BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 for Infineon Security Controller M7892 A21 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware) from Infineon Technologies AG BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111 Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.61 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Infineon Security Controller M7892 A21 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware) from Infineon Technologies AG PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement for components up to EAL 4 The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. Bonn, 6 February 2012 For the Federal Office for Information Security Bernd Kowalski L.S. Head of Department Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 This page is intentionally left blank. 4 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report Preliminary Remarks Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products. Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor. A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria. The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself. The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results. The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user. 1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821 5 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Contents A Certification........................................................................................................................7 1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7 2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7 2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7 2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8 3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8 4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9 5 Publication......................................................................................................................9 B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11 1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12 2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14 3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................16 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................17 5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................17 6 Documentation.............................................................................................................18 7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................18 8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................19 9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................20 9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................20 9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................21 10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................21 11 Security Target............................................................................................................22 12 Definitions...................................................................................................................22 12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................22 12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................24 13 Bibliography................................................................................................................26 C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................29 D Annexes...........................................................................................................................39 6 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report A Certification 1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following: ● BSIG2 ● BSI Certification Ordinance3 ● BSI Schedule of Costs4 ● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior) ● DIN EN 45011 standard ● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3] ● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15 [1] ● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2] ● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4] 2 Recognition Agreements In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed. 2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA) The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical domains only. The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined. It includes assurance levels beyond EAL 4 resp. E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement. 2 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821 3 Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230 4 Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519 5 Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730 7 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found at https:// www.bsi.bund.de /zertifizierung. The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above. 2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA) An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC. As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above. The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement. This evaluation contains the components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant 3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings. The product Infineon Security Controller M7892 A21 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware) has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. The evaluation of the product Infineon Security Controller M7892 A21 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware) was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 24 January 2012. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6 recognised by the certification body of BSI. For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG. The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG. The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI. 6 Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility 8 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report 4 Validity of the Certification Result This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that ● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed, ● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following report and in the Security Target. For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report. The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis. In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies. 5 Publication The product Infineon Security Controller M7892 A21 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware) has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111. Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7 of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above. 7 Infineon Technologies AG Am Campeon 1-12 85579 Neubiberg 9 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 This page is intentionally left blank. 10 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report B Certification Results The following results represent a summary of ● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation, ● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and ● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body. 11 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 1 Executive Summary The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Infineon Security Controller M7892 A21 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware). The TOE is a member of the Security Controller family SLE70 and provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture. The TOE consists of a core system, memories, co-processors, peripherals, security modules and analogue peripherals. The major components of the core system are the two CPUs (Central Processing Units), the MMU (Memory Management Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The co-processor block contains the processors for RSA/EC and DES/AES processing, while the peripheral block contains the random number generation and the external interfaces service. The peripheral block contains also the timers and a watchdog. All data of the memory block is encrypted and all memory types are equipped with an error detection code (EDC), the SOLID FLASH™ in addition with an error correction code (ECC). The security modules serve for operation within the specified range and manage the alarms. This dual interface controller is able to communicate using either the contact based or the contactless interface. The implemented dual interface provides a maximum flexibility in using following communication protocols: ISO 7816, ISO 14443 Type A and Type B, ISO/IEC 18092 NFC passive mode, Mifare compatible Interface as well as further communication modes, allowing also the implementation of user defined concepts for conctact based or contactless communication. The flexibility of the communication interfaces enable for example also the use cases involving external analogue modems, which are typically deemed for applications running in mobile devices. Please note that these external parts are of course not part of this TOE. The TOE implements a full 16 MByte linear addressable memory space for each privilege level, a simple scalable Memory Management concept and a scalable stack size. The flexible memory concept consists of ROM- and Flash-memory as part of the non volatile memory (NVM), respectively SOLID FLASH™. The block diagram of the TOE is shown in [6], Figure 1. The TOE comprises as one part the hardware of the smart card security controller in various configurations. According to the BPU option, a non limited number of configurations of the TOE may occur in the field. The number of various configurations depends on the order and purchase contract only. For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 1.1. This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security relevant applications and for its previous use as developing platform for smart card operating systems according to the life cycle model from [8]. The term Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software itself is not part of the TOE. All products based on M7892 A21 are identically from module design, layout and footprint, but are different in their possibilities to connect to different types of antennas or in their ability to be implemented in special packages for different form factors. The TOE is represented and made out of different mask sets with the TOE internal and security irrelevant differences described in the Security Target Lite [6], chapter 1.1. There are additional differences between the products of this TOE realised by blocking of different modules (memory sizes, interface options, cryto moduls). 12 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report In the field, the IC Embedded Software Developer can clearly identify a product in question by the Generic Chip Ident Mode (GCIM). For clear differentiation between the mask sets, each of it has assigned an individual value in the data output of the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM). All differences between the products of the TOE lead consequently to different output data of the GCIM for clear identification. Details are depicted in the user guidance hardware reference manual [16]. The M7892 A21 product allows for a maximum of configuration possibilities following the market needs. For example, a M7892 A21 product can come in one project with the fully available SOLID FLASH™ or in another project with any other SOLID FLASH™-size below the physical implementation size, or with a different RAM size. And more, the user has the free choice, whether he needs the symmetric co-processor SCP, or the asymmetric co-processor Crypto2304T, or both, or none of them. In addition, the user decides, whether the TOE comes with a free combination of software libraries or without any. The degree of freedom of the chip configuration is predefined by Infineon Technologies AG and made available via the order tool. Beside predefined fix TOE configurations, which can be ordered as usual, this TOE implements optionally the so called Billing-Per-Use (BPU) ability, also as order option. If offered, this solution enables the user to tailor a product on stock himself to the required configuration. The user software can be implemented in various options depending on the user’s choice. Thereby the user software, or parts of it, can be downloaded into the SOLID FLASH™, either during production of the TOE or at customer side. In the latter case, the user downloads his software or the final parts of it at his own premises, using the Flash Loader software. For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and Security Target Lite [7], chapter 1 and table 3. The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI- CC-PP-0035-2007 [8]. The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended. The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Features: TOE Security Features Addressed issue SF_DPM Device Phase Management SF_PS Protection against Snooping SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks 13 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 TOE Security Features Addressed issue SF_CS Cryptographic Support Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 8. The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.1.2. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2. The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. 2 Identification of the TOE The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called: Infineon Security Controller M7892 A21 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware) The following table outlines the TOE deliverables: No Type Identifier Release Form of delivery 1 HW M7892 Smart Card IC A21 (produced in Dresden) Complete module, package, with or without inlay mounting, in form of plain wafers, in an IC case or in bare dies. 2 FW Flash Loader FW Identifier 78.015.14.0 Stored in reserved area of User ROM on the IC (patch in NVM) 3 FW STS Self Test Software (the IC Dedicated Test Software) FW Identifier 78.015.14.0 Stored in Test ROM on the IC (patch in NVM) 4 FW RMS Resource Management System (the IC Dedicated Support Software) FW Identifier 78.015.14.0 Stored in reserved area of User ROM on the IC (patch in NVM) 5 FW SAM library FW Identifier 78.015.14.0 Stored in reserved area of User ROM on the IC (patch in NVM) 6 SW NVM image (including Embedded Software and crypto libraries) – Stored in Flash memory on the IC 14 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report No Type Identifier Release Form of delivery 7 SW RSA library (optional) RSA2048 v1.02.013 RSA4096 v1.02.013 Object code in electronic form 8 SW EC library (optional) EC v1.02.013 Object code in electronic form 9 SW SHA-2 library (optional) SHA-2v1.01 Object code in electronic form 10 SW Toolbox (optional) Toolbox v1.02.013 Object code in electronic form 11 DOC AMM Advanced Mode for Mifare- Compatible Technology Addendum to M7892 Hardware Reference Manual 2011-11-18 Hardcopy or pdf-file 12 DOC M7892 Controller Family for Security Applications Hardware Reference Manual 2011-12-12 Hardcopy or pdf-file 13 DOC M7892 Errata Sheet 2011-12-12 Hardcopy or pdf-file 14 DOC M7892 Controller Security Guidelines User Manual 2011-12-12 Hardcopy or pdf-file 15 DOC SLE 70 Family Programmer’s Reference User’s Manual 2011-08-19 Hardcopy and pdf-file 16 DOC SLE70 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox (1.02.013) 2011-06-07 Hardcopy and pdf-file 17 DOC Crypto@2304T User Manual 2010-03-23 Hardcopy and pdf-file 18 DOC SLx70 Family Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-2 (SHA 256/224, SHA 512/384) Library Version V1.01 2009-11 Hardcopy and pdf-file 19 DOC SLx 70 Family Production and Personalization User’s Manual 2011-10-20 Hardcopy and pdf-file Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE A processing step during production testing incorporates the chip-individual features into the hardware of the TOE. The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its serial number. The serial number comprises the lot number, the wafer number and the coordinates of the chip on the wafer. Each individual TOE can therefore be traced unambiguously and thus assigned to the entire development and production process. The hardware part of the TOE is identified by M7892 A21. Another characteristic of the TOE are the chip identification data. These chip identification data is accessible via the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM). This GCIM outputs amongst other identifiers for the platform, chip mode, ROM code, chip type, design step, fabrication facility, wafer, die position, and firmware. The TOE may be handled in different production sites but the silicon of this TOE is produced in Dresden, Germany only. To distinguish the different 15 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 production sites of various products in the field, the site is coded into the Generic Chip Ident Mode (GCIM) data. Additionally, dedicated RMS functions [16], chapter 8.21, allow a customer to extract the present hardware configuration and the original Chip Identifier Byte, which was valid before blocking. In addition to the hardware part, the TOE consists of firmware parts and software parts. The software parts are differentiated into: the cryptographic libraries RSA, EC and SHA-2 and the supporting libraries Toolbox and Base. RSA, EC, SHA-2 and Toolbox provide certain functionality via an API to the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Base Library is only used internally by the RSA, EC and Toolbox libraries and has no user interface. If none of the three libraries RSA, EC and Toolbox is delivered, also the Base Library is not on board. The SHA-2 library does not use the Base Library. The firmware parts are the RMS library, the Service Algorithm Minimal (SAM), the STS firmware for test purpose [7], chapter 2.2.2, providing some functionality via an API to the Smartcard Embedded Software, the Flash Loader for downloading user software to the NVM and the Mifare compatible software interface. The STS is implemented in a separated Test-ROM being part of the TOE. The firmware is stored in the ROM which is not accessible for the user, i.e. the TOE has no user ROM. The Smartcard Embedded Software, i.e. the operating system and applications are not part of the TOE. For the version number of firmware and software parts of the TOE refer to table 2. The RSA library is used to provide a high level interface to the RSA cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto2304T. The RSA library is delivered as object code and in this way integrated in the user software. The EC library is used to provide a high level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography. The routines are used for ECDSA signature generation, ECDSA signature verification, ECDSA key generation and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement. The EC library is delivered as object code and in this way integrated in the user software. The SHA-2 library provides the calculation of a hash value of freely chosen data input in the CPU. The SHA-2 library is delivered as object code and is in this way available for the user software. The toolbox library does not provide cryptographic support or additional security functionality as it provides only the following basic long integer arithmetic and modular functions in software, supported by the cryptographic coprocessor The Base Library provides the low level interface to the asymmetric cryptographic coprocessor and has no user available interface. The base library does not provide any security functionality, implements no security mechanism, and does not provide additional specific security functionality. For more details please refer to Security Target [6] and Security Target Lite [7], chapter 2.2.2. The cryptographic libraries RSA, EC and SHA-2 are delivery options. Therefore the TOE may come with free combinations of or without these libraries. In the case of coming without one or any combination of these libraries the TOE does not provide the Additional Specific Security Functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA) and/or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EC) and/or SHA-2. 3 Security Policy The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: 16 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report Symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithms (Triple-DES and AES), to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a random number generation of appropriate quality. The RSA library is used to provide a high level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The EC library is used to provide a high level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The SHA-2 library provides the calculation of a hash value of freely chosen data input in the CPU. 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance: protection during packaging, finishing and personalization, usage of hardware platform and treatment of user data. The augmented organizational security policy P.Add-Functions, coming from the additional security functionality of the cryptographic libraries, the augmented assumption A.Key-Function, related to the usage of key-depending function, and the threat memory access violation T.Mem-Access, due to specific TOE memory access control functionality, have been added. Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.3. 5 Architectural Information The TOE is an integrated circuits (IC) providing a platform to a smart card operating system and smart card application software. A top level block diagram and a list of subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target [6], chapter 2.1. The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture. The major components of the core system are the two CPUs (Central Processing Units), the MMU (Memory Management Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The two CPUs control each other in order to detect faults and serve by this for data integrity. The TOE implements a full 16 MByte linear addressable memory space for each privilege level, a simple scalable Memory Management concept and a scalable stack size. The flexible memory concept consists of ROM- and Flash-memory as part of the non volatile memory (NVM), respectively SOLID FLASH™. For the SOLID FLASH™ memory the Unified Channel Programming (UCP) memory technology is used. This TOE has no user available ROM. The symmetric coprocessor (SCP) combines both AES and Triple-DES with dual-key or triple-key hardware acceleration. The Asymmetric Crypto Co-processor, called Crypto2304T in the following, is an optimized version of the Crypto@1408 used in the SLE88-family with performance improvements for RSA-2048 bit (4096-bit with CRT) and Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptography. The software part of the TOE consists of the cryptographic RSA-, EC- and the SHA-2 libraries and the supporting Toolbox and Base libraries. If RSA or EC or Toolbox or combinations hereof are part of the shipment, automatically the Base Library is included. 17 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Part of the evaluation are the RSA straight operations with key length from 1024 Bits to 2048 Bits, and the RSA CRT operations with key lengths of 1024 Bits to 4096 Bits. Note that key lengths below 1024 Bits are not included in the certificate. The Flash Loader is a firmware located in the IFX-ROM (Read-Only Memory) and allows downloading the user software or parts of it to the SOLID FLASH™ memory. After completion of the download the Flash Loader can be permanently deactivated by the user. For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 1.2 and 2.2.2. 6 Documentation The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target. Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed. 7 IT Product Testing The tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories: 1. technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against the specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the circuitry (this testing is not strictly related to Security Functionalities); 2. tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE; 3. regression tests of the hardware within a simulation environment based on special software dedicated only for the regression tests; 4. regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software and for the IC Dedicated Support Software on emulator versions of the TOE and within a software simulation of chip in special hardware; 5. characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production: a) used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different operating conditions and varied process parameters (often also referred to as characterisation tests); b) special verification tests for Security Functionalities which were done with samples of the TOE (referred also as developers security evaluation) and which include also layout tests by automatic means and optical control, in order to verify statements concerning the layout; 6. functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3). The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as identified in the functional specification. The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developers site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests performed by the developer. The tests of the developer were repeated by sampling, by 18 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report repetition of complete regression tests and by software routines developed by the evaluators and computed on samples with an evaluation operating system. For the developer tests repeated by the evaluators other test parameters were used and the test equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in design data and on the final product. The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct implementation of the TOE security functionalities. For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration. Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities using bespoke equipment and expert know how. The penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks which do not modify the TOE physically. The penetration tests results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack potential in the intended environment for the TOE. 8 Evaluated Configuration This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: ● Smartcard IC M7892 A21. Depending on the blocking configuration a M7892 product can have different user available configuration as described in Security Target Lite [7], chapter 1.1. For example, a M7892 A21 product can come in one project with the fully available SOLID FLASH™ or in another project with any other SOLID FLASH™-size below the physical implementation size, or with a different RAM size. And more, the user has the free choice, whether he needs the symmetric co-processor SCP, or the asymmetric co-processor Crypto2304T, or both, or none of them. In addition, the user decides, whether the TOE comes with a free combination of software libraries or without any. And, to be even more flexible, various interface options can be chosen as well. All possible TOE configurations equal and/or within the below specified ranges are covered by the certificate. Note that there is no user available on-chip ROM module any more. The user software and data are now located in a dedicated and protected part of the SOLID FLASH™. According to the BPU option, a non limited number of configurations of the TOE may occur in the field. The number of various configurations depends on the order and purchase contract only. Type Name Version number Hardware M7892 A21 A21 Firmware FW Identifier including RMS, STS, FL, SAM and Mifare 78.015.14.0 Software RSA crypto library (optional) RSA2048 v1.02.013 RSA4096 v1.02.013 EC library (optional) EC v1.02.013 SHA-2 library (optional) SHA-2 v1.01 Toolbox (optional) Toolbox v1.02.013 Table 3: TOE Identification (Product identifiers) 19 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 The RSA (optional), EC (optional), SHA-2 (optional), Toolbox (optional), and Base Library (optional) as separate software parts of the TOE are identified by their unique version numbers. The user can identify these versions by calculating the hash signatures of the provided library files. The mapping of these hash signatures to the version numbers is provided in the Security Target Lite [7] chapter 10. The version numbers of firmware and software are listed in Table 3. 9 Results of the Evaluation 9.1 CC specific results The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE. The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34). The following guidance specific for the technology was used: ● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits ● The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards ● Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number generators (see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31). To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on top. The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of the evaluation of the TOE. As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components: ● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report) ● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation. The evaluation has confirmed: ● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [8], ● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended, ● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report. 20 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above. 9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for: SF_CS (Cryptographic Support). The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy: ● hash functions: SHA-2 ● algorithms for the encryption and decryption: 3DES, AES, RSA and EC The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks with high attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for these functions it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (www.bsi.bund.de). The Cryptographic Functionalities 2-key Triple DES (3DES), RSA 1024 provided by the TOE achieves a security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context). 10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE. The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE. The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate. The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to be considered by the user and his system risk management process. Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Support Software or Embedded Software. For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains guidelines for the developer of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Embedded Software on how to securely use the microcontroller chip and which measures have to be implemented in the software in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE. 21 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if the required measures have been correct and effectively implemented by the software. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10]. In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE: ● All security hints described in the delivered documents [12] to [19] have to be considered. The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation. ● All security hints described in [20] have to be considered. In addition the following hint resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect has to be considered: ● The IC Embedded Software Developer can deliver his software either to Infineon to let them implement it in the TOE (in ROM or Flash memory) or to the Composite Product Manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash memory. The delivery procedure from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the Composite Product Manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is required. 11 Security Target For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target Lite [7] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]). 12 Definitions 12.1 Acronyms AES Advanced Encryption Standard APB™ Advanced Peripheral Bus APDU Application Protocol Data Unit API Application Programming Interface AXI™ Advanced eXtensible Interface Bus Protocol BPU Bill Per Use BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation CI Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI) 22 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report CIM Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI), same as CI CPU Central Processing Unit CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check Crypto2304T Asymmetric Cryptographic Processor CRT Chinese Reminder Theorem DCLB Digital Contactless Bridge DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm DFA Differential Failure Analysis DPA Differential Power Analysis EAL Evaluation Assurance Level EC Elliptic Curve Cryptography ECC Error Correction Code ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm EDC Error Detection Code EDU Error Detection Unit EEPROM Electrically Erasable and Programmable Read Only Memory EMA Electro Magnetic Analysis Flash EEPROM Flash Memory FL Flash Loader software FW Firmware GCIM Generic Chip Identification Mode HW Hardware IC Integrated Circuit ICO Internal Clock Oscillator ID Identification IMM Interface Management Module IRAM Internal Random Access Memory IT Information Technology ITP Interrupt and Peripheral Event Channel Controller ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility I/O Input/Output MED Memory Encryption and Decryption MMU Memory Management Unit NVM Non-Volatile Memory 23 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 OS Operating system ST Security Target PEC Peripheral Event Channel PP Protection Profile PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator PROM Programmable Read Only Memory RAM Random Access Memory RMS Resource Management System RNG Random Number Generator ROM Read Only Memory RSA Rives-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm SAM Service Algorithm Minimal SCP Symmetric Cryptographic Processor SF Security Feature SFR Special Function Register, as well as Security Functional Requirement, the specific meaning is given in the context SO Security Objective SOLID FLASH™ An Infineon Trade Mark and Stands for Flash EEPROM Technology SPA Simple Power Analysis STS Self Test Software SW Software TOE Target of Evaluation TM Test Mode (STS) TRNG True Random Number Generator TSC TOE Security Functions Control TSF TOE Security Functionality UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter UM User Mode (STS) UmSLC User Mode Security Life Control WDT Watch Dog Timer XRAM eXtended Random Access Memory 3DES Triple DES Encryption Standards 12.2 Glossary Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package. Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC. 24 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well- established mathematical concepts. Informal - Expressed in natural language. Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations. Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type. Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE. Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics. Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects. Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance. TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs. 25 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 13 Bibliography [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009 Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009 Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009 [2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009 [3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8 . [5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also in the BSI Website [6] Security Target M7892 A21 including optional Software Libraries RSA – EC – SHA-2 – Toolbox, Version 0.7, 2011-12-12, Infineon Technologies AG [7] Security Target Lite M7892 A21, Version 1.2, 2011-12-13, Infineon Technologies AG (sanitized public document) [8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15.06.2007, registered and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under reference BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [9] Evaluation Technical Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0758, M7892 A21, Version 2, 2012-02- 03, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH – Evaluation Body for IT Security (confidential document) [10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product M7892 A21, Version 2, 2012-02-03, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Evaluation Body for IT Security (confidential document) [11] Configuration Management Scope M7892 A21 including optional Software Libraries RSA – EC – SHA-2 – Toolbox, Version 1.3, 2011-11-30, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document) 8 specifically • AIS 20, Version 1, 02. December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren • AIS 25, Version 7, 30.Juni 2011, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document • AIS 26, Version 8, 08.Juni 2011, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document • AIS 31, Version 1, 25 September 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren • AIS 32, Version 7, 08.Juni 2011, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema • AIS 34, Version 3, 03 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1) • AIS 36, Version 3, 19 October 2010, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document • AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results 26 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report [12] SLE 70 Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox User Interface, Version 1.02.013. 2011-06-07, Infineon Technologies AG [13] Crypto@2304T User Manual, 2010-03-23, Infineon Technologies AG [14] SLE 70 Family Programmer’s Reference User’s Manual, 2011-08-19, Infineon Technologies AG [15] M7892 Errata Sheet, 2011-12-12, Infineon Technologies AG [16] M7892 Controller Family for Security Applications Hardware Reference Manual, Version 1.2, 2011-12-12, Infineon Technologies AG [17] AMM Advanced Mode for Mifare-Compatible Technology Addendum to M7892 Hardware Reference Manual. Version 1.0, 2011-11-18, Infineon Technologies AG [18] SLx 70 Family Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-2 (SHA 256/224, SHA 512/384) Library, Version 1.01, 2009-11, Infineon Technologies AG [19] M7892 Controllers Security Guidelines User Manual, 2011-12-12, Infineon Technologies AG [20] SLx 70 Family Production and Personalization User’s Manual, 2011-10-20, Infineon Technologies AG 27 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 This page is intentionally left blank. 28 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report C Excerpts from the Criteria CC Part1: Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4) “The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC conformance claim that: ● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance. ● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either: – CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or – CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2. ● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either: – CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or – CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3. Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to packages, in which case it consists of one of the following: ● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package (e.g. EAL) if: – the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or – the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package. ● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package if: – the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the package. – the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the package. Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant. Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection Profiles: ● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result. ● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.” 29 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 CC Part 3: Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10) “Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent, and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP. Assurance Class Assurance Components Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation APE_INT.1 PP introduction APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition” Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11) “Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.” 30 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report Assurance Class Assurance Components Class ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_INT.1 ST introduction ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design summary ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition Security assurance components (chapter 7) “The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance classes, families, and components.“ “Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.” “Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.” The following table shows the assurance class decomposition. Assurance Class Assurance Components ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional formal specification ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model ADV_TDS.1 Basic design ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high- level design presentation 31 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Assurance Class Assurance Components AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures ALC: Life cycle support ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts ATE: Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis Assurance class decomposition 32 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8) “The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE. It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.” Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1) “Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable. As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements). These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed. While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended assurance requirements. 33 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Assurance Class Assurance Family Assurance Components by Evaluation Assurance Level EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7 Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1 ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6 ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2 ADV_INT 2 3 3 ADV_SPM 1 1 ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6 Guidance Documents AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Life cycle Support ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5 ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5 ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1 ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2 ALC_FLR ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2 ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3 Security Target Evaluation ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1 ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3 ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4 ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2 ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5 Table 4: Evaluation assurance level summary” 34 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3) “Objectives EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information. EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through security objectives. EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay. An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation.” Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4) “Objectives EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time. EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.” Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5) “Objectives EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practises. EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.” 35 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed (chapter 8.6) “Objectives EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.” Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7) “Objectives EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large. EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.” Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested (chapter 8.8) “Objectives EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks. EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.” 36 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter 8.9) “Objectives EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.” Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16) “The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.” Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1) "Objectives Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate the SFRs. Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.” 37 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 This page is intentionally left blank. 38 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report D Annexes List of annexes of this certification report Annex A: Security Target Lite provided within a separate document. Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development and production environment 39 39 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 This page is intentionally left blank. 40 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Evaluation results regarding development and production environment The IT product Infineon Security Controller M7892 A21 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware) (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. As a result of the TOE certification, dated 6 February 2012, the following results regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2) are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below: Site Address Function Agrate - DNP DNP Photomask Europe S.p.A. Via C. Olivetti 2/A 20041 Agrate Brianza Italy Mask Production Augsburg Infineon Technologies AG Alter Postweg 101 86159 Augsburg Germany Development Bangalore Infineon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. 13th Floor, Discoverer Building International Technology Park Whitefield Road Bangalore, India – 560066 Software development and testing Bangkok – SmarTrac covered by BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0007-2011 Smartrac Technology Ltd., 142/121/115 Moo, Hi-Tech industrial Estate, Tambon Ban Laean, Amphor Bang-Pa-In, 13160 Ayutthaya, Thailand Inlay antenna mounting Bukarest Infineon Technologies Romania Blvd. Dimitrie Pompeiu Nr. 6 Sector 2 020335 Bucharest, Romania Development 41 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Site Address Function Chanhassen Smartrac Technology US Inc. 1546 Lake Drive West Chanhassen, MN 55317 USA Inlay antenna mounting Corbeil Essones - Toppan Toppan Photomask, Inc. European Technology Center Boulevard John Kennedy 224 91105 Corbeil Essonnes France Mask Production Dresden Infineon Technologies Dresden GmbH & Co. OHG Königsbrücker Str. 180 01099 Dresden Germany Production, initialisation, pre-personalisation Dresden-Toppan Toppan Photomask, Inc Rähnitzer Allee 9 01109 Dresden Germany Mask Production Graz / Villach / Klagenfurt Infineon Technologies Austria AG Development Center Graz Babenbergerstr. 10 8020 Graz Austria Infineon Technologies Austria AG Siemensstr. 2 9500 Villach Austria Infineon Technologies Austria AG Lakeside B05 9020 Klagenfurt Austria Development Großostheim – K&N Infineon Technology AG DCE Kühne & Nagel Stockstädter Strasse 10 – Building 8A 63762 Großostheim Germany Distribution Center Hayward – K&N Kuehne & Nagel 30805 Santana Street Hayward, CA 94544 U.S.A. Distribution Center Hsinchu - ARDT Ardentec Corporation No. 3, Gungye 3rd Rd., Hsin-Chu Industrial Park, Hu-Kou, Hsin-Chu Hsien, Taiwan 30351, R.O.C. Taiwan 30351, R.O.C. Wafer Testing 42 / 44 BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report Site Address Function Manila - Amkor Amkor Technology Philippines Km. 22 East Service Rd. South Superhighway Muntinlupa City 1702 Philipines Amkor Technology Philippines 119 North Science Avenue Laguna Technopark, Binan Laguna 4024 Philipines Module Mounting Munich Infineon Technologies AG Am Campeon 1-12 85579 Neubiberg Infineon Technologies AG Otto-Hahn-Ring 6 81739 München (Perlach) Germany Development, Headquater Munich - G&D Giesecke & Devrient GmbH Distribution Center DLC Prinzregentenstraße 159 81677 Munich Germany Distribution Center Ranzan - Toppan Toppan Printing Co., Ltd. 6-2, Hanami-Dai, Ranzan-Machi, Hiki-Gun Saitama 355-0204 Japan Inlay antenna mounting Regensburg-West Infineon Technologies AG Wernerwerkstraße 2 93049 Regensburg Germany Smartrac Technology GmbH, Wernerwerkstraße 2 93049 Regensburg Germany Module Mounting Inlay antenna mounting Distribution Center Reichshof - SmarTrac Smartrac Technology Germany Building RW2 Gewerbeparkstr. 10 51580 Reichshof-Wehnrath Germany Inlay antenna mounting Delivery Round Rock - Toppan Toppan Printing Company America, Inc. Round Rock Site 2175 Greenhill Drive Round Rock, Texas 78664 Inlay antenna mounting Singapore - DHL Exel Singapore Pte Ltd DHL Exel Supply Chian 81, ALPS Avenue Singapore 498803 Distribution Center Singapore Kallang Infineon Technologies AG 168 Kallang Way Singapore 349253 Module Mounting, Electrical module testing 43 / 44 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Site Address Function Tainan - TSMC Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd. 1, Nan-Ke North Rd. Tainan Science Park Tainan 741-44 Taiwan Production, initialisation, pre-personalisation Wuxi Infineon Technologies (Wuxi) Co. Ltd. No. 118, Xing Chuang San Lu Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park Wuxi 214028, Jiangsu P.R. China Module Mounting Distribution Center For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites. 44 / 44