File : SDU_ICAO_ST_Lite 1.0.0.doc Date: 26 March 2007
Author : Sdu Identification Classification: standard
Electronic Passport
SECURITY TARGET LITE
for
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Certification ID: BSI-DSZ-CC-0383
Version 1.0.0
standard
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 2 of 68
Document Revision History
Version Date Author Description
1.0.0 15/03/2007 Sdu Public Release
 Copyright Sdu Identification, 2007. All rights reserved
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 3 of 68
Contents
1 ST Introduction .................................................................................................................. 6
1.1 ST reference ............................................................................................................... 6
1.2 ST Overview .............................................................................................................. 6
1.3 Conformance Claim ................................................................................................... 6
2 TOE Description ................................................................................................................ 7
2.1 TOE definition............................................................................................................ 7
2.2 TOE usage and security features for operational use................................................. 7
2.3 TOE life cycle ............................................................................................................ 9
3 TOE Environment ............................................................................................................ 11
3.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 11
3.1.1 Assets ............................................................................................................... 11
3.1.2 Subjects ............................................................................................................ 11
3.2 Assumptions............................................................................................................. 12
3.3 Threats...................................................................................................................... 13
3.4 Organisational Security Policies .............................................................................. 16
4 Security Objectives .......................................................................................................... 17
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE .............................................................................. 17
4.2 Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing Environment........... 20
4.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ............................................. 20
4.3.1 Issuing State or Organization ........................................................................... 20
4.3.2 Receiving State or organization ....................................................................... 21
4.3.3 MRTD Holder .................................................................................................. 22
5 Security Requirements ..................................................................................................... 23
5.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE....................................................... 23
5.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit................................................................................ 23
5.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)................................................................. 23
5.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication.................................................... 26
5.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection ...................................................................... 30
5.1.5 Class FMT Security Management.................................................................... 34
5.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions............................................... 37
5.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE ....................................................... 40
5.3 Security Requirements for the IT environment........................................................ 41
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 4 of 68
5.3.1 Passive Authentication ..................................................................................... 41
5.3.2 Active Authentication Key Generation............................................................ 41
5.3.3 Active Authentication Inspection Systems ...................................................... 42
5.3.4 Basic Inspection Systems................................................................................. 42
5.3.5 Personalization Terminals................................................................................ 47
5.3.6 FIA_API.1/SYM_PT Authentication Proof of Identity - Personalization
Terminal Authentication with Symmetric Key ................................................................ 47
6 Security Functions and Assurance Measures................................................................... 48
6.1 SF.ACCESS ............................................................................................................. 48
6.2 SF.MANAGEMENT................................................................................................ 48
6.3 SF.CRYPTO............................................................................................................. 48
6.4 SF.AUTH ................................................................................................................. 49
6.5 SF.PLATFORM....................................................................................................... 50
6.6 Assurance Measures................................................................................................. 50
7 PP Compliance................................................................................................................. 52
8 Extended Components Definition .................................................................................... 53
8.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS......................................................................... 53
8.1.1 FAU_SAS Audit data storage .......................................................................... 53
8.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND ........................................................................ 53
8.2.1 FCS_RND Generation of random numbers ..................................................... 54
8.3 Definition of the Family FIA_API........................................................................... 54
8.3.1 FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity....................................................... 54
8.4 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM ........................................................................ 55
8.4.1 FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability.............................................. 55
8.5 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC.................................................................... 56
8.5.1 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation...................................................................... 57
9 Glossary and Acronyms ................................................................................................... 58
9.1 Acronyms ................................................................................................................. 66
10 References .................................................................................................................... 67
10.1 Common Criteria...................................................................................................... 67
10.2 ICAO........................................................................................................................ 67
10.3 Cryptography............................................................................................................ 67
10.4 Protection Profiles.................................................................................................... 68
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 5 of 68
10.5 Other......................................................................................................................... 68
Tables
Table 1: Overview of authentication SFRs .............................................................................. 27
Table 2: Assurance measures of the TOE ................................................................................ 51
Table 3: Coverage of Security Objectives for the IT environment by SFRFout! Bladwijzer
niet gedefinieerd.
Table 4: Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE......Fout! Bladwijzer niet gedefinieerd.
Table 5: Dependencies between the SFR for the IT environmentFout! Bladwijzer niet
gedefinieerd.
Table 6: TSS to SFR Rationale .........................................Fout! Bladwijzer niet gedefinieerd.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 6 of 68
1 ST Introduction
1.1 ST reference
TOE: Sdu ICAO eMRTD
TOE Version: 1.0
Document ID: 8828-9 Security Target Lite
ST Title: Security Target Lite for Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Version Number: 1.0.0
Date: 26 March 2007
Status: public release
CC Version: 2.1 (with Final Interpretation of CCIMB as of 04.04.2005)
Assurance Level: EAL4+ ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2.
SOF Level: SOF-high
Certification ID: BSI-DSZ-CC-0383
1.2 ST Overview
The Security Target defines the environment, security objectives, requirements and Security
Functions for the Sdu ICAO eMRTD based on the Machine Readable Travel Document with
“ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control Protection Profile [22]. This TOE extends the PP
by including Active Authentication as specified in [7].
This evaluation is a composite evaluation with underlying platform being the Philips
P531G072V0Q (JCOP 31, v2.2). The certification number for the underlying platform is:
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294.
1.3 Conformance Claim
This Security Target is CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant. The evaluation level is
EAL4 augmented by ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2. The TOE fully implements the Machine
Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application” Basic Access Control Protection
Profile, version 1.0, BSI-PP-0017 [22]. The functionality of the TOE extends that contained
in the Protection Profile, by including Active Authentication.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 7 of 68
2 TOE Description
Parts of this section have been changed from the PP. These are denoted by bold text.
2.1 TOE definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Sdu ICAO eMRTD. The TOE is the contactless
integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed
according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) [6] and providing the Basic Access Control
according to the ICAO document [7].
The TOE [Sdu ICAO eMRTD] comprises of
• The Philips P531G072V0Q, comprising of
o The Philips P5CD072V0Q including the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the
integrated circuit, IC) with hardware for the contactless interface, e.g. antennae,
capacitors;
o the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC
Dedicated Support Software;
o JCOP 31 v2.2, the IC Embedded Software (operating system);
• Sdu eMRTD LDS Applet v1.2.3, the MRTD application; and
the associated guidance documentation.
For this TOE, only one application will be present on the IC, namely the MRTD Application.
The TOE utilises the evaluation of the underlying platform, which includes the Phillips chip,
the IC Dedicated Software, and the JCOP 31 v2.2.
2.2 TOE usage and security features for operational use
State or organisation issues MRTD to be used by the holder for international travel. The
traveller presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The MRTD in
context of this security target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait
of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using
OCR methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD’s
chip according to LDS for contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveller is
based on (i) the possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed
identity as given on the biographical data page and (ii) biometrics using the reference data
stored in the MRTD. The issuing State or Organization ensure the authenticity of the data of
genuine MRTD’s. The receiving State trust a genuine MRTD of a issuing State or
Organization.
For this security target the MRTD is viewed as unit of
(a) the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It
presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD
holder:
(1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
(2) the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 8 of 68
(3) the printed portrait.
(b) the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [6] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents
contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD
holder
(1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, DG1);
(2) the digitized portraits (DG2);
(3) the optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (DG3) or iris image(s)
(DG4) or both1
;
(4) the other data according to LDS (DG5 to DG16); and
(5) the Document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and
the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the document number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper,
security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organisational
security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [8]. These security
measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by
the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of
the MRTD’s chip. The TOE can optionally demonstrate that the MRTD data is contained on
the intended chip by using an RSA signature (Active Authentication).
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional
advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active Authentication
of the MRTD’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of additional
biometrics as optional security measure in the ICAO Technical report [7]. The Passive
Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed completely and
independently on the TOE by the TOE environment.
This security target addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by write-
only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Basic
Access Control Mechanism. This Security Target does not address the Extended Access
Control as optional security mechanisms.
The Basic Access Control is a security feature which shall be mandatory supported by the
TOE but may be disabled by the Issuing State or Organization. The inspection system (i)
reads the printed data in the MRZ, (ii) authenticates themselves as inspection system by
means of keys derived from MRZ data. After successful authentication of the inspection
system the MRTD’s chip provides read access to the logical MRTD by means of private
communication (secure messaging) with this inspection system [7], Annex E, and [6].
1
These additional biometric reference data are optional.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 9 of 68
2.3 TOE life cycle
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases.
Phase 1 “Development”
The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC
Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
The Operating System developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit
and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops
the IC Embedded Software (operating system) and the guidance documentation associated
with this TOE component. The application developer uses the guidance documentation
for the Operating System and develops the MRTD application and the guidance
documentation associated with this TOE component.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the
Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM) is securely
delivered to the IC manufacturer.
The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories, the MRTD
application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the MRTD manufacturer.
Phase 2 “Manufacturing” 2
In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the MRTD’s chip Dedicated
Software and the parts of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-
programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto
the chip to control the IC as MRTD material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery
process to the MRTD manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to
the MRTD manufacturer.
The MRTD is securely delivered from the MRTD manufacturer to the Personalization Agent.
The MRTD manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to
the Personalization Agent.
Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”
The personalization of the MRTD includes (i) the survey of the MRTD holder biographical
data, (ii) the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized
portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the printing of the visual readable
data onto the physical MRTD, (iv) the writing the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the
logical MRTD and (v) the writing the TSF Data into the logical MRTD and configuration of
the TSF if necessary. The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but
is not limited to the creation of (i) the digital MRZ data (DG1), (ii) the digitised portrait
(DG2), and (iii) the Document security object. For this TOE, the Active Authentication Keys
are generated by the Personalization Agent and injected into the TOE, also as part of step (iv).
The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [7] finalizes the
personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD
2
The TOE will be delivered to the Personalization agent at the completion of this Phase. The end of this phase is
the boundary of this evaluation.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 10 of 68
(together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the MRTD
holder for operational use.
Phase 4 “Operational Use”3
The TOE is used as MRTD’s chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the
“Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the
Issuing State or Organization and used according to the security policy of the Issuing State
but they can never be modified.
3
It will not be possible to add or modify the MRTD once it is in the Operational Phase. This includes
configuring BAC. [Application Note 2]
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 11 of 68
3 TOE Environment
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data and Authenticity of the MRTD’s
chip.
Logical MRTD Data
The logical MRTD data consists of the data groups DG1 to DG16 and the Document security
object according to LDS [6]. These data are user data of the TOE. The data groups DG1 to
DG14 and DG 16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Active Authentication
Public Key Info in DG 15 is used by the inspection system for Active Authentication of the
chip. The Document security object is used by the inspection system for Passive
Authentication of the logical MRTD.
Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the
MRTD’s holder is used by the traveller to authenticate himself as possessing a genuine
MRTD.
3.1.2 Subjects
This protection profile considers the following subjects:
Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD
Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of
the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users
IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalised the
MRTD.
Traveller
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD
holder.
Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on the behalf of the issuing State or Organisation to personalize the
MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity the
holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the
MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s)
(iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global,
international and national interoperability and (iv) signing the Document Security Object
defined in [6].
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 12 of 68
Inspection system
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an
MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller
as MRTD holder.
The Primary Inspection System (PIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless
communication with the MRTD’s chip and (ii) does not implement the terminals part of the
Basic Access Control Mechanism. The Primary Inspection System can read the logical
MRTD only if the Basic Access Control is disabled.
The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless communication
with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control
Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access
Control by optical reading the printed data in the MRZ or other parts of the passport book
providing this information.
The Extended Inspection System (EIS)4
in addition to the Basic Inspection System (i)
implements the Active Authentication Mechanism, (ii) supports the terminals part of the
Extended Access Control Authentication Mechanism and (iii) is authorized by the issuing
State or Organization to read the optional biometric reference data.
The following inspection system is added by the ST author.
The Active Authentication Inspection System (AAIS) implements Active Authentication in
addition to Passive Authentication. It may or may not implement the Basic Access Control
Mechanism and/or the Extended Access Control Mechanism. If Biometric Data is included on
the passport, it is authorized by the issuing State or Organization to read the optional
biometric reference data. Note that Active Authentication does not require Access Control
greater than standard MRTD data, as the only additional accessible data is a public key.
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless
interface.
Attacker5
A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement the MRTD’s chip remotely (i.e.
without knowing or reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or to manipulate the logical
MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
3.2 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be
used or is intended to be used.
4
This Security Target does not discuss the EIS further because the Extended Access Control is outside the scope,
and active authentication is covered by AAIS.
5
An impostor attacks the inspection system in the TOE IT environment by using a genuine, counterfeit or forged
MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not
relevant to the TOE.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 13 of 68
A.Pers_Agent: Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the
MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Active Authentication Public
Key Info (DG15) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key
Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document
Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to
authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys: Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii)
verifying the traveller as MRTD holder. The Primary Inspection System for global
interoperability contains the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public
Key of each issuing State or Organization [7]. The Primary Inspection6
System performs the
Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD if the logical MRTD is not protected by
Basic Access Control. The Basic Inspection System in addition to the Primary Inspection
System implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and reads the logical MRTD
being under Basic access Control. To be considered an Active Authentication Inspection
System7
, a Primary Inspection System or Basic Inspection System must be able to verify that
the Active Authentication private key (stored on the MRTD IC) matches the Active
Authentication public key contained in the logical MRTD using a challenge response
mechanism in the TOE, [7] section 2.3.2.
3.3 Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration
with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational
environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Chip_ID: Identification of MRTD’s chip
An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the MRTD’s
chip by establishing or listening a communication through the contactless communication
interface. The attacker can not read and does not know in advance the MRZ data printed on
the MRTD data page.
6
According to [7] the support of (i) the Passive Authentication mechanism is mandatory, and (ii) the Basic
Access Control and Active Authentication are optional. In the context of this Security Target the Primary
Inspection System does not implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control. Terminals that do not
implement BAC will therefore not able to read the logical MRTD if the logical MRTD is protected by Basic
Access Control. The TOE allows the Personalization agent to disable the Basic Access Control for use with these
Systems.
7
An Active Authentication Inspection System, is also either a Primary Inspection System or Basic Inspection
System, and must follow the policies defined by the TOE configuration.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 14 of 68
T.Skimming: Skimming the logical MRTD
An attacker imitates the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the
contactless communication channel of the TOE. The attacker can not read and does not know
in advance the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page.
T.Eavesdropping: Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection
system
An attacker is listening to the communication between the MRTD’s chip and an inspection
system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system uses the MRZ data
printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not know this data in advance.
Note in case of T.Skimming the attacker is establishing a communication with the MRTD’s
chip not knowing the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page and without a help of the
inspection system which knows these data. In case of T.Eavesdropping the attacker uses the
communication of the inspection system.
T.Forgery: Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it including
its security related data in order to impose on an inspection system by means of the changed
MRTD holders identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the
biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and
in the digital MRZ to claim an other identity of the traveller. The attacker may alter the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection
officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The
attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication
mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different
logical MRTD’s to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker write the digitized portrait
and optional biometric reference data of finger read from the logical MRTD of a traveller into
an other MTRD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the
holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD in an
other contactless chip.
The TOE shall avert the threat as specified below.
T.Abuse-Func: Abuse of Functionality
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational phase
in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change)
security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization
in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
T.Information_Leakage: Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order
to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal
operation or caused by the attacker.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 15 of 68
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics,
clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be
interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of
operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless
interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a
contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples
are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis
(DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault
injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
T.Phys-Tamper: Physical Tampering
An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose TSF
Data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker may
physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the
MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) to
modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the discloser or manipulation of TOE
User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g.
authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following
attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage
through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip
internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering
efforts may be used.
Before that hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified.
Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be
a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function.
Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
T.Malfunction: Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software by
applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or
functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent or deactivate or modify security functions of the
MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating
conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misuse of
administration function. To exploit this an attacker needs information about the functional
operation.
T.Clone: Attempt to Clone with public information
An attacker may attempt to clone a valid passport using the MRTD read from the valid
passport’s IC. If an attacker holds the MRTD IC, they can read both BAC enabled or disabled
passports.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 16 of 68
3.4 Organisational Security Policies
The TOE shall comply to the following organisation security policies (OSP) as security rules,
procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations (see CC
part 1, sec. 3.2).
P.Manufact8
: Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer ensure the quality and the security of the
manufacturing process and control the MRTD’s material in the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The
Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD
Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization
Agent Key.
P.Personalization: Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitised portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the
logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the
holder is performed by authorized agents of the issuing State or Organization only.
P.Personal_Data: Personal data protection policy9
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s chip
(DG1), the printed portrait and the digitised portrait (DG2), the biometric reference data of
finger(s) (DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s) (DG4) and data according to
LDS (DG5 to DG14, DG16) stored on the MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD
holder. These data groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder
by inspection systems to which the MRTD is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the
possibility for the Basic Access Control to allow read access to these data only for terminals
successfully authenticated based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as
defined in [7]. The issuing State or Organization decides (i) to enable the Basic Access
Control for the protection of the MRTD holder personal data or (ii) to disable the Basic
Access Control to allow Primary Inspection Systems of the receiving States and all other
terminals to read the logical MRTD.
8
The TOE is complete at the end of Phase 2. The TOE is delivered to the Personalizer prior to the
commencement of Phase 3.
9
The organisational security policy P.Personal_Data is drawn from the ICAO Technical Report [7]. Note that
the Document Basic Access Key is defined by the TOE environment and loaded to the TOE by the
Personalization Agent.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 17 of 68
4 Security Objectives
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the
TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into
security objectives for the development and production environment and security objectives
for the operational environment.
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of
identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organisational security policies to be
met by the TOE.
OT.AC_Pers:10
Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data groups DG1 to DG16, the Document
security object according to LDS [6] and the TSF data can be written by authorized
Personalization Agents. The logical MRTD data groups DG1 to DG16 and the TSF data can
be written only once and can not be changed after personalization. The Document security
object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups DG 3 to
DG16 are added. Only the Personalization Agent shall be allowed to enable or to disable the
TSF Basic Access Control.
OT.Data_Int: Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. If the TOE is configured for the use with
Basic Inspection Terminals only the TOE must ensure that the inspection system is able to
detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data.
OT.Data_Conf11
: Confidentiality of personal data
If the TOE is configured for the use with Basic Inspection Systems the TOE must ensure the
confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups DG1 to DG16 by granting read access to
terminals successfully authenticated by (i) as Personalization Agent or as (ii) Basic Inspection
System. The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate themselves by means of the Basic
10
The OT.AC_Pers implies that:
1. the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for MRTD holder (at least DG1 and DG2)
can not be changed by write access after personalization,
2. the Personalization Agents may (i) add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not written yet, and (ii)
update and sign the Document Security Object accordantly. The TOE does not allow a
personalization agent to add data to the LDS once it is in the Operational Phase.
11
The traveller grants the authorization for reading the personal data in DG1 to DG16 to the inspection system
by presenting the MRTD. The MRTD’s chip provides read access to this data for terminals successfully
authenticated by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys.
The security objective OT.Data_Conf requires the TOE to ensure the strength of the security function Basic
Access Control Authentication independent on the quality of the Document Basic Access Keys which is defined
by the TOE environment and loaded into the TOE by the Personalization Agent. Any attack based on decision of
the ICAO Technical Report [7] that the inspection system derives Document Basic Access Keys from the printed
MRZ data does not violate the security objective OT.Data_Conf. [Cf. CEM [4], section 8.10.3.4, para. 1625]
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 18 of 68
Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must
ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic
Inspection System.
If the TOE is configured so that BAC is disabled12
no protection in confidentiality of the
logical MRTD is required.
OT.Identification13
: Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification Data in its non-volatile memory. The
IC Identification Data must provide an unique identification of the IC during Phase 2
“Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. If the TOE is configured for
use with Basic Inspection Terminals only in Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE shall identify
themselves only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System or Personalization
Agent.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func: Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE Delivery
can be abused in order (i) to disclose critical User Data, (ii) to manipulate critical User Data
of the Smartcard Embedded Software, (iii) to manipulate Soft-coded Smartcard Embedded
Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the
TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test
Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Active_Authentication14
: Protection against MRTD Copying
The TOE must provide the option for Active Authentication. The Active Authentication
mechanism ensures that the data is read from the genuine IC and that the chip and data page
belong to each other. See [7].
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s
chip independent on the TOE environment.
12
This phrase was changed to allow for the possibility that the AAIS will have BAC disabled.
13
The TOE security objective OT.Identification addresses security features of the TOE to support the life cycle
security in the manufacturing and personalization phases. The IC Identification Data are used for TOE
identification in Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and for traceability and/or to secure shipment of the TOE from Phase
2 “Manufacturing” into the Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The OT.Identification addresses security
features of the TOE to be used by the TOE manufacturing environment as described in its security objective
OD.Material. In the Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE is identified by the passport number as part of the
printed and digital MRZ. If the TOE allows a Primary Inspection System (i.e. every terminal) to read these data
every terminal may identify the TOE. If the TOE is configured to allow a Basic Inspection System only to read
these data the OT.Identification forbids the output of any other IC (e.g. integrated circuit serial number ICCSN)
or a MRTD identifier through the contactless interface before successful authentication as Basic Inspection
System or as Personalization Agent.
14
This Objective is added to the PP to cover active authentication.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 19 of 68
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak15
: Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or
processed in the MRTD’s chip:
• by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines; and
• by forcing a malfunction of the TOE; and/or
• by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper16
: Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF
Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks
with high attack potential by means of
• measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips
surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and
current) or
• measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between
charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
• manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
• controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
• reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction17
: Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the
normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or
tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy
(esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
15
This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing due to normal operation
of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. Details correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is
not given here.
16
In order to meet the security objectives OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper the TOE must be designed and fabricated so
that it requires a high combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be able to derive
detailed design information or other information which could be used to compromise security through such a
physical attack. This is addressed by the security objective OD.Assurance.
17
A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with elements on the chip surface.
This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper) provided that detailed
knowledge about the TOE´s internals.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 20 of 68
4.2 Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing
Environment
OD.Assurance: Assurance Security Measures in Development and Manufacturing
Environment
The developer and manufacturer ensure that the TOE is designed and fabricated so that it
requires a combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be able to derive
detailed design information or other information which could be used to compromise security
through attack. This includes the use of the Initialization Data for unique identification of the
TOE and the pre-personalization of the TOE including the writing of the Personalization
Agent Authentication key(s). The developer provides necessary evaluation evidence that the
TOE fulfils its security objectives and is resistant against obvious penetration attacks with low
attack potential and against direct attacks with high attack potential against security function
that uses probabilistic or permutational mechanisms.
OD.Material: Control over MRTD Material
The IC Manufacturer, the MRTD Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent must control
all materials, equipment and information to produce, to initialise, to pre-personalize genuine
MRTD materials and to personalize authentic MRTD in order to prevent counterfeit of
MRTD using MRTD materials.
4.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
4.3.1 Issuing State or Organization
The Issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on the
behalf of the issuing State or Organisation (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and
create biographic data for the MRTD, (ii) enrol the biometric reference data of the MRTD
holder18
i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii)
personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security
measures (including the digital signature in the Document Security Object). The
Personalization Agents enable or disable the Basic Access Control function of the TOE
according to the decision of the issuing State or Organization. If the Basic Access Control
function is enabled the Personalization Agents generate the Document Basic Access Keys and
store them in the MRTD’s chip.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The Issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing
Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing Private Key and sign Document
Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of
the Country Signing Public Key to receiving States and organizations maintaining its
18
If Active Authentication is required, the RSA keys must be injected into the TOE by the Personalizer.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 21 of 68
authenticity and integrity. The Issuing State or organization must (i) generate a cryptographic
secure Document Signing Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private
Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational
environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document Signing Public Key to
receiving States and organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object
include all data in the data groups DG1 to DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [6].
4.3.2 Receiving State or organization
The Receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book
The inspection system of the Receiving State must examine the MRTD presented by the
traveller to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect
any manipulation of the physical MRTD.
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif: Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the Receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the
traveller as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the
signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD
before they are used. The receiving States and organizations must manage the Country
Signing Public Key and the Document Signing Public Key maintaining their authenticity and
availability in all inspection systems.
OE.Active_Auth19
: Verification by Active Authentication
An Active Authentication Inspection system performs all the functions of the Passive
Authentication Inspection System, and verifies the IC authenticity with an RSA signature
generated by the MRTD.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD20
: Protection of data of the logical MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the
data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical MRTD being
under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of
the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the
protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection Systems). The receiving State
examining the logical MRTD with Primary Inspection Systems will prevent eavesdropping to
the communication between TOE and inspection system.
19
This Objective is added to the PP to cover active authentication.
20
The Primary Inspection System may prevent unauthorized listening to or manipulation of the communication
with the MRTD’s chip e.g. by a Faraday cage.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 22 of 68
4.3.3 MRTD Holder
OE.Secure_Handling21
: Secure handling of the MRTD by MRTD holder
The holder of a MRTD configured for use with Primary Inspection Systems or Active
Authentication Inspection Systems with BAC disabled22
(i.e. MTRD with disabled Basic
Access Control) will prevent unauthorized communication of the MRTD’s chip with
terminals through the contactless interface.
21
The MRTD holder may prevent unauthorized communication of the MRTD’s chip with terminals e.g. by
carrying the MRTD in a metal box working as Faraday cage.
22
Text added to allow for AAIS without BAC.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 23 of 68
5 Security Requirements
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement,
selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph 2.1.4 of Part 2 of the CC. Each of
these operations is used in this ST.
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts a
requirement. Refinement of security requirements that add or change words are denoted by
bold text. In cases where words from a CC requirement were deleted, a separate statement
indicates the words that were removed.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a
requirement. Selections that have been included from the PP are denoted as underlined text.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such
as the length of a password. Assignments that have been included from the PP are denoted by
showing as underlined text.
Where the PP left the operation open, the ST author has completed the operation. These
operations are denoted by showing as bold underlined text.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations.
Iteration is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the component
identifier.
Security Requirements included in addition to the Protection Profile include the sentence:
“This SFR is provided in addition to the Protection Profile”. Iterations are marked as
described above. The selections and assignments are marked by bold underlined text.
5.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-sections
following the main security functionality.
5.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
5.1.1.1 FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the
IC Identification Data in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The iterations are caused by different cryptographic key generation algorithms to be
implemented and key to be generated by the TOE.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 24 of 68
5.1.2.1 FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD Cryptographic key generation – Generation of
Document Basic Access Keys by the TOE
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/
BAC_MRTD
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic
Access Key Derivation Algorithm and specified cryptographic key
sizes 112 bit that meet the following: [7], Annex E23
.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.1.2.2 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method physically
overwriting the keys that meets the following: none.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.1.2.3 FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key
Derivation by MRTD
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
23
The TOE is equipped with the Document Basic Access Key generated and downloaded by the Personalization
Agent. The Basic Access Control Authentication Protocol described in [7], Annex E.2, produces agreed
parameters to generate the Triple-DES key and the Retail-MAC message authentication keys for secure
messaging by the algorithm in [7], Annex E.1. The algorithm uses the random number RND.ICC generated by
TSF as required by FCS_RND.1/MRTD.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 25 of 68
FCS_COP.1.1/
SHA_MRTD
The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and cryptographic key sizes none
that meet the following: FIPS 180-224
.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.1.2.4 FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Encryption /
Decryption Triple DES
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
TDES_MRTD
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
Triple-DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that
meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [14] and [7]; Annex E.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes , or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.1.2.5 FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
MAC_MRTD
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication code in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail MAC and
cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: ISO 9797 (MAC
algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding mode
2).
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes , or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes,
or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
24
Note that the TOE Platform provides compliance to FIPS 180-1. The standard for FIPS 180-2 states that the
algorithm for SHA-1 did not change from version 1 to version 2. Thus, this SFR is consistent with the TOE
platform.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 26 of 68
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.1.2.6 FCS_COP.1/RSA Cryptographic operation – RSA Signature
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). This SFR is provided in addition to the Protection Profile.
This requirement forms part of “Active Authentication.”
Hierarchical to: No other com0ponents.
FCS_COP.1.1/
RSA
The TSF shall perform digital signature generation in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm RSA and cryptographic key sizes 1024,
1280, 1536 and 1792 Bit that meet the following: ISO 9796-2. and SHA-1
digest.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes , or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes,
or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.1.2.7 FCS_RND.1/MRTD Quality metric for random numbers
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RND.1.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers
that meet class K3 of [AIS 20] with SOF-high.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
Table 1 provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used by the TOE and its
environment.
Name SFR for the TOE SFR for the TOE
environment (terminal)
Algorithms and key sizes
according to [7], Annex
E, and [23]
Basic Access Control
Authentication
Mechanism
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD
and
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
FIA_UAU.4/BAC_T
and FIA_UAU.6/T
Triple-DES, 112 bit keys
and Retail-MAC, 112 bit
keys
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 27 of 68
Name SFR for the TOE SFR for the TOE
environment (terminal)
Algorithms and key sizes
according to [7], Annex
E, and [23]
Symmetric
Authentication
Mechanism for
Personalization
Agents
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD FIA_API.1/PT Triple-DES with 112 bit
keys
Table 1: Overview of authentication SFRs
5.1.3.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification25
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The bold text below has been added to allow the use of
active authentication when the TOE is configured with BAC disabled.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
(1) to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
(2) to read the ATS and perform the SELECT command in Phase 3
“Personalization of the MRTD”26
,
(3) to read the ATS if the TOE is configured for use with Basic
Inspection Systems only in Phase 4 “Operational Use”,
(4) to read the logical MRTD and request active authentication if the
TOE is configured for use with Primary Inspection System in Phase 4
“Operational Use”
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.3.2 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The bold text below has been added to allow the use of
active authentication when the TOE is configured with BAC disabled.
25
In the operation phase the MRTD must not allow anybody to read the ICCSN or any other unique
identification before the user is authenticated as Basic Inspection System (cf. T.Chip_ID). Note that the terminal
and the MRTD’s chip use an identifier for the communication channel to allow the terminal for communication
with more then one RFID. This identifier is randomly selected and will not violate the OT.Identification.
26
Beside the ATS the Personalization Agent is also able to send a SELECT command in the phase 3 in order to
personalise the TOE.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 28 of 68
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
(1) to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
(2) to read the ATS and perform the SELECT command in Phase 3
“Personalization of the MRTD”26
,
(3) to read the ATS if the TOE is configured for use with Basic
Inspection Systems only in Phase 4 “Operational Use”,
(4) to read the logical MRTD and request active authentication if the
TOE is configured for use with Primary Inspection System in Phase 4
“Operational Use”
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
5.1.3.3 FIA_UAU.4/MRTD Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use
authentication of the Terminal by the TOE27 28
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.4.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
27
All listed authentication mechanisms uses a challenge of 8 Bytes freshly and randomly generated by the TOE
to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in a successful authentication attempt: the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism uses RND.ICC [7], and the Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
shall use a Challenge as well.
28
The Basic Access Control Mechanism is a mutual device authentication mechanism defined in [7]. In the first
step the terminal authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip and the MRTD’s chip authenticates to the
terminal in the second step. In this second step the MRTD’s chip provides the terminal with a challenge-
response-pair which allows a unique identification of the MRTD’s chip with some probability depending on the
entropy of the Document Basic Access Keys. Therefore the TOE shall stop the communication with the terminal
not successfully authenticated in the first step of the protocol to fulfil the security objective OT.Identification and
to prevent T.Chip_ID.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 29 of 68
5.1.3.4 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms29
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the
following rules:
1. the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent
by one of the following mechanisms
(a) the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the
Personalization Agent Keys,
(b) the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the
Personalization Agent Key
2. the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection
System only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.3.5 FIA_UAU.6/MRTD Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by
the TOE30
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
29
Depending on the authentication methods used the Personalization Agent holds (i) a pair of a Triple-DES
encryption key and a retail-MAC key for the Basic Access Control Mechanism specified in [7], or (ii) a Triple-
DES key for the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism. The Basic Access Control Mechanism includes the
secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the inspection system. The
Personalization Agent may use Symmetric Authentication Mechanism without secure messaging mechanism as
well if the personalization environment prevents eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
personalization terminal. The Basic Inspection System may use the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys. Note, the successful authenticated Personalization Agent
may disable the Basic Access Control Mechanism.
30
The Basic Access Control Mechanism specified in [7] includes the secure messaging for all commands
exchanged after successful authentication of the Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messaging in
MAC_ENC mode each command based on Retail-MAC whether it was sent by the successfully authenticated
terminal (see FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for further details). The TOE does not execute any command with
incorrect message authentication code. Therefore the TOE re-authenticate the user for each received command
and accept only those commands received from the initially authenticated by means of BAC user.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 30 of 68
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.6.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to TOE after successful authentication of the
terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
The instantiations of FDP_ACC.1 are caused by the TSF management according to
FMT_MOF.1. The instantiations of FDP_ACF.1 address different SFP.
5.1.4.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control – Primary Access Control
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1/
PRIM
The TSF shall enforce the Primary Access Control SFP on
terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data
groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
5.1.4.2 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control – Basic Access control31
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1/
BASIC
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP on terminals
gaining write, read and modification access to data groups DG1 to
DG16 of the logical MRTD.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
5.1.4.3 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control – Primary Access
Control32
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The bold text below has been added to allow
the use of active authentication.
31
The Basic Access Control SFP address the configuration of the TOE for usage with Basic Inspection Systems
only.
32
The MRTD access control prevents changes of data groups by write access to the logical MRTD after their
creation by the Personalization Agent (i.e. no update of successful written data in the data groups DG1 to DG16).
The Passive Authentication Mechanism detects any unauthorised changes.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 31 of 68
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1/
PRIM
The TSF shall enforce the Primary Access Control SFP to objects
based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Terminals,
2. Objects: data in the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
3. security attributes
a. configuration of the TOE according to FMT_MOF.1,
b. authentication status of terminals.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
PRIM
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: in the TOE configuration for use with Primary Inspection
Systems
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to
write the data of the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
2. the Terminals are allowed to read the data of the groups DG1 to
DG16 of the logical MRTD and request active authentication.
FDP_ACF.1.3/
PRIM
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
PRIM
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the rule: the Terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data
groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
5.1.4.4 FDP_ACF.1/Basic Security attribute based access control – Basic
Access Control
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The bold text below has been added to allow
the use of active authentication.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1/
BASIC
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to objects
based on the following:
1. Subjects:
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 32 of 68
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Basic Inspection System,
c. Terminal,
2. Objects: data in the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical
MRTD
3. Security attributes
a. configuration of the TOE according to FMT_MOF.1,
b. authentication status of terminals.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
BASIC
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: in the TOE configuration for use with Basic Inspection
Systems only
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed
to write and to read the data of the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the
logical MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed
to read data of the groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD and
request active authentication.
FDP_ACF.1.3/
BASIC
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
BASIC
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the rule: the Terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data
groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
5.1.4.5 FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FDP_ITC.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). This SFR is provided in addition to the Protection Profile.
This requirement forms part of “Active Authentication.”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP or Primary
Access Control SFP when importing user data, controlled under
the SFP, from outside of the TSC.
FDP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the
user data when imported from outside the TSC.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 33 of 68
FDP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user
data controlled under the SFP from outside the TSC: none.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
5.1.4.6 FDP_UCT.1/MRTD Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UCT.1.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to be able to
transmit and receive objects in a manner protected from
unauthorised disclosure.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
5.1.4.7 FDP_UIT.1/MRTD Data exchange integrity - MRTD
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UIT.1.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to be able to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from
modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/
MRTD
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 34 of 68
5.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
5.1.5.1 FMT_MOF.1 Management of functions in TSF
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of functions in TSF (FMT_MOF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable and disable33
the functions
TSF Basic Access Control to Personalization Agent.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
5.1.5.2 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions
(FMT_SMF.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security
management functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Personalization,
3. Configuration.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
5.1.5.3 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Primary Inspection System,
4. Basic Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
33
Note that disabling BAC for the user does not prevent the personalization agent using this function in the
personalization phase. But if the BAC is disabled for the user, also the BAC Authentication Mechanism is
disabled.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 35 of 68
Dependencies34
: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
5.1.5.4 FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so
that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE
Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed, and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
5.1.5.5 FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so
that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the
following policy is enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE
Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed, and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
34
Updated to reflect wording from CC Part 2.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 36 of 68
5.1.5.6 FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization
Data and Pre-personalization Data35
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management functions and
different TSF data.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_ENA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data
and Pre-personalization Data to the Manufacturer.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
5.1.5.7 FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read
Access to Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data36
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management functions and
different TSF data.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_DIS
The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users
to the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
5.1.5.8 FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management functions and
different TSF data. The bold text below has been added to allow the use of active
authentication.
35
The pre-personalization Data includes but is not limited to the authentication reference data for the
Personalization Agent which is the symmetric cryptographic Personalization Agent Authentication Key.
36
According to P.Manufact the IC Manufacturer and the MRTD Manufacturer are the default users assumed by
the TOE in the role Manufacturer during the Phase 2 “Manufacturing” but the TOE is not requested to
distinguish between these users within the role Manufacturer. The TOE restricts the ability to write the
Initialization Data and the Pre-personalization Data by (i) allowing to write these data only once to the operating
system and also to the java application [to allow access to the data in Phase 3] and (ii) blocking the role
Manufacturer at the end of the Phase 2. The IC Manufacturer may write the Initialization Data which includes
but are not limited to the IC Identifier as required by FAU_SAS.1. The Initialization Data provides an unique
identification of the IC which is used to trace the IC in the Phase 2 and 3 “personalization” but is not needed and
may be misused in the Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The external read access to the Initialization Data and the Pre-
personalization Data is blocked in the usage phase. The MRTD Manufacturer will write the Pre-personalization
Data.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 37 of 68
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
KEY_WRITE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Basic
Access Keys and the Active Authentication Keys to the
Personalization Agent.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
5.1.5.9 FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read37
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management functions and
different TSF data. The bold text below has been added to ensure the protection of the active
authentication keys.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
KEY_READ
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the Document Basic
Access Keys, the Active Authentication Private Key and
Personalization Agent Keys to none.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
5.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF
Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent leakage.
With respect to the forced leakage they have to be considered in combination with the
security functional requirements “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” and
“TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance to physical attack
(FPT_PHP.3)” on the other. The SFR “Non-bypassability of the TSP (FPT_RVM.1)” and
“TSF domain separation (FPT_SEP.1)” together with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”,
“Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)”
prevent bypassing, deactivation and manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE
functions.
5.1.6.1 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)” as
specified below. The bold text below has been added to ensure the protection of the active
authentication keys.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
37
The Personalization Agent generates, stores and ensures the correctness of the Document Basic Access Keys if
the Basic Access Control is enabled. Note the Document Basic Access Keys may be used for the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism and secure messaging even if the Basic Access Control is disabled.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 38 of 68
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [variations in power consumption or
timing during command execution] in excess of [non-useful
information] enabling access to Personalization Agent
Authentication Key and the Active Authentication Private Key.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the
following interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
Personalization Agent Authentication Key and the Active
Authentication Private Key.
Dependencies: No other components.
5.1.6.2 FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur:
(1) Exposure to operating conditions where therefore a malfunction
could occur,
(2) failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
Dependencies: ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
5.1.6.3 FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up (at each
power on) to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of stored TSF executable code.
Dependencies: FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine testing.
5.1.6.4 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 39 of 68
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the
TSF by responding automatically such that the TSP is not violated.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.6.5 FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Non-bypassability of the TSP (FPT_RVM.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_RVM.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and
succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.6.6 FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF domain separation (FPT_SEP.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_SEP.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that
protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
FPT_SEP.1.2 The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of
subjects in the TSC
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 40 of 68
5.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The SARs for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are
those taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) augmented by ADV_IMP.2 and
ALC_DVS.2.
The minimum strength of function is SOF-high.
This Security Target contains the security functional requirement FCS_RND.1/MRTD with
an explicit stated strength of function claim (class K3 of [AIS 20] with SOF-high).
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 41 of 68
5.3 Security Requirements for the IT environment
This section describes the security functional requirements for the IT environment using the
CC part 2 components.
Due to CCIMB Final Interpretation #58 these components are editorial changed to express the
security requirements for the components in the IT environment where the original
components are directed for TOE security functions. The editorial changes are indicated in
bold. In each case, the replaced term is “TSF”.
5.3.1 Passive Authentication
The ICAO, the Issuing States or Organizations and the Receiving States or Organization run a
public key infrastructure for the Passive Authentication. This public key infrastructure
distributes and protects the Country Signing CA Keys and the Document Signing Keys to
support the signing of the User Data (DG1 to DG16) by means of the Document Security
Object. The Technical Report [7] describes the requirements to the public key infrastructure
for the Passive Authentication.
5.3.1.1 FDP_DAU.1/DS Basic data authentication – Passive Authentication
The Document Signer of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement “Basic
data authentication (FDP_DAU.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_DAU.1.1/
DS
The Document Signer shall provide a capability to generate
evidence that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of the logical
MRTD (DG1 to DG16) and the Document Security Object.
FDP_DAU.1.2/
DS
The Document Signer shall provide Inspection Systems of
Receiving States or Organization with the ability to verify evidence
of the validity of the indicated information.
Dependencies: No dependencies
5.3.2 Active Authentication Key Generation
This section defines the requirements for the Active Authentication Key Generation. If the
passport is to contain Active Authentication Keys, then this requirement is in addition to those
on the Passive Authentication Document Signer.
5.3.2.1 FCS_CKM.1/AAKGS Cryptographic key generation – Generation of
Active Authentication Keys38
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation
(FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). This SFR is provided in
addition to the Protection Profile. This requirement forms part of “Active Authentication.”
38
The Public RSA key must be inserted in DG 15, in accordance with [7].
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 42 of 68
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/
AAKGS
The AAKGS shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm none and specified
cryptographic key sizes RSA: 1024, 1280, 1536 and 1792 Bit that meet
the following: PKCS#1.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.3.3 Active Authentication Inspection Systems
This section defines the requirement for the Active Authentication Inspection System. If the
TOE is also in the Basic Access Control configuration then the AAIS will need to comply
with the Basic Inspection System requirements.
5.3.3.1 FCS_COP.1/AAIS Cryptographic operation – RSA Signature
The Active Authentication Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic
operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). This SFR is provided
in addition to the Protection Profile. This requirement forms part of “Active Authentication.”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
AAIS
The AAIS shall perform digital signature verification in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm RSA and cryptographic key sizes 1024,
1280, 1536 and 1792 Bit that meet the following: ISO 9796-2 and SHA-1
digest.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes , or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes,
or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.3.4 Basic Inspection Systems
This section describes common security functional requirements to the Basic Inspection
Systems and the Personalization Agent if it uses the Basic Access Control Mechanism with
the Personalization Agent Authentication Keys. Both are called “Basic Terminals” (BT) in
this section.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 43 of 68
5.3.4.1 FCS_CKM.1/BAC_BT Cryptographic key generation – Generation of
Document Basic Access Keys by the Basic Terminal39
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation
(FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/
BAC_BT
The Basic Terminal shall generate cryptographic keys in
accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation
algorithm Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm and
specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following:
[7], Annex E.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.3.4.2 FCS_CKM.4/BT Cryptographic key destruction - BT
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation
(FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall destroy cryptographic keys in
accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method
overwrite or physical deletion that meets the following: none.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.3.4.3 FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT Cryptographic operation – Hash Function by the
Basic Terminal40
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the Basic Terminal.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
39
The terminals derive the Document Basic Access Keys from the second line of the printed MRZ data by the
algorithm described in [7], 3.2.2 and Annex E.1, use them to generate the Document Basic Access Keys. The
Personalization Agent downloads these keys to the MRTD’s chip as TSF data for FIA_UAU.4/BAC_MRTD.
40
This SFR requires the terminal to implement the hash function SHA-1 for the cryptographic primitive to
generate the Document Basic Access Keys according to FCS_CKM.1/BAC_BT.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 44 of 68
FCS_COP.1.1/
SHA_BT
The Basic Terminal shall perform hashing in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithms SHA-1 and cryptographic key
sizes none that meet the following: FIPS 180-2.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.3.4.4 FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure Messaging
Encryption / Decryption by the Basic Terminal41
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the Basic Terminal.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
ENC_BT
The Basic Terminal shall perform secure messaging – encryption
and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm Triple-DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes
112 bit that meet the following: FIPS 46-3, ISO 11568-2, ISO 9797-
1 (padding mode 2).
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.3.4.5 FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure messaging
Message Authentication Code by the Basic Terminal42
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the Basic Terminal.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
41
This SFR requires the Basic Terminal to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging with
encryption of the transmitted data. The key is agreed between the TOE and the terminal during the execution of
the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism. The key size of 112 bit is chosen to resist attacks with high
attack potential.
42
This SFR requires the terminal to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging with message
authentication code over the transmitted data. The key is agreed or defined as the key for secure messaging
encryption. The key size of 112 bit is chosen to resist attacks with high attack potential.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 45 of 68
FCS_COP.1.1/
MAC_BT
The Basic Terminal shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm Retail-MAC and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet
the following: FIPS 46-3, ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block
cipher DES, zero IV 8 bytes, padding mode 2).
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.3.4.6 FCS_RND.1/BT Quality metric for random numbers - Basic Terminal
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers
(FCS_RND.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RND.1.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall provide a mechanism to generate
random numbers that meets SOF-High.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.3.4.7 FIA_UAU.4/BT Single-use authentication mechanisms – Basic Terminal
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.4.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall prevent reuse of authentication data
related to Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism43
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.3.4.8 FIA_UAU.6/BT Re-authentication - Basic Terminal44
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Re-authentication (FIA_UAU.6)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
43
The Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism [7] uses a challenge RND.IFD freshly and randomly
generated by the terminal to prevent reuse of a response generated by a MRTD’s chip and of the session keys
from a successful run of authentication protocol.
44
The Basic Access Control Mechanism specified in [7] includes the secure messaging for all commands
exchanged after successful authentication of the Inspection System. The terminal checks by secure messaging in
MAC_ENC mode each MRTD’s chip response to a command based on Retail-MAC whether it was sent by the
successfully authenticated MRTD’s chip. The authentication fails if any response is received with incorrect
message authentication code.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 46 of 68
FIA_UAU.6.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall re-authenticate the user under the
conditions each command sent to TOE after successful
authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism45
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.3.4.9 FDP_UCT.1/BT Basic data exchange confidentiality - Basic Terminal
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UCT.1.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall enforce the BT part of Basic Access
Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive objects in a manner
protected from unauthorised disclosure.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
5.3.4.10 FDP_UIT.1/BT Data exchange integrity - Basic Terminal
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UIT.1.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall enforce the BT part of Basic Access
Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive user data in a
manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay
errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/BT The Basic Terminal shall be able to determine on receipt of user
data, whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay 94 has
occurred.
45
The Basic Access Control SFP of the TOE requires to protect the User Data by access control (cf.
FDP_ACC.1/BASIC and FDP_ACF.1/BASIC) and by secure messaging (cf. FDP_UCT.1/MRTD and
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD) for the communication between the TOE and the Basic Terminal. This secure messaging
requires the Basic Terminal to support the protection of the TOE data by decryption and checking MAC and to
protect its own data by secure messaging as well. The SFP of the Basic Terminal drawn from the TOE “Basic
Access Control SFP” is named “BT part of Basic Access Control SFP” and the related SFR is described by
FDP_UCT.1/BT and FDP_UIT.1/BT corresponding to FDP_UCT.1/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD of the
communication partner (i.e. the TOE). Note the Basic Terminal does not enforce any named access control
policy or information control policy to be defined by FDP_ACC and FDP_ACF or FDP_IFC and FDP_IFF
families (respectively). The authentication mechanisms as part of Basic Access Control Mechanism include the
key agreement for the encryption and the message authentication key to be used for secure messaging.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 47 of 68
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
5.3.5 Personalization Terminals
The TOE supports different authentication and access control mechanisms which may be used
for the Personalization Agent depending on the personalization scheme of the Issuing State or
Organization:
1. The Basic Access Control Mechanism which may be used by the Personalization
Agent with a Personalization Agent Secret Key Pair. The Basic Access Control
Mechanism establishes strong cryptographic keys for the secure messaging to ensure
the confidentiality by Triple-DES and integrity by Retail-MAC of the transmitted data.
This approach may be used in a personalization environment where the
communication between the MRTD’s chip and the personalization terminal may be
listen or manipulated.
2. In a centralized personalization scheme the major issue is high productivity of
personalization in a high secure environment. In this case the personalization agent
may wish to reduce the protocol to symmetric authentication of the terminal without
secure messaging. Therefore the TOE and the Personalization Terminal support a
simple protocol as requested by the SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD and
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT.
5.3.6 FIA_API.1/SYM_PT Authentication Proof of Identity -
Personalization Terminal Authentication with Symmetric Key46
The Personalization Terminal shall meet the requirement “Authentication Prove of Identity
(FIA_API)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API.1.1/
SYM_PT
The Personalization Terminal shall provide a Authentication
Mechanism based on Triple-DES to prove the identity of the
Personalization Agent.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
46
The Symmetric Authentication Mechanism for Personalization Agents is intended to be used in a high secure
personalization environment only. It uses the symmetric cryptographic Personalization Agent Authentication
Secret key of 112 bits to encrypt a challenge of 8 Bytes with Triple-DES which the terminal receives from the
MRTD’s chip e.g. as response of a GET CHALLENGE. The answer may be sent by means of the EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE command according to ISO 7816-4 [24] command. In this case the communication may be
performed without secure messaging (note that FIA_UAU.5.2 requires secure messaging only after run of Basic
Access Control Authentication).
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 48 of 68
6 Security Functions and Assurance Measures
6.1 SF.ACCESS
The TOE implements two access control policies to ensure appropriate access to user data,
namely Primary Access Control and Basic Access Control. These policies are mutually
exclusive, and the policy used by the TOE is configured by the Personalization agent in
accordance with SF.MANAGEMENT. The TOE must be configured to apply one of these
policies. The TOE applies the policies in Phase 3 and Phase 4. The policies are described
below.
Primary Access Control
The Primary Access Control policy controls access to the User Data (DG1 to DG16, and the
SOD) for the Personalization Agent and all other terminals. Any terminal47
can read the User
Data or use the active authentication keys, however only the Authenticated Personalization
Agent may write User Data. The User Data can not be written, deleted or modified in Phase 4
“Operational Use”.
Basic Access Control
The Basic Access Control policy controls access to the User Data (DG1 to DG16, and the
SOD) for the Personalization Agent, Basic Inspection System and all other terminals. The
Authenticated Personalization Agent may write or read User Data. The authenticated Basic
Inspection System is allowed to read data or use the active authentication keys. Other
terminals may not read User Data. The User Data can not be written, deleted or modified in
Phase 4 “Operational Use”. When the TOE is in the BAC configuration, this policy will
ensure that the communication is protected by Secure Messaging (SF.CRYPTO) to protect
and detect errors arising from modification, deletion, insertion and replay. Secure Messaging
protects the transmission and receipt of objects from unauthorised disclosure.
6.2 SF.MANAGEMENT
The TOE will provide management functions in support of initializing, personalizing and
configuring the TOE. For this TOE, initialization commands are all those commands required
for installing the MRTD applet on the underlying platform (which are provided and controlled
by the underlying platform). The Personalization commands are those required to write the
User data to the TOE. The configuration command puts the TOE in either Primary Access
Control or Basic Access Control “mode”.
6.3 SF.CRYPTO
The TOE will use primitives from the underlying platform to perform the following functions
in support of BAC and Secure Messaging:
• generate 112 Bit Document Basic Access Keys according to [7], Annex E.
47
To protect their data, users are recommended to store their passport in a metal wallet, and only remove for
Authorised Inspection Systems when the TOE is configured for Primary Access Control.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 49 of 68
• destroy cryptographic keys by overwriting.
• hash data using SHA-1 according to FIPS 180-2.
• secure messaging – Triple-DES in CBC mode encryption and decryption with 112 bit
keys in accordance with FIPS 46-3 [14] and [7]; Annex E.
• secure messaging – Retail MAC message authentication code with 112 bit keys in
accordance with ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message
Counter, padding mode 2).
The TOE will use primitives from the underlying platform to perform the following functions
in support of Active Authentication:
• RSA digital signature generation with 1024, 1280, 1536 and 1792 Bit keys. Digital
signature scheme in accordance with ISO 9796-2, and SHA-1 digest.
6.4 SF.AUTH
The TOE maintains the following roles:
• Manufacturer in Phase 2;
• Personalization Agent in Phase 3;
• Based on the configuration, in phase 4, either:
o Primary Inspection System; or
o Basic Inspection System.
To interact with the TOE the user must assume one of these roles. Each user must login to
assume a role, except when the role is “Primary Inspection System” (i.e. BAC is disabled).
The Manufacturer logs in by presenting the Initialization Keys. More details of this method
can be found in [25].
The Personalization agent logs on by using the two Personalization Agent Secret Keys
provided by the Manufacturer. The TOE prevents reuse of authentication data by using an
authentication scheme based on a challenge authentication method, such as the Basic Access
Control Mechanism. The Personalization agent may use the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism or the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-
DES.
The Basic Inspection System logs on by using the symmetric access keys provided by the
Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm. This method derives the symmetric
access keys from the MRZ information which is personalized graphically on the MRTD
following ICAO specifications. The TOE prevents reuse of authentication data by using the
Basic Access Control Mechanism, which is based on challenge-response authentication.
When the Basic Access Control mechanism is being used, the TOE will re-authenticate users
for each command sent to the TOE. This is achieved through Secure Messaging, and is
inherent in the Secure Messaging protocol.
The only actions allowed by the TOE prior to identification and authentication are:
• reading the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 50 of 68
• reading the ATS and performing the SELECT command in Phase 3 “Personalization
of the MRTD”,
• reading the ATS if the TOE is configured for use with Basic Inspection Systems only
in Phase 4 “Operational Use”,
• reading the logical MRTD if the TOE is configured for use with Primary Inspection
System in Phase 4 “Operational Use”
Note: the IC Serial Number is not available in the usage phase. The passport is only
identifiable by the passport number, which is subject to the SF.AUTH and SF.ACCESS.
This function has a strength of function of SOF-High.
6.5 SF.PLATFORM
The TOE platform provides the following functions. Further details of these functions can be
found in [25].
• DES primitives
• destroy cryptographic keys by physically overwriting the keys.
• RSA primitives
• Protection from Emanations
• Limit test function capability and availability
• Limit emissions to a “non-usable” level
• Perform Self-Tests
• Preserve a secure state in the case of exposure or test failure.
• Resist Physical manipulation and probing
• ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before each function
within the TSC is allowed to proceed.
• Maintain Security Domains
• Store IC Identification Data
• Generate random numbers according to [AIS 20] class K3 with SOF-high.
This function has a strength of function of SOF-High.
6.6 Assurance Measures
In the following table the assurance measures of the TOE (documents) are listed. These
measures fulfil the requirements from EAL4 augmented by ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2.
Component Assurance Measure /
Document
ASE Security Target (this document)
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 51 of 68
Component Assurance Measure /
Document
ACM_AUT.1
ACM_CAP.4
ACM_SCP.2
Configuration Management
Documentation
ADO_DEL.2
ADO_IGS.1
Delivery and Operation
Documentation
ADV_FSP.2 Functional Specification
ADV_HLD.2 High Level Design
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation
ADV_LLD.1 Low Level Design
ADV_RCR.1 Representation Correspondence
ADV_SPM.1 Security Policy Model
AGD_ADM.1
AGD_USR.1
Guidance Documentation
ALC_DVS.2
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_TAT.1
Lifecycle Documentation
ATE_COV.2
ATE_DPT.1
ATE_FUN.1
Test Documentation
ATE_IND.2 Part of the evaluation body
AVA_MSU.2
AVA_SOF.1
AVA_VLA.2
Vulnerability Assessment
Documentation
Table 2: Assurance measures of the TOE
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 52 of 68
7 PP Compliance
The TOE is compliant with the Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application” Basic Access Control Protection Profile, version 1.0 [22].
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 53 of 68
8 Extended Components Definition
This protection profile uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2. Some of these
components are defined in [20], other components are defined in this protection profile.
8.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FAU_SAS)
of the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN,
because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because
it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
8.1.1 FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behaviour
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component leveling
FAU_SAS Audit data storage 1
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
8.1.1.1 FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the
capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit
records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
8.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family
(FCS_RND) of the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes
the functional requirements for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes.
The component
FCS_RND is not limited to generation of cryptographic keys as the component FCS_CKM.1
is. The similar component FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 54 of 68
8.2.1 FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
Family behaviour
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers
which are intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers 1
FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a
defined quality metric.
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that
meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
8.3 Definition of the Family FIA_API
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family
(FIA_API) of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family
describes the functional requirements for the proof of a the claimed identity for the
authentication verification by an external entity where the other families of the class FIA
address the verification of the identity of an external entity.
The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication verification of users’
identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality of the user to prove their
identity. The following paragraph defines the family FIA_API in the style of the Common
Criteria part 2 (cf. [3], chapter Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)) form a
TOE point of view. Note that this protection profile uses this explicit stated
SFR for the personalization terminal in the IT environment only. Therefore the word “TSF” is
substituted by the word “Personalization terminal”.
8.3.1 FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behaviour
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be verified
by an external entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component leveling:
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 55 of 68
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity 1
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity.
Management: FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.
Audit: There are no actions defined to be auditable .
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to
prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or rule].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
8.4 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE.
The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses
the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in
the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing
the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their
availability.
8.4.1 FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a
combined manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the Limited
capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific
manner.
Component leveling:
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability1 2
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its
genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions
(refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for
instance, by removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of
the TOE’s life-cycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 56 of 68
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family
(FMT_LIM) of the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes
the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new functional
requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management of
functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no
other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by
limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
8.4.1.1 FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as
follows.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so
that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and
availability policy].
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
8.4.1.2 FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as
follows.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so
that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the
following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and
availability policy].
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that there are two types of
mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together shall provide
protection in order to enforce the policy. This also allows that
(i) the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but
its capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced
or conversely
(ii) the TSF is designed with high functionality but is removed or disabled in the
product in its user environment.
The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.
8.5 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC
The additional family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the
TSF) is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 57 of 68
shall prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data where the attack is based on
external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation
of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis
(DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the
limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed by any other component
of CC part 2 [2].
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)” is specified as follows.
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling:
FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation 1
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires not emit interface emanation enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
8.5.1 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of
TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to
[assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user
data].
Dependencies: No other components.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 58 of 68
9 Glossary and Acronyms
Term Definition
Active Authentication Security mechanism defined in [7] option by which means the
MTRD’s chip proves and the inspection system verifies the
identity and authenticity of the MTRD’s chip as part of a
genuine MRTD issued by a known State of organization.
Application note Optional informative part of the PP containing additional
supporting information that is considered relevant or useful
for the construction, evaluation, or use of the TOE (cf. CC
part 1, section B.2.7).
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs
chip to store the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization
Data. This data is copied to the Application to allow the
personalizer to trace chips. It is not available in Phase 4.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the
MRTD’s chip were created by the issuing State or
Organization
Basic Access Control Security mechanism defined in [7] by which means the
MTRD’s chip proves and the inspection system protect their
communication by means of secure messaging with Basic
Access Keys.
Basic Inspection
System (BIS)
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of
the Basic Access Control Mechanism and authenticates
themselves to the MRTD’s chip using the Document Basic
Access Keys drawn form printed MRZ data for reading the
logical MRTD.
Biographical data
(biodata).
The personalized details of the bearer of the document
appearing as text in the visual and machine readable zones on
the biographical data page of a passport book or on a travel
card or visa. [8]
biometric reference
data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder
in the MRTD’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional
biometric reference data.
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security
document made by whatever means. [8]
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 59 of 68
Term Definition
Country Signing CA
Certificate (CCSCA)
Self-signed certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key
(KPuCSCA) issued by CSCA stored in the inspection system.
Document Basic
Access Keys
Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging
with encryption (key KENC) and message authentication (key
KMAC) of data transmitted between the MRTD’s chip and
the inspection system [7]. It is drawn from the printed MRZ
of the passport book to authenticate an entity able to read the
printed MRZ of the passport book.
Document Security
Object (SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the
Document Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS
Data Groups. It is stored in the MRTD’s chip. It may carry
the Document Signer Certificate (CDS). [7]
Eavesdropper A threat agent with low attack potential reading the
communication between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection
system to gain the data on the MRTD’s chip.
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person
and the subsequent preparation and storage of biometric
reference templates representing that person's identity. [9]
Extended Access
Control
Security mechanism identified in [7] by which means the
MTRD’s chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection
systems authorized to read the optional biometric reference
data, (ii) controls the access to the optional biometric
reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and
integrity of the optional biometric reference data during their
transmission to the inspection system by secure messaging.
The Personalization Agent may use the same mechanism to
authenticate themselves with Personalization Agent
Authentication Private Key and to get write and read access to
the logical MRTD and TSF data.
Extended Inspection
System (EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is
in addition to Basic Inspection System authorized by the
issuing State or Organization to read the optional biometric
reference data and supports the terminals part of the Extended
Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document,
e.g. changes to the biographical data or the portrait. [8]
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 60 of 68
Term Definition
Global
Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or
automated) in different States throughout the world to
exchange data, to process data received from systems in other
States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in their
respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective
of the standardized specifications for placement of both eye-
readable and machine readable data in all MRTDs. [9]
IC Dedicated Support
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which
provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of
the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain
phases.
IC Dedicated Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which
is used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does
not provide any functionality thereafter.
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by
assuming a false name and identity, or a person who alters his
or her physical appearance to represent himself or herself as
another person for the purpose of using that person’s
document. [8]
Improperly
documented person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an
expired travel document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit,
forged or altered travel document or visa; (c) someone else’s
travel document or visa; or (d) no travel document or visa, if
required. [9]
Initialisation Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into
the non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits
manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are for instance used for
traceability and for IC identification as MRTD’s material (IC
identification data).
Inspection The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a
traveller (the MRTD holder) and verifying its authenticity. [9]
Inspection system
(IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the
receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the
traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the
traveller as MRTD holder.
Integrated circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing
and/or memory functions. The MRTD’s chip is a integrated
circuit.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 61 of 68
Term Definition
Integrity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the
MRTD’s chip have not been altered from that created by the
issuing State or Organization
Issuing Organization Organization authorized to issue an official travel document
(e.g. the United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-
passer). [6]
Issuing State The Country issuing the MRTD. [6]
Logical Data
Structure (LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the
optional capacity expansion technology [6]. The capacity
expansion technology used is the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical
Data Structure [6] as specified by ICAO on the contactless
integrated circuit. It presents contactless readable data
including (but not limited to)
(1) personal data of the MRTD holder
(2) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ
data, DG1),
(3) the digitized portraits (DG2),
(4) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (DG3) or iris
image(s) (DG4) or both and
(5) the other data according to LDS (DG5 to DG16).
Logical travel
document
Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as
specified by ICAO in the contactless integrated circuit
including (but not limited to)
(1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory),
(2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and
(3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
Machine readable
travel document
(MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is
used by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa,
official document of identity) and which contains mandatory
visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data
summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data
elements capable of being machine read. [6]
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 62 of 68
Term Definition
Machine readable
visa (MRV):
A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter
collectively referred to as visas) conforming to the
specifications contained herein, formulated to improve
facilitation and enhance security for the visa holder. Contains
mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate
mandatory data summary capable of being machine read. The
MRV is normally a label which is attached to a visa page in a
passport. [6]
Machine readable
zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or
MRP Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the
MRTD, containing mandatory and optional data for machine
reading using OCR methods. [6]
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris
pattern, fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel
document in a form that can be read and verified by machine.
[8]
MRTD application Non-executable data defining the functionality of the
operating system on the IC as the MRTD’s chip. It includes
- the file structure implementing the LDS [6],
- the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User
Data itself (i.e. content of DG1 to DG14 and DG 16) and
- the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data
but except the authentication data itself.
MRTD Basic Access
Control
Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging
between the inspection system and the MRTD’s chip based on
MRZ information as key seed and access condition to data
stored on MRTD’s chip according to LDS.
MRTD holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State
or Organization personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC
14443 and programmed according to the Logical Data
Structure as specified by ICAOT, [10], p. 14.
MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software
Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being
developed by the IC Designer. The MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software is designed in Phase 1 and embedded into the
MRTD’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 63 of 68
Term Definition
Optional biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder
in the MRTD’s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (DG3) or
(ii) encoded iris image(s) (DG4) or (iii) both. Note that the
European commission decided to use only finger print and not
to use iris images as optional biometric reference data.
Passive authentication (i) verification of the digital signature of the Document
Security Object and (ii) comparing the hash values of the read
LDS data fields with the hash values contained in the
Document Security Object.
Personalization The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical
data are applied to the document. [8]
Personalization Agent The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or
organisation to personalize the MRTD for the holder by (i)
establishing the identity the holder for the biographic data in
the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the
MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) or
(ii) the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) writing these data on
the physical and logical MRTD for the holder.
Personalization Agent
Authentication
Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the
Personalization Agent.
Personalization Agent
Authentication Key
Symmetric cryptographic key used (i) by the Personalization
Agent to prove their identity and get access to the logical
MRTD according to the SFR FIA_UAU.4/BT
FIA_UAU.6/BT and FIA_API.1/SYM_PT and (ii) by the
MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a
terminal as Personalization Agent according to the SFR
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD, FIA_UAU.5/MRTD and
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD.
Physical travel
document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using
secure printing to present data including (but not limited to)
(1) biographical data,
(2) data of the machine-readable zone,
(3) photographic image and
(4) other data.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 64 of 68
Term Definition
Pre-personalization
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the
TOE by the MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of
non-personalized MRTD’s and/or to secure shipment within
or between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not
limited to) the Personalization Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalized
MRTD’s chip
MRTD’s chip equipped with an unique identifier and an
unique asymmetric Active Authentication Key Pair of the
chip.
Primary Inspection
System (PIS)
A inspection system that contains a terminal for the
contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip and does
not implement the terminals part of the Basic Access Control
Mechanism.
Receiving State The Country to which the MRTD holder is applying for entry.
[6]
reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to
check the verification data provided by an entity to prove this
identity in an authentication attempt.
secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere
in the document by whatever means. [8]
secure messaging in
encrypted mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message
authentication code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4
Skimming Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD
or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the
TOE without knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
Travel document A passport or other official document of identity issued by a
State or organization, which may be used by the rightful
holder for international travel. [9]
Traveller Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and
claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the
operation of the TOE (CC part 1 [1]).
Unpersonalized
MRTD
MRTD material prepared to produce an personalized MRTD
containing an initialised and pre-personalized MRTD’s chip.
User data Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 65 of 68
Term Definition
operation of the TSF (CC part 1 [1]).
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample
against the biometric reference template of a single enrolee
whose identity is being claimed, to determine whether it
matches the enrolee’s template. [9]
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to
prove their identity to the verifier. The verifier checks
whether the verification data match the reference data known
for the claimed identity.
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 66 of 68
9.1 Acronyms
Acronym Term
SFR Security functional requirement
TOE Target of Evaluation
SAR Security assurance requirements
TSF TOE security functions
CC Common Criteria
OSP Organisational security policy
PIS Primary Inspection System
BIS Basic Inspection System
PT Personalization Terminal
n.a. Not applicable
AAKGS Active Authentication Key Generation System
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 67 of 68
10 References
10.1Common Criteria
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and General Model; Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Requirements; Version 2.1, August 1999
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Requirements; Version 2.1, August 1999
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation CEM-99/045
Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0, August 1999
[5] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS32: Übernahme international
abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema, Version 1, 02.07.2001,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
10.2ICAO
[6] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical Data
Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –1.7, published
by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization, LDS 1.7,
2004-05-18
[7] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable
Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October 01, 2004,
published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization
[8] ANNEX to Section III SECURITY STANDARDS FOR MACHINE READABLE
TRAVEL DOCUMENTS, Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable
Passports, Fifth Edition – 2003
[9] BIOMETRICS DEPLOYMENT OF MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS,
TECHNICAL REPORT Development and Specification of Globally Interoperable Biometric
Standards for Machine Assisted Identity Confirmation using Machine Readable Travel
Documents, Version 1.9, ICAO TAG MRTD/NTWG, 19 May 2003
[10] INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION FACILITATION (FAL)
DIVISION, twelfth session (Cairo, Egypt, 22 March – 1 April 2004)
[11] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable
Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version – 0.42 - Draft, August, 2004,
Dr. Kügler, BSI
10.3Cryptography
[12] Geeignete Algorithmen zur Erfüllung der Anforderungen nach §17 Abs. 1 bis 3 SigG
vom 22. Mai 2001 in Verbindung mit Anlage 1 Abschnitt I Nr. 2 SigV vom 22. November
2001, Bonn, 10.8.2004 (Zieldatum der Veröffentlichung ist Januar 2005)
Sdu ICAO eMRTD
Document : 8828-9 Security Target Lite
Classification : standard
CI-number : 8828-1001-001 - 1.0.0– public release
Date: 26 March 2007 Page 68 of 68
[13] ISO/IEC 14888-3: Information technology – Security techniques – Digital signatures
with appendix – Part 3: Certificate-based mechanisms, 1999
[14] FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION FIPS PUB
46-3, DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES), Reaffirmed 1999 October 25, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik page 73 of 74 Version 1.0, 18th August
2005 Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO
Application", Basic Access Control
[15] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 SECURE HASH
STANDARD (+ Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
[16] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-2 DIGITAL SIGNATURE
STANDARD (DSS) (+ Change Notice), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
[17] Certicom Research: SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, September 20, 2000, Version
1.0
[18] AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography For The
Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)©,
September 20, 1998
[19] ISO/IEC 9796-2, Information Technology – Security Techniques – Digital Signature
Schemes giving message recovery – Part 2: Integer factorisation based mechanisms, 2002
10.4Protection Profiles
[20] PP conformant to Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001;
registered and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under
the reference BSI-PP-0002-2001
[21] Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations, Version 1.00, March 8th, 2002
[22] Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application” Basic Access Control
Protection Profile, version 1.0, August 18th, 2005
10.5Other
[23] Technical Report Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents, Version 0.8 (final), BSI,
[24] ISO 7816, Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part 4:
Organization, security and commands for interchange, FDIS 2004
[25] SECURITY TARGET Philips P531G072V0Q (JCOP 31, v2.2) on Philips P5CT072V0P,
Secure Smart Card Controller, v1.6.