UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
TÜBİTAK BİLGEM UEKAE
NATIONAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF ELECTRONICS AND
CRYPTOLOGY
eID Technologies Unit
AKiS v2.5.2N
SECURITY TARGET LITE
Revision no 01
Revision date 27.05.2019
Document code AKiS-252N-STL-01
Prepared by eID Technologies Unit
Approved by AKiS Project Manager
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REVISION HISTORY
Revision # Revision Reason Date
01 First version 27.05.2019
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CONTENTS
Revision History........................................................................................................................................2
Contents ...................................................................................................................................................3
List of Figures............................................................................................................................................6
List of Tables.............................................................................................................................................7
ST Introduction.........................................................................................................................................8
1.1 ST Reference.....................................................................................................................8
1.2 TOE Reference ..................................................................................................................8
1.3 TOE Overview ...................................................................................................................8
1.3.1 TOE Type and TOE Coverage ........................................................................................... 8
1.3.2 Major Security Properties of the TOE.............................................................................. 9
1.3.3 The Usage of the TOE .................................................................................................... 10
1.4 Required non-TOE HW/ SW/ Firmware Available to the TOE ............................................11
1.5 TOE Description ..............................................................................................................12
1.5.1 Logical View................................................................................................................... 12
1.5.2 Physical View................................................................................................................. 13
1.5.3 Interfaces....................................................................................................................... 13
1.5.4 Life Cycle........................................................................................................................ 14
2 Platform Information ......................................................................................................17
2.1 Platform Identification....................................................................................................17
2.2 Platform Description.......................................................................................................18
2.2.1 Product specific features............................................................................................... 18
2.2.2 Crypto Library................................................................................................................ 19
3 CC Conformance Claim ....................................................................................................21
3.1 PP Claim .........................................................................................................................21
3.2 Package Claim.................................................................................................................21
4 Security Problem Definition.............................................................................................22
4.1 Assets.............................................................................................................................22
4.1.1 Primary Assets............................................................................................................... 22
4.1.2 Secondary Assets........................................................................................................... 22
4.2 Subjects and External Entities..........................................................................................24
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4.3 Threats ...........................................................................................................................26
4.3.1 Hardware Related Threats............................................................................................. 26
4.3.2 Additional Threats Due To Composıte TOE Specific Functionality................................ 27
4.4 Organisational Security Policies.......................................................................................29
4.5 Assumptions...................................................................................................................32
5 Security Objectives .........................................................................................................33
5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE .......................................................................................33
5.2 Security Objectives for Operational Environment.............................................................36
5.3 Security Objectives Rationale ..........................................................................................37
6 Extended Components ....................................................................................................40
6.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS (Audit Data Storage) ....................................................40
6.1.1 FAU_SAS.1 Audit Storage .............................................................................................. 40
6.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RNG (Generatıon of Random Numbers) ...............................41
6.2.1 FCS_RNG.1 Random Number Generation..................................................................... 41
6.3 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM (Limited Capabilities And Availability)..........................41
6.3.1 FMT_LIM.1 Limited Capabilities .................................................................................... 42
6.3.2 FMT_LIM.2 Limited Availability..................................................................................... 43
6.4 Definition of the Family FIA_API (Application Proof of Identity)........................................43
6.4.1 FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity................................................................... 43
6.5 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation)......................................................44
6.5.1 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation....................................................................................... 44
7 Security Requirements....................................................................................................45
7.1 Overview........................................................................................................................45
7.2 Security Functional Requirements ...................................................................................45
7.2.1 Class FAU: Security Audit............................................................................................... 49
7.2.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support.................................................................................. 50
7.2.3 Class FDP: User Data Protection.................................................................................... 63
7.2.4 Class FIA: Identification and authentication.................................................................. 70
7.2.5 Class FMT: Security Management................................................................................. 74
7.2.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF .................................................................................... 79
7.2.7 Class FRU: Resource Utilisation..................................................................................... 82
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7.3 Security Assurance Requirements....................................................................................82
7.4 Security Requirements Dependencies..............................................................................82
7.4.1 Security Functional Requirements Dependencies......................................................... 82
7.4.2 Security Assurance Requirements Dependencies......................................................... 89
7.5 Security Functional Requirements Rationale....................................................................90
7.6 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ....................................................................96
8 TOE Summary Specification.............................................................................................97
8.1 SF_OPC: Control of Operating Conditions.........................................................................97
8.2 SF_PHY: Protection against Physical Modification ............................................................97
8.3 SF_LOG: Logical Protection..............................................................................................98
8.4 SF_COMP: Mode Management and Protection ................................................................98
8.5 SF_CSUP: Cryptographic Support .....................................................................................99
8.6 SF_IA: Identification and Authentication........................................................................100
8.7 SF_SMAC: Security Management And Access Control.....................................................100
8.8 SF_SM: Secure Messaging .............................................................................................101
8.9 Security Functions Rationale .........................................................................................102
Abbreviations and Definitions............................................................................................................. 105
Bibliography......................................................................................................................................... 106
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Coverage of the composite TOE............................................................................................... 9
Figure 2: AKiS v2.5.2N Logical View....................................................................................................... 12
Figure 3 : Functional Diagram of the SmartMX3 P71 product family ................................................... 19
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Commands used in the initialization and personalization phases .......................................... 16
Table 2: Primary assets of the TOE........................................................................................................ 22
Table 3: Secondary assets of the TOE ................................................................................................... 23
Table 4: Subjects and external entities of the TOE ............................................................................... 24
Table 5: Hardware related threats........................................................................................................ 26
Table 6: Terminal and communication related threats......................................................................... 27
Table 7: Card cloning and forgery related threats ................................................................................ 29
Table 8: Composite TOE policies ........................................................................................................... 29
Table 9: Composite TOE assumptions................................................................................................... 32
Table 10: Embedded software objectives............................................................................................. 33
Table 11: Operational environment objectives..................................................................................... 36
Table 12: Security objectives versus threats, OSPs, and assumptions.................................................. 38
Table 13: List of SFRs............................................................................................................................. 45
Table 14: Dependency of composite TOE SFRs..................................................................................... 83
Table 15: Dependencies of composite TOE SARs.................................................................................. 89
Table 16: Coverage of TOE objectives by SFRs...................................................................................... 93
Table 17: Coverage of SFRs by TOE security features ......................................................................... 102
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ST INTRODUCTION
1.1 ST REFERENCE
Title: Security Target Lite of AKiS v2.5.2N
Document Version: 01
CC Version: 3.1 (Revision 4)
Assurance Level: EAL 4+ AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2
1.2 TOE REFERENCE
The current Security Target refers to the product AKiS v2.5.2N.
1.3 TOE OVERVIEW
1.3.1 TOE TYPE AND TOE COVERAGE
AKiS v2.5.2N contact based smartcard is a composite product consisting of Embedded Operating
System, platform crypto library (platform library) and the platform security IC (platform IC). The
crypto library is evaluated as a composite product consisting of crypto library and security IC NXP
Technologies, SmartMX3 P71D320P. Detailed information for the platform is given in Section 2.
The TOE consists of
 AKiS v2.5.2N Embedded Operating System,
 IC dedicated software (test and support software including relevant libraries),
 IC dedicated crypto library,
 security IC,
 guidance documentation,
 activation data.
The coverage of the composite TOE defined in this Security Target is shown in Figure 1 as a shaded
region. Platform library is a composite product using some of the features of the platform. AKiS
v2.5.2N covers the features from both the platform library and the platform IC.
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Figure 1: Coverage of the composite TOE
1.3.2 MAJOR SECURITY PROPERTIES OF THE TOE
The TOE provides the following services to the application:
 Protection against modification, probing, environmental stress and emanation attacks mainly
by platform specification and Embedded Operating System support as detailed in Section 8
 Access control to services and data by using role attribute, PIN-knowledge attribute,
activation agent authentication status, personalization agent authentication status,
initialization agent authentication status and device authentication status.
 The following identification and authentication services:
 activation agent identification & authentication by asymmetric cryptographic
verification,
 initialization and personalization agent identification & authentication by symmetric
decryption,
 terminal and chip identification & authentication by certificate authentication,
 role identification & authentication by certificate authentication,
 user identification & authentication by PIN verification.
 Security management, for services and data by supporting activation agent, initialization
agent and personalization agent roles, and any other roles defined by the application.
 Secure messaging services between TOE and the terminal.
 The following cryptographic services:
 SHA Operation,
 AES Operation,
 MAC, Retail-MAC and CMAC Operation,
 TDES Operation,
 signature generation PKCS#1 v1.5,
AKiS v2.5.2N EOS
Platform IC
Platform Library
TOE
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 signature generation PKCS#1 v2.1,
 signature generation ISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme 1,
 signature generation ECDSA,
 signature verification ISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme 11
,
 asymmetric decryption PKCS#1 v1.5,
 asymmetric decryption PKCS#1 v2.1,
 asymmetric encryption/decryption RAW RSA2
,
 RSA key pair generation,
 ECC key pair generation,
 random number generation.
Note 1: The cryptographic functionality of AKiS v2.5.2N Embedded Operating System includes SHA-1,
SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and RSA 1024-to-2816 bit operations. However, SHA-1 and RSA-1024
operations are not included in the scope of evaluation because of security considerations.
1.3.3 THE USAGE OF THE TOE
The TOE is designed and developed to be as a platform for smart card applications. It supports the
life cycle requirements of the smart card applications and provides security services to the smart card
applications.
AKiS v2.5.2N supports two different configurations to the application owner:
 chip configuration,
 SAM configuration.
Chip configuration is developed to act as user card application like eIDs. The SAM configuration is
developed to act on behalf of the terminal as a secure access module.
TOE has security features as detailed in Section 1.3.2, for both configurations. But, there is a slight
difference between two configurations in their secure messaging properties.
In chip configuration, two secure messaging types are performed.
1 No interface for ISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme 1 signature generation and verification is present. The services start during
secure messaging automatically.
2 No interface for RAW RSA encryption/decryption is present. The service starts during secure messaging automatically.
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The first one is mutual authentication between card (chip) and the terminal by certificate exchange.
In this method, both the terminal and the card possess a public key certificate and the corresponding
private key. They share their trusted public keys with each other by certificate exchange procedure.
Next, they agree on secure messaging keys by key agreement procedure. Finally secure messaging
starts. This secure messaging starts in each mutual authentication automatically.
In the second method, a random data is generated by the terminal and sent to TOE confidentially.
Next, using this random data, card and the terminal agree on the secure messaging keys by key
agreement procedure. Finally, TOE starts secure messaging. Public key cryptography is used in each
step of the key agreement process to ensure confidentiality. No certificate is needed in this method.
In SAM configuration, only the second method is performed.
The other difference between the two configurations is in the terminal authentication method. Chip
configuration provides terminal authentication by internal and external authentication with
certificate exchange. But in SAM configuration, it is provided by PIN authentication. By this way,
“authenticated terminal” means PIN authenticated terminal for SAM configuration.
1.4 REQUIRED NON-TOE HW/ SW/ FIRMWARE AVAILABLE TO THE TOE
None.
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1.5 TOE DESCRIPTION
1.5.1 LOGICAL VIEW
The logical view of the TOE is given in Figure 2. Logicaly, TOE consists of the communication
subsystem, command subsystem, cryptographic support subsystem, security subsystem, memory
and file subsystem and system subsystem.
Figure 2: AKiS v2.5.2N Logical View
Communication Subsystem
Communication subsystem manages the communication between AKiS v2.5.2N and the external
world. Two layered communication takes place between the outer world and AKiS v2.5.2N, for the
transmission purposes T=1 protocol is implemented, for the application purposes APDU packets are
used [ 9 ].
Command Subsystem
Command subsystem processes the commands received from communication subsystem. It
performs the commands via help of the security subsystem, memory and file subsystem.
Cryptographic Support Subsystem
All cryptographic functions like encryption, decryption, signature generation, signature verification,
random number generation, hash calculation are performed within this subsystem.
Application
Terminal
Communication
Subsystem
Command
Subsystem
Security
Subsystem
Memory and File Subsystem
AKiS v2.5.2N
TPDU
APDU
Cryptographic
Support
Subsystem
System
Subsystem
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Security Subsystem
Access control conditions and lifecycle management operations are performed within this
subsystem. Whenever a security control is to be done via command subsystem, it asks to the security
subsystem if the action is allowed or not.
Memory and File Subsystem
Memory and file subsystem manages the non-volatile memory of the security IC. Memory and file
subsystem gives services to both of the command subsystem and the security subsystem.
System Subsystem
System subsystem includes the functions related to the whole system such as security controls of the
system.
1.5.2 PHYSICAL VIEW
Physical view of the TOE is given in the platform information.
1.5.3 INTERFACES
For the electrical I/O:
 ISO 1177 - Information Processing Character Structure For Start/Stop And Synchronous
Character Oriented Transmission [ 8 ].
For the transmission:
 ISO 7816-3 Information Technology – Identification Cards – Integrated Circuits with Contacts
Part 3: Electronic Signals and Transmission Protocols - T=1 Protocol [ 9 ].
For the application:
 ISO 7816-4 Information Technology – Identification Cards – Integrated Circuits with Contacts
Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange [ 10 ].
 ISO 7816-8 Information Technology – Identification Cards – Integrated Circuits with Contacts
Part 8: Commands for security operations [ 10 ].
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 ISO 7816-9 Information Technology – Identification Cards – Integrated Circuits with Contacts
Part 9: Commands for card management [ 12 ].
1.5.4 LIFE CYCLE
AKiS v2.5.2N is a composite product of Security IC and Embedded Operating System. Being a smart
card application, TOE has a similar life cycle as defined IC PP [ 1 ].
There are slight differences for composite TOE. The first one, delivery of composite TOE is performed
after phase 5. Also, additional sub phases are defined for composite TOE.
A brief overview is given below for common phases which are detailed in IC PP [ 1 ]. Although TOE
delivery refers to “after Phase-5”, due to configuration needs after TOE delivery, Phase-6 is divided
into sub phases that are described in the following section subsection.
Life Cycle Phases:
Phase-1:
 Security IC embedded software, or, Embedded Operating System, development.
Phase-2:
 IC development:
 IC design,
 IC dedicated software development.
Phase-3:
 IC manufacturing:
 integration and photo mask fabrication,
 IC production,
 IC testing.
Phase-4:
 IC Packaging.
 Security IC packaging (and testing).
Phase-5:
 Composite product integration.
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Phase-6:
 Personalization:
 the composite product personalization and testing stage where the user data of the
composite TOE is loaded into the security IC's memory.
Phase-7:
 Operational phase:
 the composite product usage by its issuers and consumers which may include loading
and other management of applications.
Sub Phases of Phase 6 and Additional Phase Defined for Embedded Operating System
Phase-6 is separated into three following sub-phases by Embedded Operating System:
 activation sub-phase,
 initialization sub-phase,
 personalization sub-phase,
Additionally, “death phase” is added.
Activation Sub-phase:
The TOE, AKiS v2.5.2N, is activated and, at the same time, initialization key and personalization key
are loaded in this phase. The TOE accepts only PERFORM SECURITY OPERATION (PSO) command,
activation command and some commands that provide very limited information about the TOE in
this phase. Before the activation command, activation agent is to transfer activation public key, in
the same session, to the TOE via PSO: VERIFY CERTIFICATE command. Managed by activation agent,
this phase is ended by activation operation in which a 2048 bit cryptogram created using activation
private key is sent to the TOE via EXCHANGE CHALLENGE command. If the signature of cryptogram is
verified successfully, activation is completed and the composite TOE (card) becomes ready for
initialization.
Initialization Sub-phase:
This phase starts by successful authentication of initialization key. Another successful authentication
is needed to complete this phase. File architecture is created by initialization agent. Application data
also might be written and access rules might be defined in this phase. Commands listed in Table 1
can be used by initialization agent. Initialization agent can perform any operation by using these
commands. Application specific restrictions cannot be implemented in initialization sub-phase.
Initialization operations must be performed in a secure environment.
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Table 1: Commands used in the initialization and personalization phases
#
Commands
1. KART TEST
2. EXCHANGE CHALLENGE
3. INITIALIZATION3
4. PERSONALIZATION4
5. CHANGE KEY
6. FORMAT
7. ERASE BINARY
8. DIR
9. DELETE SDO
10. GET DATA
11. PUT DATA
12. GET RESPONSE
13. GET CHALLENGE
14. SELECT FILE
15. CREATE FILE
16. DELETE FILE
17. UPDATE BINARY
18. READ BINARY
19. APPEND RECORD
20. UPDATE RECORD
21. READ RECORD
22. GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR
23. TERMINATE CARD USAGE
3 Applicable only in the initialization sub-phase
4 Applicable only in the personalization sub-phase
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Personalization Sub-phase:
This phase starts by successful authentication of personalization key. Another successful
authentication is needed to complete this phase. Personal information data are written and access
rules are defined in this phase. Listed commands in Table 1 can be used by personalization agent.
Personalization agent can perform any operation by using these commands. Application specific
restrictions cannot be implemented in personalization sub-phase.
Personalization operations must be performed in a secure environment.
Death Phase:
Death phase is defined by Embedded Operating System. TOE becomes out of order and can’t be used
as a legitimate one. TOE enters this phase because of unsuccessful authentication attempts during
activation, initialization and personalization. In addition, some critical integrity errors in operational
stage cause death phase. In this phase, TOE doesn’t accept any command, but the ones that provide
limited information about TOE.
2 PLATFORM INFORMATION
2.1 PLATFORM IDENTIFICATION
Platform:
NXP Technologies, SmartMX3 P71D320P
Platform ST:
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7021 VA Security Target Lite, Rev. 1.1, 2017-05-31
Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA Security Target Lite, Rev. 1.1, 5 July 2017
Platform PP Conformance:
Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, Registered and
Certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-CC-
PP-0084-2014
Platform Assurance Level:
EAL 6+ ALC_FLR.1
Platform Certification Report:
BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-2017 for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7021 VA including IC Dedicated
Software from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-2017 for Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA from NXP Semiconductors Germany
GmbH
Common Criteria Version:
CC v3.1 Revision 4
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2.2 PLATFORM DESCRIPTION
2.2.1 PRODUCT SPECIFIC FEATURES
o High-performance dual-Interface secure microprocessor
o Top-level cryptography engines with "full key length" support
 Dedicated cryptography functional unit for symmetric DES and AES algorithms
 112-bit (two-key) and 168-bit (three-key) triple-DES (TDES or 3DES), in various
configurations
 AES with 128, 192 and 256-bit key length
 Asymmetric cryptography accelerator unit, supporting RSA, ECC and related
algorithms
 RSA cryptography with arbitrary key length up to 4096 bits
 Elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) with key length up to 640 bits
o True Random Number Generator, compliant to AIS31
o Deterministic Random Number Generator for faster execution in cases where lower RNG
entropy is sufficient
o Cyclic redundancy check (CRC) functional unit for 16 and 32-bit operation
o Large memory for operating system design flexibility
o NXP FlexMem approach
o Secure bootloader for initial loading or updates of Flash memory; suitable for use in secure
manufacturing sites as well as in general environments. Various configuration options exist
to manage and delegate rights for access and writing.
o Vertical Firewall technology
o Dual-interface support with wide configuration range
Security features
 90nm CMOS technology offers strong inherent protection against invasive attacks on logic and
memories
 NXP Glue Logic concept effectively de-correlates the function and location of circuitry on the
device: no functional blocks are recognizable in any physical layer of the device, adding another
level of protection against active and passive invasive attacks
 No use of logical hardmacro blocks; all logics in the device - including CPU, coprocessors and all
other functions - are synthesized into a single glue logic area.
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Functional diagram
The diagram provides a generic overview of the architecture of the SmartMX3 P71 product family.
Functional blocks, pins and connections shown in this diagram are optional and represent a super-set
of those elements actually implemented in a real product.
Figure 3 : Functional Diagram of the SmartMX3 P71 product family
2.2.2 CRYPTO LIBRARY
Symmetric Cipher Library
The Configurable Symmetric Cipher library component supports:
• AES encryption and decryption with key length 128, 192 and 256 bit
•
• 3-DES encryption and decryption using two single-DES keys
• 3-DES encryption and decryption using three single-DES keys
• ECB mode
• CBC mode
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• RSA Library
The following functions are included within the RSA component (implemented according to [ 22 ]):
• RSA public key operation
• RSA private key (in CRT format) operation
• RSA calculation of public exponent from an RSA CRT private key
The supported key length for the public modulus n is between 512 and 4096 bits.
RSA Key Generation Library
RSA Key Generation (in CRT format) is included within the RSA component. The supported key length
for the public modulus n is between 512 and 4096 bits.
ECC Library
The following functions are included within the ECC over GF(p) component (implemented according
to [ 26 ] and [ 27 ]):
 ECDSA Signature Generation
 EC Key generation
The supported elliptic curve key length is between 128 and 640 bits.
SHA Library
The SHA library component implements hashing according to the standard [ 16 ]. It supports the
algorithms SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 for messages of length equal to an integer
number of bytes, up to a maximum length of 261
-1 bytes in length for SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256,
and up to a maximum length of 2125
-1 bytes in length for SHA-384 and SHA-512.
RNG Library
The RNG library component implements pseudo-random number generation according to the NIST
SP 800-90A specification (see [ 21 ]). The block cipher operations can be selected by the user to run
in either DES (3-Key TDEA) or AES (128, 192 or 256) mode.
Hash Library
The Hash library component implements a common interface to the hashing algorithms provided by
the hashing components.
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3 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM
This security target claims conformance to
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional
Components; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance
Components; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
As conformance claim is as follows:
 part 2 extended,
 part 3 conformant.
3.1 PP CLAIM
This ST does not claim conformance to any PP.
3.2 PACKAGE CLAIM
The current ST is conformant to the following security requirements package: assurance package
EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 as defined in the CC, part 3.
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4 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
The TOE is the Embedded Operating System (EOS) with NXP secure crypto library on SmartMX3
(platform library) on NXP chip, P71D320P (platform IC, or the security IC). Hence application (eID
application, banking application etc.) is not part of the TOE; it does not have user data and TSF data
belonging to the application. But it provides containers for storing files, keys and PINs, and
functionality to manage these entities to the application.
4.1 ASSETS
AKiS v2.5.2N is the composite product consisting of the Embedded Operating System, crypto library
(platform library) and the security IC (platform IC). Since the security target of the platform IC and
platform library claims strict conformance to the PP [ 1 ] the assets defined in section 3.1 of the
protection profile apply to this Security Target.
Additional assets are defined below.
4.1.1 PRIMARY ASSETS
Primary assets represent user data in the sense of the CC. They are given in Table 2.
Table 2: Primary assets of the TOE
Asset Name
Definition Protection
Need
Files (user data
stored)
All files that is provided to the application to store data Confidentiality
Integrity
User data
transferred
All data transferred between TOE and external entities Confidentiality
Integrity
4.1.2 SECONDARY ASSETS
Secondary assets include TSF and TSF data of the TOE. They are given in Table 3.
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Table 3: Secondary assets of the TOE
Asset Name
Definition Protection
Need
PINs TOE should provide PIN verification mechanism to the
application but it does not have natively PINs. As part of
the PIN verification mechanism, PINs are stored in the
containers that is provided by TOE and transferred by the
TSF mechanisms. Therefore, confidentiality and integrity of
the PINS are satisfied by both TOE and the application.
Confidentiality
Integrity
Keys Applications might need keys for their security
functionality. TOE should provide containers to the
application to store and manage them securely. Namely,
confidentiality and the integrity of the keys are satisfied by
TOE and the application.
Confidentiality
Integrity
Access reference
rules file
This is the file to be created by the application that
arranges access control to the assets and to the TSF
Interface. The integrity need of this file is different than the
standard file (user data stored). Thus this is regarded as a
different asset.
Confidentiality
Integrity
Activation data These are the data used in the activation agent
authentication.
Confidentiality
Integrity
Initialization and
personalization
data
These are the data used in authentication of initialization
and personalization agents.
Confidentiality
Integrity
SAM or chip PubK SAM or Chip Public Keys (PubK) are used to verify the root
CA certificates
Integrity
SAM or chip PrK The SAM or Chip Private Keys (PrK) are used to prove the
authenticity of the TOE.
Confidentiality
Integrity
SAM or chip CA
certificate
Root CA Certificate is the root certificate to be used to
validate certificate chains.
Integrity
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Asset Name
Definition Protection
Need
SAM or chip
certificate
The SAM or Chip Certificates are used to prove the
authenticity of SAM or Chip Public Key. They are signed by
CA certificate.
Integrity
IC identification
data
It is the data to uniquely identify the TOE. Integrity
EOS code TSF code is the EOS code that is in operation and in
storage. For the proper function of TOE, integrity,
confidentiality of the TSF Code must be protected. Also its
correct operation must be maintained.
Integrity,
confidentiality
Security services The TOE provides security services to the application.
Correct operation of the cryptographic operations is
essential for the application that the TOE serves for.
Correct
Operation
Files (as TSF data) The TOE provides data containers to the application, these
data containers can be used as TSF data by the application.
So, TOE might include files as TSF Data in addition to other
TSF data.
Confidentiality,
integrity
Genuineness of
TOE
Genuineness of the SC shows that it is neither copied nor
cloned.
Availability
4.2 SUBJECTS AND EXTERNAL ENTITIES
This ST considers the external entities and subjects given in Table 4.
Table 4: Subjects and external entities of the TOE
Entity
Subject Definition
Activation
agent
+ Activation agent is the entity who activates the card and writes
the configuration data, initialization and personalization data to
the TOE.
Initialization
agent
+ Initialization agent is the entity who initializes the TOE.
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Entity
Subject Definition
Personalization
agent
+ Personalization agent is the entity who personalizes the TOE.
Terminal
+ The entity that card communicates with.
Application
defined role
+ Any agent defined by application developer. Application
developer may be thought as Initialization and personalization
agent.
Card holder
- Card holder is whom the card is issued for. It is the owner of the
Chip Card.
IC developer
- The entity that designs the IC and develops the IC Dedicated
Software.
EOS developer
- The entity that designs and develops the EOS.
Application
developer
- The entity that designs and develops the application.
IC
manufacturer
- The entity that performs the following activities:
 production of the Integrated circuit,
 testing the Integrated circuit,
 EOS is loaded to the NVM of the IC. Flash loader
mechanism is not disabled by the IC manufacturer,
 writes the configuration data and IC serial number.
Card Issuer
- The entity holding the authority to issue the cards. Card issuer
employs the application developer to develop the application that
fulfills its needs. After the application is developed and the TOE is
received, card issuer may separate its authority to the following
roles: activation agent, initialization agent and personalization
agent and delegate these roles to other entities or perform them
by itself.
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Entity
Subject Definition
Certificate
authorities
(Root CA, chip
CA, terminal
CA, role CA)
- Certificate authorities are the entities which issue the certificates.
Chip CA and terminal CA (valid for chip configuration) certificates
are signed by the root CA.
Attacker
- A threat agent trying to violate the system security policy.
Attacker may have at most high attack potential.
4.3 THREATS
4.3.1 HARDWARE RELATED THREATS
Threats related to hardware are defined and explained in the platform protection profile [ 1 ] and
also given in Table 5.
Table 5: Hardware related threats
Threat Definition
T.Phys-Tamper An attacker may perform physical probing of the TOE in order (i) to
disclose user data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the TOE’s Embedded
Operating System or (iii) to disclose other critical information about the
operation of the TOE.
An attacker may physically modify the TOE in order to alter (i) its security
functionality (hardware and software part, as well), (ii) the user data or the
TSF-data stored on the TOE.
T.Information_Leakage An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE during its usage
in order to disclose confidential user data and/or TSF-data. The
information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by
the attacker.
T.Malfunction An attacker may cause a malfunction of the TOE’s hardware and
Embedded Operating System by applying environmental stress in order to
(i) deactivate or modify security features or functionality of the TOE's
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Threat Definition
hardware or to (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of
the TOE's Embedded Operating System. This may be achieved, e.g., by
operating the TOE outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting
errors in the TOE's Embedded Operating System or misusing
administrative functions. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an attacker needs
information about the functional operation of the TOE.
T.Abuse-Func An attacker may use functions of the TOE which may not be used after the
delivery of the TOE in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the user data
stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in
the TOE or (iii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or modify)
security functionality of the TOE. This threat addresses the misuse of the
functions for the initialization and personalization in the operational phase
after delivery to the TOE holder.
4.3.2 ADDITIONAL THREATS DUE TO COMPOSITE TOE SPECIFIC FUNCTIONALITY
In this section, threats due to composite TOE specific functionality are defined. These threats are
terminal and communication related threats, and card cloning and forgery related threats. They are
given in Table 6 and Table 7 respectively.
Table 6: Terminal and communication related threats
Threat Definition
T.Eavesdropping An attacker may monitor the communication between the TOE and
the terminal/card reader to get unauthorized access to the user
data and/or TSF Data.
T.Session_Hijacking An attacker may wait until the identification and authentication
process is completed and session is established between the TOE
and the terminal. After the session is established, attacker may take
out the TOE or the terminal from the communication channel and
takes over. That way attacker bypasses the identification and
authentication process and accesses to services illegitimately.
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Threat Definition
T.Man_in_The_Middle An attacker may alter the communication between the TOE and the
terminal. An attacker listens and alters the connection between the
TOE and the terminal in order to access the services that he or she is
unauthorized to access.
T.Skimming The terminal which obtains smart card’s interactions with the world
by controlling all I/O’s can observe user identification data, so this
terminal must be trusted not to capture the user’s identification
data. Concerning a variety of fake-terminal attacks become possible,
in these cases the user must be able to differentiate between “real
devices” that are manufactured by a trusted party and between
“fake devices” that are manufactured by the attackers. The user
cannot identify that the terminal has hidden features, for example
the message they sign was not altered by a malicious terminal. The
security has nothing to do with the smart card/ terminal exchange;
it is the back-end processing system that monitors the card.
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Table 7: Card cloning and forgery related threats
Threat Definition
T.Counterfeit An attacker produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a
genuine TOE to be used as part of a counterfeit operation. He or she
may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the
data from a genuine TOE and copy them on another functionally
appropriate chip to imitate this genuine TOE. This violates the
genuineness of the TOE being used either for authentication of a
Card presenter as the Card holder.
T.Unauthorised_Access An attacker may access to data that he or she is not authorized to.
T.Unauthorised_Management An attacker may illegitimately use the security management services
of the TOE.
4.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES
Organizational security policies of the composite TOE is given in Table 8.
Table 8: Composite TOE policies
#
Policy Name Definition
1. P.Identification_and_Authentication
The TOE shall support
 chip authentication,
 terminal authentication,
 PIN verification,
 role holder authentication
and any combination of this.
In addition, TOE shall calculate the cryptographic
checksum value of the Embedded Operating System
HEX code in the flash memory code area and return it
upon request, and each instantiation of the TOE shall
include a unique identification.
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2. P.PKI
There will be Certificate Authorities (CA’s) for terminal
authentication, chip authentication, and role
authentication and the certificates for these CA’s will
be signed by Root CA. Terminal certificates, chip
certificates, and role certificates will be signed by the
corresponding CA.
3. P.Access_Control
Role attribute, PIN knowledge attribute, device
authentication attribute of the user shall be used as a
security attribute to determine the access control
behavior and security management privileges during
operational phase.
No memory separation is required in the operational
phase (the TOE is a single application EOS), the access
control is rather file permission based. However,
memory separation is required in between the
memory areas of IC dedicated software and the EOS
which is supported by the platform.
Another security feature related to access control and
not derived from the threats is access to Special
Function Registers and hardware resources. Access
control policy for the access to the SFRs and hardware
resources by System Mode and the EOS code
(executing in User Mode) shall be applied such that
EOS gains access to resources via the NXP System
Mode.
4. P.PreOperational_Security_Managem
ent
The TOE shall support
 activation agent,
 initialization agent,
 personalization agent
functions and roles.
Personalization software shall handle the user data
considering their integrity as stated in the Guidance
Documents.
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5. P.Operational_Security_Management
The TOE shall support any management function and
role defined by the application.
Software accessing the TOE in the operational phase
shall check the integrity of the user data stored in the
TOE in each read operation as described in the
Guidance Documents.
6. P.Cryptographic_Operations
The TOE shall support following cryptographic
functions:
 RSA key pair generation,
 ECC key pair generation,
 hash calculation,
 eSign operations,
 PKCS #1 v2.1 PSS,
 PKCS #1 v1.5,
 ISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme 1,
 ECDSA
 asymmetric decryption,
 PKCS #1 v2.1 OAEP,
 PKCS #1 v1.5,
 Raw RSA
 asymmetric encryption,
 Raw RSA
 TDES operation,
 AES operation,
 MAC, Retail-MAC and CMAC operation,
 Destruction of the keys used
7. P.Process-TOE
An accurate identification must be established for the
TOE. This requires that each instantiation of the TOE
carries this unique identification. This also results in a
unique activation cryptogram for each TOE.
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4.5 ASSUMPTIONS
Assumptions for the operational environment of the composite TOE is given in Table 9.
Table 9: Composite TOE assumptions
#
Assumption Name Definition
1. A.Secure_Application
It is assumed that the application correctly defines the
access rules of the application data.
2. A.Key_and_Certificate_Security
It is assumed that all keys and certificates are produced,
stored and used securely outside of TOE.
3. A.PIN_Handling
It is assumed that PINS belonging to the application are
handled securely by PIN owner.
4. A.Personnel_Security
It is assumed that personnel who hold privileges over the
TOE acts responsively and according to the application
requirements.
5. A.Trusted_Parties
It is assumed that the authenticated parties that the TOE
communicates act responsively.
6. A.Pre-Operational_Environment
It is assumed that the Physical environments of
initialization and personalization phases are secure.
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5 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
5.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE
The TOE is the composite product consisting of the Embedded Operating System, the platform library
and the platform IC. The platform IC and the Embedded Operating System have different interfaces
to the external world. The platform has the physical and electrical interfaces and the Embedded
Operating System has the logical interfaces. Therefore, the attacks done through the physical and
electrical interfaces are mostly countered by the platform and the attacks performed through logical
interfaces are countered by the Embedded Operating System.
Objectives for the embedded software (platform library and the Embedded Operating System) are
defined in Table 10.
Table 10: Embedded software objectives
Objective
Definition
OT.Identification_and_Authentication The TOE shall support (i) activation agent authentication, (ii)
initialization agent authentication, (iii) personalization agent
authentication, (iv) chip authentication, (v) terminal
authentication5
, (vi) role certificate holder authentication
and (vii) PIN verification.
In addition, each instantiation of TOE shall include a unique
identification number.
The TOE shall support means to check FabKey data when the
very first APDU command is received in the lifetime of the
TOE.
The TOE shall also provide means to update the EOS in its
non-volatile memory for which all the security requirements
of the platform are fulfilled.
OT.Access_Control The TOE shall control the access to the user data and
security services according to access control rules
5 Provided by PIN authentication for SAM Configuration.
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Objective
Definition
determined by the application. Role attribute, PIN-
knowledge attribute, device authentication status and
authentication should be used as security attributes during
the decision of access permission.
OT.Security_Management The TOE shall support (i) activation agent role, (ii)
initialization agent role, (iii) personalization agent role, and
(iv) any other roles defined by the application.
OT.Cryptographic_Operations The TOE shall perform following: (i) asymmetric key pair
generation, (ii) random number generation, (iii) hash
calculation, (iv) eSign operations, (v) symmetric
cryptographic operations and (vi) destruction of the keys
used (all of the operations should be secure against side
channel attacks)
OT.Prot_Malfunction The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must
prevent its operation outside the normal operating
conditions where reliability and secure operation have not
been proven or tested. This is to prevent functional errors in
the TOE.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper The TOE must provide protection of confidentiality and
integrity of the user data, the TSF-data and the Embedded
Software by means of
 measuring through galvanic contacts representing a
direct physical probing on the chip's surface except on
pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring
voltage and current) or
 measuring not using galvanic contacts, but other types
of physical interaction between electrical charges
(using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC
failure analysis),
 manipulation of the hardware and its security
functionality, as well as
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Objective
Definition
 controlled manipulation of memory contents (user
data, TSF-data)
with a prior
 reverse engineering to understand the design and its
properties and functionality.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of
confidential user data and/or TSF-data stored by the IC
 by measurement and analysis of the shape and
amplitude of signals or the time between events found
by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field,
power consumption, clock, or I/O lines,
 by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
 by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func The TOE must prevent the abuse of the functions of the TOE,
which may not be used in TOE operational phase, in order (i)
to manipulate or to disclose the user data stored in the TOE,
(ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the
TOE, (iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify)
security functionality of the TOE.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof The TOE must enable the terminal connected to verify the
authenticity of the TOE as a whole device as issued by the
issuer by means of internal and external authentication.
OT.Secure_Communication The TOE shall support secure communication with the
terminal. TOE supports encryption, integrity and authenticity
protection against attacks during communication between
TOE and terminal.
OT.Storage_Integrity TOE shall support storage integrity protection for User Data
and TSF data.
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5.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Objectives for the operational environment are defined in Table 11.
Table 11: Operational environment objectives
Objective
Definition
OE.PKI There shall be terminal authentication CA, chip
authentication CA, Role CA all of which certificates are
signed by Root CA. Terminal Certificates, Chip Certificates
and Role Certificates must be signed by the corresponding
CA.
OE.Secure_Application Application shall correctly define the access rules of the
application data. Also application should fulfill the security
requirements of EOS as described in [ 13 ].
OE.Key_and_Certificate_Security Key creation and storage outside of the TOE shall be handled
securely.
OE.PIN_Handling PIN Creation and usage by Card Holder shall be handled
securely.
OE.Personnel_Security The personnel who have privileges (EOS developer,
activation agent, initialization agent and personalization
agent) shall have necessary security clearances and shall act
responsibly.
OE.Responsible_Parties The parties that the TOE communicates (sends or receives
data; and/or receives or gives services) should act
responsively. For example, terminal should protect any data
against confidentiality integrity attacks after taking TOE.
OE.Pre-Operational_Env_Sec Physical environment of initialization and personalization
phases shall be secure.
OE.User_Data_Handling The operational environment, i.e. activation software,
initialization software and personalization software and the
software accessing the TOE in the operational sub-phase
shall handle the user data considering the integrity means as
defined in the Guidance Documents.
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5.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE
The justification related to the threats “Physical Tampering (T.Phys-Tamper)”, “Information Leakage
(T.Information_Leakage)”, “Malfunction (T.Malfunction)”, and “Abuse of Functionality (T.Abuse-
Func)” is given below.
For all threats, the corresponding objectives in Section 5.1 are stated in a way, which directly
corresponds to the description of the threat in Section 4.3.1. It is clear from the description of each
objective that the corresponding threat is removed. More specifically, in every case the ability to use
the attack method successfully is countered by the objective.
Removal of T.Phys-Tamper and T.Malfunction is also supported by additional objectives as detailed
below:
T.Phys-Tamper is mainly removed by OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper.
T.Malfunction is mainly removed by OT.Prot_Malfunction. OT.Storage_Integrity supports by
detecting integrity anomalies and acting.
T.Eavesdropping is countered by OT.Secure_Communication.
T.Session_Hijacking is countered by OT.Secure_Communication.
T.Man_in_The_Middle is countered by OT.Secure_Communication.
T.Skimmming is countered by OT.Identification_and_Authentication and OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper as
they provide protection against physical manipulation of authenticity verification key.
T.Counterfeit is countered by OT.Identification_and_Authentication, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper,
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, and OT.Chip_Auth_Proof. Against the identification fraud,
the TOE provides identification and authentication services via
OT.Identification_and_Authentication. Against the attacks to these services, the TOE protects the TSF
data related with identification and authentication services. OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper,
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, and OT.Prot_Abuse-Func provide protection against disclosure of secret
authentication key.
T.Unauthorised_Access is countered by OT.Access_Control. It handles the unauthorized access to
the user data and services.
T.Unauthorised_Management is countered by OT.Security_Management, which provides
mechanisms to manage TSF data, and also provides for the Identification and authentication
requirements for the management activities.
P.Identification_and_Authentication is covered by OT.Identification_and_Authentication and
OT.Cryptographic_Operations. It covers the support for the chip authentication, terminal
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authentication6
, role holder authentication, and PIN verification mechanisms. CMAC property of the
OT.Cryptographic_Operations is relevant for this policy.
P.PKI is covered by OE.PKI. Additionally, OT.Identification_and_Authentication covers support for the
chip authentication, terminal authentication7
and role holder authentication mechanisms. These
authentication mechanisms include the verification of PKI hierarchy dictated by P.PKI.
P.Access_Control is covered by OT.Access_Control.
P.PreOperational_Security_Management is covered by OT.Security_Management and
OE.User_Data_Handling.
P.Operational_Security_Management is covered by OT.Security_Management and
OE.User_Data_Handling.
P.Cryptographic_Operations is covered by OT.Cryptographic_Operations.
A.Secure_Application is covered by OE.Secure_Application.
A.Key_and_Certificate_Security is covered by OE.Key_and_Certificate_Security.
A.PIN_Handling is covered by OE.PIN_Handling.
A.Personnel_Security is covered by OE.Personnel_Security.
A.Trusted_Parties is covered by OE.Responsible_Parties.
A.Pre-Operational_Environment is covered by OE.Pre-Operational_Env_Sec.
Table 12 gives the coverage of the threats, assumptions and OSPs by the objectives.
Table 12: Security objectives versus threats, OSPs, and assumptions
OT.Storage_Integrity
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Secure_Communication
OT.Identification_and_Authentication
OT.Access_Control
OT.Security_Management
OT.Cryptographic_Operations
OE.PKI
OE.User_Data_Handling
OE.Secure_Application
OE.Key_and_Certificate_Security
OE.PIN_Handling
OE.Personnel_Security
OE.Responsible_Parties
OE.Pre-Operational_Env_Sec
T.Skimming    
6 Provided by PIN authentication for SAM Configuration.
7 Provided by PIN authentication for SAM Configuration.
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T.Eavesdropping 
T.Counterfeit     
T.Abuse-Func 
T.Information_Leakage 
T.Phys-Tamper  
T.Malfunction  
T.Session_Hijacking 
T.Man_in_The_Middle 
T.Unauthorised_Access 
T.Unauthorised_Management 
P.Identification_and_Authentication  
P.PKI  
P.Access_Control 
P.PreOperational_Security_Management  
P.Operational_Security_Management  
P.Cryptographic_Operations 
P.Process-TOE 
A.Secure_Application 
A.Key_and_Certificate_Security 
A.PIN_Handling 
A.Personnel_Security 
A.Trusted_Parties 
A.Pre-Operational_Environment 
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6 EXTENDED COMPONENTS
The extended components defined and described for the TOE are:
 Family FAU_SAS (Audit Data Storage),
 Family FCS_RNG (Generation of Random Numbers),
 Family FMT_LIM (Limited capabilities and availability),
 Family FIA_API (Application Proof of Identity),
 Family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation).
6.1 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FAU_SAS (AUDIT DATA STORAGE)
FAU_SAS family of the Class FAU (Security Audit) describes the functional requirements for the
storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily
require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the
content of the audit records.
Family behavior
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component leveling
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
6.1.1 FAU_SAS.1 AUDIT STORAGE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: list of subjects] with the capability to store
[assignment: list of audit information] in the [assignment: type of persistent memory].
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6.2 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FCS_RNG (GENERATION OF RANDOM
NUMBERS)
This family describes the functional requirements for random number generation used for
cryptographic purposes.
Family behavior
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are intended
to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:
FCS_RNG.1: Generation of random numbers requires that the random numbers meet a defined
quality metric.
Management: FCS_RNG.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RNG.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
6.2.1 FCS_RNG.1 RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [selection: physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid]
random number generator that implements: [assignment: list of security capabilities].
FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet [assignment: a defined quality
metric].
6.3 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FMT_LIM (LIMITED CAPABILITIES AND
AVAILABILITY)
FMT_LIM of the Class FMT (Security Management) describes the functional requirements for the test
features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this
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class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism
used in the TOE appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by
limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
Family behavior
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a combined
manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the component Limited
Capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component leveling:
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities (perform
action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to Limited
capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by removing or by disabling functions in
a specific phase of the TOE’s life-cycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as follows.
6.3.1 FMT_LIM.1 LIMITED CAPABILITIES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits its capabilities so
that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is
enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
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6.3.2 FMT_LIM.2 LIMITED AVAILABILITY
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability so that in conjunction
with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
6.4 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FIA_API (APPLICATION PROOF OF IDENTITY)
FIA_API of the Class FIA (Identification and Authentication) describes the functional requirements for
proof of the claimed identity for the authentication verification by an external entity where the other
families of the class FIA address the verification of the identity of an external entity.
Family Behavior
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove its identity and to be verified by an
external entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component leveling:
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity:
Management: FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: Management of
authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.
Audit: FIA_API.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
6.4.1 FIA_API.1 AUTHENTICATION PROOF OF IDENTITY
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity
of the [assignment: authorized user or role].
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6.5 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FPT_EMSEC (TOE EMANATION)
FPT_EMSEC of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined here to describe the IT security
requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against TOE and other secret data where the
attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. This family describes the
functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed
by other functional requirements defined in Common Criteria Part 2.
Family behavior
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component Leveling
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF
data or user data.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access to TSF
data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT.EMSEC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
6.5.1 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE EMANATION
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment:
specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and
[assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following
interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
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7 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
7.1 OVERVIEW
This part of the ST defines the detailed security requirements that shall be satisfied by the TOE. The
statement of TOE security requirements shall define the functional and assurance security
requirements that the TOE needs to satisfy in order to meet the security objectives for the TOE. The
CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement, selection,
assignment, and iteration are defined in Section 8.1 of Common Criteria Part 1 [ 4 ]. Each of these
operations is used in this ST.
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts a
requirement. Refinements of security requirements are denoted in such a way that added words are
in bold text and removed are crossed out.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC instating a
requirement. Selections having been made are denoted as underlined text.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the
length of a password. Assignments are denoted by italicized text.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. Iteration is
denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the component identifier.
The assignment in a selection operation is used when assignment operation is selected a selection
option. Assignments in selections are denoted by italicized and underlined text.
7.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
TOE security functional requirements of the composite product are summarized in Table 13.
Table 13: List of SFRs
CLASS FAU
1. FAU_SAS.1 Audit Storage
CLASS FCS
2. FCS_CKM.1/SM
Cryptographic Key Generation - Secure Messaging Session
Keys
3. FCS_CKM.1/SM_PER-INI
Cryptographic Key Generation - Secure Messaging Keys for
Pre-Operational Phase
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4. FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair Cryptographic Key Generation - RSA Key Pair Generation
5. FCS_CKM.1/ECC_KeyPair Cryptographic Key Generation - ECC Key Pair Generation
6. FCS_CKM.2/SM Cryptographic Key Distribution - Secure Messaging Keys
7. FCS_CKM.2/SM_PER-INI
Cryptographic Key Distribution - Secure Messaging Keys For
Pre-Operational Phases
8. FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
9. FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic Operation-SHA Calculation
10. FCS_COP.1/SEC-MSG_AES
Cryptographic Operation - AES Calculation for Secure
Messaging
11.
FCS_COP.1/INIT-PERSO-
VER_AES
Cryptographic Operation - Initialization/Personalization
Verification with AES
12. FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC_AES Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption AES
13. FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC_TDES Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption TDES
14. FCS_COP.1/CMAC_AES Cryptographic Operation - AES CMAC Computation
15. FCS_COP.1/CMAC_TDES Cryptographic Operation - Triple DES CMAC Computation
16. FCS_COP.1/MAC_TDES Cryptographic Operation - Triple DES MAC Computation
17. FCS_COP.1/MAC_AES Cryptographic Operation - AES MAC Computation
18. FCS_COP.1/Retail-MAC Cryptographic Operation - Retail MAC Computation
19.
FCS_COP.1/SIG-
GEN_PKCS#1_V1.5
Cryptographic Operation - Signature Generation PKCS#1
v1.5
20.
FCS_COP.1/SIG-
GEN_PKCS#1_V2.1
Cryptographic Operation - Signature Generation PKCS#1
v2.1
21. FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_9796
Cryptographic Operation - Signature Generation ISO/IEC
9796-2 Scheme 1
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22. FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_ECDSA Cryptographic Operation - Signature Generation ECDSA
23. FCS_COP.1/SIG-VER_9796
Cryptographic Operation - Signature Verification ISO/IEC
9796-2 Scheme 1
24. FCS_COP.1/DEC_PKCS#1_V1.5
Cryptographic Operation - Asymmetric Decryption PKCS#1
v.1.5
25. FCS_COP.1/DEC_PKCS#1_V2.1
Cryptographic Operation - Asymmetric Decryption PKCS#1
v2.1 OAEP
26. FCS_COP.1/RSA_RAW
Cryptographic Operation - Asymmetric
Encryption/Decryption RAW RSA
27. FCS_RNG.1 Generation of Random Numbers
CLASS FDP
28. FDP_ACC.1/Data Subset Access Control-Data Access
29. FDP_ACC.1/FUN Subset Access Control - Function Access
30. FDP_ACF.1/Data Security Attribute Based Access Control-Data Access
31. FDP_ACF.1/FUN Security Attribute Based Access Control - Function Access
32. FDP_UCT.1 Basic Data Exchange Confidentiality
33. FDP_UIT.1 Data Exchange Integrity
34. FDP_IFC.1 Subset Information Flow Control
35. FDP_ITT.1 Basic Internal (User Data) Transfer Protection
36. FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
CLASS FIA
37. FIA_AFL.1/PIN Authentication Failure Handling - PIN Verification
38. FIA_AFL.1/ACT Authentication Failure Handling - Activation
39. FIA_AFL.1/INI Authentication Failure Handling - Initialization
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40. FIA_AFL.1/PER Authentication Failure Handling - Personalization
41. FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
42. FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication
43. FIA_UAU.4 Single Use Authentication Mechanisms
44. FIA_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms
45. FIA_UAU.6 Re-Authenticating
46. FIA_UID.1 Timing of Identification
CLASS FMT
47. FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.1 Limited Capabilities
48. FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.2 Limited Availability
49. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
50. FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
51. FMT_MOF.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior
52. FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes
53.
FMT_MTD.1/
INI_PER_AUTH_DATA
Management of TSF Data - Initialization and Personalization
Authentication Data Write
54.
FMT_MTD.1/
INI_PER_AUTH_DATA_Change
Management of TSF data - Initialization and Personalization
Authentication Data Change
55.
FMT_MTD.1/
Keys_and_AC_Rules_Write_and
_Change
Management of TSF Data-Keys and Access Control Rules
Write And Change
56. FMT_MTD.1/PuK_Keys_Use Management of TSF data-Public Key Usage
57. FMT_MTD.1/PrK_Use Management of TSF data Private Key Usage
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58. FMT_MTD.1/PIN_Management Management of TSF data - PIN Management
CLASS FPT
59. FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
60. FPT_FLS.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State
61. FPT_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection
62. FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to Physical Attack
63. FPT_TST.1 TOE Testing
CLASS FRU
64. FRU_FLT.2 Limited Fault Tolerance
7.2.1 CLASS FAU: SECURITY AUDIT
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the IC Manufacturer8
with the capability to store IC
Identification Data 9
in the not changeable configuration EEPROM area10
.
8 [assignment: list of subjects]
9 [assignment: list of audit information]
10 [assignment: type of persistent memory].
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7.2.2 CLASS FCS: CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT
The following crypto is implemented and evaluated in the TOE:
 SHA Operation
 TDES Operations
 AES Operations
 CMAC Operations
 MAC Operations
 Retail-MAC Operation
 Signature Generation PKCS#1 v1.5
 Signature Generation PKCS#1 v2.1
 Signature Generation ISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme 1
 Signature Generation ECDSA
 Signature Verification ISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme 1
 Asymmetric Decryption PKCS#1 v1.5
 Asymmetric Decryption PKCS#1 v2.1
 Asymmetric Encryption/Decryption RAW RSA
 RSA Key Pair Generation
 ECC Key Pair Generation
 Random Number Generation
Preface regarding Security Level related to Cryptography
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the Product Certification.
To fend off attackers with high attack potential, appropriate cryptographic algorithms with adequate
key lengths must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and
standards). According to these standards and documents, RSA-1024 is not recommended. In
addition, since cryptographic functionalities with a security level lower than 100 bits can no longer be
regarded as secure without considering the application context, TDES with 112 bit keys is not
recommended either. The hardware platform, however, does include countermeasures against side
channel attacks on TDES. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked whether the related
cryptographic operations are appropriate for the intended system.
FCS_CKM.1/SM Cryptographic Key Generation - Secure Messaging Session Keys
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
fulfilled by both FCS_CKM.2, FCS_COP.1/SEC-MSG_AES and FCS_COP.1/CMAC_AES
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction] fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm Diffie-Hellman-Protocol Key Agreement
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Method11
and specified cryptographic key sizes 32 bytes12
that meet the following
NIST 800-56A13
.
Application Note 1: Generated keys by this SFR are used by both the TOE and the terminal. These
keys are distributed to the terminal by FCS_CKM.2 and used by the FCS_COP.1/CMAC_AES and
FCS_COP.1/SEC-MSG_AES.
FCS_CKM.1/SM_PER-INI Cryptographic Key Generation - Secure Messaging Keys for Pre-
Operational Phase
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
fulfilled by FCS.CKM.2/SM_PER-INI, FCS_COP.1/SEC-MSG_AES,
FCS_COP.1/CMAC_AES
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction] fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm Pre-Operational Secure Messaging Key
Generation Algorithm for AKiS v2.5.2N14
and specified cryptographic key sizes 32
bytes15
that meet the following: none16
.
Application Note 2: This functionality is valid for pre-operational phases.
FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair Cryptographic Key Generation - RSA Key Pair Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation]
fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_PKCS#1_V1.5, FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_PKCS#1_V2.1,
FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_9796, FCS_COP.1/DEC_PKCS#1_V1.5,
FCS_COP.1/DEC_PKCS#1_V2.1, FCS_COP.1/RSA_RAW
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction] is fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
11 [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
12 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
13 [assignment: list of standards]
14 [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
15 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
16 [assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA-CRT17
and specified cryptographic key
sizes 1024-to-2816 bits18
that meet the following: "Regulierungsbehörde für
Telekommunikation und Post: Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach
dem Signaturgesetz und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete
Algorithmen), German "Bundesanzeiger Nr. 59", p. 4695-4696, March 30th, 2005"19
.
FCS_CKM.1/ECC_KeyPair Cryptographic Key Generation - ECC Key Pair Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation]
is fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_ECDSA
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction] is fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm ECDSA (ECC over GF(p))20
and specified
cryptographic key sizes 128 to 640 bits21
that meet the following: ISO 15946-1 [ 26 ]
and “Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und
Eisenbahnen: Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz
und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen), German
‘Bundesanzeiger‘, BAnz AT 30.01.2015 B3” [ 28 ] 22
.
FCS_CKM.2/SM Cryptographic Key Distribution - Secure Messaging Keys
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data without Security Attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
User Data with Security Attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation]
fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/SM
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction] is fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
17 [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
18 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
19 [assignment: list of standards]
20 [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
21 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
22 [assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key distribution method Device Authentication-Secure Messaging23
that meets the following: TCKK Projesinde Kullanılan Kriptografik Algoritmalar Tanım
Dokümanı, 4 Nisan 2012, v1.3, TÜBİTAK BİLGEM UEKAE Kriptoloji Birimi24
.
FCS_CKM.2/SM_PER-INI Cryptographic Key Distribution - Secure Messaging Keys for Pre-
Operational Phases
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/SM_PER-INI.
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction] is fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key distribution method: AKiS v2.5.2N SM_PER-INI key distribution
method25
that meets the following: TCKK Projesinde Kullanılan Kriptografik
Algoritmalar Tanım Dokümanı, 4 Nisan 2012, v1.3, TÜBİTAK BİLGEM UEKAE Kriptoloji
Birimi26
.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/SM and FCS_CKM.1/SM_PER-INI
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method AKiS v2.5.2N Key Destruction Method27
that meets the
following: none28
.
23 [assignment: cryptographic key distribution method]
24 [assignment: list of standards]
25 [assignment: cryptographic key distribution method]
26 [assignment: list of standards]
27 [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]
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FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic Operation - SHA Calculation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
User Data with Security Attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation] is
not fulfilled but justified.
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction] is not fulfilled but justified.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform hash value calculation29
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-51230
and cryptographic key
sizes none31
that meet the following: FIPS PUB 180-4 [ 16 ]32
.
Application Note 3: TOE also has SHA-1 capability. However, it is out of scope for this certification.
FCS_COP.1/SEC-MSG_AES Cryptographic Operation - AES Calculation for Secure
Messaging
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] is
fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/SM and FCS_CKM.1/SM_PER-INI.
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction] is fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption33
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES CBC mode34
and cryptographic key sizes 256 bits35
that
meet the following: FIPS 197 [ 17 ], NIST SP 800-38A [ 18 ]36
.
28 [assignment: list of standards]
29 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
30 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
31 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
32 [assignment: list of standards]
33 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
34 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
35 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
36 [assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_COP.1/INIT-PERSO-VER_AES Cryptographic Operation - Initialization/Personalization
Verification with AES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] is not
fulfilled but justified.
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction] is not fulfilled but justified.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform initialization and personalization verification with decryption37
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES CBC mode38
and
cryptographic key sizes 256 bits39
that meet the following: FIPS PUB 197 [ 17 ], NIST
SP 800-38A [ 18 ] 40
.
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC_AES Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption AES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] is not
fulfilled but justified.
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction] is fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption41
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES ECB and CBC mode42
and cryptographic key sizes 128,
192, and 256 bits43
that meet the following: FIPS 197 [ 17 ], NIST SP 800-38A [ 18 ]44
.
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC_TDES Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption TDES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
37 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
38 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
39 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
40 [assignment: list of standards]
41 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
42 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
43 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
44 [assignment: list of standards]
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Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] is not
fulfilled but justified.
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction] is fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption45
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Triple DES ECB and CBC mode46
and cryptographic key sizes
112 bits47
that meet the following: FIPS PUB 46-3 [ 19 ], keying option 2, NIST SP 800-
38A [ 18 ]48
.
FCS_COP.1/CMAC_AES Cryptographic Operation - AES CMAC Computation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] is
fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/SM and FCS_CKM.1/SM_PER-INI
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction] fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform message authentication code49
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES-CMAC50
and cryptographic key sizes 16, 24, and 32
bytes51
that meet the following:
 FIPS Publication 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [ 17 ],
 NIST Special Publication 800-38B [ 20 ] 52
Application Note 4: The TOE has an interface for CMAC operation with AES-128, AES-192 and AES-
256 as well as an automatic use for secure messaging with AES-256.
45 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
46 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
47 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
48 [assignment: list of standards]
49 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
50 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
51 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
52 [assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_COP.1/CMAC_TDES Cryptographic Operation - Triple DES CMAC Computation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] is not
fulfilled but justified.
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction] is fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform message authentication code53
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Triple DES CMAC54
and cryptographic key sizes 112 bits55
that
meet the following:
 FIPS PUB 46-3 [ 19 ], keying option 2,
 NIST Special Publication 800-38B [ 20 ] 56
FCS_COP.1/MAC_TDES Cryptographic Operation - Triple DES MAC Computation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] is not
fulfilled but justified.
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction] is fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform message authentication code57
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Triple DES CBC-MAC58
and cryptographic key sizes 112 bits59
that meet the following:
 FIPS PUB 46-3 [ 19 ], keying option 2,
 ISO 9797-1, MAC algorithm 1 [ 25 ] 60
53 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
54 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
55 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
56 [assignment: list of standards]
57 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
58 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
59 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
60 [assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_COP.1/MAC_AES Cryptographic Operation - AES MAC Computation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] is not
fulfilled but justified.
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction] is fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform message authentication code61
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES CBC-MAC62
and cryptographic key sizes 16, 24, and 32
bytes63
that meet the following:
 FIPS Publication 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [ 17 ],
 ISO 9797-1, MAC algorithm 1 [ 25 ]64
FCS_COP.1/Retail-MAC Cryptographic Operation - Retail MAC Computation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] is not
fulfilled but justified.
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction] is fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform message authentication code65
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Retail MAC66
and cryptographic key sizes 112 bits67
that
meet the following:
 FIPS PUB 46-3 [ 19 ], keying option 2,
 ISO 9797-1, MAC algorithm 3, Padding Method 2 [ 25 ]68
61 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
62 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
63 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
64 [assignment: list of standards]
65 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
66 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
67 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
68 [assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_PKCS#1_V1.5 Cryptographic Operation - Signature Generation
PKCS#1 v1.5
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] is
fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction] is fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform digital signature generation69
in accordance with specified
cryptographic algorithm RSASSA70
and cryptographic key sizes 1024-to-2816 bits71
that meet the following: PKCS#1 v1.5, RFC 2313, March 1998 72
.
FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_PKCS#1_V2.1 Cryptographic Operation - Signature Generation
PKCS#1 v2.1
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] is
fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction] is fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform digital signature generation73
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm RSASSA-PSS74
and cryptographic key sizes 1024-to-2816
bits75
that meet the following: PKCS#1 v2.1, RFC 3447, February 2003 76
.
69 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
70 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
71 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
72 [assignment: list of standards]
73 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
74 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
75 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
76 [assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_9796 Cryptographic Operation - Signature Generation ISO/IEC 9796-
2 Scheme 1
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] is
fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction] is fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform digital signature generation77
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm RSA and SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-51278
and cryptographic
key sizes 1024-to-2816 bits79
that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme 1, 2010
80
.
FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_ECDSA Cryptographic Operation - Signature Generation ECDSA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] is
fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/ECC_KeyPair
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction] is fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform digital signature generation81
in accordance with the specified
cryptographic algorithm ECDSA / ECC over GF(p)82
and cryptographic key sizes 128 to
640 bits83
that meet the following: ISO 15946-2 [ 27 ]84
.
Application Note 5: Due to BSI regulations the certification of the platform covers standard NIST and
Brainpool elliptic curves. As a consequence, the certification of the TOE covers only these elliptic
curves as well.
77 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
78 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
79 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
80 [assignment: list of standards]
81 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
82 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
83 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
84 [assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_COP.1/SIG-VER_9796 Cryptographic Operation - Signature Verification ISO/IEC 9796-
2 Scheme 1
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] is
not fulfilled but justified
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction] is not fulfilled but justified
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform digital signature verification85
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm RSA and SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-51286
and cryptographic
key sizes 1024-to-2816 bits87
that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9796-2 Scheme 1,
December 201088
.
FCS_COP.1/DEC_PKCS#1_v1.5 Cryptographic Operation - Asymmetric Decryption PKCS#1
v.1.5
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] is
fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction] is fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform asymmetric decryption89
in accordance with specified
cryptographic algorithm RSAES90
and cryptographic key sizes 1024-to-2816 bits91
that
meet the following: PKCS #1 v1.5, RFC 2313, March 1998.
85 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
86 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
87 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
88 [assignment: list of standards]
89 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
90 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
91 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
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FCS_COP.1/DEC_PKCS#1_v2.1 Cryptographic Operation - Asymmetric Decryption PKCS#1
v2.1 OAEP
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] is
fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction] is fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform asymmetric decryption92
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm RSAES-OAEP93
and cryptographic key sizes 1024-to-2816
bits94
that meet the following: PKCS #1 v2.1,RFC 3447, February 200395
FCS_COP.1/RSA_RAW Cryptographic Operation - Asymmetric Encryption/Decryption RAW
RSA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] is
fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair
[FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction] is fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform asymmetric encryption/decryption96
in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA-Raw)97
and
cryptographic key sizes 1024-to-2816 bits98
that meet the following: RSA
Cryptography Standard99
Application Note 6: TOE has no interface for these operations. They are performed automatically
when chip and terminal authentication operations start.
92 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
93 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
94 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
95 [assignment: list of standards]
96 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
97 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
98 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
99 [assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_RNG.1 Random Number Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet:
DRG.4.1 The internal state of the RNG shall use PTRNG or class PTG.2 (as defined in [
24 ]) as random source.
DRG.4.2 The RNG provides forward secrecy (as defined in [ 24 ]).
DRG.4.3 The RNG provides backward secrecy even if the current internal state is
known (as defined in [ 24 ]).
DRG.4.4 The RNG provides enhanced forward secrecy on demand (as defined in [1]).
DRG.4.5 The internal state of the RNG is seeded by an PTRNG or class PTG.2 (as
defined in [ 24 ]).
FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet:
DRG.4.6 The RNG generates output for which 248
strings of bit length 128 are
mutually different with probability at least 1 − 2−24
.
DRG.4.7 Statistical test suites cannot practically distinguish the random numbers
from output sequences of an ideal RNG. The random numbers must pass
test procedure A (as defined in [ 24 ]).
7.2.3 CLASS FDP: USER DATA PROTECTION
FDP_ACC.1/Data Subset Access Control - Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1/Data
FDP_ACC.1.1: The TSF shall enforce the Application Access Control SFP100
on
subjects:
 initialization agent,
 personalization agent,
100 [assignment: access control SFP]
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 terminal,
 application defined and allowed role,
objects:
 User data stored
operations:
 write, create, read, delete.101
FDP_ACC.1/FUN Subset Access Control - Function
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control]is fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1/FUN
FDP_ACC.1.1: The TSF shall enforce the Application Access Control SFP102
on
subjects:
 activation agent,
 initialization agent,
 personalization agent,
 application defined and allowed role, and
objects and operations as
 defined commands for activation, initialization, personalization, operation
and death sub-phases in [ 13 ] 103
.
FDP_ACF.1/Data Security Attributes Based Access Control - Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control] is fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1/Data
[FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization] is not fulfilled but justified
101 [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
102 [assignment: access control SFP]
103 [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
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FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Application Access Control SFP104
to objects based on the
following:
subjects:
 initialization agent,
 personalization agent,
 terminal,
 application defined and allowed role,
subject attribute:
 authorization level of subjects,
object:
 user data Stored in TOE,
object attribute:
 data access control rules.105
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
 Application defined and allowed roles have read, write, change access
according to rules determined by application developer.
 Successfully authenticated terminal106
have read, write, and change access
according to rules determined by application developer.107
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: authenticated initialization and personalization agents are
authorized to access all application data in pre-operational phase.108
104 [assignment: access control SFP]
105 [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security
attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
106 It means PIN authenticated terminal for SAM configuration.
107 [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on
controlled objects]
108 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
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FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: Nobody shall be allowed to have write, create, read, and delete
access user data in death phase109
.
FDP_ACF.1/FUN Security Attributes Based Access Control - Function
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control] is fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1/FUN
[FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization] is not fulfilled but justified
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Application Access Control SFP110
to objects based on the
following:
subjects:
 activation agent,
 initialization agent,
 personalization agent,
 Application defined and allowed roles,
objects and their attributes as referred to in111
 defined command function for activation sub-phase in document [ 13 ]
 defined command function for initialization sub-phase in document [ 13 ]
 defined command function for personalization sub-phase in document [ 13 ]
 defined command function for operation phase in document [ 13 ]
 defined command function for death phase in document [ 13 ] 112
.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
109 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
110 [assignment: access control SFP]
111 [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security
attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
112 [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security
attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
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 Only activation agent access defined command function for activation sub-
phase in document [ 13 ]
 Only initialization agent access defined command function for initialization
sub-phase in document [ 13 ]
 Only personalization agent defined command function for personalization
sub-phase in document [ 13 ]
 Only application defined and allowed roles access defined command
function for operation phase in document [ 13 ] 113
.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: Any user is allowed to access defined command functions of Death
Phase in stated in the document [ 13 ] 114
.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none115
.
FDP_UCT.1 Basic Data Exchange Confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] not fulfilled but
justified
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
Is fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Application Access Control SFP116
to transmit, receive117
user
data in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure.
Application Note 7: This SFR is valid for the communication between TOE and Terminal.
113 [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on
controlled objects]
114 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
115 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
116 [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
117 [selection: transmit, receive]
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FDP_UIT.1 Data Exchange Integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] not fulfilled but
justified
FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Application Access Control SFP118
to transmit, receive119
user
data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion, replay120
errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification,
deletion, insertion, replay121
has occurred.
Application Note 8: This SFR is valid for the communication between TOE and terminal.
FDP_IFC.1 Subset Information Flow Control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes not fulfilled but justified]
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Smartcard Data Processing Policy122
on all confidential data
when they are processed between the different parts of the TOE123
.
Refinement: Data Processing Policy: User data and TSF data shall not be accessible from the TOE
except when the Security IC embedded software decides to communicate the user
data via an external interface. The protection shall be applied to confidential data
only but without the distinction of attributes controlled by the security IC embedded
software.
118 [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
119 [selection: transmit, receive]
120 [selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
121 [selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
122 [assignment: information flow control SFP]
123 [assignment: list of subjects, information, and operations that cause controlled information to flow to and from
controlled subjects covered by the SFP]
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FDP_ITT.1 Basic Internal Transfer Protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
fulfilled by FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Platform Data Processing Policy124
to prevent the
disclosure125
of user data when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts
of the TOE.
Refinement: The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE (e.g. a
cryptographic co-processor) are seen as physically-separated parts of the TOE.
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for data
integrity and one- and/or more-bit-errors on all objects, based on the following
attributes: corresponding EDC value for integrity critical user data
 files
 file headers
 SKK and DBT tables
 special registers
FDP_SDI.2.1 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall inform the user by an error
code.
124 [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
125 [selection: disclosure, modification, loss of use]
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7.2.4 CLASS FIA: IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
FIA_AFL.1/PIN - Authentication Failure Handling - PIN Verification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within 1 to
255126
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to PIN authentication
event127
.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met128
,
the TSF shall block the usage of PIN129
.
FIA_AFL.1/ACT - Authentication Failure Handling - Activation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when 64130
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related
to activation role authentication131
.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met132
,
the TSF shall put the card into death phase133
.
126 [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment:
range of acceptable values]]
127 [assignment: list of authentication events]
128 [selection: met, surpassed]
129 [assignment: list of actions]
130 [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment:
range of acceptable values]]
131 [assignment: list of authentication events]
132 [selection: met, surpassed]
133 [assignment: list of actions]
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FIA_AFL.1/INI - Authentication Failure Handling - Initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when 10134
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related
to initialization agent Authentication135
.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met136
,
the TSF shall put the card into death phase137
.
FIA_AFL.1/PER - Authentication Failure Handling - Personalization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when 10138
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related
to personalization agent authentication139
.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met140
,
the TSF shall put the card into death phase141
.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependency
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a chip authentication142
to prove the identity of the card
itself143
.
134 [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment:
range of acceptable values]]
135 [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of
acceptable values]]
136 [selection: met, surpassed]
137 [assignment: list of actions].
138 [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment:
range of acceptable values]]
139 [assignment: list of authentication events]
140 [selection: met, surpassed]
141 [assignment: list of actions]
142 [assignment: authentication mechanism]
143 [assignment: authorized user or role]
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Application Note 9: This SFR is valid for both Chip and SAM configuration.
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification] is fulfilled by FIA_UID.1.
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
 to read chip serial number: at pre-operational, operational and death phases, and
 to perform any application allowed actions144
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4 Single Use Authentication Mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
 terminal authentication and
 role holder authentication.145
Application Note 10: This SFR is valid for both terminal and role authentication for chip
configuration. But, terminal authentication is PIN Authentication for SAM configuration as stated
before. PIN Authentication is also valid for Chip Configuration. PIN authentication data might be
reused normally. But this situation does not cause a security flaw by means of secure messaging
capabilities.
144 [assignment: list of TSF mediated actions]
145 [assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
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FIA_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide following authentication mechanisms to support user
authentication:
 activation agent authentication,
 personalization agent authentication,
 initialization agent authentication,
 terminal authentication146
,
 role authentication,
 PIN authentication.147
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the following
policies:
 The TOE will accept the activation agent as authenticated if he or she passes
activation agent authentication.
 The TOE will accept the initialization agent as authenticated if he or she passes
initialization agent authentication.
 The TOE will accept the personalization agent as authenticated if he or she passes
personalization agent authentication.
 The TOE will accept the terminal as rightful terminal if the terminal passes
authentication.
 The TOE will accept the application defined and allowed role if he or she passes
role or PIN authentication148
.
FIA_UAU.6 Re-Authenticating
Hierarchical to: No other components.
146 It means PIN authentication for SAM configuration.
147 [assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms]
148 [assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication]
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Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
 each reset or power-up,
 each command sent to the TOE during secure messaging.149
FIA_UID.1 Timing of Identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
 to read chip serial number: at pre-operational, operational and death phases and
 to perform any application allowed action150
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
7.2.5 CLASS FMT: SECURITY MANAGEMENT
FMT_LIM.1 Limited Capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FMT_LIM.2 Limited Availability] is fulfilled by FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits its capabilities so
that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is
enforced: Deploying test features after TOE delivery do not allow
 user data and TSF data to be manipulated and disclosed,
 Embedded Operating System to be reconstructed and
149 [assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
150 [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
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 substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may
enable other attacks.151
FMT_LIM.2 Limited Availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities fulfilled by FMT_LIM.1.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability so that in conjunction
with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced: Deploying
test features after TOE delivery do not allow
 user data and TSF Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
 Embedded Operating System to be reconstructed,
 substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may
enable other attacks.152
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
 activation,
 initialization,
 personalization,
 any management function defined by application developer.153
151 [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
152 [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
153 [assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
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FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FIA_UID.1/ Timing of identification] is fulfilled by FIA_UID.1.
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
 activation agent,
 initialization agent,
 personalization agent,
 any management role defined by application developer.154
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application Note 11: The term “role” in this SFR is used as a general term as defined in CC Part 2,
and it is not about the authenticated role holder.
FMT_MOF.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles] is fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
[FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions] is fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable155
the functions
 External interface command for operational mode listed in [ 14 ] 156
to application
defined roles157
.
Application Note 12: Applicable only for operational phase. Not applicable for activation,
initialization and personalization.
154 [assignment: the authorised identified roles]
155 [selection: determine the behaviour of, disable, enable, modify the behaviour of]
156 [assignment: list of functions]
157 [assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] is
fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1/Data and FDP_ACC.1/FUN
[FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles] is fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
[FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions] is fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Application Access Control Policy158
to restrict the ability to
query, modify, delete159
the security attributes access control rules of keys, PINs, user
data160
to initialization agent, personalization agents and application defined roles161
.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_PER_AUTH_DATA Management of TSF Data - Initialization and
Personalization Authentication Data Write
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to write162
the authentication reference data for
Initialization and personalization agents163
to activation agent164
.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_PER_AUTH_DATA_Change Management of TSF Data - Initialization and
Personalization Authentication Data Change
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
158 [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
159 [selection: change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
160 [assignment: list of security attributes]
161 [assignment: the authorised identified roles]
162 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
163 [assignment: list of TSF data]
164 [assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to change165
the authentication reference data for
Initialization and personalization agents166
to Initialization and personalization
agents167
.
FMT_MTD.1/Keys_and_AC_Rules_Write_and_Change Management of TSF Data - Keys and
Access Control Rules Write and Change
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to write and change168
the root Certificate Authority
public key, chip authentication PuK and PrK and access control Rules169
to
initialization agent, personalization agent any application defined and allowed role170
.
FMT_MTD.1/PuK_Keys_Use Management of TSF Data - Usage Public Key Usage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles] fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
[FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions] fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to use171
the Root CA PuK and chip authentication
PuK172
to application defined and allowed roles173
.
FMT_MTD.1/PrK_Use Management of TSF Data - Private Key Usage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles] fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
[FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions] is fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
165 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
166 [assignment: list of TSF data]
167 [assignment: the authorised identified roles]
168 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
169 [assignment: list of TSF data]
170 [assignment: the authorised identified roles]
171 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
172 [assignment: list of TSF data]
173 [assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to use174
the chip authentication PrK175
to application
defined and allowed roles176
.
FMT_MTD.1/PIN_Management Management of TSF Data - PIN Management
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to write, change, and unblock177
the PIN objects178
to
initialization agent, personalization agents, any application defined and allowed
roles179
.
7.2.6 CLASS FPT: PROTECTION OF THE TSF
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit, timing variations during command execution180
in excess of
non-useful information181
enabling access to Initialization and Personalization Keys,
PINs used by the application182
, and none.183
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users184
are unable to use the following interface contact
interface and physical contacts185
to gain access to none.186
174 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
175 [assignment: list of TSF data]
176 [assignment: the authorised identified roles]
177 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
178 [assignment: list of TSF data]
179 [assignment: the authorised identified roles]
180 [assignment: types of emissions]
181 [assignment: specified limits]
182 [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
183 [assignment list of types of user data].
184 [assignment: type of users]
185 [assignment: type of connection]
186 [assignment: list of type of user data].
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FPT_FLS.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: (i)
exposure to operating conditions which may not be tolerated according to the
requirement Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2) and where therefore a malfunction
could occur and (ii) DFA attacks on AES, DES, 3DES, RSA, ECC187
.
Refinement: The term “failure” above also covers “circumstances”. The TOE prevents failures for the
“circumstances” defined above.
Application Note 13: This refinement should be understood with the following implementation
details in mind: The TOE contains both hardware sensors (implemented in the chip card hardware)
and software sensors (implemented in the Crypto Library software). The software sensors detect DFA
attacks in cryptographic computations and this detection leads to a secure state (no computation
results are output and an exception is thrown) in case such an attack occurs. The Embedded
Operating System handles this exception by entering an infinite loop, thus further ensures a secure
state by forcing reset.
FPT_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from disclosure188
when it is transmitted between
separate parts of the TOE.
Refinement: The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE (e.g. a
cryptographic co-processor) are seen as separated parts of the TOE.
187 [assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF]
188 [selection: disclosure, modification]
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FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to Physical Attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing189
to the TSF190
by
responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
Refinement: The TSF will implement appropriate mechanisms to continuously counter physical
manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the
TSF can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against
these attacks is required ensuring that security functional requirements are enforced. Hence,
“automatic response” means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii)
countermeasures are provided at any time.
FPT_TST.1 TSF Testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during normal operation191
to demonstrate the
integrity of TSF data except Embedded Operating System code and correct
operation of the TSF192
.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authenticated users with the capability to verify the integrity
of TSF Data193
.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authenticated users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF194
.
189 [assignment: physical tampering scenarios]
190 [assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]
191 [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, at the
conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]]
192 [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]
193 [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data]
194 [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF]
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7.2.7 CLASS FRU: RESOURCE UTILISATION
FRU_FLT.2 Limited Fault Tolerance
Hierarchical to: FRU_FLT.1Degraded fault tolerance
Dependencies: [FPT_FLS.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State] is fulfilled by FPT_FLS.1
FRU_FLT.2.1 The TSF shall ensure the operation of all the TOE's capabilities when the following
failures occur: exposure to operating conditions which are not detected according to
the requirement Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1) 195
.
Refinement: The term “failure” above means “circumstances”. The TOE prevents failures for the
“circumstances” defined above.
Application Note 14: Environmental conditions include but are not limited to power supply, clock,
and other external signals (e.g. reset signal) necessary for the TOE operation.
7.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The assurance requirements for the evaluation of the TOE, its development and operating
environment are to choose as the predefined assurance package EAL4 augmented by the following
components:
 ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures),
 AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
7.4 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS DEPENDENCIES
7.4.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS DEPENDENCIES
The dependence of security functional requirements for Embedded OS the security functional
requirements are defined in Table 14.
195 [assignment: list of type of failures]
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Table 14: Dependency of composite TOE SFRs
#
Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Fulfilled by security
requirements in this ST
1. FAU_SAS.1
None ----
2. FCS_CKM.1/SM
--- FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
---FCS.CKM.2/SM,
FCS_COP.1/SEC-MSG_AES,
FCS_COP.1/CMAC_AES
--- FCS_CKM.4
3. FCS_CKM.1/SM_PER-INI
--- FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- FCS.CKM.2/SM_PER-INI,
FCS_COP.1/SEC-MSG_AES,
FCS_COP.1/CMAC_AES
--- FCS_CKM.4
4. FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair
--- FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- FCS_COP.1 /SIG-VER_PKCS,
FCS_COP.1 /SIG-GEN_PKCS,
FCS_COP.1 /SIG-VER_9796,
FCS_COP.1 /SIG-GEN_9796
--- FCS_CKM.4
5. FCS_CKM.1/ECC_KeyPair
--- FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- FCS_COP.1 /SIG-GEN_ECDSA
--- FCS_CKM.4
6. FCS_CKM.2/SM
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- FCS_CKM.1/SM
--- FCS_CKM.4
7. FCS_CKM.2/SM_PER-INI
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- FCS_CKM.1/SM_PER-INI
--- FCS_CKM.4
8. FCS_CKM.4
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.1/SM_PER-INI
--- FCS_CKM.1/SM
9. FCS_COP.1/SHA
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- Not fulfilled but justified. See
Note 2 below.
--- Not fulfilled but justified. See
Note 2 below.
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#
Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Fulfilled by security
requirements in this ST
10. FCS_COP.1/SEC-
MSG_AES
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
---FCS_CKM.1/SM and
FCS_CKM.1/SM_PER-INI
--- FCS_CKM.4
11. FCS_COP.1/INIT-PERSO-
VER_AES
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- Not fulfilled but justified. See
Note 3 below.
--- Not fulfilled but justified. See
Note 4 below.
12. FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC_AES
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- Not fulfilled but justified. See
Note 5 below.
--- FCS_CKM.4
13. FCS_COP.1/ENC-
DEC_TDES
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- Not fulfilled but justified. See
Note 5 below.
--- FCS_CKM.4
14. FCS_COP.1/CMAC_AES
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
---FCS_CKM.1/SM and
FCS_CKM.1/SM_PER-INI
See also Note 5 below.
--- FCS_CKM.4
15. FCS_COP.1/CMAC_TDES
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- Not fulfilled but justified. See
Note 5 below.
--- FCS_CKM.4
16. FCS_COP.1/MAC_TDES
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- Not fulfilled but justified. See
Note 5 below.
--- FCS_CKM.4
17. FCS_COP.1/MAC_AES
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- Not fulfilled but justified. See
Note 5 below.
--- FCS_CKM.4
18. FCS_COP.1/Retail-MAC
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- Not fulfilled but justified. See
Note 5 below.
--- FCS_CKM.4
19. FCS_COP.1/SIG-
GEN_PKCS#1_V1.5
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair
--- FCS_CKM.4
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#
Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Fulfilled by security
requirements in this ST
--- FCS_CKM.4
20. FCS_COP.1/SIG-
GEN_PKCS#1_V2.1
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair
--- FCS_CKM.4
21. FCS_COP.1/SIG-
GEN_9796
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair
--- FCS_CKM.4
22. FCS_COP.1/SIG-
GEN_ECDSA
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- FCS_CKM.1/ECC_KeyPair
--- FCS_CKM.4
23. FCS_COP.1/SIG-
VER_9796
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair
--- FCS_CKM.4
24. FCS_COP.1 /
DEC_PKCS#1_v1.5
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair
--- FCS_CKM.4
25. FCS_COP.1 /
DEC_PKCS#1_v2.1
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair
--- FCS_CKM.4
26. FCS_COP.1/ RSA_RAW
--- FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
--- FCS_CKM.4
--- FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair
--- FCS_CKM.4
27. FCS_RNG.1
None
28. FDP_ACC.1/Data
--- FDP_ACF.1 --- FDP_ACF.1/Data
29. FDP_ACC.1/FUN
--- FDP_ACF.1 --- FDP_ACF.1/FUN
30. FDP_ACF.1/Data
--- FDP_ACC.1
--- FDP_MSA.3
--- FDP_ACC.1/Data
--- Not fulfilled but justified. See
Note 6 below.
31. FDP_ACF.1/FUN
--- FDP_ACC.1 --- FDP_ACC.1/Data
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#
Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Fulfilled by security
requirements in this ST
--- FDP_MSA.3 --- Not fulfilled but justified. See
Note 9 below.
32. FDP_UCT.1
--- FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1
--- FDP_ACC.1 orFDP_IFC.1
--- Not fulfilled but justified. See
Note 7 below.
--- FDP_ACC.1
33. FDP_UIT.1
--- FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
--- FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1
--- FDP_ACC.1
--- Not fulfilled but justified. See
Note 7 below.
34. FDP_IFC.1
--- FDP_IFF.1 --- Not fulfilled but justified. See
Note 8 below.
35. FDP_ITT.1
--- FDP_IFC.1 --- FDP_IFC.1
36. FDP_SDI.2
None
37. FIA_AFL.1/PIN
--- FIA_UAU.1 --- FIA_UAU.1
38. FIA_AFL.1/ACT
--- FIA_UAU.1 --- FIA_UAU.1
39. FIA_AFL.1/INI
--- FIA_UAU.1 --- FIA_UAU.1
40. FIA_AFL.1/PER
--- FIA_UAU.1 --- FIA_UAU.1
41. FIA_API.1
None ----
42. FIA_UAU.1
--- FIA_UID.1 --- FIA_UID.1
43. FIA_UAU.4
None ----
44. FIA_UAU.5
None ----
45. FIA_UAU.6
None ----
46. FIA_UID.1
None ----
47. FMT_LIM.1
--- FMT_LIM.2 --- FMT_LIM.2
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#
Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Fulfilled by security
requirements in this ST
48. FMT_LIM.2
--- FMT_LIM.1 --- FMT_LIM.1
49. FMT_SMF.1
None ----
50. FMT_SMR.1
--- FIA_UID.1 --- FIA_UID.1
51. FMT_MOF.1
--- FMT_SMR.1
--- FMT_SMF.1
--- FMT_SMR.1
--- FMT_SMF.1
52. FMT_MSA.1
--- FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
--- FMT_SMR.1
--- FMT_SMF.1
--- FDP_ACC.1
--- FMT_SMR.1
--- FMT_SMF.1
53. FMT_MTD.1/INI_PER_AU
TH_DATA
--- FMT_SMR.1
--- FMT_SMF.1
--- FMT_SMR.1
--- FMT_SMF.1
54. FMT_MTD.1/INI_PER_AU
TH_DATA_Change
--- FMT_SMR.1
--- FMT_SMF.1
--- FMT_SMR.1
--- FMT_SMF.1
55. FMT_MTD.1/Keys_and_A
C_Rules_Write_and_Cha
nge
--- FMT_SMR.1
--- FMT_SMF.1
--- FMT_SMR.1
--- FMT_SMF.1
56. FMT_MTD.1/PuK_Keys_U
se
--- FMT_SMR.1
--- FMT_SMF.1
--- FMT_SMR.1
--- FMT_SMF.1
57. FMT_MTD.1/PrK_Use
--- FMT_SMR.1
--- FMT_SMF.1
--- FMT_SMR.1
--- FMT_SMF.1
58. FMT_MTD.1/PIN_Manag
ement
--- FMT_SMR.1
--- FMT_SMF.1
--- FMT_SMR.1
--- FMT_SMF.1
59. FPT_EMSEC.1
None ----
60. FPT_FLS.1
None ----
61. FPT_ITT.1
None ----
62. FPT_PHP.3
None ----
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#
Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Fulfilled by security
requirements in this ST
63. FPT_TST.1
None ----
64. FRU_FLT.2
FPT_FLS.1 FPT_FLS.1
Note 2 : A key does not exist here since a hash function does not use key(s).
Note 3 : AES keys that are covered by FCS_COP.1/INIT-PERSO-VER_AES are used for initialization and
personalization agent authentication. They are written to the TOE during activation phase. Activation
phase takes place within the secure environment. So FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 is justified by
environmental countermeasures.
Note 4 : AES keys that are covered by FCS_COP.1/INIT-PERSO-VER_AES are used for initialization and
personalization agent authentication. They are written during the activation sub-phase and
destruction is not needed.
Note 5 : TDES and AES keys that are covered by FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC_TDES, FCS_COP.1/ENC-
DEC_AES, FCS_COP.1/CMAC_AES, FCS_COP.1/CMAC_TDES, FCS_COP.1/MAC_TDES,
FCS_COP.1/MAC_AES, and FCS_COP.1/Retail-MAC are written to the TOE during either
personalization or operation phase. Personalization takes place within the secure environment and
writing TDES/AES keys to the TOE during operation phase requires that access conditions specified by
the personalization agent be satisfied. So, FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 is justified either by environmental
countermeasures or by SF_SMAC.
Note 6 : The TSF denies access to the objects unless their security attributes are defined. So
FMT_MSA.3 is not a required for SFR FDP_ACF.1/Data properly functioning.
Note 7: There is only one communication channel between the TOE and the outer world. So
FDP_UIT.1 and FDP_UCT.1 does not require FTP_ITC.1 and FTP_TRC.1.
Note 8: Security attributes are necessary for making security related decisions. Since FDP_IFC.1
applies to all data, here neither decision nor a security attribute is required. Hence there is no need
to FDP_IFF.1 for FDP_IFC.1 properly functioning.
Note 9: The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes having been defined
during the manufacturing and fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of the
security attributes (i.e. FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
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Note 10: There are no Embedded Operating System (EOS) defined roles to change the initial values of
the special function registers (SFR) including SFRs to change MMU segmentation. Since, EOS does not
generate different memory segmentations having different access rights, no such roles are defined
and FMT_SMR.1 is not defined. The values of the special function registers are changed by the EOS
code during system run.
7.4.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS DEPENDENCIES
Security assurance level is EAL 4+ with added components AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2. EAL4 is itself
internally consistent. The dependencies of AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 are given in Table 15.
Table 15: Dependencies of composite TOE SARs
Component Dependencies Fulfilled or not
AVA_VAN.5 ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.4
ADV_TDS.3
ADV_IMP.1
AGP_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ATE_DPT.1
All dependencies are fulfilled
by EAL4.
ALC_DVS.2 None ----
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7.5 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper:
The scenario of physical tampering as described for this objective is explicitly included in the
assignment chosen for the physical tampering scenarios in FPT_PHP.3. Therefore, it is clear that this
security functional requirement supports the objective.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak:
The refinements of the security functional requirements FPT_ITT.1 and FDP_ITT.1 together with the
FDP_IFC.1 explicitly require the prevention of disclosure of secret data (TSF data as well as user data)
when transmitted between separate parts of the TOE or while being processed. This includes that
attackers cannot reveal such data by measurements of emanations, power consumption or other
behavior of the TOE while data are transmitted between or processed by TOE parts.
Embedded Operating System has added operations to TOE, PIN verification and CMAC operation.
T.Information_Leakage is also valid for these operations. FPT_EMSEC.1 handles these added
operations and adds refinements to protect the TSF data used by cryptographic operations.
This objective is also directed against attacks, where an attacker wants to force an information
leakage, which would not occur under normal conditions. In order to achieve this, the attacker has to
combine a first attack step, which modifies the behavior of the TOE (either by exposing it to extreme
operating conditions or by directly manipulating it) with a second attack step measuring and
analyzing some output produced by the TOE. The first step is prevented by the same mechanisms
which support OT.Prot_Malfunction and OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, respectively.
The SFRs FPT_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_EMSEC.1 addressed by OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, and the
SFRs FPT_PHP.3 and FRU_FLT.2 addressed by OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper and OT.Prot_Malfunction are
covered.
OT.Prot_Malfunction:
The definition of this objective shows that it covers a situation, where malfunction of the TOE might
be caused by the operating conditions of the TOE (while direct manipulation of the TOE is covered
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper). There are two possibilities in this situation: Either the operating conditions
are inside the tolerated range or at least one of them is outside of this range. The second case is
covered by FPT_FLS.1, because it states that a secure state is preserved in this case. The first case is
covered by FRU_FLT.2 because it states that the TOE operates correctly under normal (tolerated)
conditions.
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OT.Prot_Abuse-Func:
This objective states that abuse of functions (especially provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software,
for instance in order to read secret data) must not be possible in Phase 7 of the life-cycle. There are
two possibilities to achieve this: (i) They cannot be used by an attacker (i. e. its availability is limited)
or (ii) using them would not be of relevant use for an attacker (i. e. its capabilities are limited) since
the functions are designed in a specific way. The first possibility is specified by FMT_LIM.2 and the
second one by FMT_LIM.1. Since these requirements are combined to support the policy, which is
suitable to fulfill OT.Prot_Abuse-Func both security functional requirements together are suitable to
meet the objective.
OT.Identification_and_Authentication:
OT.Identification_and_Authentication addresses the identification and authentication mechanisms to
counter masquerade attacks and implement the identification and authentication policy. FIA_UAU.5
and FIA_API.1 require the authentication mechanisms that the TOE must have. FAU_SAS.1 supports
this objective by requiring the TOE to have unique and unchangeable serial number. AKiS v2.5.2N
also provides an interface for the application developer to read this serial number. FIA_UAU.4
protects the role and terminal authentication mechanisms against replay attacks and iterates of
FIA_AFL.1 protect against the false PIN or authentication data tries. FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1also
covers the protection of integrity and confidentiality of the data shared. FCS_RNG.1 provides random
number for key generation. They provide replay protection against replay attack for PIN
authentication. FIA_UAU.6 requires the TOE to re authenticate the users after each command sent
and after each reset or power-up. Finally, FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_9796, FCS_COP.1/SIG-VER_9796 and
FCS_COP.1/RSA_RAW provide cryptographic mechanism for device and role authentication.
OT.Access_Control:
OT.Access_Control addresses user data protection against unauthorized access through logical paths.
Physical paths are covered by OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper objective. FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 protects
the user data from accessing without identification and authentication. FDP_ACC.1/Data,
FDP_ACC.1/FUN, FDP_ACF.1/Data and FDP_ACF.1/FUN together require the enforcement of
application access control policy.
OT.Security_Management:
The aim of OT.Security_Management is that only the authorized entities that are determined by
application owner can manage the TSF and TSF data. FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1 limits the actions that
can be done without identification and authentication. FMT_MOF.1 and FMT_MSA.1 enable the
application determined entities to change the behavior of TSF and security attributes of assets.
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The SFRS FMT_MTD.1/INI_PER_AUTH_DATA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_PER_AUTH_DATA_Change,
FMT_MTD.1/Keys_and_AC_Rules_Write_and_Change, FMT_MTD.1/PuK_Keys_Use,
FMT_MTD.1/PrK_Use, and FMT_MTD.1/PIN_Management address the mechanisms to manage the
TSF Data.
FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 address the management functions and roles to be implemented within
the EOS.
OT.Cryptographic_Operations:
OT.Cryptographic_Operations covers the security services and security functions that the TOE will
have.
FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair, FCS_COP.1/DEC_PKCS#1_V1.5, FCS_COP.1/DEC_PKCS#1_V2.1 and
FCS_COP.1/RSA_RAW requirements cover the (i) asymmetric RSA key pair generation part of this
objective.
FCS_CKM.1/ECC_KeyPair covers (vii) the asymmetric ECC key pair generation part of this objective.
FCS_RNG.1 covers the (ii) random number generation part of this objective.
FCS_CKM.4 covers the (vi) destruction of the keys part of this objective.
FCS_COP.1/SHA covers the (iii) hash calculation part of this objective.
FCS_COP.1/INIT-PERSO-VER_AES, FCS_COP.1/SEC-MSG_AES, FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC_TDES,
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC_AES, FCS_COP.1/CMAC_AES, FCS_COP.1/CMAC_TDES, FCS_COP.1/MAC_TDES,
FCS_COP.1/MAC_AES, and FCS_COP.1/Retail-MAC cover the (v) symmetric cryptographic operations
part of this objective.
FCS_COP.1/SIG-VER_9796, FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_9796, FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_PKCS#1_V2.1,
FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_PKCS#1_V1.5, and FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_ECDSA requirements cover the (iv)
eSign operations part of this objective.
Protection against SPA, DFA and DPA is addressed by OT.Prot_Inf_Leak.
OT.Secure_Communication:
OT.Secure_Communication covers the protection of communication between the TOE and the
external world. To fulfill this objective TOE, generates Secure Messaging Keys with the SFRs
FCS_CKM.1/SM, FCS_CKM.1/SM_PER-INI and distributes them with the SFRs FCS_CKM.2/SM,
FCS_CKM.2/SM_PER-INI. FCS_COP.1/SEC-MSG_AES, FCS_COP.1/CMAC_AES provides cryptographic
functions for encryption and integrity/authenticity protection of messages. FDP_UCT.1 and
FDP_UIT.1 covers the protection of integrity and confidentiality of the data shared. FCS_RNG.1
provides random number for key generation. And finally FIA_UAU.6 requires the authentication of
each message sent between the TOE and the external world.
OT.Storage_Integrity:
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Integrity control of the hardware against physical manipulation is covered by OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
which is fulfilled by FPT_PHP.3. In addition to this, Embedded Operating System also requires the
implementation of an integrity observation mechanism which is implemented by the Error Detection
(EDC) for critical user data. In case of any integrity anomalies, TOE detects and inform by an error
code. FPT_TST.1 covers this objective.
Table 16: Coverage of TOE objectives by SFRs
Security Functional
Requirement
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Identification_and_Authentication
OT.Access_Control
OT.Security_Management
OT.Cryptographic_Operations
OT.Secure_Communication
OT.Storage_Integrity
FAU_SAS.1 
FCS_CKM.1/SM 
FCS_CKM.1/SM_PER-INI 
FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair 
FCS_CKM.1/ECC_KeyPair 
FCS_CKM.2/SM 
FCS_CKM.2/SM_PER-INI 
FCS_CKM.4 
FCS_COP.1/SHA 
FCS_COP.1/SEC-MSG_AES  
FCS_COP.1/INIT-PERSO-
VER_AES

FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC_AES 
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC_TDES 
FCS_COP.1/CMAC_AES  
FCS_COP.1/CMAC_TDES 
FCS_COP.1/MAC_TDES 
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FCS_COP.1/MAC_AES 
FCS_COP.1/Retail-MAC 
FCS_COP.1/SIG-
GEN_PKCS#1_V1.5

FCS_COP.1/SIG-
GEN_PKCS#1_V2.1

FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_9796   
FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_ECDSA 
FCS_COP.1/SIG-VER_9796  
FCS_COP.1/DEC_PKCS#1_V1.5 
FCS_COP.1/DEC_PKCS#1_V2.1 
FCS_COP.1/RSA_RAW   
FCS_RNG.1  
FDP_ACC.1/Data 
FDP_ACC.1/FUN 
FDP_ACF.1/Data 
FDP_ACF.1/FUN 
FDP_UCT.1 
FDP_UIT.1 
FDP_IFC.1  
FDP_ITT.1  
FDP_SDI.2 
FIA_AFL.1/PIN 
FIA_AFL.1/ACT 
FIA_AFL.1/INI 
FIA_AFL.1/PER 
FIA_API.1 
FIA_UAU.1  
FIA_UAU.4 
FIA_UAU.5 
FIA_UAU.6  
FIA_UID.1  
FMT_LIM.1 
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FMT_LIM.2 
FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MOF.1 
FMT_MSA.1 
FMT_MTD.1/INI_PER_AUTH_D
ATA

FMT_MTD.1/INI_PER_AUTH_D
ATA_Change

FMT_MTD.1/Keys_and_AC_Rul
es_Write_and_Change

FMT_MTD.1/PuK_Keys_Use 
FMT_MTD.1/PrK_Use 
FMT_MTD.1/PIN_Management 
FPT_EMSEC.1 
FPT_FLS.1   
FPT_ITT.1  
FPT_PHP.3    
FPT_TST.1 
FRU_FLT.2   
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7.6 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE
An assurance level of EAL4 with the augmentations AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 are required for this
type of TOE since it is intended to defend against sophisticated attacks. This evaluation assurance
package was selected to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial practices. In order to provide a meaningful level of assurance
that the TOE provides an adequate level of defense against such attacks, the evaluators should have
access to the detailed design knowledge and source code.
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8 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
AKiS v2.5.2N is the composite product consisting of Embedded Operating System, Secure Crypto
Library (platform library) and the Security IC (platform IC). Security Features are provided together
with the platform and the EOS. However, the contribution weight of the platform and the EOS is
different in each feature. A brief overview will be given for all security features. A detailed
description also will be provided for the security features mainly provided by Embedded Operating
System. For the detailed information about security features mainly provided by the platform,
platform IC ST [ 2 ] and platform library ST [ 3 ] can be checked.
Security features mainly provided by the platform are given as:
 SF_OPC Control of Operating Conditions
 SF_PHY Protection against Physical Modification
 SF_LOG Logical Protection
 SF_COMP Mode Management and Protection
Security features mainly provided by Embedded Operating System are given as:
 SF_CSUP Cryptographic Support
 SF_IA Identification and Authentication
 SF_SMAC Security Management and Access Control
 SF_SM Secure Messaging
8.1 SF_OPC: CONTROL OF OPERATING CONDITIONS
Control of Operating Conditions security feature is inherited from the platform IC part of composite
product AKiS v2.5.2N. For the detailed information platform IC ST [ 2 ] can be checked.
Covered SFRs are FPT_FLS.1, FRU_FLT.2.
8.2 SF_PHY: PROTECTION AGAINST PHYSICAL MODIFICATION
Protection against modification attacks security feature is inherited to the composite product AKiS
v2.5.2N from the platform IC. For the detailed information platform IC ST [ 2 ] can be checked.
Added SFR by the Embedded Operating System is FPT_TST.1.
Covered SFRs are: FAU_SAS.1, FCS_RNG.1, FDP_IFC.1, FDP_ITT.1, FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FPT_FLS.1,
FRU_FLT.2, FPT_PHP.3, FPT_ITT.1, FPT_TST.1, FCS_COP.1/INIT-PERSO-VER_AES, FCS_COP.1/SEC-
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MSG_AES, FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC_TDES, FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC_AES, FCS_COP.1/CMAC_AES,
FCS_COP.1/CMAC_TDES, FCS_COP.1/MAC_TDES, FCS_COP.1/MAC_AES, FCS_COP.1/Retail-MAC,
FDP_ACC.1/Data, FDP_ACC.1/FUN, FDP_ACF.1/Data, FDP_ACF.1/FUN, FMT_MSA.1, and FMT_SMF.1
8.3 SF_LOG: LOGICAL PROTECTION
Logical Protection security feature is defined in the platform IC ST and extended in the platform
library ST and further extended in this ST by EOS features. Logical Protection feature supplied by the
platform IC prevents the TOE from disclosure of the TSF data and user data stored and/or processed
in the security IC throughout power measurement and subsequent complex signal analysis. For
detailed information platform IC ST [ 2 ] should be checked.
Logical Protection feature supplied by the platform library is mainly software countermeasures
against side channel attacks and fault attacks on cryptographic operations. For detailed information
platform IC ST [ 2 ] should be checked.
These features are required by FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1 and FDP_IFC.1 as well as by FPT_FLS.1.
Added security feature by the EOS is protection against side channel analysis attacks due to timing
leakage of EOS added functionality as required by the FPT_EMSEC.1.
8.4 SF_COMP: MODE MANAGEMENT AND PROTECTION
Mode Management and Protection security feature is fulfilled by the platform and the Embedded
Operating System. In AKiS v2.5.2N, Super System Mode and System Mode provided by the platform
and User mode are used (AKiS v2.5.2N executes in User Mode). Test mode is not active in the final
TOE.
When the TOE is powered, the chip starts executing in the highest privileged mode, Super System
Mode, and first checks the consistency of the device. When the consistency check passes, the device
will leave the Super System Mode and boot in the System Mode application; the execution then
commences in the NXP System Mode OS which is responsible to properly set-up the device such that
the EOS is able to access its resources (the EOS only gains access to resources via the NXP System
Mode OS). When the OS booting phase has finished, the NXP System Mode can hand over control to
phosExecEnv which will take care of further interaction with User Mode. Platform IC features also
prevent abuse of test functions after TOE delivery. It also inhibits abuse of features, which are used
during start-up or reset to configure the TOE. For the detailed information related to CPU modes,
platform IC ST [ 2 ] should be checked. Covered SFRs are FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 and FAU_SAS.1.
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In addition, the memory areas and register (SFR) access rights are different in different modes, which
is also provided by the platform IC. There are three modes available in the final composite TOE:
Super System Mode, System Mode and User Mode. How the memory areas and SFRs are separated
are explained in the platform IC ST [ 2 ] document.
AKiS v2.5.2N composite product may be delivered to the consumer before personalization. TOE also
provides phase management for the sub phases defined Section 1.5.4. TSF restricts TOE functions
according to the phase management.
Covered SFRs are FDP_ACC.1/FUN and FDP_ACF.1/FUN
8.5 SF_CSUP: CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT
The hardware provides many cryptographic operations as detailed in the platform IC ST and platform
library ST. The composite TOE defined in this ST document adds more cryptographic operations. They
are RSA Key Pair Generation, Signature Verification and Generation, RSA Decryption, TDES
decryption. The keys that represent confidential information are destructed after use. Covered SFRs
are FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair, FCS_CKM.1/ECC_KeyPair, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_COP.1/SEC-MSG_AES, FCS_COP.1/INIT-PERSO-VER_AES, FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC_AES,
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC_TDES, FCS_COP.1/CMAC_AES, FCS_COP.1/CMAC_TDES, FCS_COP.1/MAC_TDES,
FCS_COP.1/MAC_AES, FCS_COP.1/Retail-MAC, FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_PKCS#1_V1.5, FCS_COP.1/SIG-
GEN_PKCS#1_V2.1, FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_9796, FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_ECDSA, FCS_COP.1/SIG-
VER_9796, FCS_COP.1/DEC_PKCS#1_V1.5, FCS_COP.1/DEC_PKCS#1_V2.1, and FCS_COP.1/RSA_RAW.
The hardware provides true random number generation as detailed in HW ST. Platform library uses
hardware function to produce seeds for the deterministic random number generator. With this
property FCS_RNG.1 is covered. In addition, platform library provides RNG tests for the hardware
random number generator. Detailed information is given in the platform library ST [ 3 ].
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8.6 SF_IA: IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
SF.IA includes the authentication mechanisms of activation agent authentication, initialization and
personalization agent authentication, chip (terminal) authentication196
and PIN verification
mechanisms. Activation agent authentication, Initialization and personalization agent authentication
and PIN verification mechanisms include authentication failure handling. Role and chip (terminal)
authentication mechanisms use single user authentication and therefore are protected against replay
attacks. PIN authentication mechanism is protected against replay attack by secure messaging
capabilities. Other authentications are performed in secure environment as assumed in section 4.5.
Covered SFRs are FIA_AFL.1/PIN, FIA_AFL.1/ACT, FIA_AFL.1/PER, FIA_AFL.1/INI, FIA_API.1,
FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5, FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_9796, FCS_COP.1/SIG-VER_9796, FCS_COP.1/RSA_RAW,
FDP_UIT.1, FDP_UCT.1 and FCS_RNG.1.
8.7 SF_SMAC: SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND ACCESS CONTROL
The TOE includes security mechanisms to control access to TSF data and user data and also controls
access to the TSF Interface. Security access rules are configurable by the application which may even
allow these rules to be modified during operational phase. AKiS v2.5.2N provides application owners
with a flexible access control and security management mechanism. Covered SFRs are FIA_UID.1,
FIA_UAU.1, FDP_ACC.1/Data, FDP_ACF.1/Data, FMT_MTD.1/INI_PER_AUTH_DATA,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_PER_AUTH_DATA_Change, FMT_MTD.1/Keys_and_AC_Rules_Write_and_Change,
FMT_MTD.1/PuK_Keys_Use, FMT_MTD.1/PrK_Use, FMT_MTD.1/PIN_Management, FMT_MSA.1.
These SFRs arrange the access control of the TSF Data and user data.
The other SFR covered is FMT_MOF.1 which requires that the access to TSFI is also manageable by
the application allowed users.
Remaining SFRs covered by SF_SMAC are FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 which require the
management functions and management roles. Pre-operational roles are activation agent,
initialization agent, and personalization agents. Besides supporting these roles, AKiS v2.5.2N allows
application owners to define additional management roles that are active in the operational phase.
196 Terminal authentication is provided by PIN authentication for SAM configuration.
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8.8 SF_SM: SECURE MESSAGING
The TOE has SF.SM which allows the TOE to communicate with the external world securely. SF.SM
protects the confidentiality and authenticity of the messages going between the card and the
external world. Covered SFRs are FCS_CKM.1/SM, FCS_CKM.1/SM_PER-INI, FCS_CKM.2/SM,
FCS_CKM.2/SM_PER-INI, FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1, FIA_UAU.6, FCS_COP.1/SEC-MSG_AES,
FCS_COP.1/CMAC_AES, and FCS_RNG.1.
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8.9 SECURITY FUNCTIONS RATIONALE
Table 17 shows the assignment of security functional requirements to TOE’s security functionality.
Table 17: Coverage of SFRs by TOE security features
Security Functional Requirement
SF_COMP
SF_OPC
SF_PHY
SF_LOG
SF_IA
SF_SMAC
SF_SM
SF_CSUP
FAU_SAS.1  
FCS_CKM.1/SM 
FCS_CKM.1/SM_PER-INI 
FCS_CKM.1/RSA_KeyPair 
FCS_CKM.1/ECC_KeyPair 
FCS_CKM.2/SM 
FCS_CKM.2/SM_PER-INI 
FCS_CKM.4 
FCS_COP.1/SHA 
FCS_COP.1/SEC-MSG_AES   
FCS_COP.1/INIT-PERSO-VER_AES  
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC_AES  
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC_TDES  
FCS_COP.1/CMAC_AES   
FCS_COP.1/CMAC_TDES  
FCS_COP.1/MAC_TDES  
FCS_COP.1/MAC_AES  
FCS_COP.1/Retail-MAC  
FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_PKCS#1_V1.5 
FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_PKCS#1_V2.1 
FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_9796 
FCS_COP.1/SIG-GEN_ECDSA 
FCS_COP.1/SIG-VER_9796 
FCS_COP.1/DEC_PKCS#1_V1.5 
FCS_COP.1/DEC_PKCS#1_V2.1 
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Security Functional Requirement
SF_COMP
SF_OPC
SF_PHY
SF_LOG
SF_IA
SF_SMAC
SF_SM
SF_CSUP
FCS_COP.1/RSA_RAW 
FCS_RNG.1   
FDP_ACC.1/Data 
FDP_ACC.1/FUN 
FDP_ACF.1/Data 
FDP_ACF.1/FUN 
FDP_UCT.1 
FDP_UIT.1 
FDP_IFC.1  
FDP_ITT.1  
FDP_SDI.2 
FIA_AFL.1/PIN 
FIA_AFL.1/ACT 
FIA_AFL.1/INI 
FIA_AFL.1/PER 
FIA_API.1 
FIA_UAU.1 
FIA_UAU.4 
FIA_UAU.5 
FIA_UAU.6 
FIA_UID.1 
FMT_LIM.1  
FMT_LIM.2  
FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MOF.1 
FMT_MSA.1 
FMT_MTD.1/INI_PER_AUTH_DATA 
FMT_MTD.1/INI_PER_AUTH_DATA_Change 
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Security Functional Requirement
SF_COMP
SF_OPC
SF_PHY
SF_LOG
SF_IA
SF_SMAC
SF_SM
SF_CSUP
FMT_MTD.1/Keys_and_AC_Rules_Write_and_Change 
FMT_MTD.1/PuK_Keys_Use 
FMT_MTD.1/PrK_Use 
FMT_MTD.1/PIN_Management 
FPT_EMSEC.1 
FPT_FLS.1    
FPT_ITT.1  
FPT_PHP.3 
FPT_TST.1 
FRU_FLT.2   
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ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
AES: Advanced Encryption Standard
AKİS: Akıllı Kart İşletim Sistemi (Smart Card Operating System)
APDU: Application Packet Data Unit
CPU: Central Processing Unit
DES: Data Encryption Standard
DFA: Differential Fault Analysis
DPA: Differential Power Analysis
EAL: Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC: Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EOS: Embedded Operating System
ES: Embedded Software
IC: Integrated Circuit
PP: Protection Profile
PTG2: A class that defines the requirements for RNGs used in key generation, padding bit generation,
etc. PTG.2 is defined AIS31 [ 15 ]
RAM: Random Access Memory
RSA: Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman
ROM: Read Only Memory
SAM: Secure Access Module
SHA: Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA: Simple Power Analysis
SFR: Security Functional Requirement
ST: Security Target
TPDU: Transmission Protocol Data Unit
TOE: Target of Evaluation
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
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