MRTD full EAC v2 Public Security Target BAC FQR No: 110 7607 FQR Issue: 4 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Legal Notice © OT. All rights reserved. Specifications and information are subject to change without notice. The products described in this document are subject to continuous development and All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the properties of their respective owners. ** Printed versions of this document are uncontrolled ** MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Specifications and information are subject to change without notice. The products described in this document are subject to continuous development and improvement. All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the properties ** Printed versions of this document are uncontrolled ** Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 92700 improvement. All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the properties T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Document Management A. Identification Business Unit - Department ID R&D Document type: FQR Document Title: MRTD full EAC FQR No: 110 7 FQR Issue: 4 MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Document Management ID R&D FQR MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Security Target BAC 110 7607 4 Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Table of contents LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF TABLES 9 1 SECURITY TARGET INTR 1.1 Purpose ................................ 1.2 Objective of the security target 1.3 Security target identification 1.4 TOE technical identification 1.5 IC identification 2 TOE OVERVIEW 2.1 Product overvi 2.2 TOE overview................................ 2.3 TOE usages................................ 2.4 TOE definition 3 TOE ARCHITECTURE 3.1 Integrated Circuit 3.2 Low layer ................................ 3.3 Tools modules 3.4 Applicative modules 3.5 Operating System 3.6 Application layer 4 TOE LIFE CYCLE 4.1 Life cycle overview 4.2 Phase 1 “Development” 4.3 Phase 2 “Manufacturing” 4.4 Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document” 4.5 Phase 4 “Operational Use” MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ Objective of the security target................................................................ Security target identification ................................................................ TOE technical identification................................................................ IC identification................................................................................................ Product overview................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ Integrated Circuit - NXP P60................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ Applicative modules................................................................ Operating System................................................................................................ Application layer................................................................................................ overview .............................................................................................. Phase 1 “Development”................................................................ Phase 2 “Manufacturing”................................................................ Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document”................................ Phase 4 “Operational Use” ................................................................ Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 8 10 ..............................................10 ............................................10 ...............................................11 .................................................12 ...................................13 14 ................................14 ......................................15 ..........................................16 .....................................17 19 .................................................19 ............................................20 .....................................21 ............................................................21 ................................22 .................................22 23 ..............................23 .......................................................25 .....................................................25 ................................................26 ..................................................27 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 5 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS 5.1 Common Criteria conformance 5.1.1 Overview of the SFR defined in this ST 5.1.2 Overview of the additional protocols 5.1.2.1 Chip Authentication 5.1.2.2 Active Authentication 5.1.2.3 Prepersonalization phase 5.2 Protection Profile conformance 5.3 Rationale for the additions 5.4 Non evaluated features 6 SECURITY PROBLEM DEF 6.1 Subjects ................................ 6.1.1 PP BAC subjects 6.1.2 Additional Subjects 6.2 Assets ................................ 6.3 Threats ................................ 6.3.1 Threats from the PP BAC 6.3.2 Threats for CA 6.3.3 Threats for AA 6.3.4 Threats for Note 6 6.4 Organisational Security Policies 6.4.1 OSP from PP BAC 6.4.2 OSP for CA................................ 6.4.3 OSP for AA................................ 6.5 Assumptions ................................ 6.5.1 Assumptions from PP BAC 6.5.2 Assumptions for Chip Authentication 6.5.3 Assumptions for Active Authentication 7 SECURITY OBJECTIVES 7.1 Security Objectives for the TOE 7.1.1 SO from PP BAC 7.1.2 SO for CA ................................ MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS Criteria conformance ................................................................ Overview of the SFR defined in this ST ................................................................ Overview of the additional protocols ................................................................ Chip Authentication ................................................................................................ Active Authentication................................................................................................ Prepersonalization phase................................................................................................ Protection Profile conformance ................................................................ Rationale for the additions ................................................................ Non evaluated features................................................................ SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ................................................................................................ subjects................................................................................................ Additional Subjects ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ he PP BAC................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ s for Note 6................................................................................................ Organisational Security Policies ................................................................ OSP from PP BAC................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ Assumptions from PP BAC ................................................................ Assumptions for Chip Authentication................................................................ Assumptions for Active Authentication ................................................................ SECURITY OBJECTIVES Security Objectives for the TOE................................................................ SO from PP BAC................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 28 ............................................28 .................................... 29 ...................................... 30 ........................................ 30 ...................................... 30 ................................ 30 ...........................................31 ..................................................31 .......................................................31 32 ..............................................32 ........................................ 32 .................................. 33 .................................................34 ...............................................35 .......................................................... 35 .......................................... 38 .......................................... 38 .................................... 38 ...........................................39 ...................................... 39 ................................................ 40 ................................................ 40 .......................................40 ....................................................... 40 ...................................... 41 ................................... 42 43 ............................................43 ........................................ 43 .................................................. 44 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 7.1.3 SO for AA................................ 7.1.4 SO for Note 6................................ 7.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment 7.2.1 OE from PP BAC 7.2.1.1 Issuing State or Organization 7.2.1.2 Receiving State or Organization 7.2.2 OE for CA................................ 7.2.3 OE for AA................................ 8 EXTENDED REQUIREMENT 8.1 Extended family FAU_SAS 8.1.1 Extended components FAU_SAS.1 8.2 Extended family FCS_RND 8.2.1 Extended component FCS_RND.1 8.3 Extended family FIA_API 8.3.1 Extended component FIA_API.1 8.4 Extended family FMT_LIM 8.4.1 Extended component FMT_LIM.1 8.4.2 Extended component FMT_LIM.2 8.5 Extended family FPT_EMS 8.5.1 Extended component FPT_EMS.1 9 SECURITY REQUIREMENT 9.1 Security Functional Requirements 9.1.1 Global SFR ................................ 9.1.2 Product configuration SFR 9.1.2.1 SFR for additional code 9.1.2.2 Manufacturing and Personalization 9.1.3 Active Authentication SFR 9.1.4 Basic Access Control SFR 9.1.4.1 Common Basic Access Control SFR 9.1.4.2 Specific Basic Access Control SFR 9.1.5 Chip Authentication SFR 9.2 Security Assurance Requirements MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ Security objectives for the Operational Environment................................ OE from PP BAC................................................................................................ Issuing State or Organization ................................................................ Receiving State or Organization ................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage................................ Extended components FAU_SAS.1................................................................ Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers ................................ Extended component FCS_RND.1................................................................ Extended family FIA_API – Authentication proof of identity ................................ Extended component FIA_API.1 ................................................................ Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability Extended component FMT_LIM.1................................................................ Extended component FMT_LIM.2................................................................ Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation ................................ Extended component FPT_EMS.1................................................................ SECURITY REQUIREMENTS Security Functional Requirements................................................................ ................................................................................................ Product configuration SFR ................................................................ SFR for additional code ................................................................................................ Manufacturing and Personalization ................................................................ Active Authentication SFR................................................................ Basic Access Control SFR................................................................ Common Basic Access Control SFR................................................................ Specific Basic Access Control SFR................................................................ Chip Authentication SFR................................................................ Security Assurance Requirements................................................................ Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - .................................................. 45 ............................................ 45 ............................................46 ........................................ 46 .......................................................... 46 ...................................................... 48 .................................................. 48 .................................................. 49 51 .....................................................51 ........................................... 51 ................................51 ............................................ 51 .................................51 .............................................. 51 Limited capabilities and availability...........................52 ............................................ 52 ............................................ 52 .........................................................53 ............................................ 53 54 ........................................54 ................................................ 54 ....................................................... 56 ................................... 56 ................................................ 59 ........................................................ 67 .......................................................... 69 .................................................. 69 .................................................... 72 ........................................................... 75 ........................................81 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 10 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFIC 10.1 TOE Summary Specification 11 RATIONALES 12 REFERENCES 13 ACRONYMS INDEX 90 MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION TOE Summary Specification ................................................................ Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 82 .................................................82 85 86 89 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ List of Figures Figure 1 - ID-One Native eDoc Overview Figure 2 - Block 1 Overview Figure 3 - TOE architecture Figure 4: Smartcard product life- MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 One Native eDoc Overview -cycle for the TOE Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 15 15 19 23 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ List of tables Table 1 - General Identification Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification Table 3 - Chip Identification Table 4 - Block 1 Applications overview Table 5 - OT Cryptographic library Table 6 - Roles identification on the life cycle Table 7 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps Table 8 - Conformance Rationale Table 9 -SFR from the PP Table 10 - Additional SFR Table 11 - User Data Table 12 - TSF Data Table 13- Threats and Security Objectives Table 14 - OSPs and Security Objectives Table 15 - Assumptions and OE – MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 TOE Technical Identification Block 1 Applications overview OT Cryptographic library Roles identification on the life cycle Subjects identification following life cycle steps Conformance Rationale Threats and Security Objectives – coverage OSPs and Security Objectives – Coverage – Coverage Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 11 12 13 15 20 24 24 28 29 30 34 35 85 85 85 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose The objective of this document is to present the product on NXP components from 1.2 Objective of the security target This security target describes the security needs for MRTD full EAC v2 product. The product is conforming to PP BAC and adds requirements for prepersonalization and personalization. This security target aims to satisfy the requirements of Common Criteria level EAL4 augmented defined in §1.3 in defining the security enforcing functions of the the environment in which it operates. The objectives of this Security Target are: - To describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart card life cycle. - To describe the security envi the threats to be countered by the TOE and by the operational environment during the platform active phases. - To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE (and its documentation) during the product active phases. - To specify the security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements, the TOE assurance requirements and the security requirements for the - To describe the summary of the TOE specification including a description of the security functions and assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements. - To present evidence that this ST TOE provides on an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security environment, and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements. MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 INTRODUCTION The objective of this document is to present the Public Security Target BAC of the NXP components from P60 family. Objective of the security target This security target describes the security needs for MRTD full EAC v2 product. The product is to PP BAC and adds requirements for prepersonalization and personalization. This security target aims to satisfy the requirements of Common Criteria level EAL4 augmented in defining the security enforcing functions of the Target Of Evaluation and describing the environment in which it operates. The objectives of this Security Target are: To describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart To describe the security environment of the TOE including the assets to be protected and the threats to be countered by the TOE and by the operational environment during the platform active phases. To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE (and its documentation) during the product active phases. To specify the security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements, the uirements and the security requirements for the environment. To describe the summary of the TOE specification including a description of the security functions and assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements. To present evidence that this ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements that the TOE provides on an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security environment, and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - f the MRTD full EAC v2 This security target describes the security needs for MRTD full EAC v2 product. The product is to PP BAC and adds requirements for prepersonalization and personalization. This security target aims to satisfy the requirements of Common Criteria level EAL4 augmented as Target Of Evaluation and describing To describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart ronment of the TOE including the assets to be protected and the threats to be countered by the TOE and by the operational environment during the To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms of integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE To specify the security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements, the environment. To describe the summary of the TOE specification including a description of the security functions and assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements. is a complete and cohesive set of requirements that the TOE provides on an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security environment, and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 1.3 Security target identification Title: Security Editor: Oberthur Technologies CC version: 3.1 revision 4 EAL: EAL4 augmented with: - ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4 - ALC_DVS.2, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_TAT.2 - ATE_DPT.3 PP(s): BSI-CC-PP ST Reference: FQR 110 7216 Issue ITSEF: LETI Certification Body: ANSSI Evaluation scheme: FR MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 identification Security target BAC Oberthur Technologies 3.1 revision 4 EAL4 augmented with: ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4 ALC_DVS.2, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_TAT.2 ATE_DPT.3 PP-055 [R11] FQR 110 7216 Issue 11 Table 1 - General Identification Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 1.4 TOE technical identification Product name: ID- Commercial name of the TOE 1: ID- configuration with AA and CA Commercial name of the TOE 2: ID- with AA and CA IC type ‘6C14 ‘6014 ‘6A15 ‘6019 ‘6A20 Additional code 1 Mandatory generic Identification: ‘C96E449AD06093BB25395B4F2C4F63720C46F52E2D4D91BA00B84B098 6F7A738 Additional code 2 Optional DBI Identification: ‘B765E230D3B932A3930445DF453B50CAA3EC0077C03ABD2F327D8606 532F51C2 Table Nota Bene - The additional code doesn’t depend on the IC and the memory size - The additional code is encrypted with the LSK key - An optional additional code (functional) can be loaded. This additional code, relative to the Digitally Blurred Image process (DBI) is part of the product, but not in the scope of the evaluation. MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 identification -One ePass Full EAC v2 -One ePass Full EAC v2 on P60x080 VC/VG configuration with AA and CA -One ePass Full EAC v2 on P60x144 VA in BAC configuration with AA and CA 6C14’ (P60D080 VC) 6014’ (P60D080 VG) 6A15’ (P60D144 VA) 6019’ (P60C080 VG) 6A20’ (P60C144 VA) C96E449AD06093BB25395B4F2C4F63720C46F52E2D4D91BA00B84B098 6F7A738’ B765E230D3B932A3930445DF453B50CAA3EC0077C03ABD2F327D8606 532F51C2’ Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification The additional code doesn’t depend on the IC and the memory size The additional code is encrypted with the LSK key An optional additional code (functional) can be loaded. This additional code, relative to the Digitally Blurred Image process (DBI) is part of the product, but not in the scope of the Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - in BAC VA in BAC configuration C96E449AD06093BB25395B4F2C4F63720C46F52E2D4D91BA00B84B098 B765E230D3B932A3930445DF453B50CAA3EC0077C03ABD2F327D8606 An optional additional code (functional) can be loaded. This additional code, relative to the Digitally Blurred Image process (DBI) is part of the product, but not in the scope of the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 1.5 IC identification IC Reference: NXP P60 chips TOE 1: NXP P60x080/052/040 EAL 6 + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_DVS.2 + ASE_TSS.2 TOE 2: NXP P60x144/080PVA/PVA (Y) EAL 6 + ALC_FLR.1 Communication protocol: Contact, Contactless and Dual Memory: ROM Chip Manufacturer: NXP Semiconductors Nota Bene TOE 1 and TOE 2 possess the same source NXP chips are driven from the NXP MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 NXP P60 chips NXP P60x080/052/040 PVC/PVG [R19] + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_DVS.2 + ASE_TSS.2 P60x144/080PVA/PVA (Y) [R18] EAL 6 + ALC_FLR.1 Contact, Contactless and Dual NXP Semiconductors Table 3 - Chip Identification the same source code, which is embedded on the two NXP chips. The two NXP chips are driven from the NXP P60 chip family. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - is embedded on the two NXP chips. The two T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 2 TOE OVERVIEW 2.1 Product overview The product ID-One Native eDoc and/or contact-less smart card integrated circuits of different form factors. The product can be configured to serve different use cases, during the product. For more information on the The product supports the storage and retrieval of structured information compliant to the Logical Data Structure as specified in [R2] Access Control [R11], Supplementary Access Control [R13]), the Basic Access Protection It can host four types of applications as mentioned above, namely the IDL, Moreover, further configuration may also be done to each type of application to serve use ca other than those behaviourally defined in the referenced normative documents. This product is embedded on the ICs The ID-One Native eDoc architecture can be viewed as shown in the following picture: Platform layer Application layer Block 1: MRTD - IDL MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 One Native eDoc is a multi-applicative native software, embedd less smart card integrated circuits of different form factors. The product can be configured to serve different use cases, during the Prepersonalization/personalization product. For more information on the product, please refer to complete ST. The product supports the storage and retrieval of structured information compliant to the Logical [R2]. It also provides standard authentication protocols, namely Basic , Supplementary Access Control [R17], Extended Access Control ( ), the Basic Access Protection [R9] and Extended Access Protection (compliant to It can host four types of applications as mentioned above, namely the IDL, MRTD Moreover, further configuration may also be done to each type of application to serve use ca defined in the referenced normative documents. This product is embedded on the ICs described in §1.5 IC identification. architecture can be viewed as shown in the following picture: NXP P60 Low layer Tools modules Applicative modules Operating System Block 2: eID Block 3: eSign Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - applicative native software, embeddable in contact less smart card integrated circuits of different form factors. The product can be Prepersonalization/personalization phases of the The product supports the storage and retrieval of structured information compliant to the Logical . It also provides standard authentication protocols, namely Basic , Extended Access Control ([R12] and and Extended Access Protection (compliant to [R9]). MRTD, eID and eSign. Moreover, further configuration may also be done to each type of application to serve use cases architecture can be viewed as shown in the following picture: Block 4: Dauth T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Figure 2.2 TOE overview The TOE described in this security target is the BAC TOE of the - IDL. The block 1 of the ID-One Native eDoc is composed of the following Applications PP BAC with CA and AA [R11] EAC with BAC and AA [R12] EAC with PACE [R13] PACE [R14] BAP X EAC and BAP X PACE X PACE and EAC X Table The BAC TOE is instantiated during the product prepersonalization, using the creates the MF / DF required for the BAC configuration. The TOE life cycle is described in The TOE identification is described in Block 1: MRTD & IDL MRTD BAC IDL BAP MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Figure 1 - ID-One Native eDoc Overview The TOE described in this security target is the BAC TOE of the product, a subset of the Block 1 MRTD One Native eDoc is composed of the following applications: Targeted EAL EAL4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 EAL4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 Table 4 - Block 1 Applications overview Figure 2 - Block 1 Overview The BAC TOE is instantiated during the product prepersonalization, using the operating system creates the MF / DF required for the BAC configuration. The TOE life cycle is described in §4 TOE life cycle. The TOE identification is described in §1.4 TOE technical identification. MRTD EAC MRTD EAC w PACE MRTD PACE IDL BAP & EAC IDL PACE IDL PACE & EAC Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - a subset of the Block 1 MRTD EAL4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_DVS.2 + + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_DVS.2 + operating system that MRTD PACE IDL PACE & EAC T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Nota bene The TOE scope encompasses the following features: - Basic Access Control - Active Authentication - Chip Authentication - Prepersonalization phase Nevertheless, the TOE can embed TOE and subject to an evaluation in other TOEs. 2.3 TOE usages State or organisation issues MRTDs associated rights. For instance, it can be used to check identity at customs in an MRTD configuration, verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on th In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent and can be either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used on the field. The MRTD in context of this security target contains: - Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the booklet - A separate data summary (MRZ or keydoc data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ or keydoc area) - And data elements stored on the TOE’s chip for contact The authentication of the holder is bas - The possession of a valid on the biographical data page and - The Biometric matching performed on the Inspection system using the reference data stored in the MRTD. When holder has been authenticated the issuing State or Organization can performed extra authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to some sensitive information such as “visa information”… The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The TOE scope encompasses the following features: Prepersonalization phase embed other secure functionalities, but they are not in the scope of this TOE and subject to an evaluation in other TOEs. MRTDs to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming associated rights. For instance, it can be used to check identity at customs in an MRTD configuration, verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the holder. In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal MRTD system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used in context of this security target contains: Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the booklet rate data summary (MRZ or keydoc data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ or keydoc area) And data elements stored on the TOE’s chip for contact-less machine reading. The authentication of the holder is based on: The possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and The Biometric matching performed on the Inspection system using the reference data stored been authenticated the issuing State or Organization can performed extra authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to some sensitive information such as The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - other secure functionalities, but they are not in the scope of this to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming associated rights. For instance, it can be used to check identity at customs in an MRTD configuration, e card and correspondence with the holder. MRTD to the inspection system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the booklet rate data summary (MRZ or keydoc data) for visual and machine reading using OCR less machine reading. personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given The Biometric matching performed on the Inspection system using the reference data stored been authenticated the issuing State or Organization can performed extra authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to some sensitive information such as of the data of genuine MRTDs. The T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ The MRTD can be viewed as the combination: - A physical MRTD in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the holder o The biographical data on the biographical o The printed data in the Machine the device o The printed portrait - A logical MRTD as data of the specified by ICAO and extended in presents contact or contact the MRTD holder o The digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digita o The digitized portraits o The optional biometric refer o The other data according to LDS (up to DG24) o The Document security object The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the authenticity and integrity of the chip is uniquely identified by the document number. The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures). These security measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the physical support. The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integr document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the chip. 2.4 TOE definition The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and the Basic Access Control according to ‘ICAO Doc 9303’. The TOE comprises at least: - Circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 can be viewed as the combination: in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna. visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the The biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book The printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) or keydoc are printed portrait as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO and extended in [R7], [R8], [R9] on the contactless integrat presents contact or contact-less readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of The digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data or keydoc data, DG1) The digitized portraits The optional biometric reference data of finger(s) or iris image(s) or both The other data according to LDS (up to DG24) The Document security object The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and its data. The MRTD as the physical device and the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the document number. is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures). These security measures include the binding chip to the physical support. is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and according to ‘ICAO Doc 9303’. ircuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna. visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD data page of the passport book Readable Zone (MRZ) or keydoc area that identifies holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as on the contactless integrated circuit. It less readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of l MRZ data or keydoc data, DG1) ence data of finger(s) or iris image(s) or both MRTD to maintain the as the physical device and the MRTD’s is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security chip) and organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures). These security measures include the binding ity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ - IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Software - IC Embedded Software (operating system) - MRTD application - Associated guidance documentation MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated IC Embedded Software (operating system) sociated guidance documentation Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 3 TOE ARCHITECTURE The TOE is a smartcard, composed of various modul 3.1 Integrated Circuit - NXP The TOE is embedded on NXP chips, as presented in More information on the chips are given in the related Integrated Circuit Application layer Block 1: MRTD & IDL BAC EAC eDoc Application Platform layer MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 TOE ARCHITECTURE The TOE is a smartcard, composed of various modules and composed of the following components: Figure 3 - TOE architecture NXP P60 The TOE is embedded on NXP chips, as presented in Table 3 - Chip Identification More information on the chips are given in the related security targets. NXP P60 Resident Application Block 2 MRTD & IDL EAC w PACE PACE IDL BAP IDL BAP & EAC IDL PACE IDL PACE & EAC Low layer Tools modules Applicative modules Operating System Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - es and composed of the following components: Chip Identification. Block 3 Block 4 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 3.2 Low layer The low layer developed by Oberthur Technologies provides an efficient and easy way to access chip features from the applications. Indeed, it is based on services organized according to a multi design which allows applications to u The main features of the OS are the following: - EEPROM management including secure data processing, - Other memories management, - Transaction management, - APDU protocol management, - Low level T=0 ; T=1 and T=CL management, - Error processing, - Advanced securities activation. A dedicated cryptographic library has been developed and designed by Oberthur Technologies provide the highest security level and best tuned performances. It provides the followi Cryptographic Feature SHA1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA RSA CRT from 1024, to 4096 bits (by steps of 256 bits) - signature/verification - key pair generation RSA SFM from 1024 to 4096 bits (by steps of 256 - signature/verification - key pair generation ECC with key sizes from 192 to 521 bits - signature/verification (ECDSA) - key agreement (ECDH) - key pair generation 3DES with 112 bits key size AES with 128, 192, 256 key sizes Random Generator compliant AIS31 Diffie Hellman from 1024 to 2048 - key agreement - key generation Integrated mapping over prime field and Elliptic curves Table MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Oberthur Technologies provides an efficient and easy way to access chip features from the applications. Indeed, it is based on services organized according to a multi design which allows applications to use a high level interface completely independent of the chip. The main features of the OS are the following: EEPROM management including secure data processing, Other memories management, Transaction management, APDU protocol management, and T=CL management, Advanced securities activation. A dedicated cryptographic library has been developed and designed by Oberthur Technologies provide the highest security level and best tuned performances. It provides the followi Embedded 384 and SHA-512 bits RSA CRT from 1024, to 4096 bits (by steps of 256 bits): RSA SFM from 1024 to 4096 bits (by steps of 256 bits): ECC with key sizes from 192 to 521 bits : Generator compliant AIS31 Diffie Hellman from 1024 to 2048 : Integrated mapping over prime field and Elliptic curves Table 5 - OT Cryptographic library Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Oberthur Technologies provides an efficient and easy way to access chip features from the applications. Indeed, it is based on services organized according to a multi-layer se a high level interface completely independent of the chip. A dedicated cryptographic library has been developed and designed by Oberthur Technologies to provide the highest security level and best tuned performances. It provides the following algorithms: T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ More information is available in complete ST 3.3 Tools modules The tools modules provide MRTD full EAC v2 product: - File system compliant with ISO/IEC 7816 recommendations [R2]. - ISO Secure Messaging as specified in - PIN and BIO access rights - Asymmetric Keys Management as storage, signature, verification, DH and generation. - Symmetric Key management - Access Control for ‘Change MSK’ and ‘PUT KEY’ APDU - Authentication and secure messa Personalization phases, based on Global Platform standard More information is available in 3.4 Applicative modules The applicative modules provide MRTD full EAC v2 product: - Chip Authentication version ephemeral-static Diffie communication and unilateral authentication of the MRTD chip - Terminal Authentication two move challenge-response protocol t terminal. - PACE Protocol as specified in protocol that provides secure communication and explicit password the MRTD chip and the terminal. - Access Conditions Engine object) with a current context (CH documents such as eMRTD, iDL, eID and eSign, the application embeds ROMed access condition rules. - Another applicative module is the Digital Blurred Image (DBI) module. It allows the blurring of a JPG or JPEG2000 file stored in a transparent file. patents owned by Oberthur Technologies. scope of this present certification. MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 complete ST. The tools modules provide MRTD full EAC v2 product: compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4 and ISO/IEC 7816-9. It is also compliant with ICAO ISO Secure Messaging as specified in [R20] and as described in annex E of PIN and BIO access rights management as presented in § 2.5 of [R40] and B.6 of Asymmetric Keys Management as storage, signature, verification, DH and generation. Symmetric Key management Access Control for ‘Change MSK’ and ‘PUT KEY’ APDU Authentication and secure messaging to be used during Prepersonalization and Personalization phases, based on Global Platform standard complete ST. Applicative modules The applicative modules provide MRTD full EAC v2 product: version 1 as described in [R39] and version 2 as described in static Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that provides secure communication and unilateral authentication of the MRTD chip. Authentication version 1 as described in [R39] and version 2 as described in response protocol that provides explicit unilateral authentication of the s specified in [R17], a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key protocol that provides secure communication and explicit password-based authentication of the MRTD chip and the terminal. Access Conditions Engine that checks the AC rules attached to an object (file, key, data object) with a current context (CHA, Role ID…). For applications already defined by normative documents such as eMRTD, iDL, eID and eSign, the application embeds ROMed access Another applicative module is the Digital Blurred Image (DBI) module. It allows the blurring JPG or JPEG2000 file stored in a transparent file. This feature is the implementation of patents owned by Oberthur Technologies. This module is part of the TOE and outside the scope of this present certification. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 9. It is also compliant with ICAO and as described in annex E of [R41]. and B.6 of [R41] Asymmetric Keys Management as storage, signature, verification, DH and generation. Prepersonalization and and version 2 as described in [R40], an Hellman key agreement protocol that provides secure and version 2 as described in [R40], a hat provides explicit unilateral authentication of the Hellman key agreement based authentication of checks the AC rules attached to an object (file, key, data For applications already defined by normative documents such as eMRTD, iDL, eID and eSign, the application embeds ROMed access Another applicative module is the Digital Blurred Image (DBI) module. It allows the blurring This feature is the implementation of is part of the TOE and outside the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ More information is available in 3.5 Operating System This application manages the TOE in pre configure the TOE in the expected way. It implements and control access to Key management (MSK, LSK), File management including da addressed in clear mode for secure environment or non More information is available in 3.6 Application layer Two kinds of dispatcher are availa for Personalization Phase and for used during the Use Phase of MRTD Applications. The application layer also manages or Active Authentication. The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO Control checks that the terminal has physical access to the MRTD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access Control i This protocol is also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the con integrity) of the transmitted data. The inspection system: - Reads the printed data in the MRZ (for MRTD), - Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data. After successful 3DES based authentication, the T rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system. The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO. Basic Access Control checks that the terminal has physical access to the MRTD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access Control is based on ISO/IEC 11770 to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted data. More information is available in MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 complete ST. This application manages the TOE in pre-personalization and personalization phases in order to configure the TOE in the expected way. It implements and control access to Key management (MSK, File management including data reading and writing or additional code loading in clear mode for secure environment or non-sensitive commands, using SCP02 or SCP03 More information is available in complete ST. are available on the top of the product: the resident application for administration during Use Phase and the eDoc the Use Phase of MRTD Applications. manages protocols available during Use phase such as Basic Access Control The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO Control checks that the terminal has physical access to the MRTD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access Control is based on ISO/IEC 11770-2 [R36] key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the con integrity) of the transmitted data. eads the printed data in the MRZ (for MRTD), Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data. After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system. The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO. Basic Access Control checks that the access to the MRTD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access Control is based on ISO/IEC 11770-2 [R36] key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted ion is available in complete ST. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - personalization and personalization phases in order to configure the TOE in the expected way. It implements and control access to Key management (MSK, dditional code loading. It can be sing SCP02 or SCP03. ble on the top of the product: the resident application that is used eDoc application that is protocols available during Use phase such as Basic Access Control The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO [R2]. Basic Access Control checks that the terminal has physical access to the MRTD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data. OE provides read access to data requiring BAC rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system. The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO. Basic Access Control checks that the access to the MRTD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 4 TOE LIFE CYCLE 4.1 Life cycle overview Figure Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7 TOE delivery point Card printing Embedding Software development Patch development IC photomask fabrication IC manufacturing Application End of life Application End usage MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Figure 4: Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE Testing Testing Testing AGD PRE Micromodule Prepersonalization Personalization Software development Patch development photomask fabrication IC database construction IC manufacturing IC testing Smartcard End of life Application Smartcard product Application AGD OPE Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - ALC phase AGD phase USE phase AGD PRE AGD OPE T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ The TOE life-cycle is described in terms of four life life-cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.) Additional codes are identified in § The table below presents the TOE role: Roles Subject IC developer NXP Semiconductors IC manufacturer NXP Semiconductors TOE developer Oberthur Technologies Manufacturer NXP Semiconductors Oberthur Technologies or another agent Prepersonalizer Oberthur Technologies or another agent Personalization Agent Oberthur Technologies or another agent Table 6 - Roles identification on the life cycle The table below presents the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard smart card life cycle [R10], the Pr coverage: Steps Phase Subject Step 1 Development Oberthur Technologies Step 2 Development NXP Semiconductors Step 3 Manufacturing NXP Semiconductors TOE delivery point Step 4 Manufacturing MRD (Prepersonalizer) Step 5 Manufacturing MRD (Prepersonalizer) Step 6 Personalization Personalization Agent Step 7 Operational Use End user Table 7 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 cycle is described in terms of four life-cycle phases. (With respect to the cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.) Additional codes are identified in §1.5. The table below presents the TOE role: Subject NXP Semiconductors Semiconductors Oberthur Technologies NXP Semiconductors Oberthur Technologies or another agent Oberthur Technologies or another agent Oberthur Technologies or another agent Roles identification on the life cycle The table below presents the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard , the Protection Profile lifecycle in phases, the TOE delivery point and the Subject Covered by Oberthur Technologies ALC R&D sites NXP Semiconductors IC certification NXP Semiconductors IC certification TOE delivery point MRD Manufacturer (Prepersonalizer) AGD_PRE MRD Manufacturer (Prepersonalizer) AGD_PRE Personalization Agent AGD_PRE End user AGD_OPE Subjects identification following life cycle steps Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - cycle phases. (With respect to the [R10], the TOE The table below presents the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard ses, the TOE delivery point and the Sites Pessac and Colombes IC certification IC certification T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 4.2 Phase 1 “Development” (Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components. (Step2) The TOE developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components. The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded Software in the non-volatile non manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the Manufacturer. 4.3 Phase 2 “Manufacturing” (Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the travel document’s chip Dedicated Software and the parts of the travel volatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the Manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the Manufacturer. If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM). The IC manufacturer data in EEPROM and keys (MSK, LSK). (Step4) The Manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contact based / contactless interface in the travel document unless the travel document consists of the card only. (Step5) The Manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software or part of it and the additional source code in the non-volatile programmable memories if necessary, (ii) creates the eMRTD application, and (iii) equips travel document’s chips with pre MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Phase 1 “Development” The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components. developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components. cumentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded volatile non-programmable memories is securely delivered to the IC manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories, the eMRTD plication and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the Manufacturer. Phase 2 “Manufacturing” (Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the travel document’s chip Dedicated Software and the parts of the travel document’s chip Embedded Software in the non programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the o the Manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the Manufacturer. If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM). The IC manufacturer data in EEPROM and keys (MSK, LSK). TOE delivery point (Step4) The Manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contact based / contactless interface in the travel document unless the travel document consists of the card only. (Step5) The Manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software or part of it and the additional source volatile programmable memories if necessary, (ii) creates the eMRTD application, and (iii) equips travel document’s chips with pre-personalization Data. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components. developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation cumentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded programmable memories is securely delivered to the IC volatile programmable memories, the eMRTD plication and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the Manufacturer. (Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the travel document’s chip document’s chip Embedded Software in the non- programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the o the Manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the Manufacturer. If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM). The IC manufacturer add initialization (Step4) The Manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contact based / contactless interface in the travel document unless the travel document consists of the card only. (Step5) The Manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software or part of it and the additional source volatile programmable memories if necessary, (ii) creates the eMRTD application, T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ The pre-personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent guidance documentation to the Personalizat Additional code loading is performed in Prepersonalization phase. [R45]. The additional code loading process is performed by the the Command LOAD SECURE: - Additional code generation - MSK authentication - LSK derivation - Memory area definition - Loading of the additional code - Secure activation of the additional code The additional code loading is performed before the creation of the MF file during Prepersonalization. Identification of the additional code loading is given in Additional code generation The additional code is generated by signed. After generation, it is sent to the MRTD manufacturer to that it can load it Loading of the additional code The additional code is loaded in the (initial) TOE by the Prepersonalizer that shall authenticate itself to the TOE beforehand. Upon reception, the (intial) TOE checks it has been generated by Oberthur Technologies (by verifying the signature) before activating it. Identification of the TOE After successful loading and activation of the additional code, the TOE update its identification data to reflects the presence of the additional code. 4.4 Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document” (Step6) The personalization of the travel document includes (i) the survey of the travel document holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the Personalization Agent. The Manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the Personalization Agent. Additional code loading is performed in Prepersonalization phase. It is compliant to ANSSI Note 6 rocess is performed by the Prepersonalizer in the following steps, via Additional code generation Loading of the additional code Secure activation of the additional code additional code loading is performed before the creation of the MF file during Identification of the additional code loading is given in Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification generated by Oberthur Technologies: developped, compiled, ciphered and sent to the MRTD manufacturer to that it can load it The additional code is loaded in the (initial) TOE by the Prepersonalizer that shall authenticate itself to the TOE beforehand. Upon reception, the (intial) TOE checks it has been generated by Oberthur Technologies (by verifying the signature) before activating it. After successful loading and activation of the additional code, the TOE update its identification data to reflects the presence of the additional code. “Personalization of the travel document” (Step6) The personalization of the travel document includes (i) the survey of the travel document holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the . The Manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the It is compliant to ANSSI Note 6 in the following steps, via additional code loading is performed before the creation of the MF file during TOE Technical Identification. : developped, compiled, ciphered and sent to the MRTD manufacturer to that it can load it in the (initial) TOE. The additional code is loaded in the (initial) TOE by the Prepersonalizer that shall authenticate itself to the TOE beforehand. Upon reception, the (intial) TOE checks it has been generated by Oberthur After successful loading and activation of the additional code, the TOE update its identification data (Step6) The personalization of the travel document includes (i) the survey of the travel document holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the personalization of the visual readable data onto the physical part of the travel document, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and (v) conf step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent (i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii) the Document security object. The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer finalizes the personalization of the genuine travel document for the travel document holder. The personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is travel document holder for operational use. 4.5 Phase 4 “Operational Use” (Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according t State or Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they can never be modified. Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security need an issuing State or Organisation. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE delivery up to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation process under AGD assurance class. Therefore, the Securit P.Manufact, P.Personalization and the related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs. after TOE delivery. Some production steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3. MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 ized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the personalization of the visual readable data onto the physical part of the travel document, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary. The Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of (i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii) the Document security he signing of the Document security object by the Document signer finalizes the personalization of the genuine travel document for the travel document holder. The personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is travel document holder for operational use. Phase 4 “Operational Use” (Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing State or Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security need an issuing State or Organisation. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE delivery up to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation process under AGD assurance class. Therefore, the Security Target has to outline the split up of P.Manufact, P.Personalization and the related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs. after TOE delivery. Some production steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - ized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the personalization of the visual readable data onto the physical part of the travel document, (iv) the writing of the TOE User iguration of the TSF if necessary. The and includes but is not limited to the creation of (i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii) the Document security he signing of the Document security object by the Document signer finalizes the personalization of the genuine travel document for the travel document holder. The personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the (Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the o the security policy of the issuing State or Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of an issuing State or Organisation. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE delivery up to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation y Target has to outline the split up of P.Manufact, P.Personalization and the related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs. after TOE delivery. Some production steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 5 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS 5.1 Common Criteria conformance This Security Target (ST) claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 4 [R43] and [R44]. The conformance to the CC is claime CC Conformance rationale Part 1 Strict conformance Part 2 Conformance to the extended - FAU_SAS.1 “Audit Storage” - FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers” - FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities” - FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability” - FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation” - FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity” Part 3 Strict conformance to Part 3. The product claims conformance to - ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures” - ADV_FSP.5 “Complete semi information” - ADV_INT.2 “Well - ADV_TDS.4 “Semiformal modular design” - ALC_CMS.5 “Development tools CM coverage” - ALC_TAT.2 “Compliance with implementation standards” - ATE_DPT.3 “Testing: modular design” Remark For interoperability reasons it is assumed the receiving state cares for sufficient measures against eavesdropping within the operating environment of the inspection systems. Otherwise the TOE may 1 The rationale for SFR addition is described in the relative PP 2 This EAL and its augmentations correspond to an EAL5+ALC_DVS.2 where AVA_VAN level is downgraded to AVA_VAN.3 following constraint of [R10] about MRZ/keydoc MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 CLAIMS Common Criteria conformance This Security Target (ST) claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 4 The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows: Conformance rationale Conformance to the extended1 part: “Audit Storage” “Quality metric for random numbers” “Limited capabilities” “Limited availability” “TOE Emanation” “Authentication Proof of Identity” Part 3. The product claims conformance to EAL 4, augmented2 with: “Sufficiency of security measures” “Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error “Well-structured internals” “Semiformal modular design” “Development tools CM coverage” “Compliance with implementation standards” “Testing: modular design” Table 8 - Conformance Rationale For interoperability reasons it is assumed the receiving state cares for sufficient measures against eavesdropping within the operating environment of the inspection systems. Otherwise the TOE may The rationale for SFR addition is described in the relative PP This EAL and its augmentations correspond to an EAL5+ALC_DVS.2 where AVA_VAN level is downgraded to AVA_VAN.3 following constraint of [R10] about MRZ/keydoc entropy Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - This Security Target (ST) claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 4 [R42], pecification with additional error For interoperability reasons it is assumed the receiving state cares for sufficient measures against eavesdropping within the operating environment of the inspection systems. Otherwise the TOE may This EAL and its augmentations correspond to an EAL5+ALC_DVS.2 where AVA_VAN level is downgraded to T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ protect the confidentiality of some less sensitive assets ( which are also printed on the physical TOE) for some specific attacks only against enhanced basic attack potential (AVA_VAN.3). FPT_EMSEC.1 from the Protection Profile has been renamed to FPT_EMS.1, in order to keep formatting. FIA_API.1 has been added to this security target for the needs of the Chip Authentication Protocol, that is described in the PP EAC. 5.1.1 Overview of the SFR defined in this ST SFR are presented in § 9.1 Security Functional Requ - SFR (/Global) that are global to the product (shared between the various TOE) - SFR (/MP_Add_code) that are dedicated for the patch loading - SFR (/MP) that are dedicated for the Manufacturing and Personalization phases - SFR (/AA) that are dedicated for Active Authen - SFR (/BAC) that are dedicated for Basic Access Control - SFR (/CA) that are dedicated for Chip Authentication The following table presents all the SFR defined in the ST with the generic notation. SFR from the PP FAU_SAS.1 ; FCS_CKM.1 ; FCS_CKM.4; FCS_COP.1 FIA_UAU.4 ; FIA_UAU.5 ; FIA_UAU.6 ; FIA_AFL.1 ; FDP_ACC.1 FMT_LIM.1 ; FMT_LIM.2 ; FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA FPT_EMS.1 ; FPT_FLS.1; FPT_TST.1; FPT_PHP.3 Section Additional SFR MP FCS_CKM.1/MP ; FCS_COP.1/MP ; FDP_ACC.2/MP ; FDP_ACF.1/MP ; FDP_ITC.1/MP ; FDP_UCT.1/MP ; FDP_UIT.1/MP ; FIA_AFL.1/MP ; FIA_UAU.1/MP ; FIA_UID.1/MP ; FIA_UAU.4/MP FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ ; MP Add code FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code ; FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code ; FCS_CKM.1/ FCS_COP.1/MP_Add_code FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code ; FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code Active Authentication FCS_COP.1/AA ; FDP_DAU.1/AA ; FDP_ITC.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ ; FMT_MOF.1/AA ; MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 protect the confidentiality of some less sensitive assets (e.g. the personal data of the TOE holder which are also printed on the physical TOE) for some specific attacks only against enhanced basic FPT_EMSEC.1 from the Protection Profile has been renamed to FPT_EMS.1, in order to keep FIA_API.1 has been added to this security target for the needs of the Chip Authentication Protocol, Overview of the SFR defined in this ST Security Functional Requirements: Global) that are global to the product (shared between the various TOE) SFR (/MP_Add_code) that are dedicated for the patch loading SFR (/MP) that are dedicated for the Manufacturing and Personalization phases SFR (/AA) that are dedicated for Active Authentication SFR (/BAC) that are dedicated for Basic Access Control SFR (/CA) that are dedicated for Chip Authentication The following table presents all the SFR defined in the ST with the generic notation. FCS_COP.1/SHA ; FCS_COP.1/SYM ; FCS_COP.1/MAC ; FCS_RND.1 ; FIA_UID.1; FIA_UAU.1 FIA_AFL.1 ; FDP_ACC.1 ; FDP_ACF.1 ; FDP_UCT.1 ; FDP_UIT.1 ; FMT_SMF.1; FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA ; FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS ; FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE ; FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ FPT_PHP.3 Table 9 -SFR from the PP Additional SFR FCS_CKM.1/MP ; FCS_COP.1/MP ; FDP_ACC.2/MP ; FDP_ACF.1/MP ; FDP_ITC.1/MP ; FDP_UCT.1/MP ; FDP_UIT.1/MP ; FIA_AFL.1/MP ; FIA_UAU.1/MP ; FIA_UID.1/MP ; FIA_UAU.4/MP ; FIA_UAU.5/MP ; FMT_MTD.1/MP ; FTP_ITC.1/MP ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code ; FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code ; FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code CS_COP.1/MP_Add_code ; FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code ; FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code FCS_COP.1/AA ; FDP_DAU.1/AA ; FDP_ITC.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ ; FMT_MOF.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - e.g. the personal data of the TOE holder which are also printed on the physical TOE) for some specific attacks only against enhanced basic FPT_EMSEC.1 from the Protection Profile has been renamed to FPT_EMS.1, in order to keep the SFR FIA_API.1 has been added to this security target for the needs of the Chip Authentication Protocol, Global) that are global to the product (shared between the various TOE) SFR (/MP) that are dedicated for the Manufacturing and Personalization phases The following table presents all the SFR defined in the ST with the generic notation. FIA_UID.1; FIA_UAU.1 ; ; FMT_SMF.1; FMT_SMR.1; ; FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ ; FCS_CKM.1/MP ; FCS_COP.1/MP ; FDP_ACC.2/MP ; FDP_ACF.1/MP ; FDP_ITC.1/MP ; FDP_UCT.1/MP ; FDP_UIT.1/MP ; FIA_AFL.1/MP ; FIA_UAU.1/MP ; FIA_UID.1/MP ; MP_Add_code ; FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code ; T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Section Additional SFR Chip Authentication FIA_API.1/CA ; FSC_CKM.1/CA FIA_UID.1/CA ; FPT_TST.1/CA FDP_UCT.1/CA 5.1.2 Overview of the additional protocols 5.1.2.1 Chip Authentication The Chip Authentication has been added to this Security Target in order to reinforce the BAC authentication mechanism by ensuring the verification of the TOE SPD has been refined and contains the following additions: - Additional Threats: § 6.3.2 - Additional Objective: § 7.1.2 - Additional OE: § 7.2.2 OE 5.1.2.2 Active Authentication The additional functionality of Active Authentication related on-card generation of RSA and ECC keys. It implies the following addition to the standard PP: - Additional Threats: § 6.3.3 - Additional Objective: § 7.1.3 - Additional OE: § 7.2.3 OE for AA 5.1.2.3 Prepersonalization phase The prepersonalization phase has been reinforced in this Security Target, with the following elements. This functionality is usable in phase 5 and phase 6. Once the product is locked, stated as personalized, it is no more possible to perform this operation. performed: - Additional Threats: § 6.3.4 - Additional Objective: § 7.1.4 The TOE is compliant to the last version (draft) of ANSSI Note 6 MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Additional SFR ; FSC_CKM.1/CA ; FCS_COP.1/CA ; FIA_UAU.1/CA ; FIA_UAU.5/CA ; FIA_UAU.6/CA ; FPT_TST.1/CA ; FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE ; FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ FDP_UCT.1/CA ; FDP_UIT.1/CA Table 10 - Additional SFR Overview of the additional protocols The Chip Authentication has been added to this Security Target in order to reinforce the BAC authentication mechanism by ensuring the verification of the Card by the Terminal. For this addition, the TOE SPD has been refined and contains the following additions: 6.3.2 Threats for CA 7.1.2 SO for CA OE for CA Active Authentication (AA) is based on the ICAO PKI V1.1 and the of RSA and ECC keys. the following addition to the standard PP: 6.3.3 Threats for AA 7.1.3 SO for AA OE for AA Prepersonalization phase phase has been reinforced in this Security Target, with the following This functionality is usable in phase 5 and phase 6. Once the product is locked, stated as personalized, it is no more possible to perform this operation. The following additi 6.3.4 Threats for Note 6 7.1.4 SO for Note 6 The TOE is compliant to the last version (draft) of ANSSI Note 6 [R45]. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - ; FCS_COP.1/CA ; FIA_UAU.1/CA ; FIA_UAU.5/CA ; FIA_UAU.6/CA ; ; FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ ; The Chip Authentication has been added to this Security Target in order to reinforce the BAC the Card by the Terminal. For this addition, (AA) is based on the ICAO PKI V1.1 and the phase has been reinforced in this Security Target, with the following This functionality is usable in phase 5 and phase 6. Once the product is locked, stated as The following addition has been T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 5.2 Protection Profile conformance The Security Target claims strict conformance to the following PP written in CC3.1 revision 2: - Machine Readable Travel Documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control 5.3 Rationale for the additions The rationales are available in the complete ST. 5.4 Non evaluated features Some features may be part of the TOE but are not evaluated as they are not relevant for t - Standard and biometric PIN management - File system management - PACE - DBI The TOE may also contain other applications such as eID, eSign, …..The current evaluation covers any combination of application. Last but not least, the TOE may also contain P gain access to the TOE and its assets in the same manner as BAC, but resists to attacker with high potential, unlike BAC (that only resists to attacker with moderate potential). Strictly speaking, as PACE affects the TSF (access control policies,…) it should be included in the evaluation. However, the evaluation of PACE will be fully performed through the evaluation of another configuration of the TOE claiming conformance with [R30]. Therefore, PACE is cons part of the TOE as non evaluated feature. MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Protection Profile conformance Target claims strict conformance to the following PP written in CC3.1 revision 2: Machine Readable Travel Documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control Rationale for the additions The rationales are available in the complete ST. Non evaluated features may be part of the TOE but are not evaluated as they are not relevant for t Standard and biometric PIN management The TOE may also contain other applications such as eID, eSign, …..The current evaluation covers any Last but not least, the TOE may also contain PACE together with BAC. PACE allows the terminal to gain access to the TOE and its assets in the same manner as BAC, but resists to attacker with high potential, unlike BAC (that only resists to attacker with moderate potential). affects the TSF (access control policies,…) it should be included in the evaluation. However, the evaluation of PACE will be fully performed through the evaluation of another configuration of the TOE claiming conformance with [R30]. Therefore, PACE is cons part of the TOE as non evaluated feature. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Target claims strict conformance to the following PP written in CC3.1 revision 2: Machine Readable Travel Documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control [R11]. may be part of the TOE but are not evaluated as they are not relevant for the TSFs: The TOE may also contain other applications such as eID, eSign, …..The current evaluation covers any ACE together with BAC. PACE allows the terminal to gain access to the TOE and its assets in the same manner as BAC, but resists to attacker with high affects the TSF (access control policies,…) it should be included in the evaluation. However, the evaluation of PACE will be fully performed through the evaluation of another configuration of the TOE claiming conformance with [R30]. Therefore, PACE is considered as being T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 6 SECURITY PROBLEM DEF 6.1 Subjects 6.1.1 PP BAC subjects Manufacturer The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer. Personalization Agent The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global, international interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data and (iv) signing the Document Security Object defined in [R2]. Application Note Personalization Agent is refered as the Terminal A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless interface. Inspection System (IS) A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a termina MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspec MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer. The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity the holder for the TD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global, international interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data and (iv) signing the Document Security Object defined Personalization Agent is refered as the Personalizer in the Security Target A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless interface. chnical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the parts of the passport book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity the holder for the TD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data and (iv) signing the Document Security Object defined A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless interface. chnical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. l for the contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the parts of the passport book providing this information. The General Inspection System Chip Authentication Mechanism. tion System (i) implements the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates. Application Note This security target does not distinguish between the BIS, GIS and EIS because the Extended Access Control is outside the scope. MRTD Holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD. Traveler Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder. Attacker A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD. Application Note An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE. 6.1.2 Additional Subjects IC Developer Developer of the IC. TOE Developer Developer of part of the TOE source code. Prepersonalizer Agent in charge of the Prepersonalization. described in [R11]. MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates. does not distinguish between the BIS, GIS and EIS because the Extended Access of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD. Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder. ) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD. An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE. Additional Subjects Developer of part of the TOE source code. Agent in charge of the Prepersonalization. This agent corresponds to the MRTD manufacturer as Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The does not distinguish between the BIS, GIS and EIS because the Extended Access of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD. Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder. ) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or to manipulate the logical An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks ent corresponds to the MRTD manufacturer as T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 6.2 Assets Logical MRTD data The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to E EF.DG 16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The EF.DG 14 is used by the inspection system for the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the The Active Authentication Public Key (AAPK) Info in DG 15 is used by the inspection system for Authentication of the chip. All these data may be sorted out in two different categories: - If they are specific to the user, they are User da - If they ensure the correct behaviour of the application, they are TSF Data. User Data CPLC Data Personnal Data of the MRTD holder (EF.DGx, except EF.DG15) Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD Common data in EF.COM Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15 (AAPK) Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14 (CAPK) TSF Data TOE_ID Prepersonalizer reference authentication data Personalization Agent reference authentication Data Basic Access Control (BAC) Key Active Authentication private key (AAK) Chip Authentication private key (CAK) MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [R2]. These data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to E EF.DG 16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication EF.DG 14 is used by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD. Public Key (AAPK) Info in DG 15 is used by the inspection system for All these data may be sorted out in two different categories: If they are specific to the user, they are User data the correct behaviour of the application, they are TSF Data. Description Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered as user data as they enable to track the holder EF.DGx, Contains identification data of the holder Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD Contain a certicate ensuring the integrity of the file stored within the MRTD and their authenticity. It ensures the data are issued by a genuine country Declare the data the travel document contains. This data is optional and may be absent in the TOE Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15 Contains public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks to an Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14 Contains public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks t Authentication Protocol Table 11 - User Data Description Data enabling to identify the TOE Prepersonalizer reference authentication Private key enabling to authenticate the Prepersonalizer Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalization Agent Master keys used to established a trusted channel between the Basic Inspection Terminal and the travel document Private key the chip uses to perform an Active Authentication Private key the chip uses to perform a Chip Authentication Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security needs) and . These data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and Public Key (CAPK) in . The EF.SOD is used by the Public Key (AAPK) Info in DG 15 is used by the inspection system for Active the correct behaviour of the application, they are TSF Data. Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered as user data as they ensuring the integrity of the file stored within the MRTD and their authenticity. It ensures the data are issued by a genuine country Declare the data the travel document contains. This data is optional and Contains public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks to an Active Contains public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks to an the Chip Private key enabling to authenticate the Prepersonalizer Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalization Agent Master keys used to established a trusted channel between the Basic Private key the chip uses to perform an Active Authentication Chip Authentication T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ TSF Data Session keys for the secure channel Life Cycle State Additional Code Authenticity of the MRTD's chip The authenticity of the MRTD's chip personalized by holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD. 6.3 Threats This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE. 6.3.1 Threats from the PP BAC T.Chip_ID Adverse action: An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to communications through the contactless communication interface. Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance Asset: Anonymity of user T.Skimming Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a communication to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance. Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data. T.Eavesdropping MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Description Session keys used to protect the communication in confidentiality, authenticity and integrity Life Cycle state of the TOE Additional code to be loaded on the initial TOE during prepersonalization by the Prepersonalizer. The loading of the additional code on the initial TOE constitures the final TOE Table 12 - TSF Data Authenticity of the MRTD's chip The authenticity of the MRTD's chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD. This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its hreats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE. Threats from the PP BAC : An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to communications through the contactless communication : having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data page in advance : An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a communication to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the : having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance. : confidentiality of logical MRTD data. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - used to protect the communication in confidentiality, Additional code to be loaded on the initial TOE during prepersonalization by . The loading of the additional code on the initial TOE the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its hreats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to communications through the contactless communication : having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data : An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a communication to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE. : having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Adverse action: An attacker is listening to an existing communication between the MRTD’s chip and an inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not know these data in advan Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance. Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data. T.Forgery Adverse action: An attacker alters fr including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the changed MRTD holder"s identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a trav MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip. Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potentia MRTDs. Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data. T.Abuse-Func Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase "Operational Use" in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and th operational state after delivery to MRTD holder. Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD. Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of T.Information_Leakage Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 ker is listening to an existing communication between the MRTD’s chip and an inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not know these data in advan : having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance. : confidentiality of logical MRTD data. : An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the changed MRTD holder"s identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack cenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric chanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a trav MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip. : having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate : authenticity of logical MRTD data. : An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder. : having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD. : confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of : An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - ker is listening to an existing communication between the MRTD’s chip and an inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not know these data in advance. : having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data audulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the changed MRTD holder"s identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack cenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric chanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip. l, being in possession of one or more legitimate : An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data. e personalization in the : having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD. : confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF. : An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmissio measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e Differential Fault Analysis). Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD. Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data. T.Phys-Tamper Adverse action: An attacker may per TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the MRT chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data. The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics nee including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary. Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD. Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF. T.Malfunction Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s Embedded Software. MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e : having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD. : confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data. : An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the MRT chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data e data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or : having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD. : confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF. may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. n but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. : having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD. form physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data e data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security d to be identified. Determination of software design requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or : having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD. : confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF. may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacke Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD. Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF. 6.3.2 Threats for CA T.Counterfeit Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine MRTD's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of the MRTD's chip us attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine MRTD's chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD's chip. Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data 6.3.3 Threats for AA T.Counterfeit 6.3.4 Threats for Note 6 T.Unauthorized_Load Adverse action: An attacker tries to load an additional code that is not intended to be assembled with the initial TOE, ie the evidence of authenticity or integrity is not correct. Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and deri possession of a legitimate MRTD Asset: Logical MRTD data T.Bad_Activation Adverse action: An attacker tries to perturbate the additional code activation such as the final TOE is different than the expected one (initial TOE or perturbated TOE). MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation. : having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD. : confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF. An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine MRTD's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a MRTD. The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine MRTD's chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD's chip. having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate authenticity of logical MRTD data Threats for Note 6 An attacker tries to load an additional code that is not intended to be assembled with the initial TOE, ie the evidence of authenticity or integrity is not correct. having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD An attacker tries to perturbate the additional code activation such as the final TOE is ne (initial TOE or perturbated TOE). Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To r needs information about the functional operation. : having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD. : confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF. An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine MRTD's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the ed for authentication of a traveller by possession of a MRTD. The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine MRTD's chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD's chip. having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs An attacker tries to load an additional code that is not intended to be assembled with vation data, being in An attacker tries to perturbate the additional code activation such as the final TOE is T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD, being in possession of an additional code that is authorized to be load Asset: Logical MRTD data T.TOE_Identification_Forgery Adverse action: An attacker tries to perturbate the TOE identification and in particular the additional code identification. Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in poss Asset: TOE_ID Application Note This threat is not applicable in phase 7, as the TOE identification is not possible in phase 7. 6.4 Organisational Security Policies 6.4.1 OSP from PP BAC P.Manufact The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Key. P.Personalization The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only. P.Personal_Data The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s chip (EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s) (EF.DG4)3 and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD These data groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the MRTD is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD, being in possession of an additional code that is authorized to be An attacker tries to perturbate the TOE identification and in particular the additional having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD This threat is not applicable in phase 7, as the TOE identification is not possible in phase 7. Organisational Security Policies The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent ng State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only. The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s chip and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s) (EF.DG4)3 and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD These data groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the MRTD is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD, being in possession of an additional code that is authorized to be An attacker tries to perturbate the TOE identification and in particular the additional ession of a legitimate MRTD This threat is not applicable in phase 7, as the TOE identification is not possible in phase 7. The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD Personalization Agent ng State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD for the holder is performed by an The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s chip and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s) (EF.DG4)3 and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the MRTD is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Access Control to allow read access to these data onl on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in 6.4.2 OSP for CA P.Chip_Auth The terminal implements the Chip Authentication 6.4.3 OSP for AA P.Activ_Auth The terminal implements the Active Authentication 6.5 Assumptions The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used. 6.5.1 Assumptions from PP BAC A.MRTD_Manufact It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use). A.MRTD_Delivery Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its objectives: - Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage. - Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process and storage. - Procedures shall ensure that people deal required skill. A.Pers_Agent MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Access Control to allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [R11]. Chip Authentication protocol as described in [R39]. Active Authentication protocol as described in [R39] The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is Assumptions from PP BAC It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use). Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage. Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process and storage. Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - y for terminals successfully authenticated based . [R39]. The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and and test data (to prevent any possible copy, Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage. Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in ing with the procedure for delivery have got the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of(i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent Agent bears the Personalization Agent symmetric cryptographic mechanisms. A.Insp_Sys The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Orga the terminal part of the Basic Access Control MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD. A.BAC-Keys The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographi 9303" [R2], the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential. 6.5.2 Assumptions for Chip Authentication A.Insp_Sys_CA The Inspection System implements the verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection and establishes secure messag keys established by the Chip Authentication A.Signature_PKI The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification fo or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret recommended to distribute the Country MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 ensures the correctness of(i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The nalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms. The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R2]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical ess Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the "ICAO Doc , the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential. Chip Authentication The Inspection System implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection and establishes secure messag Chip Authentication Mechanism. The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD. The issuing or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - ensures the correctness of(i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public nization, and (ii) implements . The Basic Inspection System reads the logical ess Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or c strength. As a consequence of the "ICAO Doc , the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Mechanism. The Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection and establishes secure messaging with The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for passive ical MRTD. The issuing State or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for Security Objects of the MRTDs. The CA creates the Document Signer Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States an 6.5.3 Assumptions for Active Authentication A.Insp_Sys_AA The Inspection System implements the verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection TOE during Active Authentication. MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the te Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the MRTDs. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and Organizations. Active Authentication The Inspection System implements the Active Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection using the signature returned by the TOE during Active Authentication. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer signing the Document Certificates for the Document The Inspection System using the signature returned by the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 7 SECURITY OBJECTIVES 7.1 Security Objectives for the TOE This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE. 7.1.1 SO from PP BAC OT.AC_Pers The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object according to LDS [R2] and the TSF data can be written by authorized logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be wri changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added. OT.Data_Int The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data. OT.Data_Conf The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Agent. Read access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF. authenticated as Basic Inspection System. The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic Inspection System. OT.Identification The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 "Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD". The storage of the Pre data includes writing of the Personalization Agent identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System or MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 SECURITY OBJECTIVES Security Objectives for the TOE This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats E and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE. The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agent logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized s if data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added. e the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as . Read access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Basic Inspection System. The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE e the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its nonvolatile ory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 "Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD". The storage of the Pre Personalization Agent Key(s). In Phase 4 "Operational Use" the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats E and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE. The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object Personalization Agents only. The tten only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized e the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the inspection system is able to The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Personalization DG5 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Basic Inspection System. The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE e the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic Personalization Data in its nonvolatile ory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 "Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD". The storage of the Pre- Personalization hase 4 "Operational Use" the TOE shall Personalization Agent. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ OT.Prot_Abuse-Func After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent t functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE. Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here. OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD's chip: - by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measurin or I/O lines and - by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or - by a physical manipulation of the TOE. OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper The TOE must provide protection of the co and the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhanced basic attack potential by means of - measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probi except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or - measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges (using tools used in solid - manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as - controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data) with a prior - reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions. OT.Prot_Malfunction The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature. 7.1.2 SO for CA MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, xplore security features or functions of the TOE. Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here. The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or by a physical manipulation of the TOE. The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhanced basic attack potential by means of measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis) manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data) engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions. The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to ors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - he abuse of test and support functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate critical User coded IC Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, xplore security features or functions of the TOE. Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between g signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, nfidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhanced- ng on the chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between and IC failure analysis) engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions. The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to ors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ OT.CA_Proof The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the defined in [R39]. The authenticity proof provided by the MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential. Application note The objective implies the MRTD’s to have (i) a unique Number, (ii) a secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference data to verify the authentication attempt of MRTD’s chip i.e. a certificate for the Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication provided by (i) the Chip Authentication the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer. OT.Data_Int_CA The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after 7.1.3 SO for AA OT.AA_Proof The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Org defined in [R2]. The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential. OT.Data_Int_AA The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the during their transmission to the General Inspection System after 7.1.4 SO for Note 6 OT.Secure_Load_ACode MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip Authentication . The authenticity proof provided by the MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential. The objective implies the MRTD’s to have (i) a unique identity as given by the MRTD’s Document Number, (ii) a secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference fy the authentication attempt of MRTD’s chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip Authentication Private Key of the MRTD’s chip. This certificate is Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS [R2] and (ii) the hash value of Public Key in the Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data ion to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Active Authentication . The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected inst attacks with high attack potential. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Active Authentication Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the MRTD’s Chip Authentication as . The authenticity proof provided by the MRTD’s chip shall be protected against identity as given by the MRTD’s Document Number, (ii) a secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference fy the authentication attempt of MRTD’s chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip Authentication Private Key of the MRTD’s chip. This certificate is and (ii) the hash value of Public Key in the Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data Chip Authentication. The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of MRTD’s chip Active Authentication as . The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data Active Authentication. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ The Loader of the Initial TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and integrity of the loaded Additional Code. The Loader enforces that only the allowed version of the Additional Code can be loaded on the Initial TOE. The Loader shall forbid the loadin be assembled with the Initial TOE. During the Load Phase of an Additional Code, the TOE shall remain secure. OT.Secure_AC_Activation Activation of the Additional Code and update of same time in an Atomic way. All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the Final TOE shall be completed before activation. If the Atomic Activation is successful, then the resulting of interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Final TOE), the Initial TOE shall remain in its initial state or fail secure. OT.TOE_Identification The Identification Data identifies the Initial TOE and Additional Code. The TOE provides means to store Identification Data in its non Atomic Activation of the Additional Code, the Identification Data of the identifications of Initial TOE and Additional Code. The user must be able to uniquely identify Initial TOE and Addtitional Code(s) which are embedded in the Final TOE. TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the authenticity 7.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment 7.2.1 OE from PP BAC 7.2.1.1 Issuing State or Organization The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment. OE.MRTD_Manufact Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6. During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and tes OE.MRTD_ Delivery MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The Loader of the Initial TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and integrity of the loaded Additional Code. The Loader enforces that only the allowed version of the Additional Code can be loaded on the Initial TOE. The Loader shall forbid the loading of an Additional Code not intended to be assembled with the Initial TOE. During the Load Phase of an Additional Code, the TOE shall remain secure. Activation of the Additional Code and update of the Identification Data shall be performed at the same time in an Atomic way. All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the Final TOE shall be completed before activation. If the Atomic Activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Final TOE, otherwise (in case of interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Final TOE), the Initial TOE shall remain n Data identifies the Initial TOE and Additional Code. The TOE provides means to store Identification Data in its non-volatile memory and guarantees the integrity of these data. After Atomic Activation of the Additional Code, the Identification Data of the identifications of Initial TOE and Additional Code. The user must be able to uniquely identify Initial TOE and Addtitional Code(s) which are embedded in the Final TOE. TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the authenticity. Security objectives for the Operational Environment Issuing State or Organization The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE iate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6. During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and tes Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The Loader of the Initial TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and integrity of the loaded Additional Code. The Loader enforces that only the allowed version of the Additional Code can be g of an Additional Code not intended to the Identification Data shall be performed at the same time in an Atomic way. All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the product is the Final TOE, otherwise (in case of interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Final TOE), the Initial TOE shall remain n Data identifies the Initial TOE and Additional Code. The TOE provides means to volatile memory and guarantees the integrity of these data. After Atomic Activation of the Additional Code, the Identification Data of the Final TOE allows identifications of Initial TOE and Additional Code. The user must be able to uniquely identify Initial TOE and Addtitional Code(s) which are embedded in the Final TOE. TOE must support the Inspection The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the following objectives: - non-disclosure of any security relevant information - identification of the element unde - meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledgment) - physical protection to prevent external damage - secure storage and handling procedures (including rejectd TOE"s) - traceability of TOE during delivery in o origin and shipment details o reception, reception acknowledgement o location material/information. Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process (including if applicable any non highlight all non-conformance to this process. Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations. OE.Personalization The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric refere encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data. OE.Pass_Auth_Sign The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Sig Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization must (i) gen and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [R2]. MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the disclosure of any security relevant information identification of the element under delivery meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception physical protection to prevent external damage secure storage and handling procedures (including rejectd TOE"s) traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters: origin and shipment details reception, reception acknowledgement location material/information. Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and conformance to this process. Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations. The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Sig Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the ent Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the conformance to the confidentiality convention) and department) dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations. s acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical nce data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. erate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the ent Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ OE.BAC-Keys The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. 9303" [R2] the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Basic Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential. 7.2.1.2 Receiving State or Organization The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment. OE.Exam_MRTD The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD pr the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the D Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control OE.Passive_Auth_Verif The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspecti OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical MRTD be Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection Systems). 7.2.2 OE for CA MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the "ICAO Doc the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Basic Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential. ng State or Organization The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD pr the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R2] The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document s and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems. The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical MRTD be Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection Systems). Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or As a consequence of the "ICAO Doc the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Basic The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) ocument Signer Public Key of each issuing State or [R2]. The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document s and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document on systems. The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical MRTD being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ OE.Auth_Key_MRTD The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to - (i) Generate the MRTD's Chip Authentication Key Pair - (ii) Sign and store the Chip Authentication data in EF.DG14 - (iii) Support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object. OE.Exam_MRTD_CA Aditionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip. OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_CA Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Authentication Protocol. Application note The Inspection Systems follow the order (i) running the Basic Access Control Protocol, (ii) reading and verifying only those parts of the logical MRTD that are necessary to know for the Mechanism (i.e. Document Security Obj Authentication Protocol, and (iv) reading and verifying the less after Chip Authentication. The supposed sequence has the advantage that the less protected by secure messaging with cryptographic keys based on the which quality is under control of the TOE. The inspection system will prevent additionally eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secu established based on the Chip Authentication directly after Basic Access Control Mechanism is allowed and is not assumed as threat in this PP. But the TOE ensures that reading of sensitive data is possible after successful 7.2.3 OE for AA OE.Exam_MRTD_AA Aditionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the protocol to verify the Authenticity of the prese OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to s Chip Authentication Key Pair ign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentica upport inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip Authentication Public y by means of the Document Security Object. Aditionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the Chip Authentication to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip. Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the The Inspection Systems follow the order (i) running the Basic Access Control Protocol, (ii) reading and verifying only those parts of the logical MRTD that are necessary to know for the Mechanism (i.e. Document Security Object and Chip Authentication Public Key), (iii) running the Protocol, and (iv) reading and verifying the less-sensitive data of the logical MRTD . The supposed sequence has the advantage that the less protected by secure messaging with cryptographic keys based on the Chip Authentication which quality is under control of the TOE. The inspection system will prevent additionally eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully Chip Authentication Protocol. Note that reading the less sensitive data directly after Basic Access Control Mechanism is allowed and is not assumed as threat in this PP. But of sensitive data is possible after successful Chip Authentication Aditionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the Active Authentication protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to: Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key upport inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Chip Authentication protocol Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip The Inspection Systems follow the order (i) running the Basic Access Control Protocol, (ii) reading and verifying only those parts of the logical MRTD that are necessary to know for the Chip Authentication Public Key), (iii) running the Chip sensitive data of the logical MRTD . The supposed sequence has the advantage that the less-sensitive data are Chip Authentication Protocol which quality is under control of the TOE. The inspection system will prevent additionally re messaging is successfully Protocol. Note that reading the less sensitive data directly after Basic Access Control Mechanism is allowed and is not assumed as threat in this PP. But Chip Authentication. Active Authentication T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Authentication Protocol. OE.Activ_Auth_Verif In addition to the verification by verification by Active Authentication MRTD. OE.Activ_Auth_Sign The issuing State or Organization has to establish (i) generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Docume MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the Active Authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the authenticity of the The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRTD’s Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active ication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of Public Key by means of the Document Security Object. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - , the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Active passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the , which offers a stronger guaranty of the authenticity of the the necessary public key infrastructure in order to Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRTD’s Active Public Key in the Active ication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 8 EXTENDED REQUIREMENT 8.1 Extended family FAU_SAS 8.1.1 Extended components FAU_SAS.1 Description: see [R11]. FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records. Dependencies: No dependencies. Rationale: see [R11] 8.2 Extended family FCS_RND 8.2.1 Extended component FCS_RND.1 Description: see [R11] FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric]. Dependencies: No dependencies. Rationale: See [R11] 8.3 Extended family FIA_API 8.3.1 Extended component FIA_API.1 Description: see [R12] MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage Extended components FAU_SAS.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records. : No dependencies. Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers Extended component FCS_RND.1 FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet ent: a defined quality metric]. : No dependencies. Extended family FIA_API – Authentication proof of identity Extended component FIA_API.1 Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store Generation of random numbers The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet of identity T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FIA_API.1 Quality metric for random numbers FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role]. Dependencies: No dependencies. Rationale: See [R12] 8.4 Extended family FMT_LIM 8.4.1 Extended component FMT_LIM.1 Description: see [R11] FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]. Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2) Rationale: See [R11] 8.4.2 Extended component FMT_LIM.2 Description: See [R11] FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]. Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1) MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 FIA_API.1 Quality metric for random numbers The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role]. : No dependencies. Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability Extended component FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]. Extended component FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of Limited capabilities and availability The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Rationale: See [R11] 8.5 Extended family FPT_EMS 8.5.1 Extended component FPT_EMS.1 Description: see [R11] FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types types of user data]. FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data]. Dependencies: No dependencies. Rationale: See [R11] MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation Extended component FPT_EMS.1 FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] nd [assignment: list of types of user data]. No dependencies. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: of TSF data] and [assignment: list of The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 9 SECURITY REQUIREMENT 9.1 Security Functional Requ This chapter presents the Security Functional Requirements to take into account within the TOE configuration presented in this security target. It is composed of the following elements: - Global SFR that are applicable to all the passports configuration - MP SFR for covering the phase Manufacturing and Personalization described in the Passport Protection Profile and also the coverage of Additional Code. - Active Authentication SFR - BAC SFR that cover the Basic Access Control - CA SFR that cover the Chip Authentication Protocol 9.1.1 Global SFR This chapter covers the common SFR that are shared between the different applications that are embedded on the product. FCS_CKM.4/Global Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.4.1/Global The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method FCS_RND.1/Global Quality metric for random numbers FCS_RND.1.1/Global The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet 1. The requirement to provide an and 2. The requirement of RGS_B1 for random number generation. FMT_LIM.1/Global Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.1.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced Deploying Test Features after 1. User Data to be manipulated 2. TSF data to be disclosed or MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS Security Functional Requirements This chapter presents the Security Functional Requirements to take into account within the TOE configuration presented in this security target. It is composed of the following elements: that are applicable to all the passports configuration for covering the phase Manufacturing and Personalization described in the Passport Protection Profile and also the coverage of Additional Code. Active Authentication SFR that cover the Active Authentication Protocol that cover the Basic Access Control that cover the Chip Authentication Protocol This chapter covers the common SFR that are shared between the different applications that are Cryptographic key destruction The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none Quality metric for random numbers The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet an entropy of at least 7.976 bits in each byte, following 2. The requirement of RGS_B1 for random number generation. Limited capabilities The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced after TOE Delivery does not allow manipulated or manipulated Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - This chapter presents the Security Functional Requirements to take into account within the TOE configuration presented in this security target. It is composed of the following elements: for covering the phase Manufacturing and Personalization described in the Passport uthentication Protocol This chapter covers the common SFR that are shared between the different applications that are The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified none. The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet following AIS 31 [R37] The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced: T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 3. Software to be reconstructed 4. Substantial information about other attacks FMT_LIM.2/Global Limited availability FMT_LIM.2.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced Deploying Test Features after TOE 1. User Data to be manipulated 2. TSF data to be disclosed or 3. Software to be reconstructed 4. Substantial information about other attacks FPT_EMS.1/Global TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1/Global The TOE shall not emit execution in excess of non useful information 1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 FPT_EMS.1.2/Global The TSF shall ensure interface smart card circuit contacts 1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 FPT_FLS.1/Global Failure with preservation of secure state FPT_FLS.1.1/Global The TSF shall preserve 1. Exposure to out-of-range operating 2. Failure detected by TSF according FPT_TST.1/Global TSF testing FPT_TST.1.1/Global The TSF shall run a suite of self tests TSF, at the conditions: - At reset - Before any cryptographic - When accessing a DG or any EF MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 reconstructed about construction of TSF to be gathered Limited availability The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced TOE Delivery does not allow manipulated or manipulated reconstructed about construction of TSF to be gathered TOE Emanation The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command non useful information enabling access to 1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following contacts to gain access to 1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 Failure with preservation of secure state The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: operating conditions where therefore a malfunction according to FPT_TST.1. TSF testing The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of cryptographic operation DG or any EF Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - which may enable The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced: which may enable variations, timing variations during command are unable to use the following a secure state when the following types of failures occur: malfunction could occur to demonstrate the correct operation of the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ - Prior to any use of TSF data - Before execution of any FPT_TST.1.2/Global The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data. FPT_TST.1.3/Global The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code. FPT_PHP.3/Global Resistance to physical attack FPT_PHP.3.1/Global The TSF shall resist responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced. 9.1.2 Product configurat This chapter covers the Manufacturing and Personalization SFR. It also includes additional SFR for the compliance to Note 6. 9.1.2.1 SFR for additional code FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code FAU_STG.2.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion. FAU_STG.2.2/MP_Add_code The TSF shall be able to stored audit records in the audit trail. FAU_STG.2.3/MP_Add_code The TSF shall ensure that records will be maintained when the following conditions occur: Application Note: Additional code code is loaded with its integrity information. the TOE after the loading, and before the writing of the identification information by calculating the signature and comparing to the expected value. The signature is protected in integrity through the TOE life cycle, at each power on, the card verifies the integrity of this signature. MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 data any command The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity Resistance to physical attack The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced. Product configuration SFR This chapter covers the Manufacturing and Personalization SFR. It also includes additional SFR for the SFR for additional code _Add_code Guarantees of audit data availability The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail. The TSF shall ensure that Additional code identification records will be maintained when the following conditions occur: failure and attack Additional code code is loaded with its integrity information. This integrity information is verified by the TOE after the loading, and before the writing of the identification information by calculating the signature and comparing to the expected value. The signature is protected in integrity through the le, at each power on, the card verifies the integrity of this signature. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity probing to the TSF by This chapter covers the Manufacturing and Personalization SFR. It also includes additional SFR for the The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized modifications to the Additional code identification stored audit failure and attack. This integrity information is verified by the TOE after the loading, and before the writing of the identification information by calculating the signature and comparing to the expected value. The signature is protected in integrity through the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code FCS_CKM.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified cryptographic key sizes Cryptographic key generation algorithm Calculation of LSK_LOAD, from initial LSK and derivation data entered - AES 128 ECB FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_Add_code FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_Add_code with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Encryption of the additional code (ciphered with LSK_LOAD) and signature verification FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_Add_code FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_Add_code with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Secure Messaging with BAC - 3DES Secure Messaging with BAC - AES MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 /MP_Add_code Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard] key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Calculation of LSK_LOAD, from initial LSK and derivation data 128 /MP_ENC_Add_code Cryptographic operation MP_ENC_Add_code The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) of the additional code (ciphered with LSK_LOAD) and signature verification AES 128 /MP_MAC_Add_code Cryptographic operation /MP_MAC_Add_code The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) 3DES 3DES Retail MAC 112 AES AES CMAC 128, 192 or 256 Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards None [cryptographic operation] in accordance and cryptographic key sizes Key length Standard [R35] [cryptographic operation] in accordance and cryptographic key sizes Standard [R35] , 192 or 256 [R35] T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code FDP_UIT.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall enforce the receive user data in a manner protected from FDP_UIT.1.2/MP_Add_code [Editorially user data, whether modification has occurred. Application Note Modification errors should be understood as modification, substitution, unrecoverable ordering change of data and any other integrity error that may cause the additional code to be installed on the card to be different from the one sent by This SFR control integrity of data FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall restrict the ability to [authorized identified roles]: List of TSF data Activate Additional code Application note The Activation of the additional code modify LSK_LOAD (LSK and Derivation Data) and FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code [authorized identified roles]: TSF Data Authorized Identified roles LSK None MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 /MP_Add_code Data exchange integrity The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access manner protected from modification errors. [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of modification of some of the pieces of the application sent by Modification errors should be understood as modification, substitution, unrecoverable ordering change of data and any other integrity error that may cause the additional code to be installed on the card to be different from the one sent by the TOE Developer. control integrity of data import in phase 5, including the additional code but not only. /MP_Add_code Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection the Authorised role TOE developer of the additional code modify the TOE. This additional code is ciphered with the LSK_LOAD (LSK and Derivation Data) and activated after the authentication of the KEY_READ_Add_code Management of TSF data _Add_code The TSF shall restrict the ability to Authorized Identified roles Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - access control SFP to The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of by the TOE developer Modification errors should be understood as modification, substitution, unrecoverable ordering change of data and any other integrity error that may cause the additional code to be installed on the code but not only. the [list of TSF data] to the TOE. This additional code is ciphered with the after the authentication of the TOE developer. The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the [data] to T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code FMT_SMR.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall maintain the roles 1. TOE developper FMT_SMR.1.2/MP_Add_code The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. FPT_EMS.1/MP_Add_code FPT_EMS.1.1/MP_Add_code The TOE shall not emit command execution in excess of 1. LSK FPT_EMS.1.2/MP_Add_code The TSF shall ensure following interface smart card circuit 1. LSK FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code FTP_ITC.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. FTP_ITC.1.2/MP_Add_code [Editorially Prepersonalizer to initiate communication via the trusted channel. FTP_ITC.1.3/MP_Add_code The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for: 1. Additional code loading 9.1.2.2 Manufacturing and Personalization FCS_CKM.1/MP Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] sizes [key length] that meet the following MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 /MP_Add_code Security roles The TSF shall maintain the roles The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. /MP_Add_code TOE Emanation The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during in excess of non useful information enabling access to The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the circuit contacts to gain access to Inter-TSF trusted channel The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall permit the TOE Developer and to initiate communication via the trusted channel. The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for: Manufacturing and Personalization Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key that meet the following [standard]: Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. variations, timing variations during are unable to use the The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or TOE Developer and The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for: The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic and specified cryptographic key T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Cryptographic key generation algorithm MSK derivation from initial MSK loaded in phase 1 using SHA 256 FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_3DES The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Secure Messaging – encryption and decryption FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_AES FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_AES The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Secure Messaging – encryption and decryption FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_3DES FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_3DES The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Secure Messaging – MAC MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) MSK derivation from initial MSK loaded in phase 1 using SHA 256 256 FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) encryption and 3DES in CBC mode 112 Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) encryption and AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 /MP_MAC_3DES Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) Standard 3DES RMAC 112 [R32] Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Key length Standards None in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Key length Standard [R32] in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Standard 128, 192 and 256 [R35] in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_AES FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_AES The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Secure Messaging MAC FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_3DES FCS_COP.1.1/MP_AUTH_3DES The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Card Manufacturer Authentication (MSK) FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_AES FCS_COP.1.1/MP_AUTH_AES The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Card Manufacturer Authentication (MSK) FCS_COP.1/MP_SHA Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/MP_SHA The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 /MP_MAC_AES Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) Standard AES 128, 192 and 256 [R35] /MP_AUTH_3DES Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) Standard Card Manufacturer Authentication (MSK) 3DES 112 [R32] /MP_AUTH_AES Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) Authentication (MSK) AES 128, 192 and 256 Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Standard [R32] in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Standard [R35] in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Cryptographic operation Hashing FDP_ACC.2/MP Complete access control FDP_ACC.2.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the objects and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP. FDP_ACC.2.2/MP The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an acc Application Note This SFR enforces access control over code loading but not only. FDP_ACF.1/MP Security attribute based access control FDP_ACF.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the the following Prepersonalizer Authentication (AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS) FDP_ACF.1.2/MP The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: AUTHENTICATE). FDP_ACF.1.3/MP The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none. FDP_ACF.1.4/MP The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none. Application Note This SFR enforces access control over but not only. MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Algo Key length (bits) Standard SHA256 None [R27] Complete access control The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control on and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP. The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP. enforces access control over all the operation performed in phase 5, including Security attribute based access control SF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control Prepersonalizer Authentication (AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS). The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS=TRUE (EXTERNAL The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the . The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following enforces access control over all the operation in phase 5, including additional Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - on all subjects and all The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF all the operation performed in phase 5, including additional to objects based on The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS=TRUE (EXTERNAL The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional code loading T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FDP_ITC.1/MP Import of user data without security attributes FDP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE. FDP_ITC.1.2/MP The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE. FDP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: none Application Note This SFR control import of data in phase 5, including This SFR ensures also the MSK diviersification, which is performs once, at first command, without any security requirements preliminary to this action. FDP_UCT.1/MP Basic data exchange confidentiality FDP_UCT.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure Application note For the Additional code loading access control, the LSK_LOAD is used to cipher the data transmitted. This SFR control confidentiality of data FDP_UIT.1/MP Data exchange integrity FDP_UIT.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the data in a manner protected from FDP_UIT.1.2/MP [Editorially refined] whether modification of some pieces of the application sent by the Prepersonalizer FIA_AFL.1/MP Authentication failure handling FIA_AFL.1.1/MP The TSF shall detect when authentication of MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Import of user data without security attributes The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access control when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE. The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under none. in phase 5, including the additional code but not only. diviersification, which is performs once, at first command, without any security requirements preliminary to this action. Basic data exchange confidentiality The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access control to unauthorised disclosure. For the Additional code loading access control, the LSK_LOAD is used to cipher the data transmitted. control confidentiality of data import in phase 5, including the additional Data exchange integrity The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control SFP data in a manner protected from modification errors /MP [Editorially refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, of some pieces of the application sent by the Prepersonalizer Authentication failure handling The TSF shall detect when 3 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - when importing user The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under code but not only. diviersification, which is performs once, at first command, without any to receive user data in For the Additional code loading access control, the LSK_LOAD is used to cipher the data transmitted. additional code but not only. ccess Control SFP to receive user The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, of some pieces of the application sent by the Prepersonalizer has occurred unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 1. Prepersonalizer FIA_AFL.1.2/MP When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been the TSF shall forbid any authentication attempt as Personalizer FIA_UAU.1/MP Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow before the user is authenticated. FIA_UAU.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UID.1/MP Timing of identification FIA_UID.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow before the user is identified. FIA_UID.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.4/MP_3DES Single FIA_UAU.4.1/MP_3DES The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to 1. Authentication Mechanisms based on FIA_UAU.4/MP_AES Single FIA_UAU.4.1/MP_AES The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to 1. Authentication Mechanisms based on FIA_UAU.5/MP_3DES Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/MP_3DES The TSF shall provide 1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on to support user authentication. MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been forbid any authentication attempt as Personalizer. Timing of authentication The TSF shall allow GET DATA, SELECT FILE on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing mediated actions on behalf of that user. Timing of identification The TSF shall allow GET DATA, SELECT FILE on behalf of the user to be performed The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any mediated actions on behalf of that user. Single-use authentication mechanisms The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to 1. Authentication Mechanisms based on 3DES Single-use authentication mechanisms The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to 1. Authentication Mechanisms based on AES tiple authentication mechanisms The TSF shall provide 1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, on behalf of the user to be performed The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing on behalf of the user to be performed The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FIA_UAU.5.2/MP_3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's cl 1. The TOE accepts the authentication Authentication Mechanism with FIA_UAU.5/MP_AES Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/MP_AES The TSF shall 1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/MP_AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the 1. The TOE accepts the authentication Authentication Mechanism with FMT_MTD.1/MP Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/MP The TSF shall phase 6 to the Prepersonalizer. FTP_ITC.1/MP Inter-TSF trusted channel FTP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. FTP_ITC.1.2/MP [Editorially Refined] communication via the trusted channel. FTP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for: 1. Personalization Agent key storage 2. Life cycle transition from Prepersonalization to Personalization phase FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_ENA Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_ENA The TSF shall Prepersonalization Data to the Prepersonalizer MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent with the Personalization Agent Key Multiple authentication mechanisms The TSF shall provide 1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent with Personalization Agent Key Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to switch the TOE life cycle from phase 5 to TSF trusted channel The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. Refined] The TSF shall permit the Prepersonalizer communication via the trusted channel. hall initiate communication via the trusted channel for: Personalization Agent key storage 2. Life cycle transition from Prepersonalization to Personalization phase INI_ENA Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and the Prepersonalizer. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - aimed identity according to the Personalization Agent by the Symmetric The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the Personalization Agent by the Symmetric TOE life cycle from phase 5 to The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. Prepersonalizer to initiate hall initiate communication via the trusted channel for: Initialization Data and T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_DIS Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_DIS The TSF shall Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to identified roles]: TSF Data MSK Personalization Agent Keys FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_WRITE identified roles]: TSF Data MSK Personalization Agent Keys FAU_SAS.1/MP Audit storage FAU_SAS.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide Identification Data in the audit records. FMT_SMF.1/MP Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMF.1.1/MP The TSF shall be 1. Initialization 2. Pre-personalization 3. Personalization MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 INI_DIS Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users the Personalization Agent. KEY_READ Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the [data] Authorized Identified roles None None KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the [data] Authorized Identified roles IC manufacturer (created by the developer) None Audit storage The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store in the audit records. Specification of Management Functions The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - to disable read access for users to the [data] to [authorized [data] to [authorized IC manufacturer (created by the developer) with the capability to store the IC capable of performing the following management functions: T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FMT_SMR.1/MP Security roles FMT_SMR.1.1/MP The TSF shall maintain the roles 1. Manufacturer FMT_SMR.1.2/MP The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. FPT_EMS.1/MP TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1/MP The TOE shall not emit execution in excess of non useful information 1. Prepersonalizer Key 2. Personalization Agent Key 3. MSK FPT_EMS.1.2/MP The TSF shall ensure interface smart card circuit contacts 1. Prepersonalizer Key 2. Personalization Agent Key 3. MSK 9.1.3 Active Authentication SFR FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/AA_DSA The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Operation Algorithm Digital Signature Creation RSA signature (CRT or SFM) with SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512 MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Security roles The TSF shall maintain the roles shall be able to associate users with roles. TOE Emanation The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command non useful information enabling access to The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following contacts to gain access to Active Authentication SFR Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Key length (bits) RSA signature (CRT or SFM) with SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512 1024 to 4096 with a step of 256 bits Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - variations, timing variations during command are unable to use the following in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Standard 1024 to 4096 with a step [R25] T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/AA_ECDSA The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Operation Algo Digital Signature Creation ECDSA with SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512 FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication FDP_DAU.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of the TOE FDP_DAU.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide the indicated information. Refinement: Evidence generation and ability of verfying it, constitute the FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes FDP_ITC.1.1/AA The TSF shall enforce the user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE. FDP_ITC.1.2/AA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE. FDP_ITC.1.3/AA The TSF shall enforc the SFP from outside the TOE: none FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Key length (bits) ECDSA with SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 192 to 521 over prime field curves FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a TOE itself. The TSF shall provide any users with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of Evidence generation and ability of verfying it, constitute the Active Authentication FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes The TSF shall enforce the Active Authentication Access Control user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE. The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under none. KEY_READ Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the AAK to Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Standard 192 to 521 over prime [R25] [R26] [R27] [R28] The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of Active Authentication protocol. Control SFP when importing The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when e the following rules when importing user data controlled under to none. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FPT_EMS.1/AA TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1/AA The TOE shall not emit execution in excess of non useful information 1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK) FPT_EMS.1.2/AA The TSF shall ensure interface smart card circuit contacts 1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK) FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functi FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to Authentication to Personalization Agent FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_WRITE T Agent. 9.1.4 Basic Access Control SFR 9.1.4.1 Common Basic Access Control SFR FCS_CKM.1/BAC Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1.1/BAC The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm cryptographic key sizes [key length] Cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 TOE Emanation The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command non useful information enabling access to 1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK) The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following contacts to gain access to 1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK) FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions Personalization Agent. KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the AAK Basic Access Control SFR Common Basic Access Control SFR Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] [key length] that meet the following [standard]: key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm 112 Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - variations, timing variations during command are unable to use the following the functions TSF Active AAK to Personalization The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified Standards [R2] T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_AUTH The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Symmetric authentication, encryption and decryption FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_SHA The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Hashing FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_ENC The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Secure Messaging (BAC) – encryption and decryption FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_MAC The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) encryption and decryption 3DES 112 Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) SHA1 None Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) encryption and 3DES in CBC mode 112 Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Key length Standard [R35] in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Key length Standard [R27] in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Key length Standard [R35][R32] in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Cryptographic operation Secure Messaging MAC FDP_UCT.1/BAC Basic data exchange confidentiality FDP_UCT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the data in a manner protected from FDP_UIT.1/BAC Data exchange integrity FDP_UIT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the data in a manner protected from FDP_UIT.1.2/BAC The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether deletion, insertion and replay has occurred FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_RE FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to identified roles]: TSF Data Document Access Keys FMT_LIM.1/BAC Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.1.1/BAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced Deploying Test Features after 1. User Data to be disclosed MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Algo Key length (bits) Standard Retail MAC 112 [R32] Basic data exchange confidentiality The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to transmit and r data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure. Data exchange integrity The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to transmit and r nner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether has occurred KEY_READ Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the [data] Authorized Identified roles None Limited capabilities The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced after TOE Delivery does not allow Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - transmit and receive user transmit and receive user errors The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification, [data] to [authorized The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced: T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FMT_LIM.2/BAC Limited availability FMT_LIM.2.1/BAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1 Deploying Test Features after TOE 1. User Data to be disclosed FPT_TST.1/BAC TSF testing FPT_TST.1.1/BAC The TSF shall run a suite of self tests TSF, at the conditions: - When performing a BAC authentication FPT_TST.1.2/BAC The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data. FPT_TST.1.3/BAC The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code. FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE [authorized identified roles]: List of TSF data Write Document Basic Access Keys 9.1.4.2 Specific Basic Access Control SFR FDP_ACC.1/BAC Complete access control FDP_ACC.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 among subjects and objects covered by t MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Limited availability The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced TOE Delivery does not allow TSF testing The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of performing a BAC authentication The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of /BAC_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data /BAC_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection the Authorised role Document Basic Access Keys Personalization Agent Specific Basic Access Control SFR Complete access control The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP on terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 among subjects and objects covered by the SFP. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in )" the following policy is enforced: to demonstrate the correct operation of the The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of the [list of TSF data] to terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and all operations T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FDP_ACF.1/BAC Security attribute based access control FDP_ACF.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the following: 1. Subjects: a. Personalization Agent b. Basic Inspection System c. Terminal 2. Objects: a. data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD b. data in EF.COM c. data in EF.SOD 3. Security attributes: a. authentication status of terminals FDP_ACF.1.2/BAC The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: 1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD 2. the successfully authenticated Basic EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD FDP_ACF.1.3/BAC The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none. FDP_ACF.1.4/BAC The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: 1. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD 2. Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF 3. The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4. FMT_SMR.1/BAC Security roles FMT_SMR.1.1/BAC The TSF shall maintain the roles 1. Basic Inspection System FMT_SMR.1.2/BAC The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Security attribute based access control The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to objects based on the a. Personalization Agent b. Basic Inspection System o EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD a. authentication status of terminals The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: 1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD 2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the none. The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following 1. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD 2. Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD 3. The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4. Security roles The TSF shall maintain the roles The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - to objects based on the The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among 1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and read the data of the Inspection System is allowed to read the data in EF.COM, The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following 1. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD .DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD 3. The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FIA_AFL.1/BAC Authentication failure handling FIA_AFL.1.1/BAC The TSF shall detect when range of acceptable values 0 to 255 consecutive to BAC authentication protocol FIA_AFL.1.2/BAC When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been or surpassed the TSF shall wait for an increasing time betw and sending of the TSF response during the BAC authentication attempts FIA_UAU.6/BAC Re-authenticating FIA_UAU.6.1/BAC The TSF shall re to the TOE after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism FIA_UID.1/BAC Timing of identification FIA_UID.1.1/BAC The TSF shall allow 1. To read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing” 2. To read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD” 3. To read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use” on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. FIA_UID.1.2/BAC The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user FIA_UAU.1/BAC Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.1.1/BAC The TSF shall allow 1. To read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing” 2. To read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD” 3. To read the random identifier in Phase 4 “ Operationa Use” on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Authentication failure handling The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within 0 to 255 consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been wait for an increasing time between receiving of the terminal challenge and sending of the TSF response during the BAC authentication attempts authenticating The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Timing of identification The TSF shall allow Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing” 2. To read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD” 3. To read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use” on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any mediated actions on behalf of that user Timing of authentication The TSF shall allow ation Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing” 2. To read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD” 3. To read the random identifier in Phase 4 “ Operationa Use” on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - an administrator configurable positive integer within unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met een receiving of the terminal challenge authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FIA_UAU.1.2/BAC The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.4/BAC Single-use authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.4.1/BAC The TSF shall prevent r 1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism FIA_UAU.5/BAC Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/BAC The TSF shall provide 1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/BAC The TSF shall authenticate any user's cl 1. The TOE accepts the authentication Basic Access Control Authentication Mechani 9.1.5 Chip Authentication SFR FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity FIA_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a identity of the TOE. FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified cryptographic key sizes Cryptographic key generation algorithm Algorithm based on the Key Diffie protocol compliant to PKCS#3 MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing mediated actions on behalf of that user. use authentication mechanisms The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism Multiple authentication mechanisms The TSF shall provide Authentication Mechanism The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys Chip Authentication SFR FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication protocol according to /CA_DH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation ES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard] Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman key derivation 112 Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing aimed identity according to the Basic Inspection System only by means of the sm with the Document Basic Access Keys protocol according to [R39] to prove the The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards [R2] T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified cryptographic key sizes Cryptographic key generation algorithm Algorithm based on the Key Diffie protocol compliant to PKCS#3 FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified cryptographic key sizes Cryptographic key generation algorithm Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946 FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified cryptographic key sizes Cryptographic key generation algorithm Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946 FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm Key length MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 /CA_DH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard] key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman key derivation 128, 192, 256 /CA_ECDH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation /CA_ECDH_SM_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard] key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to 112 /CA_ECDH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation /CA_ECDH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard] key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to 128, 192, 256 /CA_SHA_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation /CA_SHA_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes Key length Standards Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 128, 192, 256 [R2] The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards [R2] The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 128, 192, 256 [R2] in accordance with a specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ (bits) SHA1 None FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) SHA1 and SHA256 None FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm key sizes [key length] that meet the following Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) 3DES CBC mode 112 FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES with a specified cryptographic algorithm length] that meet the following [standard] Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) AES 128, 192 and 256 MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 (bits) None [R27] /CA_SHA_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes Key length (bits) Standards None [R27] /CA_SYM_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation /CA_SYM_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform SM encryption and accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] that meet the following [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 112 [R27] /CA_SYM_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall perform SM encryption and decryption with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 128, 192 and 256 [R27] Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - in accordance with a specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that SM encryption and decryption in [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic decryption in accordance cryptographic key sizes [key T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm key sizes [key length] that meet the following Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) 3DES Retail MAC 112 FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm key sizes [key length] that meet the following Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) AES CMAC 128, 192 and 256 FDP_ITC.1/CA Import of user data without security attributes FDP_ITC.1.1/CA The TSF shall enforce the user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE. FDP_ITC.1.2/CA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE. FDP_ITC.1.3/CA The TSF shall enforce th the SFP from outside the TOE: none FIA_UAU.1/CA Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.1.1/CA The TSF shall allow: 1. To establish the communication channel 2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS 3. To identify themselves by selection of the authentication key MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 /CA_MAC_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation /CA_MAC_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform SM message authentication code accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] that meet the following [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 112 [R39] /CA_MAC_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation /CA_MAC_SM_AES The TSF shall perform SM message authentication code accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] that meet the following [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 128, 192 and 256 [R39] FDP_ITC.1/CA Import of user data without security attributes The TSF shall enforce the Chip Authentication Access Control user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE. The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under none. Timing of authentication The TSF shall allow: 1. To establish the communication channel ization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS 3. To identify themselves by selection of the authentication key Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - authentication code in [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic SM message authentication code in [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic SFP when importing The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when e following rules when importing user data controlled under ization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 4. To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. FIA_UAU.1.2/CA The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_3DES The TSF shall provide 1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode 2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_3DES The TSF shall authen 1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism FIA_UAU.5/CA_AES Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_AES The TSF shall provide 1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode 2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the 1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism FIA_UAU.6/CA Re-authenticating FIA_UAU.6.1/CA The TSF shall re the TOE after successful run of the CA shall be verified as being sent by the inspection system MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 4. To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES Multiple authentication mechanisms The TSF shall provide ENC mode 2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the s of the Chip Authentication Mechanism Multiple authentication mechanisms The TSF shall provide ENC mode 2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism authenticating The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent t after successful run of the CA shall be verified as being sent by the inspection system Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any aimed identity according to the After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the each command sent to after successful run of the CA shall be verified as being sent by the inspection system T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FIA_UID.1/CA Timing of identification FIA_UID.1.1/CA The TSF shall allow 1. To establish the communication channel 2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disbled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS 3. To carry out th Chip Authentication Protocol on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. FIA_UID.1.2/CA The TSF shall require each other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FPT_EMS.1/CA TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1/CA The TOE shall not emit execution in excess of non useful information 1. Chip Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK) FPT_EMS.1.2/CA The TSF shall ensure interface smart card circuit contacts 1. Active Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK) FPT_TST.1/CA TSF testing FPT_TST.1.1/CA The TSF shall run a suite of self tests TSF, at the conditions: - When performing the Chip Authentication FPT_TST.1.2/CA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data. FPT_TST.1.3/CA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code. FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to Agent. MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Timing of identification The TSF shall allow 1. To establish the communication channel 2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disbled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS 3. To carry out th Chip Authentication Protocol on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any mediated actions on behalf of that user. TOE Emanation The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command non useful information enabling access to 1. Chip Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK) The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following contacts to gain access to 1. Active Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK) TSF testing The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of performing the Chip Authentication The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of WRITE Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the CAK Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disbled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS user to be successfully identified before allowing any variations, timing variations during command are unable to use the following to demonstrate the correct operation of the The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of AK to Personalization T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to FDP_UCT.1/CA Basic data exchange confidentiality FDP_UCT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] receive user data in a manner protected from protocol. FDP_UIT.1/CA Data exchange integrity FDP_UIT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] receive user data in a manner protected from after Chip Authentication protocol FDP_UIT.1.2/CA [Editorially Refined] whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay protocol 9.2 Security Assurance Requirements The security assurance requirement level is EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_TAT.2 and ATE_DPT.3. MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 KEY_READ Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the CAK to Basic data exchange confidentiality [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure after Chip Authentication Data exchange integrity [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay after Chip Authentication protocol [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data , deletion, insertion and replay has occurred after Chip Authentication Security Assurance Requirements The security assurance requirement level is EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_TAT.2 and ATE_DPT.3. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - to none. SFP to transmit and after Chip Authentication Control SFP to transmit and , deletion, insertion and replay errors The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, after Chip Authentication The security assurance requirement level is EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, ADV_FSP.5, T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 10 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFIC 10.1 TOE Summary Specification Access Control in reading This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable: - BAC keys - Chip Authentication keys, - Active Authentication private key - Personalization Agent keys - MSK and LSK It controls access to the CPLC data as well: - It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase - It ensures it can not be readable in free mode Regarding the file structure: In the operational use: - The terminal can read user data, the Document Security Object, EF.COM only after BAC authentication and through a valid secure channel. In the personalization phase - The Personalization Agent the TOE (using its authentication keys). It ensures as well that no other part of the Access Control in writing This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. It ensures as well the CPLC data can not be written anymore once the TOE is personalized and that it is not possible to load an additional code. Regarding the file structure In the operational use: It is not possible to create any files (s not possible to update any system files. However - the application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs In the personalization phase - The Personalization Agent files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys. MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION TOE Summary Specification This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable: keys, private key keys It controls access to the CPLC data as well: It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase It ensures it can not be readable in free mode at the end of the personalization step The terminal can read user data, the Document Security Object, EF.COM only after BAC authentication and through a valid secure channel. Personalization Agent can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys). It ensures as well that no other part of the memory can be accessed at anytime This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are fe cycle state. It ensures as well the CPLC data can not be written anymore once the TOE is personalized and that it is not possible to load an additional code. In the operational use: It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible to update any system files. However the application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs Personalization Agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all the data files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access at the end of the personalization step The terminal can read user data, the Document Security Object, EF.COM only after BAC can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is authenticated by This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are It ensures as well the CPLC data can not be written anymore once the TOE is personalized and that it ystem or data files). Furthermore, it is the application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs ough a valid secure channel all the data files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Active Authentication This security functionality ensures the is activated by the personnalizer). BAC mechanism This security functionality ensures the BAC is correctly performed. It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the symmetric BAC keys the during the personalization phase. Furthermore, this security f are destroyed at the end of each BAC session. Chip Authentication This security functionality ensures the activated by the personnalizer). It could be used as an alternative of reinforce the Authentication of the Chip. It differs from an EAC not performing the Terminal Authentication. Personalization This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personnali an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging. Physical protection This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks. Prepersonalization This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the P demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. initializing the product and loading additional code TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging. Safe state management This security functionalities ensures th - an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS - a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM) MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in ctivated by the personnalizer). This security functionality ensures the BAC is correctly performed. It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the symmetric BAC keys the Personalization Agent during the personalization phase. Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures the session keys of each BAC session. This security functionality ensures the Chip Authentication is performed as described in activated by the personnalizer). It could be used as an alternative of Active Authentication reinforce the Authentication of the Chip. It differs from an EAC not performing the Terminal This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personnalization Agent, demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging. This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks. This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Prepersonnalization A demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This function is in charge of pre initializing the product and loading additional code if needed. This TSF is conformant with TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging. This security functionalities ensures that the TOE gets back to a secure state when an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM) Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - s described in [R39]. (if it This security functionality ensures the BAC is correctly performed. It can only be performed once the Personalization Agent loaded beforehand unctionalities ensures the session keys is performed as described in [R39] (if it is Active Authentication to reinforce the Authentication of the Chip. It differs from an EAC not performing the Terminal zation Agent, demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric This TSF can use a Secure ersonnalization Agent, demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric This function is in charge of pre- This TSF is conformant with [R45]. This k to a secure state when T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ This security functionality ensures that such card" or becomes mute. Secure Messaging This security functionality ensures the confidentiality between the TOE and the IFD. After a successful BAC authentication, a secure channel is establishe based on Triple DES algorithm, and after a successful Chip Authentication, a established based on Triple DES/AES This security functionality ensures - No commands were inserted - The data exchanged remain confidential If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed This Secure Messaging can be combined with the This TSF can provide a GP Secure Messaging (SCP02 or SCP03) for the Prepersonalization or Personalization. Self tests The TOE performs self tests to verify the integrity - Before the TSF data usage - The additional code integrity - The integrity of keys and sensitive data is ensured MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 This security functionality ensures that such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in the state "kill This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity & integrity of IFD. After a successful BAC authentication, a secure channel is establishe based on Triple DES algorithm, and after a successful Chip Authentication, a /AES algorithms. This security functionality ensures No commands were inserted, modified nor deleted within the data flow The data exchanged remain confidential If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed. This Secure Messaging can be combined with the Active Authentication. This TSF can provide a GP Secure Messaging (SCP02 or SCP03) for the Prepersonalization or to verify the integrity on the TSF data: usage integrity is checked at each POWER ON of the card The integrity of keys and sensitive data is ensured Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in the state "kill & integrity of the communication IFD. After a successful BAC authentication, a secure channel is established based on Triple DES algorithm, and after a successful Chip Authentication, a secure channel is This TSF can provide a GP Secure Messaging (SCP02 or SCP03) for the Prepersonalization or T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 11 RATIONALES Threats Security Objectives T.Chip_ID OT.Identification T.Skimming OT.Data_Conf T.Eavesdropping OT.Data_Conf T.Forgery OT.AC_Pers OE.Exam_MRTD OE.Pass_Auth_Sign T.Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Abuse T.Information_Leakage OT.Prot_Inf_Leak T.Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Phys T.Malfunction OT.Prot_Malfunction T.Counterfeit OT.AA_Proof OE.Exam_MRTD_CA T.Unauthorized_Load OT.Secure _Load_ACode T.Bad_Activation OT.Secure _AC_Activation T.TOE_Identification_Forgery OT.TOE_Identification Table 13- Threats and Security Objectives OSP Security Objectives P.Manufact OT.Identification P.Personalization OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification P.Personal_Data OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf P.Activ_Auth OT.AA_Proof P.Chip_Auth OT.CA_Proof Table 14 - OSPs and Security Objectives Assumptions OE A.MRTD_Manufact OE.MRTD_Manufact A.MRTD_Delivery OE.MRTD_ Delivery A.Pers_Agent OE.Personalization A.Insp_Sys OE.Exam_MRTD, A.BAC-Keys OE.BAC-Keys A.Insp_Sys_CA OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_CA A.Insp_Sys_AA OE.Exam_MRTD_AA A.Signature_PKI OE.Exam_MRTD_ Table 15 - Assumptions and OE The other rationales are available in the complete ST MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Security Objectives OT.Identification, OE.BAC-Keys, OT.TOE_Identification OT.Data_Conf, OE.BAC-Keys OT.Data_Conf, OE.BAC-Keys OT.AC_Pers, OE.Personalization, OT.Data_Int, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, Exam_MRTD, OE.Exam_MRTD_CA, OE.Exam_MRTD_AA, OE.Pass_Auth_Sign, OE.Passive_Auth_Verif OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OE.Personalization OT.Prot_Inf_Leak OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Malfunction OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA, OT.CA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_CA, Exam_MRTD_CA, OE.Activ_Auth_Verif, OE.Auth_Key_MRTD OT.Secure _Load_ACode OT.Secure _AC_Activation OT.TOE_Identification Threats and Security Objectives – coverage Security Objectives OT.Identification, OE.Personalization OT.Data_Conf, OT.Data_Int_CA, OT.Data_Int_AA OSPs and Security Objectives – Coverage OE.MRTD_Manufact OE.MRTD_ Delivery OE.Personalization , OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_CA, OE.Exam_MRTD_CA OE.Exam_MRTD_AA, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA OE.Exam_MRTD_CA, OE.Passive_Auth_Verif, OE.Activ_Auth_Sign Assumptions and OE – Coverage rationales are available in the complete ST. Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 12 REFERENCES MRTD specifications [R1] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization [R2] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization [R3] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readab Travel Documents, Specifications for electronically enabled offical travel documents with biometric identification capabilities (including supplement), ICAO doc 93003, 2008 [R4] Development of a logical technologies Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical Data Structure 1.7, published by authority of the Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004 [R5] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine readable travel documents Access control (EAC) [R6] Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Reada from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 IDL specifications [R7] Information Technology 1:Physical characteristics and basic da [R8] Information Technology 2: Machine-readable technologies, ISO/IEC 18013 [R9] Information Technology 3: Access control, authentication and integrity validation, ISO/IEC 18013 Protection Profiles [R10] Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile v 1.0 [R11] Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access contro PP-0055 v1.10 25th march 2009 [R12] Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access control BSI-PP-0056 v1.10 25 [R13] Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP) [R14] MRTD with PACE – PP [R15] E-passport: adaptation and interpretation of e SGDN/DCSSI/SDR, ref. 10.0.1, February 2007 [R16] Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended Configurations, ANSSi-CC-PP-2009/02, 1/12/2009 MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date uthority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 – Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 3 – Machine Readable Offical Travel Documents, Specifications for electronically enabled offical travel documents with biometric identification capabilities (including supplement), ICAO doc 93003, 2008 Development of a logical data structure – LDS for optional capacity expansion technologies Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision 1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-18 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine readable travel documents Access control (EAC) – TR03110 – v1.11 Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports, Fifth Edition Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence 1:Physical characteristics and basic data set, ISO/IEC 18013-1:2005 Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence readable technologies, ISO/IEC 18013-2:2008 Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence 3: Access control, authentication and integrity validation, ISO/IEC 18013 Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile v 1.0 - BSI-PP-0035 15/06/2007 Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access contro march 2009 Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access control 0056 v1.10 25th march 2009 Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control P) – BSI-PP-0056 V2 – 2012 PP-0068v2 passport: adaptation and interpretation of e-passport Protection Profiles, SGDN/DCSSI/SDR, ref. 10.0.1, February 2007 Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended Configurations, 2009/02, 1/12/2009 Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel - October 01, 2004, uthority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization – Machine Readable Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization Machine Readable Offical Travel Documents, Specifications for electronically enabled offical travel documents with biometric identification capabilities (including supplement), ICAO doc 93003, 2008 LDS for optional capacity expansion technologies Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision – secretary general, International Civil Aviation Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine readable travel documents – Extended ble Travel Documents Excerpts Machine Readable Passports, Fifth Edition – 2003 ISO Compliant Driving Licence — Part ISO Compliant Driving Licence — Part ISO Compliant Driving Licence — Part 3: Access control, authentication and integrity validation, ISO/IEC 18013-3:2009 0035 15/06/2007 Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access control – BSI- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access control – Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control passport Protection Profiles, Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended Configurations, T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ [R17] Technical Report, Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents – version v1.01 Chips References [R18] Certification report Controller P60x144/080 [R19] Certification report Controller P60x080/052/040PVC(Y/Z/A)/PVG with IC Dedicated Software Standards [R20] ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 [R21] Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to 2006 [R22] ISO/IEC 15946-1. Information technology techniques based on elliptic c [R23] ISO/IEC 15946-2. Information technology techniques based on elliptic curves [R24] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology techniques based on elliptic curves [R25] ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 schemes giving message recovery [R26] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993 [R27] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180 Change Notice to include SHA of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1 [R28] AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62 Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9 septembre 1998 [R29] Jakob Jonsson and Burt Kaliski. Public cryptography specifications version 2.1. RFC 3447, 2003 [R30] RSA Laboratories. PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA cryptography standard. RSA Laboratories Technical Note, 2002 [R31] ANSI X9.31 - Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 1998. [R32] FIPS 46-3 Data Encryption Standard (DES) [R33] ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999 "Codes d'authentification de message (MAC) Partie 1: Mécanismes utilisant un cryptogramme bloc" [R34] NIST SP 800-90 – Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Determini Random Bit Generators (Revised) [R35] FIPS 197 – Advance Encryption Standard (AES) [R36] ISO/IEC 11770-2. Information Technology part 2: Mechanisms using symmetric techniques, 1996 Misc MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Technical Report, Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents Certification report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0845-V2-2013-MA-02 - NXP Secure Smart Card 144/080PVA/PVA(Y/B) with IC dedicated software FW5.0 Certification report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-v2-2014 - NXP Secure Smart Card Controller Controller P60x080/052/040PVC(Y/Z/A)/PVG with IC Dedicated Software :2013 – Organization, security and commands for interchange Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO/IEC 1. Information technology – Security techniques techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General, 2002 2. Information technology – Security techniques techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures, 2002 ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques echniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002 2002 - Information technology - Security techniques schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note, Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 Secure Hash Standard (+ Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Inst of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1 AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9 septembre 1998 Jakob Jonsson and Burt Kaliski. Public-key cryptography standards (PKCS) #1: RSA yptography specifications version 2.1. RFC 3447, 2003 RSA Laboratories. PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA cryptography standard. RSA Laboratories Technical Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Industry (rDSA), 1998. 3 Data Encryption Standard (DES) 1:1999 "Codes d'authentification de message (MAC) Partie 1: Mécanismes utilisant un cryptogramme bloc" Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Determini Random Bit Generators (Revised) Advance Encryption Standard (AES) 2. Information Technology – Security techniques – part 2: Mechanisms using symmetric techniques, 1996 Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Technical Report, Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents NXP Secure Smart Card /B) with IC dedicated software FW5.0 NXP Secure Smart Card Controller Controller P60x080/052/040PVC(Y/Z/A)/PVG with IC Dedicated Software Organization, security and commands for interchange ISO/IEC 15946.TR-ECC, BSI Security techniques – Cryptographic Security techniques – Cryptographic Security techniques — Cryptographic Part 3: Key establishment, 2002 Security techniques - Digital signature Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-function Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note, 2 Secure Hash Standard (+ 224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute 1998: Public Key Cryptography For The key cryptography standards (PKCS) #1: RSA RSA Laboratories. PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA cryptography standard. RSA Laboratories Technical Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the 1:1999 "Codes d'authentification de message (MAC) Partie 1: Mécanismes Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic – Key management – T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ [R37] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretati und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1, 25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik [R38] NOTE-10 - Interpretation with e [R39] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 1 Technical Guideline TR [R40] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 2 Technical Guideline TR [R41] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 3 Technical Guideline TR CC [R42] Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and general model, CCMB [R43] Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB 2012 [R44] Common Criteria for Assurance Components, CCMB 2012 [R45] ANSSI-CC note 6 – v0.91 MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1, 25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Interpretation with e-passport PP_courtesy translation-draft v0.1 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 1 Technical Guideline TR-03110-1 – version 2.10 March 2012 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 2 Technical Guideline TR-03110-2 – version 2.10 March 2012 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 3 Technical Guideline TR-03110-3 – version 2.10 March 2012 Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and model, CCMB-2012-09-001, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September 2012 Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB-2012-09-002, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2012-09-003, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September v0.91 Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - onen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1, draft v0.1 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 1 – Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 2 – Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 3 – Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and 001, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September 2012 Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 2: Security 002, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September Information Technology security Evaluation Part 3: Security 003, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 13 ACRONYMS AA Active Authentication BAC Basic Access Control CC Common Criteria Vers CPLC Card personalization life cycle DF Dedicated File DFA Differential Fault Analysis DG Data Group EAL Evaluation Assurance Level EF Elementary File EFID File Identifier DES Digital encryption standard DH Diffie Hellmann I/0 Input/Output IC Integrated Circuit ICAO International Civil Aviation organization ICC Integrated Circuit Card IFD Interface device LDS Logical Data structure MF Master File MRTD Machine readable Travel Document MRZ Machine readable Zone MSK Manufacturer Secret Key OCR Optical Character Recognition OS Operating System PKI Public Key Infrastructure PP Protection Profile SFI Short File identifier SHA Secure hashing Algorithm SOD Security object Data TOE Target of Evaluation TSF TOE Security function MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Active Authentication Basic Access Control Common Criteria Version 3.1 revision 4 Card personalization life cycle Differential Fault Analysis Evaluation Assurance Level Digital encryption standard International Civil Aviation organization Integrated Circuit Card Logical Data structure Machine readable Travel Document Machine readable Zone Manufacturer Secret Key Optical Character Recognition Public Key Infrastructure Secure hashing Algorithm Security object Data Target of Evaluation rity function Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ INDEX A A.BAC-Keys .................................................... A.Insp_Sys...................................................... A.Insp_Sys_AA................................ A.Insp_Sys_CA ................................ A.MRTD_Delivery ................................ A.MRTD_Manufact................................ A.Pers_Agent................................ Access__Control__in__reading..................... Access__Control__in__writing...................... Active__Authentication................................ Attacker......................................................... Authenticity__of__the__MRTD's__chip B BAC__mechanism................................ F FAU_SAS.1/MP................................ FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code ........................... FCS_CKM.1/BAC ................................ FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES...................... FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES ........................ FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES .................... FCS_CKM.1/MP ................................ FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code........................... FCS_CKM.4/Global ................................ FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA ................................ FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA ................................ FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH................................ FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC ................................ FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC ................................ FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA ................................ FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES.................... FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES ...................... FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES ..................... MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 ....................40 ......................39 ...............................................40 ...............................................40 ..........................................39 ........................................39 .................................................39 .....................71 ......................71 .................................71 .........................34 Authenticity__of__the__MRTD's__chip.......35 ..........................................71 ..............................................59 ...........................52 ............................................61 ......................66 ........................66 FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES..................66 ....................67 .............................................54 ...........................52 ........................................50 ......................................60 ..................................60 ..................................62 ....................................62 ...................................62 ....................................62 ....................68 ......................68 .....................67 FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_3DES FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_AES FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES FCS_COP.1/MP_Enc_Add_code FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_AES FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_3DES FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_Add_code FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_AES FCS_COP.1/MP_SHA................................ FCS_RND.1/Global ................................ FDP_ACC.1/BAC................................ FDP_ACC.2/MP ................................ FDP_ACF.1/BAC ................................ FDP_ACF.2/MP................................ FDP_DAU.1/AA ................................ FDP_ITC.1/AA................................ FDP_ITC.1/CA................................ FDP_ITC.1/MP................................ FDP_UCT.1/BAC................................ FDP_UCT.1/MP................................ FDP_UIT.1/BAC................................ FDP_UIT.1/CA ................................ FDP_UIT.1/MP ................................ FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code FIA_AFL.1/BAC................................ FIA_AFL.1/MP ................................ FIA_API.1/CA................................ FIA_UAU.1/BAC ................................ FIA_UAU.1/CA................................ FIA_UAU.1/MP................................ FIA_UAU.4/BAC ................................ FIA_UAU.4/MP_3DES ................................ FIA_UAU.4/MP_AES ................................ FIA_UAU.5/BAC ................................ FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES ................................ FIA_UAU.5/MP_3DES ................................ FIA_UAU.5/MP_AES ............................... Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 92700 FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES....................... 67 FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES.................... 67 FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES...................... 67 FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_3DES........................ 55 FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_AES .......................... 55 FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES........................... 54 FCS_COP.1/MP_Enc_Add_code ................... 52 FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_AES............................. 54 3DES ......................... 55 FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_Add_code ................. 52 FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_AES............................ 55 ..................................... 56 ........................................ 50 ............................................ 64 ............................................. 56 ............................................ 64 .............................................. 56 ............................................. 60 ................................................ 61 ................................................ 68 ............................................... 56 ...................................... 62, 70 ............................................. 57 ............................................. 63 ............................................... 70 .............................................. 57 FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code............................ 53 .............................................. 65 ............................................... 57 ................................................. 66 ............................................ 65 ............................................... 68 .............................................. 57 ............................................ 65 ................................... 58 ..................................... 58 ............................................ 65 .................................... 68 ................................... 58 ............................... 58, 69 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FIA_UAU.6/BAC................................ FIA_UAU.6/CA ................................ FIA_UID.1/BAC................................ FIA_UID.1/CA................................ FIA_UID.1/MP................................ FMT_LIM.1/BAC ................................ FMT_LIM.1/Global................................ FMT_LIM.2/BAC ................................ FMT_LIM.2/Global................................ FMT_MOF.1/AA................................ FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ.......................... FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE ........................ FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_READ........................ FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE ...................... FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ.......................... FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE ........................ FMT_MTD.1/MP................................ FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code ......................... FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_DIS.............................. FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_ENA ............................ FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ......................... FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE ....................... FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE_Add_code FMT_SMF.1/MP................................ FMT_SMR.1/BAC................................ FMT_SMR.1/MP ................................ FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code.......................... FPT_EMS.1/AA................................ FPT_EMS.1/CA................................ FPT_EMS.1/Global................................ FPT_EMS.1/MP................................ FPT_EMS.1/MP_Add_code ........................... FPT_FLS.1/Global................................ FPT_PHP.3/Global ................................ FPT_TST.1/BAC................................ FPT_TST.1/Global ................................ FTP_ITC.1/MP................................ FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code .......................... FTP_ITC.1/PP................................ MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 .............................................65 ...............................................69 ...............................................65 .................................................69 ................................................57 ............................................63 .........................................50 ............................................63 .........................................50 .............................................61 ..........................61 ........................61 ........................63 ......................63 ..........................70 ........................70 ............................................58 .........................53 ..............................59 ............................59 .........................59 FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code.......53 .......................59 FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE_Add_code.....53 .............................................59 ...........................................64 ............................................59 ..........................53 ...............................................61 ...............................................69 .........................................51 ..............................................60 ...........................53 ...........................................51 .........................................51 ..............................................63 ....................................51, 69 ..............................................58 ..........................54 ...............................................70 IC_developer................................ Inspection_System................................ Logical__MRTD__data Manufacturer................................ MRTD_Holder ................................ OE.Auth_Key_MRTD................................ OE.BAC-Keys ................................ OE.Exam_MRTD........................... OE.MRTD___Delivery ................................ OE.MRTD_Manufact................................ OE.Pass_Auth_Sign................................ OE.Passive_Auth_Verif OE.Personalization................................ OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD OT.AA_Proof................................ OT.AC_Pers................................ OT.CA_Proof ................................ OT.Data_Conf ................................ OT.Data_Int................................ OT.Data_Int_AA................................ OT.Data_Int_CA................................ OT.Identification................................ OT.Prot_Abuse-Func................................ OT.Prot_Inf_Leak................................ OT.Prot_Malfunction................................ OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper OT.Secure_AC_Activation OT.Secure_Load_ACode OT.TOE_Identification P.Activ_Auth ................................ P.Chip_Auth................................ Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 92700 I ................................................. 34 ........................................ 33 L .................................. 34 M ................................................ 33 ............................................... 34 O ..................................... 45 ................................................. 44 ...........................31, 44, 45, 46 ................................... 43 ..................................... 43 ....................................... 44 OE.Passive_Auth_Verif ................................. 44 ........................................ 44 OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD................................. 45 ................................................. 42 ................................................... 41 ................................................. 42 ............................................... 41 ................................................... 41 ............................................ 42 ............................................ 42 ........................................... 41 ..................................... 41 .......................................... 41 .................................... 42 .................................. 42 OT.Secure_AC_Activation............................. 43 OT.Secure_Load_ACode ............................... 43 .................................. 43 P ................................................. 39 .................................................. 39 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ P.Manufact.................................................... P.Personal_Data ................................ P.Personalization................................ Personalisation__Agent__Authentication Personalization_Agent ................................ Physical__protection................................ Prepersonalizer ................................ S Safe__state__management .......................... Secure__Messaging................................ Self__tests..................................................... Software_developer................................ T T.Abuse-Func................................ T.Bad_Activation ................................ T.Chip_ID ....................................................... T.Counterfeit ................................ T.Eavesdropping................................ T.Forgery........................................................ T.Information_Leakage ................................ T.Malfunction................................ T.Phys-Tamper................................ T.Skimming.................................................... T.TOE_Identification_Forgery ....................... T.Unauthorized_load................................ Terminal ........................................................ Traveler.......................................................... MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Securi F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 ....................38 ............................................38 ...........................................38 Personalisation__Agent__Authentication ....72 ..................................33 .....................................72 .............................................34 ..........................72 .......................................72 .....................72 ......................................34 .................................................36 ...........................................38 .......................36 ...........................................37, 38 ............................................36 ........................36 .................................36 ................................................37 ...............................................37 ....................36 .......................38 .....................................38 ........................33 ..........................34 Public Security Target BAC 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 92700