BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021
for
STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC
from
Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021 (*)
eHealth: Smart Cards
STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC
from Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
PP Conformance: Card Operating System Generation 2 (PP COS G2),
Version 2.1, 10 July 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0082-V4-
2019
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and
AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 18 June 2021
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................16
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................17
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................18
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................18
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................18
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................19
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................20
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................22
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................25
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................25
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................25
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................28
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................31
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................32
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V3-2019. Specific results from
the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V3-2019 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC was conducted by SRC
Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 2 June 2021.
SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised
by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Giesecke+Devrient Mobile
Security GmbH.
The product was developed by: Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 18 June
2021 is valid until 17 June 2026. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
Prinzregentenstr. 159
81677 München
Germany
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC developed
by Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH.
The TOE is a smart card product according to the G2-COS specification [21] from gematik
and is implemented on the hardware platform Infineon Security Controller
IFX_CCI_000005h from Infineon Technologies AG (refer to [18], [19]).
The TOE is intended to be used as a card operating system platform for cards of the card
generation G2 in the framework of the German health care system.
For this purpose, the TOE serves as secure data storage and secure cryptographic service
provider for card applications running on the TOE and supports them for their specific
security needs related to storage and cryptographic functionalities. In particular, these
storage and cryptographic services are oriented on the different card types eHC (electronic
Health Card), HPC (Health Professional Card), SMC-B (Security Module Card Type B),
gSMC-K (gerätespezifische Security Module Card Type K for the so-called Konnektor) and
gSMC-KT (gerätespezifische Security Module Card Type KT for Terminals) as currently
specified for a card product of the generation G2 within the German health care system.
These TOE's storage and cryptographic services that are provided by the TOE and
invoked by the human users and components of the German health care system cover the
following issues:
• authentication of human users and external devices,
• storage of and access control on user data,
• key management and cryptographic functions,
• management of TSF data including life cycle support,
• export of non-sensitive TSF and user data of the object system if implemented.
The TOE comprises
• the circuitry of the dual-interface chip (i.e. contact-based and contactless chip)
including all IC Dedicated Software being active in the Smart Card Initialisation
Phase, Personalisation Phase and Usage Phase of the TOE (the integrated circuit,
IC Infineon IFX_CCI_000005h),
• the IC Embedded Software (STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC Operating System),
• the so-called Wrapper (TOE specific SW tool for re-coding and interpretation of
exported TSF and user data), and
• the associated guidance documentation.
The TOE is ready for the installation and personalisation of object systems (applications)
on the TOE that match the G2-COS specification [21], but does not contain itself any
object systems (applications). However, the delivered product comprises beside the TOE
also an object system already installed on the TOE.
In functional view, the TOE with its IC Embedded Software (STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-
SMC Operating System) is implemented according to the G2-COS specification [21] from
gematik. Hereby, the TOE implements the mandatory part of the G2-COS specification [21]
with the base functionality of the operating system platform. In addition, the TOE
implements the option RSA Key Generation (“Option_RSA_KeyGeneration”), the option
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Contactless (“Option_kontaktlose_Schnittstelle”), the option Crypto Box (“Option_-
Kryptobox”) and the option Logical Channel (“Option_logische_Kanäle“) as defined in the
G2-COS specification [21]. None of the further options PACE for Proximity Coupling
Device (“Option_PACE_PCD”), USB (“Option_USB_Schnittstelle”) and RSA CVC
(“Option_RSA_CVC”) defined in the G2-COS specification [21] is implemented in the TOE.
Furthermore, the TOE provides the commands CREATE and PSO HASH (refer to the user
guidances [12], chapter 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 and [15], chapter 2.3.1 and 2.3.2) that are outlined
as optional in the G2-COS specification [21]. In addition, the TOE provides developer-
specific initialisation and personalisation commands (refer to the user guidance [15],
chapter 2.4) for support of the Initialisation Phase and Personalisation Phase of the TOE’s
life cycle model (refer to chapter 2).
The TOE's Wrapper is implemented according to the Wrapper specification [22] from
gematik.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Card Operating System Generation 2 (PP COS G2), Version 2.1, 10 July
2019, BSI-CC-PP-0082-V4-2019 [8]. The Security Target [6] and [7] uses the mandatory
parts of the PP and the optional packages RSA Key Generation, Contactless, Crypto Box
and Logical Channel defined in the PP. None of the PP’s further optional packages PACE
for Proximity Coupling Device and RSA CVC is used.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 6.1, 7.4, 8.4, 9.4 and 10.4. They are selected from
Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2
extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
• SF_AccessControl:
The TOE provides access control mechanisms that allow the restriction of access to
only specific users (world, human users, device) based on different security
attributes.
• SF_Authentication:
The TOE supports user and device authentication: symmetric authentication
mechanisms based on AES and asymmetric authentication mechanisms based on
ECC and RSA.
• SF_AssetProtection:
The TOE provides mechanisms for supporting data integrity for User Data and TSF
Data. The TOE hides information about IC power consumption and command
execution time ensuring that no confidential information about User Data and TSF
Data can be derived from this information.
• SF_TSFProtection:
The TOE detects and resists physical tampering of the TSF with sensors for
operating voltage, clock frequency, temperature and electromagnetic radiation.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021 Certification Report
• SF_KeyManagement:
The TOE supports onboard generation of cryptographic keys based on ECDH as
well as generation of RSA and ECC key pairs. Moreover, it supports the generation
and negotiation of session keys in authentication mechanisms (based on symmetric
and asymmetric cryptography, in particular PACE).
• SF_CryptographicFunctions:
The TOE supports secure messaging for protection of the confidentiality and the
integrity of the commands. The TOE supports asymmetric and symmetric
cryptographic and hashing algorithms to perform authentication procedures,
signature computation and verification, data encryption and decryption. The TOE
implements a DRG.4 and a PTG.2 random number generator.
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1, 7.4, 8.4, 9.4, 10.4 and
12 and [7], chapter 6.1, 7.4, 8.4, 9.4 and 10.4.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [7],
chapter 3.1, 7.2.1, 8.2.1, 9.2.1 and 10.2.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security
Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies.
This is outlined in the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 7.2.2, 7.2.3, 7.2.4,
8.2.2, 8.2.3, 8.2.4, 9.2.2, 9.2.3, 9.2.4, 10.2.2, 10.2.3 and 10.2.4.
This certification covers the configuration of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No. Type Identifier Release Type / Form of Delivery
1 HW/SW Infineon Security Controller
IFX_CCI_000005h including
its IC Dedicated Software
(Firmware)
(refer to the Certification
Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-
V3-2020 ([19]))
Infineon Security
Controller
IFX_CCI_000005h (with
Firmware version
80.100.17.3)
Dual-interface chip (contact-
based and contactless chip).
Delivery as chip to the module
production site NedCard
Shanghai / Wijchen according to
the delivery procedures
specified in BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-
V3-2020 ([19]).
2 SW IC Embedded Software:
STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-
SMC Operating System
STARCOS 3.7 COS
HBA-SMC
OS Identification:
Implemented in the flash of the
IC (refer to row no. 1).
The TOE itself covers the IC and
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021
No. Type Identifier Release Type / Form of Delivery
‘47 44 00 B7 04 01 01’
(refer to Table 3)
the IC Embedded Software and
is delivered as product together
with an already installed object
system. The TOE or product
respectively (i.e. the TOE plus
an already installed object
system) is delivered as initialised
module or smart card. The
delivery is performed by the TOE
developer Giesecke+Devrient
Mobile Security GmbH. Refer to
the description of the TOE's life
cycle model and related
production processes below this
Table.
3 DOC Guidance Documentation
STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-
SMC – Main Document [11]
Version 1.6 Document in electronic form
(encrypted and signed)
4 DOC Guidance Documentation
for the Usage Phase
STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-
SMC [12]
Version 1.8 Document in electronic form
(encrypted and signed)
5 DOC Guidance Documentation
for the Initialization Phase
STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-
SMC [13]
Version 2.3 Document in electronic form
(encrypted and signed)
6 DOC Guidance Documentation
for the Personalisation
Phase STARCOS 3.7 COS
HBA-SMC [14]
Version 2.2 Document in electronic form
(encrypted and signed)
7 DOC STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-
SMC Functional
Specification - Part 1:
Interface Specification [15]
Version 1.6 Document in electronic form
(encrypted and signed)
8 DOC STARCOS 3.7 Internal
Design Specification [16]
Version 1.0 Document in electronic form
(encrypted and signed)
9 SW Wrapper Version 1.8.6 File rar-archive:
egkwrapper-v1.8.6.rar consisting
of the jar files:
• wrapper.jar (main file)
• gdoffcard.jar (helper
library)
• gdoffcardstarcos.jar
(helper library)
(encrypted and signed)
The integrity and authenticity of
the Wrapper is given by the
following SHA-256 hash value:
D277B7E7E239E2EC11574657
94A48625272AF86373D22C1B
307FA2F1635590FF
10 DOC STARCOS 3.7 COS Version 1.3 Document in electronic form
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021 Certification Report
No. Type Identifier Release Type / Form of Delivery
Guidance Documentation
for the Wrapper [17]
(encrypted and signed)
11 DATA Cryptographic keys for the
TOE's personalisation
---
(customer-specific
personalisation keys)
Items in electronic form
(encrypted and signed)
Table 1: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC is as well known under the following product
identificator:
Manufacturer: '44 45 47 2B 44' (DEG+D)
Product: '53 33 37 4F 53 48 42 41' (S37OSHBA)
OS Version Number: '01 00 01 (1.0.1)
According to the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 1.2.2 the life cycle model of the TOE
consists of the following four phases:
Phase 1: Development Phase
Phase 2: Initialisation Phase (loading of the STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC Operating
System and installation of an object system)
Phase 3: Personalisation Phase (loading of personalisation data into the installed
object system)
Phase 4: Usage Phase
The STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC Operating System is completely loaded in the
framework of the Initialisation Phase (Phase 2) by Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security
GmbH. Furthermore, in the framework of this initialisation process in Phase 2 an object
system is loaded onto the TOE. Hereby, the TOE delivery in the sense of the CC takes
place at the end of Phase 2. The delivered product is the TOE supplemented with an
object system installed on the TOE. The product (including the TOE) is delivered by
Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH to the Personalisation Agent
(Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH or third party) for personalisation.
The TOE or product respectively (i.e. TOE plus an already installed object system) is
delivered as initialised module or smart card.
In order to verify that the user uses a certified TOE, the TOE can be identified using the
means described in the user guidances [13], chapter 4.6, [14], chapter 5.7 and [12],
chapter 4.1.1.
The TOE can be identified by using the command GET PROTOCOL DATA. Via the
command GET PROTOCOL DATA (CLA = ‘A0’, INS = ‘CA’ with specific P1 and P2 values,
see Table 2) the user can read out the chip information and identify the underlying chip as
well as the STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC Operating System and its configuration
embedded in the chip.
The following identification data can be retrieved within byte strings responded by the
command GET PROTOCOL DATA in different command variants:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021
Command Parameters Identifier Length Description
P1 = '9F’ P2 = ’6B’ 8 bytes Chip manufacturer data
P1 = ’9F’ P2 = ’6A’ 7 bytes Identification of the operating system (OS version)
Table 2: TOE Identification via the command GET PROTOCOL DATA
The command GET PROTOCOL DATA with its parameters is described in the user
guidances [13], chapter 4.6, [14], chapter 5.7 and [12], chapter 4.1.1.
The following table describes the concrete values identifying the TOE:
Data Type Tag in the ProtocolData DO Data
Chip manufacturer data '9F 6B' ‘05 16 00 13 00 02 00 00'
Identification of the operating system (OS
version)
'9F 6A' '47 44 00 B7 04 01 01'
Table 3: TOE Identification data retrieved by the command GET PROTOCOL DATA
3. Security Policy
The TOE is a composite smart card product, based on the hardware platform Infineon
Security Controller IFX_CCI_000005h from Infineon Technologies AG and with IC
Embedded Software STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC Operating System implemented by
Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH according to the G2-COS specification [21]
from gematik.
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The TOE is intended to be used as a card operating system platform for applications of the
card generation G2 in the framework of the German health care system. For this purpose,
the TOE serves as secure data storage and secure cryptographic service provider for card
applications running on the TOE and supports them for their specific security needs
related to storage and cryptographic functionalities. In particular, these storage and
cryptographic services are oriented on the different card types eHC (electronic Health
Card), HPC (Health Professional Card), SMC-B (Security Module Card Type B), gSMC-K
(gerätespezifische Security Module Card Type K for the so-called Konnektor) and gSMC-
KT (gerätespezifische Security Module Card Type KT for Terminals) as currently specified
for a card product of the generation G2 within the German health care system.
The TOE implements physical and logical security functionality in order to protect user
data and TSF data stored and operated on the smart card when used in a hostile
environment. Hence the TOE maintains integrity and confidentiality of code and data
stored in its memories and the different CPU modes with the related capabilities for
configuration and memory access and for integrity, the correct operation and the
confidentiality of security functionality provided by the TOE. Therefore the TOE's overall
policy is to protect against malfunction, leakage, physical manipulation and probing.
Besides, the TOE's life cycle is supported as well as the user Identification whereas the
abuse of functionality is prevented. Furthermore, specific cryptographic services including
random number generation and key management functionality are being provided to be
securely used by the smart card embedded software.
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Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in the
Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
Security Objectives for the
operational environment
defined in the Security Target
Description according to the ST
OE.Plat-COS Usage of COS
To ensure that the TOE is used in a secure manner the object
system shall be designed such that the requirements from the
following documents are met: (i) TOE guidance documents
(refer to the Common Criteria assurance class AGD) such as
the user guidance, including TOE related application notes,
usage requirements, recommendations and restrictions, and (ii)
certification report including TOE related usage requirements,
recommendations, restrictions and findings resulting from the
TOE’s evaluation and certification.
OE.Resp-ObjS Treatment of User Data and TSF Data by the Object System
All User Data and TSF Data of the object system are defined as
required by the security needs of the specific application
context.
OE.Process-Card Protection during Personalisation
Security procedures shall be used after delivery of the TOE
during Phase 6 ‘Personalisation’ up to the delivery of the smart
card to the end-user in order to maintain confidentiality and
integrity of the TOE and to prevent any theft, unauthorised
personalisation or unauthorised use.
OE.PACE_Terminal PACE support by contactless terminal
The external device communicating through a contactless
interface with the TOE using PACE shall support the terminal
part of the PACE protocol.
OE.SecureMessaging Secure messaging support of external devices
The external device communicating with the TOE through a
trusted channel supports device authentication with key
derivation, secure messaging for received commands and
sending responses.
OE.LogicalChannel Use of logical channels
The operational environment manages logical channels bound
to independent subjects for running independent processes at
the same time.
Table 4: Security Objectives for the operational environment
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Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 4.2, 7.3, 8.3, 9.3 and 10.3.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is set up as a composite product. It is composed of the Infineon Security
Controller IFX_CCI_000005h from Infineon Technologies AG and the IC Embedded
Software with the STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC Operating System developed by
Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH.
The TOE does not use the cryptographic software libraries of the Infineon hardware
platform, but provides its cryptographic services by the cryptographic library developed by
Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH.
For details concerning the CC evaluation of the underlying IC see the evaluation
documentation under the Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V3-2020 ([18], [19]).
According to the TOE design the Security Functions of the TOE as listed in chapter 1 are
implemented by the following subsystems:
• System Library: Contains the application framework
• Chip Card Commands: Pre-processor and processor of all implemented
commands
• Security Management: Manages the security environment, security states and
rule analysis
• Key Management: Search, pre-processing, use and post-processing of
keys
• Secure Messaging: SM handling
• Crypto Functions: Library with an API to all cryptographic operations
• Wrapper: Export of non-sensitive TSF and user data
These subsystems are supported by the subsystems Runtime System, File System, Non-
Volatile Memory Management and Transport Management.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 1 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target [6] and [7].
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with simulator
tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to
demonstrate its expected behaviour including error cases. Hereby a representative sample
including all boundary values of the parameter set, e.g. all command APDUs with valid and
invalid inputs were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs.
Repetition of developer tests was performed during the independent evaluator tests.
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Since many Security Functions can be tested by APDU command sequences, the
evaluators performed these tests with real cards. This is considered to be a reasonable
approach because the developer tests include a full coverage of all security functionality.
Furthermore penetration tests were chosen by the evaluators for those Security Functions
where internal secrets of the card could maybe be modified or observed during testing.
During their independent testing, the evaluators covered:
• testing APDU commands related to Key Management and Crypto Functions,
• testing APDU commands related to NVM Management and File System,
• testing APDU commands related to Security Management,
• testing APDU commands related to Secure Messaging,
• testing APDU commands related to Runtime System and System Library,
• penetration testing related to the verification of the reliability of the TOE,
• source code analysis performed by the evaluators,
• side channel analysis for SHA, RSA and ECC, including RSA and ECC key
generation,
• fault injection attacks (laser and EM attacks),
• testing APDU commands for the initialisation, personalisation and usage phase,
• testing APDU commands for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms,
• fuzzy testing on APDU processing.
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential during
their penetration testing.
The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE as outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [7]:
STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC
There is only one configuration of the TOE. Refer to the information provided in chapter 2
of this Certification Report.
The TOE is installed on a dual-interface chip (contact-based and contactless chip) of type
Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_000005h from Infineon Technologies AG. This IC is
certified under the Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V3-2020 (refer to [19]).
The TOE does not use the cryptographic software libraries of the Infineon hardware
platform, but provides its cryptographic services by the cryptographic library developed by
Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH.
The TOE covering the IC and the IC Embedded Software (STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC
Operating System) is delivered as a module or smart card together with an already
installed object system. For details refer to chapter 2 of this Certification Report.
The user can identify the certified TOE by the TOE response to specific APDU commands,
more detailed by using the command GET PROTOCOL DATA in different command
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variants according to the user guidances [13], chapter 4.6, [14], chapter 5.7 and [12],
chapter 4.1.1. See chapter 2 of this Certification Report for details.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices according to AIS
36 (see [4]). On base of this concept the relevant guidance documents of the
underlying IC platform (refer to the guidance documents covered by [19]) and the
document ETR for composite evaluation from the IC’s evaluation ([20]) have been
applied in the TOE evaluation. Related to AIS 36 the updated version of the JIL
document ‘Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices’,
version 1.5.1, May 2018 was taken into account.
(ii) Guidance for Smartcard Evaluation (AIS 37, see [4]).
(iii) Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices (AIS 26, see [4]).
(iv) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards (AIS 26, see [4]).
(v) Application of CC to Integrated Circuits (AIS 25, see [4]).
(vi) Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices
(AIS 25, see [4]).
(vii) Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ and EAL6 (AIS 34,
see [4]).
(viii) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical and deterministic
random number generators (AIS 20 and AIS 31, see [4]).
(ix) Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen (AIS 46, see [4]).
For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 34,
AIS 36, AIS 37 and AIS 46 (see [4]) were used. For RNG assessment the scheme
interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 were used (see [4]).
A document ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 has not been provided in
the course of this certification procedure. It could be provided by the ITSEF and submitted
to the certification body for approval subsequently.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report).
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● The components ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V3-2019, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the re-certified
underlying IC platform including its updated guidance documentation, on functional and
security-related changes in the TOE’s implementation as well as on the integration of the
optional functional packages Crypto Box and Logical Channel defined in the G2-COS
specification [21]. In particular, the TOE’s (crypto) implementation was re-evaluated and
re-assessed.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Card Operating System Generation 2 (PP COS G2), Version
2.1, 10 July 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0082-V4-2019 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The Security Target [6] and [7] uses the mandatory parts of the PP and the optional
packages RSA Key Generation, Contactless, Crypto Box and Logical Channel defined in
the PP. None of the PP’s further optional packages PACE for Proximity Coupling Device
and RSA CVC is used.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The table in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of
application where its specific appropriateness is stated.
The strength of these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
According to the specification [21] and the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03116-1 [25] the
algorithms are suitable for authentication and key agreement and for supporting integrity,
authenticity and confidentiality of the data stored in and processed by the TOE as a card
operating system platform that is intended to be used for cards of the card generation G2
in the framework of the German health care system. In particular, the card operating
system platform is intended for use by the different card types eHC (electronic Health
Card), HPC (Health Professional Card), SMC-B (Security Module Card Type B), gSMC-K
(gerätespezifische Security Module Card Type K for the so-called Konnektor) and gSMC-
KT (gerätespezifische Security Module Card Type KT for Terminals) as currently specified
by gematik. The validity period of each algorithm is mentioned in the official catalogue [25].
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10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in Table 1 contain necessary information about the usage of
the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the Application Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes
guidance documentation (see Table 1) which contains obligations and guidelines for the
developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which
measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or
system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively
implemented by the product layer on top.
In particular, the following aspects from the TOE user guidance documentation [11] to [17]
need to be taken into account when using the TOE and when designing and implementing
object systems (applications) intended to be set up on the TOE, especially in view of later
TR-conformity testing of card products according to the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03144
([23]):
• Security requirements and hints for designing and implementing object systems
(applications) intended to be set up and running on the TOE:
This concerns on the one hand the design and generation of product flash images
containing such object system by the Initialisation Data Manager. As well this
concerns on the other hand after TOE delivery the application developers and card
management e.g. by using the commands LOAD APPLICATION and CREATE.
For an object system, one has to take care of the choice of the access rules and
flag described in chapter 2.5 of [16] for the object system's objects. In particular, this
concerns key and PIN objects including their related files for the key and PIN data
and assigned security attributes.
For the choice of the access rules and flag described in chapter 2.5 of [16] for the
object system's objects one has to consider that the TOE's Wrapper is only able to
export security attributes and public key data of the object system and its objects if
their access rules and flags are set appropriately for read access.
For card products that undergo a later TR-conformity testing according to the
Technical Guideline BSI TR-03144 ([23]) it is strongly recommended to care for the
appropriate choice of the access rules and the flag described in chapter 2.5 of [16]
for all object system's objects. It shall be possible for the Konsistenz-Prüftool
according to the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03143 ([24]) that is used for conformity
testing to get a complete picture of the object system installed in the card product
for further comparison against the respective object system specification.
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The specific life cycle state concept of the TOE for objects managed and processed
by the TOE as the MF, folders, files, key and PIN objects has to be taken into
account. Especially, the concept of physical and logical life cycle states and their
specific processing by the TOE are of relevance for object systems intended to run
on the TOE (refer to [21]).
Any object system set up on the TOE shall only make use of the TOE's functionality
as described in the G2-COS specification [21] and the user guidance [15]. The
object system has to be checked for taking this requirement into account by using
the TOE's Wrapper and carrying out further manual checks in order to get
information about functionality that lies beyond the certified TOE scope, but is used
in the card product. The requirements outlined in the user guidances [12], chapter
5.1.1.1 and [13], chapter 3.2.1 and 3.2.3 shall be followed, i.e. looking for
exceptions thrown by the Wrapper and looking for information provided via the
Wrapper that indicates the use of proprietary (uncertified) COS functionality in the
card product. Card products with an object system that do not fulfil the requirement
run out of the scope of the certified TOE and shall not be delivered respective used.
An object system running on the TOE shall for its ECC related cryptographic
functionality only make use of the elliptic curves brainpoolP{256, 384, 512}r1 [26]
and ansix9p{256, 384}r1 [27]. Refer to the user guidances [12], chapter 6 and [14],
chapter 6. The related curve parameter files in the object system (application) have
to be set and filled according to the requirements in the user guidance [16], chapter
2.5.2.4. Card products with an object system that do not fulfil the requirement run
out of the scope of the certified TOE.
Refer to the user guidance documentation [12], chapter 5.1.1.1 and 6, [13], chapter
3.2.1 and 3.2.3, [14], chapter 6, [15] and [16], chapter 2.5 (in particular 2.5.2.4) and
following subchapters.
• Security requirements and hints for the Development Phase / Phase 1 (concerning
the design and implementation of object systems (applications) and the generation
of the related product flash images by the Initialisation Data Manager), for the
Initialisation Phase / Phase 2 (concerning the load and install processes for the
product flash images to be performed by the Initialiser), for the Personalisation
Phase / Phase 3 (concerning the personalisation of installed object systems
(applications) by the Personalisation Agent) and for the Usage Phase / Phase 4 of
the TOE's life cycle model:
Refer to the user guidance documentation [11], [12], [13], [14] and [15].
• The TOE's Wrapper and its specifics beyond the Wrapper specification [22], in
particular concerning the exceptions that are thrown by the Wrapper:
Refer to the user guidance [17].
• The command PSO HASH shall not be used for processing of confidential data.
Refer to the user guidance [12], chapter 5.2.2.
• In particular, the following aspects need to be taken into account when using the
TOE:
[12], chapter 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 including subchapters, [13], chapter 3.2 including
subchapters and 4.7.1 and [14], chapter 5.8.1 and 5.8.2.
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• For the design and generation of product flash images containing an object system
for card products that undergo a later TR-conformity testing according to the
Technical Guideline BSI TR-03144 ([23]) it is strongly recommended to care for that
via the TOE's specific personalisation commands initialised security attributes and
public key data of the object system and its objects cannot be overwritten (except
for where explicitly intended by the object system's intention and design).
For a TR-conformity testing of a card product set up on the TOE according to the Technical
Guideline BSI TR-03144 ([23]) the following specific aspects and issues have to be taken
into account:
• The card product shall be checked that the export of the security attributes and
public key data of the object system and each of its objects via the TOE's Wrapper
is possible without any restriction and therefore fulfils the requirements for data
export in the Wrapper specification [22]. This means that it has to be ensured that
there is no restriction for read access to all the related files in the object system
because of an inappropriate choice of the access rules and the flag described in
chapter 2.5 of [16]. It shall be possible for the Konsistenz-Prüftool according to the
Technical Guideline BSI TR-03143 ([24]) that is used for conformity testing to get a
complete picture of the object system installed in the card product for further
comparison against the respective object system specification. Refer to the user
guidances [12], chapter 5.1.1.1, [13], chapter 3.2.1 and 3.2.3 and [16], chapter 2.5
and following subchapters.
Note: If such export property cannot be checked in the card product or if read
access for the export of the security attributes and public key data of the object
system and each of its objects via the TOE's Wrapper is not given the card product
will be rejected for a TR-certificate according to the Technical Guideline BSI TR-
03144 ([23]).
• Any object system set up on the TOE shall only make use of the TOE's functionality
as described in the G2-COS specification [21] and the user guidance [15].
The card product's object system has to be manually checked for taking this
requirement into account by using the TOE's Wrapper and following the
requirements outlined in the user guidances [12], chapter 5.1.1.1 and [13], chapter
3.2.1. Refer to the user guidance [13], chapter 3.2.3.
Note: If there is any object found for which the TOE's Wrapper throws an exception
or where the Wrapper or Konsistenz-Prüftool according to the Technical Guideline
BSI TR-03143 ([24]) indicates the use of proprietary (uncertified) COS functionality
the card product will be rejected for a TR-certificate according to the Technical
Guideline BSI TR-03144 ([23]).
• The card product's object system (application) running on the TOE shall for its ECC
related cryptographic functionality only make use of the elliptic curves
brainpoolP{256, 384, 512}r1 [26] and ansix9p{256, 384}r1 [27]. Refer to the user
guidance [12], chapter 6 and [14], chapter 6. All related curve parameter files
contained in the object system have therefore to be manually checked that only the
elliptic curves as mentioned above are used and that the curve parameters are
correctly set according to the requirements in the user guidance [16], chapter
2.5.2.4. Refer to the user guidance [13], chapter 3.2.3.
Note: If a curve parameter file cannot be read out, if elliptic curves beyond those
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mentioned above are used in the card product's object system or if a curve is
incorrectly coded in the related curve parameter files the card product will be
rejected for a TR-certificate according to the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03144
([23]).
• For the card product, it has to be checked that via the TOE's specific
personalisation commands initialised security attributes and public key data of the
object system and its objects cannot be overwritten (except for where explicitly
intended by the object system's intention and design). Refer to the user guidance
[13], chapter 3.2.3.
Note: If overwriting of initialised security attributes and public key data of the object
system and its objects via the TOE's specific personalisation commands is possible
and not technically suppressed (except for data where overwriting is explicitly
intended by the object system's intention and design) the card product will be
rejected for a TR-certificate according to the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03144
([23]).
• If in the framework of the TR-conformity testing of a card product according to the
Technical Guideline BSI TR-03144 ([23]) the Konsistenz-Prüftool according to the
Technical Guideline BSI TR-03143 ([24]) depicts in its test report within an access
rule of an object a wild card or an APDU header lying outside the G2-COS
specification [21] or the user guidance [15] this has to be manually examined and
valuated. Refer to the user guidance [13], chapter 3.2.3.
• For card products that undergo a TR-conformity testing according to the Technical
Guideline BSI TR-03144 ([23]), the OS version number retrieved via the command
GET PROTOCOL DATA shall be checked for correctness related to the
identification data described in chapter 2 of this certification report.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target Lite [7] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE)
is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version
of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
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CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CPU Central Processing Unit
DEMA Differential Electromagnetic Analysis
DFA Differential Fault Analysis / Attack
DO Data Object
DPA Differential Power Analysis
DRNG Deterministic Random Number Generator
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
eHC electronic Health Card
eIDAS electronic IDentification, Authentication and trust Services
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
gSMC-K gerätespezifische Security Module Card Type K (Konnektor)
gSMC-KT gerätespezifische Security Module Card Type KT (Kartenterminal)
HPC Health Professional Card
HW Hardware
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
NVM Non-Volatile Memory
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
PRNG Physical Random Number Generator
QES Qualified Electronic Signature
RFU Reserved for Future Use
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman Algorithm
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SEMA Simple Electromagnetic Analysis
SFP Security Function Policy
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SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SM Secure Messaging
SMC-B Security Module Card Type B
SPA Simple Power Analysis
ST Security Target
SW Software
TOE Target of Evaluation
TR Technische Richtlinie (Technical Guideline)
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - Named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements.
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen),
https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
,
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website,
https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021, Security Target STARCOS 3.7 COS
HBA-SMC, Version 2.0, 22 April 2021, Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
(confidential document)
7
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report)
für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 19, Version 9, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation
Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria) und ITSEC
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 23, Version 4, Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
(but with usage of updated JIL document ‘Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar
devices’, version 1.5.1, May 2018)
• AIS 38, Version 2.9, Reuse of evaluation results
28 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021 Certification Report
[7] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021, Security Target Lite STARCOS 3.7
COS HBA-SMC, Version 1.0, 18 May 2021, Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security
GmbH (sanitised public document)
[8] Common Criteria Protection Profile Card Operating System Generation 2 (PP COS
G2), Version 2.1, 10 July 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0082-V4-2019, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[9] ETR BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021, Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) – Summary
for STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC, Version 2.9, 2 June 2021, SRC Security
Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[10] Configuration List BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021, Configuration List STARCOS 3.7
COS HBA-SMC, Version 1.1, 19 May 2021, Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security
GmbH (confidential document)
[11] Guidance Documentation STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC – Main Document,
Version 1.6, 23 March 2021, Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
[12] Guidance Documentation for the Usage Phase STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC,
Version 1.8, 22 March 2021, Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
[13] Guidance Documentation for the Initialization Phase STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-
SMC, Version 2.3, 29 April 2021, Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
[14] Guidance Documentation for the Personalisation Phase STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-
SMC, Version 2.2, 6 April 2021, Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
[15] STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC Functional Specification - Part 1: Interface
Specification, Version 1.6, 3 March 2021, Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
[16] STARCOS 3.7 Internal Design Specification, Version 1.0, 4 April 2018,
Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
[17] STARCOS 3.7 COS Guidance Documentation for the Wrapper, Version 1.3, 10
February 2021, Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
[18] Security Target of the underlying hardware platform, Security Target
IFX_CCI_000003h, IFX_CCI_000005h, IFX_CCI_000008h, IFX_CCI_00000Ch,
IFX_CCI_000013h, IFX_CCI_000014h, IFX_CCI_000015h, IFX_CCI_00001Ch,
IFX_CCI_00001Dh, IFX_CCI_000021h, IFX_CCI_000022h design step H13,
Version 3.3, 22 April 2020, Infineon Technologies AG, BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V3-2020
(confidential document)
Security Target Lite of the underlying hardware platform, Security Target
IFX_CCI_000003h, IFX_CCI_000005h, IFX_CCI_000008h, IFX_CCI_00000Ch,
IFX_CCI_000013h, IFX_CCI_000014h, IFX_CCI_000015h, IFX_CCI_00001Ch,
IFX_CCI_00001Dh, IFX_CCI_000021h, IFX_CCI_000022h design step H13,
Version 1.8, 22 April 2020, Infineon Technologies AG, BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V3-2020
(sanitised public document)
[19] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V3-2020 for Infineon Security Controller
IFX_CCI_000003h, IFX_CCI_000005h, IFX_CCI_000008h, IFX_CCI_00000Ch,
IFX_CCI_000013h, IFX_CCI_000014h, IFX_CCI_000015h, IFX_CCI_00001Ch,
IFX_CCI_00001Dh, IFX_CCI_000021h, IFX_CCI_000022h in the design step H13
and including optional software libraries and dedicated firmware in several versions
from Infineon Technologies AG, 13 May 2020, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
29 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021
[20] ETR for Composite Evaluation of the underlying hardware platform Infineon Security
Controller IFX_CCI_000003h, IFX_CCI_000005h, IFX_CCI_000008h,
IFX_CCI_00000Ch, IFX_CCI_000013h, IFX_CCI_000014h, IFX_CCI_000015h,
IFX_CCI_00001Ch, IFX_CCI_00001Dh, IFX_CCI_000021h, IFX_CCI_000022h
design step H13 from certification procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V3-2020, Version 1,
23 April 2020, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[21] Einführung der Gesundheitskarte, Spezifikation des Card Operating System (COS),
Elektrische Schnittstelle, Version 3.13.1, 01.11.2019, gematik Gesellschaft für
Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte mbH
[22] Einführung der Gesundheitskarte, Spezifikation Wrapper, Version 1.8.0, 24.08.2016,
gematik Gesellschaft für Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte mbH
[23] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03144 eHealth – Konformitätsnachweis für Karten-
Produkte der Kartengeneration G2, Version 1.2, 27.07.2017, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[24] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03143 eHealth – G2-COS Konsistenz-Prüftool,
Version 1.1, 18.05.2017, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[25] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116-1: Kryptographische Vorgaben für Projekte der
Bundesregierung, Teil 1 – Telematikinfrastruktur, Version 3.20, 21.09.2018,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[26] Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve
Generation, RFC 5639, March 2010, IETF
[27] American National Standard X9.62, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA),
November 2005, ANSI
[28] Certification Report for Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH Development
Center Germany (DCG), BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0132-2019, 4 October 2019, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[29] Certification Report CCN-CC/2020-47/INF-3465 for Giesecke+Devrient
Development Center Spain (DCS), related to CCN-CC-8/2021, 17 May 2021
(Certificate Date), National Cryptologic Centre (CCN)
[30] Certification Report for NedCard (Shanghai) Microelectronics Co. Ltd. of NedCard
BV, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0144-2020, 08 May 2020, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
[31] Certification Report for NedCard Wijchen of NedCard BV, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0128-
2019, 16 December 2019, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI)
[32] Certification Report CCN-CC/2019-49/INF-3362 for Giesecke & Devrient Iberica
S.A., related to CCN-CC-41/2020, 17 May 2020 (Certificate Date), National
Cryptologic Centre (CCN)
[33] Certification Report CCN-CC/2020-35/INF-3504 for Giesecke & Devrient (China)
Technologies Co. Ltd. Huangshi Branch, related to CCN-CC-13/2021, 21 May 2021
(Certificate Date), National Cryptologic Centre (CCN)
30 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5.
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1.
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8.
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12.
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17.
• The table in CC part 3, Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/.
31 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target Lite [7] provided within a separate document
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development and production environment
Annex C: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
32 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product STARCOS 3.7 COS HBA-SMC (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of
the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 18 June 2021, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH Development Center Germany
(DCG) for Development and Testing. Refer to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-
CC-S-0132-2019 ([28]).
b) Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security Iberica S.A.U. Development Center Spain
(DCS) for Development. Refer to the Certification Report CCN-CC-8/2021
([29]).
c) NedCard (Shanghai) Microelectronics Co. Ltd. of NedCard BV for Module
Production. Refer to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0144-2020 ([30]).
d) NedCard B.V. Wijchen for Module Production. Refer to the Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0128-2019 ([31]).
e) Giesecke & Devrient Iberica S.A. for Production (in particular inlay embedding)
and Initialisation. Refer to the Certification Report CCN-CC-41/2020 ([32]).
f) Giesecke+Devrient (China) Technologies Co. Ltd. Huangshi Branch for
Production (in particular inlay embedding) and Initialisation. Refer to the
Certification Report CCN-CC-13/2021 ([33]).
g) For development and production sites regarding the underlying IC platform
please refer to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V3-2020 ([19]).
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6] and [7]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security
objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the
Security Target [6] and [7]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
33 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021
Annex C of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementati
on
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Comments
1 Authenticity RSA signature
generation
(RSASSA-PSS-
SIGN with SHA-
256,
RSASSA-PKCS1-
V1_5-SIGN,
RSA ISO9796-2
DS2 SIGN with
SHA-256)
[PKCS#1],
chap. 8.1.1,
8.2.1, 9.1.1,
9.2, [ISO
9796-2] (RSA)
[FIPS 180-4]
(SHA)
Modulus length
= 2048, 3072
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.6.3.1
[TR-03116-1]
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.S
(PSO COMPUTE DIGITAL
SIGNATURE)
FCS_COP.1/SHA
2 ECDSA signature
generation using
SHA-{256, 384,
512}
[TR-03111]
(ECDSA)
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve
brainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1
[RFC 5639] and
ansix9p{256,
384}r1 [ANSI
X9.62]
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.6.3.2
[TR-03116-1]
FCS_COP.1/
COS.ECDSA.S
(PSO COMPUTE DIGITAL
SIGNATURE)
Note: The hash value is
given within the command
data of PSO COMPUTE
DIGITAL SIGNATURE.
3 ECDSA signature
verification using
SHA-{256, 384,
512}
[TR-03111]
(ECDSA)
[FIPS 180-4]
(SHA)
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve
brainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1
[RFC 5639] and
ansix9p{256,
384}r1 [ANSI
X9.62]
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.6.4.2
[TR-03116-1]
FCS_COP.1/
COS.ECDSA.V
(PSO VERIFY
CERTIFICATE
PSO VERIFY DIGITAL
SIGNATURE)
FCS_COP.1/SHA
Note: There is no hash
computation by the TOE in
case of PSO VERIFY
DIGITAL SIGNATURE as
the hash value is given
within the command data.
4 SHA-256 based
fingerprint
[FIPS 180-4]
(SHA)
- [G2 COS],
chap. 6.1.2,
14.9.2
FPT_ITE.1
(FINGERPRINT)
5 Authentication AES in CBC mode [FIPS 197]
(AES)
[SP800-38A]
(CBC)
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.7.1.2,
6.7.2.2
|k| = 128, 192,
256
|challenge| = 64
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.7.1.2,
6.7.2.2
[TR-03116-1]
FCS_COP.1/COS.AES
(MUTUAL
AUTHENTICATE
GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE)
6 AES in CBC mode [FIPS 197]
(AES)
|k| = 128, 192,
256
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.7.1.2,
package Crypto Box:
FCS_COP.1/CB.AES
34 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021 Certification Report
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementati
on
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Comments
[SP800-38A]
(CBC)
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.7.1.2,
6.7.2.2
|challenge| = 64 6.7.2.2
[TR-03116-1]
(EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE
INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE)
7 AES in CMAC
mode
[FIPS 197]
(AES)
[SP800-38B],
[TR-03116-1],
chap. 3.6.2
(CMAC)
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.6.1,
6.6.2
|k| = 128, 192,
256
|challenge| = 64
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.6.1,
6.6.2
[TR-03116-1],
chap. 3.6.2
FCS_COP.1/COS.CMAC
(MUTUAL
AUTHENTICATE
GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE)
8 AES in CMAC
mode
[FIPS 197]
(AES)
[SP800-38B],
[TR-03116-1],
chap. 3.6.2
(CMAC)
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.6.1,
6.6.2
|k| = 128, 192,
256
|challenge| = 64
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.6.1,
6.6.2
[TR-03116-1],
chap. 3.6.2
package Crypto Box:
FCS_COP.1/CB.CMAC
(EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE
INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE)
9 RSA signature
generation
(RSASSA-PSS-
SIGN with SHA-
256,
RSASSA-PKCS1-
V1_5-SIGN)
[PKCS#1],
chap. 8.1.1,
8.2.1, 9.1.1,
9.2 (RSA)
[FIPS 180-4]
(SHA)
Modulus length
= 2048, 3072
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.6.3.1
[TR-03116-1]
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.S
(INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE)
FCS_COP.1/SHA
10 ECDSA signature
generation using
SHA-{256, 384,
512}
[TR-03111]
(ECDSA)
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve
brainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1
[RFC 5639] and
ansix9p{256,
384}r1 [ANSI
X9.62]
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.6.3.2
[TR-03116-1]
FCS_COP.1/
COS.ECDSA.S
(INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE)
Note: The hash value is
given within the command
data of INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE.
11 ECDSA signature
verification using
SHA-{256, 384,
512}
[TR-03111]
(ECDSA)
[FIPS 180-4]
(SHA)
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve
brainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1
[RFC 5639] and
ansix9p{256,
384}r1 [ANSI
X9.62]
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.6.4.2
[TR-03116-1]
FCS_COP.1/
COS.ECDSA.V
(EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE
GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE)
FCS_COP.1/SHA
Note: There is no hash
computation by the TOE in
case of EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE as the
hash value is given within
the command data.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementati
on
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Comments
12 PACEv2 [TR-03110],
Part 1
(PACEv2)
Length of nonce:
128
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve
brainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1
[RFC 5639]
[G2 COS]
[TR-03110],
Part 3
[TR-03116-1]
package Contactless:
FIA_UAU.5/PACE.PICC
FIA_UAU.6/PACE.PICC
FIA_USB.1/PACE.PICC
(GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE)
13 Key
Agreement
Key Derivation
Function for AES
based on SHA-{1,
256}
[TR-03111],
chap. 4.3.3,
4.4.3
[FIPS 180-4]
(SHA)
[FIPS 197]
(AES)
|k| = 128, 192,
256
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.2.2,
6.2.3, 6.2.4,
6.2.5
[TR-03116-1]
[TR-03110],
Part 3
FCS_CKM.1/AES.SM
(within authentication:
MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE
GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE
package Crypto Box:
EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE
INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE
package Contactless:
GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE (PACE))
FCS_COP.1/SHA
14 ECDH [TR-03111],
chap. 4.3.1
(ECDH)
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve
brainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1
[RFC 5639]
[G2 COS],
chap.
14.7.2.1,
14.7.2.7
[TR-03111]
package Contactless:
FCS_CKM.1/
DH.PACE.PICC
(GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE)
id-PACE-ECDH-GM-AES-
CBC-CMAC-128
id-PACE-ECDH-GM-AES-
CBC-CMAC-192
id-PACE-ECDH-GM-AES-
CBC-CMAC-256
15 Confidentiality AES encryption
and decryption in
CBC mode
[FIPS 197]
(AES)
[SP800-38A]
(CBC)
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.7.1.2,
6.7.2.2
|k| = 128, 192,
256
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.7.1.2,
6.7.2.2
[TR-03116-1],
chap. 3.3.1
FCS_COP.1/COS.AES
(secure messaging)
16 AES encryption
and decryption in
CBC mode
[FIPS 197]
(AES)
[SP800-38A]
(CBC)
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.7.1.2,
6.7.2.2
|k| = 128, 192,
256
[TR-03110],
Part 2
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.7.1.2,
6.7.2.2
[TR-03116-1],
chap. 3.3.1
package Contactless:
FCS_COP.1/
PACE.PICC.ENC
(secure messaging for
PACE)
36 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021 Certification Report
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementati
on
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Comments
17 AES encryption
and decryption in
CBC mode
[FIPS 197]
(AES)
[SP800-38A]
(CBC)
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.7.1.2,
6.7.2.2
|k| = 128, 192,
256
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.7.1.2,
6.7.2.2
[TR-03116-1],
chap. 3.3.1
package Crypto Box:
FCS_COP.1/CB.AES
(PSO ENCIPHER
PSO DECIPHER)
(for trusted channel)
18 RSA encryption
and decryption
(RSA-OAEP)
Transcipher RSA
to ELC and ELC to
RSA
[PKCS#1],
chap. 7.1.1,
7.1.2
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.8.1.2,
6.8.2.2
Modulus length
= 2048, 3072 for
RSA private key
operation and
2048 for RSA
public key
operation
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.8.1.2,
6.8.2.2
[TR-03116-1]
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA
(PSO ENCIPHER
PSO DECIPHER
PSO TRANSCIPHER)
For the ELC part of PSO
TRANSCIPHER see
FCS_COP.1/COS.ELC in
row 19.
19 ELC encryption
and decryption
Transcipher RSA
to ELC and ELC to
RSA
[TR-03111]
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.8.1.3,
6.8.2.3
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve
brainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1
[RFC 5639] and
ansix9p{256,
384}r1 [ANSI
X9.62]
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.8.1.3,
6.8.2.3
[TR-03116-1]
FCS_COP.1/COS.ELC
(PSO ENCIPHER
PSO DECIPHER
PSO TRANSCIPHER
GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE)
For the RSA part of PSO
TRANSCIPHER see
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA in
row 18.
20 RSA encryption
(RSA-OAEP)
[PKCS#1],
chap. 7.1.1
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.8.1.2
Modulus length
= 2048
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.8.1.2
[TR-03116-1]
package Crypto Box:
FCS_COP.1/CB.RSA
(PSO ENCIPHER)
21 ELC encryption [TR-03111],
chap. 4.3.1,
4.3.3, 5.3.1.2
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.8.1.3
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve
brainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1
[RFC 5639] and
ansix9p{256,
384}r1 [ANSI
X9.62]
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.8.1.3
[TR-03116-1]
package Crypto Box:
FCS_COP.1/CB.ELC
(PSO ENCIPHER)
22 Integrity AES in CMAC
mode
[FIPS 197]
(AES)
[SP800-38B],
[TR-03116-1],
chap. 3.6.2
(CMAC)
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.6.1,
6.6.2
|k| = 128, 192,
256
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.6.1,
6.6.2
[TR-03116-1],
chap. 3.6.2
FCS_COP.1/COS.CMAC
(secure messaging)
37 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementati
on
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Comments
23 AES in CMAC
mode
[FIPS 197]
(AES)
[SP800-38B],
[TR-03116-1],
chap. 3.6.2
(CMAC)
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.6.1,
6.6.2
|k| = 128, 192,
256
[TR-03110],
Part 2
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.6.1,
6.6.2
[TR-03116-1],
chap. 3.6.2
package Contactless:
FCS_COP.1/
PACE.PICC.MAC
(secure messaging for
PACE)
24 AES in CMAC
mode
[FIPS 197]
(AES)
[SP800-38B],
[TR-03116-1],
chap. 3.6.2
(CMAC)
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.6.1,
6.6.2
|k| = 128, 192,
256
[G2 COS],
chap. 6.6.1,
6.6.2
[TR-03116-1],
chap. 3.6.2
package Crypto Box:
FCS_COP.1/CB.CMAC
(PSO COMPUTE
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
CHECKSUM
PSO VERIFY
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
CHECKSUM)
(for trusted channel)
25 Trusted
channel
Secure messaging
in MAC-ENC mode
[G2 COS],
chap. 13
[TR-03110]
n.a. [G2 COS],
chap. 13
[TR-03110]
Based on symmetric,
asymmetric or PACE
authentication
mechanisms, see rows for
authentication, key
derivation, AES based
encryption / decryption /
MAC generation / MAC
verification
FTP_ITC.1/TC
package contactless:
FTP_ITC.1/PACE.PICC
26 Cryptographic
Primitive
Hybrid
deterministic RNG
DRG.4
[ISO 18031],
Appendix
C.3.2 with
developer
specific
enhancements
[AIS 20]
n.a. [TR-03116-1] FCS_RNG.1
(GET CHALLENGE)
27 Hybrid
deterministic RNG
DRG.4
[ISO 18031],
Appendix
C.3.2 with
developer
specific
enhancements
[AIS 20]
n.a. [TR-03116-1] FCS_RNG.1/PACE
(GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE)
28 Physical RNG
PTG.2
[AIS 31] n.a. [TR-03116-1] FCS_RNG.1/SICP
FCS_RNG.1/GR
(GET RANDOM)
29 SHA-{1, 256, 384,
512}
[FIPS 180-4] - [G2 COS],
chap. 6.1
[TR-03116-1]
FCS_COP.1/SHA
38 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021 Certification Report
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementati
on
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Comments
30 SHA-{1, 224, 256,
384, 512}
[FIPS 180-4] - [G2 COS],
chap. 6.1
[TR-03116-1]
FCS_COP.1/CB_HASH
(PSO HASH)
31 Key
Generation
RSA key
generation
[TR-02102-1]
with G+D
specific
modification
Modulus length
= 2048, 3072
[G2 COS] package RSA Key
Generation:
FCS_CKM.1/RSA
(PSO GENERATE
ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR)
32 ECC key
generation
[TR-03111]
with G+D
specific
modification
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve
brainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1
[RFC 5639] and
ansix9p{256,
384}r1 [ANSI
X9.62]
[G2 COS] FCS_CKM.1/ELC
(PSO GENERATE
ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR)
Table 5: TOE cryptographic functionality
Bibliography for Table 5
[PKCS#1] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 2.2, October 2012,
RSA Laboratories
[ISO 9796-2] ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010 Information technology – Security techniques –
Digital signature schemes giving message recovery – Part 2: Integer
factorization based mechanisms, December 2010, ISO
[FIPS 180-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4 (FIPS
PUB 180-4), Secure Hash Standard (SHS), August 2015, U.S.
Department of Commerce/National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST)
[TR-03111] Technical Guideline BSI TR-03111: Elliptic Curve Cryptography,
Version 2.10, 01.06.2018, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
[FIPS 197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197 (FIPS PUB
197), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), November 2001, U.S.
Department of Commerce/National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST)
[SP800-38A] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and
techniques, NIST Special Publication 800-38A, 2001, National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[SP800-38B] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC
mode for Authentication, NIST Special Publication 800-38B, 2005,
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
39 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0976-V4-2021
[TR-03110] Technical Guideline BSI TR-03110:
Technical Guideline BSI TR-03110-1: Advanced Security Mechanisms
for Machine Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token – Part 1:
eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1, Version 2.20,
26 February 2015, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
Technical Guideline BSI TR-03110-2: Advanced Security Mechanisms
for Machine Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token – Part 2:
Protocols for electronic IDentification, Authentication and trust
Services (eIDAS), Version 2.21, 21 December 2016, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
Technical Guideline BSI TR-03110-3: Advanced Security Mechanisms
for Machine Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token – Part 3:
Common Specifications, Version 2.21, 21 December 2016,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[ISO 18031] ISO/IEC 18031:2005, Information technology – Security techniques –
Random bit generation, 2005, ISO
[TR-02102-1] BSI – Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102-1: Kryptographische
Verfahren: Empfehlungen und Schlüssellängen, Version 2021-01,
24.03.2021, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[RFC 5639] Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), Brainpool Standard Curves and
Curve Generation, RFC 5639, March 2010, IETF
[ANSI X9.62] American National Standard X9.62, Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA), November 2005, ANSI
[G2 COS] Einführung der Gesundheitskarte, Spezifikation des Card Operating
System (COS), Elektrische Schnittstelle, Version 3.13.1, 01.11.2019,
gematik Gesellschaft für Telematikanwendungen der
Gesundheitskarte mbH
[TR-03116-1] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116-1: Kryptographische Vorgaben für
Projekte der Bundesregierung, Teil 1 – Telematikinfrastruktur,
Version 3.20, 21.09.2018, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
[AIS 20] see chapter 14, [4] of this report
[AIS 31] see chapter 14, [4] of this report
Note: End of report
40 / 40