Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007
for
Sdu ICAO eMRTD version 1.0
from
Sdu Identification bv
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V3.4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007
Security IC with MRTD BAC Application
Sdu ICAO eMRTD version 1.0
from
Sdu Identification bv Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Basic
Access Control, version 1.0 (BSI-PP-0017-2005)
Functionality: BSI-PP-0017-2005 conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by:
ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF) and
ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 02 May 2007
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.35
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective in March 1998. This agreement has been signed by
the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
recognizes certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and
the United Kingdom within the terms of this Agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition
of Protection Profiles based on the CC. As of February 2007 the arrangement
has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.
The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http:\\www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the
TSF) and ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures) that are not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families are relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Sdu ICAO eMRTD version 1.0 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Sdu ICAO eMRTD version 1.0 was conducted by
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor and vendor is Sdu Identification bv
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 02 May 2007.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-22 and D1 to D-4.
The product Sdu ICAO eMRTD version 1.0 has been included in the BSI list of
the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Sdu Identification bv
Oudeweg 32
2031 CG Haarlem
The Netherlands
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 11
3 Security Policy 12
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 12
5 Architectural Information 13
6 Documentation 13
7 IT Product Testing 13
8 Evaluated Configuration 14
9 Results of the Evaluation 15
10 Comments/Recommendations 17
11 Annexes 17
12 Security Target 18
13 Definitions 18
14 Bibliography 20
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) [6] resp. [7]
is the Security IC with a Machine Readable Travel Document, Basic Access
Control Application Sdu ICAO eMRTD version 1.0 including Active
Authentication.
The Security Target is based on the Common Criteria Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Basic Access
Control [9] extended by Active Authentication.
The TOE is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure
(LDS) [10] and providing the Basic Access Control according to ICAO document
[11]. It will be embedded as an inlay chip module into a passport booklet.
The TOE comprises
• the Philips P5CD072V0Q including the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the
integrated circuit, IC) with hardware for the contactless interface, e.g.
antennae, capacitors,
• the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and
IC Dedicated Support Software,
• JCOP 31 v2.2, the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
• Sdu eMRTD LDS Applet v1.2.3, the MRTD application, and
• the associated guidance documentation.
The TOE is a Smart Device with an operating system (JCOP) and a dedicated
file-system, that contains all data relevant for the ICAO application.
For details on the MRTD chip and IC Dedicated Software see certification report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006-MA-01 Smartcard with Java Card Platform Philips
P531G072V0Q (JCOP 31 v2.2) [13] and related baseline report BSI-DSZ-CC-
0294-2006.
According to the MRTD BAC PP [9] the TOE life cycle is described in terms of
the four life cycle phases.
• Life cycle phase 1 “Development”: Development of Hardware and
Software. This life cycle phase 1 covers Phase 1 and Phase 2 of PP0002
[12].
• Life cycle phase 2 “Manufacturing”: IC Production, Initialisation and Pre-
Personalization of the MRTD Application. This life cycle phase 2
corresponds to Phase 3 and Phase 4 of PP0002 [12] and may include for
flexibility reasons Phase 5 and some production processes from Phase 6
as well.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007
• Life cycle phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”: This life cycle phase
corresponds to the remaining initialisation and personalization processes
not covered yet from Phase 6 of the PP0002 [12].
• Life cycle phase 4 “Operational Use”. This life cycle phase corresponds
to the Phase 7 of the PP0002 [12].
The TOE is finished after initialisation, testing the OS, loading the MRTD applet
and creation of the dedicated file system with security attributes and ready
made for the import of LDS. This corresponds to the end of life cycle phase 2 of
the Protection Profile MRTD BAC PP [9].
The IT product Sdu ICAO eMRTD version 1.0 was evaluated by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 13 March 2007.
The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL4+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented). The following table shows
the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+: ADV_IMP.2 Development – Implementation of the TSF
+: ALC_DVS.2 Life cycle support – Sufficiency of security measures
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD Cryptographic key generation – Generation
of Document Basic Access Keys by the TOE
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key
Derivation by MRTD
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007 Certification Report
Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Encryption /
Decryption Triple-DES
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
FCS_COP.1/RSA Cryptographic operation – RSA Signature
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1 (PRIM) Subset access control – Primary Access
Control
FDP_ACC.1 (BASIC) Subset access control – Basic Access
control
FDP_ACF.1 (PRIM) Security attribute based access control –
Primary Access Control
FDP_ACF.1 (Basic) Security attribute based access control –
Basic Access Control
FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD Data exchange integrity - MRTD
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD Single-use authentication mechanisms -
Single-use authentication of the Terminal by
the TOE
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of
Terminal by the TOE
FMT Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of functions in TSF
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization
Data
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of
Read Access to Initialization Data and Pre-
personalization Data
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007
Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1/MRTD Quality metric for random numbers
FMT Security management
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.1.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1/AAKGS Cryptographic key generation – Generation
of Active Authentication Keys
FCS_COP.1/AAIS Cryptographic operation – RSA Signature
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_BT Cryptographic key generation – Generation
of Document Basic Access Keys by the
Basic Terminal
FCS_CKM.4/BT Cryptographic key destruction – BT
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT Cryptographic operation – Hash Function by
the Basic Terminal
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure
Messaging Encryption / Decryption by the
Basic Terminal
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007 Certification Report
Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
messaging Message Authentication Code by
the Basic Terminal
FCS_RND.1/BT Quality metric for random numbers - Basic
Terminal
FDP User data protection
FDP_DAU.1/DS Basic data authentication – Passive
Authentication
FDP_UCT.1/BT Basic data exchange confidentiality - Basic
Terminal
FDP_UIT.1/BT Data exchange integrity - Basic Terminal
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_UAU.4/BT Single-use authentication mechanisms –
Basic Terminal
FIA_UAU.6/BT Re-authentication - Basic Terminal
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT Authentication Proof of Identity -
Personalization Terminal Authentication with
Symmetric Key
Table 4: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.3.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.ACCESS Realisation of either the Primary Access Control or the Basic
Access Control (configured by the Personalization Agent).
SF.MANAGEMENT Providing of management functions in support of initialization
(installing the MRTD applet), personalization (write User Data)
and configuring (Primary Access Control or Basic Access
Control mode) the TOE.
SF.CRYPTO Providing of cryptographic functions
SF.AUTH Identification and authentication based on roles
(Manufacturer, Personalization Agent, Primary Inspection
System, Basic Inspection System), access keys and challenge
authentication methods.
SF.PLATFORM Security functions from the JCOP platform
Table 5: Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 6.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed high (SOF-High) for the following
security functions: SF.AUTH (Identification and Authentication).
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The ST defines the following assets taken from the MRTD BAC PP [9]:
• Logical MRTD Data consisting of the data groups DG1 to DG16 and the
Document security object according to LDS [10]. These data are user
data of the TOE. The data groups DG1 to DG14 and DG 16 contain
personal data of the MRTD holder. The Active Authentication Public Key
Info in DG 15 is used by the inspection system for Active Authentication
of the chip. The Document security object is used by the inspection
system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.
• Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
Assets have to be protected in terms of confidentiality and/or integrity.
The ST considers the following subjects taken from the MRTD BAC PP [9]:
Manufacturer, MRTD Holder, Traveller, Personalization Agent, Inspection
System (split into Primary Inspection System (PIS), Basic Inspection System
(BIS), and Extended Inspection System (EIS)), the Terminal and the Attacker. In
addition the ST defines the subject Active Authentication Inspection System
(AAIS). For details refer to the Security Target chapter 3.1.1.
The following list of considered threats for the TOE is defined in the Security
Target taken from the MRTD BAC PP [9].
T.Chip_ID: Identification of MRTD’s chip
An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely
the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening a communication through the
contactless communication interface. The attacker can not read and does not
know in advance the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page.
T.Skimming: Skimming the logical MRTD
An attacker imitates the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of
it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE. The attacker can not
read and does not know in advance the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data
page.
T.Eavesdropping: Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
inspection system
An attacker is listening to the communication between the MRTD’s chip and an
inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007 Certification Report
uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not
know this data in advance.
T.Forgery: Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of
it including its security related data in order to impose on an inspection system
by means of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery.
T.Abuse-Func: Abuse of Functionality
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE
operational phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate
(explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the
TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data. This threat addresses the
misuse of the functions for the initialisation and the personalization in the
operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
T.Information_Leakage: Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its
usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may
be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
T.Phys-Tamper: Physical Tampering
An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order to
disclose TSF Data to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software. An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i)
modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security
functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) to modify User Data or
(iv) to modify TSF data.
T.Malfunction: Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify
security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent or deactivate or
modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
The following threat is defined in the Security Target in addition to the MRTD
BAC PP [9]:
T.Clone: Attempt to Clone with public information
An attacker may attempt to clone a valid passport using the MRTD read from
the valid passport’s IC. If an attacker holds the MRTD IC, they can read both
BAC enabled or disabled passports
For more details refer to the Security Target chapter 3.3.
The TOE shall comply to the following organisation security policies as security
rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its
operations:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007
P.Manufact: Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer ensure the quality and the
security of the manufacturing process and control the MRTD’s material in the
Phase 2 Manufacturing. The Initialisation Data are written by the IC
Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the
Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.
P.Personalization: Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or
Organisation only
The issuing State or Organisation guarantees the correctness of the
biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitised portrait, the biometric
reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD
holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by
authorised agents of the issuing State or Organisation only.
P.Personal_Data: Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the
MRTD’s chip (DG1), the printed portrait and the digitised portrait (DG2), the
biometric reference data of finger(s) (DG3), the biometric reference data of iris
image(s) (DG4) and data according to LDS (DG5 to DG14, DG16) stored on the
MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are
intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection
systems to which the MRTD is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the
possibility for the Basic Access Control to allow read access to these data only
for terminals successfully authenticated based on knowledge of the Document
Basic Access Keys as defined in [11].
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The issuing State or Organisation decides (i) to enable the Basic Access
Control and Active Authentication for the protection of the MRTD holder
personal data or (ii) to disable the Basic Access Control to allow Primary
Inspection Systems of the receiving States and all other terminals to read the
logical MRTD. This configuration is performed during the personalization phase
3 of the TOE life cycle.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the
TOE will be used or is intended to be used. The ST defines the following
assumptions taken from the MRTD BAC PP [9]:
A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with
respect to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the
Active Authentication Public Key Info (DG15) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and
(iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip).
The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007 Certification Report
Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to
authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving
State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its
authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as MRTD holder. The Primary
Inspection System for global interoperability contains the Country Signing Public
Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization
[11]. The Primary Inspection System performs the Passive Authentication to
verify the logical MRTD if the logical MRTD is not protected by Basic Access
Control. The Basic Inspection System in addition to the Primary Inspection
System implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and reads the
logical MRTD being under Basic access Control.
To be considered an Active Authentication Inspection System, a Primary
Inspection System or Basic Inspection System must be able to verify that the
Active Authentication private key (stored on the MRTD IC) matches the Active
Authentication public key contained in the logical MRTD using a challenge
response mechanism in the TOE, [11] section 2.3.2.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Sdu ICAO eMRTD version 1.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW /
SW
Sdu ICAO eMRTD i.e.
eMRTD LDS Applet v1.2.3
and JCOP 31 v2.2 Java
Card Platform 9
Version 1.0 SW completely contained in ROM
and EEPROM memory, chip
mounted into an inlay package
initialised and tested
9
For details on the MRTD chip, IC Dedicated Software and operating system see
certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006-MA-01 Smartcard with Java Card Platform
Philips P531G072V0Q (JCOP 31 v2.2) from IBM Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH [13].
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
2 DOC Electronic Passport Admin
Guidance for Sdu ICAO
eMRTD [14]
Version 1.1,
12 September
2006
Document in paper / electronic form
as pdf file, encrypted
3 DOC Electronic Passport User
Guidance for Sdu ICAO
eMRTD [15]
Version 1.1,
12 September
2006
Document in paper / electronic form
as pdf file, encrypted
Table 6: Deliverables of the TOE
For this TOE, only one applet is present on the IC, namely the MRTD
Application. The TOE is finalized at the end of phase 2 as an initialized and pre-
personalized inlay module according to the MRTD BAC PP. Delivery is
performed from the Initialization facility to the personalization facility (Sdu) by a
secured transport. Furthermore, the Personalization Agent receives information
about the personalization commands and process requirements to be followed.
The Personalization Agent can check the identification data of the chip by the
GET DATA CPLC command and the applet version by the GET INFO command
(the VERSION field of LDS applet v1.2.3 is set to the value: 0155-0300-
01.02.03.0012). The GET_INFO command can be executed in personalization
phase and optional (configurable by Personalization Agent) in operational
phase. The JCOP platform can be identified by using the IDENTIFY command
during all life cycle phases as outlined in the Electronic Passport Admin
Guidance document [14].
3 Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is defined according to the MRTD BAC PP by
the security objectives and requirements for the contactless chip of machine
readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and
recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). It
addresses the advanced security methods Basic Access Control in the
Technical reports of the ICAO New Technology Working Group. The Security
Target extends the PP by including Active Authentication as specified in [11].
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions on Personalization of the MRTD’s chip and on Inspection
Systems for global interoperability as outlined above are of relevance.
The state or organisation issues the MRTD to be used by the holder for
international travel. The traveller presents a MRTD to the inspection system to
prove his or her identity. The authentication of the traveller is based on (i) the
possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity
as given on the biographical data page and (ii) biometrics using the reference
data stored in the MRTD. The issuing State or Organisation ensure the
authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The receiving State trust a genuine
MRTD of a issuing State or Organisation.
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5 Architectural Information
The TOE consists of the subsystems LdsApplet, TransparentEF and due to
usage of the underlying platform (JCOP Platform) the subsystem JCOP-
Platform.
The LdsApplet handles all personalization and operational APDU calls, starting
with the SELECT DF by AID, where the AID is the AID specified in the LDS 1.7
specification. This command is handled mostly by the Global Platform Card
Manager, which is part of the JCOP Platform. The ATS is also part of the JCOP
Platform, and is not handled by the LdsApplet class. All the other APDUs
needed for performing the personalization and handling of the LDS functionality
are implemented by the LdsApplet.
TransparentEF is a class that implements an ISO 7816-4 compliant Transparent
EF. The file-system, which is part of the LdsApplet is responsible for
identification and/or access control. Therefore, this class does not offer any
methods or fields for identification or access control.
Only the API of the Java Card 2.2.1, which is part of the evaluated JCOP
Platform runtime environment, is used by the LdsApplet implementation to
provide the required standard interfaces.
External interface of the composite TOE used in the MRTD application is a
specific set of commands operating on a defined file-system of the application.
This interface is available to the inspection system via the contactless chip
interface.
6 Documentation
The Electronic Passport Admin Guidance for Sdu ICAO eMRTD [14] is provided
for the Personalization Agent of the TOE who needs information about security
procedures and how the TOE supports the personalization process.
The Electronic Passport User Guidance for Sdu ICAO eMRTD [15] is provided
for the developer of an inspection system who needs information how the TOE
interacts with the inspection system.
7 IT Product Testing
Developer tests, independent evaluator tests and penetration tests were
performed using MRTD chips as defined in table 6, no.1.
TOEs in the configuration LDS (Logical Data Structure) and BAC (Basic Access
Control) were tested.
The physical configuration tested was equal to the physical configuration
described in Security Target except that the plastic wrapping and by that the
visual readable data including personal data of the MRTD holder was missing.
The separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using
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OCR methods in the Machine readable zone was emulated by the test
environment.
Besides the used file system consisting of EF.COM, EF.DG1 and EF.DG12,
combinations of configuration options were tested, as related to Basic Access
Control to the logical MRTD, Active Authentication of the MRTD’s chip and the
CPLC readability.
Testing is performed on the final TOE, consisting of the platform specified and
the LDS applet, accessed through a contact less card reader. All developer’s
tests address the observable behaviour of the TOE, with one single exception of
a test case which reverts to code inspection of the applet code.
The testing approach for each security function of the TSF is suitable to
demonstrate the expected behaviour. Test of SF.PLATFORM itself were re-
used from the platform certification. Testing was performed with the composite
product using the certified platform.
Testing covers the TOE life cycle phases Manufacturing (limited to Pre-
personalization), Personalization and Operation. Each script moves the TOE to
a defined state by reloading and, if needed, personalizing the LDS.
The analysis of coverage and depth of developer testing is demonstrated in the
test documentation. The developer has tested the TOE systematically tested on
the level of the Functional Specification (FSP) and on High Level Design (HLD)
subsystem level. The test cases defined showed the conformance to the
expected behaviour of the TOE in the personalization and operational phase.
The evaluators testing approach has been to repeat all developer’s tests, to test
all TSF either completely newly designed or as iterations from developer’s tests
to show the correctness of the implemented TSFs using the contact less APDU
Interface used to test logical interface to the LDS Applet. A JCWorkBench tool
was used. The TOE operated as specified. Independent evaluator tests were
performed in all relevant TOE life-cycle phases after TOE delivery as described
in Security Target. The tests confirmed the expected behaviour as specified.
The evaluators penetration tests confirmed the effectiveness of all security
functions of the TOE. During these tests the different life cycle phases were
considered. The penetration tests were performed based on the developers
vulnerability analysis and based on the independent vulnerability analysis of the
evaluator. Potential vulnerabilities were assessed upon their exploitability by
analysis and tests. Analysis results and tests results showed that potential
vulnerabilities are not exploitable in the intended operational environment of the
TOE and that the TOE is resistant against low attack potential AVA_VLA.2 as
specified.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is delivered at the end of phase 2 in form of initialised and tested inlay
module as outlined in the Protection Profile MRTD BAC PP [9].
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All procedures for personalization and configuration for the end-user necessary
after delivery are described in the Administrator Guidance document [14].
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
As the evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation, the
ETR [8] includes also the evaluation results of the composite evaluation activi-
ties in accordance with CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition:
Annex A Composite smart card evaluation [4, AIS 36]. The ETR [8] builds up on
the ETR-lite for Composition document of the evaluation of the underlying
platform BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006-MA-01 [13] and the related baseline
certification BSI-DSZ-CC-0249-2006.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]). For smart card specific
methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36 (see [4])
were used.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Sufficiency of security measures ALC_DVS.2 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Validation of analysis AVA_MSU.2 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Independent vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.2 PASS
Table 7: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• the TOE is conformant to the PP Machine Readable Travel Document
with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, version 1.0 (BSI-PP-
0017-2005) [9]
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are PP
conformant plus product specific extensions and are Common Criteria
Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF) and ALC_DVS.2
(Sufficiency of security measures).
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The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function
SOF-high: SF.AUTH, SF.PLATFORM (see table 5 above). The RNG was tested
by using AIS20 class K3 requirements.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for the Triple-DES functionality.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to Sdu ICAO eMRTD version
1.0 as defined in table 6 above. The validity can be extended to new versions
and releases of the product, provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or
assurance continuity of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any
security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documents [14] and [15] contain necessary information about
the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
The TOEs implemented security functions meet the claimed strength of function
SOF-high from design and construction point of view. The strength of function
available in a specific system context where the TOE is used depends on the
selection of the data used to set up the communication to the TOE. Therefore
the issuing state or organisation is responsible for the strength of function that
can be achieved in a specific system context. This has to be assessed in the
specific system context. Then, the administrator (Personalization Agent) is in
collaboration with the issuing state or organisation responsible to provide keys
with sufficient entropy, as required by the specific system context.
Only chips from the production sites (waferfabs, module and inlay production
sites) as outlined in the certification reports for BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006-MA-01
[13] and the related baseline certification BSI-DSZ-CC-0249-2006 shall be
used.
The Personalization Agent has to verify that they got the correct version of the
TOE. TOE version identification by the GET_INFO command shall be possible
in operational phase.
Defect chips and invalid passports including a chip must be destroyed in a way
that the chip itself is destructed.
11 Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
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12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [7] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitized version of the
complete security target [6] used for the evaluation performed.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC Basic Access Control
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DOC Document
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ES Embedded Software
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
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TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TSS TOE Summary Specification
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
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Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version
2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE. , specifically
- AIS 25, Version 2, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, -
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 1.2, July
2002
- AIS 26, Version 2, 6 August 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, -
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 1.1, July
2002
- AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international
abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungs-
schema.
- AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for
CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
- AIS 36, Version 1, 29 July 2002 for:
CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition, Version 1.1,
July 2002 and CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for
Composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation, Version
1.2, March 2002
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Electronic Passport SECURITY TARGET for Sdu ICAO eMRTD, BSI-
DSZ-CC-0383 Version 1.5.4, Sdu (confidential document)
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[7] Electronic Passport SECURITY TARGET LITE for Sdu ICAO eMRTD,
BSI-DSZ-CC-0383, Version 1.0.0, Sdu (sanitized public document)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 07 March 2007, BSI-DSZ-CC-
0383 for Sdu ICAO eMRTD 1.0, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
(confidential document)
[9] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-PP-0017, Version
1.0, 18 August 2005, BSI
[10] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of
a Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion
Technologies, Revision –1.7, published by authority of the secretary
general, International Civil Aviation Organisation, LDS 1.7, 18 May 2004
[11] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine
Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version -
1.1, 01 October 2004, published by authority of the secretary general,
International Civil Aviation Organisation
[12] Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI
registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs,
Hitachi Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[13] Certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006-MA-01 Smartcard with Java
Card Platform Philips P531G072V0Q (JCOP 31 v2.2) from IBM
Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH, 01 September 2006, BSI
[14] Electronic Passport Admin Guidance for Sdu ICAO eMRTD, BSI-DSZ-
CC-0383, Version 1.1, 12 September 2006, Sdu
[15] Electronic Passport User Guidance for Sdu ICAO eMRTD, BSI-DSZ-CC-
0383, Version 1.1, 12 September 2006, Sdu
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment D-3
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Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0383-2007
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Sdu ICAO eMRTD version 1.0 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has
been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved evaluation facility using
the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005), extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance, for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, version 2.3 (ISO/IEC15408: 2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 02 May 2007, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common
Criteria assurance requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.2),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Sdu Identification bv, Oudeweg 32, 2031 GH Haarlem, The Netherlands
(Development environment and production (initialization, pre-
personalization) environment)
Note: The personalization process was not part of the evaluation.
b) Aontec Teotorante, Pairc Tionscail na Tulaigh, Baile na hAbhann,
Co.Galway, Ireland (inlay assembly)
c) PAV Card, Hamburger Strasse 6, D-22952 Lütjensee, Germany (inlay
assembly)
For development and productions sites regarding the JCOP platform refer to the
certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006-MA-01 [13] and the related baseline
certification BSI-DSZ-CC-0249-2006 chapter 9.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in
accordance with the Security Target (Electronic Passport SECURITY TARGET
for Sdu ICAO eMRTD, BSI-DSZ-CC-0383 Version 1.5.4, Sdu (confidential
document) [6]). The evaluators verified, that the requirements for the TOE life
cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6]) are fulfilled by
the procedures of these sites.
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