BSI-DSZ-CC-0547-2009
for
S3CC9PF 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for
Smart Card, Revision 2
from
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-327 V4.30
BSI-DSZ-CC-0547-2009
S3CC9PF 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card,
Revision 2
from Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
June 2007, Eurosmart, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 4 November 2009
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Abteilungspräsident
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0547-2009 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0547-2009
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................10
1 Executive Summary......................................................................................................11
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................12
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................12
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................12
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................12
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................12
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................13
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................13
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................13
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................13
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................14
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................15
11 Security Target............................................................................................................15
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................16
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................16
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................16
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................18
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................21
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................31
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0547-2009 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became initially effective in March 1998.
This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April
1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates
issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The
Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0547-2009
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not
mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL 4-components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product S3CC9PF 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 2 has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product S3CC9PF 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card,
Revision 2 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 27 October 2009. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Samsung Electronics Co.,
Ltd.
The product was developed by: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0547-2009 Certification Report
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required
and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance
continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product S3CC9PF 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 2 has been
included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-
Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
San24, Nongseo-dong
Giheung-gu
Yongin-City
Gyeonggido
Korea
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0547-2009 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0547-2009
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 2.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE), the S3CC9PF microcontroller featuring the TORNADO™
cryptographic coprocessor, is a smartcard integrated circuit which is composed of a
processing unit, security components and contact based I/O ports, hardware circuit for
testing purpose during the manufacturing process and volatile and non-volatile memories
(hardware). The TOE includes IC Dedicated Software. Such software (also known as IC
firmware) is used for testing purpose during the manufacturing process but also provides
additional services to facilitate the usage of the hardware and/or to provide additional
services, including a RSA asymmetric cryptography library, an AIS20 compliant random
number generation library and an AIS31 compliant random number generator. All other
software is called Smartcard Embedded Software and is not part of the TOE.
The TOE is intended to be used in a range of high security applications like banking and
finance applications for credit or debit cards, electronic purse (stored value cards) and
electronic commerce. Network based transaction processing such a mobile phones (GSM
SIM cards), pay TV (subscriber and pay-per-view cards), communication highways
(Internet access and transaction processing). Transport and ticketing applications (access
control cards). Governmental cards (ID cards, health cards, driving licenses). Multimedia
applications and Digital Rights Management protection. Several security features
independently implemented in hardware or controlled by software will be provided to
ensure proper operations and the integrity and confidentiality of stored data. This includes
measures for memory protection, leakage protection and sensors to allow operations only
under specified conditions.
The main security features of the S3CC9PF integrated circuit are:
● Security Sensors or Detectors including High and Low Temperature Detectors, High
and Low Frequency Detectors, High and Low Supply Voltage Detectors, Supply
Voltage Glitch Detectors, Light Detector and the Passivation Removing Detector
● Active Shields against physical intrusive attacks
● Dedicated tamper-resistant design based on synthesizable glue logic and secure
topology
● Dedicated hardware mechanisms against side-channel attacks such as Internal
Variable Clock, Random Waits Generator, RAM and EEPROM encryption mechanisms
● Secure DES and AES Symmetric Cryptography support
● Secure Tornado™ coprocessor for RSA asymmetric cryptographic Support
The IC Dedicated Software includes a modular arithmetic library V3.7S for RSA
Asymmetric Cryptography support (optional), a Deterministic Random Number Generator
(DRNG) for AIS20-compliant and a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) for AIS31-
compliant Random Number Generation. For the detailed information about the Hardware
and Software of the S3CC9PF 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 2 refer
to [8], chapter 1.2 to 2.4.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, June 2007,
Eurosmart, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7].
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0547-2009 Certification Report
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 5.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionalities:
TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
SFR1 Failure with preservation of secure state
SFR2 Limited fault tolerance
SFR3 Resistance to physical attacks
SFR4 Subset access control
SFR5 Subset access control
SFR6 Static attribute initialization
SFR7 Management of security attributes
SFR8 Specification of management functions.
SFR9 Audit Storage
SFR10 Limited capabilities
SFR11 Limited availabilities
SFR12 Subset information flow control
SFR13 Basic internal transfer protection
SFR14 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
SFR15 Random number generation
SFR16 Cryptographic operation
SFR17 Cryptographic key generation
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 3.1 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0547-2009
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.1 to 3.4.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Smartcard IC S3CC9PF revision 2
● Smartcard IC S3CC9PF revision 2 with Secure Crypto Library V3.7S
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
S3CC9PF 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 2
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of delivery
1 HW S3CC9PF Revision 2 Wafer
2 SW DRNG V2.0 Source code in
electronic form
3 SW TRNG V2.0 Source code in
electronic form
4 SW Test ROM Code V1.0 Included in S3CC9PFTest ROM
5 SW Secure Crypto Library (optional) V3.7S Source code in
electronic form
6 DOC S3CC9PF Chip Delivery Specification V3.1
Softcopy
7 DOC User's manual [12] V1.10
Softcopy
8 DOC S3CC9PF Security Application Note [13] V1.4
Softcopy
9 DOC DRNG Library Application Note [14] V2.0
Softcopy
10 DOC TRNG Library Application Note [15] V1.7
Softcopy
11 DOC RSA Library Application Note [16] V1.16
Softcopy
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is identified by S3CC9PF revision 2. Another characteristic of the TOE is the
product code. This information is stored in the EEPROM and can be read out by the user
of the card via the normal EEPROM read command. It contains the following information at
which among others the production line indicator is part of the serial number. Here the hex
value “15” at the beginning of the serial number indicates that the TOE is produced in
Giheung (Korea) wafer line 6.
Address Contents Data
80000h – 80001h Chip status information Samsung’s internal management value
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0547-2009 Certification Report
Address Contents Data
80002h – 80003h ROM code number ROM code number
80004h – 80005h Device Type 190F h
80006h – 8000Fh Available for customer All FF h
80010h – 8001Bh Serial number
Samsung’s internal management value
beginning with 15 h
8001Ch – 8001Dh IC Fabricator 4250 h
8001Eh – 8001Fh IC Fabrication Date
YDDD h (where Y is the last digit of the year
and DDD is the number of the day within the
year)
80020h – 80021h IC Module Fabricator 4252 h
80022h – 80023h IC Module Packaging date
YDDD h + 9 Format (If Samsung does not
ship the IC module, customer should use
other area for this purpose. “YDDD + 9 “
means 9 days will be need for finishing
module making)
80024h – 80027h IC Serial Number A proprietary binary number
80028h – 80029h IC Batch number A proprietary binary number
8002Ah IC Version 02 h
8002Bh Test ROM Code Version 10 h
8002Ch – 8002Dh Crypto. Library Version 037C h
8002Eh DRNG Library Version 02 h
8002Fh TRNG Library Version 02 h
80030h – 8007Fh Available for customer All FF h
Table 3: TOE Version Information
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functionality to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to
support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a deterministic random number
generator.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during Triple-DES), against physical probing, against malfunctions,
against physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0547-2009
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security
Functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functionality) provided by the
TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance: Usage of Hardware Platform, Treatment of User Data, Protection during
TOE Development and Production, Protection during Packaging, Finishing and
Personalisation. Details can be found in the Security Target Lite [8], chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
The S3CC9PF 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 2 is integrated circuits
(IC) providing a platform to a smart card operating system and smart card application
software. A top level block diagram and a list of subsystems can be found within the TOE
description of the Security Target Lite [9, chapter 1.2]. The complete hardware description
and the complete instruction set of the TOE is to be found in guidance documents
delivered to the customer, see table 2. The TOE consists of the 20 subsystems (16
hardware / 4 software) as defined in evaluation documentation. For the implementation of
the TOE Security Functionalities basically the components processing unit (CPU) with
ROM, EEPROM, RAM, I/O, Deterministic Random Number Generator (DRNG) and True
Random Number Generator(TRNG), Tornado, Clock, Timer/16-bit Timer and 20-bit
Watchdog, Detectors and Security Control, RESET, Address and Data Bus, DES, AES,
Power Control, MPU / Memory Protection Unit, Testrom_code, Crypto Library, DRNG
Library and TRNG Library are used.
Security measures for physical protection are realised within the layout of the whole
circuitry. The Special Function Registers, the CPU instructions and the various on-chip
memories provide the interface to the software using the Security Functionalities of the
TOE.
The subsystem Testrom_code stored on the chip, is used for testing purposes during
production only and is completely separated from the use of the embedded software by
disabling before TOE delivery.
The TOE includes also functionality to calculate single DES operations, but part of the
evaluation is the Triple-DES operation only.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories:
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1. technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against the
specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the circuitry
(this testing is not strictly related to Security Functionalities);
2. tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the
analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE;
3. regression tests of the hardware within a simulation environment based on special
software dedicated only for the regression tests;
4. regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software and for the IC
Dedicated Support Software on emulator versions of the TOE and within a software
simulation of chip in special hardware;
5. characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production:
● used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different operating
conditions and varied process parameters (often also referred to as characterisation
tests)
● special verification tests for Security Functionalities which were done with samples
of the TOE (referred also as developers security evaluation) and which include also
layout tests by automatic means and optical control, in order to verify statements
concerning the layout;
6. functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct
functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3).
The developer tests cover all Security Functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification, and in the high and low level designs.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developers
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. The tests of the developer are repeated by sampling, by
repetition of complete regression tests and by software routines developed by the
evaluators and computed on samples with evaluation operating system. For the developer
tests repeated by the evaluators other test parameters are used and the test equipment
was varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout measures
were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in design data and on the
final product.
The evaluation provides evidence that the actual version of the TOE provides the Security
Functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE Security Functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all Security Functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of Security Functionalities using bespoke equipment and
expert know how. The penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the TOE
and attacks which do not modify the TOE physically.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by S3CC9PF 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 1
and specific EEPROM coding as outlined above. This certification covers the following
configurations of the TOE:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0547-2009
● Smartcard IC S3CC9PF revision 2
● Smartcard IC S3CC9PF revision 2 with Secure Crypto Library V3.7S
No further generation takes place after delivery to the customer. After delivery the TOE
only features one fixed configuration (normal mode), which cannot be altered by the user.
The TOE was tested in this configuration. All the evaluation and certification results
therefore are only effective for this version of the TOE. For all evaluation activities
performed in test mode, there was a rationale why the results are valid for the normal
mode, too.
Every information of how to use the TOE and its Security Functionalities by the software is
provided within the user documentation.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(iii) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of true random number
generators
(see [4], AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS31) were used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC
(see also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
● All components claimed in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7 and defined in the
CC (see also part C of this report)
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, June 2007,
Eurosmart, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
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For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
● algorithms for the encryption and decryption Triple-DES, AES and RSA
This functionality is provided by SFR16: FCS_COP.1
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation
(see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with a security
level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks with high
attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for these functions it
shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended
system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie
BSI TR-02102' (www.bsi.bund.de).
The Cryptographic Functionality 2-key Triple DES (2TDES) provided by the TOE achieves
a security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition, the
following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● All security hints described in [12] and the delivered documents [13]...[16] have to be
considered.
The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints
to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [17] have to be considered.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4])
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, Act setting up the Federal Office for Information
Security
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CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CPU Central Processing Unit
CMOS Complimentary Metal Oxide Semiconductor
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA Differential Power Analysis
DRNG Deterministic Random Number Generator
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB Electronic Code Book
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA Electro Magnetic Analysis
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
I/O Input/Output
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MPU Memory Protection Unit
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman – a public key encryption algorithm
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TSS TOE Summary Specification
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver and Transmitter
USB Universal Serial Bus
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12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of
the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 1, September 2006
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 2, September 2007
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 2, September 2007
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 2, September 2007
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certifcates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target of S3CC9PF 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards, Version
2.2 from 2009-04-22 Project Chippewa, Samsung Electronics (confidential
document)
[7] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15.06.2007, registered and
certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under
reference BSI-CC-PP-0035
[8] Security Target Lite of S3CC9PF 16-bit RISC Microcontroller For Smart Cards,
Version 1.0, 15th
May 2009, Samsung Electronics
[9] EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT-SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY) for the product
S3CC9PF, Version 1 from 2009-09-04, TÜViT (confidential document)
[10] ETR FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR-COMP) according to AIS 36 for the
Product S3CC9PF, Version 1 from 2009-09-04, Version 1 from 2009-09-04, TÜViT
(confidential document)
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 1, 2. December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 6, 7 May 2009, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins
deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
• AIS 34, Version 2, 24 October 2008, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
• AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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[11] Life Cycle Definition (Class ALC_CMC.4/CMS.5) – Project Chippewa, Version 1.5,
2009-05-15,Samsung Electronics(confidential document)
[12] User’s manual S3CC9PF Family (S3CC9PF/AF/PW) 16-Bit CMOS Microcontroller
for Smart Card including Appendix B (Calm Instruction Set) and including User’s
manual errata (Version 1.10, March 2009), Version 1.10 from March 2009
[13] Security Application Note, S3CC9PF, Version 1.4, 2009-04-02, Samsung Electronics
[14] Application Note DRNG Software Library, Version 2.0, 2006-12-13 Samsung
Electronics
[15] S3CC9PF AIS31 TRNG library application note , Version 1.7, 2009-08-04
SS3CC9PF AIS31
[16] Application Note RSA Crypto Library with TORNADO Version 3.7S, 1.16 2009-04-30
Samsung Electronics
[17] S3CC9PF Chip Delivery specification, Version 3.1, 03.2009, Samsung Electronics
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0547-2009 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 9.4)
„The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex A.
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decompositon.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“ The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 2 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE Functionalities in a
manner consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment 37
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0547-2009
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product S3CC9PF 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 2 (Target of
Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the
Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology
of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 4 November 2009, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1 and ALC_TAT.2
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Site Adress Function
Giheung Plant
Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd.
San24, Nongseo-dong, Giheung-gu
Yongin-City, Gyeonggido, 449-711
Korea
Development, Production (Wafer Fab)
Hwasung
Plant
Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd.
San #16, Banwol-Ri, Hwasung-Eup
Gyeonggi-Do, 445-701
Korea
Development (Server room, Mask data preparation)
Onyang Plant
Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd.
San #74, Buksoo-Ri, Baebang-Myun
Asan-City, Chungcheongnam-Do
449-711
Korea
Delivery (Warehouse)
PKL Plant
PKL Co., Ltd. Plant
493-3 Sungsung-Dong, Cheonan-
City
Choongcheongnam-Do, 330-300
Korea
Production (Mask House)
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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