Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 1
Wiseaccess v1.4
Security Target
The Security Target related to the certified TOE. This Security Target is written in Korean and
translated from Korean into English.
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 2
Revision History
Configuration
document no.
Detail Data Created by
v1.4.0 Initial Registration 2022-06-10 RAONSECURE Co., Ltd.
v1.4.1
Modification of security
requirements
2023-01-25 RAONSECURE Co., Ltd.
v1.4.2 SFR change 2023-04-24 RAONSECURE Co., Ltd.
v1.4.3
Operating environment version
update
2023-05-08 RAONSECURE Co., Ltd.
v1.4.4 Modify Overview 2023-05-31 RAONSECURE Co., Ltd.
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 3
Contents
1. ST Instroduction...............................................................................................................................................................6
1.1 ST reference.......................................................................................................................................................................... 6
1.2 TOE reference ...................................................................................................................................................................... 6
1.3 TOE overview ....................................................................................................................................................................... 6
1.4 TOE description ................................................................................................................................................................12
1.5 Operation .............................................................................................................................................................................17
1.6 Terms and definitions...................................................................................................................................................18
1.7 Structure of Security Target .....................................................................................................................................22
2. Conformance claims ................................................................................................................................................... 22
2.1 CC conformance claim..................................................................................................................................................22
2.2 PP conformance claim..................................................................................................................................................23
2.3 Package conformance claim .....................................................................................................................................23
2.4 Conformance claim rationale ...................................................................................................................................23
2.4.1 Rationale...............................................................................................................................................................................23
2.5 Conformance Statement .............................................................................................................................................23
3. Security objectives for the operational environment ............................................................................. 24
3.1 Security objectives for the operational environment................................................................................24
4. Extended components definition........................................................................................................................ 25
4.1 Cryptographic support.................................................................................................................................................25
4.1.1 Random Bit Generation...............................................................................................................................................25
4.2 Identification and authentication ..........................................................................................................................26
4.2.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication.....................................................................................................................26
4.2.2 Specification of Secrets................................................................................................................................................27
4.3 Security Management...................................................................................................................................................28
4.3.1 ID and password..............................................................................................................................................................28
4.4 Protection of the TSF....................................................................................................................................................29
4.4.1 Protection of stored TSF data..................................................................................................................................29
4.5 TOE Access...........................................................................................................................................................................30
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 4
4.5.1 Session locking and termination............................................................................................................................30
5. Security requirements................................................................................................................................................ 31
5.1 Security functional requirements...........................................................................................................................31
5.1.1 Security audit (FAU).......................................................................................................................................................32
5.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)....................................................................................................................................36
5.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA) ..............................................................................................................39
5.1.4 Security management (FMT) ....................................................................................................................................42
5.1.5 Protection of the TSF....................................................................................................................................................44
5.1.6 TOE access ...........................................................................................................................................................................45
5.2 Security assurance requirement .............................................................................................................................45
5.2.1 Security Target evaluation.........................................................................................................................................46
5.2.2 Development......................................................................................................................................................................50
5.2.3 Guidance documents.....................................................................................................................................................51
5.2.4 Life-cycle support............................................................................................................................................................52
5.2.5 Tests ........................................................................................................................................................................................53
5.2.6 Vulnerability assessment.............................................................................................................................................54
5.3 Security requirement rationale................................................................................................................................54
5.3.1 Dependency rationale of security functional requirements ..................................................................54
5.3.2 Dependency rationale of security assurance requirements...................................................................57
6. TOE summary specification.................................................................................................................................... 57
6.1 Security Audit(AUDIT) ..................................................................................................................................................57
6.1.1 Audit data generation(AUDIT.1).............................................................................................................................57
6.1.2 Audit data review(AUDIT.2) ......................................................................................................................................58
6.1.3 Audit repository inspection and security violation response (AUDIT.3)........................................58
6.2 Cryptographic support(CKM)...................................................................................................................................59
6.2.1 Cryptographic Key Management and Cryptographic Operation(CKM.1)......................................59
6.2.2 Generate an encryption key......................................................................................................................................59
6.2.3 Cryptographic key distribution ...............................................................................................................................60
6.2.4 Destroy the encryption key.......................................................................................................................................60
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 5
6.2.5 Cryptographic operation.............................................................................................................................................61
6.3 Identification and authentication (FIA) ..............................................................................................................63
6.3.1 Authentication failure handling..............................................................................................................................63
6.3.2 Mutual authentication between TOE components......................................................................................63
6.3.3 Verification of Confidential Information...........................................................................................................64
6.3.4 Creation and destruction of confidential information..............................................................................65
6.4 Security management(SM).........................................................................................................................................66
6.4.1 Security management(SM.1).....................................................................................................................................66
6.5 Protection of the TSF(PT)...........................................................................................................................................68
6.5.1 Protection of the TSF(PT.1).......................................................................................................................................68
6.6 TOE access(TA)..................................................................................................................................................................70
6.6.1 Session management(TA.1).......................................................................................................................................70
[Appendix].................................................................................................................................................................................. 71
1. Integrity verification target.................................................................................................................................... 71
1.1 SSO Server ...........................................................................................................................................................................71
1.1.1 sessionserver folder .......................................................................................................................................................71
1.1.2 policyserver folder..........................................................................................................................................................71
1.1.3 wpm folder..........................................................................................................................................................................72
1.2 SSO Agent............................................................................................................................................................................84
1.2.1 api folder..............................................................................................................................................................................84
1.2.2 ssoengine folder...............................................................................................................................................................85
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 6
1. ST Instroduction
1.1 ST reference
Item Specification
Title TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Security Target
Document Identification wiseaccess-D-ST v1.4.4
Version v1.4.4
Publication Date 2023-05-31
Evaluation Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Common Criteria version v3.1 R5
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL1+(ATE_FUN.1)
Author RAONSECURE Co., Ltd.
Keywords
integrated authentication, SSO(Single Sign-On), single
authentication, Authentication token
1.2 TOE reference
Item Specification
TOE TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4
Version v1.4.4.3
Components
SSO
Server
∙ TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Server v1.4.4.3
: wiseaccess_server_v1.4.4.3_linux.tar.gz
SSO
Agent
∙ TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Agent v1.4.4.3
: wiseaccess_agent_v1.4.4.3_linux.tar.gz
Manual
∙ TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Administrator's Manual v1.4.3
: TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Administrator's Manual v1.4.3.pdf
∙ TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 API Manual v1.4.2
: TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 API Manual v1.4.2.pdf
∙ TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Installation Guide v1.4.3
: TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Installation Guide v1.4.3.pdf
Developer RAONSECURE Co., Ltd.
1.3 TOE overview
This Security Target defines the security functional requirements and assurance requirements of
TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 which provides services for End user with Single Sign-On.
TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 (hereinafter referred to as “TOE”) provides the ID/PW based user log-in
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 7
function and issues an authentication token when a user initially attempts to log in. The TOE
issues a token during user log-in, and verify the issued token if accessing another business system
after user log-in.
The TOE sets the ID and PW policy for identifying and authenticating End User. It also manages
various business systems by registering services. The TOE provides separate access by business
system to control the single authentication function. To do so, an
issued/saved/validated/discarded authentication token must use a validated cryptographic module
whose security and implementation conformance are validated by the Korean Cryptographic
Module Validation Program (KCMVP).
The TOE uses the following validated cryptographic modules.
Item Specification
cryptographic module name Key# Crypto V1.5
Developer RAONSECURE Co., Ltd.
verification date 2022-11-02
expiration date 2027-11-02
verification number CM-220-2027.11
The TOE provides the security audit function that records and manages critical events as audit
data when activating the security functionality and management function, function of protecting
the data that stored in the TSF controlled repository, and TSF protection function such as TSF self-
testing. In addition, the TOE provides authentication failure handling, identification and
authentication functions including mutual authentication between the TOE components,
cryptographic support function such as cryptographic key management and cryptographic
operation for issuing a token, security management function for management of security
functions behavior and configuration, and the TOE access function to manage the authorized
administrator’s interacting session.
In addition, the token requires confidentiality and integrity protection, and the TOE executable
code requires integrity protection.
For End User identification and authentication process, it has two phases; the initial authentication
phase using the ID and PW; the token-based authentication phase that accesses the business
system using the token issued during the initial authentication procedure.
The initial authentication process is as follows.
The user requests log-in using the ID/PW, and the SSO Agent that receives the log-in request
message sends a log-in verification request to the SSO Server to check the authorized user status.
The SSO Server performs log-in verification using the user information stored in the DBMS. The
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 8
SSO Server requests token issue to the SSO Agent if the log-in verification result is valid.
The SSO Agent issues the authentication token accordingly.
The token-based authentication phase is performed only when the toke has been normally issued
in the initial authentication phase. When an End User uses business system services, the SSO
Agent verifies the validity of the token and decides the access accordingly.
- Authentication Token Issuer: SSO Agent
- Authentication token storage location: User PC
- Authentication token verification subject: SSO Agent
[Figure 1] end-user identification and authentication process
Authentication Phase Operation Procedure
Initial authentication
(1) Login request -> (2) Login verification -> (3) Token issue request
-> (4) Issue token
Token-based
authentication
(A) Token-based authentication request -> (B) Token verification
[Table 1] Authentication step operation procedure
The TOE is an ‘integrated authentication’ solution which allows an End User to access to various
business systems with a single log-in. SSO Agent is a combination of the ‘API type’ composed of
the library file and the ‘process type’ composed of the executable file.
The TOE is composed of the SSO Server that manages security and the SSO Agent that is installed
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 9
in a business system.
▣ SSO Server
Check the integrity when running a SSO Server. Perform identification and authentication when
the administrator attempts to log-in and perform the authentication failure correspondence
function accordingly. Limit the number of concurrent sessions to one to access to the security
management view via web browser.
Manage organization, service and configuration for the security function management.
The authorized administrator set an organization and authorization for service usage, and sets the
ID/PW policy applied to users in the organization.
Set a threshold to protect the audit data storage and notification on potential security violations.
Calculate the disk capacity where DBMS is installed, and create an event when exceeding the
threshold (warning notification, delete past records) or failing audit storage and generate an audit
log.
Encrypt a channel for mutual authentication and security communications between the SSO
Server and the SSO Agent and transfer the data between the SSO Server and the SSO Agent via
secure links.
The SSO Server identifies and authenticates the end-user with the user’s authentication
information (ID/password) when getting the request of identification and authentication attempts
from the end-user.
After successfully authenticating the end-user with the authentication information, request the
SSO Server to generate the session to generate the authentication token of the SSO Agent. Send
the needed information(such as Token ID, user ID, token generation time, expiration date, etc.) for
authentication token generation.
When the SSO Agent requests session generation, generate the session for the requested end-
user and check duplication log-in. TokenID is generated when generating the session.
▣ SSO Agent
The SSO Agent installed in the business system verifies the authentication token when
authenticating the user.
If there is no authentication token information during user’s initial log-in attempt, get the
information for authentication token generation (such as Token ID, user ID, token generation time,
expiration date, etc.) from the SSO Server and generate the authentication token. Send the
authentication token to the business system via the SSO Agent.
When calling the SSO Agent function from the business system, get the authentication
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 10
information of the user, the authentication token information or the authentication result
(success/failure).
The requirements for hardware, software and operating system to install the TOE are as in the
following.
• The requirements for hardware, software and operating system to install the TOE
1) SSO Server
Item Specification
Hardware
CPU
RAM
ᆞIntel(R) Xeon(R) 2.8GHz or higher
ᆞ8GB or higher
HDD ᆞSpace required for TOE installation is 1GB or higher
NIC ᆞ100/1000 Ethernet Port x 1EA or higher
Software
OS ᆞOracle Linux 8.7 (64bit) (Kernel 5.15.0)
DBMS ᆞMySQL 8.0.33
Etc.
ᆞApache Tomcat 8.5.88 (64bit)
ᆞOpenJDK 1.8.0_372 (64bit)
2) Managed PC
Item Specification
Software ᆞChrome 112.0
3) SSO Agent
Item Specification
Hardware
CPU ᆞIntel(R) Xeon(R) 2.8GHz or higher
RAM ᆞ8GB or higher
HDD ᆞSpace required for TOE installation is 1GB or higher
NIC ᆞ100/1000 Ethernet Port x 1EA or higher
Software
OS ᆞOracle Linux 8.7 (64bit) (Kernel 5.15.0)
Etc.
ᆞApache Tomcat 8.5.88(64bit)
ᆞOpenJDK 1.8.0_372 (64bit)
4) External Entity
Item Specification
Mail Server
Sends an e-mail about potential security violations to the
authorized administrator on the designated receiving side
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 11
from the SSO server.
[Figure 2] shows the operational environment where the TOE is operated.
[Figure 2] Operational environment of the TOE
The operational environment of the TOE is composed of the SSO server that is installed in the
management server and the SSO Agent that is installed in the business system.
The TOE is provided in software form.
The SSO Server is installed in the form of a process composed of executable files on the
management server to perform security management, and the SSO Agent is installed in the form
of a library module and process in each business system to perform functions such as issuance
and verification of authentication tokens.
The SSO Server performs the security management of the TOE via web browser which supports
HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Secure Socket Layer). A Wrapper is used for compatibility
with various business systems, out of the TOE scope.
▣ DBMS(MySQL)
MySQL, an open source relational database management system, is installed in the DBMS. When
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 12
SSO Server requests data inquiry/modification using arbitrary conditions, TSF data and audit data
stored in the DBMS are searched, sorted, ordered, and statistically processed.
▣ Web Server (Apache Tomcat)
It is used to provide web-based management functions through a web browser.
▣ Tomcat Encryption Function
The authorized administrator communicates using the SSO Server which is run on Apache Tomcat
that supports HTTPS protocol and browser.
- Confidentiality : AES 128 bit
- Integrity : SHA 256 bit
- Key exchange : RSA 2048 bit
1.4 TOE description
In this part, the physical scope of the TOE such as TOE components, hardware, software, firmware
and guidelines are described and security features provided by the TOE are explained in detail in
the logical scope of the TOE.
1.4.1 Physical scope
The physical scope of the TOE consists of the SSO Server, SSO Agent and manuals(Administrator
manual, API manual, Installation guidance). Verified Cryptographic Module(Key# Crypto V1.5) is
embedded in the TOE components.
Hardware, OS, DBMS, WAS, JDK and Wrapper are out of the physical TOE scope.
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 13
[Figure 3] Physical scope of the TOE
Type Detail
Distribution
Type
SSO Server
∙ TouchEn Wiseaccess 1.4 Server v1.4.4.3
: wiseaccess_server_v1.4.4.3_linux.tart.gz
CD-ROM
SSO Agent
∙ TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Agent v1.4.4.3
: wiseaccess_agent_v1.4.4.3_linux.tar.gz
Manual
∙ TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Administrator’s Manual v1.4.3
: TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Administrator’s Manual v1.4.3.pdf
∙ TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 API Manual v1.4.2
: TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 API Manual v1.4.2.pdf
∙ TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Installation Guide v1.4.3
: TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Installation Guide v1.4.3.pdf
1.4.2 Logical scpoe
The logical scope of the TOE is as in [Figure 4] below.
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 14
[Figure 4] Logical scope of the TOE
Includes logical scopes in each module.
▣ Security Audit
[SSO Server]
SSO Server manages the TSF data from browser and generates the audit data on security
management. Generate the audit data about management and security setting, information
change of the TSF data, identification and authentication, integrity test, start/termination of the
audit function and security violation.
The TOE corresponds to security violations and mutual authentication between the SSO Server
and SSO Agent. Generate the audit data about cryptographic key management, integrity test and
start/termination of the audit function accordingly.
The audit data includes log generation time, identity of the subject, result of the event (success or
failure), type of the event and additional audit data.
The audit data is stored in the DBMS. The audit data is provided in a manner suitable for the
authorized administrator. Protect the data from unauthorized users to delete.
Only the top-level administrator can search the audit data.
SSO Server shall periodically check audit data storage according to the setting and send a
warning email to the administrator when the audit data storage exceeds the threshold. Delete the
past records in the DBMS if the past records exceed the deletion threshold.
In addition, perform corresponding actions (send a warning email to the authorized administrator)
on security violations (self-test failure of the validated cryptographic module ‘Key# Crypto V1.5’,
exceed the audit storage, self-verification and integrity test failure of the SSO Server and the SSO
Agent, the audit storage failure, exceeding the number of authentication failures
(administrator/end-user)).
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 15
[SSO Agent]
SSO Agent generates the audit data about the mutual authentication between the SSO Agent and
the SSO Server, authentication token generation/operation/destruction using the cryptographic
key, cryptographic key management, integrity test and start/termination of the audit function.
The audit data includes log generation time, subject’s identity, event result (success or failure),
items about event type and additional audit data.
▣ Cryptographic support
[SSO Server]
SSO Server generates random numbers with the RBG for mutual authentication and verifies
signature with the digital signature algorithm. After completing mutual authentication, distribute
cryptographic key to the SSO Agent. Use Key# Crypto V1.5, a validated cryptographic module. Do
not save the encryption key but destory it.
[SSO Agent]
SSO Agent generates random bits with the RBG for mutual authentication with the SSO Server.
During mutual authentication, user the digital signature algorithm to perform signature
verification. After mutual authentication, use the symmetric algorithm and the MAC algorithm to
generate and manage the authentication token. Use the validated cryptographic module, Key#
Crypto V1.5, as a cryptographic algorithm. Do not save the encryption key but destory it.
▣ Identification and authentication
[SSO Server]
Identify the administrator with ID when attempting identification and authentication, and perform
administrator authentication before all the actions. Present the password with ‘•’ to prevent the
password from being exposed by providing the information of authentication failure reason.
SSO Server provides the function to prevent reuse of authentication information related to the
administrator.
Set administrator’s password according to the password rule. If identification and authentication
succeeds, the administrator maintains the security management authority.
If the number of authentication attempts via the SSO Server exceeds the allowed number of
authentication failures (5 times), lock the account for 10 minutes as the administrator sets.
Perform mutual authentication via implemented protocol for safe communication among TOE
components.
[SSO Agent]
SSO Agent identifies the end-user with ID when the end-user initially attempts to identify and
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 16
authenticate. Perform the end-user authentication before all the actions. Present the password as
‘•’ to prevent the password from being exposed by providing the information of authentication
failure.
After completing the initial identification and authentication of end user, issue an authentication
token depending on the implementation and performs identification and authentication with the
authentication token. Onetime Token prevents the authentication from being reused. Do not save
the authentication token but destroy it
If the end-user exceeds the allowed number of authentication failures (5 times), lock the end-
user’s account for the set time interval of user lock.
▣ Security management
[SSO Server]
Conduct security management via SSO Server.
Set security policy for single authentication with organization/service.
Forced to change the password when the authorized administrator accesses for the first time to
the security management interface.
There is only top-level administrator who can set and perform all the policy of security
management functions.
▣ Protection of the TSF
[SSO Server]
SSO Server shall protect the TSF data stored within containers controlled by the TSF and
transferred between the TOE components. Run TSF testing to check major security function
process. SSO Server shall run self-test for major processes and ensure the integrity of the TOE
configuration files and major process periodically during initial start-up and operation. If integrity
is compromised, send a warming email to the administrator.
SSO Server safely store and manage the authentication information of end user and administrator
in the DBMS.
[SSO Agent]
When transmitting data between separate parts of the TOE, protects the data from disclosure and
modification using the secure channel. Check integrity periodically.
SSO Agent shall protect the TSF data stored within containers controlled by the TSF and
transferred between the TOE components. Run TSF testing to check major security function
process. The TOE shall run self-test for major processes and ensure the integrity of the TOE
configuration files and major process periodically during initial start-up and operation. If integrity
is compromised, send a warming email to the administrator.
The authentication token is temporarily saved in the user’s PC memory and destructed
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 17
immediately right after the use.
▣ TOE Access
[SSO Server]
For the time interval of SSO Server inactivity, the administrator performs the automated
termination of sessions function. In order to reuse, reauthentication is required.
In addition, limit the maximum number of session connection for the administrator session of
security management to 1 to avoid duplication log-in. After the authorized administrator logs in,
another administrator PC performs a log-in with the same account, the previous connection will
be terminated.
Able to set the allowed IP addresses for administrator to 2. Output ‘Access Denied Error!’ when
accessing from an IP not in the allowed list.
[SSO Agent]
After the end-user’s identification and authentication, terminates the session when the idle time of
authentication token exceeds. Re-authenticate the user and perform identification and
authentication.
1.5 Operation
This security Target objectives uses English for some abbreviations and clear meaning. The
notation, form and preparation rules used follow the common evaluation criteria.
Iteration
Iteration is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. The result of iteration is
maked with an iteration number in parenthesis following the component identifier, i.e., denoted as
(iteration No.).
Assignment
This is used to assign specific values to unspecified parameters (e.g., password length). The result
of assignment is indicated in square brackets like [ assignment_value ].
Selection
This is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a requirement. The result
of selection is shown as underlined and italicized.
Refinement
This is used to add details and thus further restrict a requirement. The result of refinement is
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 18
shown in bold text.
1.6 Terms and definitions
Terms used in this PP, which are the same as in the CC, must follow those in the CC.
Term Description
API (Application
Programming Interface)
A set of software libraries that exist between the application layer
and the platform system layer and facilitate the development of
applications that run on the platform.
Approved
cryptographic algorithm
A cryptographic algorithm selected by Korean Cryptographic Module
Validation Authority for block cipher, hash function, message
authentication code, random bit generation, key agreement, public
key cipher, digital signatures cryptographic algorithms considering
safety, reliability and interoperability.
Approved mode of
operation
The mode of cryptographic module using approved cryptographic
algorithm.
Assets Entities that the owner of the TOE presumably places value upon.
Assignment
The specification of an identified parameter in a component (of the
CC) or requirement
Attack potential
Measure of the effort to be expended in attacking a TOE expressed
as an attacker’s expertise, resources and motivation.
Augmentation Addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Authentication Data Information used to verify a user’s claimed identity.
Authentication token
Authentication data that authorized end-users use to access the
business system.
Authorized
Administrator
Authorized user to securely operate and manage the TOE.
Authorized User
The TOE user who may, in accordance with the SFRs, perform an
operation.
Business System
An application server that authorized end-user access through
‘integrated authentication’.
Can/could
The ‘can’ or ‘could’ presented in Application notes indicates optional
requirements applied to the TOE by ST author’s choice.
Class Set of CC families that share a common focus
Client Application program that can access the services of SSO server or
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 19
SSO agent through network.
Component
Smallest selectable set of elements on which requirements may be
based.
Critical Security
Parameters (CSP)
Information related to security that can erode the security of the
encryption module if exposed or changed (e.g., verification data
such as secret key/private key, password, or Personal Identification
Number)
DBMS (Database
Management System)
A software system composed to configure and apply the database.
Decryption
The act that restoring the ciphertext into the plaintext using the
decryption key.
Dependency
Relationship between components such that if a requirement based
on the depending component is included in PP, ST or package, a
requirement based on the component that is depended upon must
normally also be included in the PP, ST or package.
Element Indivisible statement of a security need.
Encryption
The act that converting the plaintext into the ciphertext using the
encryption key.
Encryption key Values to encrypt and decrypt an authentication token.
End User
Users of the TOE who want to use the business system, not the
administrators of the TOE.
Evaluation Assurance
Level (EAL)
Set of assurance requirements drawn from CC part 3, representing a
point on the CC predefined assurance scale, that form an assurance
package.
External Entity
Human or IT entity possibly interacting with the TOE from outside of
the TOE boundary.
Family
Set of components that share a similar goal but differ in emphasis or
rigor.
Identity
Representation uniquely identifying authorized users. It can be user’s
real name, nickname or false name.
Iteration
Use of the same component to express two or more distinct
requirements.
Kerberos
A centralized authentication scheme, described in RFC 1510, that
provides user authentication using symmetric cryptographic
technique in a distributed computing environment.
Korea Cryptographic
Module Validation
Program (KCMVP)
A system to validate the security and implementation conformance
of cryptographic modules used for protection of important but not
classified information among the data communicated through the
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 20
information and communication network of the government and
public institutions.
Management access
The access to the TOE by using the HTTPS, SSH, TLS, etc. to manage
the TOE by administrator, remotely.
Object
Passive entity in the TOE containing or receiving information and on
which subjects perform operations
Operation(on a
component of the CC)
Modification or repetition of a component. Allowed operations on
components are assignment, iteration, refinement and selection.
Operation(on a subject) Specific type of action performed by a subject on an object
Private Key
A cryptographic key which is used in an asymmetric cryptographic
algorithm and is uniquely associated with an entity, not to be
disclosed.
Protection Profile (PP)
Implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE
type
Public Key
A cryptographic key which is used in an asymmetric cryptographic
algorithm and is associated with an unique entity (the subject using
the public key), it can be disclosed.
Public Key(asymmetric)
cryptographic algorithm
A cryptographic algorithm that uses a pair of public and private key.
Public Security
Parameters (PSP)
Security related public information whose modification can
compromise the security of a cryptographic module.
RADIUS (Remote
Authentication Dial-In
User Services)
Service to identify and authenticate users by sending information
such as user ID, password and IP address to the authentication
server when a remote user requests a connection.
Random bit generator
(RBG)
A device or algorithm that outputs a binary sequence that is
statistically independent and is not biased. The RBG used for
cryptographic application generally generated 0 and 1 bit string, and
the sequence can be combined into a random bit block.
The RBG is classified into the deterministic and non-deterministic
type. The deterministic type RBG is composed of an algorithm that
generates bit strings from the initial value called a “seed key,” and
the non-deterministic type RBG produces output that depends on
the unpredictable physical source.
Random key Random values to be generated by RBG.
Recommend/be
recommended
The ‘recommend’ or ‘be recommended’ presented in Applicate notes
is not mandatorily recommended, but required to be applied for
secure operations of the TOE.
Refinement Addition of details to a component.
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 21
Role
Predefined set of rules on permissible interactions between a user
and the TOE.
Secret Key
The cryptographic key which is used in symmetric cryptographic
algorithm and is associated with on or more entity, it is not allowd
to release.
Security Policy
Document
Document uploaded to the list of validated cryptographic module
with the module’s name and specifying the summary for the
cryptographic algorithms and operational environments of the TOE.
Security Target (ST)
Implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE
Selection Specification of one or more items from a list in a component.
Self-test
Pre-operational or conditional test executed by the cryptographic
module.
Sensitive Security
Parameters (SSP)
Critical security parameters (CSP) and public security parameters
(PSP).
Shall/must
The ‘shall’ or ‘must’ presented in Application notes indicates
mandatory requirements applied to the TOE.
SSL (Secure Sockets
Layer)
This is a security protocol proposed by Netscape to ensure
confidentiality, integrity and security over a computer network.
Subject Active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Symmetric
cryptographic
technique
Encryption scheme that uses the same secrete key in mode of
encryption and decryption, also known as secrete key cryptographic
technique.
TACACS (Terminal
Access Controller
Access Control System)
Authentication protocol that is common for UNIX networks,
described in RFC 1492, used by remote access server to send user
login passwords to an authentication server.
Target of Evaluation
(TOE)
Set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by
guidance.
Threat Agent
Entity that can adversely conduct actions such as unauthorized
access, modification and deletion on assets
TLS (Transport Layer
Security)
This is a cryptographic protocol between a SSL-based server and a
client and is described in RFC 2246.
TOE Security
Functionality (TSF)
Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
SFRs.
TSF Data
Data for the operation of the TOE upon which the enforcement of
the SFR relies.
User Refer to “External entity”, authorized administrator and authorized
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 22
end-user in the TOE.
Validated Cryptographic
Module
A cryptographic module that is validated and given a validation
number by validation authority.
Wrapper
Interfaces for interconnection between the TOE and various types of
business systems or authentication systems.
1.7 Structure of Security Target
Chapter 1 introduces the Security Target and provides ST reference, TOE reference, TOE overview,
TOE description, and writing rules.
Chapter 2 declares conformity to the Common Criteria, Protection Profile, and Package as a
conformance declaration, and describes the rationale for the conformance declaration.
Chapter 3 describes the security objectives for the TOE operating environment.
Chapter 4 defines new components that are not included in Part 2 or Part 3 of the CC among the
components described in this Security Target as extension component definition.
Chapter 5 describes security functional requirements and assurance requirements to satisfy
security objectives as security requirements.
Chapter 6 describes how the TOE satisfies all security functional requirements.
2. Conformance claims
2.1 CC conformance claim
This security target claims conformance the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5.
CC
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. Part 1: Introduction and
General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-001, April, 2017)
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. Part 2: Security Functional
Components, Version 3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-002, April, 2017)
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. Part 3: Security Assurance
Components, Version 3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-003, April, 2017)
Conformance claim
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation part 2 expansion : FCS_RBG.1,
FIA_IMA.1, FIA_SOS.3, FMT_PWD.1, FPT_PST.1, FTA_SSL.5
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation part 3 : Conformant
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 23
2.2 PP conformance claim
This security target claim conformance the following protection profile.
• Korean national protection profile for Single Sign On V1.1 (2019.12.11)
2.3 Package conformance claim
This ST claims conformance to assurance package EAL1 augmented with ATE_FUN.1.
2.4 Conformance claim rationale
Since the security target specification equally accepts the TOE type, security objectives and
security requirements of the protection profile, the conformance declaration of the 'Korean
national protection profile for Single Sign On V1.1' is 'strict protection profile conformance'.
2.4.1 Rationale
Since the protection profile that this Security Target conforms to requires strict compliance, the
rationale for the conformance declaration is not required.
2.5 Conformance Statement
The security target specification requires strict compliance of the conforming protection profile, so
all security objectives for the TOE must be included, but it was confirmed that there are security
objectives that can be excluded for the following reasons.
In the case of
OE. Authentication System Security defined for the security purpose of the protection profile
operating environment, if the TOE uses an external authentication system (RADIUS, TACACS,
Kerberos, and other authentication servers within the organization) in the first authentication step,
the external authentication system is safely authorized. This is a security objective to support the
function of storing and managing authentication information of a general user.
However, since the TOE implements the user's initial authentication function directly in the TOE, it
is correct that the security objective OE.Authentication System Security is not derived because it is
not related to the TOE.
In addition, it was confirmed that OE.TIME_STAMP, OE.DBMS, and OE.MANAGEMENT_ACCESS were
included as security objectives for the operating environment, as it is allowed to include security
objectives for the operating environment additional to the TOE in strict compliance.
The additional security objectives of OE.TIME_STAMP and OE.DBMS were confirmed to be
appropriate as security objectives for the operating environment.
Korean national protection profile Security Target
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 24
for Single Sign On
OE.PHYSICAL_CONTROL OE.PHYSICAL_CONTROL
OE.TRUST_ADMIN OE.TRUST_ADMIN
OE.LOG_BACKUP OE.LOG_BACKUP
OE.OPERATION_SYSTEM_REINFORCEMENT OE.OPERATION_SYSTEM_REINFORCEMENT
OE.SECURE_DEVELOPEMENT OE.SECURE_DEVELOPEMENT
OE.Authentication System Security -
- OE.TIME_STAMP
- OE.DBMS
- OE.MANAGEMENT_ACCESS
* OE.TIME_STAMP : The TOE is used to receive a reliable timestamp (FPT_STM.1) so that it can
accurately record security-related events included in audit records, so the added security
objectives for the operating environment are reasonable.
* OE.DBMS: As the TOE uses a secure DBMS to protect audit records from unauthorized deletion,
the added security objective for the operating environment is reasonable.
* OE.MANAGEMENT_ACCESS : Since the user's safe communication path is provided through
communication between the web browser of the user's PC and the web server, which is the
operating environment of the management server (SSO server), the security objective for the
added operating environment is reasonable.
3. Security objectives for the operational environment
3.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
OE. PHYSICAL_CONTROL
The place where the TOE is installed shall be equipped with access control and protection facilities
so that only authorized administrator can access.
OE. TRUST_ADMIN
The authorized administrator of the TOE shall be non-malicious, have appropriately trained for the
TOE management functions and accurately fulfill the duties in accordance with administrator
guidance.
OE.LOG_BACKUP
The authorized administrator shall periodically check a spare space of audit data storage in case
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 25
of the audit data loss, and carries out the audit data backup (external log server or separate
storage device, etc.) to prevent audit data loss.
OE. OPERATION_SYSTEM_REINFORCEMENT
The authorized administrator of the TOE shall ensure the reliability and security of the operating
system by performing the reinforcement on the latest vulnerabilities of the operating system in
which the TOE is installed and operated.
OE. SECURE_DEVELOPEMENT
The developer who uses the TOE to interoperate with the user identification and authentication
function in the operational environment of the business system shall ensure that the security
functions of the TOE are securely applied in accordance with the requirements of the manual
provided with the TOE.
OE. TIME_STAMP
TOE shall accurately record security related events with reliable time stamps provided by the TOE
operation environment.
OE.DBMS
The DBMS that saves the TSF data and the audit data shall be physically, safely operated.
OE. MANAGEMENT_ACCESS
All the information sent to the SSO Server which is a component of the TOE shall be safely
protected.
4. Extended components definition
4.1 Cryptographic support
4.1.1 Random Bit Generation
Family Behaviour
This family defines requirements for the TSF to provide the capability that generates random bits
required for TOE cryptographic operation.
Component leveling
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 26
FCS_RBG.1 random bit generation, requires TSF to provide the capability that generates random
bits required for TOE cryptographic operation.
Management: FCS_RBG.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RBG.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
4.1.1.1. FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FCS_RBG.1.1The TSF shall generate random bits required to generate an cryptographic key using
the specified random bit generator that meets the following [assignment: list of standards].
4.2 Identification and authentication
4.2.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication
Family Behaviour
This family defines requirements for providing mutual authentication between TOE components in
the process of user identification and authentication.
Component leveling
FIA_IMA.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication requires that the TSF provides mutual authentication
function between TOE components in the process of user identification and authentication.
Management: FIA_IMA.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FIA_IMA.1
The following actions are recommended to record if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 27
included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimum: Success and failure of mutual authentication
4.2.1.1. FIA_IMA.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_IMA.1.1The TSF shall perform mutual authentication between [assignment: different parts of
TOE] using the [assignment: authentication protocol] that meets the following [assignment: list of
standards].
4.2.2 Specification of Secrets
Family Behaviour
This family defines requirements for mechanisms that enforce defined quality metrics on provided
secrets and generate secrets to satisfy the defined metric.
Component leveling
The specification of secrets family in CC Part 2 is composed of 2 components. It is now composed
of three components, since this PP adds one more component as below.
※ The description on two components included in CC Part 2 is omitted.
FIA_SOS.3 Destruction of secrets requires, that the secret information be destroyed according to
the specified destruction method, which can be based on the assigned standard.
Management: FIA_SOS.3
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FIA_SOS.3
The following actions are recommended to record if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimum : Success and failure of the activity
4.2.2.1. FIA_SOS.3 Destruction of Secrets
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 28
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_SOS.2 TSF Generation of secrets
FIA_SOS.3.1The TSF shall destroy secrets in accordance with a specified secrets destruction
method [assignment: secret destruction method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
4.2.2.1. FIA_SOS.3 Destruction of Secrets
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_SOS.2 TSF Generation of secrets
FIA_SOS.3.1The TSF shall destroy secrets in accordance with a specified secrets destruction
method [assignment: secret destruction method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
4.3 Security Management
4.3.1 ID and password
Family Behaviour
This family defines the capability that is required to control ID and password management used in
the TOE, and set or modify ID and/or password by authorized users.
Component leveling
FMT_PWD.1 ID and password management, requires that the TSF provides the management
function of ID and password.
Management: FMT_PWD.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Management of ID and password configuration rules.
Audit: FMT_PWD.1
The following actions are recommended to record if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimum: All changes of the password
4.3.1.1 FMT_PWD.1 Management of ID and password
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 29
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_PWD.1.1The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the password of [assignment: list of
functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
1. [assignment: password combination rules and/or length]
2. [assignment: other management such as management of special characters unusable for
password, etc.]
FMT_PWD.1.2The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the ID of [assignment: list of functions] to
[assignment: the authorized identified roles].
1. [assignment: ID combination rules and/or length]
2. [assignment: other management such as management of special characters unusable for
ID, etc.]
FMT_PWD.1.3 The TSF shall provide the capability for [selection, choose one of: setting ID and
password when installing, setting password when installing, changing the ID and password when
the authorized administrator accesses for the first time, changing the password when the
authorized administrator accesses for the first time].
4.4 Protection of the TSF
4.4.1 Protection of stored TSF data
Family Behaviour
This family defines rules to protect TSF data stored within containers controlled by the TSF from
the unauthorized modification or disclosure.
Component leveling
FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data, requires the protection of TSF data stored in
containers controlled by the TSF.
Management: FPT_PST.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_PST.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 30
4.4.1.1. FPT_PST.1 basic protection of stored TSF data
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_PST.1.1The TSF shall protect [assignment: TSF data] stored in containers controlled by the TSF
from the unauthorized [selection: disclosure, modification].
4.5 TOE Access
4.5.1 Session locking and termination
Family Behaviour
This family defines requirements for the TSF to provide the capability for TSF-initiated and user-
initiated locking, unlocking, and termination of interactive sessions.
Component leveling
In CC Part 2, the session locking and termination family consists of four components. In this PP, it
consists of five components by extending one additional component as follows.
※ The relevant description for four components contained in CC Part 2 is omitted.
FTA_SSL.5 The management of TSF-initiated sessions, provides requirements that the TSF locks or
terminates the session after a specified time interval of user inactivity.
Management: FTA_SSL.5
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Specification for the time interval of user inactivity that is occurred the session locking
and termination for each user
b) Specification for the time interval of default user inactivity that is occurred the session
locking and termination
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 31
Audit: FTA_SSL.5
The following actions are recommended to record if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimum: Locking or termination of interactive session
4.5.1.1. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_UAU.1 authentication or No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.5.1The TSF shall [selection:
• lock the session and re-authenticate the user before unlocking the session,
• terminate] an interactive session after a [assignment: time interval of user inactivity].
5. Security requirements
The security requirements specify security functional requirements and assurance requirements
that must be satisfied by the TOE.
The security functional requirements included in this PP are derived from CC Part 2 and Chapter 4
Extended Components Definition.
5.1 Security functional requirements
The following table summarizes the security functional requirements used in the ST.
Security
functional
class
Security functional component
FAU
FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FUA_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
FCS
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic key generation(1)
FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic key generation(2)
FCS_CKM.1(3) Cryptographic key generation(3)
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 32
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation(1)
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation(2)
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic operation(3)
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic operation(4)
FCS_COP.1(5) Cryptographic operation(5)
FIA
FIA_AFL.1(1) Authentication failure handling(1)
FIA_AFL.1(2) Authentication failure handling(2)
FIA_IMA.1(Extended) TOE Internal mutual authentication
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_SOS.2 TSF Generation of secrets
FIA_SOS.3(Extended) Destruction of secrets
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FMT
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_PWD.1(Extended) Management of ID and password
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FPT
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_PST.1(Extended) Basic protection of stored TSF data
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FTA
FTA_MCS.2
Per user attribute Limitation on multiple
concurrent sessions
FTA_SSL.5(Extended) Management of TSF-initiated sessions
FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
5.1.1 Security audit (FAU)
FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
FAU_ARP.1.1The TSF shall take [the following list of actions] upon detection of a potential security
violation.
Potential security violation list Action list
Key# Crypto V1.5 self-test fail Send e-mail to authorized
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 33
DBMS disk capacity exceeded administrator
Audit save fails
SSO Server/SSO Agent not-operating
End-user authorization fail exceeds allowed number (5 times)
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) [ Refer to the “auditable events” in [Table 2] Audit events, [none] ].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the ST, [ Refer to the contents of “additional audit record” in [Table 2]
Audit events, [none] ].
Security
functional
component
Auditable event
Additional audit
record
FAU_ARP.1
Responses taken as a result of a potential security
violation
FAU_SAA.1
Initiation and deactivation of the analysis mechanism,
Automatic response by tool
-
FAU_STG.3 Response in case of DBMS disk capacity exceeded
FAU_STG.4 Responding Actions in Case of Audit Save Fail
FCS_CKM.1 action successes and failures
FCS_CKM.2
action successes and failures
(applies only to key distribution related to TSF data
encryption/decryption)
FCS_CKM.4
action successes and failures
(Applicable only to key destruction related to TSF data
encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1
Success and failure of cryptographic operation, type of
cryptographic operation (applies only to matters related
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 34
to issuance, storage, verification, and destruction of
authentication tokens)
FIA_AFL.1
The reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful
authentication attempts and the actions taken, and the
subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal
state
FIA_SOS.2 Rejection by the TSF of any tested secret
FIA_SOS.3
(Extended)
Success and failure of the activity(applicable to the
destruction of SSO token only)
FIA_UAU.1 All use of the authentication mechanism
FIA_UAU.4 Attempts to reuse authentication data
FIA_UID.1
All use of the administrator identification mechanism,
including the administrator identity provided
-
FMT_MOF.1
All modifications in the behaviour of the functions in
the TSF
-
FMT_MTD.1 All modifications to the values of TSF data
Modified values of
TSF data
FMT_PWD.1
(Extended)
All changes of the password
FMT_SMF.1 Use of the management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Modifications to the user group of rules divided
FPT_TST.1
Execution of the TSF self tests and the results of the
tests
Modified TSF data
or execution code
in case of
integrity violation
FTA_MSC.2
Denial of a new session based on the limitation of
multiple concurrent sessions
FTA_SSL.5
(Extended)
Locking or termination of interactive session -
FTA_TSE.1
Denial of a session establishment due to the session
establishment mechanism
All attempts at establishment of a user session
-
[Table 2] Audit events
FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAA.1.1 The TSF shall be able to apply a set of rules in monitoring the audited events and
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 35
based upon these rules indicate a potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs.
FAU_SAA.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules for monitoring audited events.
a) Accumulation or combination of [
Self-test failure of the validated cryptographic module (Key# Crypto V1.5)
Audit storage is full
Integrity test failure of the SSO Server
Integrity test failure of the SSO Agent
Audit storage failure
Exceed the allowed number of administrator/end-user authentication failures (5 times)
] known to indicate a potential security violation;
b) [ none ].
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [authorized administrator] with the capability to read [all the
audit data] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the authorized
administrator to interpret the information.
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3.1 The TSF shall provide the ability to apply [the following method of search] of audit
data based on [the following criteria with logical relations].
Criteria with logical relations Method of search
User use
history
Time, type, search condition
AND operation
User ID, name, organization name, time,
engine info, user IP, target ID, command,
result value, additional info, details : ordering
in the descending order based on the time
of audit data generation
Administrator
use history
User ID, name, organization name, time, user
IP, target ID, command, result value, details :
ordering in the descending order based on
the time of audit data generation
System user
history
Time and type AND operation
Time, IP, product info, command, result value,
additional info, details : : ordering in the
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 36
descending order based on the time of audit
data generation
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.3.1 The TSF shall [ Notification to the authorized administrator, [none] ] if the audit trail
exceeds [ the threshold set by the authorized administrator(80%) ].
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall overwrite the oldest stored audit records and [none] if the audit trail is
full.
Application notes : When exceeding past record deletion threshold (90%), loss damage is carried
out.
5.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic key generation(1)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [ HASH_DRBG(SHA 256) ] and specified cryptographic key
sizes [ 128 Bit ] that meet the following: [ TTAK.KO-12.0331-Part2 (2018) ].
Application notes : It is implemented through Key# Crypto V1.5, a verified cryptographic module.
FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic key generation(2)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [ RSAES ] and specified cryptographic key sizes [ 2048 Bit ]
that meet the following: [ ISO/IEC 18033-2(2006) ].
Application notes : It is implemented through Key# Crypto V1.5, a verified cryptographic module.
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 37
FCS_CKM.1(3) Cryptographic key generation(3)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [ Password-based key derivation(PBKDF2) ] and specified
cryptographic key sizes [ 256 Bit ] that meet the following: [ ISO/IEC 18033-2(2006) TTAK.KO-
12.0334-Part1/2 (2018) ].
Application notes : It is implemented through Key# Crypto V1.5, a verified cryptographic module.
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key distribution method [ RSAES 2048 ] that meets the following: [ ISO/IEC 18033-
2(2006) ].
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to No other components.
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [ Overwrite 3 times with 0 ] that meets the following:
[ none ].
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation(Digital Signature)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [ Digital Signature and verification ] in accordance with a
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 38
specified cryptographic algorithm [ RSA-PSS 2048 ] and cryptographic key sizes [ 2048 Bit ] that
meet the following: [ ISO/IEC 14888-2(2008) ].
Application notes : It is implemented through Key# Crypto V1.5, a verified cryptographic module.
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation(Public key)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [ public key cryptographic operation ] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [ RSAES ] and cryptographic key sizes [ 2048 Bit ] that meet the
following: [ ISO/IEC 18033-2(2006) ].
Application notes : It is implemented through Key# Crypto V1.5, a verified cryptographic module.
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic operation(MAC)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [ Generate message authentication code, Verification of
authentication token ] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [ HMAC-SHA256 ]
and cryptographic key sizes [ 256 Bit ] that meet the following: [ TTAK.KO-12.0330 ].
Application notes : It is implemented through Key# Crypto V1.5, a verified cryptographic module.
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic operation(Symmetric key)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [ Symmetric key encryption ] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [ SEED ] and cryptographic key sizes [ 128 Bit ] that meet the following:
[ KO-12.0004/R1(2005) ].
Application notes : It is implemented through Key# Crypto V1.5, a verified cryptographic module.
FCS_COP.1(5) Cryptographic operation(HASH)
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 39
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [ the following list of cryptographic operations ] in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [ cryptographic algorithm ] and cryptographic key sizes
[ none ] that meet the following: [ ISO/IEC 10118-3:2001(2018) ].
cryptographic algorithm list of cryptographic operations
SHA 256 User password / integrity verification
SHA 512 Admin password
Application notes : It is implemented through Key# Crypto V1.5, a verified cryptographic module.
FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation(Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FCS_RBG.1.1 The TSF shall generate random bits required to generate an cryptographic key using
the specified random bit generator that meets the following [ the following list of standards ].
list of standards Random bit generation algorithm
[TTAK.KO-12.0331-Part2 (2018)] HASH_DRBG(SHA 256)
Application notes : It is implemented through Key# Crypto V1.5, a verified cryptographic module.
5.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)
FIA_AFL.1(1) Authentication failure handing(Admin)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [ 5 ] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to
[ authentication of administrator ].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
surpassed the TSF shall [ lock account for disabled time set by administrator (10 minutes) ].
FIA_AFL.1(2) Authentication failure handling(User)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [ 5 ] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to
[ authentication of user ].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
surpassed the TSF shall [ lock account for disabled time set by administrator (10 minutes) ].
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 40
FIA_IMA.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication(Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_IMA.1.1 The TSF shall perform mutual authentication between [ TOE components ] using the
[ own protocol ] that meets the following [ none ].
Application notes : Perform mutual authentication between SSO Server and SSO Agent.
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [ the following
permission criteria ].
Acceptable characters
52 English letters (case sensitive)
10 numbers (0~9)
~!@#$%^&*()_+`-={}|[]\:";'<>?,./
Password combination rules
Must include at least one English letter, number and special
character each
[Administrator password]
- 9 – 63 characters
[User password]
- 9 – 63 characters
- 3-4 upper/lower case letters, numbers and special
characters
- ID check
- DOB check
- Not case sensitive
- Same characters cannot be used 3-5 times
- Sequential characters cannot be used 3-5 times
Application notes : Combination rules are conducted according to the settings of the authorized
admin.
FIA_SOS.2 TSF Generation of secrets
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_SOS.2.1 TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate an authentication token that meet [the
following a defined acceptable standard].
Prescribed allowance Contents
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 41
standards
Authentication token
configuration method
Keys shared between servers, user ID, user ID, token generation
time, valid time, idle time, session Slot and Token ID
- valid time: valid time for accessing to the business system.
Update after verification.
- idle time: valid for the set time (8 hours) since the initial log-
in and authentication token generation.
- session slot: session index generated during log-in.
Composition field length 256 byte
Symmetric encryption
algorithm
SEED 128
FIA_SOS.2.2 TSF shall be able to enforce the use of TSF-generated authentication token for [ user
login ].
FIA_SOS.3 Destruction of secrets (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_SOS.2 TSF Generation of secrets
FIA_SOS.3.1 The TSF shall destroy authentication tokens in accordance with a specified
authentication token destruction method [ Overwrite 3 times with 0 ] that meets the following:
[ none ].
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Dependencies FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to [ identified
authentication mechanism(s) ].
Type identified authentication mechanism(s)
Administrator/User password
authentication
SessionID encryption with random bits
Authentication token Use Onetime Token
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 42
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [•, Authentication failure message] to the user while the
authentication is in progress.
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Hierarchical to FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
5.1.4 Security management (FMT)
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to conduct management actions of the functions
[ list of functions in [Table 3] ] to [ the authorized administrator ].
List of functions
Conduct management actions The
authorized
role
determine Enable modify disable
WPM
service structure O O O O
the
authorized
administrator
Service O O O O
Permission O O O O
Password policy X O O O
User login policy X O O O
Admin ip X X O X
[Table 3] List of functions
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the [ the following list of TSF data ] to
[ the authorized administrator ].
The authorized
role
manage
Change_default query modify delete [create]
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 43
list of TSF data
the authorized
administrator
Organizaton X O O O O
User X O O O O
Password
combination rules
O O O X X
ID creation rules O O O X X
User profile X O O O O
Permission X O O O O
Allowed IP X O O O O
Password O X O X X
user password X X O X X
[Table 4] list of TSF data
FMT_PWD.1 Management of ID and password (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_PWD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the password of [ list of functions ] to
[ the authorized administrator ].
1. [password combination rules and/or length]
List of function password combination rules and/or length]
Password combination rules
(admin)
[Administrator password]
- 9 – 63 characters
characters
- Combination of 3 or more English letters, numbers, or
special characters(~!@#$%^&*()_+`-={}|[]\:";'<>?,./)
Password combination rules
(user)
[User password]
- 9 – 63 characters
characters
- Combination of 3 or more English letters, numbers, or
special characters(~!@#$%^&*()_+`-={}|[]\:";'<>?,./)
- ID check
- DOB check
- Not case sensitive
- Same characters cannot be used 3-5 times
- Sequential characters cannot be used 3-5 times
2. [none]
FMT_PWD.1.2 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the ID of [ID combination rules] to [ the
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 44
authorized administrator ].
1. [ user ID : 1~31 characters, IE Type(letters / numbers / letters and numbers / letters,
numbers and special characters), First character(letters / numbers / none) ]
2. [none]
FMT_PWD.1.3The TSF shall provide the capability for [changing the password when the authorized
administrator accesses for the first time].
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to No other components
Dependencies No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
[
a) TSF function management: items specified in FMT_MOF.1
b) TSF security attributes management: items specified in FMT_MSA.1
c) TSF data management: items specified in FMT_MTD.1
]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [the authorized administrator/delegated
administrator].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users and their roles defined in FMT_SMR.1.1.
5.1.5 Protection of the TSF
FPT_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF data transfer protection
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from disclosure, modification when it is transmitted
between separate parts of the TOE.
FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_PST.1.1 The TSF should protect the [ TSF data ] stored in the repository, which is controlled by
the TSF, from unauthorized exposure and modification.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 45
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up, periodically during normal
operation to demonstrate the correct operation of TSF.
FTP_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF data.
FTP_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF.
5.1.6 TOE access
FTA_MCS.2 Per user attribute limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
Hierarchical to FTA_MCS.1 Basic limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
Dependencies FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FTA_MCS.2.1 The TSF shall restrict the maximum number of concurrent sessions that belong to the
same user according to the rules [ restriction to one for the maximum number of concurrent
sessions for administrator management access session ]
FTA_MCS.2.2 The TSF shall enforce, by default, a limit of [ 1 ] sessions per user.
FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_UAU.1 Authentication or No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.5.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [time interval of administrator
inactivity(10 minute), Authenticated token idle time].
FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies
FTA_TSE.1.1 The TSF shall be able to deny administrator’s management access session
establishment based on [ connection IP, whether or not to activate the management access
session of the same account ].
5.2 Security assurance requirement
This section defines the assurance requirements for the TOE. Assurance requirements are
comprised of assurance components in CC part 3, and the evaluation assurance level is
EAL1+(ATE_FUN.1). The following table summarizes assurance components.
Security assurance class Security assurance component
Security Target ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 46
evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_OBJ.1
Security objectives for the
operational environment
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Tests
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.1
Independent testing -
conformance
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
5.2.1 Security Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action
elements
ASE_INT.1.1D The developer shall provide an ST introduction.
Content and presentation
elements
ASE_INT.1.1C The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference, a TOE reference, a TOE
overview and a TOE description.
ASE_INT.1.2C The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST
ASE_INT.1.3C The TOE reference shall uniquely identify the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.4C The TOE overview shall summarise the usage and major security features of the
TOE.
ASE_INT.1.5C The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type.
ASE_INT.1.6C The TOE overview shall identify any non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
required by the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.7C The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.8C The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the TOE.
Evaluator action
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 47
elements
ASE_INT.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_INT.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference, the TOE overview, and the
TOE description are consistent with each other.
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Dependencies ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
Developer action
elements
ASE_CCL.1.1D The developer shall provide a conformance claim.
ASE_CCL.1.2D The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale.
Content and
presentation
elements
ASE_CCL.1.1C The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that identifies the
version of the CC to which the ST and the TOE claim conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.2C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part
2 as either CC Part 2 conformant or CC Part 2 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.3C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part
3 as either CC Part 3 conformant or CC Part 3 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.4C The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended components
definition.
ASE_CCL.1.5C The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security requirement packages
to which the ST claims conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.6C The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of the ST to a package
as either package-conformant or package-augmented.
ASE_CCL.1.7C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the TOE type is
consistent with the TOE type in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.8C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of the
security problem definition is consistent with the statement of the security
problem definition in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.9C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
security objectives is consistent with the statement of security objectives in the
PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.10C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 48
security requirements is consistent with the statement of security requirements
in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
Evaluator action
elements
ASE_CCL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action
elements
ASE_OBJ.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives.
Content and
presentation
elements
ASE_OBJ.1.1C The statement of security objectives shall describe the security objectives for the
operational environment. Evaluator action elements
ASE_OBJ.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action
elements
ASE_ECD.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2D The developer shall provide an extended components definition.
Content and
presentation
elements
ASE_ECD.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended security
requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2C The extended components definition shall define an extended component for
each extended security requirement.
ASE_ECD.1.3C The extended components definition shall describe how each extended
component is related to the existing CC components, families, and classes.
ASE_ECD.1.4C The extended components definition shall use the existing CC components,
families, classes, and methodology as a model for presentation.
ASE_ECD.1.5C The extended components shall consist of measurable and objective elements
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 49
such that conformance or nonconformance to these elements can be
demonstrated.
Evaluator action
elements
ASE_ECD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_ECD.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can be clearly
expressed using existing components.
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
Dependencies ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
Developer action
elements
ASE_REQ.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_REQ.1.2D The developer shall provide a security requirements rationale.
Content and
presentation
elements
ASE_REQ.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the SARs.
ASE_REQ.1.2C All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external entities and other
terms that are used in the SFRs and the SARs shall be defined.
ASE_REQ.1.3C The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the
security requirements.
ASE_REQ.1.4C All operations shall be performed correctly.
ASE_REQ.1.5C Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied, or the
security requirements rationale shall justify the dependency not being satisfied.
ASE_REQ.1.6C The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent.
Evaluator action
elements
ASE_REQ.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Dependencies ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Developer action
elements
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 50
ASE_TSS.1.1D The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification
Content and
presentation
elements
ASE_TSS.1.1C The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each SFR.
Evaluator action
elements
ASE_TSS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is consistent with
the TOE overview and the TOE description.
5.2.2 Development
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action
elements
ADV_FSP.1.1D The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2D The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the
SFRs.
Content and
presentation
elements
ADV_FSP.1.1C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for
each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2C The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each
SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.3C The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization
of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_FSP.1.4C The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional
specification.
Evaluator action
elements
ADV_FSP.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.1.2E The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and
complete instantiation of the SFRs.
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 51
5.2.3 Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Dependencies ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Developer action
elements
AGD_OPE.1.1D The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
Content and
presentation
elements
AGD_OPE.1.1C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-
accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure
processing environment, including appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the
available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available
functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of
the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type
of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to
be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under
the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of
the TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their
consequences and implications for maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security
measures to be followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the
operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
Evaluator action
elements
AGD_OPE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action
elements
AGD_PRE.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 52
Content and
presentation
elements
AGD_PRE1.1C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery
procedures.
AGD_PRE1.2C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational
environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational
environment as described in the ST.
Evaluator action
elements
AGD_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can
be prepared securely for operation.
5.2.4 Life-cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
Dependencies ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Developer action
elements
ALC_CMC.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
Content and
presentation
elements
ALC_CMC.1.1C The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
Evaluator action
elements
ALC_CMC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meet requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action
elements
ALC_CMS.1.1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
Content and
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 53
presentation
elements
ALC_CMS.1.1C The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the
evaluation evidence required by the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
Evaluator action
elements
ALC_CMS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.5 Tests
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
Dependencies ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
Developer action
elements
ATE_FUN.1.1D The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.
ATE_FUN.1.2D The developer shall provide test documentation.
Content and
presentation
elements
ATE_FUN.1.1C The test documentation shall consist of test plans, expected test results and
actual test results.
ATE_FUN.1.2C The test plans shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the
scenarios for performing each test. These scenarios shall include any ordering
dependencies on the results of other tests.
ATE_FUN.1.3C The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a successful
execution of the tests.
ATE_FUN.1.4C The actual test results shall be consistent with the expected test results.
Evaluator action
elements
ATE_FUN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance
Dependencies ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Developer action
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 54
elements
ATE_IND.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and
presentation
elements
ATE_IND.1.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action
elements
ATE_IND.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as
specified.
5.2.6 Vulnerability assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
Dependencies ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Developer action
elements
AVA_VAN.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing
Content and
presentation
elements
AVA_VAN.1.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action
elements
AVA_VAN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.1.2E The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential
vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an
attacker possessing Basic attack potential.
5.3 Security requirement rationale
5.3.1 Dependency rationale of security functional requirements
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 55
The following table shows dependency of security functional requirement.
NO.
Security functional
requirements
Dependency Reference No.
1 FAU_ARP.1 FAU_SAA.1 3
2 FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 OE.TIME_STAMP
3 FAU_SAA.1 FAU_GEN.1 2
4 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 2
5 FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.1 4
6 FUA_STG.3 FAU_STG.1 OE.DBMS
7 FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 OE.DBMS
8 FCS_CKM.1(1)
[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
11, 15, 16
12
9 FCS_CKM.1(2)
[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
11, 13, 14
12
10 FCS_CKM.1(3)
[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
11, 16
12
11 FCS_CKM.2
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
8, 9
12
12 FCS_CKM.4
[FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1] 8, 9, 10
13 FCS_COP.1(1)
[FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
9
12
14 FCS_COP.1(2)
[FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
9
12
15 FCS_COP.1(3)
[FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
8
12
16 FCS_COP.1(4)
[FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
8
12
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 56
17 FCS_COP.1(5)
[FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
-
18 FCS_RBG.1 - -
19 FIA_AFL.1(1) FIA_UAU.1 25
20 FIA_AFL.1(2) FIA_UAU.1 25
21 FIA_IMA.1 - -
22 FIA_SOS.1 - -
23 FIA_SOS.2 - -
24 FIA_SOS.3 FIA_SOS.2 23
25 FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 28
26 FIA_UAU.4 - -
27 FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 25
28 FIA_UID.2 - -
29 FMT_MOF.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
32
33
30 FMT_MTD.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
32
33
31 FMT_PWD.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
32
33
32 FMT_SMF.1 - -
33 FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 28
34 FPT_ITT.1 - -
35 FPT_PST.1 - -
36 FPT_STM.1 - -
37 FPT_TST.1 - -
38 FTA_MCS.2 FIA_UID.1 28
39 FTA_SSL.5 FIA_UAU.1 또는 없음 25
40 FTA_TSE.1 - -
[Table 5] Rationale for the dependency of the security functional requirement
FAU_GEN.1 has the dependency on FPT_STM.1. It records security related tests using the reliable
time stamp provided by the operational environment of TOE. It is satisfied by the operational
environment of security objective OE. time stamp
FAU_STG.3 and FAU_STG.4 have the dependency on FAU_STG.1. It is satisfied by the operational
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 57
environment of OE.DBMS.
FIA_AFL.1(1), FIA_AFL.1(2), FIA_UAU.7, FTA_SSL.5 have the dependency on FIA_UAU.1. It is satisfied
by FIA_UAU.2 which is in a hierarchical relationship with FIA_UAU.1.
FIA_UAU.2, FMT_SMR.1, FTA_MCS.2have the dependency on FIA_UID.1. It is satisfied by FIA_UID.2
which is in a hierarchical relationship with FIA_UID.1.
FCS_COP.1(5) has dependency on FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_CKM.1, and FCS_CKM.4. It is
satisfied by the Hash algorithm does not use the cryptographic key.
5.3.2 Dependency rationale of security assurance requirements
The dependency of EAL1 assurance package provided in the CC is already satisfied, the rationale
is omitted.
The augmented SAR ATE_FUN.1 has dependency on ATE_COV.1. but, ATE_FUN.1 is augmented to
require developer testing in order to check if the developer correctly performed and documented
the tests in the test documentation, ATE_COV.1 is not included in this PP since it is not necessarily
required to show the correspondence between the tests and the TSFIs.
6. TOE summary specification
6.1 Security Audit(AUDIT)
6.1.1 Audit data generation(AUDIT.1)
▣ SSO Server/SSO Agent
The TOE performs the security management function and generates the result of potential security
violation of the TOE components, the result of identification and authentication, and the audit
data of events from the system.
The TOE stores the audit data in the DBMS.
Audit data Cases for audits Remarks
User history
- User identification and authentication
- Authentication token issue
- Authentication token verification
SSO Agent
Admin history
- Administrator identification and authentication
- Security setting
- TSF data information change
SSO Server
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 58
- Session termination
System history
- Start/Terminate
- Self-test and integrity test
- Exceed the administrator allowed number of
failures
- Key# Crypto V1.5 self-test
- Audit storage is full
- Self-test and integrity test
SSO Server
- Start/Terminate
- Self-test and integrity test
- Cryptographic key management (generation,
operation)
SSO Agent
For each audit data, audit data is generated by including the log generation time, case type,
identify of subject (if available), case results (success or fail) and selective audit review for case
type is possible.
Related SFRS : FAU_GEN.1
6.1.2 Audit data review(AUDIT.2)
The TOE stores the audit data in the DBMS and provide the audit records in a manner suitable for
the authorized administrator to interpret the information. It is possible to review Detail, the
identity of the subject (end-user or administrator ID, end-user or administrator IP, TOE
components), date of the event, type of the event and failure/success of the event with the AND
condition.
▣ SSO Server
The TOE provides the ability to review the audit data to the authorized administrator.
The provided audit data that is stored in the DBMS, an operational environment of the TOE,
includes the identification and authentication history of the authorized administrator and the user,
TSF function change, data value, management history of threshold change and history of TOE
component start/termination. Query the DBMS to provide the data in a manner suitable for the
authorized administrator.
Only the top-level administrator can search the audit data.
Related SFRS : FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3
6.1.3 Audit repository inspection and security violation response (AUDIT.3)
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 59
▣ SSO Server
The TOE shall periodically detect self-test of potential security threats (validated cryptographic
module (Key# Crypto V1.5), DBMS DISK capacity check, self-test of the SSO Server/SSO Agent,
integrity test, audit storage failure, exceed the allowed number of failures for administrator/user)
and send a warning email about security threats to the authorized administrator
In addition, send the emails to the administrator to prevent audit data loss when the DBMS
exceeds the threshold (80%). When reaching the threshold for deleting past records in the DBMS,
delete the oldest audit records to prevent audit data loss, and send the emails to the
administrator.
The audit records generated by the TOE is stored in the DBMS that the TOE operational
environment provides. Only authorized administrator can access to the audit record DB and
organize the audit records.
Related SFRS : FAU_ARP.1, FAU_SAA.1, FAU_STG.3, FAU_STG.4
6.2 Cryptographic support(CKM)
6.2.1 Cryptographic Key Management and Cryptographic Operation(CKM.1)
The TOE uses the following verified cryptographic modules to perform cryptographic support
functions.
구분 내용
cryptographic
module name
Key# Crypto V1.5
Developer RAONSECURE Co., Ltd.
verification date 2022-11-02
expiration date 2027-11-02
verification number CM-220-2027.11
User mode Linux (libjavaCmvp.so ,libKeySharpCryptoV1_5.so)
▣ SSO Server/SSO Agent
The TOE performs the password support function for each SSO Server/SSO Agent component as
follows.
- SSO Server와 SSO Agent
6.2.2 Generate an encryption key
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 60
Cryptographic
key
classification
usage
Encryption
key type
algorithm Standard list
Encryption
key length
DEK Encrypting
TSF
Token key
(authentication
token data
encryption)
random
number
generator
HASH_DRBG
(SHA 256)
[TTAK.KO-
12.0331-
Part2 (2018)]
128
DEK Encrypting
TSF
set encryption
key
random
number
generator
HASH_DRBG
(SHA 256)
[TTAK.KO-
12.0331-
Part2 (2018)]
128
KEK Encrypting
DEK
public/private
key
public key
cryptographic
algorithm
RSAES
(SHA 256)
ISO/IEC
18033-
2(2006)
2048
KEK Encrypting
DEK
Encryption key
(token key
encryption)
random
number
generator
HASH_DRBG
(SHA 256)
[TTAK.KO-
12.0331-
Part2 (2018)]
128
KEK Encrypting
DEK
judo key
Password-
based key
derivation
function
Pbkdf2
[TTAK.KO-
12.0334-
Part1/2
(2018)]
128
DEK to encrypt
data in transit
section
encryption key
random
number
generator
HASH_DRBG
(SHA 256)
[TTAK.KO-
12.0331-
Part2 (2018)]
128
6.2.3 Cryptographic key distribution
Cryptographic
key
classification
usage
Encryption
key type
algorithm Standard list
Encryption
key length
DEK to
encrypt data
in transit
Section
encryption
key
distribution
public key
cryptographic
algorithm
RSAES
(SHA 256)
ISO/IEC
18033-
2(2006)
2048
6.2.4 Destroy the encryption key
Cryptographic key
classification
usage destruction cycle
Destruction
method
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 61
DEK Encrypting TSF
Encryption key
(token key)
Destroy immediately after use
Overwrite 3
times with 0
DEK Encrypting TSF
set encryption
key
Destroy immediately after use
KEK Encrypting DEK encryption key Destroy immediately after use
DEK to encrypt data in
transit
section
encryption key
Destroy immediately after use
- private key Destroy immediately after use
6.2.5 Cryptographic operation
Cryptographic
key
classification
usage
Encryption
key type
algorithm
Encryption
key length
Standard list
Authentication
Token
Encryption
Token key
(authentication
token encryption)
block cipher SEED-CBC 128
[TTAS-KO-
12.0004/R1
(2005)]
Encryption key
(token key
encryption)
block cipher SEED-CBC 128
[TTAS-KO-
12.0004/R1
(2005)]
Authentication
Token Integrity
Verification (Token
Message
Authentication)
message
authentication
HMAC
(SHA-2)
256
[TTAK.KO-
12.0330]
TSF data
encryption
mutual
authentication
public key
cryptographic
algorithm
RSAES
(SHA 256)
2048
ISO/IEC
18033-
2(2006)
Digital
Signature
Algorithm
RSA-PSS 2048
ISO/IEC
14888-
2(2008)
Communication
section encryption
public key
cryptographic
algorithm
RSAES
(SHA 256)
2048
ISO/IEC
18033-
2(2006)
Digital
Signature
RSA-PSS 2048
ISO/IEC
14888-
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 62
Algorithm 2(2008)
TFS Important
Information
block cipher SEED-CBC 128
[TTAS-KO-
12.0004/R1
(2005)]
TOE integrity hash function SHA-256
[KS X
ISO/IEC
10118-
3:2001
(2018)]
Administrator/User
Password
hash function SHA-512
[KS X
ISO/IEC
10118-
3:2001
(2018)]
Each component generates an encryption key using the public key cryptographic algorithm
(RSAES2048) and uses the digital signature algorithm (RSA-PSS2048) for cryptographic operation.
Periodically overwrite the encryption key generated by the SSO Server and SSO Agent with 0
three times to destroy it.
The components of the SSO Server generate the interval cryptographic key of 128bit using the
RBG (HASH_DRBG(SHA256). The interval cryptographic key uses the public key algorithm (RSAES
2048) to distribute the SSO Agent and the interval cryptographic key, and encrypt the
communication interval. Overwrite the interval cryptographic key with 0 three times to destroy
right after the use.
The components of the SSO Server generate the cryptographic key of 128bit using the RBG
(HASH_DRBG(SHA256) and use the symmetric key algorithm (SEED(CBC) 128bit) to
encrypt/decrypt the token key. Overwrite the encryption key with 0 three times to destroy it
immediately right after the use.
The SSO Agent generates the token key of 128bit using the RBG (HASH_DRBG(SHA256). Encrypt
the important components of the authentication token using the symmetric key algorithm
(SEED(CBC) 128bit)
The SSO Agent generates and verifies the message authentication code and the authentication
token using the MAC algorithm (HMAC-SHA256) and the hash algorithm (SHA-256). Overwrite the
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 63
authentication token with 0 three times to destroy it immediately right after the use.
Related SFRS : FCS_CKM.1(1), FCS_CKM.1(2), FCS_CKM.2, FCS_COP.1(1), FCS_COP.1(2), FCS_COP.1(3),
FCS_COP.1(4), FCS_COP.1(5), FCS_RBG.1
6.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)
The TOE uses the following verified cryptographic modules to perform cryptographic support
functions.
구분 내용
cryptographic
module name
Key# Crypto V1.5
Developer RAONSECURE Co., Ltd.
verification date 2022-11-02
expiration date 2027-11-02
verification number CM-220-2027.11
User mode Linux (libjavaCmvp.so ,libKeySharpCryptoV1_5.so)
6.3.1 Authentication failure handling
▣ SSO Server
The TOE requests the authorized administrator to set the specification of the unsuccessful
authentication attempts for the administrator. The allowed number of authentication failures is set
to 5.
If the administrator reaches the allowed number of authentication failures for the management
console, lock the administrator’s account for 10 minutes as the authorized administrator sets.
▣ SSO Agent
The TOE requests the authorized administrator to set the specification of the unsuccessful
authentication attempts for the user. The allowed number of authentication failures is set to 5.
When the user initially attempts to authenticate with the business system, the SSO Agent that is
installed in the business system gets the identification and authentication requests of the user. If
reaching the allowed number of authentication failures, lock the user’s account for 10 minutes as
the authorized administrator sets.
Related SFRS : FIA_AFL.1(1), FIA_AFL.1(2)
6.3.2 Mutual authentication between TOE components
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 64
The TOE performs mutual authentication between the SSO Server and SSO Agent using the
protocol. The detailed mechanism for mutual authentication between the SSO Server and SSO
Agent is as follows.
1) During the SSO Server activation, generate the cryptographic key pairs (public key and private
key) using the validated cryptographic module.
2) During the SSO Agent activation, generate the cryptographic key pairs (public key and private
key) using the validated cryptographic module.
3) SSO Agent authentication request.
4) Generate the PChallenge value (HASH_DRBG(SHA 256)) from the SSO Server and send the SSO
Server public key.
5) Sign the PChallenge value from the SSO Agent digitally (RSA-PSS 2048) with the private key of
the SSO Agent
6) Generate the EChallenge value (HASH_DRBG(SHA 256)) from the SSO Agent and send the SSO
Agent public key.
7) Verify (RSA-PSS 2048) the value which is signed in the SSO Server with the SSO Agent public
key and the PChallenge.
8) Digitally sign (RSA-PSS 2048) the EChallenge value from 6) with the SSO Server private key
9) Verify (RSA-PSS 2048) the EChallenge value in the SSO Agent with the SSO Server public key.
10) Success of mutual authentication
Related SFRS : FIA_IMA.1
6.3.3 Verification of Confidential Information
▣ SSO Server
The TOE identifies an administrator who tries to access. Any administrator and IT entity without
completing identification can utilize any function of the TOE.
The administrator’s authentication information is ID and password. Uppercases (A~Z), lowercases
(a~z), numbers (1~0) and special characters (~!@#$%^&*()_+`-={}|[]\:";'<>?,./) are allowed for the
password for identification and authentication. The password shall be able to be composed of
combinations of English letters, numbers and special characters, and support passwords of from 9
characters to 63 characters in length. Present the password in ‘•’ and send the failure message to
prevent the information of authentication failure reason and the password from being exposed. If
identification and authentication succeed, keep the authority for security management.
Prevent reuse of authentication data by encrypting the session ID including the random value.
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 65
▣ SSO Agent
For the initial user identification and authentication via the business system, perform the user
identification and authentication before allowing all the actions. During authentication, send [•]
and the failure message to hide the information of authentication failure reason to the user.
User’s initial identification and authentication information is ID and password. The password
combination rule is applied as the authorized administrator sets. The authorized authenticator sets
the password combination rule which is able to be composed of three different characters among
Uppercases, lowercases, numbers and special characters; inclusion of ID and DOB for password;
case-sensitivity; repetition of the same letters (3~5 times); continuation letters (3~5times).
According to the combination rule, password can be generated from 9 characters to 63 characters
in length.
Prevent reuse of end user’s authentication data by encrypting the session ID including the
random value.
Related SFRS : FIA_SOS.1, FIA_SOS.2, FIA_SOS.3, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_UID.2
6.3.4 Creation and destruction of confidential information
▣ SSO Agent
After completing user’s initial identification and authentication, the authentication token in
generated. Use the validated cryptographic module when generating the authentication token.
The authentication token is composed of the shared key between the servers, user ID, user ID,
token generation time, valid time, idle time, session Slot and Token ID.
Use the validated cryptographic module to generate the token key via the RBG ((HASH_DRBG(SHA
256)). Encrypt the components of the authentication token with the token key using the
symmetric algorithm (SEED 128(CBC)).
Encrypt the token key, a cryptographic key from the SSO Server, using the symmetric algorithm
(SEED 128(CBC))
Use the MAC algorithm (HMAC-SHA256) to generate the authentication token and verify integrity.
Do not save the authentication token. Overwrite the token with 0 three times to destroy it after
sending it to the business system.
Onetime Token prevents the authentication token from being reused.
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 66
Related SFRS : FIA_SOS.1, FIA_SOS.2, FIA_SOS.3, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_UID.2
6.4 Security management(SM)
6.4.1 Security management(SM.1)
▣ SSO Server
The SSO Server sets organization, service, audit and configuration.
[Organization]
There is only the top-level administrator for the authorized administrator.
Change the password when the authorized administrator accesses to the security management
interface for the first time.
Manage the top-level organization and sub organization and the account of administrator and
user.
Allocate the ID and password policy to users in the organization and set the service authority of
the business system by organization and user.
User’s ID can be generated from 1 character to 31 characters in length according to the
administrator’s setting. Register and manage the ID combination (English letters/numbers/English
letters, numbers/ English letters, numbers, English letters), initial letter setting (English
letters/numbers/no limit) and exception letters for ID.
Verify the validity of password value according to the password policy when generating and
changing user’s and authorized administrator’s password.
The TOE provides the verification mechanism when creating and changing the password.
List of function password combination rules and/or length]
Password combination rules
(admin)
[Password Length]
- 9 – 63 characters
[Password Combination Rules]
- Combination of 3 or more English letters, numbers, or
special characters
- English upper case : A - Z
- English lower case : a – z
- number : 0 – 9
- special characters : ~!@#$%^&*()_+`-={}|[]\:";'<>?,./ (32)
Password combination rules
(user)
[Password Length]
- 9 – 63 characters
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 67
[Password Combination Rules]
- Combination of 3 or more English letters, numbers, or
special characters
- English upper case : A - Z
- English lower case : a – z
- number : 0 – 9
- special characters : ~!@#$%^&*()_+`-={}|[]\:";'<>?,./ (32)
- ID check
- DOB check
- Not case sensitive
- Same characters cannot be used 3-5 times
- Sequential characters cannot be used 3-5 times
[Service]
Linked with the business system, register services where the user accesses to as tree type.
Set authority for service use by organization and period of service use.
[Configuration]
Register and manage the user profile for the constraint rule in the policy.
Register and manage authority (e.g. add, search, edit, delete) for registered service use.
Manage the combination rule which is composed of length setting (from 9 characters to 63
characters) and mixing rule setting involving English letters, numbers and special characters.
Security function
component
management function
management
type
FAU_ARP.1 Manage corresponding actions (add, delete, edit). Manager
FAU_SAA.1
Maintain the rule (add, edit or delete a rule from the
rule set).
Manager
FAU_SAR.1 Review the audit record. Manager
FAU_STG.3
Maintain the threshold.
fixed value
Maintain corresponding actions (add, edit, delete) if
audit storage failure is expected.
FAU_STG.4
Maintain corresponding actions (add, edit, delete) if
audit storage fails.
fixed value
FIA_AFL.1
Manage the threshold for unsuccessful authentication
attempts.
fixed value
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 68
[표 1] 보안기능요구사항
Related SFRS : FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_PWD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
6.5 Protection of the TSF(PT)
6.5.1 Protection of the TSF(PT.1)
▣ SSO Server, SSO Agent
The TOE performs mutual authentication and interval encryption by component to protect TSF
data from disclosure and modification when transmitting the data between separate parts of the
TOE.
Manage corresponding actions if authentication fails.
FIA_SOS.1 Manage corresponding actions if authentication fails. Manager
FIA_UAU.2 Manage the authentication data by the administrator. Manager
FIA_UID.2 Manage the identity of the administrator. Manager
FMT_MOF.1
Manage the security function which is interactable
with the TSF function.
Manager
FMT_MTD.1
Manage the TSF data which is interactable with the
TSF data.
Manager
FMT_PWD.1(Extended) Manage the password setting rule. Manager
FMT_SMR.1 Manage the security role. Manager
FPT_ITT.1
Manage the mechanism that is used to protect the
data transferred between the different parts of the
TSF.
Manager
FPT_TST.1
Manage the time interval under which TSF self-test
occurs, such as ‘during initial start-up’, ‘regular
interval’, or ‘under specified conditions’.
Manager
FTA_MCS.2
Manage the rule for managing the maximum number
of concurrent user sessions by the administrator.
fixed value
TSF Protect TSF Component Algorithm
Mutual
Authentication
SSO Server SSO Agent
- Public Key Encryption
: RSAES(2048)
- Digital Signature Algorithm
: RSA-PSS(2048)
Encryption
Between
Components
SSO Server SSO Agent
- Random Bit Generator
: HASH_DRBG(SHA256)
- Public Key Encryption
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 69
The TSF self-test verifies the accurate operation of the TSF and provides the function that is used
by the authorized administrator to verify the integrity of the TSF data.
The TOE shall run its own tests to ensure that all TSFs are operating correctly every hour during
the TOE run and during normal operation.
For self-test, the SSO Server sends an email to the administrator when the port goes inactivated.
Generate the audit log to search in case of SSO Agent abnormal termination.
The TOE performs DB password encryption and decryption for protecting important information
and connects to the DBMS. Use the hash algorithm (SHA-512) to safely store the administrator
and user password in the DBMS.
The SSO Server and SSO Agent shall run self-test for major security function processes during
running The SSO Server and SSO Agent shall perform integrity verification (SHA-256) hourly
during running and normal operation. Manage the list of integrity verification as the Appendix
[integrity verification]. the TOE shall run self-test for major processes periodically during initial
start-up and operation, and ensure the integrity of the TOE configuration files
The TOE protects the TSF data from unauthorized disclosure and modification by encrypting it.
And then store and manage it.
The TSF data list and the applied cryptographic algorithm is as follows.
: RSAES(2048)
- Symmetric Key Encryption
: SEED(CBC) 128 bit
TSF Protect TSF Component Algorithm
DB password
encryption/decryption
SSO Server DBMS
- block cipher
: SEED-CBC
Encryption of
encrypted DB
password
- random number generator
: HASH_DRBG(SHA256)
- Password-based key derivation
function
: PBKDF2
Encryption of
important setting
values
(administrator ip,
stmp email address,
password)
SSO Server
- block cipher
: SEED-CBC
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 70
Related SFRS : FPT_ITT.1, FPT_PST.1, FPT_TST.1
6.6 TOE access(TA)
6.6.1 Session management(TA.1)
▣ SSO Server
The TOE controls the management access of the administrator based on the access IP when the
administrator attempts to access to the SSO Server, and blocks the management access session
from the un-allowed IP.
Limit the number of concurrent sessions for the SSO Server to 1 so that the top-level
administrator owns the rights. Concurrent session is not allowed.
The TOE terminates the interacting session after a specified time interval of authorized
administrator inactivity (10 minutes), after that reauthentication is required.
▣ SSO Agent
The TOE terminates the session after the idle time of authentication token, after that
authentication token verification will be failed. For reauthentication, identification and
authentication with end user’s ID/password is required.
Related SFRS : FTA_MCS.2, FTA_SSL.5, FTA_TSE.1
authentication token SSO Agent
- block cipher
: SEED-CBC
TOE integrity
SSO Server
SSO Agent
- hash function
: SHA-256
Administrator/User
Password
-
- hash function
: SHA-512 / SHA-256
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 71
[Appendix]
1. Integrity verification target
1.1 SSO Server
1.1.1 sessionserver folder
path File name
/home/cctest/wiseaccess_v1.4/server/sessions
erver/integrity/
gson-2.2.4.jar
jcl-over-slf4j-1.7.32.jar
libjavaCmvp.so
libKeySharpCryptoV1_5.so
libsigar-amd64-linux.so
logback-classic-1.2.9.jar
logback-core-1.2.9.jar
mysql-connector-java-8.0.21.jar
sensor-1.4.4.3-linux-x8664.jar
sensor.conf
sessionserver.conf
sigar-1.6.6.jar
slf4j-api-1.7.32.jar
solutionintegrity-1.5.0.2.jar
xenv
xinfo
xstart
xstop
xversion
1.1.2 policyserver folder
path File name
/home/cctest/wiseaccess_v1.4/server/policyse
rver/integrity
jcl-over-slf4j-1.7.32.jar
libjavaCmvp.so
libKeySharpCryptoV1_5.so
libsigar-amd64-linux.so
logback-classic-1.2.9.jar
logback-core-1.2.9.jar
mysql-connector-java-8.0.21.jar
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 72
ojdbc6-11.2.0.4.jar
policyserver.conf
policyserver.jar
ps.mysql.conf
sensor-1.4.4.3-linux-x8664.jar
sensor.conf
sigar-1.6.6.jar
slf4j-api-1.7.32.jar
solutionintegrity-1.5.0.2.jar
xenv
xinfo
xinfo_ps
xstart
xstart_ps
xstop
xstop_ps
xversion
xversion_ps
1.1.3 wpm folder
path File name
/home/cctest/wiseaccess_v1.4/server/policy
server/integrity
accessDenied.jsp
acecommon.jar
addAlarmRecipients.jsp
addService.jsp
addUacl.jsp
addUaclOfService.jsp
admin.gif
adminAlarm.jsp
adminIndex.jsp
adminIP.jsp
adminLog.jsp
adminLogGridList.jsp
adminSearchHeader.jsp
admin_on.gif
admin_password.jsp
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 73
ajax-loader.gif
animated-overlay.gif
application-security.xml
audit.props
AuditLeftMenu.jsp
base.css
base64js.min.js
batchjob_import.gif
batchjob_import_on.gif
batchjob_lumpprocess.gif
batchjob_lumpprocess_on.gif
bcprov-jdk14-128.jar
bg_gnb.gif
bg_header.gif
bg_line.gif
bg_list_over.gif
bg_list_over.png
bg_list_th.gif
bg_list_th_over.gif
bg_lnb.gif
bg_login.gif
bg_pop.png
bg_pop_container.gif
bg_pop_original.png
bg_tab1.gif
bi.gif
bi.png
blank.jsp
bodySample.jsp
bootstrap-datepicker.css
bootstrap-datepicker.js
bower.json
btn.gif
btn_black.gif
btn_black_icon.gif
btn_close.gif
btn_excel2.gif
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 74
btn_icon.gif
btn_login.gif
btn_logout.gif
btn_orange.gif
btn_search.gif
btn_search_b.gif
btn_search_small.gif
btn_tab.gif
bu_orange.gif
calender.js
chgPwd.jsp
com.springsource.javax.mail-1.4.5.jar
com.springsource.javax.servlet.jsp.jstl-1.1.2.jar
com.springsource.org.aopalliance-1.0.0.jar
com.springsource.org.apache.commons.beanutils-
1.8.0.jar
com.springsource.org.apache.commons.collection
s-3.2.1.jar
com.springsource.org.apache.commons.dbcp-
1.2.2.osgi.jar
com.springsource.org.apache.commons.digester-
1.8.1.jar
com.springsource.org.apache.commons.fileupload
-1.2.0.jar
com.springsource.org.apache.commons.io-
1.4.0.jar
com.springsource.org.apache.commons.logging-
1.1.1.jar
com.springsource.org.apache.commons.pool-
1.5.3.jar
com.springsource.org.apache.taglibs.standard-
1.1.2.jar
com.springsource.org.apache.tiles-2.1.2.osgi.jar
com.springsource.org.apache.tiles.core-
2.1.2.osgi.jar
com.springsource.org.apache.tiles.jsp-2.1.2.jar
com.springsource.org.apache.tiles.servlet-2.1.2.jar
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 75
com.springsource.org.aspectj.tools-
1.6.6.RELEASE.jar
com.springsource.org.codehaus.jackson-1.4.2.jar
com.springsource.org.codehaus.jackson.mapper-
1.4.2.jar
com.springsource.org.joda.time-1.6.0.jar
common.css
common.js
commonService.xml
config.properties
cos.jar
daowired.xml
dataSource.xml
delegate.gif
delegate_on.gif
delimg.jpg
dom4j-1.6.1.jar
error.jsp
error.props
errorPage.jsp
excelimg.jpg
fileimg.jpg
Footer.jsp
forwardLogin.jsp
frameSpringcommon.js
frameSpringcommonOptions.js
GeneralTiles.xml
glyphicons-halflings.png
gnb1.gif
gnb10.gif
gnb10_on.gif
gnb11.gif
gnb1_on.gif
gnb2.gif
gnb2_on.gif
gnb3.gif
gnb3_on.gif
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 76
gnb4.gif
gnb4_on.gif
gnb5.gif
gnb5_on.gif
gnb6.gif
gnb6_on.gif
gnb7.gif
gnb7_on.gif
gnb8.gif
gnb8_on.gif
gnb9.gif
gnb9_on.gif
gnb_help.gif
gnb_help_on.gif
grid.addons.js
grid.locale-ar.js
grid.locale-bg.js
grid.locale-bg1251.js
grid.locale-cat.js
grid.locale-cn.js
grid.locale-cs.js
grid.locale-da.js
grid.locale-de.js
grid.locale-dk.js
grid.locale-el.js
grid.locale-en.js
grid.locale-es.js
grid.locale-fa.js
grid.locale-fi.js
grid.locale-fr.js
grid.locale-gl.js
grid.locale-he.js
grid.locale-hr.js
grid.locale-hr1250.js
grid.locale-hu.js
grid.locale-id.js
grid.locale-is.js
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 77
grid.locale-it.js
grid.locale-ja.js
grid.locale-kr.js
grid.locale-lt.js
grid.locale-mne.js
grid.locale-nl.js
grid.locale-no.js
grid.locale-pl.js
grid.locale-pt-br.js
grid.locale-pt.js
grid.locale-ro.js
grid.locale-ru.js
grid.locale-sk.js
grid.locale-sr-latin.js
grid.locale-sr.js
grid.locale-sv.js
grid.locale-th.js
grid.locale-tr.js
grid.locale-tw.js
grid.locale-ua.js
grid.locale-vi.js
grid.postext.js
grid.setcolumns.js
GruntFile.js
gson-2.2.4.jar
handleradap.xml
hwpimg.jpg
icons.gif
icon_cal.GIF
ic_calendar.gif
index.html
index.jsp
jasper-el.jar
jcl-over-slf4j-1.7.32.jar
jquery-ui-custom.css
jquery-ui.css
jquery-ui.js
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 78
jquery-ui.structure.css
jquery-ui.theme.css
jquery.contextmenu.js
jquery.cookie.js
jquery.dynatree.js
jquery.dynatree.min.js
jquery.jqGrid.min.js
jquery.js
jquery.searchFilter.js
jquery.selectbox-0.6.1.js
jquery.selectbox.css
jquery.tablednd.js
jquery.timepicker.css
jquery.timepicker.d.ts
jquery.timepicker.js
jquery.timepicker.min.js
json-simple-1.1.1.jar
json2.js
jt.timepicker.jquery.json
jxl.jar
last.gif
lay-selectMoreButton.gif
layer.jsp
layer2.jsp
left.gif
leftMenu.jsp
libjavaCmvp.so
libKeySharpCryptoV1_5.so
libsigar-amd64-linux.so
line_lnb.gif
lnb_1.gif
lnb_1_on.gif
lnb_2.gif
lnb_2_on.gif
lnb_3.gif
lnb_3_on.gif
lnb_4.gif
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 79
lnb_4_on.gif
lnb_5.gif
lnb_5_on.gif
loading.gif
logback-classic-1.2.9.jar
logback-core-1.2.9.jar
logback-ext-spring-0.1.5.jar
logback.xml
login.jsp
login_bg.gif
login_bottom.gif
login_fail.jsp
login_ok.jsp
login_top.gif
logoutLayer.jsp
MainFrame.jsp
manager.gif
manager_over.gif
MANIFEST.MF
mappingXml.prpertes
modUserBasic.jsp
mswimg.jpg
mybatis-3.4.1.jar
mybatis-spring-1.3.2.jar
mysql-connector-java-8.0.21.jar
my_macl.gif
my_macl_on.gif
next.gif
odtimg.jpg
org.jsp
orgAddPopup.jsp
orgBasicInfo.jsp
orgBody.jsp
orgDivAddPopup.jsp
orgDivAdvanceInfo.jsp
orgDivBasicInfo.jsp
orgDivIndex.jsp
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 80
orgIndex.jsp
orgTree.jsp
orgTreeOnActivate.jsp
orgUserList.jsp
package.json
pdfimg.jpg
pptimg.jpg
prec.gif
protobuf-java-3.11.4.jar
pwdChange.jsp
pwdChangePopup.jsp
README.md
resize.js
root-context.xml
scheduler.xml
screenshot.png
searchFilter.css
searchResult.jsp
securityAuth.js
sensor-1.4.4.3-linux-x8664.jar
sensor.conf
service.jsp
service.xml
serviceAddPopup.jsp
serviceBasicInfo.jsp
serviceIndex.jsp
serviceList.jsp
serviceStructBody.jsp
serviceStructureAddPopup.jsp
serviceStructureBasicInfo.jsp
serviceStructureIndex.jsp
serviceTree.jsp
servlet-context.xml
sigar-1.6.6.jar
site.css
site.js
sjxlsx-1.0.1.jar
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 81
slf4j-api-1.7.32.jar
solutionintegrity-1.5.0.2.jar
spring-aop-3.2.18.RELEASE.jar
spring-beans-3.2.18.RELEASE.jar
spring-context-3.2.18.RELEASE.jar
spring-core-3.2.18.RELEASE.jar
spring-expression-3.2.18.RELEASE.jar
spring-jdbc-3.2.18.RELEASE.jar
spring-orm-3.2.18.RELEASE.jar
spring-oxm-3.2.18.RELEASE.jar
spring-security-acl-3.2.10.RELEASE.jar
spring-security-config-3.2.10.RELEASE.jar
spring-security-core-3.2.10.RELEASE.jar
spring-security-taglibs-3.2.10.RELEASE.jar
spring-security-web-3.2.10.RELEASE.jar
spring-tx-3.2.18.RELEASE.jar
spring-web-3.2.18.RELEASE.jar
spring-webmvc-3.2.18.RELEASE.jar
sqlMapConfig.xml
SSL.crt
SSL.csr
SSL.jks
SSL.key
SSL.p12
sub_manager.gif
sub_manager_over.gif
system.gif
system.jsp
systemLog.jsp
systemLogGridList.jsp
systemSearchHeader.jsp
system_on.gif
system_profile.jsp
time.js
ti_delegate_macl.gif
ti_detail.gif
ti_dsd.gif
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 82
ti_group.gif
ti_gro_detail.gif
ti_importexport.gif
ti_login.gif
ti_loginincert.gif
ti_logininPolicy_detail.gif
ti_lumpprocess.gif
ti_maclGroup.gif
ti_maclGroup_detail.gif
ti_my_macl.gif
ti_org.gif
ti_org_detail.gif
ti_policy.gif
ti_policy1.gif
ti_policy2.gif
ti_policy3.gif
ti_policy_detail.gif
ti_policy_detail2.gif
ti_policy_detail3.gif
ti_role.gif
ti_role_detail.gif
ti_role_detail2.gif
ti_role_detail3.gif
ti_sert_detail.gif
ti_service.gif
ti_ser_detail.gif
ti_ser_tree.gif
ti_set_detail.gif
ti_set_detail2.gif
ti_set_detail3.gif
ti_set_detail4.gif
ti_set_detail_admin.gif
ti_ssd.gif
ti_user.gif
ti_user_view.gif
topMenu.jsp
transaction.xml
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 83
uaclItem.jsp
uaclList.jsp
uaclListOfService.jsp
uacl_config.jsp
ui-bg_diagonals-thick_18_b81900_40x40.png
ui-bg_diagonals-thick_20_666666_40x40.png
ui-bg_flat_0_888888_40x100.png
ui-bg_flat_0_aaaaaa_40x100.png
ui-bg_flat_10_000000_40x100.png
ui-bg_flat_55_fbec88_40x100.png
ui-bg_flat_75_ffffff_40x100.png
ui-bg_glass_100_f6f6f6_1x400.png
ui-bg_glass_100_fdf5ce_1x400.png
ui-bg_glass_25_e1f0f5_1x400.png
ui-bg_glass_55_444444_1x400.png
ui-bg_glass_55_fbf9ee_1x400.png
ui-bg_glass_65_ffffff_1x400.png
ui-bg_glass_75_dadada_1x400.png
ui-bg_glass_75_e6e6e6_1x400.png
ui-bg_glass_95_fef1ec_1x400.png
ui-bg_gloss-wave_35_f6a828_500x100.png
ui-bg_highlight-soft_100_eeeeee_1x100.png
ui-bg_highlight-soft_75_cccccc_1x100.png
ui-bg_highlight-soft_75_ffe45c_1x100.png
ui-bg_inset-hard_100_fcfdfd_1x100.png
ui-bg_inset-soft_95_fef1ec_1x100.png
ui-icons_222222_256x240.png
ui-icons_228ef1_256x240.png
ui-icons_256x240.png
ui-icons_2e83ff_256x240.png
ui-icons_309bbf_256x240.png
ui-icons_444444_256x240.png
ui-icons_454545_256x240.png
ui-icons_555555_256x240.png
ui-icons_777620_256x240.png
ui-icons_777777_256x240.png
ui-icons_888888_256x240.png
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 84
ui-icons_bf3030_256x240.png
ui-icons_cc0000_256x240.png
ui-icons_cd0a0a_256x240.png
ui-icons_ef8c08_256x240.png
ui-icons_ffd27a_256x240.png
ui-icons_ffffff_256x240.png
ui.dynatree.css
ui.jqgrid.css
ui.multiselect.css
ui.multiselect.js
user.gif
userAddPopup.jsp
userAdvanceInfo.jsp
userBasicInfo.jsp
userIndex.jsp
userList.jsp
userLog.jsp
userLogGridList.jsp
userSearchHeader.jsp
user_on.gif
viewdefines.xml
virtualware_logo.gif
virtualware_logo_small.gif
VWIbatis.2.3.7.264base.vw.0.0.1.jar
web.xml
wpm-1.4.4.3.jar
xmlbeans-2.3.0.jar
Xstart
Xstop
1.2 SSO Agent
1.2.1 api folder
path File name
/home/cctest/wiseaccess_v1.4/demo/webapp
s/demo/integrity
jcl-over-slf4j-1.7.32.jar
libjavaCmvp.so
libKeySharpCryptoV1_5.so
Copyright(c) RAONSECURE Co., Ltd. 85
logback-classic-1.2.9.jar
logback-core-1.2.9.jar
logback.xml
slf4j-api-1.7.32.jar
sso.conf
1.2.2 ssoengine folder
path File name
/home/cctest/wiseaccess_v1.4/demo/webapp
s/demo/integrity
gson-2.2.4.jar
jcl-over-slf4j-1.7.32.jar
libjavaCmvp.so
libKeySharpCryptoV1_5.so
libsigar-amd64-linux.so
logback-classic-1.2.9.jar
logback-core-1.2.9.jar
mysql-connector-java-8.0.21.jar
ojdbc6-11.2.0.4.jar
sensor-1.4.4.3-linux-x8664.jar
sensor.conf
sigar-1.6.6.jar
slf4j-api-1.7.32.jar
solutionintegrity-1.5.0.2.jar
sso_engine.conf
sso_engined
xenv
xinfo
xinfo_engine
xstart
xstart_engine
xstop
xstop_engine
xversion
xversion_engine