BSI-DSZ-CC-0615-2009
for
Océ PRISMAsync 11.9.75.55
as used in the Océ VarioPrint 41x0 Release 1.3
from
Océ Technologies BV
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.30
BSI-DSZ-CC-0615-2009
Printer Controller
Océ PRISMAsync 11.9.75.55
as used in the Océ VarioPrint 41x0 Release 1.3
from Océ Technologies BV
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by
ALC_FLR.1
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 13 November 2009
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0615-2009
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0615-2009 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0615-2009
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................8
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................16
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................17
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................17
7.1 Test configuration...................................................................................................17
7.2 Developer Testing..................................................................................................17
7.3 Evaluator Testing...................................................................................................17
7.4 Penetration Testing................................................................................................18
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................18
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................19
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................19
11 Security Target............................................................................................................19
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................20
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................20
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................21
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................22
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................23
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................31
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0615-2009 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
● Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0615-2009
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became initially effective in March 1998.
This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April
1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates
issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The
Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Océ PRISMAsync 11.9.75.55 as used in the Océ VarioPrint 41x0 Release 1.3
has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-
DSZ-CC-0510-2008. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0510-2008
were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Océ PRISMAsync 11.9.75.55 as used in the Océ VarioPrint
41x0 Release 1.3 was conducted by Brightsight BV. The evaluation was completed on 23
October 2009. The Brightsight BV is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Océ Technologies BV
The product was developed by: Océ Technologies BV
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required
and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance
continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product Océ PRISMAsync 11.9.75.55 as used in the Océ VarioPrint 41x0 Release 1.3
has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see
also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Océ Technologies BV
P.O. Box 101
5900 MA Venlo
The Netherlands
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0615-2009 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0615-2009
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Océ PRISMAsync 11.9.75.55 as used in the Océ
VarioPrint 41x0 Release 1.3.
The Océ PRISMAsync is a PC-based Multi Function Device (MFD) controller. The Océ
PRISMAsync provides a wide range of printing, scanning and copying functionality to the
MFD peripherals to which it is connected. The Océ PRISMAsync provides Security
Functionality to the MFD.
The Target of Evaluation is a collection of software components (Océ developed software,
3rd party printer language interpreters, Operating System) that use the underlying
hardware platform. The TOE is a subset of the complete Océ PRISMAsync (for further
details concerning the TOE boundary see chapter 2 of this report and chapter 2.1.1 of the
Security Target [6]).
The TOE assumes that its operational environment is a repro-room contained within a
regular office environment. Physical access to the operational environment is restricted to
TOE operators and Océ service engineers as defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL2
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 5.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus
the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
There are no SFRs defined which are relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.FILTERING The TOE uses a built-in firewall to block ports that are not
needed for the operation of the TOE. In addition no
network protocols that are not supported by the evaluated
configuration are enabled.
SF.SHREDDING Once a print, copy or scan job has been deleted, the data
is overwritten. It is possible to perform multiple write
cycles, with various patterns being applied. At least three
write cycles will always take place. The first write cycle
starts after the job has been deleted and to improve job
throughput performance, all other remaining cycles are
done once the TOE enters an idle state. The shredding
mechanism supports US DOD 5220-22m and Gutmann
algorithms.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0615-2009 Certification Report
SF.MANAGEMENT The TOE can be managed in relation to SF.SHREDDING.
In order to gain access, the S.REMOTE_SYSADMIN or
S.SERVICE_ ENGINEER must authenticate themselves
to the TOE. S.SERVICE_ENGINEER does this by
entering a PIN. S.REMOTE_SYSADMIN authenticates
himself by entering a password. The TOE is delivered by
Océ with the most restrictive set of operational settings.
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'basic' (SOF-basic) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.2 is confirmed.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapters 3.2 to 3.4.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The Océ PRISMAsync
can operate in two different security modes: ‘High’ and ‘Normal’. The TOE configuration
only covers the Océ PRISMAsync operating in the security mode ‘High’ as delivered by
Océ to the customer. This mode provides a restricted set of functionality that is configured
to meet the Security Target claim. Changing the operational mode irretrievably invalidates
the claims made in the Security Target.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Océ PRISMAsync 11.9.75.55 as used in the Océ VarioPrint 41x0 Release 1.3
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release/Edition Form of Delivery
1 SW Océ PRISMAsync-specific
software
11.9.75.55 Pre-installed on the hard disk
of the Océ PRISMAsync
2 SW The Microsoft Windows
embedded Operating
System
XP with service pack
2 plus the patches
listed in the Security
Target [6], Appendix F
Pre-installed on the hard disk
of the Océ PRISMAsync
3 SW Adobe PS3-PDF
Interpreter
3018 Pre-installed on the hard disk
of the Océ PRISMAsync
4 SW Zoran PCL6 interpreter IPS6.0.2 Pre-installed on the hard disk
of the Océ PRISMAsync
5 SW Apache Tomcat Web
server (with SSL support)
5.5.26 Pre-installed on the hard disk
of the Océ PRISMAsync
6 DOC Océ VarioPrint 4110/4120
Common Criteria certified
configuration of the Océ
PRISMAsync [9]
2009-09 Electronic document
7 DOC Océ VarioPrint 4110/4120
Manual type Operating
information [10]
2008-11 Electronic document
8 DOC Océ VarioPrint 4110/4120
Administrator settings and
tasks [11]
2009-05 Electronic document
9 DOC Océ VarioPrint 4110/4120
Security service
documentation [12]
2009-10 Electronic document
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The Océ PRISMAsync is customized according to the customer order form and packaged
with the MFD into one package. The package is labelled and transported to the customer.
The operator can instruct the TOE to print out a configuration report. This configuration
report clearly lists the separate software components and their versions. The customer can
compare the configuration report to the Security Target or this Certification Report in order
to determine that he received the TOE.
The name of the TOE in the configuration report (Smart Imager) is not the same as the
one in the ST (PRISMAsync). However, this is considered to be acceptable since the
following remark is made on p. 4 of the guidance document “Océ VarioPrint 4110/4120
Common Criteria certified configuration of the Océ PRISMAsync” [9]: “In the past
PRISMAsync was named Smart Imager. It may happen that you still encounter this name,
especially in the configuration report or in the about of the Setting Editor. In this case, note
that the name Smart Imager refers to the same system as PRISMAsync.”
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3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The Océ PRISMAsync provides a wide range of printing, scanning and copying
functionality to the MFD peripherals to which it is connected. The Océ PRISMAsync
provides Security Functionality to the MFD.
The TOE protects two assets: itself and the copy, print and scan job data that it receives.
Firstly, the TOE protects it’s own integrity against threats from the LAN to which it is
attached through use of a firewall. Secondly, the TOE protects the confidentiality of print,
copy and scan job data after they are no longer needed. The Océ PRISMAsync does this
by e-shredding the data after they are deleted.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance: Physical protection of the TOE by the environment, management of the
network to which the TOE is attached and the local physical interfaces of the TOE. Details
can be found in the Security Target [6] chapter 4.2.
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5 Architectural Information
The following diagram indicates the subsystems of the TOE that implement the Security
Functionality.
Figure 1: Overview of the TOE subsystems
The four blue boxes indicate the subsystems of the TOE. That are:
Communication Layer: This subsystem provides the communication functionality between
the TOE subsystems and the internal interfaces between the subsystems. In addition, this
subsystem provides the communication functionality to the MFD Peripheral Interface.
Firewall: The firewall subsystem is part of the Windows XP embedded operating system
provided by Microsoft. It provides state-full inspection of the inbound network packets that
pass through the network card. The firewall settings are not user configurable.
Settings manager: The Settings manager subsystem manages a number of settings that
are related to its operation. This subsystem manages security related settings of the Océ
PRISMAsync. There are no security-related settings that can be changed by the ordinary
users in the configured mode of operation.
E-shred service: The E-shred subsystem provides the shredding of the job data objects
(Print Job, Scan job and Copy job).
The external physical interfaces are identified by black blocks. These are the interfaces to
the network, the Ethernet, the LUI device and the MFD peripherals. The external logical
interfaces are shown by a red arrow. They show the communication path between each
subsystem and their associated physical interface to the outside world. The internal
interfaces are indicated by orange arrows. They show the internal TSF communication
between the subsystems. They show that the internal communication path between each
subsystem is through the Communication Layer subsystem.
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6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Test configuration
Tests are performed with the Océ PRISMAsync 11.9.75.55 connected to the Océ
VarioPrint 4100.
The security mode is ‘High’ (factory default). The following software components are used:
● The Microsoft Windows XP embedded operating system with service pack 2 plus the
patches listed in the ST [6], Appendix F.
● Océ PRISMAsync-specific software release 11.9.75.55.
● Adobe PS3-PDF Interpreter, Version 3018
● Zoran PCL6 interpreter, Version IPS6.0.2
● Apache Tomcat web server with SSL support, Version 5.5.26.
7.2 Developer Testing
The depth of testing corresponded with the depth of the level of the Functional
Specification. The developer has performed all necessary functional tests for the Security
Functions. All Security Functions have been tested at least once. In addition, the developer
has performed extensive vulnerability test that exceeds the attack potential required by
EAL2. All test results were as expected.
7.3 Evaluator Testing
The evaluator tests are built upon the security functions as defined in ST. The evaluators
ran all of the developer tests, as well as independent evaluator tests. In total the following
security functions have been tested: SF.FILTERING, SF.SHREDDING and
SF.MANAGEMENT.
The objectives for the tests are derived from the security functions and are:
● Check that filtering conforms to the Functional Specification. With all network
functionality enabled in security level 'High', the firewall should be properly configured.
Check that on the external Ethernet connector the firewall only allows certain defined
ports.
● Check that shredding conforms to the Functional Specification.
● Check that the TOE administrator authentication and the Océ service engineer
authentication conforms to the Functional Specification.
The depth of testing corresponded with the depth of the level of the Functional
Specification. All test results were as expected.
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7.4 Penetration Testing
The evaluators took the Functional Specification as starting point for the identification of
which interfaces and which Security Functions need to be tested. Based on the more
detailed knowledge of the High-Level Design some tests are included additionally.
The evaluators applied a number of publicly available scanners for obvious vulnerabilities
on the network interface.
All test results were as expected. The Security Functionality worked as expected. The
vulnerability tests showed that the TOE is resistant against all tested public known
vulnerabilities based on recent internet scans. The vulnerability scans did not reveal
vulnerabilities that could be exploited on the level of EAL2.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE: The Océ PRISMAsync can
operate in two different security modes: ‘High’ and ‘Normal’. The TOE configuration only
covers the Océ PRISMAsync operating in the security mode ‘High’ as delivered by Océ to
the customer. This mode provides a restricted set of functionality that is configured to meet
the Security Target claim. Changing the operational mode irretrievably invalidates the
claims made in the Security Target.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the class ASE
● All components of the EAL2 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0510-2008, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the change of the external
interfaces and the updates of the TOE software components.
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The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by
ALC_FLR.1
● The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function: basic
SF.MANAGEMENT
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptoalgorithms. Thus, no such mechanisms were part of the
assessment.
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition, the
following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● The customer should read the Security Target [6] for the assumptions and
organisational security policies to create the intended environment of the TOE.
● In order to maintain the CC certified configuration of the TOE, it must never be set in
any other security mode than the mode ‘High’.
● The security instruction given by guidance documentation (especially [9] and [12]) have
to be followed.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
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12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LAN Local Area Network
LUI Local User Interface
MFD Multi Functional Decive
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
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12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis
for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and
distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0615-2009
13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0615-2009, Version 4.6.2, 08 October 2009, “ST of the
Océ PRISMAsync 11.9.75.55 as used in the Océ VarioPrint 41x0 Release 1.3 ”,
Océ Technologies BV
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 4.0, 22 October 2009, “Evaluation Technical
Report Océ PRISMAsync 11.9.75.55 as used in the Océ VarioPrint 41x0 Release
1.3”, Brightsight BV (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.9.2, 08 October 2009, “Configuration
Management List for the Océ PRISMAsync Controller R11.9.75.55 as used in the
Océ VarioPrint 4110/4120 printer/copier/scanner release 1.3 products”, Océ
Technologies BV (confidential document)
[9] Océ VarioPrint 4110/4120 Common Criteria certified configuration of the Océ
PRISMAsync, Edition 2009-09, Océ Technologies BV
[10] Océ VarioPrint 4110/4120 Manual type Operating information, Edition 2008-11, Océ
Technologies BV
[11] Océ VarioPrint 4110/4120 Administrator settings and tasks, Edition 2009-05, Océ
Technologies BV
[12] Océ VarioPrint 4110/4120 Security service documentation, Edition 2009-10, Océ
Technologies BV
8
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen
ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0615-2009 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
ACM: Configuration management
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support
Development security (ALC_DVS)
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests
Coverage (ATE_COV)
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0615-2009 Certification Report
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0615-2009 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2
Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0615-2009 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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