Certificate Report
Version 1.1
17 August 2021
CSA_CC_21002
For
ADPICS Data Diode (ADPICS-DD)
Version 1.0
From
Attila Cybertech Pte Ltd.
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Foreword
Singapore is a Common Criteria Certificate Authorizing Nation, under the
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA). The current list of signatory
nations and approved certification schemes can be found at the CCRA portal:
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Singapore Common Criteria Scheme (SCCS) is established for the info-
communications technology (ICT) industry to evaluate and certify their IT products
against the requirements of the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1 (ISO/IEC 15408) and Common
Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM) Version 3.1
(ISO/IEC 18045) in Singapore.
The SCCS is owned and managed by the Certification Body (CB) under the ambit
of Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA).
The SCCS certification signifies that the target of evaluation (TOE) under
evaluation has been assessed and found to provide the specified IT security
assurance. However, certification does not guarantee absolute security and
should always be read with the particular set of threats sought to be addressed
and assumptions made in the process of evaluation.
This certification is not an endorsement of the product.
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Amendment Record
Version Date Changes
1.0 August 2021 Released
1.1 August 2021 Minor editorial changes
NOTICE
The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore makes no warranty of any kind with
regard to this material and shall not be liable for errors contained herein or
for incidental or consequential damages in connection with the use of this
material.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 5
Executive Summary
This report is intended to assist the end-user of the product in determining the
suitability of the product in their deployed environment.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the ADPICS Data Diode (ADPICS-DD)
Version 1.0 and has undergone the CC certification procedure at the Singapore
Common Criteria Scheme (SCCS).
The TOE consists of the following.
Name and version Version
ADPICS Data Diode (ADPICS-DD) Hardware 1.0
Attila ADPICS Data Diode User Guidance 2.0
The ADPICS Data Diode (i.e. the TOE) is a network gateway that ensures
physical layer one-way data transmission through the TOE. The TOE is used to
connect two separate networks together, one being the Source Zone and the
other being the Destination Zone. The TOE ensures that the data can only flow
from the Source Zone to the Destination Zone but blocks data flow in the
reverse direction.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by An Security, an approved
CC test laboratory, at the assurance level CC EAL 1 and was completed on 27
July 2021.
The certification body monitored each evaluation to ensure a harmonised
procedure and interpretation of the criteria has been applied.
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The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following
TOE Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality
Enforcing unidirectional data flow between two zones through physical
disconnection of the reverse flow interfaces.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionality
Please refer to the Security Target [1] for more information.
The assets to be protected by the TOE has been defined. Based on these
assets, the TOE Security Problem Definition has been defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisation Policies. These are outlined in Chapter
4 of the Security Target [1]
This Certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in Chapter
5.3 of this report.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate and on the condition that it is in compliance with all the stipulations
as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate applies only to the
specific version and release of the IT product in its evaluated configuration.
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Table of Contents
1 CERTIFICATION .......................................................................................8
1.1 PROCEDURE..........................................................................................8
1.2 RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS...................................................................8
2 VALIDITY OF THE CERTIFICATION RESULT .........................................9
3 IDENTIFICATION ....................................................................................10
4 SECURITY POLICY ................................................................................ 11
5 ASSUMPTIONS & SCOPE OF EVALUATION........................................ 11
5.1 ASSUMPTIONS ..................................................................................... 11
5.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE..................................................................... 11
5.3 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION.................................................................12
5.4 NON-EVALUATED FUNCTIONALITIES .......................................................12
5.5 NON-TOE COMPONENTS .....................................................................12
6 DOCUMENTATION .................................................................................13
7 IT PRODUCT TESTING ..........................................................................13
7.1 EVALUATOR TESTING (ATE_IND)..........................................................13
7.1.1 Test Approach and Depth............................................................13
7.1.2 Test Configuration .......................................................................13
7.1.3 Test Results ................................................................................13
7.2 PENETRATION TESTING (AVA_VAN)......................................................13
7.2.1 Test Approach and Depth............................................................13
8 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION ..........................................................14
9 OBLIGATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USAGE OF THE TOE..14
10 ACRONYMS.........................................................................................15
11 BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................16
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1 Certification
1.1 Procedure
The certification body conducts the certification procedure according to the
following criteria:
▪ Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5 [2] [3] [4];
▪ Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
Revision 5 [5]; and
▪ SCCS scheme publications [6] [7] [8]
1.2 Recognition Agreements
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based
on the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement had been ratified on 2 July
2014. The arrangement covers certificates with claims of compliance against
collaborative protection profiles (cPPs) or evaluation assurance levels (EALs)
1 through 2 and ALC_FLR. Hence, the certification for this TOE is fully covered
by the CCRA.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement mark printed on the certificate
indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement
by all signatory nations listed on the CC web portal
(https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org).
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2 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the TOE as indicated.
The Certificate is valid till 03 August 20261.
In cases of changes to the certified version of the TOE, the validity may be
extended to new versions and releases provided the TOE sponsor applies for
Assurance Continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the revised TOE,
in accordance with the requirements of the Singapore Common Criteria
Scheme (SCCS).
The owner of the Certificate is obliged:
▪ When advertising the Certificate or the fact of the product’s certification,
to refer to and provide the Certification Report, the Security Target and
user guidance documentation herein to any customer of the product for
the application and usage of the certified product;
▪ To inform the SCCS immediately about vulnerabilities of the product that
have been identified by the developer or any third party; and
▪ To inform the SCCS immediately in the case that relevant security
changes in the evaluated life cycle has occurred or the confidentiality of
documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure where the certification of the
product has assumed this confidentiality being maintained, is no longer
valid.
1 Certificate validity could be extended by means of assurance continuity. Certificate could also
be revoked under the conditions specified in SCCS Publication 3 [8]. Potential users should
check the SCCS website (www.csa.gov.sg/programmes/csa-cc-product-list) for the up-to-date
status regarding the certificate’s validity.
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3 Identification
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is: ADPICS Data Diode (ADPICS-DD) Version
1.0. The following table identifies the TOE deliverables.
Identifier Version
ADPICS-DD Hardware 1.0
Table 2 - TOE Deliverable
The guide for receipt and acceptance of the above-mentioned TOE are
described in the set of guidance documents.
Name and version Version
Attila ADPICS Data Diode User Guidance 2.0
Table 3 - Guidance Document (part of TOE deliverables)
Additional identification information relevant to this Certification procedure as
follows:
TOE ADPICS Data Diode (ADPICS-DD) v1.0
Security Target ADPICS® Data Diode Security Target, Version 4.0, 22
July 2021
Developer Attila Cybertech Pte. Ltd.
Sponsor Attila Cybertech Pte. Ltd.
Evaluation
Facility
An Security Pte Ltd
Completion
Date of
Evaluation
27 July 2021
Certification
Body
Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA)
Certificate ID CSA_CC_21002
Certificate
Validity
5 years from date of issuance
Table 4: Additional Identification Information
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4 Security Policy
The TOE’s Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional
Requirements listed and implemented by the TOE.
The TOE implements policies pertaining to security functional class “User Data
Protection”.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policy can be found
in Chapter 5 of the Security Target [1].
5 Assumptions & Scope of Evaluation
5.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target [1] and some aspects of Threats
and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These
aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE
environment and are listed in the tables below:
Environmental
Assumptions
Description
OE.PHYSICAL
The intended operation environment shall be capable of
storing and operating the TOE in accordance with the
requirements of the Source Zone.
OE.NETWORK
The TOE is the only method of interconnecting Source
Zone to the Destination Zone.
OE.USER
The users are trusted; the users shall not maliciously
compromise the security functionality of the TOE.
Table 5: Environmental Assumptions
Details can be found in section 3.1 of the Security Target [1].
5.2 Clarification of Scope
The scope of evaluation is limited to the claims made in the Security Target [1].
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5.3 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration in the Security Target [1] is as shown in Figure 2.
The TOE enforces unidirectional data flow between the Source Zone and
Destination Zone.
Figure 1: TOE Evaluated Configuration
5.4 Non-Evaluated Functionalities
There are no non-evaluated functionalities within the scope as clarified in
section 5.2.
5.5 Non-TOE Components
The TOE does not require additional components for its operation.
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6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as listed in Table 3 - Guidance Document is
being provided with the product to the customer. These documentations
contain the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance
with the Security Target.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Evaluator Testing (ATE_IND)
7.1.1 Test Approach and Depth
As there are no required developer test plan, the evaluator decided to test the
unidirectional property of the TOE following the steps in the user guidance to
verify data unidirectional flow from IN PORT to OUT PORT.
7.1.2 Test Configuration
A detailed test description was provided in the ATE document. Prior to running
tests, the evaluator performed identification of the test environment and
verification of the TOE.
7.1.3 Test Results
The developer’s test reproduced were verified by the evaluator to conform to
the expected results from the test plan.
7.2 Penetration Testing (AVA_VAN)
7.2.1 Test Approach and Depth
The AVA_VAN.1 assurance class requires the evaluator to conduct a
vulnerability survey based on publicly available source of information and based
on structured examination of the evidence while performing previous evaluation
activities (ASE, ADV, AGD, ATE). The evaluator then performs penetration
testing to confirm that the potential vulnerabilities cannot be exploited in the
operational environment for the TOE.
The approach chosen by the evaluator is commensurate with the assurance
component chosen (AVA_VAN.1) treating the resistance of the TOE to an attack
with the Basic potential.
The evaluator found no exploitable vulnerability in the TOE when operated in
the evaluated configuration. No residual risks were identified.
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8 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) was provided by the CCTL in
accordance with the CC, CEM and requirements of the SCCS. As a result of
the evaluation, the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
▪ All components of the EAL 1 assurance package
This implies that the TOE satisfies the security requirements specified in the
Security Target [1].
9 Obligations & Recommendations for Usage of the
TOE
The documents as outlined in Table 3 - Guidance Document contain necessary
information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be
considered. In addition, all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as
outlined in the Security Target [1] that are not covered by the TOE shall be
fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
Potential user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within
his/her system risk management process. As attack methods and techniques
evolve over time, he/she should define the period of time whereby a re-
assessment of the TOE is required and convey such request to the sponsor of
the certificate.
No additional recommendation was provided by the evaluators.
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10 Acronyms
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CCTL Common Criteria Test Laboratory
CSA Cyber Security Agency of Singapore
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCCS Singapore Common Criteria Scheme
SFR Security Functional Requirement
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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11 Bibliography
[1] Attila Cybertech Pte Ltd, “ADPICS Data Diode Security Target, Version
4.0, 10 August 2021”.
[2] Common Criteria Maintenance Board (CCMB), “Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and
general model [Document Number CCMB-2017-04-001]. Version 3.1
Revision 5,” 2017.
[3] Common Criteria Maintenance Board (CCMB), “Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security functional
components [Document Number CCMB-2017-04-002], Version 3.1
Revision 5,” 2017.
[4] Common Criteria Maintenance Board (CCMB), “Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security assurance
components [Document Number CCMB-2018-04-003] Version 3.1
Revision 5,” 2017.
[5] Common Criteria Maintenance Board (CCMB), “Common Methodology for
Information Technology Security Evaluation - Evaluation Methodology
[Document Number CCMB-2017-04-004], Version 3.1 Revision 5,” 2017.
[6] Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA), “SCCS Publication 1 -
Overview of SCCS, Version 5.0,” 2018.
[7] Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA), “SCCS Publication 2 -
Requirements for CCTL, Version 5.0,” 2018.
[8] Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA), “SCCS Publication 3 -
Evaluation and Certification, Version 5.0,” 2018.
[9] An Security, “Evaluation Technical Report EAL 1 CC Evaluation of ADPICS
Data Diode, Version 1.0, 27 July 2021”.
[10] Attila Cybertech Pte Ltd, “Attila ADPICS Data Diode User Guidance,
Version 2.0,” 2021.
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