Certification Report
EAL 4+ (AVA_VAN.5,ALC_DVS.2) Evaluation of
TÜBİTAK BİLGEM UEKAE
AKiS v2.5.2N
issued by
Turkish Standards Institution
Common Criteria Certification Scheme
Certificate Number: 21.0.03/TSE-CCCS-59
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
DOCUMENT INFORMATION.......................................................................................................................................3
DOCUMENT CHANGE LOG .........................................................................................................................................3
DISCLAIMER..............................................................................................................................................................4
FOREWORD...............................................................................................................................................................4
RECOGNITION OF THE CERTIFICATE............................................................................................................................5
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................................................6
1.1 BRIEF DESCRIPTION........................................................................................................................................6
1.2 MAJOR SECURITY FEATURES...........................................................................................................................6
1.3 THREATS........................................................................................................................................................7
2. CERTIFICATION RESULTS...................................................................................................................................10
2.1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION ...............................................................................................10
2.2 SECURITY POLICY..........................................................................................................................................11
2.3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE..............................................................................................13
2.4 ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION ...................................................................................................................14
2.5 DOCUMENTATION........................................................................................................................................15
2.6 IT PRODUCT TESTING....................................................................................................................................15
2.7 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION.......................................................................................................................16
2.8 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION ......................................................................................................................16
2.9 EVALUATOR COMMENTS / RECOMMENDATIONS..........................................................................................17
3. SECURITY TARGET............................................................................................................................................17
4. GLOSSARY .......................................................................................................................................................18
5. BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................................................................19
6. ANNEXES.........................................................................................................................................................19
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Document Information
Date of Issue 03.06.2019
Approval Date 06.06.2019
Certification Report Number 21.0.03/19-005
Sponsor and Developer TÜBİTAK BİLGEM UEKAE
Evaluation Facility TÜBİTAK BİLGEM TDBY OKTEM
TOE AKiS v2.5.2N
Pages 19
Prepared by Zümrüt MÜFTÜOĞLU
Reviewed by İbrahim Halil KIRMIZI
This report has been prepared by the Certification Expert and reviewed by the Technical Responsible of which
signatures are above.
Document Change Log
Release Date Pages Affected Remarks/Change Reference
1.0 06.06.2019 All First Release
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DISCLAIMER
This certification report and the IT product defined in the associated Common Criteria document has been
evaluated at an accredited and licensed evaluation facility conformance to Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, version 3.1, revision 4, using Common Methodology for IT Products Evaluation, version 3.1,
revision 4. This certification report and the associated Common Criteria document apply only to the identified
version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. Evaluation has been conducted in accordance
with the provisions of the CCCS, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are
consistent with the evidence adduced.
FOREWORD
The Certification Report is drawn up to submit the Certification Committee the results and evaluation
information upon the completion of a Common Criteria evaluation service performed under the Common
Criteria Certification Scheme. Certification Report covers all non-confidential security and technical
information related with a Common Criteria evaluation which is made under the ITCD Common Criteria
Certification Scheme. This report is issued publicly to and made available to all relevant parties for reference
and use.
The Common Criteria Certification Scheme (CCCS) provides an evaluation and certification service to ensure
the reliability of Information Security (IS) products. Evaluation and tests are conducted by a public or
commercial Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCTL = Common Criteria Testing Laboratory) under
CCCS’ supervision.
CCTL is a facility, licensed as a result of inspections carried out by CCCS for performing tests and evaluations
which will be the basis for Common Criteria certification. As a prerequisite for such certification, the CCTL
has to fulfill the requirements of the standard ISO/IEC 17025 and should be accredited by accreditation bodies.
The evaluation and tests related with the concerned product have been performed by TÜBİTAK BİLGEM TDBY
OKTEM which is a public CCTL.
A Common Criteria Certificate given to a product means that such product meets the security requirements
defined in its security target document that has been approved by the CCCS. The Security Target document is
where requirements defining the scope of evaluation and test activities are set forth. Along with this
certification report, the user of the IT product should also review the security target document in order to
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understand any assumptions made in the course of evaluations, the environment where the IT product will run,
security requirements of the IT product and the level of assurance provided by the product.
This certification report is associated with the Common Criteria Certificate issued by the CCCS for AKİS
v2.5.2N whose evaluation was completed on 21.03.2019 and whose evaluation technical report was drawn up
by TÜBİTAK BİLGEM TDBY OKTEM (as CCTL), and with the Security Target document with version no 24
of the relevant product.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target document are posted on the ITCD
Certified Products List at bilisim.tse.org.tr portal and the Common Criteria Portal (the official web site of the
Common Criteria).
RECOGNITION OF THE CERTIFICATE
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo is printed on the certificate to indicate that this certificate
is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA.
The CCRA has been signed by the Turkey in 2003 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based on the
CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL2. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be found on:
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report constitutes the certification results by the certification body on the evaluation results applied with
requirements of the Common Criteria for Information Security Evaluation.
Evaluated IT product name: AKİS v2.5.2N
IT Product version: v2.5.N
Developer’s Name: TÜBİTAK BİLGEM UEKAE
Name of CCTL: TÜBİTAK BİLGEM TDBY OKTEM
Assurance Package: EAL 4+ (AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DVS.2)
Completion date of evaluation: 21.03.2019
1.1 Brief Description
AKiS v2.5.2N contact based smartcard is a composite product consisting of Embedded Operating System,
platform crypto library (platform library) and the platform security IC (platform IC). The crypto library is
evaluated as a composite product consisting of crypto library and security IC NXP Technologies, SmartMX3
P71D320P.
1.2 Major Security Features
The TOE provides the following services to the application:
• Protection against modification, probing, environmental stress and emanation attacks mainly by
platform specification and Embedded Operating System support as detailed in Section 8
• Access control to services and data by using role attribute, PIN-knowledge attribute, activation
agent authentication status, personalization agent authentication status, initialization agent
authentication status and device authentication status.
• The following identification and authentication services:
• activation agent identification & authentication by asymmetric cryptographic verification,
• initialization and personalization agent identification & authentication by symmetric decryption,
• terminal and chip identification & authentication by certificate authentication,
• role identification & authentication by certificate authentication,
• user identification & authentication by PIN verification.
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• Security management, for services and data by supporting activation agent, initialization agent
and personalization agent roles, and any other roles defined by the application.
• Secure messaging services between TOE and the terminal.
• The following cryptographic services:
• SHA Operation,
• AES Operation,
• MAC, Retail-MAC and CMAC Operation,
• TDES Operation,
• signature generation PKCS#1 v1.5,
• signature generation PKCS#1 v2.1,
• signature generation ISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme 1,
• signature generation ECDSA,
• signature verification ISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme 1 ,
• asymmetric decryption PKCS#1 v1.5,
• asymmetric decryption PKCS#1 v2.1,
• asymmetric encryption/decryption RAW RSA ,
• RSA key pair generation,
• ECC key pair generation,
• random number generation.
1.3Threats
The threats are categorized into Hardware related , Terminal and communication related, Card cloning and
forgery related.
Hardware Related Threats are;
• T.Phys-Tamper
An attacker may perform physical probing of the TOE in order
o to disclose user data or
o to disclose/reconstruct the TOE’s Embedded Operating System or
o to disclose other critical information about the operation of the TOE.
An attacker may physically modify the TOE in order to alter
o its security functionality (hardware and software part, as well),
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o the user data or the TSF-data stored on the TOE.
• T.Information_Leakage
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose
confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by
the attacker.
• T.Malfunction
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software by applying
environmental stress in order to
o deactivate or modify security features or functionality of the TOE’s hardware or to
o circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the TOE's Embedded Operating System.
• T.Abuse-Func
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which may not be used after the delivery of the TOE in order
manipulate User Data,
o to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE or
o to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE or
o to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or modify) security functionality of the TOE.
Terminal and communication related threats and card cloning and forgery related threats are because of
composite TOE specific functionality.
Terminal and communication related threats are;
• T.Session_Hijacking
An attacker may wait until the identification and authentication process is completed and session is
established between the TOE and the terminal. After the session is established, attacker may take out the
TOE or the terminal from the communication channel and takes over. That way attacker bypasses the
identification and authentication process and accesses to services illegitimately.
• T.Skimming
The terminal which obtains smart card’s interactions with the world by controlling all I/O’s can observe
user identification data, so this terminal must be trusted not to capture the user’s identification data.
Concerning a variety of fake-terminal attacks become possible, in these cases the user must be able to
differentiate between “real devices” that are manufactured by a trusted party and between “fake
devices” that are manufactured by the attackers. The user cannot identify that the terminal has hidden
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features, for example the message they sign was not altered by a malicious terminal. The security has
nothing to do with the smart card/ terminal exchange; it is the back-end processing system that monitors
the card.
• T.Eavesdropping (Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection system)
An attacker may monitor the communication between the TOE and the terminal/card reader to get
unauthorized access to the user data and/or TSF Data.
• T.Man_in_The_Middle
An attacker may alter the communication between the TOE and the terminal. An attacker listens and
alters the connection between the TOE and the terminal in order to access the services that he or she is
unauthorized to access.
Card cloning and forgery related threats are ;
• T.Counterfeit
An attacker produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine TOE to be used as part of a
counterfeit operation. He or she may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data
from a genuine TOE and copy them on another functionally appropriate chip to imitate this genuine
TOE. This violates the genuineness of the TOE being used either for authentication of a Card presenter
as the Card holder.
• T.Unauthorised_Access
An attacker may access to data that he or she is not authorized to.
• T.Unauthorised_Management
An attacker may illegitimately use the security management services of the TOE.
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2. CERTIFICATION RESULTS
2.1Identification of Target of Evaluation
Certificate Number 21.0.03/TSE-CCCS-59
TOE Name and Version AKIS v.2.5.2N
Security Target Title AKIS v.2.5.2N
Security Target Version V24
Security Target Date 04.03.2019
Assurance Level EAL 4+ (AVA_VAN.5,ALC_DVS.2)
Criteria • Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model;
CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components;
CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components;
CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012
Methodology Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004,
Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
Protection Profile Conformance None
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Platform
Security Target Title, Version
and Date of the Platform
Hardware
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7021 VA Security
Target Lite, Rev. 1.1, 2017-05-31
Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA Security Target Lite,
Rev. 1.1, 5 July 2017
Protection Profile Conformance
of the Platform Hardware
Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, Registered and Certified by
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
2.2 Security Policy
Organizational Security Policies are;
• P.Identification_and_Authentication
The TOE shall support
•chip authentication,
•terminal authentication,
•PIN verification,
•role holder authentication
and any combination of this.
In addition, TOE shall calculate the cryptographic checksum value of the Embedded Operating System
HEX code in the flash memory code area and return it upon request, and each instantiation of the TOE
shall include a unique identification.
• P.PKI
There will be Certificate Authorities (CA’s) for terminal authentication, chip authentication, and role
authentication and the certificates for these CA’s will be signed by Root CA. Terminal certificates, chip
certificates, and role certificates will be signed by the corresponding CA.
• P.Access_Control
Role attribute, PIN knowledge attribute, device authentication attribute of the user shall be used as a
security attribute to determine the access control behavior and security management privileges during
operational phase.
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No memory separation is required in the operational phase (the TOE is a single application EOS), the
access control is rather file permission based. However, memory separation is required in between the
memory areas of IC dedicated software and the EOS which is supported by the platform.
Another security feature related to access control and not derived from the threats is access to Special
Function Registers and hardware resources. Access control policy for the access to the SFRs and
hardware resources by System Mode and the EOS code (executing in User Mode) shall be applied such
that EOS gains access to resources via the NXP System Mode.
• P.PreOperational_Security_Management
The TOE shall support
• activation agent,
• initialization agent,
• personalization agent
functions and roles.
Personalization software shall handle the user data considering their integrity as stated in the Guidance
Documents.
• P.Operational_Security_Management
The TOE shall support any management function and role defined by the application.
Software accessing the TOE in the operational phase shall check the integrity of the user data stored in
the TOE in each read operation as described in the Guidance Documents.
• P.Cryptographic_Operations
The TOE shall support following cryptographic functions:
• RSA key pair generation,
• ECC key pair generation,
• hash calculation,
• eSign operations,
• PKCS #1 v2.1 PSS,
• PKCS #1 v1.5,
• ISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme 1,
• ECDSA
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• asymmetric decryption,
• PKCS #1 v2.1 OAEP,
• PKCS #1 v1.5,
• Raw RSA
• asymmetric encryption,
• Raw RSA
• TDES operation,
• AES operation,
• MAC, Retail-MAC and CMAC operation,
• Destruction of the keys used
• P.Process-TOE
An accurate identification must be established for the TOE. This requires that each instantiation of the
TOE carries this unique identification. This also results in a unique activation cryptogram for each TOE.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
Assumptions for the operational environment of the composite TOE are;
• A.Secure_Application
It is assumed that the application correctly defines the access rules of the application data.
• A.Key_and_Certificate_Security
It is assumed that all keys and certificates are produced, stored and used securely outside of TOE.
• A.PIN_Handling
It is assumed that PINS belonging to the application are handled securely by PIN owner.
• A.Personnel_Security
It is assumed that personnel who hold privileges over the TOE acts responsively and according to the
application requirements.
• A.Trusted_Parties
It is assumed that the authenticated parties that the TOE communicates act responsively.
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• A.Pre-Operational_Environment
It is assumed that the Physical environments of initialization and personalization phases are secure.
2.4 Architectural Information
TOE consists of the communication subsystem, command subsystem, cryptographic support subsystem,
security subsystem, memory and file subsystem and system subsystem.
Communication Subsystem
Communication subsystem manages the communication between AKiS v2.5.2N and the external world.
Two layered communication takes place between the outer world and AKiS v2.5.2N, for the transmission
purposes T=1 protocol is implemented, for the application purposes APDU packets are used.
Command Subsystem
Command subsystem processes the commands received from communication subsystem. It performs the
commands via help of the security subsystem, memory and file subsystem.
Cryptographic Support Subsystem
All cryptographic functions like encryption, decryption, signature generation, signature verification, random
number generation, hash calculation are performed within this subsystem.
Security Subsystem
Access control conditions and lifecycle management operations are performed within this subsystem.
Whenever a security control is to be done via command subsystem, it asks to the security subsystem if the
action is allowed or not.
Memory and File Subsystem
Memory and file subsystem manages the non-volatile memory of the security IC. Memory and file
subsystem gives services to both of the command subsystem and the security subsystem.
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System Subsystem
System subsystem includes the functions related to the whole system such as security controls of the
system.
2.5Documentation
Documents below are provided to the customer by the developer alongside the TOE;
Name of Document Version Number Date
AKIS v.2.5.2N Security Target V16 29.01.2018
AKİS v2.5.2N User Guide V19 29.01.2018
2.6 IT Product Testing
During the evaluation, all evaluation evidences of TOE were delivered and transferred completely to CCTL by
the developers. All the delivered evaluation evidences which include software, documents, etc. are mapped to
the assurance families Common Criteria and Common Methodology; so the connections between the assurance
families and the evaluation evidences has been established. The evaluation results are available in the final
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) of AKIS v.2.5.2N.
It is concluded that the TOE supports EAL 4+ (AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DVS.2). There are 29 assurance families
which are all evaluated with the methods detailed in the ETR.
IT Product Testing is mainly described in two parts:
2.6.1 Developer Testing
Developer has prepared TOE Test Document according to the TOE Functional Specification documentation,
TOE Design documentation which includes TSF subsystems and its interactions. All SFR-Enforcing TSFIs
have been tested by developer. Developer has conducted 74 functional tests in total.
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2.6.2 Evaluator Testing
• Independent Testing: Evaluator has chosen 42 developer tests to conduct by itself. Additionally,
evaluator has prepared 32 independent tests. TOE has passed all functional tests to demonstrate that its
security functions work as it is defined in the ST.
• Penetration Testing: TOE has been tested against common threats and other threats surfaced by
vulnerability analysis. As a result, 30 penetration tests have been conducted.
2.7 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated TOE configuration is composed of;
• the IC Embedded Software including operating system (AKIS v2.5.2N),
• Secure IC (NXP Technologies, SmartMX3 P71D320P),
• the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support
Software, IC Dedicated Crypto library
• Guidance documents
During the evaluation; following documents of the developer were used;
2.8 Results of the Evaluation
Table below provides a complete listing of the Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE. These
requirements consists of the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL 4) components as specified in Part 3 of the
Common Criteria, augmented with AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DVS.2
The Evaluation Team assigned a Pass, Fail, or Inconclusive verdict to each work unit of each EAL 4+
(AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DVS.2) assurance component. For Fail or Inconclusive work unit verdicts, the Evaluation
Team advised the developer about the issues requiring resolution or clarification within the evaluation
evidence. In this way, the Evaluation Team assigned an overall Pass verdict to the assurance component only
when all of the work units for that component had been assigned a Pass verdict. So for TOE “AKIS v2.5.2N”,
the results of the assessment of all evaluation tasks are “Pass”.
BİLİŞİM TEKNOLOJİLERİ
TEST VE BELGELENDİRME
DAİRESİ BAŞKANLIĞI /
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES TEST AND
CERTIFICATION DEPARTMENT
Doküman No BTBD-03-01-FR-01
CCCS CERTIFICATION REPORT
Yayın Tarihi 30/07/2015
RevizyonTarihi 29/04/2016 No 05
Sayfa 17/19
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2.9 Evaluator Comments / Recommendations
No recommendations or comments have been communicated to CCCS by the evaluators related to the
evaluation process of “AKIS v2.5.2N” product, result of the evaluation, or the ETR.
3. SECURITY TARGET
The Security Target associated with this Certification Report is identified by the following terminology:
Title: Security Target Lite of AKIS v.2.5.2N
Revision: v01
Date of Document: 27.05.2019
BİLİŞİM TEKNOLOJİLERİ
TEST VE BELGELENDİRME
DAİRESİ BAŞKANLIĞI /
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES TEST AND
CERTIFICATION DEPARTMENT
Doküman No BTBD-03-01-FR-01
CCCS CERTIFICATION REPORT
Yayın Tarihi 30/07/2015
RevizyonTarihi 29/04/2016 No 05
Sayfa 18/19
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4. GLOSSARY
AA : Active Authentication
ADV : Assurance of Development
AES : Advanced Encryption Standard
AGD : Assurance of Guidance Documents
AKIS : Akıllı Kart İşletim Sistemi
ALC : Assurance of Life Cycle
ASE : Assurance of Security Target Evaluation
ATE : Assurance of Tests Evaluation
AVA : Assurance of Vulnerability Analysis
BİLGEM : Bilişim ve Bilgi Güvenliği İleri Teknolojiler Araştırma Merkezi
CC : Common Criteria (Ortak Kriterler)
CCCS : Common Criteria Certification Scheme (TSE)
CCRA : Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CCTL : Common Criteria Test Laboratory
CEM :Common Evaluation Methodology
CMC : Configuration Management Capability
CMS : Configuration Management Scope
DEL : Delivery
DES : Data Encryption Standard
DF : Dedicated File
DVS : Development Security
EAC : Extended Access Control
EAL : Evaluation Assurance Level
EF : Elementary File
MAC : Message Authentication Code
OKTEM : Ortak Kriterler Test Merkezi
OPE : Opretaional User Guidance
OSP : Organisational Security PolicyPP : Protection Profile
PRE : Preperative Procedures
BİLİŞİM TEKNOLOJİLERİ
TEST VE BELGELENDİRME
DAİRESİ BAŞKANLIĞI /
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES TEST AND
CERTIFICATION DEPARTMENT
Doküman No BTBD-03-01-FR-01
CCCS CERTIFICATION REPORT
Yayın Tarihi 30/07/2015
RevizyonTarihi 29/04/2016 No 05
Sayfa 19/19
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Basım tarih ve saati: 13.12.2019 15:01
PP : Protection Profile
SAR : Security Assurance Requirements
SFR : Security Functional Requirements
ST : Security Target
TOE : Target of Evaluation
TSF : TOE Secırity Functionality
TSFI : TSF Interface
TUBİTAK : Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu
UEKAE : Ulusal Elektronik ve Kriptoloji Araştırma Enstitüsü
5. BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September
2012,
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 4,
September 2012
[3] Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, v1.2, April 2012
[4] Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, v2.9, May 2013
[5] BTBD-03-01-TL-01 Certification Report Preparation Instructions, Rel.Date: February 8th
2016
[6] DTR 54 TR 02 AKIS v2.5.2N EAL4+(ALC_DVS.2) Evaluation Technical Report Rev2.0
[7] 0782-v2_ETR-COMP_151021_v7 Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation (ETR COMP),
v7, October 21st
2015
[8] BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V2-2015-RA-01 Assurance Continuity Reassessment Report, April 7th
2017
[9] Security IC Protection Profile, BSI-PP-0035, version 1.0, June 15th
2007
[10] Technical Guideline TR-03110-3 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents, Part 3: Common Specifications, Version 2.10, March 10th
2012
6. ANNEXES
There is no additional information which is inappropriate for reference in other sections