Certification Report
EAL 4+ Evaluation of
Avocent®-Cybex® Secure DVI KVM Switch, Secure KM
Switch and Secure Windowing KVM
Issued by:
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Certification Body
Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
© Government of Canada, Communications Security Establishment Canada, 2012
Document number: 383-4-323 CR
Version: 1.0
Date: 16 July 2012
Pagination: i to iii, 1 to 09
CCS Certification Report Avocent Corporation (Emerson).
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DISCLAIMER
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its
associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established
under the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) – using the
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision
3, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 3. This certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to
the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation
has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the CCS, and the conclusions of the
evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This
report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by the
Communications Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization that recognizes or
gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by
the Communications Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization that
recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed or
implied.
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FOREWORD
The Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) provides a third-
party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Evaluation
Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the CCS Certification Body, which is managed by the
Communications Security Establishment Canada.
A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the CCS Certification Body to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025:2005, the General Requirements for the
Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories. Accreditation is performed under the
Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada (PALCAN), administered by the
Standards Council of Canada.
The CCEF that carried out this evaluation is EWA-Canada located in Ottawa, Canada.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the CCS Certification Body asserts that the
product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A
security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the
evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target,
in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions
made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements,
and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product satisfies the
security requirements.
This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated 16 July
2012, and the security target identified in Section 4 of this report.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted on the
CCS Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
Common Criteria Project).
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Disclaimer ....................................................................................................................................... i
Foreword........................................................................................................................................ii
Executive Summary...................................................................................................................... 1
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ................................................................................ 2
2 TOE Description ................................................................................................................... 2
3 Evaluated Security Functionality ........................................................................................ 2
4 Security Target...................................................................................................................... 2
5 Common Criteria Conformance.......................................................................................... 2
6 Security Policy....................................................................................................................... 3
7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................................. 3
7.1 SECURE USAGE ASSUMPTIONS................................................................................... 3
7.2 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS................................................................................ 3
7.3 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE .......................................................................................... 4
8 Evaluated Configuration...................................................................................................... 4
9 Documentation ...................................................................................................................... 5
10 Evaluation Analysis Activities ............................................................................................. 5
11 ITS Product Testing.............................................................................................................. 6
11.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS........................................................................... 7
11.2 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING......................................................................... 7
11.3 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING ....................................................................... 7
11.4 CONDUCT OF TESTING................................................................................................ 8
11.5 TESTING RESULTS ...................................................................................................... 8
12 Results of the Evaluation...................................................................................................... 8
13 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations ........................................... 8
14 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations..................................................................... 8
15 References.............................................................................................................................. 9
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Executive Summary
Avocent®-Cybex® Secure DVI KVM Switch, Secure KM Switch and Secure Windowing
KVM (hereafter referred to as Avocent KVM Switch), from Avocent Corporation
(Emerson), is the Target of Evaluation for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4
augmented evaluation.
Avocent KVM Switch is a peripheral sharing switch. The Avocent KVM Switch allows the
secure sharing of a single set of peripheral components such as Keyboard, Video Display and
Mouse/Pointing devices among multiple computers through standard USB and DVI
interfaces.
EWA-Canada is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on
03 July 2012 and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common
Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS).
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions
made during the evaluation, the intended environment for Avocent KVM Switch, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) to which it is asserted
that the product satisfies its security requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their
operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification
report.
The results documented in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)1
for this product provide
sufficient evidence that it meets the EAL 4 augmented assurance requirements for the
evaluated security functionality. The evaluation was conducted using the Common
Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3, for
conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 3. The following augmentation is claimed: ALC_FLR.3 – Systematic
flaw remediation.
Avocent KVM Switch claims demonstrable compliance with the Peripheral Sharing Switch
(PSS) Protection Profile for Human Interface Devices, version 2.1, 7 September 2010.
Communications Security Establishment Canada, as the CCS Certification Body, declares
that the Avocent KVM Switch evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the
Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the CCS
Certified Products List (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
Common Criteria Project).
1
The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is
not releasable for public review.
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1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4 augmented
evaluation is Avocent®-Cybex® Secure DVI KVM Switch, Secure KM Switch and Secure
Windowing KVM (hereafter referred to as Avocent KVM Switch), from Avocent
Corporation (Emerson).
2 TOE Description
Avocent KVM Switch is a peripheral sharing switch. The Avocent KVM Switch allows the
secure sharing of a single set of peripheral components such as Keyboard, Video Display and
Mouse/Pointing devices among multiple computers through standard USB and DVI
interfaces. The Avocent KVM Switch is equipped with multiple unidirectional flow forcing
devices (optical data diodes) to assure adherence to the unidirectional forced data flow policy
between coupled computers. The Avocent KVM Switch is available in 2, 4, 8 or 16 port
models with single or dual-head (displays). Products include traditional KVM switching
devices, direct display connection products (KM), remote desktop controllers (RDC) and
KVM Combiners. The Remote Desktop Controller (RDC) Model RDC440 was evaluated on
all models.
3 Evaluated Security Functionality
The complete list of evaluated security functionality for Avocent KVM Switch is identified in
Section 6 of the ST.
4 Security Target
The ST associated with this Certification Report is identified by the following nomenclature:
Title: Avocent®-Cybex® Secure DVI KVM Switch, Secure KM Switch and Secure
Windowing KVM
Version: 1.14
Date: 03 July 2012
5 Common Criteria Conformance
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3, for conformance to the Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3.
Avocent KVM Switch is:
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a. Common Criteria Part 2 extended; with functional requirements based upon functional
components in Part 2, except for the following explicitly stated requirements defined in
the ST:
 EXT_VIR.1 - Visual Indication Rule;
 EXT_IUC.1 - Invalid USB Connection; and
 EXT_ROM.1 - Read-Only Memory.
b. Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, with security assurance requirements based only
upon assurance components in Part 3; and
c. Common Criteria EAL 4 augmented, containing all security assurance requirements in the
EAL 4 package, as well as the following: e.g. ALC_FLR.3 – Systematic Flaw
Remediation.
d. Avocent KVM Switch claims demonstrable compliance with the Peripheral Sharing
Switch (PSS) Protection profile for Human Interface Devices, version 2.1, 7 September
2010.
6 Security Policy
Avocent KVM Switch implements a Data Separation security policy to allow peripheral data
to be transferred only between peripheral port groups with the same ID, as well as a
unidirectional forced data flow policy to restrict data flow from shared peripherals to
switched computers only; details of these security policies can be found in Section 6 of the
ST.
In addition, Avocent KVM Switch implements policies pertaining to security management
and protection of the TSF. Further details on these security policies may be found in Section
6 of the ST.
7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
Consumers of Avocent KVM Switch should consider assumptions about usage and
environmental settings as requirements for the product’s installation and its operating
environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
7.1 Secure Usage Assumptions
The following Secure Usage Assumption is listed in the ST:
 The Authorized user is non-hostile and follows all usage guidance and possesses the
necessary privileges to access the information transferred by the TOE.
7.2 Environmental Assumptions
The following Environmental Assumption is listed in the ST:
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 The TOE is physically secure and is installed and managed in accordance with the
manufacturer’s directions.
7.3 Clarification of Scope
The TOE is intended for use by non-hostile and trained users that have followed the
installation and configuration guidance provided in the product’s user manual.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration for Avocent KVM Switch comprises one of the following
switches:
 Avocent - Cybex Secure 2-port DVI-I KVM Switch w/audio - Model SC 820D, Part
number 520-933-501, Ver. 33303-C3C3;
 Avocent - Cybex Secure 4-port DVI-I KVM Switch w/audio - Model SC 840D, Part
number 520-935-501, Ver. 33303-C3C3;
 Avocent - Cybex Secure 4-port DVI-I KVM Switch w/audio and DPP - Model SC
840DD, Part number 520-956-501, Ver. 33333-C3C3;
 Avocent - Cybex Secure 8-port DVI-I KVM Switch w/audio and DPP - Model SC
880DD, Part number 520-961-501, Ver. 33333-C3C3;
 Avocent - Cybex Secure 4-port DVI-I Dual-Head KVM Switch w/audio and DPP -
Model SC 845DD, Part number 520-958-501, Ver. 33333-C3C3;
 Avocent - Cybex Secure 8-port DVI-I Dual-Head KVM Switch w/audio and DPP -
Model SC 885DD, Part number 520-958-501, Ver. 33303-C3C3;
 Avocent - Cybex Secure 16-port DVI-I KVM Switch w/audio and DPP - Model SC
1016DD, Part number 520-963-501, Ver. 33333-C3C3;
 Avocent - Cybex Secure 4-port KM Switch w/audio - Model SC 840KM, Part number
520-926-501, Ver. 33303-C3C3;
 Avocent - Cybex Secure 4-port KM Switch w/audio and DPP - Model SC 840KMP,
Part number 520-959-501, Ver. 33333-C3C3; or
 Avocent - Cybex Secure 8-port KM Switch w/audio - Model SC 880KM, Part number
520-927-501, Ver. 33303-C3C3.
The Remote Desktop Controller (RDC) Model ESC 100, Part number 520-944-501, Ver. 4-
A3 was evaluated on all models.
The publications in section 9 of this report describe the procedures necessary to install and
operate Avocent KVM Switch in its evaluated configuration.
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9 Documentation
The Avocent Corporation (Emerson) documents provided to the consumer are as follows:
a. User Manual Avocent Cybex Secure DisplayPort KVM, Rev. 1.1
b. User Manual Avocent Cybex Secure Windowing KVM, Rev. 1.1
c. User Manual Avocent Cybex Secure KVM Mini-Matrix, Rev. 1.1
d. User Manual Avocent Cybex Secure KM Switch, Rev. 1.1
e. User Manual Avocent Cybex Secure DVI-I KVM Dual-Head Switch with Audio,
Rev.1.1
f. User Manual Avocent Cybex Secure Windowing KVM, Rev. 1.1
g. User Manual Avocent Cybex Secure KM Switch, Rev. 1.1
h. User Manual Avocent Cybex Secure KM Switch w/Audio and DPP, Rev. 1.1
i. User Manual Avocent Cybex Secure DVI-I KVM Switch, Rev. 1.1
j. SC840D/SC840DD 4-Port DVI-I Secure KVM Switch User Manual, Rev. 1.1
k. Avocent Cybex 8-Port DVI-I Secure KVM Switch User Manual, Rev. 1.1
l. SC840H/SC845H 4-Port Single/Dual Head HDMI Secure KVM Switch User Manual,
Rev. 1.1
m. User Manual Avocent Cybex Secure Remote Desktop Controller (RDC), Rev. 1.1
n. Avocent Cybex Secure 2 port DVI-D/HDMI/DP KVM Switch User Manual, Rev.
1.1
o. User Manual Avocent Cybex Secure DVI-I KVM Dual-Head Switch with Audio,
Rev.1.1
p. Avocent Cybex 16-Port DVI-I Secure KVM Switch User Manual, Rev. 1.1
q. SC840HP/SC845HP 4-Port Single/Dual Head HDMI Secure KVM Switch User
Manual, Rev. 1.1
10 Evaluation Analysis Activities
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of Avocent KVM Switch,
including the following areas:
Development: The evaluators analyzed the Avocent KVM Switch functional specification,
design documentation, and a subset of the implementation representation; they determined
that the design accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and the
TSF subsystems and modules, and how the TSF implements the security functional
requirements (SFRs). The evaluators analyzed the Avocent KVM Switch security
architectural description and determined that the initialization process is secure and that the
security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are
maintained. The evaluators also independently verified that the correspondence mappings
between the design documents are correct.
Guidance Documents: The evaluators examined the Avocent KVM Switch preparative user
guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and
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unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration
and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the
preparative and operational guidance, and determined that they are complete and sufficiently
detailed to result in a secure configuration.
Life-cycle support: An analysis of the Avocent KVM Switch configuration management
system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the Avocent
KVM Switch configuration items were clearly marked and could be modified and controlled
by automated tools. The developer’s configuration management system was observed during
a site visit, and it was found to be mature and well-developed and operated in accordance
with the CM plan. The evaluators confirmed that the access control measures as described in
the CM plan are effective in preventing unauthorised access to the configuration items.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of
the procedures required to maintain the integrity of Avocent KVM Switch during distribution
to the consumer.
The evaluators examined the development security procedures during a site visit and
determined that they detailed sufficient security measures for the development environment
to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the Avocent KVM Switch design and
implementation. The evaluators determined that the developer has used a documented model
of the TOE life-cycle and well-defined development tools that yield consistent and
predictable results.
The evaluators reviewed the flaw remediation procedures used by Avocent Corporation
(Emerson) for Avocent KVM Switch. During a site visit, the evaluators also examined the
evidence generated by adherence to the procedures. The evaluators concluded that the
procedures are adequate to track and correct security flaws, and distribute the flaw
information and corrections to consumers of the product.
Vulnerability Assessment: The evaluators conducted an independent vulnerability analysis
of Avocent KVM Switch. Additionally, the evaluators conducted a review of public domain
vulnerability databases and a focused search of all evaluation deliverables. The evaluators
identified potential vulnerabilities for testing applicable to Avocent KVM Switch in its
operational environment.
All these evaluation activities resulted in PASS verdicts.
11 ITS Product Testing
Testing at EAL 4 consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing
independent functional tests, and performing penetration tests.
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11.1 Assessment of Developer Tests
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining
their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETR2
.
The evaluators analyzed the developer’s test coverage and depth analysis and found them to
be complete and accurate. The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer’s
test documentation and the functional specification, TOE design and security architecture
description was complete.
11.2 Independent Functional Testing
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining
design and guidance documentation, examining the developer's test documentation, executing
a sample of the developer's test cases, and creating test cases that augmented the developer
tests.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of
the testing procedures and results. Resulting from this test coverage approach is the following
list of EWA-Canada test goals:
a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The objective of this test goal is to repeat a subset of the
developer's tests;
b. Initialization: The objective of this test goal is to ensure that the system is initialized to a
suitable state prior to independent testing.
c. Invalid USB Connection: The objective of this test goal is to verify that the Avocent
KVM Switch will not allow access to a USB drive.
d. Default Settings: The objective of this test goal is to verify that the Avocent KVM Switch
defaults to the host computer on start up.
11.3 Independent Penetration Testing
Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and a focused
review of all evaluation deliverables, limited independent evaluator penetration testing was
conducted. The penetration tests focused on:
a. Monitor for Information Leakage: The purpose of this test is to determine if the TOE is
leaking any information that might be useful to an attacker;
2
The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is
not releasable for public review.
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b. Misuse by TOE User: The purpose of this test is to show that the TOE cannot be used to
copy files to a USB drive or to move files from one host to another.
c. Misuse with USB Hub: The purpose of this test is to verify that a USB Hub may not be
used with the Avocent KVM Switch.
The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the
intended operating environment.
11.4 Conduct of Testing
Avocent KVM Switch was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented,
independent functional and penetration tests. The testing took place at the Information
Technology Security Evaluation and Test (ITSET) Facility at EWA-Canada. The CCS
Certification Body witnessed a portion of the independent testing. The detailed testing
activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are documented in a separate Test Results document.
11.5 Testing Results
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, giving
assurance that Avocent KVM Switch behaves as specified in its ST, functional specification,
TOE design and security architecture description.
12 Results of the Evaluation
This evaluation has provided the basis for an EAL4 + level of assurance. The overall verdict
for the evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
13 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations
Good security practices should be employed when fielding such a device. Ensure that only
the recommended cables are used and that installation guidance is followed. All users of the
TOE should be made aware that blinking LEDs are an indication that anti-tampering has been
triggered.
14 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations
Acronym/Abbreviation/
Initialization
Description
CCEF Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CCS Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and
Certification Scheme
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Acronym/Abbreviation/
Initialization
Description
CPL Certified Products list
CM Configuration Management
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSET Information Technology Security Evaluation
and Testing
PALCAN Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories
- Canada
PSS Peripheral Sharing Switch
SFR Security Functional Requirements
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
USB Universal Serial Bus
15 References
This section lists all documentation used as source material for this report:
a. CCS Publication #4, Technical Oversight, Version 1.8, October 2010.
b. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 3, July 2009.
c. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM,
Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009.
d. Peripheral Sharing Switch (PSS) Protection Profile for Human Interface Devices,
version 2.1, 7 September 2010.
e. Avocent®-Cybex® Secure DVI KVM Switch, Secure KM Switch and Secure
Windowing KVM, Security Target version 1.14, 16 July 2012
f. Evaluation Technical Report for EAL 4+ Common Criteria Evaluation of Avocent®-
Cybex® Secure DVI KVM Switch, Secure KM Switch and Secure Windowing KVM,
version 1.0, 16 July 2012.