BSI-DSZ-CC-1002-2018
for
IBM Enterprise PKCS#11 Firmware
FW IDs 'dada00eb' (4767) and 'e41c1444' (4765)
from
IBM Research & Development Germany
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.2
BSI-DSZ-CC-1002-2018 (*)
IBM Enterprise PKCS#11 Firmware
FW IDs 'dada00eb' (4767) and 'e41c1444' (4765)
from IBM Corporation
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 26 March 2018
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber L.S.
Head of Branch
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1002-2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1002-2018 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................7
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................7
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................7
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................8
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................9
5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................9
6. Publication...................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................14
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................16
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................17
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................17
6. Documentation............................................................................................................17
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................18
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................21
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................21
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................21
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................23
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................25
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................27
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1002-2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1002-2018 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
7 / 28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1002-2018
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1002-2018 Certification Report
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM Enterprise PKCS#11 Firmware, FW IDs 'dada00eb' (4767) and
'e41c1444' (4765) has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product IBM Enterprise PKCS#11 Firmware, FW IDs 'dada00eb'
(4767) and 'e41c1444' (4765) was conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The
evaluation was completed on 20 March 2018. atsec information security GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: IBM Research &
Development Germany.
The product was developed by: IBM Corporation.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 26 March
2018 is valid until 25 March 2023 Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1002-2018
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product IBM Enterprise PKCS#11 Firmware, FW IDs 'dada00eb' (4767) and
'e41c1444' (4765) has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published
regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
IBM Corporation
2455 South Road
Poughkeepsie NY 12601-5400
USA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1002-2018 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1002-2018
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the IBM Enterprise PKCS#11 firmware (EP11) version
1.2.9 and version 2.4.18 running on the IBM CryptoExpress 4 (4765) and the IBM
CryptoExpress 5 (4767) cryptographic coprocessors, respectively. It is an implementation
of the industry-standard PKCS#11 cryptographic service provider API version v2.20 with
some modifications and algorithmic extensions, adapted to requirements typical in
enterprise servers. The EP11 firmware provides a stateless backend, relying mainly on
host-resident, encrypted datastores to maintain sensitive state, while presenting services
as a regular HSM-based PKCS#11 implementation.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Secure key management Keys generated by, or imported to the TOE, are always associated with
their attributes. The TOE uses several attributes that affect the key
management, e.g., CKA_MODIFICABLE allows to change the key
attributes, while CKA_IBM_RESTRICTABLE allows attribute changes but
no addition of new attributes.
Key or state exported to the host is protected with regards to integrity and
confidentiality using authenticated encryption using wrapping keys and
MAC keys that are maintained within the TOE. Optionally, exported
objects can be associated with session identifiers.
Cryptographic operations The following groups of functional services are offered to users:
• Generate or derive keys: AES, TDES, RSA, EC (elliptic curve,
prime field, NIST P-curves, or BP curves), DSA, generic secret
keys
• Generate or verify digital signatures with asymmetric keys: RSA,
ECDSA, DSA
• Key agreement: ECDH
• Encrypt or decrypt data with asymmetric keys: RSA
• Encrypt or decrypt data with symmetric keys: AES, TDES
• Cryptographic hash functions: SHA-1 and SHA-2 family of hash
functions (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512)
• Random-number generation: DRNG (HASH_DRBG)
• Storage, use, and disposal of secrets within the TOE
Application identification and
authentication
The TOE distinguishes applications using its services based on either
proof of possession, or cryptographic authentication, in the cases where
users of services need to be identified.
Non-administrative services are available without authentication, unless
they reference host-resident state, which involves sessions (SFR FIA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1002-2018 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
UID.1). Objects bound to sessions are usable as long as the
corresponding session is registered within the TOE.
Administrators are identified and authenticated through their X.509
public-key certificates, which are loaded into the TOE with the
corresponding private keys resident outside the TOE. Administrators are
identified through signatures on state-changing administrative
commands. Lists of administrators are maintained for the whole card,
and separate lists exist for each internal domain. There are several
administrative commands that require the signatures of more than one
administrator (with the number of signatures being configurable).
Policy enforcement Usage restrictions combine object-level attributes and those of the
domain where the request is executed.
Objects feature fundamental functional restrictions, such as allowing
encryption/signature generation/etc. by a given object, with the
capabilities stored as attributes within each object, for instance encrypt or
sign data.
Domain restrictions can be defined through control points which
represent a diverse set of functional-level usage restrictions, e.g., key
types, key strength, but also the use of certain group of algorithms.
Objects must be allowed for each of these restrictions to become eligible
for use.
Administrative services Administrative commands includes queries and commands. Queries are
allowed for everyone, while administrative commands that change state
need to be signed by an administrator. The TOE provides different groups
of administrative commands, e.g., administrator management, key or
state import/export, management of control points, etc.
Selftests During startup, or upon demand, a set of known-answer tests are
executed. Failure prohibits subsequent cryptographic operations, and
may be remedied by restarting the module.
Audit Security-relevant operations within the TOE are audited through an HSM-
resident audit subsystem. It is based on a hash chain and , therefore,
immune to insertion or deletion.
Audit records may contain fields, which are public, and indirect, non-
sensitive information derived from keys, but NEVER sensitive values.
Indirect information, such as types, sizes, or truncated hashes of keys,
MAY be logged.
Audit records, when queried through non-administrative query, are
returned without additional signatures. Administrative query responses
are returned digitally signed, signing the same audit-record content,
when requested.
Actually recorded events are for example startup/shutdown of the TOE,
time updates, selftest completion, import/export keys, etc.
Random-number generation The TOE uses a hybrid random-number generation process. A hardware-
provided “true-random” (TRNG) provides a seed, which is conditioned
and then post-processed with a stateful pseudo-random generator
(DRNG). The TRNG seed is obtained from the HSM-internal entropy
source. The DRNG is based on a non-invertible, cryptographic hash
function (SHA-256), instantiating the DRBG structure from ISO
18031:2011, C.2.2.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1002-2018
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IBM Enterprise PKCS#11 Firmware, FW IDs 'dada00eb' (4767) and 'e41c1444' (4765)
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release / SHA-256 Hash Value Form of Delivery
IBM Crypto Express 5 EP11 (4767)
1 FW Segment 0 94a0356f a9e5f7bc 2f95ee11 e440cd6f
2281b732 8eb2b272 9fb8122d 10326ee2
Embedded in HSM
2 FW Segment 1 47ded8ee’bb79cf982 250ddbb 1ce945c46
cab4243b d11e4b0d 742664c9 78c1702
Embedded in HSM
3 FW Segment 2 49432fd9’3fad4710 dca1ce91 99953275
85eccd8b b4880783 bf2cf36e 64f2991b
Embedded in HSM
4 FW Segment 3 1dbd97b8’5cae9f30 87f87d18 55bedd3b
23b9cd38 6a93ecbc 2d2a207a 5e573bf5
Embedded in HSM
5 FW Enterprise PKCS#11
(part of segment 3)
dada00eb’e58b1075 72deb5e8 426888f4
68d8ef5a 280fe494 2830cac8 97a0c80e
Embedded in HSM
6 HW Crypto engines of
Andretta ASIC
Andretta 2.0, Revision: 00CW683 Embedded in HSM
IBM Crypto Express 4 EP11 (4765)
7 FW Segment 0 044b8def 0f9b41da 812f81cd eb125311
c2d12fdf a92df004 9a166481 8fb77578
Embedded in HSM
8 FW Segment 1 722df07c’6c6b4939 5ffc5b6f 777c5b88
a35bf368 bb733f49 91646d49 8b9e5107
Embedded in HSM
9 FW Segment 2 f8b90022’ab279393 911b0d9b dfa407f2
18b7ca99 718c2c4b b7c26cc4 e9cce252
Embedded in HSM
10 FW Segment 3 c748d76e’7b92860f c15eb45f a720e901
129308e9 c95cb039 6e00e340 9e7a3fd1
Embedded in HSM
11 FW Enterprise PKCS#11
(part of segment 3)
e41c1444’e1237584 5880adc4 fb116650
d98f9f42 d3dc3d85 26d3bfbd 6e828212
Embedded in HSM
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1002-2018 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release / SHA-256 Hash Value Form of Delivery
12 HW Crypto engines of
Otello ASIC and
Rigolone FPGA
Otello 2.0, PN: 51Y2321
Rigolone 1.55.40
Embedded in HSM
TOE guidance
13 DOC Enterprise PKCS#11
(EP11) Library
structure
2018.02.02
8aba4181 1eca7b2b 3580232d 47f76521
4b78e87e d554727e 7b503e4f 2aa93c3b
Download: https://www-
03.ibm.com/security/crypt
ocards/pciecc2/pdf/ep11-
structure.pdf
14 DOC 4765 PCIe
Cryptographic
Coprocessor
Installation Manual
First edition, May 2011
bc79fcc5 7fc512db cae620f0 ae9f5ee8
c9e029fb d7ead787 da8cecfd 32e03737
Download: https://www-
03.ibm.com/security/crypt
ocards/pciecc/pdf/4765inst
all.pdf
15 DOC 4767 PCIe
Cryptographic
Coprocessor
Installation Manual
First edition, Sept 2016
1f6d91ae 7465f3d7 562bfa6b 715872fa
02b52391 412000c5 30760e51 5013b777
Download: https://www-
03.ibm.com/security/crypt
ocards/pciecc2/pdf/4767in
stall.pdf
16 DOC TKE Workstation
User’s Guide
SC14-7511-07
dad53f9c 85990638 be5314e5 5e2ed3c6
92c211f3 87239cfd 36353ab0 fb04e5fa
Download: https://www-
304.ibm.com/servers/reso
urcelink/svc00100.nsf/pag
es/zOSV2R3sc147511/$fil
e/csfb600_tke_9_0.pdf
HSM-enclosures (containing the TOE and non-TOE parts)
17 HW IBM 4767 PCIe
Cryptographic
Coprocessor
4767-001 / 4767-002 By service personal
18 HW IBM 4765 PCIe
Cryptographic
Coprocessor
4765-001 By service personal
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered as part of the HSM-enclosure, which is part of the TOE environment
(except for the hardware parts listed as #6 and #12 in Table 2). The TOE is exclusively
delivered to the user by dedicated personnel that will also install the PCIe card in the
user's environment (typically an EC-12 s390x mainframe system). The developer does not
offer the product containing the TOE by any other delivery procedure. The guidance can
be obtained via https-secured download and verified using the SHA-256 hash values listed
in Table 2.
The end-user is able to identify the TOE by inspecting details of the cryptographic
coprocessor or accelerator using the toolset of the operating system that operates the
HSM device. Each of the FW segments is identified by name and by a SHA-256 hash
value. The expected hash values are the ones listed in Table 2 for the 4765 and 4767
HSM models, respectively. The enclosing HSM is labeled with either 4765-001, 4767-001,
or 4767-002. The "-002" variant has an improved circuitry layout with otherwise identical
internals and functionality.
Please note that the TOE does not comprise the complete Cryptographic Coprocessor, but
rather its firmware running inside the HSM, as well as cryptographic algorithms
implemented in an ASIC and ASIC/FPGA, respectively. The evaluation of those hardware
parts of the TOE was based on a VHDL code review, aspects of the life cycle (ALC) have
not been examined regarding the hardware production.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1002-2018
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
Cryptographic services
The TOE provides cryptographic services for asymmetric and symmetric ciphers, including
key generation and key destruction policies.
User identification and authentication
The TOE provides user authentication (via sessions) and administrator authentication (via
certificates).
Domain control point access control policy
The TOE enforces an access control policy that affects the functions (mainly allowing or
disallowing a function) that are triggered by requests for TOE keys or state.
Object security attribute access control policy
The TOE enforces an access control policy, which allows or disallows an operation
triggered by a session request on TOE objects based on the attributes bound on that
object.
Session object access control policy
The TOE enforces an access control policy, which allows or disallows an operation
triggered by a session request on a TOE key or state based on the existence and validity
of a session, and the association of a TOE key or state with a session.
Domain access control policy
The TOE verifies the attributes of user data when imported or exported from outside the
TOE. The control is based on domain identifiers and does not allow usage of objects from
one domain in another except the related operation is a card-level administrative request.
This includes the consistent interpretation of attributes of cryptographic keys when shared
with an external entity.
Inter-TSF detection of modification
The TOE rejects TSF data transmitted from an external IT product if the data integrity
check fails. That includes signature verification of administrator commands.
Auditing
The TOE creates audit events for its operation (e.g. startup) as well as key management
and administrator operation, including a timestamp from a reliable time source. The audit
events are provided in an user-interpretable format, and the audit trail is protected against
unauthorized deletion, and prevents overwriting of recent audit events when the audit trail
becomes full.
Residual information protection
Previous information from a resource is made unavailable upon deallocation.
Management of TSF
The TOE provides management functions to administrators:
• manage administrators
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1002-2018 Certification Report
• manage control points
The TOE provides management functions to users:
• manage their session data
• manage their object key attributes
TSF protection through self-tests
The TOE runs self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the cryptographic
primitives, and ensures a secure state through prohibiting further operation in case the self
tests fail.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
• Key generation by IT environment
• Analysis of TOE audit data
• Personal security
• Availability of cryptographic key and key material
• Physical protection
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
Internal software is divided into four layers, i.e. the segments 0 to 3. The base two layers,
and a stub in the third layer control security and configuration of the module:
• Layer 0: Permanent POST 0 (Power-on Self Test) and Miniboot 0 (security
bootstrap). This code is in ROMmed flash, bootstrapping the entire module,
effectively non-modifiable.
• Layer 1: Rewritable POST 1 and Miniboot 1, responsible for self-test and some
card-level management functionality. The upper two layers customize the operation
of each individual device.
• Layer 2: System software. Supervisor-level code, including any system-provided
device drivers, but excluding the startup stub.
• Layer 3: Application code, including userspace drivers, if any.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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7. IT Product Testing
Developer testing
347 automated tests have been executed on the 4767 and 4765 model, and 2 additional
manual tests have been executed on the 4767 model.
All tests were successfully executed with the results being consistent with the expected
results.
Evaluator testing and penetration testing
The evaluator performed all tests on the 4767 and 4765 model.
The 4767 model was tested in one version prior to the TOE version, due to a last minute
change to fix a session function defect (identified during penetration testing).
The tests for the 4767 model did apply to the following configuration:
• IBM 4767-002 PCI-e Cryptographic Coprocessor
• 5.2.26 P0123 M0121 P0123 F0D01 (segment 1) (47DE D8EE)
• 5.2.10 1.0-lnx-2015-06-16-20 (segment 2) (4943 2FD9)
• 2.4.17 EP11 (segment 3) (3B00 175E / c4f5b29d)
Only one penetration test, which targets the TOE session behavior (and which was the
cause for a version change), has been rerun on the updated TOE version (2.4.18 EP11
segment 3 - 1DBD 97B8 / DADA00EB). The 2.4.18 EP11 version differs to the 2.4.17 only
with regards to the correction of the session fix.
The tests for the 4765 model did apply to the following configuration:
• IBM 4765-001 PCI-e Cryptographic Coprocessor
• S0103 P1v0607, Revision: 40105 (segment 1) (177C AF13)
• 4.4.17 y4_13-lnx-2013-08-09-18 (segment 2) (9E64 A050)
• 1.2.9 EP11 (segment 3) (C748 D76E / E41C1444)
The evaluator repeated all automated developer tests on the 4765 and 4767 model. In
addition, 9 new additional evaluator tests have been executed on the 4765 and the 4767
model.
All test were executed successfully with no relevant deviations from the expected function
behavior.
The evaluator performed 7 penetration tests on the 4765 and 4767 model.
Tests on the 4765 model showed two Denial-of-Service vulnerabilities. However, no
vulnerability that would violate any security objectives of the TOE that are exploitable in the
intended operational environment, were identified.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The evaluated configuration requires the TOE (or rather its enclosing HSM) to be installed
in an IBM zSeries mainframe that runs a Common Criteria evaluated version of the z/OS
operating system. The TOE is accessed via ICSF and TKE.
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Function-wise, the guidance documentation provides configuration requirements specific
to the evaluated configuration through mandatory control point settings. Details of the
required control point settings are documented in [9], Enterprise PKCS#11 (EP11) Library
structure, appendix ‘Wire format’, section 8.1.1.3.5.
Furthermore, the following activities are not allowed in the evaluated configuration:
• manual key import
• key transport with enforced attribute binding (no separation of keys and attributes)
• firmware updates
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretation AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
The evaluation has confirmed:
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only.
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
1 Cryptographic
Primitive
TDES encryption and
decryption
(ECB and CBC mode)
FIPS 46-3
NIST SP 800-38A
(2001 Edition)
168 No
2 Cryptographic
Primitive
AES encryption and
decryption
(ECB and CBC mode)
FIPS 197
NIST SP 800-38A
(2001 Edition)
128, 192, 256 No (EBC)
Yes (CBC)
3 Cryptographic
Primitive
SHA-1 FIPS 180-4 N/A No
4 Cryptographic
Primitive
SHA-{224, 256, 384,
512}
FIPS 186-4 N/A Yes
5 Cryptographic
Primitive
RSA encryption,
decryption, signature
generation, and
signature verification
RFC 3447 (PKCS#1
V2.1)
2048, 3072, 4096 Yes
6 Cryptographic
Primitive
DSA signature
generation and
verification
FIPS 186-4 2048, 3072 Yes
7 Cryptographic
Primitive
ECDSA signature
generation and
verification
(NIST curves)
ANSI X9.62-2005
FIPS 186-4
192 No
224, 256, 320,
384, 521
Yes
8 Cryptographic
Primitive
ECDSA signature
generation and
verification
(Brainpool curves)
ANSI X9.62-2005
RFC 5639
192 No
224, 256, 320,
384, 512
Yes
9 Cryptographic
Primitive
ECDH
(NIST curves)
ANSI X9.62-2001
FIPS 186-4
192 No
224, 256, 320,
384, 521
Yes
10 Cryptographic
Primitive
ECDH
(Brainpool curves)
ANSI X9.62-2001
RFC 5639
192 No
224, 256, 320,
384, 512
Yes
11 Key Generation RSA FIPS 186-4
(algorithm C9)
2048, 3072, 4096 Yes
12 Key Generation DSA FIPS 186-3
(Appendix A.1 for p, q
and Appendix A.2 for
g)
2048 Yes
13 Key Generation ECDSA FIPS 186-4 192 No
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
(NIST and Brainpool
curves)
(Section 6.2.1)
FIPS 186-4
RFC 5639
224, 256, 320,
384, 512, 521
Yes
14 Random
Number
Generation
Hash_DRBG with SHA-
256
(seeded by an internal
noise source)
NIST SP 800-90A
(revision 1)
FIPS 186-4
N/A N/A
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in Table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of
the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
ASIC Application-Specific Integrated Circuit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
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CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FPGA Field-Programmable Gate Array
FW Firmware
HSM Hardware Security Module
HW Hardware
ICSF Integrated Cryptographic Service Facility
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PCIe Peripheral Component Interconnect Express
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TKE Trusted Key Entry
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
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Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012,
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012,
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1002-2018, Version 1, Rev. 273, 2017-08-30, IBM
Enterprise PKCS#11, IBM Research Zürich and IBM Böblingen/Poughkeepsie
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 5, 2018-03-12, Final Evaluation Technical
Report, atsec information security GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration lists for the TOE:
Configuration list of static content measured by SHA256 hashes, Version 1.0, 2016-
12-12, IBM (confidential document)
EP11 configuration list BOE, Version 1, 2017-07-14, IBM (confidential document)
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 23, Version 4, Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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EP11 configuration list (BOE) for documentation files, Version 1, 2017-07-14, IBM
(confidential document)
Hardware configuration list for IBM 4765 and 4767 EP11 HSMs, Version 1.0, 2017-
08-31, IBM (confidential document)
[9] Guidance documentation of the TOE:
Enterprise PKCS#11 (EP11) Library structure, 2018-02-02, IBM
4765 PCIe Cryptographic Coprocessor Installation Manual, First edition, May 2011,
IBM
4767 PCIe Cryptographic Coprocessor Installation Manual, First edition, September
2016, IBM
TKE Workstation User’s Guide, SC14-7511-07, IBM
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.4
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 11
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 12 to 16
• The table in CC Part 3, Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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Note: End of report
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