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© Apple Inc., 2020 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Prepared for Apple Inc.
Prepared by Acumen Security, LLC.
Document Version: 1.3
Apple iOS and iPadOS 13
Contacts Security Target
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© Apple Inc., 2020 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Table Of Contents
1 Security Target Introduction.................................................................................................................5
1.1 Security Target and TOE Reference ..............................................................................................5
1.2 TOE Overview................................................................................................................................5
1.3 TOE Description.............................................................................................................................5
1.3.1 Evaluated Configuration .......................................................................................................5
1.3.2 Physical Boundaries ..............................................................................................................8
1.3.3 Logical Boundaries ................................................................................................................8
1.3.4 TOE Documentation..............................................................................................................8
2 Conformance Claims.............................................................................................................................9
2.1 CC Conformance ...........................................................................................................................9
2.2 Protection Profile Conformance ...................................................................................................9
2.3 Conformance Rationale ................................................................................................................9
2.3.1 Technical Decisions...............................................................................................................9
3 Security Problem Definition................................................................................................................11
3.1 Threats ........................................................................................................................................11
3.2 Assumptions................................................................................................................................11
3.3 Organizational Security Policies..................................................................................................11
4 Security Objectives..............................................................................................................................12
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ..................................................................................................12
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment................................................................13
5 Security Requirements........................................................................................................................14
5.1 Conventions ................................................................................................................................14
5.2 Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................................15
5.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)...............................................................................................15
5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP).................................................................................................15
5.2.3 Security Management (FMT) ..............................................................................................16
5.2.4 Privacy (FPR)........................................................................................................................16
5.2.5 Protection of TSF (FPT)........................................................................................................17
5.2.6 Trusted Path/Channel (FTP)................................................................................................18
5.3 Dependency Rationale for SFRs..................................................................................................18
5.4 Security Assurance Requirements ..............................................................................................18
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5.5 Assurance Measures...................................................................................................................19
6 TOE Summary Specification................................................................................................................20
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Revision History
Version Date Description
0.1 August 2019 Initial Draft
0.2 September 2019 Updated based on Apple review
0.3 September 2019 Updated with additional models
0.4 November 2019 Updated based on internal review
0.5 March 2020 Updated TDs
0.6 May 2020 Updated for submission
1.0 May 2020 Updated based on ECR comments
1.1 June 2020 Added processor details
1.2 June 2020 Updated for publication
1.3 June 2020 Updated device identifiers
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1 Security Target Introduction
1.1 Security Target and TOE Reference
This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its TOE.
Category Identifier
ST Title Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Contacts Security Target
ST Version 1.3
ST Date June 2020
ST Author Acumen Security, LLC.
TOE Identifier Apple iOS and iPadOS 13: Contacts
TOE Software Version 13.4.1
TOE Developer Apple Inc.
Key Words Application, Mobility
Table 1 TOE/ST Identification
1.2 TOE Overview
The TOE is the Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Contacts application which runs on iPhones and iPads. The
product provides access and management of user contact information within the devices.
Note: The TOE is the application software only. The Apple iOS and iPadOS operating systems have been
separately validated.
1.3 TOE Description
1.3.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is an application on a mobile OS. The TOE is the Contacts application only. The Apple iOS and
iPadOS operating systems have been separately validated against the Protection Profile for Mobile
Device Fundamentals Version 3.1. The mobile operating system and hardware platforms are part of the
TOE environment. The evaluated version of the TOE is version 13.4.1.
As evaluated, the TOE software runs on the following devices,
Device Name Model OS Processor WiFi Bluetooth
iPhone 11 Pro Max A2161
A2218
A2219
A2220
iOS A13 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac/ax 5.0
iPhone 11 Pro A2160
A2215
A2216
A2217
iOS A13 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac/ax 5.0
iPhone 11 A2111
A2221
A2222
A2223
iOS A13 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac/ax 5.0
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Device Name Model OS Processor WiFi Bluetooth
iPhone SE (2nd Gen) A2275
A2296
A2298
iOS A13 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac/ax 5.0
iPhone Xs Max A1921
A2101
A2102
A2103
A2104
iOS A12 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
iPhone Xs A1920
A2097
A2098
A2099
A2100
iOS A12 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
iPhone XR A1984
A2105
A2106
A2107
A2108
iOS A12 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
iPhone X A1865
A1901
A1902
A1903
iOS A11 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
iPhone 8 Plus A1864
A1897
A1898
A1899
iOS A11 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
iPhone 8 A1863
A1905
A1906
A1907
iOS A11 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
iPhone 7 Plus A1661
A1784
A1785
A1786
iOS A10 Fusion 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPhone 7 A1660
A1778
A1779
A1780
iOS A10 Fusion 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPhone 6S Plus A1634
A1687
A1690
A1699
iOS A9 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPhone 6s A1633
A1688
A1691
A1700
iOS A9 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
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Device Name Model OS Processor WiFi Bluetooth
iPhone SE A1662
A1723
A1724
iOS A9 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPad Pro 12.9” (4th gen) A2229
A2232
A2069
A2233
iPadOS A12Z Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac/ax 5.0
iPad Pro 11” (2nd gen) A2228
A2068
A2230
A2331
iPadOS A12Z Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac/ax 5.0
iPad Pro 12.9-inch
(3rd gen)
A1876
A1895
A1983
A2014
iPadOS A12X Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
iPad Pro 11-inch A1980
A1934
A1979
A2013
iPadOS A12X Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
iPad Air (3rd gen) A2123
A2152
A2153
A2154
iPadOS A12 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
iPad mini (5th gen) A2124
A2125
A2126
A2133
iPadOS A12 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
iPad Pro (12.9-inch 2nd
gen)
A1670
A1671
A1821
iPadOS A10X Fusion 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPad Pro (10.5-inch) A1701
A1709
A1852
iPadOS A10X Fusion 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPad (7th gen) A2197
A2198
A2199
A2200
iPadOS A10 Fusion 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPad (6th gen) A1893
A1954
iPadOS A10 Fusion 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPad Pro (12.9) A1584
A1652
iPadOS A9X 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPad Pro (9.7-inch) A1673
A1674
A1675
iPadOS A9X 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPad (5th gen) A1822
A1823
iPadOS A9 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
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Device Name Model OS Processor WiFi Bluetooth
iPad Air 2 A1566
A1567
iPadOS A8X 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPad mini 4 A1538
A1550
iPadOS A8 802.11a/b/g/n 4.2
Table 2 IT Environment Components
1.3.2 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a software application running on a mobile device (as listed above). The mobile device
platform provides a host Operating System, controls that limit application behavior, and wireless
connectivity.
1.3.3 Logical Boundaries
The TOE provides the security functionality required by [SWAPP].
1.3.3.1 Cryptographic Support
The TOE platform provides HTTPS/TLS functionality to securely communicate with trusted entities. The
TOE does not directly perform any cryptographic functions.
1.3.3.2 User Data Protection
The TOE requests no hardware or software resources during the use of the application. The TOE requires
network access.
1.3.3.3 Security Management
The TOE is installed completely pre-configured. No security related configuration is required for
operation.
1.3.3.4 Privacy
The TOE does not request any PII with the intent to transmit the data over the network. However, the
TOE will transmit contact information at the request of the user. In these cases, the TOE provides a
notification when sharing this information.
1.3.3.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE platform performs cryptographic self-tests at startup which ensures the TOE ability to properly
operate. The TOE platform also verifies all software updates via digital signature.
1.3.3.6 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE is a software application. The TOE has the ability to establish protected communications using
platform provided TLS/HTTPS.
1.3.4 TOE Documentation
• Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Contacts Security Target, Version 1.3 [ST] (This Document)
• Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Contacts Security Target Addendum, Version 1.0 (Proprietary)
• Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Contacts Common Criteria Configuration Guide, Version 1.6 [AGD]
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2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance
This TOE is conformant to:
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluations Part 1, Version 3.1, Revision 5,
April 2017
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluations Part 2, Version 3.1, Revision 5,
April 2017: Part 2 extended
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluations Part 2, Version 3.1, Revision 5,
April 2017: Part 3 extended
2.2 Protection Profile Conformance
This TOE is conformant to:
• Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP].
2.3 Conformance Rationale
This Security Target provides exact conformance to Version 1.3 of the Protection Profile for Application
Software. The security problem definition, security objectives and security requirements in this Security
Target are all taken from the Protection Profile performing only operations defined there.
2.3.1 Technical Decisions
All NIAP Technical Decisions (TDs) issued to date that are applicable to [SWAPP] have been considered.
The following table identifies all applicable TD:
Identifier Applicable Exclusion Rationale (if applicable)
0510 – Obtaining random bytes for iOS/macOS No The TOE does not obtain random bytes
from the platform.
0505 – Clarification of revocation testing under
RFC6066
Yes
0498 – Application Software PP Security Objectives
and Requirements Rationale
Yes
0495 – FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 Test Clarification No The TOE does not directly invoke X.509
functionality.
0486 – Removal of PP-Module for VPN Clients from
allowed with list
Yes
0473 – Support for Client or Server TOEs in
FCS_HTTPS_EXT
No The TOE uses platform HTTPS, so it does
not include FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.
0465 – Configuration Storage for .NET Apps No This TD only applies to Windows platforms.
The TOE runs on iOS and iPadOS.
0445 – User Modifiable File Definition Yes
0444 – IPsec selections Yes
0437 – Supported Configuration Mechanism Yes
0435 – Alternative to SELinux for FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3 No This TD only applies to Linux platforms. The
TOE runs on iOS and iPadOS.
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Identifier Applicable Exclusion Rationale (if applicable)
0434 – Windows Desktop Applications Test No This TD only applies to Windows platforms.
The TOE runs on iOS and iPadOS.
0427 – Reliable Time Source Yes
0416 – Correction to FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Test Activity Yes
Table 3 Technical Decisions
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3 Security Problem Definition
The security problem definition has been taken from [SWAPP] and is reproduced here for the
convenience of the reader. The security problem is described in terms of the threats that the TOE is
expected to address, assumptions about the operational environment, and any organizational security
policies that the TOE is expected to enforce.
3.1 Threats
The following threats are drawn directly from the [SWAPP].
ID Threat
T.NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the
network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with the
application software or alter communications between the application software and
other endpoints in order to compromise it.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the
network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged
between the application and other endpoints.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the same computing platform
on which the application executes. Attackers may provide maliciously formatted
input to the application in the form of files or other local communications.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.
Table 4 Threats
3.2 Assumptions
The following assumptions are drawn directly from the [SWAPP].
ID Assumption
A.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a reliable time clock for
its execution. This includes the underlying platform and whatever runtime
environment it provides to the TOE.
A.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the
software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
A.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or
hostile, and administers the software in compliance with the applied enterprise
security policy.
Table 5 Assumptions
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
There are no OSPs for the application.
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4 Security Objectives
The security objectives have been taken from [SWAPP] and are reproduced here for the convenience of
the reader.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The following security objectives for the TOE were drawn directly from the [SWAPP].
ID TOE Objective
O.INTEGRITY Conformant TOEs ensure the integrity of their installation and update packages, and
also leverage execution environment-based mitigations. Software is seldom, if ever,
shipped without errors. The ability to deploy patches and updates to fielded
software with integrity is critical to enterprise network security. Processor
manufacturers, compiler developers, execution environment vendors, and
operating system vendors have developed execution environment-based
mitigations that increase the cost to attackers by adding complexity to the task of
compromising systems. Application software can often take advantage of these
mechanisms by using APIs provided by the runtime environment or by enabling the
mechanism through compiler or linker options.
Addressed by: FDP_DEC_EXT.1, FMT_CFG_EXT.1, FPT_AEX_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.1
O.QUALITY To ensure quality of implementation, conformant TOEs leverage services and APIs
provided by the runtime environment rather than implementing their own versions
of these services and APIs. This is especially important for cryptographic services
and other complex operations such as file and media parsing. Leveraging this
platform behavior relies upon using only documented and supported APIs.
Addressed by: FMT_MEC_EXT.1, FPT_API_EXT.1, FPT_LIB_EXT.1
O.MANAGEMENT To facilitate management by users and the enterprise, conformant TOEs provide
consistent and supported interfaces for their security-relevant configuration and
maintenance. This includes the deployment of applications and application updates
through the use of platform-supported deployment mechanisms and formats, as
well as providing mechanisms for configuration. This also includes providing control
to the user regarding disclosure of any PII.
Addressed by: FMT_SMF.1, FPT_IDV_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FPR_ANO_EXT.1
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of user data in the event of loss of
physical control of the storage medium, conformant TOEs will use data-at-rest
protection. This involves encrypting data and keys stored by the TOE in order to
prevent unauthorized access to this data. This also includes unnecessary network
communications whose consequence may be the loss of data.
Addressed by: FDP_DAR_EXT.1, FCS_STO_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.1
O.PROTECTED_COMMS To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet modification) network
attack threats, conformant TOEs will use a trusted channel for sensitive data.
Sensitive data includes cryptographic keys, passwords, and any other data specific
to the application that should not be exposed outside of the application.
Addressed by: FTP_DIT_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_CKM_EXT.1, FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1,
FDP_NET_EXT.1
Table 6 Objectives for the TOE
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4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The following security objectives for the operational environment assist the TOE in correctly providing
its security functionality. They were drawn directly from the [SWAPP] and track with the assumptions
about the environment.
ID Objective for the Operation Environment
OE.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This
includes the underlying operating system and any discrete execution environment
provided to the TOE.
OE.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses
the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
OE.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or
hostile, and administers the software within compliance of the applied enterprise
security policy.
Table 7 Objectives for the environment
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5 Security Requirements
This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE and/or Platform. The Security
Functional Requirements included in this section are derived from Part 2 of the Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5 and all international interpretations.
Requirement Description
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
Table 8 SFRs
5.1 Conventions
The CC defines operations on Security Functional Requirements: assignments, selections, assignments
within selections and refinements. This document uses the following font conventions to identify the
operations defined by the CC:
• Assignment: Indicated with italicized text;
• Refinement: Indicated with bold text;
• Selection: Indicated with underlined text;
• Iteration: Indicated by appending the iteration number in parenthesis, e.g., (1), (2), (3).
• Where operations were completed in the PP itself, the formatting used in the PP has been
retained.
Explicitly stated SFRs are identified by having a label ‘EXT’ after the requirement name for TOE SFRs.
Formatting conventions outside of operations matches the formatting specified within the PP.
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5.2 Security Functional Requirements
5.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
• use no DRBG functionality,
] for its cryptographic operations.
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
• generate no asymmetric cryptographic keys,
].
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
• not store any credentials,
] to non-volatile memory.
5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1
The application shall restrict its access to [
• network connectivity,
• camera,
].
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2
The application shall restrict its access to [
• address book,
• [photos library]
] .
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FDP_NET_EXT.1.1
The application shall restrict network communication to [
• user-initiated communication for [updating contacts],
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] .
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
• leverage platform-provided functionality to encrypt sensitive data,
] in non-volatile memory.
5.2.3 Security Management (FMT)
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
• invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform vendor for storing and setting
configuration options.
].
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1
The application shall provide only enough functionality to set new credentials when configured with
default credentials or no credentials.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2
The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect the application
binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged users.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [
• no management functions,
] .
5.2.4 Privacy (FPR)
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
FPR_ANO_EXT.1
The application shall [
• not transmit PII over a network,
] .
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5.2.5 Protection of TSF (FPT)
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_API_EXT.1.1
The application shall use only documented platform APIs.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1
The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for [no exceptions].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2
The application shall [
• not allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions ,
] .
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3
The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the platform vendor.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4
The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files unless
explicitly directed by the user to do so.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5
The application shall be built with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
The application shall [leverage the platform] to check for updates and patches to the application
software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The application shall [leverage the platform] to query the current version of the application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4
The application installation package and its updates shall be digitally signed such that its platform can
cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5
The application is distributed [with the platform OS]
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1
The application shall be packaged with only [no third-party libraries].
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FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_IDV_EXT.1.1
The application shall be versioned with [[Bundle configuration information (bundle ID and version
number)]] .
5.2.6 Trusted Path/Channel (FTP)
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
• invoke platform-provided functionality to encrypt all transmitted data with [HTTPS, TLS]
] between itself and another trusted IT product.
5.3 Dependency Rationale for SFRs
The Security Target contains all of the required SFRs from the Protection Profile for Application
Software. Based on instructions contained in the PP, the Security Target includes all required selection-
based SFRs. The dependency analysis can be found within the PP. As such, the dependencies are not
applicable since the PP has been approved.
5.4 Security Assurance Requirements
The TOE assurance requirements for this ST are taken directly from the Protection Profile for Application
Software and Common Criteria Part 3 Version 3.1, Revision 5. The assurance requirements are
summarized in the table below.
Assurance Class Components Components Description
Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational
environment
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
Table 9 Security Assurance Requirements
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5.5 Assurance Measures
The TOE satisfies the identified assurance requirements. This section identifies the Assurance Measures
applied by Apple to satisfy the assurance requirements. The table below lists the details.
SAR How the SAR will be met
ADV_FSP.1 The functional specification describes the external interfaces of the TOE; such as the means for
a user to invoke a service and the corresponding response of those services. The description
includes the interface(s) that enforces a security functional requirement, the interface(s) that
supports the enforcement of a security functional requirement, and the interface(s) that does
not enforce any security functional requirements. The interfaces are described in terms of their
purpose (general goal of the interface), method of use (how the interface is to be used),
parameters (explicit inputs to and outputs from an interface that control the behavior of that
interface), parameter descriptions (tells what the parameter is in some meaningful way), and
error messages (identifies the condition that generated it, what the message is, and the
meaning of any error codes).
AGD_OPE.1 The Administrative Guide provides the descriptions of the processes and procedures of how
the administrative users of the TOE can securely administer the TOE using the interfaces that
provide the features and functions detailed in the guidance.
AGD_PRE.1 The Installation Guide describes the installation, generation, and startup procedures so that the
users of the TOE can put the components of the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
ALC_CMC.1 The Configuration Management (CM) documents describe how the consumer identifies the
evaluated TOE. The CM documents identify the configuration items, how those configuration
items are uniquely identified, and the adequacy of the procedures that are used to control and
track changes that are made to the TOE. This includes details on what changes are tracked and
how potential changes are incorporated.
ALC_CMS.1
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Apple uses a systematic method for identifying and providing security relevant updates to the
TOEs users via its support infrastructure.
ATE_IND.1 Apple will provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1 Apple will provide the TOE for testing.
Table 10 TOE Security Assurance Measures
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6 TOE Summary Specification
This chapter identifies and describes how the Security Functional Requirements identified above are met
by the TOE.
SFR Rationale
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 The TOE does not use DRBG functionality.
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 The TOE does not perform asymmetric key generation.
FCS_STO_EXT.1 The contacts application does not store any credentials. Credentials used for user-
initiated updates of contacts are stored by the platform. These credentials are used
(along with platform provided TLS/HTTPS) by the platform when the user initiates an
update.
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 The TOE requests only access to the following hardware resources:
• Network connectivity
• Camera
The TOE limits its access to the following sensitive information repository:
• Address book
• Photos Library
FDP_NET_EXT.1 The TOE communicates on the network based upon user-initiated request to update
contacts.
Note: The platform can also be periodically be configured to update the platform
address book independently of the Contacts application.
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Contact data is the only data and only sensitive data stored by the TOE. The TOE
securely stores sensitive data using platform-provided functionality to encrypt the data,
specifically stored under Class C (Protected Until First User Authentication-
NSFileProtectionComplete).
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 The TOE maintains a restricted configuration with no management functions being
performed by users. All configuration options are stored and set by the underlying
platform. The TOE reads configuration options from platform’s user defaults system.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 The TOE does not come with any default credentials. The user must configure an
account on the underlying platform before accessing the TOE.
The TOE stores data under Class C (Protected Until First User Authentication-
NSFileProtectionComplete) to prevent modification by unprivileged users.
FMT_SMF.1 The TOE provides no management functionality. All management of settings is
performed by the underlying platform.
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 The TOE does not request any PII with the intent to transmit the data over the network.
However, the TOE will transmit contact information at the request of the user. In these
cases, the TOE provides a notification when sharing this information.
Note: this SFR only applies to PII that is specifically requested by the application.
FPT_API_EXT.1 The following API frameworks are used by contacts:
• Accounts.framework
• AddressBook.framework
• AppKit.framework
• AppSupport.framework
• AssistantServices.framework
• Contacts.framework
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SFR Rationale
• ContactsDonation.framework
• CoreData.framework
• CoreFoundation.framework
• CoreGraphics.framework
• CoreSpotlight.framework
• CoreSuggestions.framework
• CoreText.framework
• DataAccessExpress.framework
• Foundation.framework
• IntlPreferences.framework
• PhoneNumber.framework
• Security.framework
• TCC.framework
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 The TOE is compiled with ASLR enabled (achieved by compiling with the -fPIE flag) and
does not make any calls to mmap or mprotect.
The TOE does not allocate any memory regions with the PROT_EXEC permission.
The underlying platform is iOS or iPadOS, so the platform ensures the TOE:
1) is compatible with the platform security features
2) writes data to the application working directory and not the directory
containing executable files
Stack-based buffer overflow protection is provided by being compiled with the -fstack-
protector-all flag.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 The TOE is provided within the underlying OS image and packaged as a signed IPA file.
The platform considers the signature authorized if the certificate used to sign the IPA
file chains to the Apple Worldwide Developer Relations Certification Authority or the
Apple iPhone Certification Authority. Updates to the TOE are provided through
underlying OS updates and current versions of the TOE can be checked through the
Settings of the underlying platform.
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 The TOE does not leverage any third-party libraries. It is a 1st part application that is
provided on the underlying platform by the vendor.
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Each iOS and iPadOS application must be distributed in as an Application Bundle. The
Application Bundle includes an Info.plist file containing the following identifying
information: Bundle name, Bundle ID, and Platform version (since the TOE is included
with the platform OS). For the TOE, these are the following key/value pairs in the
Info.plist file:
• Bundle name: Contacts
• Bundle identifier: com.apple.MobileAddressBook
• DTPlatformVersion: 13.4.1
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 All application data is transmitted securely via platform provided HTTPS and TLS with
Apple Servers or other user configured servers. The TOE uses the NSURL class to initiate
a synchronization of contacts with the servers. User credentials are transmitted during
the synchronization process; however, credentials are managed and transmitted by the
platform OS as necessary.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 To report security or privacy issues that affect Apple products or web servers, should
contact product-security@apple.com. Submissions can use Apple's Product Security
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SFR Rationale
PGP key (https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201214) to encrypt sensitive information
that is sent by email. When the email is received, Apple will send an automatic email as
acknowledgment. If this email is not received, please check the email address and send
again. For the protection of our customers, Apple generally does not disclose, discuss,
or confirm security issues until a full investigation is complete and any necessary
patches or releases are available. Apple distributes information about security issues in
its products through security advisories. Users can also receive Apple security
advisories through the security-announce mailing list.
Table 11 TOE Summary Specification SFR Description