BSI-DSZ-CC-0752-2013
for
z/VM Version 6, Release 1
from
IBM Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.71
BSI-DSZ-CC-0752-2013
Operating System
z/VM Version 6, Release 1
from IBM Corporation
PP Conformance: Operating System Protection Profile, Version 2.0,
01 June 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0067-2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Labeled Security,
Version 2.0, 28 May 2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Virtualization, Version
2.0, 28 May 2010
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 20 February 2013
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
for components up
to EAL 4
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0752-2013
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0752-2013 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0752-2013
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................15
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................16
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................16
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................16
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................18
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................19
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................23
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................24
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................25
11 Security Target............................................................................................................25
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................27
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................29
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................31
CC Part1:........................................................................................................................31
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................32
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................41
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0752-2013 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0752-2013
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom.Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product z/VM Version 6, Release 1 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product z/VM Version 6, Release 1 was conducted by atsec
information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 4 February 2013. The atsec
information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: IBM Corporation.
The product was developed by: IBM Corporation.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
5 Publication
The product z/VM Version 6, Release 1 has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
IBM Corporation, 2455 South Road P328, Poughkeepsie NY 12601-5400, USA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0752-2013 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is z/VM Version 6 Release 1. z/VM is a highly secure,
flexible, robust, scalable operating system implementing a virtual machine hypervisor for
IBM System z® mainframe servers onto which to deploy mission-critical virtual servers.
z/VM is designed to host other operating systems, each in its own virtual machine. Multiple
virtual machines can run concurrently to perform a variety of functions requiring controlled,
separated access to the information stored on the system. Apart from virtual servers, the
TOE provides additional virtual machines for each logged in human user, separating the
execution domain of virtual machine from others as defined in the virtual machine
definitions stored in the system directory. In addition to the system directory, the RACF
security server is employed to mediate access to resources and privileged functions.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Operating System Protection Profile, Version 2.0, 01 June 2010, BSI-
CC-PP-0067-2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Labeled Security, Version 2.0, 28 May 2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Virtualization, Version 2.0, 28 May 2010 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and from
OSPP [7], where some SFRs have been defined as extended components. Thus the TOE
is CC part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Functions Addressed issue
Identification and Authentication The TOE provides identification and authentication of users by
the means of an alphanumeric user ID and a system-
encrypted password. The following parts of the TOE perform
identification and authentication independently:
● Control Program (CP)
● RACF
For supporting identification and authentication, the TOE
employs RACF managing resource profiles and user profiles.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) For implementation of extended DAC rules, the TOE
component RACF provides the capability and flexibility as
required by the evaluation compared to the usage of the
system. Basically, a user's authority to access a resource
while operating in a RACF-protected system at any time is
determined by a combination of these factors:
● User's identity and group membership
● User's attributes including group-level attributes
● User's group authorities
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TOE Security Functions Addressed issue
● Security classification of the user and the resource profile
● Access authority specified in the resource profile
Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
and Support for Security Labels
In addition to DAC, the TOE provides Mandatory Access
Control (MAC), which imposes access restrictions to
information based on security classification. Each user and
each RACF controlled object can have a security classification
specified in its profile. The security classification can be a
security level and zero or more security categories. Security
labels are maintained separately from privilege classes in
RACF.
The access control enforced by the TOE ensures that users
may only read labeled information if their security label
dominates the information's label, and that they may only write
to labeled information containers if the container's label
dominates the subject's.
Separation of virtual machines Operating system failures that occur in virtual machines do not
normally affect the TOE running on the real processor. If the
error is isolated to a virtual machine, only that virtual machine
fails and can be restarted without affecting any processes
running in other virtual machines, in particular, mission-critical
virtual servers are not affected by failures of virtual machines
associated with the human users logged in.
Supported by the underlying processor, the TOE restricts
results of software failures (such as program checks)
occurring in a virtual machine to this machine, thus not
affecting other virtual machines or the CP. Failures of the
Control Program that cannot be isolated to one of its virtual
machines maintained result in its abnormal termination
("abend"). In the event of such an abend, the system will re-
initialize itself, if possible. Special abend code numbers are
used to identify the specific reason for the abend.
Auditing The TOE provides an audit capability that allows generating
audit records for security critical events. RACF provides a
number of logging and reporting functions that allow resource
owners and auditors to identify users who attempt to access
the resource. The audit records generated by RACF are
collected into files residing on disks that are protected from
unauthorized modification or deletion by the DAC and (in
Labeled Security Mode) MAC mechanism.
Object Reuse The TOE provides a facility clearing protected objects and
storage previously used by virtual machines or the TOE itself
prior to reassignment to other virtual machines or the TOE.
This ensures confidentiality of data maintained either by the
TOE or by virtual machines.
DASD devices and their derivatives (such as minidisks or
temporary disks) are to be cleared manually by the
administrator in accordance with the organizational policies.
There is additional software support by the IBM Directory
Maintenance Facility (DirMaint), which however is not part of
this evaluation.
Security Management The TOE provides a set of commands and options to
adequately manage the security functions of the TOE. The
TOE recognizes several roles that are able to perform the
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TOE Security Functions Addressed issue
different management tasks related to the TOE's security:
● General security options are managed by security
administrators.
● Management of MAC attributes is performed by security
administrators in Labeled Security Mode.
● Management of users and their security attributes is
performed by security administrators. Management of
groups can be delegated to group security administrators.
● Management of virtual machine definitions is performed by
security administrators.
● Users are allowed to change their own password, their
default group, and their user name.
● Users may choose their security label from the range
defined in their profile at login time in Labeled Security
mode.
● Auditors manage the parameters of the audit system (e.g.
list of audited events) and can analyse the audit trail.
TSF Protection The TOE control program enforces integrity of its own domain.
No virtual machine can access TOE resources without
appropriate authorization. This prevents tampering with TOE
resources by untrusted subjects. Supportive to this
functionality are hardware implemented facilities, namely the
Interpretive-Execution Facility (SIE instruction). Therefore, the
hardware and firmware components providing the abstract
machine for the TOE are required to be physically protected
from unauthorized access.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] chapter 1.5.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The Target of Evaluation, IBM z/VM Version 6 Release 1, requires the following software
components to be installed, enabled, and configured:
● CMS for operating RACF and TCP/IP
● Control Program (CP)
● RACF Security Server feature
● TCP/IP for z/VM
● PTF UM90240 (RSU4)
● PTF UM33246 (Super Cor PTF for 0910)
● PTF UK76856 (SSL APARs PM52716 and PM43382)
For further details refer to chapter 8 and section 1.5.4.4 of the ST [6].
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The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
z/VM Version 6, Release 1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1
.
SW z/VM Version 6 Release 1, program number 5741-A07 V6R1 Tape/DVD
2
.
DOC Program Directory for z/VM V6R1 base GI11-4319-00 Hardcopy
3
.
DOC Program Directory for RACF function level 610 GI11-4325-00 Hardcopy
4
.
DOC Guide for Automated Installation and Service GC24-6197-00 Hardcopy
5
.
DOC December 2011 z/VM DVD Collection Kit SK5T-7054-04 DVD
6
.
DOC z/VM V6R1 Secure Configuration Guide contained in #5 above SC24-6230-02 Softcopy
7
.
SW RSU 4 (PTF UM90240) n/a Electronic
Super Cor PTF for 0910 (PTF UM33246)
SSL APARs PM52716 and PM43382 (PTF UK76856)
to be obtained electronically from ShopzSeries
https://www.ibm.com/software/shopzseries
n/a Electronic
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
All hardcopy guidance documents and the publications DVD are packaged and securely
shipped with the installation media via registered courier to the customer.
To install and configure the TOE such that it matches the evaluated configuration as
described in the Security Target, the user has to follow the guidance provided in:
● z/VM V6R1.0 Secure Configuration Guide (SC24-6230-02) [10]
listed as item 6 above.
The z/VM V6R1.0 Secure Configuration Guide is part of the "December 2011 z/VM DVD
Collection Kit" listed as item 5 above.
The Secure Configuration Guide contains references to other relevant guidance
documentation contained in item 5, i.e. December 2011 z/VM DVD Collection Kit (SK5T-
7054-04).
During the order process for the TOE, the customer needs to explicitly order the CC-
certified version of z/VM Version 6 Release 1. This already ensures that the product
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delivered to the customer actually is the TOE containing all required components. The
administrator after installation of the product according to the Secure Configuration Guide
[10] also is able to verify the version of the TOE by querying the CPLEVEL and verifying
the list of installed PTFs against the list of PTFs required as stated in the ST. Output of the
CPLEVEL command8
:
“….
q cplevel
z/VM Version 6 Release 1.0, service level 1003 (64-bit)
...”
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Security audit
● Cryptographic support
● User data protection
● Identification and authentication
● Security management
● Protection of the TSF
● TOE access
● Trusted path/channels
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: competent and trustworthy administrators, trusted remote IT systems, correct
configuration and setup of system, system maintenance, trusted physical environment,
secure recovery mechanisms. Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
5.1 General Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the z/VM virtual machine operating system with the
software components as described in section 1.5.4 of the [6].
z/VM is an operating system designed to host other operating systems, each in its own
virtual machine. Multiple virtual machines can run concurrently to perform a variety of
functions requiring controlled, separated access to the information stored on the system.
The TOE provides a virtual machine for each logged in user, separating the execution
domain of each user from other users as defined in the virtual machine definitions stored in
the system directory. In addition, the system directory contains access control information
8
The only difference between the provided list and the results obtained are the time stamps and execution
times of the commands issued.
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for privileged functions, such as use of certain options of the processor's DIAGNOSE
instruction. In addition to the system directory, the RACF security server is employed to
mediate access to resources and privileged functions.
The TOE is seen as one instance of z/VM running on an abstract machine as the sole
operating system on the level of the abstract machine and exercising full control over this
abstract machine regardless which software runs inside of virtual machines. This abstract
machine is provided by a logical partition (LPAR) of an IBM System z server.
The LPAR itself is not part of the TOE, but belongs to the TOE environment. It is to be
noted that although a z/VM instance can be run within a z/VM instance, the evaluated
configuration is restricted to one z/VM instance running directly within an LPAR. A z/VM
instance running within a virtual machine is allowed, but this “second level” z/VM instance
is not in an evaluated configuration, as some security functionality is implemented
differently, in particular with respect to the usage of the processor's Start Interpretive
Execution (SIE) instruction.
Multiple instances of the TOE may share the RACF database. This is done by sharing the
DASD (direct access storage device) volume keeping the RACF database between the
different z/VM instances. Although sharing of the RACF database between z/VM and z/OS
is technically feasible, it is explicitly excluded from this evaluation.
The platforms selected for the evaluation consist of IBM products, which are available
when the evaluation has been completed and will remain available for some period of time
afterwards. Even if withdrawn from general marketing, the product may be obtained by
special request to IBM.
The TOE security functions (TSF) are provided by the z/VM operating system kernel
(called the Control Program – CP) and by an application called RACF that runs within a
specially-privileged virtual machine. In addition to providing user authentication, access
control, and audit services to CP, RACF can provide the same services to other authorized
virtual machines. z/VM provides management functions that allow configuring the TSF and
tailor them to the customer's needs.
Some elements have been included in the TOE which do not provide security functions,
but run in authorized mode and could therefore, if misbehaved, compromise the TOE.
Since these elements are substantial for the operation of many customer environments,
they are included as trusted applications within the TOE.
In its evaluated configuration, the TOE allows two modes of operation: a standard mode
meeting all requirements of the Operating System Protection Profile base [7] and its
extended package for Virtualization, and a more restrictive mode called Labeled Security
Mode, which additionally meets all requirements of the OSPP extended package for
Labeled Security.
Labeled Security Mode enabled or disabled, the same software elements are used. The
two modes have different RACF settings with respect to the use of security labels. All other
configuration parameters are identical in the two modes.
5.2 Major structural components of the TOE
The TOE consists of three major components, i.e. the z/VM Control Program, the Security
Manager RACF, and the TCP/IP component, with RACF and TCP/IP running within
specific virtual machines maintained by CP.
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The z/VM Control Program (CP) is primarily a real-machine resource manager. CP
provides each user with an individual working environment known as a virtual machine.
Each virtual machine is a functional equivalent of a real system, sharing the real processor
instructions and its functionality, storage, console, and input/output (I/O) device resources.
CP provides connectivity support that allows application programs running within virtual
machines to exchange information with each other and to access resources residing on
the same z/VM system or on different z/VM systems.
In order to create and maintain these rules (virtual machine definitions), additional
management software is employed, that runs outside the CP, but is part of the TOE.
Hence, each component of the management software runs within a virtual machine. The
following list illustrates, which functionality runs within virtual machines:
● CMS: a single-user general-purpose operating system that is employed to run the RACF
and TCP/IP applications. CMS does not provide any security functionality but
implements a file system that can be used by applications running on top.
● RACF server: provides authentication, authorization, and audit services to CP and other
authorized virtual machines that run applications on CMS. It runs within a virtual
machine maintained by CP and communicates with CP through a tightly-controlled well-
defined interface.
● TCP/IP server: provides traditional IP-based communications services. For SSL
encrypted communication, it interacts with the SSL server, which is seen as a
subcomponent of the TCP/IP component rather than an additional part of the TOE. Both
the TCP/IP server and the SSL server are not part of CP, but each run within a
respective virtual machine maintained by CP.
Embedded within the TCP/IP stack is the Telnet service that enables users to access their
virtual machine consoles ("log on") from the IP network. In particular, this Telnet service
receives console traffic from the network, removes the telnet or TN3270 protocol wrappers,
and then forwards it to CP using a special form of the DIAGNOSE processor instruction.
CP generates a virtual console session as a memory object. All outgoing information is
sent from the CP back to the Telnet service, which encapsulates the information in the
Telnet or TN3270E protocol and sends it back to the client. The TCP/IP server also
provides SSL/TLS - by interacting with the SSL service virtual machine maintained by CP -
allowing the establishment of cryptographically secured channels.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Test Configuration
Developer as well as the independent evaluator testing was performed on the same
configuration. The logical partition was provided by a certified version of PR/SM on a
System z10 Enterprise Class server also referred to as System z10 High End.
The test system - for both the developer and the evaluator test sessions - had installed the
TOE in its evaluated configuration as required by the [ST]. This was confirmed by the
evaluator analysing developer evidence generated and running respective checks on his
own.
Due to an evaluator finding when performing tests on the SSL server, an additional PTF
needed to be generated and tested by the developer and the evaluator. Also for those
additional tests, the evaluator was able to verify that the test system had installed the TOE
in its evaluated configuration only containing the modification applied by the additional
PTF.
7.2 Developer Testing
The following functional testing was performed by the developer:
TOE test configuration:
The tests were performed on a IBM internal system running within a logical partition
of a System z10 High End server.
The test system had installed the z/VM Version 6 Release 1. An analysis of the
instructions to determine the service level including expected output were
performed by the evaluator to demonstrated that all required RSU and PTF as
stated in section 1.5.4.1 of the ST were installed on the machine.
The TOE had been in its evaluated configuration when the developer tests were
performed.
The limitation of tests performed to the test system identified above was accepted,
because the system configuration was considered to be representative for all
allowed configurations. The TOE relies on an underlying abstract machine that is
compliant with the z/Architecture definition. Extensive testing was performed by the
developer on all configurations (including the chosen one) to verify full
z/Architecture compliance of the abstract machine provided to the TOE.
Testing approach:
The developer designed a specific CC related test suite that contains various test
scenarios covering the security functions provided by the TOE.
The tests performed by the developer directly stimulate the following TSFI identified
in the Functional Specification:
● CP commands
● RACF commands
● API
● RACF Report Writer
● TELNET Server
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and observe the resulting behaviour.
The following TSFI are tested indirectly by the tests performed and the required test
setup:
● System Directory
● TCP/IP configuration files and commands
● IUCV
All but two test cases are automated, i.e. after executing a script file, a significant
amount of single tests are executed mediated by the CHUG test tool as well as the
FACT test tool, the results of which are documented. Proper verification whether the
actual test results match the expected results is already included in the respective
test cases. The manual test cases related to the RACF Report Writer and the
certificate based authentication implemented by the SSL Server contain sufficiently
detailed information for the tester to decide on whether the actual test results
obtained match the expected results.
The developer performed a significant amount of SAK testing verifying that the
interface provided towards the virtual machines managed by the TOE is compliant
with the z/Architecture definition. Those SAK tests, however, are to be considered
negative tests, since the cannot actually prove compliance with z/Architecture but
due to extensively issuing random processor instruction streams over a significant
amount of time without ending up in any system errors, sufficient confidence of
proper z/Architecture implementation is built up. The developer testing was
performed to the depth of the TOE design at subsystem level, i.e. the developer
test-depth analysis demonstrated that the TOE subsystems CP, RACF, and TCPIP
have been subject to test cases exercising the TSFI and the TSF implemented by
those components.
As result of an evaluator observation with respect to a deficiency limited to the
TCPIP subsystem, the developer had to update the TCPIP subsystem and was
required to repeat the TCPIP related tests in addition to the necessary functional
testing of the changes applied. The developer testing, therefore, has been split up
into two separate test session.
Testing results:
The test evidence provided by the developer and examined by the evaluator
demonstrates that all but one test case were successful, i.e. the TOE behaviour
observed during the tests matched the expected behaviour.
For one test case a deviation from the expected behaviour was identified, which
resulted in opening a respective bugfix record. An analysis of the error performed by
the developer resulted in the determination that the observed deviation does not
present a security/integrity issue, i.e. no security mechanisms of the TOE were
bypassed or disabled and no vulnerability is introduced.
7.3 Evaluator Testing Effort
The following independent testing was performed by the evaluator:
TOE test configuration:
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The tests were performed on a IBM internal system running within a logical partition
of a System z10 High End server. Note that this was the system the developer
testing was also performed on.
The test system had installed the z/VM Version 6 Release 1, which was displayed
after logon. Issuing the commands to determine the service level including expected
output, the evaluator was able to verify that all required RSU and PTF as stated in
section 1.5.4.1 of the ST were installed on the machine.
The TOE had been in its evaluated configuration when the evaluator tests were
performed.
Subset size chosen; selection criteria for the security functions that compose the
subset; security functions tested; developer tests performed:
The evaluator repeated a randomly chosen subset of the developer tests. For each
of the test case groups "CP commands", "RACF commands", and "DIAGNOSE",
coverage of at least 33% was achieved by the sampling strategy. The overall
coverage achieved by the sample chosen was 39%.
No SAK test case was repeated.
In addition, the evaluator devised independent test cases to cover the TSFI that are
not explicitly but only implicitly triggered by the developer tests repeated. The
independent evaluator test cases directly triggered the TELNET Server, the TCP/IP
configuration files and commands, the System Directory, and RACF and CP
commands. The evaluator covered all TSFI except the API comprising the
z/Architecture instructions and the RACF Report Writer by independent test cases,
with those not explicitly listed above triggered indirectly.
Verdict for the activity:
The overall judgement on the results of evaluator testing during the evaluation is
that all tests performed passed, i.e. the actual results achieved by the evaluator
matched the expected results
By using developer tests as base for independent testing, the evaluator achieved
the same test depth as the developer when repeating a subset of the developer
tests. Therefore, the tests performed by the evaluator were at the level of the
subsystems of the TOE design.
There were no failed tests that were caused by TOE behavior different from the
expected behavior or violating requirements stated in ST.
7.4 Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator consulted public domain information in order to identify vulnerabilities that
would require performing penetration testing, but found no such vulnerabilities.
As for the penetration testing based on the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis
the evaluator devised three penetration test cases. Whereas one of the test cases was
intended to identify additional interfaces potentially bearing weaknesses, the second and
third test case were intended to explicitly probe for buffer overflow weaknesses . All tests
were performed at the depth of the subsystems of the TOE design exercising the TCPIP
subsystem of the TOE.
A port-scan was performed from within the same network segment the TOE was located in
to eliminate interferences with other active network component. No open ports on the
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target machine other than the TELNET port, which was expected to be open for the
purpose of establishing connections to the TOE as designed, thus matching the expected
results.
Attempts to deliberately provoke buffer overflows during input of user credentials were
performed. That test was performed using the standard clients to be used when accessing
the TOE as well as from the command line. In particular, no specific setup reflecting other
active network components was done. The tests revealed no weaknesses. The excessive
inputs were rejected with error messages, thus matching the expected results.
In order to identify weaknesses in the implementation, a client using a modified openssl
library was used for connecting with the TOE. The tests ran for a significant amount of
time, no buffer overflows or other unexpected behaviour was observed.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The Target of Evaluation is z/VM Version 6 Release 1. The TOE is software only and is
accompanied by guidance documentation. The items listed in table 2 of this report
represent the TOE.
TOE is one instance of z/VM running on an abstract machine as the sole operating system
on the level of the abstract machine and exercising full control over this abstract machine
regardless which software runs inside of virtual machines. This abstract machine is
provided by a logical partition (LPAR) of an IBM System z server.
A detailed list of supported IBM system z machine models is given in section 1.5.4.4 of the
ST [6] which is the base for evaluation.
The LPAR itself is not part of the TOE, but belongs to the TOE environment. It is to be
noted that although a z/VM instance technically can be run within a z/VM instance, the
evaluated configuration is restricted to one z/VM instance running directly within an LPAR.
A z/VM instance running within a virtual machine is allowed, but this “second level” z/VM
instance is not in an evaluated configuration, as some security functionality is implemented
differently, in particular with respect to the usage of the processor's Start Interpretive
Execution (SIE) instruction.
Multiple instances of the TOE may share the RACF database. This is done by sharing the
DASD (direct access storage device) volume keeping the RACF database between the
different z/VM instances. Although sharing of the RACF database between z/VM and z/OS
is technically feasible, it is explicitly excluded from this evaluation.
The evaluated configuration of the TOE is additionally defined by the configuration
requirements to be met as stated in the Secure Configuration Guide e.g. table 2. The ST
[6] in section 1.5.4.3 redirects readers to this document, which is part of the deliverables
as listed in table 2.
8.1 Software Configuration
The TOE software components allow a broad range of configuration possibilities. However,
to implement all security requirements, restrictions on the configuration must be made.
The Secure Configuration Guide [10] provides instructions and constraints for the
evaluated configuration.
8.2 Hardware configurations
The following assumptions about the technical environment of the TOE are made. In the
ST [6], the TOE is seen as one instance of z/VM running on an abstract machine as the
sole operating system and exercising full control over this abstract machine. This abstract
machine can be provided by one of the following: a logical partition provided by a certified
version of PR/SM on an IBM System z processor:
● IBM System z10 Business Class
● IBM System z10 Enterprise Class
● zEnterprise 114
● zEnterprise 196
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The abstract machine itself is not part of the TOE, rather, it belongs to the TOE
environment. Nevertheless the correctness of separation and memory protection
mechanisms implemented in the abstract machine is analyzed as part of the evaluation
since those functions are crucial for the security of the TOE.
The following peripherals can be used with the TOE preserving the security functionality:
● all terminals supported by the TOE
● all storage devices supported by the TOE
● all network adapters supported by the TOE
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used. For RNG assessment the scheme
interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.3 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance:
Operating System Protection Profile, Version 2.0, 01 June 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0067-
2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Labeled Security, Version 2.0, 28 May 2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Virtualization, Version 2.0, 28 May 2010 [10]
● for the Functionality:
PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for: The TOE Security
functionality according to the following table:
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Algorithm Key length Intended purpose Implementation standard
SHA-1 not applicable integrity verification U.S. NIST FIPS PUB 180-4
DSA L=1024, N=160 bit Authentication, Key Exchange U.S. NIST FIPS PUB 186-3
RSA 2048 bit Authentication, Key Exchange U.S. NIST FIPS PUB 186-3
TDES in CBC mode 168 bit encryption, decryption U.S. NIST FIPS PUB 46-3,
U.S. NIST PUB SP800-38A
AES in CBC mode 128 bit,
256 bit
encryption, decryption U.S. NIST FIPS PUB 197,
U.S. NIST PUB SP800-38A
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
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12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CP Control Program
DAC Discretionary Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IPL Initial Program Load
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MAC Mandatory Access Control
PP Protection Profile
PR/SM Processor Resource/Systems Manager™
RACF Resource Access Control Facility
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Control Program (IBM) - The Control Program provides the kernel or nucleus of z/VM
running in supervisor state outside the SIE instruction environment. It controls and
manages the SIE instruction provided by the underlying processor providing a restricted
computing environment for the virtual machines.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) - An access control policy that allows authorized
users and authorized administrators to control access to objects based on individual user
identity or membership in a group (PROJECTA, for example).
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Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Logical Processor (IBM) - A logical processor is a share of a real processor that is used
by a logical partition (LPAR). Logical processors have the same behavior as real
processors, but may "float" among the available real processors. The point-in-time
mapping of a local processor to a real processor is managed by the PR/SM LPAR
hypervisor which can overcommit the available CPU capacity, making LPARs wait for
access to the CPU. This means that the total number of logical processors can exceed the
number of real processors.
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) - An access control policy that determines access
based on the sensitivity (SECRET, for example) or category (PERSONNEL or MEDICAL,
for example) of the information being accessed and the access authority of the user
attempting to access that information.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Label (IBM) - A name that represents the combination of a hierarchical level of
classification (IBM security level) and a set of non-hierarchical categories (security
category). Security labels are used as the base for mandatory access control decisions.
Security labels are sometimes referred to as SECLABELs.
Security Level (IBM) - A numerical value that represents the relative sensitivity of the
information an object contains or that a user is permitted to access. A higher number
represents a higher level of sensitivity. Security levels are sometimes referred to as
SECLEVELs. The equivalent MLS term is classification.
Security Level (MLS policy in the Bell-LaPadula model) - The combination of a
hierarchical classification (called security level in z/VM) and a set of nonhierarchical
categories that represents the sensitivity of information is known as the security level. The
equivalent term in other IBM documentation is security label.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE9
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0752-2013, Version 1.1, 2013-01-18, IBM z/VM
Version 6 Release 1 Security Target, IBM Corporation
[7] Operating System Protection Profile, Version 2.0, 01 June 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0067-
2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Labeled Security, Version 2.0, 28 May 2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Virtualization, Version 2.0, 28 May 2010
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2013-02-01, Final Evaluation Technical
Report, atsec information security GmbH, (confidential document)
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, 2012-03-21, Configlist for zVM CP, RACF, and TCPIP
components (confidential document)
[10] Secure Configuration Guide IBM z/VM Version 6 Release 1, Version SC24-6230-02,
Date 2012-03-21, IBM
9
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 2, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0752-2013 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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