (Software development)
c) For development and production sites regarding the “SLE66CLX800PE /
m1581-e13a/a14, SLE66CLX800PEM / m1580-e13a/a14, SLE66CLX800PES /
m1582, SLE66CLX800PE / m1599-e13a/a14-e13a/a14, SLE66CLX360PE /
m1587-e13a/a14, SLE66CLX360PEM / m1588-e13a/a14, SLE66CLX360PES /
m1589-e13a/a14, SLE66CLX180PE / m2080-a14, SLE66CLX180PEM /
m2081-a14, SLE66CLX120PE / m2082-a14, SLE66CLX180PEM / m2083-
a14,all optional with RSA 2048 V1.5 and ECC V1.1 and all with specific IC
dedicated software from Infineon Technologies AG“ refer to the certification
report BSI-DSZ-CC-0482-2008.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the Threats, Security Objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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