BSI-DSZ-CC-0469-2008
for
VoiceIdent Unit 2.0
from
Deutsche Telekom AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.24
BSI-DSZ-CC-0469-2008
Biometric Verification System
VoiceIdent Unit 2.0
from Deutsche Telekom AG
PP Conformance: Protection Profile - Biometric Verification
Mechanisms, Version 1.04
BSI-PP-0016-2005
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by
ADV_SPM.1
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 for conformance to
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 08 July 2008
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0469-2008
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0469-2008 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0469-2008
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................8
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................10
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................13
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information..............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing........................................................................................................16
7.1 Test Configuration.................................................................................................16
7.2 Developer Testing..................................................................................................16
7.3 Evaluator Indenpendent Testing............................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................16
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................17
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................17
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................17
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................18
11 Security Target...........................................................................................................18
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................18
12.1 Acronyms...........................................................................................................18
12.2 Glossary.............................................................................................................19
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................20
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................21
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................29
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0469-2008 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [4]
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0469-2008
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became effective on 3 March 1998.
This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was
extended to include certificates based on the CC for all Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL
1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises
certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom
within the terms of this agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of
America. The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product VoiceIdent Unit 2.0 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is
a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0359-2007. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-0359-2007 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product VoiceIdent Unit 2.0 was conducted by SRC Security
Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 23 June 2008. The SRC
Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Deutsche Telekom AG
The product was developed by: Deutsche Telekom AG
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0469-2008 Certification Report
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security
Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance
of the certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if
required and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to
perform a re-assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product VoiceIdent Unit 2.0 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de) and [6]. Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Deutsche Telekom AG
Friedrich-Ebert-Allee 140
53113 Bonn
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0469-2008
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0469-2008 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product VoiceIdent Unit 2.0. The TOE consists of
the Voice Gateway/Sikom (Sikom VoiceMan 7.5), the ASR/Verifier (Nuance ASR 9.0 /
Verifier 3.5), the Application Server (Jakarta Tomcat 5.5, SV-VoiceDialog Version 2.0, SV-
Webservice Version 2.0) and the Admin Server (SV-AdminSrv Version 2.0).
VoiceIdent Unit 2.0 provides a verification process to verify the claimed identity of a human
being using his voice as a unique characteristic of his body. It enables operators of portals
to uniquely authenticate their customers by means of a voiceprint. A portal in relation to
the TOE is the physical or logical point beyond which information or assets are protected
by the TOE. With failed verification, the portal is closed for the user. Via successful
verification, the portal is open.
The TOE is a biometric system that works in verification mode. Biometric Identification is
not addressed within the evaluation. Furthermore the enrolment process is out of scope of
the evaluation and it is assumed that all authorized users have been properly enrolled.
VoiceIdent Unit 2.0 verifies the identity of a user for the purpose of controlling access to
the portal.
Beside the biometric verification process VoiceIdent Unit 2.0 includes a
username/password mechanism to identify and authenticate an administrator of the
system and enforces an access control for the objects of the TOE. This is especially
important to limit the ability to change the threshold settings for the biometric verification
process to an authorized administrator.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0359-2007, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the extension to the VoIP-
technology besides normal telephony (i.e. extension of capture devices to VoIP-devices
besides normal telephones in the IT environment of the TOE and update of the Voice
Gateway in the TOE), the adding of the database types IBM DB2 and the Microsoft
SQLServer besides the Oracle 9.2 DBMS (databases are IT environment of the TOE) and
update of the automatic speech recognition software Nuance ASR 9.0 to the latest version.
The Security Target [7] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Protection Profile - Biometric Verification Mechanisms, Version 1.04
BSI-PP-0016-2005 [10].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2
augmented by ADV_SPM.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [7], chapter 5.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus
the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The Security Requirements relevant for the Environment of the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [7], chapter 5.2.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0469-2008
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
F.AUDIT_REACTION Logging of security critical processes
F.ROLES_AND_ACCESS Role based access control
F.BIO_VERIFICATION Access control to a portal by biometric verification mechanism
F.AUTHADMIN TOE administrator authentication
F.RESIDUAL No residual data remaining
F.NO_REPRODUCE_OR_
RESIDUAL_CAPTURE
Prevention of re-use of recorded voice samples
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 6.1.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'medium' (SOF-medium) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [7], chapter 6.2 is confirmed.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [7], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [7],
chapter 3.2 to 3.4.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The evaluated configuration was a VoiceIdent Unit 2.0 (subsystem versions and files in
accordance with table 2 and the configuration list) installed on one machine and restricted
to the local development network.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0469-2008 Certification Report
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
VoiceIdent Unit 2.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW Voice Gateway / Sikom
Sikom VoiceMan 7.5
Version
7.5.3.156
Installed at the customer’s site
by technicians of the developer
2 SW ASR/Verifier
Nuance ASR 9.0 / Verifier
3.5
Version
9.0 SP1
Installed at the customer’s site
by technicians of the developer
3 SW Application Server
Jakarta Tomcat 5.5
SV-VoiceDialog
SV-Webservice
Version 5.5.26
Version 2.0
Version 2.0
Installed at the customer’s site
by technicians of the developer
4 SW Admin Server
SV-AdminSrv Version 2.0
Installed at the customer’s site
by technicians of the developer
5 Paper
and
PDF
Administration Guide
VoiceIdent Unit 2.0
Version 2.0.4 Handed personally resp.
installed at the customer’s site
by technicians of the developer
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The TOE provides access to a portal to authorised users and provides access to the TOEs
management functions to authorised administrators only.
Therefore the TOE enforces the following rules:
● A user has access to the user data behind the portal only after forwarding the
claimed ID to the TOE and successful voice verification.
● After the successful username/password authentication on the Admin-Server, the
TOE administrator can
● administrate the users (store, change and delete the user identity data and
the biometric identification records (BIR)),
● perform the TOE relevant settings and check the audit records,
● reset the counter of consecutive unsuccessful attempts for the user,
● change his own password.
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● After the successful username/password authentication on the operating system the
IT administrator has access to the subsystem "Admin-Server" via a command line
program and can
● administrate the TOE administrators incl. reset the counter of consecutive
unsuccessful attempts for the TOE administrator,
● change his own username/password.
● After the successful username/password authentication on the operating system the
Developer-Administrator can perform the installation of the TOE with IT
administrator supports and set (once) the threshold value for acceptance or
rejection of user authentication attempts.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance:
● Trained and trustworthy administrators
● Suitable capture devices, in this case normal telephones or VoIP-devices
● Enrolment process
● Sufficient quality and secure storage of biometric identification records (BIR)
● Adequate and well administered IT-infrastructure (operating system, databases,
network)
● Secure environment (except capture devices)
● Availability of a fallback mechanism for the biometric verification system
Details can be found in the Security Target [7] chapter 4.2.
The TOE is a biometric system that works in verification mode. Biometric identification is
not addressed within the evaluation. Furthermore the enrolment process is out of scope
and it is assumed that all authorized users have been enrolled.
For correct operation the TOE needs cryptographically strong random numbers and
reliable timestamps that are provided by the underlying plattform.
The biometric identification records that are produced during the enrolment process as
well as all other user identification data are stored in two databases that are outside the
TOE.
For more detailed information about the the TOE boundary see the following chapter in
this report and the Security Target [7], chapter 2.5.
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5 Architectural Information
The following diagram shows the TOE in its intended environment. The TOE consists of
the four software subsystems Voice Gateway/Sikom, ASR/Verifier, Application Server
(containing the VoiceXML Dialog and the BusinessLogic) and Admin Server that are
marked by blue boxes and that implement the TOE Security Functionality. The TOE
boundary is shown by the light violett box which surrounds the subsystems. The black
arrows named S1, S2, S4 and S7 – S12 indicate the external interfaces of the TOE. The
black arrows named S3, S5 and S6 indicate the internal interfaces of the TOE.
Figure 1: Architecture of the TOE
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Test Configuration
The used test configuration was a VoiceIdent Unit 2.0 (subsystem versions and files in
accordance with the configuration list) installed on one machine (a Fujitsu-Siemens RX200
S2 Server with 2 Intel Xeon 3,6 GHz prozessors, 4 GB RAM, 2 x 72 GB harddisks and an
Eicon Diva Server 4BRI-8M 2.0 ISDN card, operating system Windows Server 2003
Standard-Edition, Service Pack 1) and restricted to the local development network. That
meant that no external email-addresses were available and in the verification process
rejected users were not forwarded to a call centre. Except these restrictions the used test
configuration was conform to the Security Target. But for all the restrictions complete
testing of the TOE Security Functions was possible without any qualification.
7.2 Developer Testing
The developer specified and implemented test cases for each defined Security Function.
Each test case covered one Security Function and the test procedures were based on the
described behaviour of the Security Function. All Security Functions were covered and the
actual test results were conform to the expected test results.
7.3 Evaluator Indenpendent Testing
The evaluators used the test configuration installed and used by the developer for the
developer tests. The hardware and software used by the evaluators for testing were the
same as the ones used by the developer, because the tests took place in the test
environment of the developer.
Taking into account the results of the developer’s tests the evaluators specified tests by
varying existing tests. Only for the residual tests the evaluators did not specify varying
tests, because the tests of the developer are adequate to cover the Security Function
behaviour. The evaluators conducted at least one test case for each Security Function.
One evaluator test could be understood as penetration test for obvious attacks (a user
trying to authenticate with a recorded voice sample). The evaluator recorded his own voice
sample and used it for the authentication attempt. The authentication failed. All actual test
results were conform to the expected test results.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE is identified as VoiceIdent Unit 2.0.
The evaluated configuration was a VoiceIdent Unit 2.0 (subsystem versions and files in
accordance with table 2 and the configuration list) installed on one machine and restricted
to the local development network.
For setting up and running the TOE according to the evaluated configuration all guidance
documents (refer to chapter 6) and the implications given by the Security Target were
followed. These implications can also be found in chapter 1 and 4 of this report.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [4] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [5] as relevant for the TOE.
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
The Biometrics Evaluation Methodology Supplement (BEM) [3] was used for the
evaluation of the biometric verification mechanism.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
• All components of the class ASE
• All components of the EAL 2 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
• The components ADV_SPM.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0359-2007, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the extension to the VoIP-
technology besides normal telephony (that is extension of capture devices to VoIP-devices
besides normal telephones in the IT environment of the TOE and update of the Voice
Gateway in the TOE), the adding of the database types IBM DB2 and the Microsoft
SQLServer besides the Oracle 9.2 DBMS (databases are IT environment of the TOE) and
update of the automatic speech recognition software Nuance ASR 9.0 to the latest version.
The evaluation has confirmed:
• PP Conformance: Protection Profile - Biometric Verification Mechanisms,
Version 1.04
BSI-PP-0016-2005 [10]
• for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
• for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by
ADV_SPM.1
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function : medium
F.BIO_VERIFICATION, F.NO_REPRODUCE_ OR_RESIDUAL_CAPTURE and
F.AUTHADMIN
In order to assess the Strength of Function for the TOE Security Function
F.BIO_VERIFICATION the Biometrics Evaluation Methodology Supplement (BEM) [3]
was used
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptoalgorithms. Thus, no such mechanisms were part of the
assessment.
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10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
ASR Automatic Speech Recognition
BEM Biometrics Evaluation Methodology Supplement
BIR Biometric Identification Record
BLR Biometric Live Record
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FAR False Accept Rate
FRR False Rejection Rate
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
VoIP Voice over IP
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12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the
basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected
and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] Biometrics Evaluation Methodology Supplement (BEM), Version 1.0, August 2002
[4] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[5] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[6] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[7] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0469-2008, Version 2.0.7, 21.04.2008, “Common Criteria
Security Target for VoiceIdent Unit 2.0“, Deutsche Telekom AG
[8] Evaluation Technical Report VoiceIdent Unit 2.0, Version 2.2, 20.06.2008,
SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 2.0.2, 19.06.2008, “Konfigurationsliste BSI-
Zertifizierung VoiceIdent Unit 2”, Deutsche Telekom AG (confidential document)
[10] Protection Profile BSI-PP-0016-2005, Version 1.04, 17.08.2005, “Protection Profile
for Biometric Verification Mechanisms“, Federal Office for Information Security
[11] Administrator Guide, Version 2.0.4, 24.01.2008, “Administratorhandbuch BSI-
Zertifizierung VoiceIdent Unit 2”, Deutsche Telekom AG
8
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen
ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0469-2008 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
(APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/
or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter
11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter
11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately
resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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