BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-2015
for
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/016/012PVB(Y/Z/A)/PVF with IC
Dedicated Software
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.12
BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-2015 (*)
Smartcard Controller
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB(Y/Z/A)/PVF
with IC Dedicated Software
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.1
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also
published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
Bonn, 15 June 2015
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-2015
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-2015 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-2015
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................9
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................16
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................17
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................19
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................20
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................21
11. Security Target............................................................................................................22
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................22
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................24
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................27
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................28
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-2015 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification, Procedural
Description (BSI 7138) [3]
● BSI certification: Requirements regarding the Evaluation Facility (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-2015
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. This Domain is linked to
a conformance claim to one of the related SOGIS Recommended Protection Profiles. In
addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the
assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and certificates for Protection Profiles and
for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA are government representatives
from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08
September 2014, this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up
to and including CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components
ADV_FSP.5, ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.3, ADV_SPM.1, ADV_TDS.5, ALC_CMC.5,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.3, ASE_TSS.2, ATE_COV.3, ATE_DPT.3, ATE_FUN.2
and AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the
CCRA-2000, for mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are
relevant.
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3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB(Y/Z/A)/PVF with
IC Dedicated Software has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/016/012PVB(Y/Z/A)/PVF with IC Dedicated Software was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 18 May 2015. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH.
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 15 June
2015 is valid until 14 June 2020. The validity date can be extended by re-assessment or
re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report and the
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-2015
Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any
applicant of the product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the product's evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and
production sites or processes, occur or the confidentiality of documentation and
information related to the product or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the product or resulting from
the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the product
deliverables according to the Certification Report part B chapter 2 to third parties,
permission of the Certification Body at BSI has to be obtained.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB(Y/Z/A)/PVF with
IC Dedicated Software has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Stresemannallee 101
22569 Hamburg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-2015 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-2015
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the IC hardware platform “NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P60D024/016/012PVB(Y/Z/A)/PVF with IC Dedicated Software”. It is a
microcontroller incorporating a central processing unit, memories accessible via a Memory
Management Unit, cryptographic coprocessors, other security components and two
communication interfaces. On-chip memories are ROM, RAM and EEPROM. The
EEPROM is optimized for applications requiring reliable non-volatile data storage for data
and program code.
The end-consumer environment of the TOE is phase 7 of the Security IC product life-cycle
as defined in [7]. In this phase the Security IC product is in usage by the end-consumer. Its
method of use now depends on the Security IC Embedded Software. The TOE can be
used to assure authorized conditional access in a wide range of applications. Examples
are identity cards, Banking Cards, Pay-TV, Portable communication SIM cards, Health
cards and Transportation cards. The end-user environment covers a wide spectrum of very
different functions, thus making it difficult to monitor and avoid abuse of the TOE.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality. The Security Functionality provided by the TOE is split into Security
Services (SS) and Security Features (SF):
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Security Services
SS.RNG Random Number Generator
SS.HW_DES Triple-DES coprocessor
SS.HW_AES AES coprocessor
SS.Reconfig Post Delivery Configuration
Security Features
SF.OPC Control of Operating Conditions
SF.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation
SF.LOG Logical Protection
SF.COMP Protection of Mode Control
SF.MEM_ACC Memory Access Control
SF.SFR_ACC Special Function Register Access Control
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-2015 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.FFW Firmware Firewall
SF.FIRMWARE Firmware Support
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.2 to 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB(Y/Z/A)/PVF with IC
Dedicated Software
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/016/012PVB(Y/Z/A)
nameplate
9047A
wafer, module,
inlay or package
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/016/012PVF
nameplate
9047B
wafer, module,
inlay or package
2 SW Test ROM Software (Security IC Dedicated Test
Software), Test-ROM on the chip acc. to
9047A_BG002_TESTROM_v1_btos_08v07_fos_5v0.hex
Version 08.07,
21 September,
2011
stored in ROM on
the chip
3 SW Boot ROM Software (part of the Security IC Dedicated
Support Software), Boot-ROM on the chip acc. to
9047A_BG002_TESTROM_v1_btos_08v07_fos_5v0.hex
Version 08.07,
21 September,
2011
stored in ROM on
the chip
4 SW PVB(Y):
Firmware Operating System (FOS) (part of the Security
IC Dedicated Support Software), Firmware Operating
System on the chip acc. to
9047A_BG002_TESTROM_v1_btos_08v07_fos_5v0.hex
Version 5.00,
21 September,
2011
stored in ROM on
the chip
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
PVB(Z/A)/PVF:8
Firmware Operating System on the chip acc. to
9047A_BG002_TESTROM_v1_btos_08v07_fos_5v0.hex
Version 5.00 /
5.03,
21 September,
2011
stored in ROM on
the chip
5 DOC Product Data Sheet, SmartMX2 family P60D024/016/012
VB/VF, Secure high-performance smart card controller,
NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification
Rev. 5.2,
27 June 2014
electronic form
[12]
6 DOC Instruction set for the SmartMX2 family, Secure smart
card controller, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit
Identification
Rev. 3.1,
2 February
2012
electronic form
[13]
7 DOC NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012
VB/VF, Information on Guidance and Operation,
Guidance and Operation Manual
Rev. 1.6,
12 December
2014
electronic form
[14]
8 DOC Wafer and delivery specification, SmartMX2 family
P60D024/016/012 VB/VF, NXP Semiconductors
Rev. 3.2,
23 May 2014
electronic form
[15]
9 DOC Product Data Sheet Addendum, SmartMX2 family, Post
Delivery Configuration, NXP Semiconductors
Rev. 3.2,
04 February
2013
electronic form
[16]
10 DOC Product Data Sheet Addendum, SmartMX2 family Chip
Health Mode, NXP Semiconductors
Rev. 3.0,
11 May 2012
electronic form
[17]
11 DOC Product Data Sheet Addendum, SmartMX2 family,
Firmware Interface Specification, Firmware, NXP
Semiconductors
Rev. 4.1,
25 June 2014
electronic form
[18]
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The requirements for the delivery of TOE are described in chapter 2 of the “Guidance and
Operation Manual” [14] and in chapter 4 of the “Wafer and delivery specification” [15]. For
each delivery form of the hardware platform NXP offers two ways of delivery of the TOE:
1. The customer collects the hardware platform himself at the NXP site.
2. The hardware platform is sent to the customer by NXP with special protective measures.
The TOE documentation (last seven items of Table 3) is delivered in electronic form by the
document control centre of NXP.
The commercial type name is the identification used to order the TOE in the respective
major configuration and with the evaluated package type. In consequence this means that
a full commercial product name that fits in the variable forms described in Table 8 of [6]
determines that the hardware platform is an evaluated product. In addition the hardware
version can be identified by the crypted nameplate "9047A", respectively “9047B” for PVF
(cf. [11], 3.1]) on the surface of the hardware platform as described in chapters 4.2 and
3.9.3 of the Wafer and delivery specification [15]. The nameplate is the same for all
configurations. In addition each major configuration has a different device coding
described in [12] section 31.2. The device coding is reproduced in the following Table 3.
Identification is also possible using the Chip Health Mode. The identification string
provided by the command 00h of the Chip Health Mode comprises also the device coding
and the firmware version.
8
FOS Version 5.03 includes extensions on top of 9047A_BG002_TESTROM_v1_btos_08v07_fos_5v0.hex
stored in the Firmware Mode EEPROM
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Each major configuration has a dedicated device coding as listed in the following table:
P60D024PVB(Y/Z/A)/
PVF
P60D016PVB(Y/Z/A)
/PVF
P60D012PVB(Y/Z/A)/
PVF
DC0 22h 22h 22h
DC1 0Ch 0Bh 0Ah
DC2 00h 00h 00h
DC3 17h 17h 17h Options
DC4
yyxx xxxx yyxx xxxx yyxx xxxx
EEPROM programming
characteristics:
yy=00: TSMC ver. a
yy=01: TSMC ver. b
yy=10: reserved
yy=11: reserved
xxxx 1xxx xxxx 1xxx xxxx 1xxx
NXP option PATDET
configuration selection set
to “a”
xxxx 0xxx xxxx 0xxx xxxx 0xxx
NXP option PATDET
configuration selection set
to “initial”
xxxx x1xx xxxx x1xx xxxx x1xx
Start-up with Run mode
disabled
xxxx x0xx xxxx x0xx xxxx x0xx
Start-up with Run mode
enabled
xxxx xxx1 xxxx xxx1 xxxx xxx1
LA / LB input capacitance,
Class 2 (half ID1) antenna
xxxx xxx0 xxxx xxx0 xxxx xxx0
LA / LB input capacitance,
Class 1 (ID1) antenna
Table 3: Device coding of the major configurations
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. As the TOE is a security hardware platform, the security policy
of the TOE provides countermeasures against: leakage of information, physical probing,
malfunctions, physical manipulations, access to code, access to data memory, abuse of
functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the
TOE and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security
Functions (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
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specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
• Clarification of “Usage of Hardware Platform (OE.Plat-Appl)”
• Clarification of “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)”
• Protection during composite product manufacturing (OE.Process-Sec-IC)
• Check of initialisation data by the Security IC Embedded Software (OE.Check-Init)
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 4.2 and 4.3.
5. Architectural Information
The NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB(Y/Z/A)/PVF with IC
Dedicated Software is a microcontroller incorporating a central processing unit, memories
accessible via a Memory Management Unit, cryptographic coprocessors, other security
components and two communication interfaces. The central processing unit supports a
32-/24-/16-/8-bit instruction set optimized for smart card applications, which is a super set
of the 80C51 family instruction set. The first and in some cases the second byte of an
instruction are used for operation encoding. On-chip memories are ROM, RAM and
EEPROM. The non-volatile EEPROM can be used as data or program memory. It consists
of high reliable memory cells, which guarantee data integrity. The EEPROM is optimized
for applications requiring reliable non-volatile data storage for data and program code.
EEPROM double read function is included for correct memory readout. Dedicated security
functionality protects the contents of all memories.
The IC Dedicated Software comprises IC Dedicated Test Software for test purposes and
IC Dedicated Support Software. The IC Dedicated Support Software consists of Boot-ROM
Software controlling the boot process of the hardware platform and Firmware Operating
System which can be called by the Security IC Embedded Software. The Firmware
Operating System provides an interface for programming of the internal EEPROM
memory, which is mandatory for use by the Security IC Embedded Software when
programming the EEPROM memory.
Users have the possibility to tailor the available crypto co-processor, which is also part of
the TOE, during the ordering process by deselecting the Symmetric Block Cipher
Interfaces. Hence the TOE can be delivered with or without the functionality of 3DES and
AES, respectively. In case of deactivation, the accompanying additional specific security
functionality 3DES and AES is not provided to the end consumer by the TOE. Deselecting
the Symmetric Block Cipher Interfaces has no impact on any other security policy of the
TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the
functionality. Also the Fame2 coprocessor (for large number arithmetics) can be
deactivated during the life cycle phases 5 and 6 (post delivery configuration), which results
in the fact that the dedicated hardware support for asymmetric calculations cannot be
used. In either case, a software cryptographic library is not part of the TOE and thus not in
scope of the evaluation. Besides the crypto coprocessor blocking, the user has also the
possibility to block the above mentioned memory size of the EEPROM and RAM and
choose between different interface options. This has no influence to the security policy of
the TOE.
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6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The tests performed can be divided into the following categories:
7.1. Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
Testing has been performed by the developer according to a documented testing
approach, covering well defined TOE configurations and various categories of tests,
thereby covering the whole TOE security functionality.
The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE in general and its TSFs behave
as expected and specified.
TOE test configuration and developer’s testing approach:
• The tests are performed with the TOE in different test environments and
configurations depending on the test categories.
• All TSF and a relevant subset of related security mechanisms, subsystems and
modules are tested in order to assure complete coverage of all SFR.
Test categories:
◦ Production testing on wafers using test functions implemented in the IC
Dedicated Software. These test functions are accessed via test commands,
which are issued by the production tests. Test functions respond signatures to
the production tests. Production tests also apply signals to and/or measures
signals at any contact of the device. Final test or module test therefore is limited
to a verification of electrical connections like checking the pins of the package
for shorts and opens.
◦ Simulation tests are performed to verify functionality, which is not visible at the
accessible interfaces of the TOE. These simulation tests are a subset of those,
which were performed during development of the device to ensure a proper
design of its modules.
During run-time of a simulation an automated regression test continuously
compares pre-defined internal signals (probe list) like data and address buses,
control signals, register contents and microcode information against a “golden
reference”. Test results are automatically listed in log files and a summary, i.e.
discrepancies occurred (yes/no), is output to the user interface.
Manual simulation tests are performed in case an automated result comparison
based on executable code is not possible.
◦ Characterization tests verify the electrical properties of the device, which are
specified with regard to limiting values, thresholds and timings of several
electrical parameters like voltages, currents, frequencies, capacitors,
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resistances and latches. For this purpose a number of devices for test are taken
from production.
◦ Verification tests are performed on single samples of the device to verify specific
security functionality, which is not testable for each device during production test
or within the scope of characterization testing. Such tests include standard tests
of the Random Number Generator, AES coprocessor and Triple-DES
coprocessor.
◦ Test of configurations: Configuration data are stored to EEPROM based on the
customer’s choices in the Order Entry Form at later stages of the production
test. For this purpose production test implements special test steps relying on an
according test strategy to verify the required configuration. Special parts of
verification tests explicitly test the configuration options of the device.
7.2. Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
The whole TOE security functionality was tested by the evaluator by utilizing a
documented test approach, which covered well defined TOE configurations as well as
various categories of tests.
As a result, the evaluator’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE in general and its
TSFs behave as expected and specified.
The independent testing was partly performed in the developer’s testing environment and
partly at TÜViT GmbH, information security department, in Essen. The same platforms and
tools as for the developer tests were used (see ATE_FUN one section above).
Testing approach:
• The evaluator's objective regarding this aspect was to test the functionality of the
TOE, and to verify the developer's test results by repeating developer's tests and
additionally add independent tests.
• In the course of the evaluation of the TOE the following classes of tests were
carried out:
◦ Module tests,
◦ Simulation tests,
◦ Emulation tests,
◦ Tests in user mode,
◦ Tests in test mode,
◦ Hardware tests.
With this kind of tests the entire security functionality of the TOE was tested.
7.3. Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
The penetration testing was partially performed using the developer’s testing environment,
partially using the test environment of the evaluation body.
All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were
tested. The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and
the actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential high was
actually successful.
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Penetration testing approach:
• Systematic search for potential vulnerabilities and known attacks in public domain
sources, use of a list of vulnerabilities, and from a methodical analysis of the
evaluation documents.
• Analysis why these vulnerabilities are unexploitable in the intended environment of
the TOE.
• If the rationale is suspect in the opinion of the evaluator penetration tests are
devised.
• Even if the rational is convincing in the opinion of the evaluator penetration tests are
devised for some vulnerabilities, especially to support the argument of
non-practicability of exploiting time in case of SPA, DPA and FI attacks.
• The tests are performed with the chip P60D024/016/012PVB(Y/Z/A)/PVF. For the
tests different chip types are prepared with different patch. With the loaded patch
code the defined tests could be performed. The entire functionality is the same for
all chips.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB(Y/Z/A)/PVF with IC
Dedicated Software can be delivered in different major configurations. All major
configurations listed in the following table are covered by this evaluation
P60D024PVB(Y/Z/A)
/PVF
P60D016PVB(Y/Z/A)
/PVF
P60D012PVB(Y/Z/A)
/PVF
accessible EEPROM for the
Security IC Embedded Software
24 kBytes except for
512 Bytes reserved
for Security Rows
and configuration
data of the
manufacturer and
768 Bytes reserved
for IC Dedicated
Support Software
(Firmware OS)
16 kBytes except for
512 Bytes reserved
for Security Rows
and configuration
data of the
manufacturer and
768 Bytes reserved
for IC Dedicated
Support Software
(Firmware OS)
12 kBytes except for
512 Bytes reserved
for Security Rows
and configuration
data of the
manufacturer and
768 Bytes reserved
for IC Dedicated
Support Software
(Firmware OS)
Contactless communication
according to ISO/IEC 14443 A
contactless interface
enabled
contactless interface
enabled
contactless interface
enabled
ROM available to the Security
IC Embedded Software
352 kBytes 352 kBytes 352 kBytes
Table 4: Overview of major configurations
The NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB(Y/Z/A)/PVF with IC
Dedicated Software was tested including all major configurations as well as all minor
configuration options that can be selected based on Table 7 in chapter 1.4.2.2 of [6] and
[8]. All major and minor configurations are available to the evaluator. Besides the
differences listed in above table there are no other differences between the major
configurations. The major configuration does not have dependencies to security features.
All minor configuration options that are part of the evaluation were tested. The minor
configuration options behave as specified and described in [6] and [8] as well.
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Therefore the results described in this document are applicable for the listed major
configurations as well as for all minor configurations described in [6] and [8].
The major and minor configurations cannot be influenced by the customer. They are
selected by the customer according to the Order Entry Form [21], [22] and [23]. This
configuration cannot be changed in the Application Mode after delivery of the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(iii) Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.1
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
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The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
Cryptographic
Primitives
Two-key TDES [FIPS-46-3] (DES) |K| = 112 no
Three-key TDES [FIPS-46-3] (DES) |K| = 168 yes
AES [FIPS-197] (AES) |K| = 128, 192,
256
yes
Table 5: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation
(see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product
layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which measures have to be
implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the product
layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also
consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation
[10].
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11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
DES Data Encryption Standard
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
IC Integrated Circuit
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
ROM Read Only Memory
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
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TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
[3] BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification of products,
protection profiles and sites (BSI 7138) and Requirements regarding the Evaluation
Facility for the Evaluation of Products, Protection Profiles and Sites under the CC
and ITSEC (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE9
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-2015, NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/016/012PVB(Y/Z/A)/PVF Security Target, NXP Semiconductors, Version
3.1, 09 December 2014 (confidential document)
[7] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
[8] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-2015, NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/016/012PVB(Y/Z/A)/PVF Security Target Lite, NXP Semiconductors,
Version 3.1, 09 December 2014
[9] Evaluation Technical Report, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Version 7, 24 April
2015 (confidential document)
[10] Evaluation Technical Report FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION Version 6, 24 April
2015 (confidential document)
9
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 1, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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[11] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB(Y/Z/A)/PVF,
Configuration List, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification, NXP
Semiconductors, Rev. 2.41, 10 October 2014 (confidential document)
[12] Product Data Sheet, SmartMX2 family P60D024/016/012 VB/VF, Secure
high-performance smart card controller, NXP Semiconductors, Rev. 5.2, 27 June
2014 (confidential document)
[13] Instruction set for the SmartMX2 family, Secure smart card controller, NXP
Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification, Rev. 3.1, 02 February 2012
(confidential document)
[14] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D012/016/024P VB/VF, Information on
Guidance and Operation, Guidance and Operation Manual, NXP Semiconductors,
Rev. 1.6, 12 December 2014 (confidential document)
[15] SmartMX2 family P60D024/016/012 VB/VF, Wafer and delivery specification,
Product data sheet addendum, NXP Semiconductors, Rev. 3.2, 23 May 2014
(confidential document)
[16] SmartMX2 family Post Delivery Configuration (PDC), Secure high-performance
smart card controller, Product data sheet addendum, NXP Semiconductors, Rev.
3.2, 04 February 2013 (confidential document)
[17] SmartMX2 family Chip Health Mode (CHM), Secure high-performance smart card
controller, Product data sheet addendum, NXP Semiconductors, Rev. 3.0, 11 May
2012 (confidential document)
[18] Firmware interface specification, Firmware, Product data sheet addendum, NXP
Semiconductors, Rev. 4.1, 25 June 2014 (confidential document)
[19] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB(Y/Z/A)/PVF and NXP
Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF, Evaluation
Reference List, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification, Rev. 3.17, 02
February 2015 (confidential document)
[20] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB(Y/Z/A)/PVF and NXP
Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF, Customer specific
Appendix of the Configuration List, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit
Identification, Rev. 2.20, 04 November 2013 (confidential document)
[21] Order Entry Form P60D024, NXP Semiconductors, Release: 2.22
[22] Order Entry Form P60D016, NXP Semiconductors, Release: 2.18
[23] Order Entry Form P60D012, NXP Semiconductors, Release: 2.17
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-2015
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB(Y/Z/A)/PVF with
IC Dedicated Software (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM),
Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5
and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 15 June 2015, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.3)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Development site Task within the evaluation
NXP Semiconductors Hamburg
Business Unit Identification (BU ID)
Stresemannallee 101
22529 Hamburg
Germany
Development, Delivery and customer support
TSMC, Fab 2 and 5
No. 121 Park Ave. III
Hsinchu Science Park
Hsinchu, Taiwan 300, R.O.C.
Mask data preparation
TSMC, Fab 7
No. 6, Creation Rd. II
Hsinchu Science Park
Hsinchu, Taiwan 300, R.O.C.
Mask data preparation
TSMC, Fab 6 and Fab 14
No. 1, Nan-Ke North Rd.
Tainan Science Park
Tainan, Taiwan 741, R.O.C.
Mask and wafer production
Chipbond Technology Corporation
No. 3, Li-Hsin Rd. V
Science Based Industrial Park
Hsin-Chu City
Taiwan, R.O.C.
Bumping
NXP Semiconductors GmbH Hamburg
Test Center Europe - Hamburg (TCE-H)
Test Center and configuration of the Fabkey
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Development site Task within the evaluation
Stresemannallee 101
22529 Hamburg
Germany
Assembly Plant Bangkok
303 Moo 3 Chaengwattana Rd.
Laksi, Bangkok 10210
Thailand
Test Center, Delivery and Module assembly
Assembly Plant Kaohsiung
NXP Semiconductors Taiwan Ltd
#10, Jing 5th Road, N.E.P.Z, Kaohsiung 81170
Taiwan, R.O.C
Test Center and Module assembly
SMARTRAC Technology Ltd.
142 Moo 1 Hi-Tech Industrial Estate
Tambon Ban Laean, Amphor Bang-Pa-In
13160 Ayutthaya
Thailand
Inlay assembly
SMARTRAC Technology Wehnrath GmbH
Gewerbeparkstr. 10
51580 Reichshof-Wehnrath
Germany
Inlay assembly
HID Global Teoranta
Paic Tionscail na Tulaigh
Balle na hAbhann
Co. Galway
Ireland
Inlay assembly
NXP Semiconductors Austria GmbH Styria
Business Unit Identification (BU ID)
Mikron-Weg 1
8108 Gratkorn
Austria
Document control
NedCard B.V.
Bijsterhuizen 25-29
6604 LM Wijchen
The Netherlands
Module assembly
NedCard (Shanghai) Microelectronics Co. Ltd.
Standardized Plant Building #8
No. 789 Puxing Road
Caohejing Hi-Tech Park, EPZ
201114 Shanghai
People’s Republic of China
Module assembly
NXP Semiconductors Netherlands B.V.
Gerstweg 2
6534AE Nijmegen
The Netherlands
Development and Manufacturing
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Development site Task within the evaluation
NXP High Tech Campus
Building 60, High Tech Campus
Secure Room 131
5656AE, Eindhoven
The Netherlands
Regional Quality Center - Europe, Tape Out
Office, and Materials Management
Department
Atos Bydgoszcz Building BETA Secure Room
B20S1
Biznes Park
ul. Kraszewskiego 1
85-240 Bydgoszcz
Poland
IT Engineering and Generic Support
Ardentec Corporation (T Site)
Ardentec Corporation
No. 3, Gungye 3rd Rd.
Hsin-Chu Industrial Park,
Hu-Kou,
Hsin-Chu Hsien
Taiwan 30351, R.O.C.
Wafer Testing
Ardentec Corporation (K Site),
No. 24, Wen-Huan Rd., Hsin-Chu Industrial
Park, Hu-Kou,
Hsin-Chu Hsien, Taiwan 30351,R.O.C.
Wafer Processing
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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